Another Friday night with Pierre and members of the NS. Pierre starts out asking several of us -- regarding last week's 3 meetings (Fri,Sat,Sun) on the Logos in Proclus' Elements of Theology: What's it like exploring and trying to come to an understanding of the Logos?
What's it like exploring and trying to come to an understanding of the Logos?
7:27 with Barbara, on Proposition 123
What is the relationship between a particular activity and its parent (where it comes from)?
How does Super-Ousian relate to the Logos?
7:37 with Barbara, on Theology of Plato, Book 3, Chapter 1.
7:42 How did he get the idea of unities from what he said just before? And what does he mean by unities?
“constitute”. better: “give substance to”.
7:55 We need the Logos, otherwise we cannot participate in the Ideas nor in anything above them
8:00 2nd para
Hyparxis/flowering/perfection of beings under each monad
8:14 What is color? What is Beauty?
What is Intellect?
How does Beauty relate to the Logos?
What something is versus how it functions.
8:33 everybody wants to.. but not to ..
8:36 Michio Kaku and a Beautiful Universe
8:38 Any relationship between Beauty and Truth?
8:43 Beauty and Truth in basketball
8:45 Justice: important in the experience of Beauty (e.g. in basketball) as well?
Good rules and justice: any relationship?
8:47 Doesn't anyone explore the things necessary for them to enjoy what they are doing?
8:51 Whatever you are reading of Proclus, keep in mind: What does Proclus consider to be an answer? Esp with the issue of What is the Logos?
with Regina, back to Super-Ousian and its application to the Logos
8:57 turning the Logos upon itself
Text from Theology of Plato
“It appears therefore to me, that Parmenides demonstrating these things through the second hypothesis, connects The One with being, surveys all things about The One, and evinces that this proceeding nature, and which extends its progressions as far as to the last of things is The One. For prior to true beings it was necessary to constitute the unities; since it neither was nor is lawful, says Timæus, for that which is the best of things to effect anything else than that which is most beautiful. But this is in a remarkable degree most similar to that which is best. To The One however, a unical multitude is most similar; since the demiurgus of the universe also being good, constituted all things similar to himself through goodness itself.”
Much more therefore, does the fountain of all good produce goodness naturally united to itself, and establish them in beings. Hence there is one God, and many Gods, one unity and many unities prior to beings, and one goodness, and many after the one goodness, through which the demiurgic intellect is good, and every intellect is divine, whether it be an intellectual or intelligible intellect. And that which is primarily superessential is The One; and there are many superessentials after The One. Whether therefore, is this multitude of unities imparticipable in the same manner as The One Itself, or is it participated by beings, and is each unity of beings the flower as it were of a certain being, and the summit and centre of it, about which each being† subsists? But if these unities also are imparticipable, in what do they differ from The One? For each of them is one, and primarily subsists from The One.”
For if each of them is one and many, we shall appear to transfer to them the peculiarity of being. But if each is one only, in the same manner as The One Itself, why does this rank as the cause which is exempt from all things, but each of these is allotted a secondary dignity? Neither therefore shall we preserve the transcendency of the first with reference to the things posterior to it, nor can we admit that the unities proceeding from it are unconfused either with respect to themselves, or to the one principle of them.”