tv Capital News Today CSPAN January 31, 2011 11:00pm-1:59am EST
this is a situation where the government needs to fix in 2010, which is a draconian law on censorship on media regulation and enforce it. right now there's regulatory policy. again that becomes an issue of political will. :n, that becomes an issue of political will. but i do, the other trend that i have been researching and it's small right now, but it's one to watch, the recent femme on none is that some islamists, religious parties and extremist organizations have been reaching out and trying to connect with journalists and sort of, you know, in the effort of saying get up, get up point of view on air, trying to get to know them better and exchanging sort of sympathies in the media groups with access to breaking news and things like that, this was very small at the moment but i'm interested to see where that
goes. >> i'm steve cohen, part of this project. want to return to a country that arnold asked about the bureaucracy. one of the things i learned in writing, and doing this project and writing about it in my paper, and i think it's important to follow and first make categories, pakistan is both an idea. it's an idea of pakistan. it's also a state. and i think one of the trend lines we've seen of the state of pakistan with one exception has been a decline of the state, the bureaucracy, the administrative structure and so forth. that's not true of the army in a sense. the army has grown to the point where it dominates the rest of the pakistani state. but we learned from many examples around the world that countries or states can't operate on the basis of a powerful army. whenever i go to pakistan, i say, your country, your estate, hopping on one strong leg which is the army. and there's strategic dilemma of
the military leadership is to build up that civilian way, the chinese official said we would characterize it as pakistan having one leg like an elephant and the other like a chop stick. that's maybe an exaggeration but i think the point is clear the army can't do everything in pakistan. in fact it can barely do the things it's supposed to do, let alone build a state. and the interaction of the state, the state of pakistan which is in decline. with the idea of pkz, competing ideas of pakistan i think is at the heart of the pakistani. if you read my -- i think the issue, as arnold says states and bureaucracies are important. i started to figure out there are 18 or 19 different variables or factors. and i'm not sure how to rank them in terms of importance. i think different variables, religion, ethnicity, state, the army and so flort be important at different times. applies to exteshal factors such as india or iran. or china. so i think that it's a difficult
country to understand, because it's complicated. and i think it's an important country to understand as huma said, in a few years from now we're going to have 30 million pakistanis with maybe 300 declared weapons. 300 million pakistanis with 300 million with 30 -- with maybe 300 nuclear weapons. one nuclear weapon per 100 million. something like that. so i don't think we've ever faced a country like this. a country this large, this feeble in terms of its development of indicators with such, such enormous power. >> well, i was hoping to find what i'm thinking of, in my mind, was whether the bureaucracy is an obstacle or an agent to change in pakistan. my own feeling is it's possible, but -- >> i think the answer to that is yes. >> i sort of like to know where
there are agents for change. >> young pakistani historian that looks at the trend line of the pakistani civil bureaucracy. and it looks like that. so in a sense the army has to be think about rebuilding a civil bureaucracy that functions. >> let me ask a question from the overflow room. this one is from ambassador milam. what do you think can be done to engage china more, and to help foster stability in the region and in pakistan, versus playing a spoiler role. >> well we've got so many problems with china i'm not quite sure where pakistan comes in. for us here at the table, or for you in the room, i suppose it would come from very high on the list. but, for the rest of the government of our country, it may come further down, with economic problems being very
high on the list, as well as strategic problems in the western pacific. so, i don't know. i think, i hope, in fact, that when we have visits or meetings between the president of china, and the president of the united states, that pakistan comes up, and that we express our worries about the chinese role there, and how they might improve it. but, other than that, i'm frankly unaware of where -- of whether we bother to discuss pakistan in these meetings or not. even below the presidential level. i assume we do. but other than talking to the chinese, and of course we've got such a wish list that the chinese are probably able to pick and choose with ease, i don't know quite what we do.
