tv U.S. Senate CSPAN November 29, 2010 8:30am-12:00pm EST
>> she asked me to do something, and i said to her, mary beth, i think that's an unreasonable request. i'm 70 years old. and she said, bob, you're 73 years old. [laughter] curtis, is there a light here? no. okay. good evening, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome to the los angeles world affairs council. it's my duty tonight, and i'm happy to introduce our guest for this evening. when national public radio went to looking for a new chief executive officer, it led rapidly to control the evolving digital world. they selected a career media executive with plenty of experience in both old-school journalism and new-age
technology. in its effort to meld traditional information, distribution and cutting-edge technology, npr selected a savvy executive with an understanding of both camps, both old school and digital. vivian schiller was a top official at the most traditional of all right-wing media, "the new york times." [laughter] where she managed that new media entity, "the new york times".com, the largest newspaper web site on the internet. and that is a major accomplishment. earlier mrs. shiller spent four years as senior vice president and general manager of the discovery times channel. under her leadership discovery times tripled its distribution while achieving critical acclaim for its award-winning
programming. mrs. shiller also served as senior vice president of cnn productions where documentaries and series or produced under her leadership earned three peabody awards, four dupont/columbia university awards and dozens of emmys. mrs. shiller will be interviewed tonight by a man who knows a bit about the subject at hand, dr. ernest james wilson iii. dr. wilson is a walter annenberg chair of communication and dean of the annenberg school for communications at the university of southern california. he is also a professor of political science, a university fellow at the usc center on public diplomacy at the annenberg school and an adjunct fellow at the pacific council on international policy. he was elected the first african-american chairman of the corporation for public broadcasting in 2009.
ladies and gentlemen, please welcome me in joining to the stage mrs. vivian schiller and dr. james wilson. [applause] >> good evening, everyone. another evening. anyone out there? good evening, everyone. okay, that's better. >> good evening, dr. wilson. [laughter] >> it's after dinner, we need to be lively here. i have come with the accoutrement of every modern person whether i know how to use it or not which is the ipad. as a sign of the importance, i think, of communication and new ways of transmitting information. what i would -- this is going to be a conversation, and vivian and i have talked about this
with the leadership, of course, of this great organization, and so it will be a genuine conversation. and we'll talk for about 20 minutes back and forth sharing ideas, and then we'll open it up to q&a from you. i'd like to start off -- since it's been told i've been a professor, i've tried to limit these remarks to 90 minutes which is the usual time that professors talk for, so i'll try to keep it slightly under 90 minutes. but i want to start off, maybe, with a puzzle. and the puzzle has to do with international affairs and essential information. and it has two components. number one is that the current secretary of state, hillary clinton, has talked about the distinction between hard power on the one hand, military power,
and soft power -- sort of diplomatic, cultural power. and she's called for something called smart power. now, the idea for smart power actually grew from a study that was done at the center for strategic and international studies in washington, d.c. which is kind of a national security think tank. so does this idea of smart power which is the ability to think about military instruments as well as diplomatic ones. and yet the curious thing is at the moment we're talking about smart power, we need more information if we're going to be smart. and yet at a time when the american economy is more and more reliant on international trade and international investment, what is happening to our media? most platforms, most publications, most broadcasters are not just cutting back, but
eviscerating their international coverage. now, how -- why does that make sense? we're becoming more reliant on the world, and yet most news organizations are cutting back dramatically on the stories that we hear about the world. so that, that sustainable? that's not a very good way to move forward, it seems to me. there is one institution, however, that has been expanding its international coverage, and that is npr. and so i'm going to ask vivian schiller -- by the way, i should say that i have yang and -- vivian and i have worked closely together. i was chairman of the corporation for public broadcasting, worked very closely with vivian who is really one of the most dynamic and innovative thinkers in public broadcasting, and she really deserves a great vote of thanks and confidence for taking
that leadership position. but, vivian, what is going on with the country? we're becoming more international in trade and we're fighting two wars, and yet i don't know if it's "the new york times," but certainly most of the other outlets are cutting way back. first of all, can you say something about why that dynamic is happening? this. >> money. >> all right. [laughter] good answer. >> it's actually fairly straightforward. it's not a good story, but it's not really that complicated a story. as many of you know, we could spend the entire time talking about the tremendous losses that have happened in traditional media in this country. a recent pew report revealed, calculated that in the last ten years $1.6 billion in reporting and editing capacity has been lost in this country. i always love the expression
reporting and editing capacity which is sort of a euphemism for jobs, reporters and editors. and when news organizations who, whose business model is, basically, just in a state of revolution have to cut, they're going to look, naturally as any good business leaders would, at two things: where -- what part of my business is the most expensive, and what part of it is the least compatible with generating revenue? and foreign coverage falls neatly into both of those categories. foreign coverage is tremendously expensive. you know, people are living aprod. you have security issues -- abroad. you have security issues. you've got travel. it is very expensive. and further, it is not very attractive to advertisers. so it really, i guess, is not a very hard calculation to look at reducing the ranks of foreign coverage. and that's why, you know, and i
say this not in a yea us kind of way, but actually with a lot of sadness that npr has more foreign bureaus than any broadcast news operation including abc news, nbc news, cbs news. it's really a very disconcerting state of affairs, frankly. >> but wouldn't -- i mean, isn't that bad for america's democracy if our, if our citizens -- i mean, it may be good for the advertisers, but if students that i teach at usc or high school students, if they don't know how to find things on a map, if they don't know international economics works, if they don't know information about china, isn't that bad for american democracy? it's -- >> it's terrible. it's frightening. it's one of the reasons i went into public broadcasting because i wanted to play a part in not only preserving, but expanding our foreign coverage. you know, it's not just a matter of -- i mean, certainly we do a
lot of cover coverage around the hot spots around the world, particularly in iraq. we're one of the few news organizations with a permanent presence there and also in afghanistan, but also in africa. undercovered areas like africa, latin america, china, you know, southeast asia. it is, it is -- you said it exactly right, ernie, which is, you know, in a state when the world -- to quote a columnist from my form employee, employer, you know, the world is flat, and yet we have less and less reliable, independent, original reporting from parts of the world that have such great impact on our lives. >> so how is npr managing to do this if everybody else is cutting back and it's all about money, how are you managing to increase your coverage of international issues. >> well, like any business you have to sort of prioritize where you spend your money.
we -- i started two years ago, and that was right in the beginning or the worst part of the recession, at least for public broadcasting. since that time we've really focused on trying to increase our revenue so that we had to make a lot of cuts actually. right before i arrived at npr two, shows were canceled, unfortunately, two shows that were produced right here in los angeles. and since that time we've been looking at trying to, you know, focus on building up our revenue so that we can, you know, reestablish more, you know, our growth in reporting. but even throughout that time you have to say these are the things that are important, these are the things that nobody else is doing, and no matter what we cut, we're not going to touch this, and foreign coverage was one. so, yes, we had to make painful cuts by losing two shows, but the choice was do we lose these, do we cut these two shows whose audiences were not huge, or do we sort of nickel and dime our coverage from all over the world? and to me, i think, the choice was pretty clear.
>> now, you're a government-owned corporation, right? i mean -- >> we're a private corporation. >> let me rephrase that. you take some government money. couldn't you be accused, potentially, of being biased in one direction or another because you, you take money from the government? some people would say ha that's a bad -- that that's a bad thing. why should we waste federal money on giving it to private suppliers who might be too liberal -- >> this is sounding really familiar, actually. [laughter] yes, one could and i've certainly heard a lot especially in recent days about the question of federal funding. if you don't mind, let me just lay out a couple of facts, and then i can tell you why i believe that federal funding is so critical. it is, there's a lot of confusion, rightfully so. i was confused, frankly, before i got into npr about the whole thing works.
npr is a membership organization, and we are -- our primary purpose is to produce national programming that we distribute to the stations. morning edition, all things considered the two most listened-to stations in public radio are ours as well. other shows that hopefully you enjoy like car talk and wait, wait, don't tell me and what have you. our member stations, and we have 268 members representing more than 800 stations in this country. those 268 members are all completely separate institutions, they're locally owned and operated. npr has no authority or jurisdiction over them whatsoever. but what we do is we make those programs available to stations, they license those programs from us and in turn they raise money from, from local underwriters and also from listeners like you, an expression that you probably heard before including, i think, today on kppc. so where does the government funding come in? well, first i wanted to just
establish npr as distinct from stations. it is a, you know, symbiotic relationship. you really can't have one without the other. npr proper receives, gets no direct federal support. we haven't since 1983. now, we do apply for competitive grants from the corporation for public broadcasting which dr. wilson knows a little bit about, a lot about. whose role it is to distribute federal dollars to public broadcasting. and depending on the year and what competitive grants we win, that represents about 2-3% of our revenue. now, moving over to the station side -- but i'm not done. i'll come back to npr in this a second. moving over to the station side, stations overall in this aggregate, about 10% of station funding if you look at the whole station economy comes from the corporation for public broadcasting, so it's about a billion dollar economy, $90 million goes to public radio stations. to be sure, those public radio
stations, you know, it's 10% of the revenue. with that they pay, you know, the electric bill, they pay for the towers, they pay for their, you know, personnel, they pay for programming from npr, from pri, from apm to produce their own programs, so certainly in that mix, of course, if it's 10%, some of that money ends up coming back to npr. it's almost impossible to figure out a statistic because the money goes into a pool at the station, and it gets spent on all manner of things. so that's the way, that's the role that federal dollars play at a very high level. i'm not drilling down too deeply in public radio. >> so you're saying it's only about 13% -- i mean, the three that goes directly -- >> well, they're not additive. 2-3% of npr's budget -- our budget's about $160 million a year -- >> let me interrupt you for a second. i would love to talk -- this is what i do. >> we're walking out here. yeah. >> i want to sort of get back to the more controversial question.
>> yes. why federal dollars. >> let's say for the sake of argument it's 20, 25% just for the sake of argument. won't that tilt you in one direction or another if the democrats are in power and, you know, you know you're getting some money from them and maybe you want to shift things a little bit toward the democratic side and if republicans are in power? isn't there the risk of tilting the stories? how do you prevent that from happening? >> the answer is no, and i'm sorry for getting wonky. the answer no. there are layers of firewall. first of all, there's a firewall at cpb which is the board is, you know, the board who are political appointees don't make decisions about the funding that cpb staff makes, and once you get to npr, the news division is completely separated from anybody involved with the funding. and we have layers and layers and layers of safe guard.
the newsroom is separated from any of the funding sources. within the newsroom you have editor -- you know, you have reporters being edited by editors, editors being reported by those editors, you have only budsmen which very few organizations have who we pay to be completely independent and to report on npr and give independent assessments with no, you know, with a guaranteed employment no matter what she writes. so we have check after check after check to prevent the kind of, exactly the kind of thing that you're talking about. and i will tell you as somebody that's been in the news media for 25 years, almost all in commercial media, it's really no different than the kinds of firewalls we had at the new york times or cnn from advertisers. so it is in the same way that, you know, i'm making this up, but, you know, toyota isn't going to -- the fact that "the new york times," again, i'm inventing this example, but the
fact that toyota buys advertising on cnn and the new times doesn't mean those are not going to cover toyota. this is a legacy in journalism, and it's no different here. >> okay. let me just put in a quick plug for public broadcasting here which is that some years ago we had a bit of a controversy about whether public broadcasting was fair and balanced. some of you may remember that controversy. that controversy. so cpb -- the corporation for public broadcasting which funds television and radio -- commissioned a study. it was like mirror, mirror on the wall, who's the fairest of them all. and so we paid a couple of consulting firms, survey firms to look into this. and you know what we found? fox, abc, cbs, nbc, msnbc, compare them against public broadcasting. guess who was judged to be the
fairest and least biased of all of these entities? [laughter] i'm delighted to say you're wrong. it was public broadcasting. it was public broadcasting. and if you asked people let's rank, oh, let's say the u.s. supreme court, the presidency -- and this is an easy one -- the congress and public broadcasting, who do you think gives you the better value? and i'm delighted to say that, in fact, it was public broadcasting once again. the only institution that at this time in the poll was done t received a higher ranking was the organization represented by some of our guests over here which is the u.s. military. so it was the u.s. military, then public broadcasting, then the presidency, judiciary, etc., etc. so i think this does speak to the very valuable role that
public broadcasting is playing in the united states. but, again, this was the world affairs council, so we'll go back to the international domain for a moment. there are these wonderful institutions called voice of america, radio-free europe, radio liberty, radio-free asia which are government-owned corporations which are involved in the news industry and the media industry, but mostly international. now, does npr have any relationship with these bodies? or maybe you could say a little bit about how they're different from what -- >> no. we have no relationship whatsoever with any of those entities. they really were sort of -- i'm actually not really an expert on their governance, so i'm not sure i can speak particularly intelligently about them, but they are part -- i know that the person that runs, that's in charge of all of those is a, is a political appointee who has to be approved by congress, so it's a very different situation. npr is a completely -- and
public radio stations -- are completely private, independent organizations. i would say, but moving aside, away from the government for a moment, those, those entities are really about providing news, well, in english or other languages to the world. now, while npr and public radio we do, especially now in the digital age, we do have an audience overseas, we are really -- that's really not our aim. we are not looking, it is not sort of part of our business plan at the moment to try to provide, you know, really focus on npr content to audiences overseas. we are very much focused on audiences in the united states and making sure that those audiences get the kind of coverage from around the world that will help them be more informed citizens. to the extent that we do get audiences among expats or others overseas, we're thrilled, but it's not a focus, and i think that's probably a big difference
right there. >> you say, then, that the local stations which are 200 and some -- >> 268 members representing over 800 stations. that's a lot of numbers. >> and a bunch of them, of course, in this neighborhood that you're all familiar with. do you see any difference in the kind of products -- >> yes. >> -- that different stations around the country buy, especially in international? so i would like to think that in a sophisticated city like los angeles that the stations here buy a lot of stuff of that deals with international affairs whereas maybe another city that's less global might not buy -- but do you see any sort of patterns to that? >> yeah. i think that's one of the wonderful things about public radio. because stations are all locally owned and operated and the people that work in them live in the community, there's bricks and mortar in the community, the flavor of each station is unique to the community or in the case of los angeles where we have two spectacular stations, kppc and
kcrw and, well, ckusc, but they're both very popular, they both have a different flavor to them. so every station chooses based on its own guiding principle, its own values and what it wants to provide to the audience. and, yes, foreign coverage interestingly enough not just in big cities, particularly in more rural areas is very popular whether it's npr programs or programs from the other distributers. for instance, the world, bbc's the world which is distributed by pri, a, another distributer who are, you know, on some level are our competitors but on many levels are our friends, that's a popular program. there's quite a few internationally-themed programs throughout public radio, and every station makes its programming decisions based on how it best wants to serve the audience. >> let me ask you this, sort of a big question in the room that we, i think, do have to -- in the spirit of journalism, you'll appreciate and understand is
that you've been the center of a lot of controversy. npr has been the center of a lot of controversy over the past ten days or so. and i wonder if you want to say a bit about that, whether that has been -- was that expected? was it unexpected? did that happen because of the change in the congress? was it something you said? was it something that the station did? be how would you characterize this? >> well, i think what you're referring to, let's just name it, is we made a back on october 20th we terminated the contract of on one of our contractor part-time news analysts named juan williams, i think -- i expect everybody in the room has heard about this particular incident. he was a contractor, he was a part-time news analyst, and we terminated his contract perfectly under the terms of the agreement. the circumstances around that were unique. there's a lot of chatter, i
guess, about the reasons that we did it. you didn't hear those from me. there are a lot of assumptions that are made about why we did it and what happened, and the fact is all i will say because it's just not -- i don't -- it's not my practice and npr's practice, nor do i think it's appropriate to get into personnel, decisions around personnel, so i will say that the circumstances were unique, there was a series of incidents over time. these are all things that i've said before. and so we terminated his contract. that's really all i want to say specifically about the matter. but certainly as you know that, what followed was really a tsunami of media attention and opinion and can a lot of commentary all over the map, and it was -- did we expect it to be quite that large? no, i think it's fair to say we didn't. we made -- npr as an organization made mistakes in
the way that we executed this. i take, as ceo i take full responsibility for that. our staff did not meet with juan williams in person, that was a mistake. i think we left our stations and some of our supporters without the tools and information they needed to be able to address it with their constituents. those things were certainly a mistake. what's happening now and i think that there's general consensus that this likely would have happened anyway although certainly the controversy did not help things, is there is a call with the change in congress, certainly, and with the ever-growing deficit there is a call that among the deficit reductions included in that should be the, i think it's about $450 million of federal support for public broadcasting. and so that is really what we're looking at right now.
