tv [untitled] CSPAN June 9, 2009 12:00am-12:30am EDT
scariest -- this curious phrase to me is i can't remember where i read about, you know, that is -- that is exactly what our business has done wrong over the last ten years. we haven't will of our product, protected the franchise, elevated it the way it deserves to be elevated above all this other ways. that isn't to say that there are not -- there is enormous contribution to be made to the information flow but i still think newspapers and what we produce is a product people want and we just have to figure out how -- as our executive editor often says it's not the news business that's in trouble, it's the advertising business that's in trouble. it's the reason we are struggling is because advertising is -- newspaper advertising is no longer
effective. internet advertising isn't substantial enough to sustain a news room the size of the "washington post" newsroom or the st. louis dispatch or the "boston globe," so the answer is finding enough money to make that -- to make the operation sustainable. and we will do that and figure out and maybe rupert murdoch with figuring out or arthur sulzberger or maybe don graham, but somebody will figure it out and we will survive. so you can all read easily. [laughter] ..
as a magazine publisher who has edited publications and written for them i am interested in staying in business but the physicality of the product and have to say i don't know it is going to remain the same. i don't know we'll be using paper or by paper. as a publisher i have to buy paper for every magazine and published and i don't have to do that if it is an online version 4i charge money and people are willing to pay for it. i do think we are in a revolution that is a much larger thing then just the news industry newspaper magazine industry. i was out at stanford last week talking to the head librarian and their digitalizing everything under the sun. everything. at all the old books from centuries ago and of the kneuer
was there are putting right into electronic format now so as i see this happening in this kind of context i ask myself and my really going to see a newspaper thrown in my yard on my front step. hopefully. will see that in 5210 years? i now know how long it will take but icing we will see a conversion of race switchover and will have to find a model that will support journalism and i think it's not going to be in advertising, i think advertising is a serious issue. it will have to be in the only other stream of revenue you can have which is paying for the subscription. and people talk a lot about how much do you charge online right now. those who still have it printed publications should ask him much you charge offline because you have to go the way of having an online you are probably in better terms of how you brushed the product. >> unless there are any burning
>> we are going to resume and we will start as people lohan. this is our final panel before hearing from dr. parazynski at our lunch. you probably will be grateful to know that we only have one more power point, this is a rand conference so of course, it is often power point heavy and apologize for that but we try to limit as much as possible today but i think you'll find david thaler power point well worth it. we have to ever senior analysts at rand presenting the and external perspective today, we heard a lot this morning about negotiations with iran, the internal domestic situation within iran, and rationalism and the economy and now we are returning to iran in the broader region. we will start with david thaler will be focusing on iran's military power projection and a capability is and will be followed by fred wehrey, another
senior analyst will be focusing on it regional reaction to iran. so without further ado, thank you. >> thank-you all for being here. i am going to talk today about iran's defense strategy and a little bit about its military doctrine and then how well this has been able to operational as that doctrine to develop capabilities that will benefit that doctrine in the third occurrence of strategy. my key points are three fold -- first of all, it looks like from our perspective and that iran it is able to formulate a strategy and a doctrine that allies will with a strategy and i will talk about that in just a minute. the second piece is that while this is the case, a number of
capabilities that they have developed or tried to develop have fallen short in some key areas. how far short of that doctrine but in other areas the third point i will get two there is some reason to be concerned especially as we look out the next three to five and 10 years if they continue developing these capabilities and can be a problem for our power projection in the region. so based on an analysis of statements, some doctrinal work from within iran looking at exercises and those kinds of things, we discern for components of what iran calls its diverse defense strategy. the verse when, of course, it is on regime survival that is paramount for the islamic republic but defending the regime against internal threats.
they have capabilities in part in the military, paramilitary, intelligence capabilities that are designed to ensure the that the regime is stable and can survive. the second area is on deterring aggression -- deterrence is a major parts of the strategy which i did not say is it geopolitically defensive strategy we believe but it has offensive tenancies. if at the deterrence fails they intend to defeating aggression within their borders the in never of capabilities many partisan warfare and those kind of things which i will get to in just a second and the fourth thing is really the offense of tennessee part of their strategies, and their use and other military forces as a way
of extending their influence around the region on think that is very important to note here is that a major part of their defense strategy and doctrine is not really tuna toward attaining territorial gains but mainly toward protecting influence into the region. well, the defense strategy is based on a number of the actress and the doctor and have developed is well timed and well suited to their defense strategy. they have had experience, of course, in the eye iran-iraq war which is a traumatic experience and gave a lot of lessons here and they have also had experience against the united states and the tanker war in the late 1980's and have been
impressed by a u.s. air and naval superiority know they cannot possibly stand up to the u.s. naval and air capabilities and then have watched in lebanon and iraq and afghanistan as insurgent groups and terrorist groups have been able to make inroads against more superior conventional power and have gained a lot of lessons from those kind of observations. in the key focus for them especially given a look at the u.s. as their main adversary from a kiefer of this is defending their regime and encountering what is a superior adversary in the u.s., so did terence is of great importance.