>> i have covered in the balacan region and my question is two pronged. we have been discussing extremism in pakistan recently. but i will take you back to the swat issue. we see that in swat, 3 million people, the areas, and just to get support to the army and the government to pressure in those areas. and we -- support behind the army. and was successful. conducted successful and today we see that it is almost free. number two is in this society
there are people who took up arms to fight those militants which ought to include. and those have gone answered. number two part is my during the crisis from 2006 to 2010, we have been having every crisis, as you mentioned, but then we see we, we have in this crisis, we came on strongly, and we have an independent tradition. we have now a media, civil society, and then a parliament which is making more laws these days. and politicians which like having sense. so what do we see, is this -- there is all everything pessimistic or is there still some hope? thank you. >> i would just start by saying
that, i think that there are a number of lessons one could draw from what happened in suwat but one of them is a story of the resilience of the state. that the military does have red lines that it doesn't want to have crossed within its own borders. i don't think we know exactly what those red lines are or why they were triggered in that case. was the military increasingly embarrassed by all of the international exposure of what was happening. were they concerned about certain lines of communication being compromised. did they have a more systemic worry about their borderlands slipping out of their control. it's really hard to know. but nonetheless, they did show a concern, and have -- and understock some pretty serious operations. and i think that that's -- that's worth noting. and there are also some other positive trends. we haven't talked about the judiciary here very much. we mentioned it briefly. this will be a fascinating thing to watch over the coming years
because the judiciary is seemingly a little bit more assertive, and many people would say well that's wonderful. that's an unmitigated good. and it is good to see, in a country in which the judiciary has been the hand maiden of military power for a very long time to see some action in this regard. but it's also true that in pakistan, the supreme court has moto powers which mean means they don't have to wait for cases to move up the appellate docket they can essentially pull cases out of thin air and decide that they want various and sundry people to appear before them and explain themselves on various and sundry issues. this can be also a very good thing for public accountability. it can be a little bit strange sometimes to have the supreme court setting the agenda and holding people accountable and bringing up its own pet issues. there are some who worry that they will even take this a little bit too far. that's an institution to watch
over the coming years as it sort of grows into its own skin in a new way and tests the boundaries of this kind of assertiveness. >> first of all, i welcome the focus on the future of pakistan. i think it's such an important issue to look forward beyond the immediate, beyond the sort of three month or six month or one year window and have a bit of a think about pakistan more generally. my question really is about the data which we face some of our pessimism or qualified optimism of pakistan in future. we talked a bit about the state and the role of state institutions and a little bit about pakistani society. but i wondered if the panel would like to comment on two very important elements, i think in thinking about future of pakistan, one is how much will patronage networks like the brotherhood networks, like some of the political patronage networks within political parties help manage the kind of manage the kind of demographic
change that were mentioned earlier. the second question is about pakistan's middle class. wendy, i know this is something you in particular are focused on. the lower middle class in pakistan is going to be a very important variable in the future of pakistan. how much do we really know about that group of people. how much do we know about small businessmen or students? and if we don't know it, what should we be finding out? >> i can just start on the first question. i actually think that we're going to see this extensive culture of political patronage. in my mind it will be further consolidated in coming years, assuming that civilian governance is allowed to stay on track. and as we see sort of more ethnic bodies come to the floor as the decentralization takes
effect i think in order to stay relevant there will be a desire to sort of keep situations happy. and we'll see more of that intensify rather than change. i think it will be playing a fairly big role. >> do you have anything to add to that? >> it's a great question, it's a hard question. i think we don't know very much. i think we have a general sense that the lower middle class will often vote a little bit right of center just historically and that we see the quote -- developmental class in a number of places in the muslim world. i really think you've hit on something important, is that we don't really know what the trend
toward urbanization is going to mean politically, and how it's going to be playing out in the coming years. one can extrapolate from current trends and say, many of the urban traders vote somewhat wright of center and they have more of an islamic nationalist discourse and world view. i'd be worried having the linear extrapolation from that. the political landscape may become a little more complicated over time. >> excuse me, let me ask a question from the other room. the question really is, does the -- to what extent does nationalism trump the religious ideology? and the questioner points out that pakistanis are quite exercised about drone strikes even those in the u.s.,