and it is very important that we -- that federal support or is critical -- support is critical. and so, you know, we are, we feel songly and we hope to make the case and we hope that at least in the case of public radio our 34 million loyal listeners who listen six hours a week will support the case that this funding is really critical for stations particularly in underserved areas, rural areas, indian reservations, places that really have no other media. that money pays for critical infrastructure. and this is very important element of a democracy. and so i feel strongly that it should be preserved. >> one of the interesting things that this has provoked is as the dean of a journalism school it says, well, we have these rules that we followed when there was a legacy media and newspapers, traditional broadcasters, but what happens when you get these things and we have blogs and we
have tweets and twittering? what is the distinction between a professional journalist who's trained and has experienced on the one hand and someone who just gets up and goes boom, boom, boom, hits f7 or send, and it's all over the world? and we've been debating at the annenberg school, for example, how do we train our students to draw a sharp distinction between opinion on the one hand and fact on the other? and not just our journalism students, but i think more and more our universities are trying to talk about media literacy, that every student whether they're a biology student or what have you needs to be able to understand and distinguish between fact and fiction and opinion. now, i wonder -- because i know we're coming to the end of our part of the discussion, if you just want to say maybe a few words about how you see --
because that's, in some ways, at the heart of your termination of this gentleman which is that you pelt that as he -- felt that he sort of moved too far over that line. >> well, let's talk about the concept of opinion. opinion, opinion is great. we all have opinions. i have opinions. opinion is a critical part of journalism, and if you listen to npr, you can't listen for more than a minute or two without hearing opinions, very strong, sometimes controversial opinions on all across the whole spectrum of whatever it is the summit that's -- subject that's being talked about. here's the critical difference. those opinions are coming out of the mouths of people that we interview, not out of the mouths of our hosts, reporters and should not be out of the mouths of our news analysts. but we embrace opinion, we embrace a diversity of ideas, we embrace controversy. and the other thing i'll say about opinion is the concept that there is something of an extremely legitimate form of
journalism called opinion journalism. it has a storied tradition in this country going back to pamphleteering in the 18th century. many newspapers practice it in their op-ed pages, in their editorial pages. there's nothing wrong with that. it is opinion based on fact as tip o'neill famously said, everybody's entitled to their own opinion, not everybody's entitled to their own fact as long as it's opinion based on fact. terrific. it's a vital service. that is not really -- we at npr don't very much practice opinion journalism on air. we are mostly about original reporting. we do have some opinion journalism, and i will tell you that we're about to undertake sort of a review as every news organization must of our new standards and ethics, and we're going to take a look at that and either reaffirm or make a decision about the role that that should have on npr's area because you are absolutely right. the world is changing so fast,
and whatever the rules were there are certain fundamentals about journalism that are core, but the fact is the world is changing, and social media is an exciting new tool, but it also has really affected the dynamic of journalism. so we want to take a look at all of that in a very reasoned way, and we'll share all of that publicly and have a dialogue with our audience about it. ..
>> corporations are now entitled to have free speech and unlimited amounts of money, how can we keep the airwaves with free speech for people who don't have the money and the corporations? >> i assume you're talking about the political ads? is that what you mean? well, we don't -- [inaudible] >> right. in public radio and in public television i believe it's the same. i know it is this a. we can't take political ads. it's a violation -- we don't take political ads. underwriting messages that are very short, have rules around them as dictated by the fcc. so there was no financial gain to public broadcasting. where we play a role in all of this is, quite honestly, is to keep doing what we are doing, to
keep doing original reporting, to do more original fact-based reporting by reporters who are on the ground working sources, and telling the stories of what's happening in this country. and that's the most we can do in order to help provide for civil discourse for our audience. and it seems to be working, because our audience has grown 60%. 60% in the last 10 years. even since i've been, i'm not getting this to me, believe me, but since i've been at npr, it just so happens, our audience has gone up every year. at the same time the commercial media is going down double-digit. so we must be doing something right, that 34 million people, this is no small, 34 million people tune in and broadcast, and million more in digital
media i have to believe it is because they are looking for the original reporting, which unfortunate can be left at other news organizations. >> hello. my name is david doyle. my question kind of speaks to what you do started talking about. it seems to me that in the past few years the traditional news agencies are turning more to entertainment coverage, and less on hard news. i don't know if anyone else is the sense that, cbs news and these people. so it seems to me the reason maybe your ratings are getting higher, more people are attracted to you, if you are still doing traditional newsgathering, whereas the other media and multi-sources now of media are covering entertainment as news.
celebrities news. do you see that as something, a trend that your competitors -- i do want to say selling out to celebrity, but certainly not doing the newsgathering. >> there's nothing wrong entertainment and nothing wrong with fun. we air car talk every week and it's fun. but yes, i think it is true that in certain -- and certainly i talk about foreign coverage being a very expensive, and b., not very attractive to advertising, the same can be said for science coverage, which has been decimated in american journalism. coverage of the arts, investigative reporting, which we are ramping up as many news organizations are stepping away from because it's expensive, it's time-consuming, it's legally risky. but we feel that with other news organizations stepping away, to have an investigative reporting unit that is polling public institutions is vital. and i think it's not a
coincidence, that as we continue, you know, stick to our knitting and continue to grow that coverage, our audience goes a. it seems to me not to be a coincidence. so i think that if true. i certainly hope that is true. >> my name is dennis. i have a question about to if you're sometime competitors that you mentioned, american public radio, and pri, public radio. i appreciate your predicament of 10% of your budget is coming from the federal government. i'm curious, do those to other organizations also get public funding? and if they don't and you do, why is that? >> they are given the american public media is owned by minnesota public raider. that is one institution. and it's a really terrific institution based in st. paul. and they both operate stations throughout all of minnesota, and they are a program producer and
distributor. so as stations they did community service grants from the corporation for public broadcasting, so that is federal dollars. pri, i believe that just like npr, npr gets no direct funding from the federal government. we apply as i mentioned for competitive grants. i believe pri also applied for competitive grants and gifts those. so pri and npr are exactly in the same boat. to the extent that a station to get the federal dollars licenses shows from those, it's the same. we are exactly the same for all three of those organizations. >> good evening. my name is jean. >> right under the light. >> recently jon stewart of comedy central, the daily show, was interviewed about journalism
integrity. and he stated, for instance, that he believes journalists are lacking the moral courage to point out to their listeners the difference between facts and opinions. and that they really have a duty in order to do that. do you agree with that? >> and they have -- >> a duty to point out the difference between fact and opinion when a lot of the people on the show are mostly giving opinions. do you agree with that? >> well, jon stewart does something different. i think jon stewart is extraordinary work, one of the best news interviewers on television. we are doing something a little different in the sense that when our reporters and hosts interview people, we expect them, and they do, to challenge our guests to, if something that guess, the person they are interviewing, says is false or unsubstantiated, and to question where did you get that information, why do you say that? that's just what professional
news reporters, interviews and hosts do. so certainly we do that all the time. and, of course, our reporters in covering stories, whether it's about washington or about science or whether it's about entertainment, that is their job, to root out the facts and to find the truth about any given situation. or at least not the truth, the nuances and information that surrounded issue. so that's really what you're describing is really at the core of journalistic principle. >> back to the little box on your lap there, professor. my name is charlie, and i've been fortunate to travel pretty much the world. and one of the neat things we have learned when you travel, you did read some of the local
newspapers. and the cool thing about the box on your lap there is, i can read those newspapers not anywhere in the world. so i really maybe don't need the "l.a. times" to cover that for me if i can read the jerusalem post, or whatever it is. and i'm just wondering what your comments are. because now we don't have to go to the newsstand to buy foreign ideas and information from the foreign press. >> that's a good question. and it is likely that this thing, this ipad is going to revolutionize publishing. especially for magazines and newspapers. and, in fact, i have to say that if you want one of the really coolest applications for this was designed by npr. and so for those of you who haven't downloaded npr yet on your ipad, digital grandkids
for your kids, which is what i had to do, or students, to put the thing on. but it's really worthwhile. i do think that unless we have information in the public interest, we will not have democracy. you know, the biggest concern, the business model is important, et cetera, et cetera. but in country after country, no free press, no information of the public interest, no democracy. it may not be immediate but it will happen. part of democracy is listening to multiple voices. and one of the downsides of the new technology is we can all have newspapers, newspapers, that cater only to our own ideological or geographic or intellectual interests. so if i'm interested in western europe, i don't need to know -- i can download stuff here that only is from "the guardian" or
whatever. i don't have to read about africa or the middle east. that's probably not good for congress. so i would say that on the one hand it's negative. on the other hand, my students have very little trust in the "new york times," "washington post," any of the legacy media. but what they do do, that doesn't mean they don't listen, what they do is they go to 10 different sources. they will go to the jerusalem post, they will go to the "new york times," they will go to al-jazeera. they will go to the bbc, and they will triangulate. and so i think as with most technology, there is good news and bad news. the good news is that we can now download just about anything from any part of the world. and here, unfiltered perspective. i want to underscore that. unfiltered perspectives. not to the american priorities.
but the priorities of the balkans or the french or the chinese. the bad news is that we can tailor it so much that we can't exclude from our knowledgebase places that we are not interested in, but maybe we need to be interested in. i think that's a great, great question. >> vivian, i think he said that 20% of your revenue comes from the government. whether it goes to your affiliates. somehow you get $5 million, right? if this goes away, can you survive? 20% of the revenue is not small in any business. >> is 10% upon -- across public review but even 10% is meaningful. it is particularly meaningful for stations -- that 10% is an average. for stations in rural underserved communities, that
committee service grant from the cpb can be far more double, triple, quadrupled that 10%. and without it i worry that those communities, the whole point of public broadcasting is news and information in the public interest, and to provide universal access. so my fear is if that money goes away, the people that are most underserved, that most need to be served will not have access. because what that money does is pay for critical infrastructure. it pays for the towers, it pays for the signals, it pays for the engineers. it keeps the signal on the air. and that is at risk, yes, it is. that risk is -- sorry. the risk is if that money goes away, though services will disappear. and that is far and away my most critical concern. so, you know, some stations is less than 10%. perhaps for them it's not quite
as dramatic, but i think the core principle of all the public broadcasting, that this is about universal access in serving audiences is really fundamental to democracy. so i feel strongly about it, both at a financial perspective and also as a matter of principle. >> my name is alan curtis. i wonder if you would comment on the relationships, if any, between npr and pbs. you may be aware that our local pbs station is no longer going to be pbs, which i hate to think that the same might happen to npr. >> we have, i'm happy to say that we have a wonderful relations with pbs. we are two completely separate organizations. we are actually structured quite differently. our relationships with stations is quite different, but the principles and our core values are exactly the same.
at a personal level and very good friends with the ceo of pbs, paula. she and i just had breakfast on monday which we do very frequently. and we are doing everything that we can to share information and to work together. first of all, because we have a common interest, and also a lot of our stations are what we call inside the system of joint licensees that in that they are both public television and radio stations at the same time. that's not the case here in los angeles. the strong public review stations kppc, they are all read only and the others are television. but just up the road in san francisco, for example, k. pps down in san diego, are both joint licensees. our fates are tied and we also are doing the same thing. again, information, cultural programming, education, in the public interest. so we work together. we're also working together in a really wonderful way in terms of new technology because gone are
the days where we are rated and every tv. we're all media now. we must work together and we're very successful, i think. >> i am a mandalas and i teach journalism and i'm here with my knife through 12th graders, newspaper staff. with a print edition. with a website with news blogs and opinion blogs. so i think we can all agree that the state of me today is pretty precarious and uncertain. and i was wondering since you that experience, not one but two of the most impressive 21st century news organizations, obviously the "new york times" and npr, maybe if you had some idea of when my students, 10 years from now are entering the journalist marketplace, what the media landscape will look like, and what skills they to start think about working on now to help when they get their. >> first of all, i'm thrilled to see journalist with students
you. this is my favorite, you live and breathe it every day but for me it is such a treat that the answer to the question is what will the media landscape look like in 10 years, you guys in that table will invent it. may be in 15 years. i do not what you are exactly. nobody knows where this is going, but i am actually not pessimistic at all. i'm quite excited about where media is going. yes, the business models are being disrupted. there's no question about it. newspapers really have to reinvent their business models and highly. television much in the same boat. you know, but the fact is what the internet and social media has provided is an incredible new set of tools that will take journalism to places that we could never have imagined before. both in the way that the news is gathered. having, we use twitter and facebook. we use it to gather critical information after the earthquake in haiti and about the recent
elections, in a way that news is distributed. and the engagement with our audience and a two-way relationship with the audience. but the business model is what's uncertain. and i don't know where it is going. i think the answer is we will just have to experiment relentlessly and look at multiple revenue sources until we figure it out, instead of looking for the one, you know, answer to the business model for journalism. but it's all about experiment and it's all about digital natives which you guys at the table, people have grown up and it is second nature to completely reinvent journalism and exciting and thrilling new ways. so i don't have a specific answer for you, but i'm hoping you'll have an answer for me. >> hello. mining is six elite. there's obviously a lot of adults in this room. before the younger -- for the younger audience, how is npr
engaging us speak is a great question. the answer to that, here's how -- there are many schools of thought about how you reach younger audiences. well, there are two general schools of thought that i will take the one that personally i am not in favor of. which is you say, okay, here we are at npr. we want to reach younger audiences. we'll get a bunch of grown-ups in the room and think about what's a show that would appeal to the youngsters? now, i'm being sarcastic for reason because that's a losing proposition. you don't want to dump him -- something to that you don't want to pander or cater to an audience, particularly an audience that is as savvy as your generation that is coming up that can smell a rat from 50 miles away. so you will know that it is not authentic. so that's not the direction we're going. what we're doing is we're trusting you, trusting you to be smart, curious and engaged. and that the stuff that we do, which is report the news, and tell stories that human beings
that sheds a light on the events of this world is as much of appeal to you as it is to someone of my generation. you're going to consume it in a different way. so maybe you're not listening to radio. maybe you are listening to on your i thought, or your ipad are you and droid phone, and now your iphone, or what have you. and that is on twitter, facebook. that is why we have pushed very aggressively to be on all those platforms. and it is working. the median age for broadcast listening to npr is 50, which is about 10 to wealth years younger than cable news, but still 50. it's not 21. but if he moved to different platforms, it drops. npr.org is in the mid '40s. i was about the same as in wide times.com. then go down to the ipad, the iphones hit by the time you get to podcasting, the average age for the very same content is 34. that may not sound, that may sound all to you, but for news
media, as a meeting age that is really young. so it is the same content that it is how it is delivered. that's our strategy for reaching younger audiences that and it seems to be working. and as new stuff comes along and we're moving much more on facebook and twitter and social media, we will see those meeting age is dropping as well. >> disagree a bit. which is that i do not think public service media is doing enough to reach younger demographics. that is probably more true on the televisions. and i love public television, but public television, in my view, gets the audience from two to seven, right, because you know that is, right? all the muppets. and then from 47 to 70 years after death. [laughter] >> we all have market niches.