it is a matter of public statement and exercises and those are all geared into word from a very high cost if they are attacked. it may have a per feel defense which they look back and recall of a ford the plans whereby they used proxy is and militias and other types of kind of unconventional capabilities to project their power and as a defense against invasion and then in case of invasion in mosaic defense whereby they want to conduct in and run and guerrilla tactics and also use strategic patients to wear down any invader and underlined his doctrine of issues that i have just gone through are four types of components. one is self-reliance.
it is a very important part of a iran's self-image as well as it stands strategy that it become self-sufficient in a settlement of the capabilities as well as the plans of its borders. ideological fortitude in the ranks, the iranians to emphasize indoctrination in these kind of things in joint force integration at least in their statements are very much emphasizing the idea of integrating air and ground in the different components of national power to meet an enemy had on and then encouraging captains initiative meaning they look at the potential in an invasion of iran, that look good initiative at lower levels of command being an important part of their doctrine so before i
get into whether capabilities our meeting this doctrine and want to give a sense of the force structure in iran. it is a bifurcated force structure sitting at the top the commander in chief and which is the supreme leader that has both to rent control over the armed forces and over national security generally but also in direct control the informal ties and representatives throughout the force structure but the main issue here is that there are two main forces in iran. what is the islamic revolutionary guard corps, the irgc as well as the regular army. this irgc have an army, navy and air force. they have an overlapping
missions. there are other parts of the force structure, the intelligence services, the law enforcement services and then within the islamic revolutionary guard corps, the quds force which is used mainly for a training and advising militia overseas and then the basij militia which is also part of the irgc but part of this 5 million or sometimes called a 10 million man army that will take up arms in case of invasion. but the main point here is that there are a number of overlapping missions and while this works very well as a way of coup proven and it is difficult as far as integration of the forces and these different components of our competitive
with one another especially over resources so the question is are these doctrine of themes being incorporated in the capabilities that one season iran and someone is definitely, yes,. certainly in the exercises the parades and the official statements that go with that in statements that gone all the time there is an effort to showcase iran's capability is and showcases regional power and as some cases making statements about capability here to for unknown by the outside world. this is a major party exaggeration of the capabilities as a major part of its deterrent and ballistic and cruise missiles certainly becoming more capable.
the have the capability of every chain much of the region including israel but also closer in with the u.s. might have a number of bases and forces the quds force and along with that the ministry of intelligence services and security -- the mois -- is very active both very active outside the borders. guerrilla warfare has been incorporated in some areas and in particular in the naval area which i will discuss and a second. passim defenses, air defenses and things like that that seemed to be a key part of their defense especially a key points such as the capital and their nuclear assets and that kind of thing and they seem to be putting a great deal of emphasis on those kind of things about the defense industry appears to be expanding, they are putting
out equipment in almost every area of military capability. however, there are some key areas where they do fall short in their ability to meet the doctrine. iranian forces despite the exercises that are supposed to show denigration are not integrated in these are a set piece oftentimes in the exercises are. their readiness abyss suspect and logistics' really don't have the capability of supporting for example all major incursions' into neighboring countries because of their poor logistics system. support of foreign groups doesn't ring control which i think fred it will really go into in detail. the components that are passed to execute a lot of the so-called guerrilla warfare and
asymmetric tactics are not necessarily seriously trained in net to. there is on the ideological front and a great deal of cynicism that we found including in the basij and the irgc especially among different generations. there is some ambivalence about the indoctrination that goes on there. and a key point, the force structure is very large and in his old and very difficult to modernize that especially given the last pliant which is is by this industry, this defense industry that is supposed to make iran self-sufficient, it cannot put out either the technologically sophisticated types of capabilities where to put out of the capabilities to recapitalize their very large a structurally weak force.
however, there are specific areas where our research has shown they could make a difference as far as giving as complications of problems and as projecting power to the region. one of them is on the use of ballistic missiles in particular voir right now when we look at their ballistic capability is many of them, they can be used as terror weapons or weapons to scare our allies into not allowing us to operate out of their countries and that kind of thing but in the future as guidance systems and payload capability is get better and better over the next 5210 years and they could actually have an operationally meaningful a fact
on our power projection capabilities meaning they could affect the use of our bases in the region. the second thing as a mentioned before their naval capabilities in the gulf and especially in the straits of hormuz are something to worry about a thing. regardless putting aside the idea of whether they would want to necessarily close or tried to close the straits of some ormuz the capabilities are swarming tactics, the use of multiple components both maritime and air as well as under siege capabilities could pose a threat to shipping generally been even to the u.s. navy especially prior two our right at the beginning of a shooting war and then finally was on many people's minds is the nuclear
issue wishes that iran has a bit of a rationale for developing nuclear weapons and is not clear that the iranian leadership has decided that is what they wanted to do is to deploy nuclear weapons however if they did our research has shown this would greatly complicate our power projection capabilities of course, but also make it more difficult to manage a conflict with what is a weaker conventional power and if it believes is regime's survival is at risk sometime in the future may be more willing to. did their weapons in that case so bottom-line i just went through the use key points. its military doctrine does online very well with iran's defense strategy. does try to exploit its adversaries witnesses, mainly been the united states.