protesting in the u.s. and u.k., but do not internationalize their radicalism. for example, very few pakistanis web to the iraq in the early days of that war. >> i think they're increasingly asking youngsters to say things like, are you muslim first or pakistani first? and answers to that are fairly chaotic. in some cases islam wins out, in some cases pakistan does. i think that increasingly, however, the pride in being a pakistani comes from being a muslim, and they have become n conflated. there's a great sense of this notion of external persecution of islam and pakistan comes from
being from the country that has the muslim bomb. >> i would just add to alex's question, i think it's important for us to remember that islamist parties and patronage oriented parties are not mutually exclusive. you can have patronage oriented countries that are very islamist, you can have patronage other yinted parties that have an ethnonationalist party. >> another question? >> i was going to stress the more than of patronage. perhaps i'll save my question -- >> no, no, ask it now. >> we're talking about
bureaucracy, a judicious yarry, we're talking about structures. but the process in my experience underlining all of those is a patronage based system. and the real incentives for choice and action regardless of the institution or structure in which you are operating is often primarily patronage or your relation 1ship to other people a kinship basis. very few of us seem to perceive that or its impact on the way people react to proposals or make decisions. it's more of a comment. >> yeah, it's very interesting. >> would you like to respond? >> i agree with the speaker. i mean, i think that patronage system is so embedded in the culture, that it can -- it will perhaps transform in its form in
a sense that there were other new urban institutions, urban parties will become still, will remain still patronage institutions. i don't see that as a big change. and i think that's another reason why i think we won't see much difference, despite the urbanization in the way people react. >> this has been hinted at some of the comments from the panel members. one event which is likely to have an effect for the next decade is the census. the last one was done in '98. one of the reasons we don't have an accurate idea, some site 21
as the median age, others site 18 as the median age. if and when the census does take place. it will put pakistan on the map as a largely urban country. when the results of that census are implemented by redrawing the political constituencies, it's going to shift the political balance from the countryside to the city. and then you juxtapose on that the work that chris and i have done and published recently on changing recruitment packages. this is going to be a major factor in how people think. and it may actually affect some of the dependencies on the rural port on the landlords. by shifting and changing the
political landscape. to give you one example. in karachi alone, they only have two representatives in the provincial assembly. out of a population of 18 million after the census, they're likely to have much more representati representation. that's certainly going to affect the future of pakistan and pakistani politics. i'm wondering if someone wants to comment on this democratic shift leading to a political shift. >> i think you put it quite well. i actually have a counter question for you. i agree, you see sort of the tension in parties. they realize the census is going to change things. i think that contributes to some of the instability we keep seeing.
i think ten or 11 million people in a decade -- they have absolutely no sense of what this will look like. but my counter question to you in some ways, you mentioned the military and the recruitment for the pakistan army. what effect will that have as we see a pakistan army taking better educated populations, leaving the bureaucracy more sort of debilitated, is that something we're thinking about? >> the army's always taken pretty well educated people into its ranks. the effect that it's most likely to have is that when it recruits primarily from the cities and if we go back to some of the earlier work that barbara and others have done on the inn innerci innercities, then you have a
much more conservative group coming into the army, which means that they now represent the population of pakistan much more accurately than they did before, when they were tilted toward certain limited number of districts. so that obviously will have an effect. we don't know if that is going to be just a conservative effect like the rest of the country or whether there will be elements of radicalism creeping in if the economy tanks and if the society falls apart and other factors start intruding. those are the questions we have to keep an eye on. >> i think this is our last question. >> i'm harlan allman. i was such surprised nobody mend tunisia and egypt. could you rectify that, please? >> since i was the one that started off on external factors, i will rectify it by saying i thought this morning as i was
riding in on the subway, perhaps that ought to be a part of what i ended with. we don't -- i can't think of exactly whether there will be an effect from the tunisia and egypt or not. if there will be an economic effect if egypt as it looks like, at least it might, if problems in egypt drive oil prices again, which they looked like they might do. but whether i am less -- frankly i'm skeptical at the popular uprisings we have seen, spontaneously at least in tunisia, and seemingly in egypt are transferable to pakistan. i could be wrong. but who usually gets control of the streets in pakistan? it's not necessarily the
spontaneous development of just people on the streets. but it's usually organized. and organized by parties or some -- in many cases islamist groups. i don't know. i really don't know the answer. >> but it is a good question. >> very quickly. >> you know a lot, you could answer it yourself. >> very quickly, josh. >> it seems to me that such a public grassroots response requi requires a clear focal point. in many ways it seemed that the waning days of musharif's rule were seeing more of that activity. there was widespread frustration not with the army as an institution or state. but with one person who had crossed -- in people's minds, boundaries of what was acceptable for his office.