you can satisfy everybody. but it seems to me that if public media is going to remain relevant, it has got to find ways to produce content that is especially relevant to your demographic. and that's on the age side. it's also true on the political side. and for the state of california, for a city like los angeles, where california is now am a majority minority, is that how it is said? that's got to be reflected more and more and more on public media. because everybody pays for, for that content. so the content that is produced is wonderful content, but i think we've got to do better. the public, npr, i will talk about the corporation, which i'm chairman of.
until yesterday i guess we changed. but we need to target, and we have. we call it diversity, digital and dialogue. and what i would propose to young people in the room is that challenge us. challenge operations for public broadcasting and pbs. get involved with local stations, which i'm sure there are ways to do that. and that's the way that younger voices, i think, will be incorporated into public service media. but that's just one persons opinion. >> i think we have time for one more question. >> hi. my name is emily. so you have mentioned that social media is going to be a big part of journalism in the future, but you mentioned that many as a tool for reporters. do you think that social media,
like non-reporters looking the same? >> i will tell you the way, the role of social media plays for us at npr. it is really threefold. one is as a tool for reporters, absolutely. we tested our reporters both find individual sources, i can tell you a million stories where my through twitter, we found sources, reporters as they're going to place they haven't been before. and also in terms of crowd sourcing. i mentioned haiti, after the earthquake in haiti when the infrastructure was largely down, but yet mobile devices were still working. we were able to years, and then galvanize efforts with all the other news organizations to use social media to be able to map where the greatest destruction was and where aid was desperately needed. so it's a reporting tool. next, it's a dissertation tool. npr, i may have the statistic wrong because i haven't checked this in about a month or two, but some months back we were the
most, the most re-tweeted source of news. now, that may sound like probably due to some of you, but this is very, very important because what that means if you're the most re-tweeted, a story is tweeted, you then say i like that, i'm going to tweeted to all my followers. they will fall -- tweeted to all their followers and we are reaching people we've never reached before, both on twitter and facebook him and it is driving traffic. and the third is as participant in the dialogue of what we do which is so of the core of public media, the public and public media is the audience. and so were we are able to have dialogue. if you read any story posted on facebook, on npr, the comment stream that follows is absolutely delightful and intelligent, and informed most of the time. and we are in it within. our reporters and editors are in the mix. you know, talking to people. so that's a very exciting element.
i think we've just begun to scratch the surface of how powerful social media can be in journalism. i'm not sure that answered the question. okay, good. >> ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming vivian schiller for wonderful remarks and topic. [applause] >> supposedly does a book you're somewhere to thank you. but doctor, you certainly didn't throw any softballs. >> thank you. i think we all live today take away some very good points. very but -- present your case very strong and enthusiastically. i'm sure npr will do well under your tutelage. thank you for coming. >> thank you. [applause] [inaudible conversations]
>> are your this month several of the nation's incoming republican governors gathered at their party's annual conference in san diego. they talked about the approaches to governing and the fiscal challenges they will face. you hear from governors elect john kasich of ohio, nikki haley of south carolina, and tom corbett of pennsylvania. this one our forum begins with comments by nevada governor elect brian sandoval.
[no audio] [no audio] >> take a look at the new members of congress with the c-span video library. find a complete list under the congress tab. every new member is listed with the district map, campaign finances, and any appearances on c-span. it's all free on your computer, any time. it's washington your way.
>> we are moving on with our program schedule. >> good morning and welcome to our release of third quarter results for fdic insured banks and thrift. today's headline is much the same as it was three months ago. the industry continues making progress and recovering from the financial crisis. credit performance has been improving, and we remain cautiously optimistic about the outlook. lower provisions for loan losses are driving bank earnings by allowing a larger share of revenues to reach the bottom line. industry earnings in the third quarter totaled $14.5 million. this is a substantial improvement from a year ago but is less than banks reported any of the first two quarters of this year. as we saw last quarter, almost two-thirds of all institutions reported year-over-year
increases in earnings. proportionate institutions reporting positive net income rose to the highest level in more than two years. lower provisions for loan losses were a key factor in driving earnings higher. insured institution set aside almost $35 billion in provisions in the third quarter which is $20 billion less to be set aside a year earlier. the decline in lost revisions correspond with an improvement in asset quality. as you can see in his chart, both net charge of an noncurrent loan balances declined for the second quarter in a row. the improving outlook for loan losses has encouraged some institutions to reduce quarterly loan loss provisions below the level of their charge off, resulting in reduction in their total loan loss reserves. almost 60% of its occasions increase their reserves, but the dollar volume of reserve reductions exceeded reserves built. most large banks had substantial reductions in the magnitude of
the reductions overshadowed the reserve billing that occurred mainly in smaller banks. as a result as you can see in this chart, the industry ratio fell slightly, even the noncurrent loan balance is also decline. reserve reductions are not unusual when troubled loans are declining. and we are seeing an improving trend in credit quality. out as this chart shows troubled loans remain near historic high levels, while the coverage ratio is still low. many institutions came into the recent crisis with inadequate reserve levels, and they need to exercise restraint in drawing them down now. at this point in a credit cycle is too early for institutions to be reducing reserves without strong evidence of sustainable improving our performance and reduced loss rates. when it comes to the adequacy of reserves, institutions should always and are on the side of caution. in recent quarters stable revenues and falling off provisions have combined to improve earnings, but at some
point industry must begin to grow its revenues. and loan growth will be an essential ingredient. this chart shows that the declining trend in loan balances that has been underway for more than two years appears to almost have run its course. total loans and leases held by fdic insured institutions declined by just $6.8 million, or 0.1% in the third quarter. if not for the change in accounting rules that brought securitized loans back onto bank balance sheets in the first quarter of this year this would've been a small decline in two years. many large banks have had sizable reductions in their vote for photos over the past couple of years, but in the third quarter such reductions were notably absent. i hope we are close to sing genuine increases in loan balances again. however, surveys indicate the demand for loans is recovering slowly, even as banks are starting to ease access to credit. it is important to keep in mind that while most of the industry is on a recovery track, some institutions continue to
experience the stress. almost 19% of institutions were unprofitable in the third quarter, and almost 36% had lower quarterly earnings than a year ago. a number of problem institutions continues to rise, and the number of failures remains high. through last friday 149 institutions have failed this year him as we anticipated the number of failures this year has already exceeded 2000 total of 140. but we expect the total assets of this years of failures to be lower than last years. as we've indicated before, we anticipate fewer theaters next year. as the banking industry continues to recover, we also see a positive trend in the deposit insurance fund. the deposit insurance fund balance at the end of september was negative $8 billion. compared to negative $15.2 billion in the prior quarter. the balance remains in negative territory because of losses from failures that have occurred to
date as well as the $21.3 billion continued loss reserves we have set aside to cover the cost of expected failures. but after declined for seven straight quarters the balance has not improved for three quarters in a row. this improvement reflects both income from assessment and downward revisions in estimate of losses from future bank failures. at the end of the third quarter our total cash position was $634 billion, approximate the same as june. what we expect immense uncashed to continue, our projections indicate our current resources are more than enough to resolve anticipated failures and make outstanding obligations for banks that have already failed. the industry has come a long way in cleaning up a balance sheet, building capital and adjusting to changes in financial markets and economy. but the adjustments are not over and this is no time for complacency. conservation of capital remains a priority. if it continues answer to, surrounding the housing market. the recently disclosed documentation problems at
federal large mortgage services have raised new questions about contingent liabilities they might face. if these issues are not addressed properly, the resulting slow down and resolving problem mortgages could delay the recovery at u.s. housing market. we welcome the federal reserves toughened stance on dividends and stock buybacks by large bank holding companies. banks as well should be conservative with dividends, bonuses and other payments that could impact capital. as we continue to emerge from this devastating financial crisis, building capital must remain a priority for insured banks, so that they can retain ready access to funding and continue to serve as credit intermediaries, even under adverse conditions. with that i would be happy to take your questions. >> chairman bair,. [inaudible] >> i hope so. i think so. we are always looking for the balance. we want proven safe and sound logic i do think there's been
balance sheet repairs, and the fact that we haven't had these more significant finds in loan balances, especially when large institutions in the skoda i think is a positive sign. i think we are turning the corner. >> can you explain by which he means by questions about contingent liabilities, that they might face? what consequences do you see as possible? >> well, we have already seen a significant public commentary about investor unhappiness and put back risk. so obviously, the securitized service loans, that could be impacted by the situation got so we don't have both facts you but i think it is something to be aware of and it's a serious issue we need to get to the bottom of. >> can you expand further, it seems that the face of large and small banks are really diverting
here, but the larger banks are doing much better. is that what, i mean -- >> well, they think, i think the smaller banks are getting healthier soon. it is not as fast as it is with the larger institutions. they are commercial real estate continues to weigh on the balance sheets, a lot of them. the smaller banks. community banks are diverting as well. their loan balance remains more confident for the larger institutions were we have seen more significant decline. so yes, they are a little behind the bigger banks but they are improving, also. [inaudible] >> the inspector general is conducting criminal investigations. >> i think it's important to distinguish, thank you, go join the civil litigation and the
fdic corporate initiates which is part of the ftse that complete autonomous as it should be. i think we've improved about 200 d. in no case that averaging present about to bring dollars in potential recovery. so we probably won't get all of that. and will be many more. i think, you know, if insurance is a very viable think about, and it does require high standards of prudence and care. on the other hand, you understand that it's important to be able to attract good board. we try to be very balanced, even, and targeted when we bring cases that generally for extra to directors, the criteria is gross negligence. and so there needs to be clear violation of obligations by the management and directors when we proceed. but when we do have that, we feel we are wise to proceed. they spend money that it costs bank but it can only cost taxpayers money, which backs the
deposit on. our ig is at a separate track with criminal investigations, which they coordinate with the fbi that and i would refer you to them in terms of commenting on any of that. a lot of that wall street article relates to the ig investigation. [inaudible] >> with that we can turn it over. >> thank you very much. >> considering the 0.1%, the decline in loan balances, the trajectory seems to be going up. so how confident are you that that will turn positive next quarter? >> these cycles tend to run in
fairly predictable ways. we had a declining commercial loan balance in the last cycle, 13 consecutive quarter. once the recovery came it was pretty sustained. and so you've seen students cling of the balance sheet. using to the regular surveys that lending standards have stopped tightening and had begin to loosen somewhat. i do think low demand has lagged behind somewhat. large companies have gone straight to the market in recent years, and record values. bond issues that they're starting to come back a little more to banks and credit loans as well. small businesses have lagged behind somewhat. they are sink like a demand for their products. it's been a slow turnaround, but we think once it does take place, that it will be sustained. >> will be 0.1% against next quarter or will it be -- >> we don't have a prediction for what it will be next
quarter, but i think history shows that the cycles of contraction are sustained. they run their course and then the cycle of expansion are sustained and they run their course as well. we are poised to a cycle of expansion in the next couple of quarters. that's my expectation. >> i would add, many institutions are under tremendous amount of liquidity, as demand picks up, they are ready to extend lending. and i think that is certainly what we see as the economy picks up. and what we should see activity on the long side, too. spent another indicator we did see on the "salon" commitments expand for the first time in three years. again, that's kind of an indicator for the credit availability at least. they are expanding.
>> the chairman said -- sorry. the chairman talked about the need, looking forwards exactly, there's just no time for complacency, the adjustments are not over. as far as provisioning, are you getting any guidance to banks about banking -- backing off of the provisioning, what are you doing about it? if you're a worried about complacency. >> well, loan-loss reserve provisioning is one of the major, probably the major area focus of our on site dreams for all the regulators. this has been communicated directly to the institutions. and where institutions stand right now is very important to understand that if they are
seeing improvement, that this improvement can be sustained. and an understanding that, you know, certainly in the economic environment, which institutions are operating in come not to be too aggressive on holding back. >> it's kind of a unique and vibrant coastal have a high volume of problem loans out there that the economy is getting steady but it's a slow expansion to a really hasn't reduce unemployment all that much to date. so i think in that environment i think banks are trying to find the right level of how much they can reserve going for. all we're doing is asking them to take into account that uncertainty, make sure that they are prepared for dealing with the problems that still exists on the balance sheet spent and as the chairman noted, most banks are still increasing their reserves at this stage.
the oval industry aggregate is being driven by reductions, kind of leading the way out to the recovery. >> have you given any extra guidance with regard to the foreclosure mess? and potential for cutbacks, things like that. additional guidance their, and any instructions to make sure that their provisioning for those? >> the agencies are in the process of doing some on site evaluations of institutions with the largest mortgage banking operations. and once that information is gathered, and covers all the items you just mentioned, that there definitely will be some guidance to follow. >> was there a factor besides
the decline in loan balances that you attribute to the strong capital growth? >> no. actually, i think we indicated that have a substantial increase, the largest we've seen. and i think -- i don't have a particular list of the specific institutions. we did the capital ratios improving across the institutions, apart from the decline in assets. so i think we did see some substantial improvement in capital positions. it was not confined to just a few institutions. >> but that's because institutions are deploying capital? >> no, they were adding to the capital. and it was, you know, for the most part, it was through means other the retained earnings, but we did see, in absolute capital balance, a substantial amount.
