picking up from where we left off at the recent seminar..
if our assumption is that the idea of the Self is playing an interesting role in this work, let's see what Parmenides does after Socrates unearths it
each one of the ideas appears to possess a self
2 classes of ideas: those that are participatory, and those that are not
is Parmenides making a distinction between what Zeno is doing and what Socrates is doing with those ideas?
perhaps the ideas (Socrates later learns) are not separable
whatever way you read it, you have to go back and ask what a Greek would do with that
on what phrase does this ambiguity arise?
is the translation confusing? or is Parmenides confused?
the things we possess: 'qualities' instead of 'particulars'? or merely concepts?
130c Parmenides to Socrates: the problems with Socrates models and what things you are going to put in the class of ideas.
(from DC): ..and how we become what we are by virtue of those ideas -- and how do those ideas exist so that we could become such?
how do we become what we are? (some how in some way that ideas function) what is man?
what effect does Parmenides' question have on Socrates?
P: you will not dishonor any of these particulars
DC: if ideas function the way they do, then everything that touches humanity has to have an idea. but then that gets in the problem of hair, dirt, and mud.
PG (in response): no room for (the Buddhist concept of) maya. there is a natural place for appearance. if you look at particulars without looking at them in a despised form, then you're crediting the nature of everyday appearances with a certain kind of integrity -- which is missing in the idea of maya. 'maya' is dismissive: it's all illusion. it doesn't have any redeeming merits. Parm is saying, you're young. if you get through this successfully, you'll be able to dump this idea and not fear it. and you'll see that there is an integrity to particulars.
now he has the discussion of ideas. now he can introduce the problem of participation.
there are all kinds of puzzles with the idea and classes of ideas. now he is going to do the same thing with participation.
how much does something have to participate?
if participates, should it do it wholly? how does it occur? and in what way?
maybe 'participate' is not a good translation for metexo (μετεχο) and metalambano (μεταλαμβανο)
what better word could we find? 'share'? 'have with'? (barbara investigating lexicon entries)
would you say there is a source for what is here?
(if so), are you willing to deal with the possibility that there might be Beauty itself? and Justice itself? or Good itself?
if you're willing to hold that for a few moments, then would you agree that somehow we encounter a /likeness/ and that it is /very/ dim?
so if you needed a word to splain this...
the issue is that it is /so dim/. a trickle-down. a tiny piece of justice. how do you describe that? what word would you use?
it is so unusual to experience Justice. what we experience is such a dim reflection of it, that what would you call it? 'participation' doesn't capture this.