today i don't think that's the case in pakistan, even though zudari is not beloved as a leader. the groups that have been most adaptive at organizing mass protests are religious parties. they're pretty good at it, they have youth wings and student wings they can mobilize. even they have shown limited ability to organize very widespread grassroots movements of that kind. >> well, thank you all very much. and i'd like to remind you that we have a short break here, and that we will resume the second panel promptly at 2:15. thank you.
[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> if we could please settle down and begin again. this is the future of pakistan, but i'm trying not to talk on pakistani time. thanks again for joining mass. i was reminded that i forgot to introduce myself when i kicked off the proceedings. that made a a habit of this, that such an import is not
quiet. i'm going to let introduce me and i don't want to do it twice. let me quickly introduce andrew wilder who will chair the next session looking at the possible futures for packet in. and your heads afghanistan and pakistan and joined us last summer coming down from boston, taft university where he was direct to earth research the finds an international center. he has spent most of his life in south asia and the. the last decade focusing on afghanistan and also heading one of the think tanks in kabul. andrew. >> thank you for organizing this event. i might say a very ambitious event saltier says that the network and trying to study
south asia. i always try to stay out of the business of predicting the future. invariably i got it wrong. but we now have an eminent panel coming up with people who can tell you about the future i'm sure with great certainty. i like to start off by introducing christine fair. chris is an professor at georgetown school of foreign service and is also a senior fellow at the counter terrorism center at west point. chris has done extensive research on south asia and a lot of that focusing on pakistan and afghanistan. chris has her phd from chicago, but more importantly a fellow graduate of the berkeley purdue program in lahore. chris, welcome. chris will be speaking on pakistani's tree of how my global look at the next 10 years. shall be followed by believed. it's my great pleasure to
introduce my colleague, moeed yusuf who will be talking about doesn't have the luxury to stabilize going forward. they south division at u.s.a. team has done an incredible job in the last series and you're getting a much more active focus on issues relating to pakistan, peace and conflict issues in pakistan. as you been attending many of these have been focusing on pack of the come in nearly all credit goes to train to. moeed's current research focuses on youth and democratic institution that ways to mitigate militancy over its timely and topical and important issues, which i'm sure he'll share some of those views today. moeed has his masters from bu and is currently working on his phd there as well. last but not least we have jonah blank. come join us, jonah, who will be speaking on pakistan's likely
future. john is the chief policy adviser to south central and southeast asia on the majority staff and senate relations committee and also focuses on a range of other issues like counterterrorism and nuclear proliferation issues. jonah did his phd at harvard and is taught at harvard, georgetown and is doing some teaching advice in addition to his work on the hill he is a phd in anthropology from harvard. culinary terms of introductions and turn it over to you, chris. tell us about the future. >> i don't do that either. i'm a libra, so if you give me on that i go down a justice path. do we have to do that? >> you'll be on television, so -- >> i'm also blinded the back, so i really have to be like this. alright, so, we also know the general landscape of pakistan.