>> this process the balance sheet repair, it has involved lending restraint, tighter lending standards for sometime. that is starting to fall at this point that it has involved david and policy, retaining earnings and things of that sort as well. it's sort of a combination of factors that go capital, recognizing capital, recognizing loan losses and moving the balance sheet to a stronger position. going forward that's a sign of strength for that any capacity of the industry. it may not occur to today but i think going forward, the industry is in a much better position from a balance sheet perspective in terms of loss recognition and in terms of capital to make loans, as that low demand materializes. we see the u.s. auto fleet, trucking fleet getting older. it will need replacement. and we see businesses, middle-market for example, starting to build inventories. that's leading to some low demand now. the industry has improved its balance sheet positioned to meet
>> "the communicators" is on location this week in downtown washington, d.c., at the government 2.0 summit sponsored by o'reilly media. and our topic this week is open government and telecommunications policy. here's our lineup. first up is david eaves from vancouver candidate he is from the center of the study of democracy. you we talk about how the canadian government uses technology to create more access to government. after him, stacey donahue. she is there investment director and this foundation invest in technologies to increase access to government worldwide. and, finally, we will talk with attending pundit and she uses her blog and technology to increase access and awareness of politics in africa. first up, davies of canada. what do you do for the city of vancouver candidate? >> i advised the mayor and
council around open government and open data. >> what is open government? >> it is this idea that would have better access to decision-making, to information, for the machinery of government and they will have access, citizens are more informed, are better able to influence decisions. and can actually self organize and tragic create services and help themselves rather than just relying on government. leverage your comment has done. >> how this technology help the? >> think a lot of governments have always strived to be open. especially in right from the very beginning there was we'll going to print everything and share everything. there's been a strong history of trying to open up governments as well. that technology has changed how we do that. now we live in an era where with digit integers, we are able to
transmit huge quantities of information to citizens or interests. the real question is how to not overwhelm them, how do we get away they can search it and use it to make it real for them, and do whatever they want. >> in the resolution, you called for vancouver to think like the web. what did you mean by that? >> so, the go read and think like the web, if you look at how the internet works, huge conversation going on. where anybody can come on the states. they can leverage the work that other people have done. so if you have a webpage and you write a blog, i can comment or i can come in and build and leverage what you have done. for those who work in the open source space, i actually take your coat and i can go and build something that is different, better, that suits my needs. and that's kind of what made innovation happen on the web. the question is how can we take that exciting process, and what
can we learn from it, and then apply to government. here's this huge opportunity to engage citizen, how public servants work together, how to deliver services what the web does. >> how connected is vancouver's? >> vancouver is a very blessed city. where the huge software industry, a huge videomaker in vancouver. we have a strong developer community. a lot of the innovations around video on the internet took place early on in vancouver. i would say it's a very connected city. and that means many community of people who naturally understand opportunity of the web and what it could mean for government. >> once the government support of broadband expansion in candidate? >> in canada, it's a great question because the united states is a big country, but canada is bigger but more sparsely populated. you have to think of the united states but with one-tenth the number of people.
that means you have huge distances between towns. so you're getting broadband, an enormous question in canada, one of the main issues that governments have to tackle with. before broadband them how to get phones into rural communities. this has been a long-standing issue so the government plays a relatively active role in trying to guide. they take a direct role in getting broadband. >> how so? >> they will sometimes have investment requirements. sort of -- >> requires? >> and originally, the telco is government owned. in canada, a huge problem, i grew up in a country every province had its own telco. telco. that is because the government, such an important thing that citizens need to have and it wasn't for the private sector could bridge these huge distances and to government picked that roll up. those have since been privatized. >> and how much government
support subsidies, how much is spent annually, do you know? >> no. on broadband i know enough to be dangerous. so i should be careful about how much, i don't know specific numbers. >> we had an ongoing debate and it's kind of increased here in this country, on the issue of privacy, and online privacy, telecommunications policy. where is the debate in canada on that issue of? >> candidate is a little bit of a leader in this space, and that's in part because we have the prevention which is like a state level, many other provinces, but the federal level as well. we have an office of the privacy commissioner. passed with thinking of nothing but privacy. and not just within government, not just what information does government have and had we want to manage the information and make sure it is used judiciously and how we keep it private. but also how we look at as an
industry. what did they say what of industry practices going on. it's this advocate for issues of privacy. they have been very aggressive, especially doing with some of the social networks, they spoke. very concerned and very aggressive and always looking at one of the privacy considerations we need to be think about. i think it is very, very will serve in this area. >> is vancouver one big hot spot? >> no. there is not, kind of a citywide hotspot in vancouver. an action item of a single city in canada that has that. there may be one. i don't know, but i do know that what's been interesting, sort like montréal and toronto there've been efforts to self organize hotspot. communities of people coming together and trying to create kind of a one big citywide hotspot. sometimes it is organizations working on their own. they had mixed success.
there are places where you get good coverage. >> in a recent column, david eaves, you will know, you quoted john gilmore, the net interprets censorship as damage and routes around it. what does that mean for? >> so, you know, when you were trying to access something on the internet, you know, you are trying to block access to a site, one of the great things of the internet, is it because it is decentralized there are multiple routes to get information. so if one route is blocked, the internet will try to find other routes around that to get to it. so rather than saying the bloc as some kind of the end-all to all. it treats it as a bug, a problem. and i use that code in a very specific context because i'm interested in accessing information in government. and one of the things that i see happening is you look at things like freedom of information request, or in canada we call the access to information.
.. >> they look at the way their government operates and the way that it shares information, and they see it as a bug. they don't see that as an is end bl operating parameter. so i see theme say we've got to reduce by days or even by weeks, and i'm like, you have to be thinking radically differently about this problem. you need to completely collapse this timeline if you want to have a citizenship that is active and engaged and to broaden the number of people who
want to be interested in what government's doing. a lot of people are quite happy to make us wait, but i think we can do better. >> host: what is the access to the federal government in canada online? >> guest: so in the united states -- that's a large question, so i'm going to kind of focus in on what i think people here are most excited about which is open data, and that's certainly the work that, you know, we've been doing in vancouver. you know, open data, you have data.gov, day to.gov.u, here you have databases they have internally and looking at how we can share information about crime, about egg, information -- education, in addition about health care. actually the raw data itself so people might be able to do interesting things with it. in canada what i see going on at the municipal level, there's a real interest in this, and i
think that's partly becauseties are o close to citizens and he was so few -- they have so few resources, they're looking to share information with citizens because the demand is always immediate. it's right in the politicians' face all the time, so they've been kind of the forefront, and vancouver's been leading that charge in canada. but at the federal level it's been much, much slower. we don't have anything like data .gov. i think something's going to happen on the horizon, but how much further behind are we going to slip? it's certainly an area of concern for people like me. >> host: so what are you doing p, david eaves, at a government 2.0 conference? this. >> guest: i wrote a chapter in tim o'reilly's recent book "open government." i'm interested in what open government means for how government's going to change. a lot of people are interested in the citizen side, and i do a lot of work there, but people don't seem to be talking about how the role of the public servant is going to change in a world of e-enabled and gov 2.0
world. i think the processes they use are going to change, the way they view their world, the way they view their job, so i write a bit about that, and i'm also here to talk about what's going on in vancouver and some of the exciting things that are taking place. >> a segment from this week's "communicators" program which you can see tonight at 8 eastern on c-span2. going live now to the brookings institution here in washington. the senate foreign relations committee has passed the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty calling for nuclear arms reduction by the u.s. and russia, but the full senate hasn't taken it up just yet. today act academics will discuse prospects for ratification by the senate and the ramifications if treaty does not pass. this is live coverage on c-span2. >> i think we'll first go aheadd
begin, and i wanted to welcome everyone here. i'm a senior fellow at brookings, and we're delighted to have you here to discuss the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty and the future of nuclear deterrence, nuclear safety, nuclear arms control. and we have a very good panel that's discussed these issues before publicly and in a working group last year that the american enterprise and brookings ran to discuss these issues with you this morning. so i'm delighted to see everybody here, struggling back after thanksgiving weekend. i think we can formally mark today, also, as the end of the washington redskins' season, so that allows us to fully embark on discussion of topics like this as we await the return of our senators and members of congress for the rest of the lame duck session during which the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty is on the agenda. i'm just going to say a couple words of introduction about our panelists, a couple words of introduction about the treaty itself, and then we'll just run down the line with presentations of about 8-10 minutes each.
and, again, we're talking about the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty, recently signed this year and awaiting senate consideration. but we'll also be talking more generally about the future of nuclear weapons, and we have different relative emphases on those two questions. and, of course, you're or invited to raise whichever parts of the broader subject you like in discussion. sitting to my left is steve pfeiffer who's my colleague here at brookings and one of the nation's expert negotiators and practitioners as well as academics on nuclear arms control. former member of the state department, worked a great deal on the inside process of treaty negotiations during his time in government. also as u.s. ambassador to ukraine and has written prolifically since coming to brookings a couple of years ago on arms control, and i will briefly take the opportunity to advertise his new paper, the next round of nuclear weapons,
and i think steve will make a case largely in support of the treaty. going down the line, keith payne is the president and ceo and founder of the national institute for public policy, and you'll find many of its publications and information at nipp.org. he is the author of the great american gamble. he is a foremost expert on nuclear deterrence, former pentagon official and also a member of the congressional commission on the strategic posture of the united states. and, again, i was honored to be part of the working group last year with keith who is extraordinarily thought-provoking and, perhaps, will raise some different points of view on the future of new s.t.a.r.t. and arms control from what you will have heard up until that point. tom donnelly is at the american enterprise institute and also a distinguished author who has written a number of books largely on ground forces and conventional combat. but all the more reason why, i think, it's important to have tom on the panel because he
brings, of course, a perspective on the interrelationship between different military forces, different military capabilities and the relative role of nuclear weapons in broader national security policy. and tom's forthcoming paper is "toward a new, new look: strategy and forces for the third nuclear age." his most recent book is a 2010 publication with fred kagan, "lessons for a long war: how america can win on new battlefields." and before turning over to steve, i'll briefly mention my most recent book on this subject is called a septic's case for -- skeptic's case for disarmament. the vision that president obama along with people like george shultz and henry kissing ger, sam nunn and bill perry have articulated of a world someday free of nuclear weapons, whether that would be a good thing, a feasible thing or in any way relevant to the issues on the
agenda for the united states, in any case. so let me just briefly remind you in two sentences that this new s.t.a.r.t. treaty that is being considered by the senate would lower our overall deployed strategic forces by somewhere between 10-30% depending on how the two countries, russia and the united states, would choose to posture their forces. it would not effect tactical nuclear weapons mean, of course, short-range weapons, surplus nuclear weapons, weapons that are in a stockpile but not directly associated with any particular war plan or delivery vehicle or missile defense even though there's been, as you know, a great deal of controversy about even the mention in the treaty's preamble to the possible association in russian eyes between missile defenses and offensive arms. and that's become a summit of controversy, but -- subject of controversy, but there are no binding restrictions whatsoever on missile defense in the treaty. there is no differential or distinguishing between a
nuclear-armed long-range icbm or slbm, a long-range missile, and a conventionally-armed one. and for those people who are interested in the question whether we can put conventional warheads on previously nuclear specific systems, there is no allowance, so it counts against your treaty limits. these are a few of the points that will come up in discussion, but again, to emphasize the big picture, we're looking at 10-30% reductions in deployed strategic forces and a resumption of the verification measures that are now lapsing from previous arms control accords. that's the basic, immediate issue, but we'll be talking more generally about everything under the sun that's nuclearnd with that i will turn things over to steve piper. >> thanks, mike. i'm happy to be here to talk about both the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty, but then what comes after it, what's the next step. let me begin by reminding of the three basic limits. first, the united states and russia would be limited to no more than 1,550 strategic
warheads, warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles and then each heavy bomber would count as one under the 1550 count. there's a second limit which is each side can deploy no more than 700 launch ballistic missiles and heavy bombers and a third limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed icbm launchers and heavy bombers. a nondeployed launcher would be, for example, a ballistic submarine tube with no missile in it. typically, two of our submarines in long-term overhaul with no missiles onboard. they would count as nondeployed launchers under the 800 limit. let me talk why i believe the treaty is in the u.s. interest and why i hope it will be ratified fairly quickly. first of all, it will reduce and cap the level of russian strategic nuclear forces. now, i don't lie awake late at
night worried about a russian nuclear attack, but i think americans are safer and more secure if the russian force is reduced and limited. second, new s.t.a.r.t. treaty contains a wide range of verification measures; detail exchange, notifications, on-site inspections that are going to give the u.s. military a lot more information about russian strategic forces than the u.s. military would otherwise have. and that means the u.s. military will be in a position where it can avoid worst-case assumptions, it can make smarter decisions about how it e win r quip t -- equips and operates u.s. forces. although the treaty will require some reductions on the u.s. side, the department of defense has looked carefully at how it can make use of the full numbers allowed to it under new s.t.a.r.t., and the result will be a u.s. strategic deterrent that is agile, survival bl and robust, capable of deterring attack against the united states and also against american allies. and, fourth, bringing the new
s.t.a.r.t. treaty into force is going to strengthen the u.s. hand in terms of raising the bar against proliferation, and it's also going to contribute to a stronger u.s./russia relationship. and we've already seen over the last 15 months how as the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty's been developed you've seen a better relationship with moscow that has yielded some specific benefits. in terms of russia helping to provide more access to provide supplies to american and nato forces in afghanistan, and i think most importantly over the last year and a half you've seen russia take a much tougher attitude towards iran on the nuclear question that was the case in the previous seven years, and i think that flows from the reset which has been driven to a fair degree by the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. i do believe that the new s.t.a.r.t.'s treaty's going to be ratified in the end, i think the arguments in its favor are compelling, and i guess at the end of the day it's difficult for me to see how serious republican senators, in the end, can justify opposing a treaty that has been supported unanimously by the joint chiefs
of staff, by the commander of strategic command who operates all u.s. strategic nuclear forces, by seven of his predecessors and by every senior serious republican statesman, every republican former secretary of state, former secretary of defense and former national security adviser who has endorsed it. so i'm optimistic regarding ratification and entry into force. i'm not smart enough to say when it will happen. i hope it will happen sooner because i think gaining access to the verification measures and t transparency measures in that treaty will begin to give us information about russian strategic forces that we have not been receiving, now, for the last year since s.t.a.r.t. i lapsed in 2009. when it comes into force, there's the question what comes next. and president obama has already said that he envisages a step by step process of reducing nuclear forces. i'm not sure the russians are
all that enthusiastic about further cuts, but they have not only committed in joint statements to such a step by step process, and when you get into that, you have to look at a number of questions that may arise. only of them are predictable. one, you know, what would be the level of deployed strategic warheads under a new treaty? the would the sides want to go below 1550 and, if so, how far? second, if you're going to reduce strategic warheads, would you also reduce strategic deliverly vehicles and launchers below the 700 and 800 limits in new s.t.a.r.t.? but also going beyond that i think the sides are going to go into some new territory. president obama, when he signed the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty in april of this year, said that the next round should address nonstrategic and non-deployed strategic weapons, and that's going to get the sides into new territory. negotiating limits on tactical nuclear weapons is not going to be easy for a couple of reasons. first of all, the russians have a large numerical advantage, and
whenever you have this kind of disparity, it's always difficult to negotiate an equal outcome. moreover, though, the russians because they perceive that their conventional forces have disadvantages vis-a-vis nato and china, they've adopted nato nuclear strategy from the 1960s and '70s and now see tactical nuclear weapons as an offset to conventional disadvantages. so that's going to compensate a negotiation. moreover, you're going to have new verification challenges. when you look at the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty, a lot of the verification measures are focused on strategic warheads. when you begin to talk about tactical weapons, you're likely to talk about weapons that have been not sitting with delivery systems, and that's going to pose a set of verification challenges that neither the united states or russia have had to yap l with confer -- grapple
with before. you talking about warheads separated from missiles. although there may be kind of an interesting dynamic on the non-deployed strategic warhead side because that will be likely an area of u.s. advantage. the united states plans to achieve most of its limits over the new s.t.a.r.t. by downloading missiles, that is keeping the missiles, but taking warheads off. so, for example, the minuteman iii icbm will be deployed with just a single warhead. those extra warheads will be stored somewhere, they won't be limited in the immediate future, and that would give the united states the potential should the russians, for example, violate the treaty, to put those warheads back on, to upload warheads. the russians appear to be keeping their residual missiles with full warhead sets, so they're not going to have that capability, and that u.s. advantage in terms of non-deployed strategic warheads may offer a bit of bargaining
leverage on the tactical side. other questions that may come up, the russians, i suspect, will raise missile defense again in the next round of negotiations, and i think there is potentially a dilemma for the administration. because the russians will seek or i believe will seek some kind of constraints on missile defense. i don't detect any interest on the part of the administration in negotiating on limits on missile defense, and i think the administration also understands that any treaty on strategic offensive arms that work to contain meaningful constraint would be dead on arrival when it went to the senate for ratification. so there is this potential box here. the one way out may have been articulated about eight days ago at lisbon when russian president medvedev met with nato leaders and expressed interest in working towards nato/russia cooperation on missile defense. and if you could have, in fact, genuine cooperation between the united states, nato and russia on missile defense to provide missile defense protection for
europe, including european russia, that might change the dynamics surrounding the missile defense question. one issue that might come up would be the question of third country nuclear forces, particularly those of britain, france and china. and the lower that you push u.s. and russia numbers, the greater the pressure will be to bring other countries in although my sense is that u.s. administration folks would like to have one more negotiation that would focus just on u.s./russian forces before you got into the much more complex dynamic of bringing in other countries and making those negotiations multilateral. finally, these issues i address in the paper that mike mentioned at the beginning which is either now or will shortly be up on the brookings web site in talking about the next round, and in exploring the issues the paper also talks about what might be a u.s. position for the next round. and what i would suggest is looking for a limit of 2,500 total music lahr weapons counting everything except those
weapons that are in the queue for dismantlement. it would indeed strategic, tactical and deployed and non-deployed. and within that limit there would be a sublimit of 1,000 deployed strategic warheads that would correspond to the 1550 limit in the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. it'd basically allow a trade-off where the united states might have an advantage in nondeployed strategic warheads or the russians might have an advantage of tactical weapons in the context of an overall limit providing for equality. now, i think i should add in that kind of a limitation regime, you would likely have a two-tiered verification system in which you would have high confidence in your ability to monitor the limits on deployed strategic warheads, but you would have much less confidence this your ability to monitor limits on tactical warheads or on nondeployed strategic warheads. in the end, although that's an imperfect verification scheme, it gives you at least some limits and some reductions on
russian tactical weapons and some monitoring in contrast to the current system where, in fact, there are no constraints on russian tactical weapons and absolutely no monitoring. and then hopefully, as you go through that verification scheme you gather experienced expertise that would allow you to form a smarter very by case -- verification system for later on. this kind of agreement would, i think, require further reductions on the russian side but still would allow the united states to keep the strategic triad, although i think at that point when you're talking about a thousand warheads, you begin to come under a little bit of stress on the triad, and the pentagon probably has to make some decisions that will be a bit painful. in any case, all of this is the next step. the first step, really, is going forward in the immediate future to rat by case of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. >> thank you, steve. keith, over to you. >> thank you. it's a pleasure to be here this morning. i'd like to thank michael and stephen and brookings for the invitation to speak.