however, is operational capabilities to fall short in a number of areas and what is interesting is despite this and this by the iraq and have enlarged and a conventional force generally they will continue to try to upgrade and improve and much of that may be because of bureaucratic inertia and a vested interest in the maintenance of this large defense industry and the development of conventional capability like tanks, aircraft and a large naval vessels and that kind of thing and finally as i said iran does maintain a military options and is likely they will get more capable in these areas in the next five years and is something that the u.s. news to take into account as projecting power into the region. thank you. [applause]
>> we will hear from fred it now on how the region will respond. >> thank you. i talk today is not necessarily going to focus on i iran's power projection and regional influence in the middle east but rather they diverse and very regional responses to that power and i think a key question is whether the topics are two sides of the same quote. in other words, to what degree has iran's influence been a facilitated by disunity come in disarray and chaos in the arab system. it now no less a figure than prince turki of saudi arabia asked this question in april, this is a remarkable admission that they typically blame the u.s. on i rand's rise, but interesting twist of introspection prince turki noted that it was arab is unity and specifically tension between the
so-called moderate and radical added taxes and the arab world that was responsible for enabling and extending the region in the arab world giving cause of steel to what otherwise be a paper tiger. of course, indexing critics of the regime would argue this plea for unity is actually a thinly disguised attempt as saudi dominance of arab affairs and is releasing this among the smaller gulf states might have long accused them of hyping the threat from iran to consolidate control over the gcc summit and increase recognition from washington. in 2006 and analyst told us that nuclear ambitions weren't the bomb itself but rather what you call the saudi arabia's hegemonic overreactions to that threat. of course, close observers of the gulf argue that this dissidents and version is nothing new. oman and qatar voice of marge to a different tune but even if we
look farther west to the so-called block of moderate sunni arab states, cairo and riyadh that are supposedly leading the charge against iran we find in the disagreements about the nature of that threat and arab leadership hierarchy. much of this cooperation i argue should be seen as tactical an instrumental. in early 2008 a former egyptian diplomat told us that cairo was worried about the new saudi activism and said they are everywhere with initiatives against iran and this worries us, the saving graces of these initiatives never amount to anything and we consider them annoying fact of life. added to this tension between states about what to do about iran there are differences between public and official thinking and we certainly saw this in the aftermath of the 2006 lebanon war when a ahmadinejad enjoy it in a claim in the arab streets and this was quickly dissipated by a stark reminder to arab regimes of iran's provocative ability of a
one absentia but over arab regimes and the palestine fun and a clear issue and this members in the wake of the gaza crisis. i think this dynamic space to the underlying problems of governance and legitimacy in the arab societies and how that impasse threat perceptions of iran and also in both the public and official realms. an editorial captioned this dynamic noting that that gap between arab societies and governments is a bleeding wound that iran has been able to exploit and this wound has pushed iranian foreign policy toward parana and brings machete. taken in summoning this lot of consensus endeavor city about the nature of that has a poor and implications for u.s. strategy especially if we try to forge some consensus on the region in the hopes of solidifying a containment block in terms of isolating iran, not only does this approach flatten the multi dimensional landscape
of italy's politics but will argue in incur certain tradeoffs in other u.s. policy interest name of the promotion of domestic reform. in my remaining time i will highlight regional diagnoses of the challenges illustrating similarities and beverages is from u.s. objectives and focus on the prognoses for that talent which required a very suavely an analyst drawbacks' an opportunity cost that may result from trying to forge artificial consensus on that region. by way of background much of this comes from fieldwork in the region looking and perceptions of nuclear iran and local viewless and the spillover of the iraq war and impact of the and iraq war and the findings were in the studies but also in an article i co-authored in the summer issue of the washington quarterly entitled contained iran? avoiding a two dimensional strategy in a four dimensional
region. so starting out how then has the arab world diagnosed the challenge of iran? i think on the surface air bridge seems may suggest an alignment with similar u.s. concerns and from the u.s. perspective it can be argued one of the solar linings of the toppling of a saddam hussein and lebanon war has laid bare of iran's long standing by levels before and the region and spurred their stance toward greater activism against the iranian challenge and throughout that we found in rain by arab activists the half ounce to anticipate the challenge and i iran's regional rise especially in iraq. jardine alice told us you have to hand it to the iranians, they had a plan for iran the renovation and deserve the influence that they have. in light of this recognition is to come as no surprise the u.s. is trying to harness the activism through