it's an exporter of terrorism, but also a victim of terrorism. there is ethnic discord, significant debate going around about who is a muslim and who calls themselves muslim. it's an extreme of cores and ideas for a logical hobble. there's a lot of interesting debate in tousled going on amongst pakistanis and what the state is going to look like. there's a difference of opinion of who should govern the country. ..
so i'm going to focus my comments upon identifying some of the significant fissures within pakistan and trying to look at the structural mechanism that would be necessary to resolve some of these foundational issues and i think you are going to find at the end of my comments that i'm but i'm not terribly optimistic. now, i do a lot of polling work, and what is nice about pakistan and you can say this about a lot of countries is there a lot of fabulous statisticians in pakistan, really confirms that can do wonderful work if you structure the research questions appropriately. so i've been doing a lot of polling and always learning exercises. never did a survey that you wish you would she did when she got there and you hope someone will
keep giving them money to take keep refining the process. let me tell you about a 2009 survey that jake and schapiro and myself did. interviewed 6000 pakistanis. is a general example reflective of the four provinces which is very different from other polls you might encounter. now come i want to talk a little bit about this sharia stuff. every single poll shows that pakistanis cannot get enough -- and i love to ask my students in class what do you think sharia means? usually they talk about sony's and beheadings and shopping at fingers and whipping sam stone's would have you. we ask pakistanis what you think sharia is? they said sharia was good governance, lack of corruption, the ability to have justice served expeditiously and when i say that 90, 95, nagy presented people answered along those dimensions of sharia.
what is that sound like? people want good governance. 50% of those people also said they thought it would be stoning and cutting off hands and so forth that i bring this out that the people in d.c. see sharia, they freak out. when i see sharia is actually a lot of people here who want the same things that i do but they are not getting it and we see that some of the militant groups have stepped into that malaya to provide some of those issues. this is an immobilizing factor for the pakistan taliban although i don't like to wear because they are a cluster of militant so it is a shorthand that when you see different commanders doing this and there are various aor's. another thing our survey shows are really deep divisions about what kind of government pakistanis want and we were particularly interested in their views about the army. only one in five survey said the army should never under any circumstances come in. one and five, only one in five had that belief so there are
actually -- who think the army has a legitimate role in governing this day. the circumstances under which were heavily variable within our population. pakistanis are also ambivalent on the main about how best to deal with the internal militants right now. what i mean by ambivalent. over the years what you have seen is up the ships and to military action declining and support for peace deals declining. this is not to say that pakistanis have rallied around military action or they have rejected peace deals. what it means is that they are attenuating but there is really no clear general consensus and it is extremely variable across provinces, which most are surveys don't actually allow you to look into because your sample sizes are so small and they are not drawn to be relevant at that level of granularity. so, what we see looking across key questions about what kind of pakistan do you want, who can
call themselves a muslim, foundational issues. there are profound fissures across pakistan. now, what are some of the structural factors that might ring about some reconciliation of these issues? obviously one of the first might be political parties. they have hardly been discussed at length. i think it is fair to say and i don't want to be too charitable, that they are personality cults. they vertically integrate interest. they are horrible aggregators of national interest, and ironically, the only cause closet democratic party in pakistan is khasami and they are the only party that has a think-tank that generates policy ideas domestically and internationally and that is the idea so you know you are in a interesting position in the most democratic party into noun is that. that is kind of where we are. even the smaller parties like the ethnic parties and they are
the same thing. so it is an issue of scalability how patronage center they are and how deep their patronage or how far their patch in its networks go but there is no such thing as a genuine national party that can build consensus on policy issues because that is not what they do. one of my favorite closes from a state assembly in baluchistan. she says you know chris, i have no interest in legislating. okay, moving right along. go back to the ngo you are about to set up with american money. moving along to cso. we have heard about cso so i was really glad huma racist.. the cso's that are effective are those that take no international money. this is a principle agent principle agent problem. those cso's that are effective drop on their membership and they remained loyal to that constituency. so there is an interest in investing in ngo's but the problem is by virtue of putting
our money and they're there and since has become aligned to dealing with the donor, not to the people that they should be serving and i know for my own experience working with a pakistani ngo as a student in lahore their primary products are in english because -- this is how little they care about publications. translating their pamphlets into urdu. that was not saying that my urdu was good. it wasn't a priority, so if the pakistani ngo doesn't care about putting the stuff out in urdu we have a problem here. the thing that i find most interesting about cso's is when you talk to american audiences there is oddly this assumption that cso's are liberal or that they will be forces for liberality. and one of the things i've observed in pakistan is that yes we have the lawyers movement by the really didn't go anywhere and some of the shine is come off a bad apple. but some of the most effective cso's are not liberal at all.