as a good academic, i usually look out 10-15-50 years in my discussions and writings, but today because new s.t.a.r.t. is an immediate concern and a subject of immediate attention, i'd like to comment on the process that has gone along with new s.t.a.r.t. in washington, because i think in this case the process has been important to the substance of the debate. obama administration efforts to garner senate support for ratification of this new s.t.a.r.t. treaty have met greater than expected resistance. and this resistance follows primarily from concerns about the various loopholes in the treaty's limits on forces, its narrow but explicit limits on missile defense and non-nuclear strategic missiles and also the treaty's significant weaking of s.t.a.r.t.'s past verification provisions. but it may well be that the
opposition to new s.t.a.r.t. and this resistance that we see has as much to do with the administration's mode of promoting the treaty as it does with the substance. senior members of the administration have contributed to skepticism about new s.t.a.r.t. by engaging in a pattern of mischaracterization and misdirection about the treaty while simultaneously being dismiss i have of reasonable -- dismissive of reasonable treaty concerns identified by knowledgeable commentators. for example, even before president obama and medvedev signed the treaty in april 2010, some u.s. commentators expressed concern that the administration would agree in new s.t.a.r.t. to limits on missile defense. russian commentators fanned this flame by frequently claiming that the treaty would, indeed, limit u.s. defenses.
in response, the administration assured all that there would be no such limits whatsoever. new s.t.a.r.t. was to be a treaty on strategic offensive forces, not on defensive forces. during an april 29 press conference to explain new s.t.a.r.t., the undersecretary of state for arms control and international security stated, i quote, the treaty does nothing to constrain missile defense. this treaty is about offensive strategic weapons. and, quote, there is no limit or constraint on what the united states can do with its missile defense system. further, quote, there are no constraints to missile defense. yet the actual text of the treaty shows russian commentators and u.s. skeptics to be correct. new s.t.a.r.t.'s article 5, paragraph 3 explicitly limits some u.s. missile defense options. and the treaty establishes a bilateral commission wherein missile defense can be the subject of further ongoing
secret discussions and possible limitation. the administration has repeated the false claim of no limits on missile defense so often and so defendtively that the -- definitively that the claim continues to be presented as erroneous fact by journalists sympathetic to new s.t.a.r.t.. several u.s. commentators, similarly, expressed concerns that the administration would allow russia to gain limits on prospective u.s. non-nuclear strategic forces under new s.t.a.r.t.. senior military commanders for years have pressed for non-nuclear strategic forces for prompt goal strike, and the u.s. senate specifically warned against any such limits in new s.t.a.r.t.. undersecretary talk abouter, again, assured that there is no effect for prompt global strike in the treaty. very much like missile defense, it doesn't have any constraints to it. the white house fact sheet on new s.t.a.r.t. posted on march
26th also assured us that, quote, the treaty does not contain any constraints on testing, development, or deployment of united states long-range conventional strike capabilities. this carefully-nuanced statement is precisely correct but wholly misleading. it would have been impossible to constrain u.s. current or planned capabilities for prompt global strike because no current or planned public program for deployment existed. in fact, the treaty explicitly constrains select options for these perspective weapons by counting them as if they were strategic nuclear warheads and launchers and limiting them under the treaty's ceiling on deployed nuclear warheads and launchers. the pattern of mischaracterization and misdirection is not limited to the two critical issues of missile defense and non-nuclear strategic forces. soon after the treaty text became available, several
commentators observed the rail mobile icbms, an old russian favorite, were not specifically defined in the treaty for elimination as they had been in previous, in the previous s.t.a.r.t. agreement. this raised the concern that rail mobile icbms had been carefully excluded from the treaty's limits. administration officials and treaty supporters, in general, dismissed this concern as absurd. yet when the senate demanded that the u.s. specifically state that the treaty does, indeed, limit rail mobile icpms -- icbms, constantine cose chof, the chairman of the russian duma committee responsible for treaties, stated in response that such a u.s. claim compelled the duma to stop action on the treaty. he noted critically, and i quote. the americans are trying to apply the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty to mobile icbms.
apparently, this problem identified early on by some commentators is not so outlandish. the pattern of mischaracterization and misdirection also extends to the repeated administration claims that new s.t.a.r.t. will reduce the number of deployed strategic warheads by the usual, and be i quote, and the usual number is about 30% below the 2200 maximum that was in the 2002 moscow treaty, close quote. however, the specific terms of the treaty actually permit the number of nuclear weapons to move higher than the 2200 maximum under the previous moscow treaty. despite the administration's repeated claims of 30% reductions, new s.t.a.r.t. would permit an increase in the number of strategic nuclear weapons because under new s.t.a.r.t. all the weapons on a bomber would count as only one warhead. even though some bombers are capable of carrying many more. long-range nuclear-armed cruise missiles, possibly on submarines
and ships, wouldn't be captured at all. a russian strategic expert, mikhail urbanov, described this slight of hand as, and i quote, nothing short of fraudulent. and clearly designed to mislead the public. nevertheless, the near universal talking point about new s.t.a.r.t. is this erroneous claim that it will reduce the number of nuclear warheads. usually the claim is by 30%. similarly, the obama administration has made much of the fact that new s.t.a.r.t. requires reductions not only in nuclear warheads, but in the number of strategic launchers. icbms, bombers and submarine tubes carrying those warheads. a fact that the administration typically has left unsaid in this regard, however, is that according to russia's own count of its strategic launchers as presented in the open russian
press, russia is already well below new s.t.a.r.t. launcher limits and is headed lower with or without treaty. in short, new s.t.a.r.t.'s strategic launcher limits impose reductions only on the united states. senator kit bond made this point during a senate floor speech on november 18th. the state department immediately responded with a continuation of mischaracterization and misdirection. i quote the response: the treaty does not force the united states to reduce unilaterally; rather, the treaty imposes equal limits on both parties, close quote. here the administration rightly claims that new s.t.a.r.t. mandates common limits on launchers but erroneously denies the fact that the u.s. alone must reduce its number of launchers to meet those limits. russia would have to build up its forces to do so. finally, the administration now claims that the lame duck senate must ratify new s.t.a.r.t.
immediately lest u.s. national security be seriously endangered. yet secretary of defense gates has stated repeatedly that russia poses no military threat to us or our allies. so why the urgency? this bit of illogic remains unexplained, and even "the washington post" labels such administration claims of urgency as, and i quote, overstatement and hyperbole, close quote. perhaps the administration' apparent treaty mischaracterization and misdirection would be less noxious if it was not also frequently so dismissive of the concerns raised by u.s. commentators. unfortunately, there are numerous illustrations of this behavior. for example, an assistant secretary of state reportedly observed that no one with any, and be i quote, pedigree has
raised concerns about new s.t.a.r.t.. this dismissive characterization manages to be simultaneously insulting and arrogant and nonsensical when notables such as james woolsey, the directer of central intelligence under president clinton, former undersecretary of state robert joseph and former undersecretary of defense eric edelman have all raised serious concerns about the treaty. in addition, undersecretary tauscher often refers to concerns about the treaty as red herrings. in testimony before the senate on june 17th, secretary of state hillary clinton suggested that those expressing concerns, and i quote, just don't believe in arms control treaties at all, and from my perspective are very, unfortunately, slanting a lot of what they say, close quote. so dismissing skeptics concerns has been the administration's consistent mode of operation
with regard to new s.t.a.r.t.. ironic given it own pattern of mischaracterization and misdirection and its calls for bipartisanship. the politics is a game of hardball, and as president harry truman famously observed, if you can't stand the heat, get out of the kitchen. treaty skeptics do not need, nor expect cheers from the administration, but the administration might ultimately fare better with new s.t.a.r.t. and even advance arms control a step if it shifted it current mode of operation and instead engaged concerns about the treaty seriously and thoughtfully. thank you. >> thank you, keith, for a very thoughtful presentation. tom, over to you. >> thanks, mike. keith very kindly set aside the art of the long term in his
presentation, so i'm going to take that as my theme. but before i do that i have but two words to stay on s.t.a.r.t.. in addition to being more a student of conventional military power and, thus, a student of warfare as opposed to all things nuclear, a former congressional staffer and thus a political hack who can count votes and who's read the constitution recently. and as an employee of the house of representatives, i'm also painfully aware of the rules of the senate. so i want to talk about the near-term politics of the s.t.a.r.t. deal as a way of suggesting why there's unlikely to be a vote during the lame duck session and to look ahead a bit. i think the administration could have had, as steve suggested,
ultimately will get senate ratification of the treaty, but they've not seriously engaged in making any concessions or any deal making particularly with senator jon kyl who is a man of pedigree when it comes to nuclear issues and the leading figure in opposition to the treaty as it currently stands. he's signaled the issues very clearly that he wants to be satisfied about, and i think certainly the senator himself but also his representatives have suggested what his price is. in particular, on upgrading missile defense investments and making a serious investment in the modernization of the nuclear infrastructure. not just for the purposes of enabling a test ban, further test ban treaty, but actually modernizing the prur in the event -- infrastructure in the event that the united states sees fit to produce nuclear
warheads in the future. i think that's a reasonable price, it is certainly senator kyl's price, but the obama administration having governed keeping 60 senate votes in mind up until this point has reached a juncture where it needs 67 votes and can't get them, and senator kyl is likely to be able to get, have more influence and be able to get more of what he wants in the coming session of congress. so i would say there's very little incentive for senator kyl to reach an agreement at this juncture unless the obama administration is willing to move the needle pretty substantially and make more commitments than it's been willing to make thus far, and the president himself is going to engage in these negotiations or deal with it at a much higher level than the administration has done heretofore. the president's priorities have been elsewhere, and i just, this
is sort of like an expanded version of the korea free trade deal in the sense that you can't get there from here in the time remaining. so that would be, i think, the one note that i could contribute about the current s.t.a.r.t. debate. but to lift our eyes up a little bit and look a little bit more to the larger picture and the longer term, the connection between nuclear issues and the larger questions of international politics and military correlations of forces as the soviets used to say are coming, becoming much more interrelated than they have been certainly during the late years of cold war. when it was the prussian nuclear weapons were qualitatively different, particularly at the levels that the soviet union and the united states enjoyed during the solid years of tens of
thousands of warheads quite capable of eradicating all human life on the planet, etc., etc. well, those days are gone, but it's also the case that the sort of bipolar international system of which the nuclear balance was a reflection is also a thing of the past. why are we negotiating so assiduously with the soviet union? the soviet union is entirely unlike the united states except in the number of nuclear weapons that it has. the soviet union is an ex-superpower, a demographically collapsing state, a political-imploded empire, domestically its polls are highly underremitted and a resource extraction economy on a larger scale but not qualitatively different than
other second or third-rate countries on the planet. by contrast, the world that we see coming in the 31st -- 21st century, the multipolar world that everybody talks about features most prominently the rise of the people's republic of china as an international, global great power. a step behind that, the rise of india. but with many other factors that complicate international politics that are being propelled by the proliferation of nuclear weapons. thousand, the administration, quite rightly, spent a lot of time talking about proliferation, nuclear anti-proliferation efforts as a way to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists and other non-state actors, again, to use the term of social science euphemism. and that's a seriously terrifying prospect. so that's quite reasonable and no sensible american would stand
against that. of course, this treaty has almost nothing to do with that. the second feature of our nuclear future that we can clearly see is the rise of otherwise weak second-rate powers with iran and north korea being the leading edge examples, of aspiring and small nuclear states who are constantly trying to build larger arsenals, the efforts to contain north korea's program as we just heard again in recent weeks has not been successful. likewise, it's highly unlikely that any effort to prevent iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, and then of obtaining a militaryically-significant arsenal, again, not measured in the thousands or tens of thousands of warheads, but certainly measured in the dozens, if not low hundreds over
the course of time. seems highly unlikely. and those data points, those facts are creating uncertainty and instability and new questions about the need for nuclear weapons among not only other points and enemies and adversaries of the united states such as venezuela and hugo chavez's regime, but by america's friends. the conversation that we've heard as the wikileaks stories over the weekend suggest, the prospect of an iranian bomb is deeply terrifying to the arab screams of the persian gulf -- regimes of the persian gulf region and other possibly unsavory but long-term strategic partners, if you will, of the united states.