and islamist revival organization -- i don't have an opinion on it but i will say this. it is not a force of liberality. they tell us what they do in terms of feminist liberation although i know very few feminists that would recognize that kind of feminism. obviously you have got groups like islami and to break each oman and i'm not passing a normative opinion about them.
but oddly enough, these liberal use ills of social media are marketed. a friend of mine who works for the "christian science monitor" he is routinely getting -- if you want to wage jihad on so-and-so texas number. they are very good at using it. and that pakistanis have a much more sophisticated sense of how to use the cell phones than we do. viral videos. these are the ways in which some of the things we have learned about through the social media so my point is, the facebook revolution need not go as some people might be predicting. obviously the army has an important role to play in civil military relations. this is perhaps not the most appropriate place for this particular set of comments but i personally am not convinced that kayani is for democrats he claims to be in the sense that they might mean democrat. in the sense that he is been intimately involved in ghastly
managing some interesting as well as delicate political impasse is. so rather than being politically neutral, he has actually been very -- you can either say effectively the think that is a role that he should play in negotiating significant differences among politicians and between the courts and various politicians. won the other hand, so that obviously i respect very much. the other view is that kind of weird role for a chief of army staff to be playing, and that is not necessarily the best indicator of civil military relations going in the direction of greater civilian control. a couple of summers ago there was a big brouhaha over the two-page budget sent to the senate. that was mostly for our consumption because there was actually nothing that could have been done and the two-page budget, two pages for defense budget? really, give me a break.
so if we were to go through and sort of think about what are perhaps the biggest challenges for pakistan internally, it has to be the problem that pakistan relies upon like lashkar-e-taiba and judge. some of the elements that are reconfigured and casting it internally and obviously i'm talking about the pakistani taliban. lashkar-e-taiba at never attacked the state and never was in the state. it is definitely pitcher while on a leash. at least. i met doug glover and chihuahua spike. they are the ones that are on the leash. josh, fsb and lbj, they are the ones that have been somewhat and a jihadi jumbled that have realigned and are targeting the state in the west even though -- so it will be difficult for pakistan to book down its
internal minutes entelechy and find a way of strategically getting away from relying upon these militants. so i see there is, in terms of bellagio. i had to come home from my students graduation. i think we can imagine really to extreme outcomes particularly with respect to what the u.s. can do, and what i see currently in the u.s., i don't know, toolbox is in creative incremental thinking that has gotten us nowhere in the bush administration or in this administration and by the way i get wise pakistanis are mad at us. this is not a mystery to me. we do things that are absolutely stupid and we do things that are morally wrong. israel, our policy towards israel for example. we can get our knickers in a twist about pakistanis being mad at us until we recognize what we
do. the reality is we have supported military government more often than not. kerry-lugar-berman is a very interesting bill but even kerry-lugar-berman incentivizes some very strange things and we can talk more about that, but if we continue the status quo and we have this idea that we can keep throwing money at the army and things are going to change, we are going to come to the point of the conflicts. conflict. i don't see any way of getting out of there with this incremental, noncreative empirical because there is no flipping data and forming what we do and what we are going to find very quickly in a position of us trying to contain pakistan. that is not going to be pretty. think about what it would take to contain pakistan. at the other extreme and this is the extreme i'm going to advocate for even though i think it has zero possibility of actually working oregon being possible. in the same way that actually tellis envisioned a new big idea
for india and pulled the bureaucracy around to get all of our institutional differences towards a new big idea for india we need to do this for pakistan. we need to relook at the country. in. in you to see pakistan as it is, not how we wish it were and we have to deal with that on its terms. we can talk about how we can do this. i have been a fan of the civilian nuclear deal that has very similar but better conditions on kob. the india u.s. nuclear tipped more than six years and we are still not even there yet, such as putting this on the table creates negotiations that we don't have right now. so we need someone who has the sort of clarity of ashley who has the ability to have the. >> indifferent canoes where he has got legitimacy and multiple circles and it bureaucracy that is wedded in trying to make a