secretary clinton, i think, quite rightly but without much discussion extended an offer of deterrence to the gulf states about 15 months ago x that pressure -- and that pressure is likely to expand. the demand for american security guarantees in the face of nuclear proliferation is already increasing and is likely to increase ever more as time goes forward. and finally as i suggested, the larger great power ce decision will inevitably lead to modernization and expansion of now-small arsenals as we see in china, in india, in pakistan, for example, although where exactly in what category if not all three categories that i've laid out one should put pakistan would be a subject for yet another panel.
but at any rate, this is by any measure and by many measures an entirely different future than our cold war past. all the things that we told ourself ourselves were stable and predictable and negotiate bl about cold war past do not obtain in the future. i noted in steve's presentation one of the great debates in the negotiating community is when do you expand the realm of negotiations to include third parties? an interesting question, but as steve suggested, much more meddlesome and complex set of negotiations that, again, i think will make our cold war ongoing negotiations with the soviet union and after the cold war with russia look like child's play. the fact is there is no international consensus for
nuclear disarmament, and that's the only way one can explain the behavior of those who feel threatened by american conventional power and who have their own regional ambitions or own domestic regimes stability ambitions as the north koreans do. so if we're so uncertain about what the future is going to be like except to say that it's going to be deeply unlike our past experience, why should we be continue to be locked like two scorpions in a bottle to use the cold war metaphor with the russians? we don't know what's coming, and that's exactly the point. we don't know what kind of arsenal we will need, although we do know that the need to respond to very different music lahr crises -- nuclear crises and potentially nuclear use and in the face of very different
nuclear threats is a certainty. so why should we continue to go down this road with the russians? even if s.t.a.r.t. treaty itself is ultimately ratified, it doesn't really address the most pressing nuclear questions that face us now and will face us in the future. and we don't know what kind and what array of nuclear capabilities with will need -- we will need. but, again, it's almost certain that we will need some form, probably more varied forms, of nuclear weapons ourselves. so now is a good time to open the aperture, to take the longer view and ask ourselves not what deal can we reach with the russians, but what set of deals, what kind of arms control
agreements will actually secure americans in the future, and what kind of deterrent arse mall do we need to -- arsenal do we need to respond to a future that 's almost impossibly different from the past? here endth the lesson. >> thank you, tom. we're anxious to get you involved in the discussion. i'm going to use my mini presentation, now, to make a couple of comments in support of new s.t.a.r.t., and then we'll go straight to a discussion, and i think other panelists may want to comment during the course of that on each other's remarks as well, and we'll engage you in that conversation. i think as i expected there have been some very thoughtful comment from various perspectives on this issue, and i for one would also like to say as a supporter of the treaty that i think senator kyl is being entirely sincere and serious in the issues that he raises. i think that there is not politics in what he's doing, and republicans in the last two years have proven that they're willing to be supportive of
president obama on foreign policy issues in general where they agree with him. the politics have been largely relegated to domestic and economic matters. this is not a defense of either party's overall approach, but it is a little bit of an after my mission of the old adage that politics should stop at the water's edge. actually historically, poll sticks does not stop -- politics does not stop at the water's edge, but we've had issues like iraq and afghanistan and sanctions on iran. so i think in general i take as face value senator kyl's arguments that he has the kinds of questions on his mind that keith payne and tom donnelly have raised today as opposed to wondering whether this is the moment to give the obama administration a political boost or not. having said that, let me now make a few arguments in favor of new s.t.a.r.t., and i think easily the most important is that, in fact, the obama administration is correct when it says that new s.t.a.r.t. has helped improve u.s./russia strategic cooperation in general
on other issues. the treaty, in my mind, while it can be critiqued here and there, and keith's done a very good job on some specific points, nonetheless, the generally solid enough that i don't worry about whether in theory the bomber loophole could allow one side or the other to theoretically increase its forces, and i'm not too worried about how one particular way we could deploy missile defense may be constrained because the overall possibilities for missile defense are, generally, wide open for american and russian consideration. but what i'm interested in is seeing that the u.s./russia relationship is, actually, i think, much improved, and this is not, by the way, a critique of how the u.s./russia relationship or arms control were handled under george w. bush. i actually agreed pressure with his approach to arms control which was essentially to say the u.s./russia strategic detail should matter anymore the way it used to. let's just do a three-page
treaty, let's agree among gentlemen -- mr. putin, mr. bush -- to reduce forces. we don't need all these lengthy consultations, let's just do something fast, and that happened in may 2002 in the sort treaty, as you may recall. but unfortunately over time it didn't really seem to work in the sense that it did not improve the u.s./russia strategic relationship adequately. and i think this was primarily because russia wasn't fully ready to move beyond classic arms control and also felt it was losing a little pit of clout internationally -- little clout internationally, and, of course, the bush administration was controversial in other ways on other issues. and that led to a situation where, in fact, russia wanted to resume a classic form of arms control. i basically see no harm in it. i think the new s.t.a.r.t. tree treaty is generally sound, and i think it's improved our security is other ways. it has certainly, i believe, fostered a better spirit of u.s./russia cooperation on the northern distribution network of
shipping supplies into afghanistan where we don't want complete dependence on pakistan as our only way in for nato supplies through that important war effort that now involves 145,000 foreign troops who require an enormous number of supplies. and as you know, in much of the early years of the war russia either opposed or tried to interfere with hipping of supplies through -- ships of supplying through its own territory or through former soviet republics. and now we've seen a mellowing of that to the point depending on where which supplies you're looking at, 30-40% of nato supplies are coming in through the north. that's a huge improvement, and it's not just important numerically, it also may strengthen our hand a little bit dealing with pakistan to remind pakistan that, in fact, we don't depend on them exclusively and entirely the way they once must have, once might have thought. and this is important as we seek to pressure pakistan, frankly, to work harder against the
afghan insurgent sanctuaries on its territory. i know i've come a long way from icbms to the haqqani network, but linkage is real, and i do believe we're seeing benefits in russian cooperation in afghanistan because of this generally-improved relationship which is partially due to giving russia what it asked for which is a formalized arms control process yet again. just mention one more issue, and again in the spirit of bipartisanship or nonpartisanship that i think, i hope is present across our entire panel, and i certainly heard that today with just very serious, substantive arguments. but a point i would make in fairness to the bush administration, i think that in their earlier years or their years in office not only did they have a very reasonable approach towards trying to limit offensive arms in a way that was consistent with our interests of the day and consistent with the
nature of american interests in general, but, in fact, russia was willing to start putting greater pressure on iran in that period of time as well under george w. bush, and it was gradually increasing. and some of the sanctions that undersecretary levy began to impose, some of the not just u.n. sanctions, but informal cooperation across major powers was starting to improve in the '07-'08 time period, and i give the bush administration credit, i think, for trying to identify that issue, some of these mechanisms of working more effectively, putting pressure on iran's high technology sectors, on its banking industry. some of this was done officially, again, at the u.n., some of this more unofficially, but it had begun in that period of time. but it has accelerated under president obama, and we have seen more u.n. resolutions, more u.n. sanctions and more international cooperation including, now, russia being willing to stop the shipment of
advanced sa-10 surface to air missile batteries to iran partly as a result of this improved u.s./russia relationship which is, again, helped along by the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. so i don't want to get into the details any more than i already have on the specifics of the treaty. it's not to say that we should sign a bad treaty to do good things elsewhere, but the treaty whatever minor or even mid-sized flaws it may have or points of stipulation that may not be quite as ideal as some would prefer is generally solid. it allows us to do everything we need to with our nuclear and conventional and missile defense forces in the foreseeable future as far as i'm concerned, and it helps u.s./russia's strategic relations on other issues that are arguably even more pressing and get to some of the matters tom donnelly was talking about with some other countries' nuclear ambitions. so for these reasons i strongly
support it and look forward very much, thousand, to the conversation with you all on new s.t.a.r.t. or any other issue in the future of nuclear deterrence or nuclear arms control that you'd like to raise. so, again, please, for the benefits of the tv cameras and us, identify yourself, wait for a microphone first and then, please, pose a concise question. we'll begin here in the front row, please, and then move back to the third row. >> thank you very much. my name is monzer, center for american and arab studies, think tank monitor. it seems to me the nuclear club also called nuclear club has been expanding lately, and the prospect of expansion is on the horizon. and i think even the issue of of iran probably going to end up guiding the arab gulf states and
other states like egypt and others to renew their effort to have to establish their nuclear programs. so the question is what is the mechanism with this treaty and any future treaties to get rid of nuclear weapons, of weapon of mass destruction? it seems to me mr. donnelly in particular, i sense that he's looking into new forms of nuclear weapons for the united states to introduce more weapons instead of reduction of weapons. the question remain for the rest of the world and for united states, how we can get rid of weapon of maas destruction and why -- mass destruction, and why we don't go through the issue of nuclear-free zone or weapon of mass destruction-free zone for each continent like some
continent already started. and we put this goal and then everything will be measured toward that goal. >> let me say one brief word and then ask ourselves because that's the topic of my book, and i would just quickly say that i don't think this panel would all agree on the desirability of that goal of a nuclear-free world. and certainly there's no particular linkage between the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty and prejudging the long-term ability of the world to reach that conclusion. now, i'm a skeptic who supports the vision of a nuclear-free world, but i think it's several decades into the future, and i'm wary about -- especially in the middle east -- rushing too much towards that destination at a time when, as you say, we see trends in the other direction. a lot of americans worried -- a lot of american allies worried about whether the u.s. nuclear commitment is strong enough. so i volunteer myself to start the answer just because even though i'm a supporter of this vision, i'm pretty skeptical of
how much we can fast forward the process in the next few years in the middle east. let me go down the aisle, down the panel here. steve? this. >> yeah. let me say i agree with the idea that we ought to have the objective of a nuclear-free world out there although at this point i'm not sure whether we can reach it. i can see steps getting in that direction, but a lot of things have to happen. keith and i were talking earlier, we actually might agree if we could get to a non-nuclear world with all the provisions, that's probably a good thing. the debate is how likely it is to get to those because they require fundamental changes in the the political relationships. the united states might say a non-nuclear world from our perspective is not bad. we have a powerful conventional force, we have the pacific ocean, the atlantic ocean and friendly neighbors. you know, if you're another country, though, you may not have that positive geopolitical setting, and you may have a different view. and until you can get that country to feel likewise
comfortable, that country's going to have, i think, hesitations about giving up its nuclear weapons. i think tom made a valid point although i think i've come to a different conclusion. as we think about, you know, u.s. nuclear weapons in a broader contest we do have to worry not just about russia and china, but all the other countries out there with nuclear weapons. although when i look at a u.s. strategic force of 1550 deployed strategic warheads or even a thousand strategic warheads if you wanted to go what i would see is perhaps the next step, it seems to me that that lev of forces is going to be sufficient to deter russia, china and anybody else. if country x is not going to be deterred by a thousand strategic warheads, they're probably not going to be deterred by 5,000, so you're going to have to come up with some other way to effect the calculations.
>> keith? >> i'm a bit agnostic on the goal, i must say, of nuclear disarmament because we've seen what a non-nuclear world looks like. it looked like the first half of the last century. it looked like world world war d world war ii with somewhere around 120 million casualties. i don't think that was a very attractive world, and i think pining to go back to that world, as i said, i'm agnostic about that possibility or the possibility of that as a goal to aspire to to. as long as nuclear weapon withs provide a profound deterrent effect, it seems to me they're enormously important for us, they're enormously important for many other countries. let me add to that briefly because the bipartisan strategic posture commission, i believe, got it right with regard to the goal of nuclear zero. the bipartisan commission said nuclear zero will be feasible with the transformation of the
world order. i would agree with that. i believe nuclear zero will be feasible, even admirable as a goal with the transformation of the world order. the question in the back of my mind is whether that transformation is feasible. if last 2,000 years of history give us indication of what may be possible in the future, the answer is that level of transformation of the world order is not possible. the league of nations was an effort to create collective security to end international war. it failed. the united nations was an effort to create a collective security system to end international war. so far it's failed to do that. so in my mind absent a collective, a reliable, trustworthy, collective security system that can provide security for all members, nuclear zero will be very difficult to get
to, probably impossible. because members will want to retain the great deterrent power of nuclear weapons. and let me say, lastly, that i think nuclear zero is the wrong goal. in general. i would much prefer to see zero weapons of mass destruction. if we're going to have a goal that's a visionary goal, that's a goal to aspire to. it should be zero weapons of mass destruction. because we don't want biological weapons which can be every bit as devastating as nuclear weapons. very difficult to get rid of all nuclear weapons if biological weapons are going to remain out there, because some countries are going to want to retain a nuclear retent to deter bioattack. so i'd much rather see the goal zero weapons of maas destruction if we're going to, essentially, posit a goal to aspire to.