sensible idea a reality. that may not work, but i'm going to argue it's a lot better than think about containment. thank you. >> thank you. thanks, andrew. it is always a tough task following chris fair but i'm going to give it my best shot and i'm not going to he nearly as exciting. but let me, and definitely not going to predict the future even though i have got all of you here to listen to that. what i want to do is perhaps shout out what pakistan stability may look like. you know we talk about instability and in the general sense being that pakistan is on the precipice sow instability is to be avoided at any cost whether it is political instability whether it is
economic instability, terrorism related etc.. what i'm going to give you is a contrary view, which is that i think this neat distinction we have come up with both in washington and among segments of the pakistani elite, that there is one stability which should look orderly, which should look like pakistan is progressing in the right direction, and the other part where you see turbulence, you see chaos and you see a country going towards a semi-anarchic sort of system and my argument is even pakistan stability if you project the future is going to be inherently turbulent and will have bouts of instability and will be uncertain for are protected period. so if the benchmark we are looking at when we see pakistan weathered his this instability and the politicians are not getting their act together and economy is not working, things are wrong.
it is not the best one to apply. now my argument of course is not that we should promote instability, not of all of course. but what i'm saying is i think we should distinguish between the instability that throws us in many pakistanis into hypermode in terms of our response. at me give you three examples. contrary examples and areas that are critical to any country but definitely for pakistan looking forward. politics the economy and the law and order, extremism terrorism situation. what will a staple dispensation look like? i think everybody is agreed it has to be a consolidated democracy but how do you get there? chris mentioned the self centers self-centered sort of pakistani political elite. i think huma talked about pakistan moving in a particular direction but is it fair to expect the stability of the apolitical response from the political elite?
when they neither of the time nor the opportunity nor the incentive to actually get out of their short-sighted policy making and think about national interest. if you look at pakistan's politics i think it's squarely is moving towards a model of coalition. you are not going to have hegemonic parties. more and more, the ethnic parties in the regional parties perhaps are going to become important. which really means you were going to have coalition governments for some time to come. coalition politics will then throw out the entire set of messiness the superficial -- coalitions which break inform as they have in most under developing countries of this will mean that pakistan will have repeated political tensions, coalition partners may be switching breakaway. the opposition may be supporting the government at times and not others. the military may be trying to battle and politics from behind the scenes but ultimately you will have governments form with
greater frequency than perhaps we would like at if the lenses to lenses to see political stability. now on the face of that one could argue that is not a good thing and i would agree if our only thins a short-term stability in pakistan. but there is no other process apart from going through this political -- for a productive period of time, which will allow these pakistani political elite to learn to coexist with each other and perhaps at some point, there is no guarantee this will happen but odds are in favor that at some time they will come out with the national on certain issues which they agree not to undermine because of political evaluating. these will be the issues where you will see consistency in pakistan across the period of time. ethernet politics remains stable
so my argument is politics will be turbulent if that is your benchmark. is going to be turbulent no matter what were the move toward instability or stability that there but there may be a time when you have this elite consensus and at that point, you will see pakistani politics resemble politics in india today. politicians have been changed and corruption is a going away but there are certain elements of indianess which they have agreed on and do not try and undermine every time a government changes. now for those, many in washington to argue and say they are not capable let me just say that i think there are massive signs that this is beginning. you at the 18th amendment that is in agreement that pakistan is going to be a more decent -- pakistan. you also have some sort of agreement at this point that they're not going to go to the ghq and tell until the military to oust. they will try to fight it out among themselves. there may also be now i think an agreement in some ways where you