>> but you asked will we need different kinds of nuclear weapons to deter iran. i don't actually know the answer to that question, but i think it's an open question. and the cold war we had, many times, intermediate-range nuclear forces. as others have suggested there was a whole tactical, you know, which on the american side, said some absurdities as the davy crockett nuclear bazooka. so not that that was, you know, a very useful solution your that we do ourselves and and justice if we think that was just that the people who are trying to solve those problems were completely misguided and didn't know what they were thinking. in other theaters of the world, east asia, there's a huge ballistic missile competition going on. there's nothing so destabilizing as to east asia as the expansion
of the chinese of ballistic and cruise missiles. that's again that we are constrained from entering because pass deals with the ex-soviet union. so, again, i just think we have to confront the world as we find it. you know, treaties litigating, traditional tools of statecraft and strategy to achieve your goals in that world. but you can't simply export mechanisms in a wholesale fashion. from one strategic era to another, and expect there to be, yeah, perfectly effective and efficient in a way that you expected them to be. particularly with the strategic landscape is much more complex and a number of factors is much more diverse, and inspired by a
wide array of ideologies and geopolitical goals. so these are questions that we just need to ask and not foreclose answers now, because we are continuing as negotiators with russia. >> we don't have time to follow. take two questions at a time. both here in the third row if i could, then i will take responses. >> bruce smith, brookings, retired. thank you for your next -- very excellent panel. one was partially i think that in the first response, but let me repeat it, just to make sure we are talking clearly. is it the policy of the obama administration to declare, as a declaratory policy or rhetorical policy, or anything else, that they embrace and endorse a nuclear free concept?
i think that does have some bearing on whether we go beyond the current s.t.a.r.t., even if the rationale for the current s.t.a.r.t. make sense. the new s.t.a.r.t. of helping us and the issues, but secondly, it is contended in the administration, has given that impression, that they have met all of senator kyl's objections. they have given him more than he asked for comments or not he has welshed on his commitment to live up to the bargain. where i was hearing him yesterday on the news shows, he made a very persuasive case that the administration has not met his request for modernization upgrades, except again and the kind of lose, oh, yes, we agree with you, but they didn't practically commit query. is it the administration's
policy to strive for the nuclear, not merely to strive for, but to embrace it as a goal? and secondly, what is their policy on the strategic modernization? and in particular, senator kyl's request to modernize our facilities in los alamos. >> thanks, you can pass the microphone to the right. take that question also. >> thank you for the presentation. my name is anthony from china country media. my question is what about north korea? how should united states government do after the so-called facilities, in terms of anti-proliferation issues? and should the united states review its current policy towards this regime? thank you. >> why don't we go in the reverse order this time starting with tom if that's okay. any question you want, any or all. >> i would defer to others on
the administration's policy. the presence commitment to nuclear war i find was clearly stated and has a long-standing, there are still questions as if though that is their policy, that doesn't obligate them to take any particular set of next steps, the path to get there. unit, there are many paths to get there. my understanding is that senator kyl has been pretty consistent about what he has wanted from the s.t.a.r.t., so to speak. and that the particular investments in budgets proposed by the administration have not met his threshold tests, the administration's response has been we can't make commitments for future administrations. that said, there are clearly
things they could do to prepare for a long-term modernization of the facilities you described. and i would tend to think senator kyl is -- but i visit i have been privy to the description or discussions. so it's hard to judge from the outside. as far as north korea, again, i think that's another case that's illustrative of the world that i have been trying to describe in a very broad and general way. these are the kinds of nuclear issues that we are likely to see more of, and for which we do not yet have a very good response, and which are only tangentially related to either our overall relations with russia, and not at all related to our arms control negotiations with
russia. so, again, i would not -- my point is not s.t.a.r.t. per se is bad, although i think keith does raise some important issues that need to be addressed. and i would agree with senator kyl about the need for investments elsewhere. it's just that we are not devoting most of our efforts to the most critical problems that we face now, and which will only get greater in the future. >> keith? >> thanks. let me address the first question, and i believe it has to do with the obama administration's policy position concerning nuclear zero. a very good question. i would only point you to, for example, the 2010th nuclear posture review that the administration produced, which by and large i think is a very good document, congratulate the administration on the 2010 nuclear posture review. but if you look at that document, i believe it is page
six, what it says is that movement towards nuclear zero nonproliferation is the administration's highest nuclear policy and priority. highest nuclear policy and priority. the reason i mentioned that is because administrations in the past have given rhetorical support to nuclear disarmament. but they tended to balance that goal with the goal of maintaining nuclear deterrent, assuring allies with the extended nuclear deterrent, administration and it has to the goal of requirements for nuclear deterrence and assurance, and the goal of moving towards nuclear disarmament. really dramatic change in that icy and the kind of document that i referred you, is the comment that this is now the highest nuclear policy priority. which leads to concerns at least among some that what we will see is when trade-offs, the
trade-offs will be to the disadvantage of u.s. requirements for deterrence and assurance. the way that point is connected, i believe, with the other question concerning, for example, north korea's nuclear program, is that as we see the potential for nuclear proliferation continuing, continue a pace, north korea, possibly in iran, we see other countries now apparently interested in acquiring nuclear weapons. the concern is how do we assure our allies, how do we continue to assure our allies who live in these growing, increasingly dangerous neighborhoods? so for example, if north korea is going to stay with a nuclear capability as a strategic decision and modernize that, expanded nuclear capability, we need to expect that the requirements to assure japan and south korea, for example, are likely to change. they are likely to become deeper
and wider in scope. and so we as a country that provides these types of guarantees, they are very important to our structure, need to understand that to assure allies in the future, if nuclear proliferation does continue, will require us to be very agile, and listen closely to our allies about what they see the requirements are for their assurance against these emerging threats. i haven't noticed any conversation we had today, this is been very difficult of the types of debate in the united states. we tend to identify some number of weapons we associate with adequate for deterrence. and, therefore, say that a good number, and arms control can't attain that number and we are satisfied. that deterrence in the only goal for our strategic nuclear forces. yes, deterrence of enemies is a role for strategic nuclear forces. but assuring allies is also a
very important goal. and these are two different goals. i believe it was harold macmillan who said determined enemies probably makes 10% of what actually takes to assure allies. and so what you see a different requirements for what the u.s. force structure needs to be to provide these important roles of deterring opponents and assuring allies. and in particular, that radical i believe is going to become more challenging and require more of the united states if nuclear proliferation continues. >> looking at first a response to your question about why the obama administration is on a world free of nuclear weapons, i think when the president made his articulation of ago i think he was careful to say a lot of things have to happen in order to achieve that goal, and it probably wouldn't happen in his lifetime. i took it as a short reflection of some of the concerns we would
have, things have to be achieved in order to get to a nuclear zero. but is also having pretty clear, every time he is come back to the subject is made the point that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the united states needs to have a safe, reliable secure robust strategic nuclear deterrence. i think he is squared the circle. the second point if you go back to the spring about the time the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty was signed, the administration had a couple spending plans looking out over it 10 years. both with regard to the strategic triad, the icbms, and heavy bombers there but also with regards to modernization of the nuclear weapons complex, the national, and that infrastructure that maintains the actual weapons themselves. and what they announced in the spring was over the next 10 years the plan was $100 billion for the strategic triadcome and $80 billion for modernization of the nuclear weapons complex. which was i think about a 10 to 15% increase over the previous
plants. in response to senator kyl, i think i was in part to address senator kyle's concerns and the concerns of others, that if you're going to be reducing nuclear weapons you have to have confidence that nuclear weapons complex can support, in fact that the weapons are reliable. there's been a lot of exchanges going on over the last four months between administration officials, including the vice president and senator kyl on this question, and two weeks ago the administration said it was prepared to commit an additional four to $5 million to upgrade the nuclear weapons comment -- complex. we are not privy to those negotiations but it does sound like there is an effort on the part of the administration to address senator kyle's concern. and to assure him that it will be sufficient funds so that the weapons complex can support the nuclear arms for the future. my sense is the administration has gone quite far in this. i think there's a question now, how much more does it need to go
to secure senator kyl support? the last point, i would agree with keith. the point of nuclear weapons is not only to deter adversaries but also to assure allies, nato allies, also countries such as japan, south korea and australia. but from as far as i have seen allied government has spoken out under the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty has endorsed that treaty. so i thought from that the conclusion of the allies when you look at these treaties even within the reductions, at the end of the day strategic force that still leaves them ushered that that force cannot only deter attack on the united states but also extended deterrence to include them as well. >> let's go to the next round. start here with a gary and take one more as well and then go through the responses from the panel. so i guess here, and then in the middle, and then will have a set
of responses. >> thanks. gary mitchell from the mitchell report. i want to just say at the outset that i feel like i've paid some attention to this issue of this is far and away the best conversations i've heard about it. because i think it is laid out the complexity, which is really, which is very, very helpful trick it seems to me we have heard at least four points of view. one is the tree is good on its own merits, vote for. the other is the tree is good enough and is also important because it helps us in a long, other issues related to russia. the treaty has been badly misrepresented and has been badly handled politically, and, therefore, it is in trouble, and sort of if i can characterize train once, biden, this is not necessary the time to be
concerned about whether we close this deal in the next couple of weeks, but whether we take this opportunity sort of wide and the aperture, how the world will look further out. i threw in another one, which is not mind but you're probably familiar with the case that was made last week in an op-ed by jamie rubin about the fact that we don't need to do these big trees anymore because so much can get done under executive, executive deals and given the difficulty that non-parliamentary governments like ours have, we are to be thinking about that. and then mike also alluded earlier in his presentation to the notion that this sort of helps us with our discussions on the nuclear rising the world. if we do this deal it was sort of help smooth the path. and i wonder whether that is
aspirational or an actual sort of point of view. having said all that, when i'm interesting is not, whatever loved it is okay, how are you going to vote on this thing. because i did pretty clear sense and a couple of places and less clear in another sense. what i'd be interested in knowing is given everything that we have heard, each of your contributions and contributions of your partners, when push comes to shove, is there more upside in approving this treaty and uprooting it both during the lame-duck session, or is it more downside in doing that cracks and ? and if there's more downside in doing that, what is your recommendation about how we ought to move forward, how the senate ought to move forward on this? >> before your the vote of the senators, donnelly, we'll go to the next question and respond. >> i am not speaking for any
organization. is there any strategic utility for the u.s. to modernize nuclear weapons? and i'm changing, it's an extension of deterrence because we are assuring the allies that we will defend them against an attack to help deter anyone who could attack them. and related to this, is there any strategic advantage both high reliability for nuclear weapons? this just seems to be taken this as a given, but since the basic point of possessing the weapons is deterrence, not war fighting, any opponent cannot assume that a weapon won't work. so it is not useful. and, in fact, not very high deterrence, not very high reliability, although reliability of any particular warhead would work, that would actually make it so a first strike might be less likely for
whoever needs to ensure that a certain bomb goes off, could not be assured. assured that it does. spent quite a i start here and work down the other way. first of all my response would be i hear where you're coming from on this last question, but i would not support the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty, which i do emphatically. if i did not believe we could retain very high stockpiles assurance and confidence with that treaty, and also front with a comprehensive nuclear test ban. so i support both those accords, and believe we would have very high confidence in our arsenal. part of the reason being that we are seeing the plutonium pit ask hold up quite well. we see a lot of monitoring to the tune of six to $7 billion a year of stockpiles stewardship in various ways. and so i understand the debate centered how is having a with the administration. i think we're already doing a great deal to assure the reliability of u.s. nuclear arsenal. the question is what added steps may be needed in the future down the road, but i think america
can have confidence in the very high reliability of their nuclear arsenal today. a couple more specific things and i will be done and pass the baton to see. first in classification to jamie rubin's thinking that i believe he did want to see congressional action, not just executive he wanted to have law as opposed to treaty. what would guide some of our thinking, and that would allow a majority vote, a two-thirds vote. but, of course, in other, other countries will say that means the united states is not quite as committed as we like it to be, so there's a pro and con. very last point apply to support way down to a nuclear-free world, i do not support new tragedy for that reason that added new s.t.a.r.t. prejudge the pace at which we could pursue a nuclear-free world, i might not support it because i think we're a long ways away from being on that path that there are certain specific things i would like to see the next round of arms control do. for example, more focused on co-op the missile defense. and i applaud the elizabeth summit speaker would accomplish
but it hasn't translated into program. i would like to see some of the more had monitoring is steve pifer talk about. these are the things we have to learn more about and do a lot more of, even see if a nuclear-free world may someday be attainable. but ratify new s.t.a.r.t. does not prejudge that debate and i don't think one should apply otherwise. that without too much into this particular conversation. >> first of all, i emphatically support new s.t.a.r.t. i think it is good arms control but i think it also has other positive aspects such as on the u.s.-russian relationship. now, if the treaty doesn't get ratified, that may not be the end of the world but i don't know what 2011 timeframe looks like. i do think it is january our favorite with the new congress. how far back does that get pushed? that's why i worry that as of december 5, 6 days enough, we will be one year without the verification for the data exchange, that allowed
s.t.a.r.t. wondered how far do we stretch that out? the farther that goes, the more our confidence in our assessment of russia's strategic forces decline, it weakens. i think there is a certain, getting it sooner rather than later will limit that period of time when we don't have inspectors on the ground, when we don't have data exchanges. i think the question out thing, why not do a lame-duck session? we now have 18 cemeteries, for briefings. i think the count i heard from the administration was 985 questions for the record it so there's been a lot study about his treaty over the last six or seven months. it seems to me senators probably have the information they need. certainly it is out there. and they got to be able to take that and make a decision. so i guess i don't see a persuasive argument for not going ahead in the lame-duck session. to go back to appoint the key
keep me, i think the administration is partially in this bind because i think as keith said, some of their language was in providing, in precise ways that raised suspicions that don't need to be there. for example, the administration did say, or some administration officials that there are no limits in his treaty on missile defense. i think more correct term, there are no meaningful on this. paragraph the for example, says the united states and russia could not put the intercept into an old converted icbm silo. i don't think it is a meaningful constraint because we have done both. we have converted five icbm silos to hold missile defense interceptors come in with a 25 or 30 new silos in alaska, brand-new. and the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty allows it to grandfather and says those five interceptors of icbm silos, those are okay,
don't do it again. but what we learned was that cost about $20 million per silo to convert an old icbm silo at the cost of one of these things brand-new. so i don't see -- if there's a constraint that prevents us from doing anything, something we would never do again, under any circumstances, it's probably a constraint we can live with. you know, likewise i think it ministration, it was emphasized, there are no constraints on -- because, in fact, the limited 1500 would capture conventional warheads on icbms. now at this point, neither the united states in our rush to deploy those. there has been talking american side about a prompt global strike system where you would put in the bush administration a proposal was a 30 conventional warheads on strategic ballistic missiles. with it ministration now says is if there to go ahead and exercise that option, it would be a few warheads. i know some people are
uncomfortable with the idea that a strategic arms treaty would limit any capability. i am not an couple with the idea that if you want to deploy, say, 30 or 40 conventional warheads, i don't see that as cutting into 1500 on the nuclear side. but again i think the administration probably could do more how every to describe some of these provisions. because it creates some suspicious, that i think we look at the treaty didn't have a strong base. >> keith spent let me respond to both questions but start here, sir. and follow on from stevens point. because in some ways it reflects back to what we talked about earlier. i'm not making the argument, trying to make you, that the restrictions on missile defense or prompt global strike are extremely significant restrictions. that wasn't my point.
my point was that when the administration took the opportunity to explain the treaty in a number of different ways, it was incorrect in its explanation. it misrepresented the treaty. in some very important areas. these were the folks who created the treaty, and they misrepresented it. in open testimony. now, the reason why that is important, never mind for now whether the missile option is important or not important, the point was that by misrepresented treaty and overselling it so thoroughly and so consistently, and even to the current period, what it creates is skepticism among those who are asking for answers. so i point you to, for example, kit bond, senator kit bond speech on november 18 we're kit bond said absently factual correct things about the treaty. the state department replied
last week specifically to kit bond, senator bond speech, and some of the responses to senator bonds point are literally factually incorrect. now, when you have a process like that that went on in the past that continues now, what is it just is there will be many who would like to have more time to ask resources out. that's what i think that not having just decided a lame-duck would be a good idea. because there's still a great deal of questioning about his treaty, given the types of responses that have been provided by the administration on numerous occasions. i see no value whatsoever, no advantage whatsoever in pushing his treaty through during the lame-duck. there are some great disadvantage i think in trying to do so. and the advantage of moving it in 2011 with the new senate, is the senate will have time to methodically, systematically, seriously go through these
issues that have been created by the administration in handling of it it it would seem to be the administration would want that. >> let me go to the second question, with regard to deterrence that it was a fabulous question, thank you for posting it. because with the questions that essentially was, nuclear weapons provide deterrent effect even with great uncertainty about them. therefore why do you worry about modernization or innocence the details of the force structure. because if deterrent effect is available, because of the uncertainty surrounding nuclear weapons, it is available with uncertainty. then stop worrying about all the rest of the. we sorely don't need to spend all the money to get these things down to great precision. okay, the gentleman is shaking his head just. that's the point. but let me suggest that there's a strong tenant of u.s. thought on strategic policy going back to the mid '60s that is exactly that.
i mean, that is one of the profound schools of thought in the united states on nuclear deterrence, nuclear strategy, and force requirements. the other school of thought says no. in some cases opponents won't be deterred by uncertainty. you have to posit an opponent that is deterred by uncertainty for that to apply. you have to posit an opponent who is deterred even if the reliability of our weapon may not meet our satisfaction that you have to posit an opponent who is deterred even the weapon may not be structured in such that they meet our satisfaction. in other words, you have to pose, path i should say, a very specific type of opponent who is deterred within the great context of uncertainty for those points to apply. now, that as i have said has been a theme in u.s. strategic
policy for decades. that is exactly so. the other team is know, on occasion there will be opponents they will need to be deterred, unless we suffer, or our allies suffered a devastating attack. and they will not be deterred by uncertainty. in fact, they may be spurred on by uncertainty. they may see uncertainty as something to take advantage of the, as some of those something to be deterred by. now, because we don't know what the future looks like and we don't know what i'll be opponents are going, how they're going to calculate in the future, my view has always been we want to be able to deter those opponents in the context of the uncertainty, but also want to be able to deter those opponents who might otherwise be spurred on by uncertainty surrounding the u.s. force structure. which is why, as michael i believe said, i'm one of those who say no, we want to have reliability. we want to have precision. we want to have a very effective
strategic force structure, because deterrence may require it to and the failure of deterrence one time in this era could lead to several millions, to scores of millions of fatalities in the united states, or in our allied countries. we can't afford to take a lot of chances with deterrence, in my view and relying upon opponents who are deterred by uncertainty and thinking we have an adequate deterrent in that case i believe is a mistake. >> and before passing to tom, which will have the last word, i would to picture you didn't want to direct respond to gary's invitation to vote. or do you prefer to wait and say this is not something for this week or this month, our next month? let's wait for 2011. >> i probably should wait. >> fair enough. >> very quickly, my desired outcome for the treaty would actually be for the
administration to essentially satisfy its critics. to essentially frame ideal that just using senator kyl's place, that would be acceptable to senator kyl. and i.t. would be passed in the lame-duck session. because that would represent a commitment on the part of administration and democrats, as a party to nuclear modernization or missile defense that has been so far lacking. now, you could really take that to the bank for very long, i don't think, but in american politics that is as good as it gets. so if you can't assure me of that, and actually i would like to put this whole discussion in the rearview mirror and talk about the things that i was describing earlier, and also part of voting for the treaty would be like a five year moratorium on arms control negotiations with the russians. just simply cut it out and
start, let's start talking about the things that are more critically important that so if you could meet those two threshold tests, i would be willing to vote for the treaty. and the sooner the better. >> i think you just ratified it. [laughter] >> thank you all for being here. thanks for the panel. [applause] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]
minister and green party leader john gormley. this is just under 45 minutes. sae >> good afternoon, everyone. thank you all very much. i wish to say a few introductory remarks. jon schorle, green party leader and then brian lenihan. today we were going to announce before your plan between now and 2014. it's to bring certainty for our people, to ensure that they have hope for the future, to let them know that while we have a challenging time ahead, we can and we will pull through as we had in the past.to lethem know the crisis that has come and we're dealing with since the th sin middle 2008, and which now we need to step out in further h itil at that we do wit between now and 2014, is similar in some respects to of the crisis in other countries at
other times. those countries came through that crisis. those they came through thosetime foro problems.together aa people, it is time for us to pulland ton together. to do so in a way whics those who have the most will make the most contribution, those who have leased will be protected to the greatest extent we possibly can, that no one can be sheltered from the contribution that has been made towards national recovery. i think is important in conveying to people why we can have a hope and confidence in the future. it is to say that the basic idea behind this plan is to move our present levels of revenue, levels of revenue of 2003, up to 2006. people can recall what their tax situation was in 2006, and that will give them an idea as
to where they will stand on that side. in relation to government spending, we have to reduce our spending from 2010 back to 2007 levels. and of course central to all of this is not just the cuts in spending or the increase in taxes, but it is about growing the economy, identifying those sectors which are proving to be competitive, which are ensuring that we are burning our way in the world as we move to a past that we are earning our way in the world. miti 1.8 million people at home in jobs -- maintaining 1.8 million people at home in jobs. we believe we can grow the economy next year by 2.75%. on average but to me now and 2014. we do that predicated on our knowledge of the flexibility of our economy and labor markets,
how we have improved competitiveness, and how we continue to grow and create jobs. looking at the fact we are a strong diversified economy with a strong multinational sector, a well scaled up irish native industrial base, internationally traded services, building on our national resources and agriculture and tourism, looking to the future with confidence with a well- educated population, the youngest population in europe and the greatest number of graduates, we are smart, resilience, proud people and we will come through this challenge because we love our country and we want to make sure our children have a future here, too. this is an expression of generational solidarity. this is about we now having come through very good times in the previous sector, unprecedented prosperity for
which lessons will be learned, too. we have to make sure in this new set of circumstances we provide the policies and framework that will get us through by 2014. that we will have a public service at that stage that will decide -- where we will have tax rates and tax levels of income tax at 2006 levels, that we would have spending back to what we were spending three years ago. this is something that can be achieved. this is something that the people can envisage, a challenge that can be surmounted and it is one that we must all be determined as a people to overcome. i'm confident that the talents and will and ability of our own people is going to make this a reality for us as a people.
i am confident that the -- i am hopeful that this plan is another confidence-building measure, another signpost along the road towards national recovery, a journey on which we have been on since the crisis began. finally, to say to our people that what we have done for the last 2.5 years has made that week -- has meant that we have made adjustments on the order of 15 billion euros, 14.5 billion euros over three budgets. we face an adjustment over similar size. we will front load this adjustment next year by taking 40% of the requirement by having a $6 billion adjustment in our 2011 budget. this is about us making sure that we plan our way through these difficulties and that
this four-year plan and our budget to be passed and our arrangements to be negotiated and finalized to put the facility in place that will add confidence to our people's capacity to overcome the challenges that we face, those three things can and must happen for our people in the weeks ahead. we are determined as your government to do that. we are appreciative of the assistance from states and european union institutions with whom we are engaged in a constructive way to find a solution to a problem that is not just for ireland to consider or to confront, but for the wider euro area as well. i hand over to john gormely. >> thank you. good afternoon, everyone. earlier this week the government brought greater
certainty about the timing of the general election. this afternoon we present plans to bring greater economic certainty for the coming four years. we must be candid and acknowledged that these are very difficult times for the irish people. we face the biggest economic challenges in the history of the irish state, and we must work with the eu and international counterparts to achieve a good outcome keep ourselves from our current difficulties. we in the green party late great emphasis on protecting education spending in preparation for the plan. we are proud education spending will be increased over the coming period. this is vital to protect the needs of a rising generation. increased spending on education is above all central to efforts to rebuild national prosperity. so for these and other reasons, we have prioritized education. we have also worked to ensure
the best environmental practices at the heart of this plan, minimizing waste and encouraging people to better respect our environment and our resources. we have insisted that what has happened before a fair system of overcharges is introduced. i will again be frank and say that these are elements in the plan, many that are difficult for many people, and we know that we are in our current difficulties because of past mistakes leading to an unsustainable property bubble, further inflated by reckless banking practices. since coming to government in june, 2007, we have worked with our partners to deal with the ensuing problems. we succeeded in bringing in some reforms, but also the appointments of outside people to head the financial regulation system and the central bank.
overall, we in the green party worked hard to conclude this document before you here today, and we believe it is the first crucial step on the road to recovery for the irish economy. this four-year plan is the first of three crucial items which must be achieved ahead of the general election early in the new year. the other two are the budget of 2011, due to represented on the 22nd. this government is determined to meet our responsibilities to successfully conclude these matters and help lay the foundations for a return of confidence and the irish economy, and above all else, ladies and gentlemen, to give the irish people greater hope in the future of this great country. thank you. >> thank you, john. ladies and gentleman, the
government decided in early october to prepare a recovery plan, and i want to thank my colleagues individually and collectively for the enormous amount of work that has gone into this plan. government meetings took place on a constant basis since early october, mornings, afternoons coming evenings, weekends, and weekdays. all of that work was concentrated on rebuilding confidence in this economy, preparing areas where mistakes were made, and the plan has been launched or is being launched today. as the negotiations for the external assistance program for financial support take place. but the work here is the government's work. as the plan points out, recovery in our economy is
beginning to take shape. our underlying budget deficit this year will be 11.7% of gdp. our budget deficit will be 11% of gdp. with the benefits of the budget that will be introduced on tuesday, it will decline to 9% next year. our tax revenue this year is somewhat ahead of target so far and spending has been contained. it is expected that our gdp will record a small increase this year, improving on the forecast made at the time of last year's budget. that has happened on the back of strong export growth. indeed, our exports have held remarkably well throughout this downturn. they are expected to grow by 6% in real terms this year. the growth is not just coming from the multinationals. our own indigenous exporters are also building their market share. it is to broad -- is a broad
based recovery driven by exports and demand bite trading partners, and also by significant improvements and competitiveness that have already taken place. it has already been contributed to by our work force and employers. conditions in the labor market are beginning to stabilize. unemployment, of course, is unacceptably high. the register has fallen for two consecutive month, the first time in 2007. of benefit payments will show -- the benefit payments will show a small surplus next year but we are beginning to pay our way in a wider world. all of these data paint a picture of an economy that is returning to growth after a deep and prolonged recession. the purpose of the recovery plan is to plot a course and have sustainable growth in the four years ahead. the plan will dispel uncertainty, reinforce the confidence of consumers,
businesses, and of those whom we trade with and are from outside the country. taxpayers have the benefit of knowing that the changes in the income tax over the life of the plan will bring us to liberals a tense -- the levels of taxation we saw as recently as 2006. taxes paid by all holders will be introduced next year, averaging just over 2000 euros per household by the end of the plan in 2014, and the minimum contribution of 100 euros per household will be the maximum contribution for those most in need, pensioners and those in lower income. the certainty that the plan gives about taxation over the next four years will allow consumers to plan investments and give them confidence to spend in this economy. the revenue measures in the plan
will perform an overhaul our tax system, will broaden the base and provide revenue stabilization so that we can raise the necessary results to pay for public services we are about to see. we know from our experience and the international evidence that a broadly based tax system as its economic growth. it concerns not only the quantity of the revenue raised, but the quality of the measures adopted we will have a tax system that serves an advanced, growing economy. our tax system will continue to incentivize work and incentivize enterprise, incentivize innovation, and incentivize investment. for that reason, all but 5% corporation tax will remain unchanged -- 12.5% corporation tax will remain unchanged during the period. expenditure will be brought back to years and will terms. the numbers at a public service will be reduced by almost 25,000 by 2014. we will not allow this reduction in numbers to be detrimental to
the quality of the public service. that is why we have an agreement with our staff, that is why we have a public service agreement, and and efficiency and productivity will be delivered under this agreement. the reductions in expenditure of focus in the areas of public sector pay, pensions, social welfare, and other programs relating to the capital program. it is important to understand that they are the key drivers of expenditure, and that is why these have to be protected. careful truces have been made in determining expand -- careful choices that been made in determining expenditure over the next four years. investment in education is a priority for the whole government. so is investment in innovation and enterprise. these will all be maintained at high levels to foster the growth potential in our economy. the labor market must be reformed to remove barriers to job creation and to incentivize
growth and to make it worthwhile to employee and be employed. the minimum wage will be reduced, and the short-term focus return of the agreements that apply in agricultural, catering, and construction sectors is underway agreements cannot endanger jobs or prevent the creation of jobs for younger persons. this plan is not just about expenditure assessments and taxation arrangements but these are realistic strategies for growth in this economy. the strategy is set out in the plan both in terms of the conditions that will apply to reducing cuts and in terms of each sector of the economy and the divestment of each sector of the economy and how the state can assist in developing different sectors of the economy. by providing certainty to consumers, the plan will provide certainty that the economy desperately needs.
it is important for us to recall that the economy has had strong, balanced growth in the past, and the purposes of this plans to resume the economy on that track way of balanced growth. there are some matters in the past to which of necessity cannot be fully disclosed until budget on the seventh of december. the details of taxation within the annual budget and that will be the case this year. if, in your perusal of the plastic, you find it short in detail in some of those areas, it is because more precise announcements will be made on budget day, as has been the custom and tradition. it is a rational and sensible plan and bring us out of the downturn that we are already getting out of. it will he ensure that as we climb out of it, we will do so on a sustainable basis for the teacher, ensuring that the next
generation can enjoy standards of living that we have had the privilege of joining in recent times. -- of enjoying in recent times. >> the greens were very adamant that those fees would not be reintroduced the students contribution to those levels is effectively fees by another name, is it not, minister? >> note, and you will have to await the forthcoming budget to see how we deal with that particular issue. but we always said that education has to be prioritized. and he agreed with this assessment that education was the most important issue, because he had the experience in his own country and in mind when they laid emphasis on education. -- on country in finland when
they laid emphasis on education. again, i emphasize that you will have to await the budget to see where we go with that particular issue. >> this plan is going to cause a lot of hard chip for a lot irish people. do we really need to make savings of as much as 6 billion because the labor leader argues the figure only needs to be 4.5 billion. >> the basis for what we're having in terms of providing a facility for the country is on the basis of a 6 billion adjustment. that is the context under which we are operating. therefore, i don't agree, obviously, with the contention on that point. the second point to make is that, yes, this will ask a lot of all of our people.
but i am confident that people, if we can do this in as fair and equitable way as we possibly can, that people will see that there is a genuine effort to see that the burden is shared appropriately and proportionately and progressively. if people can see that the basic contours, the basic format of this plan is about taxation levels and income tax at the 2006 model and spending at 2007 levels, then people will see over the next four years a progressive improvement in our situation. it is about creating jobs, the conditions under which we can create more jobs for our people. without putting public finances on a more sustainable basis, we cannot have confidence or investment from business and the private sector to drive a job creation. we have got to create those conditions and work with people
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