see political parties realize they need to be in the same page on certain issues. the charge of democracy was a good idea. these may or may not hold but other consensus points will emerge if you allow the system to progress. but it will be turbulent and it will be uncertain. the economy is another one. and i think it is intrinsically made for politics. i think josh or somebody talked about the economy and they were not making the right decisions in monetizing their dead etc.. what else do you expect from the political elite again that is not richard? they haven't had the luxury and they simply haven't had the incentive to get out of there structures. the debate is the best example. on the one hand, it its populist politics. they are responding to what the people of pakistan are asking them to. no more taxes and i completely understand what this is thing. the entire world is moving
toward subsidies and you are asking is this country already in trouble to impose more taxes so from that angle it may make war sense. but, none of the political parties need an effort to go out and explain to their constituents that pakistan come to stay pakistan is committed to certain goals and aims with the imf which forces it to make these changes and impose these taxes. the gasoline subsidies is another reason why they raise the prices and then pull back but the argument again is let's not expect miracles. it is easy to stand here and say they are not doing this and this and this. that is true, but they are not going to be able to do that realistically until they go through that process. through that lyrically and then come out with some form of national consensus. and if you look at other examples, the economy is almost always part of that elite body that the politicians come up with so certain parts they will
agree with. i borrow this point from josh when he mentioned this. they decided at the point they would not tax that fellow elite. that is a negative consensus for you. there may be the sense that we are going to live off of foreign aid. we are not good to put our house in order but keep on making do. but then there may be others. i see signs that i think all parties agree we need to cut the deficits of the major public-sector organizations. i think that is happening also. so again these particular consensus points may change but you will allow, you will have to allow for this populist politics which will dismay us and many others when the consensus comes about. is there a guarantee? no, there is no guarantee that this is the path to stability. there is no circumventing this path. going in and ban dating the political process or going to
the imf and saying -- is not what is going to happen. two minutes. organizers probe which. [laughter] two more, okay. you know i could talk about terrorism and extremism but i think the point should be clear, just think about if pakistan goes after all the militant groups as many in pakistan outsider asking it. the country will seem as if it is imploding from within. for months, if not a year or two, before they come out on top. the country will remain stable, we are sadly mistaken. will be a very chaotic place when pakistan takes the steps. select become through this is does pakistan have the space to go through this process?
or is a special place in international politics going to deny it this luxury? because we are so microscopically focused on this countries i mentioned every political crisis requires require something to be done. both by the pakistani elite and the people outside who are concerned about pakistan and have an interest. i ask this question especially because of you look at the track record, the pakistani political elite have been mastered in delaying everything and feel there is no option. look at the swat operation. we talked about 60 miles from islamabad. look at the estimation of the judges when all of their options were expended. look at the political crisis. they have tried everything they could and tell they found out they were in the minority and then think started pulling back. so pakistan may look like going beyond the precipice a number of
times. will we still allow at the space to go through the motions and get on the other hand? or is there a demand that this country is too important and we can't take this risk? this is the question we have to answer. with the pakistani military sit back and watch all the politicking going on for a wild? will the pakistani business elite be okay with populist economic decisions until the politicians come to some consensus and will washington and other countries up by the benefactors continue to support pakistan? can jonah convince people on the heels that we still need to continue supporting pakistan which i think we do despite the fact that the returns are not forthcoming? these are the questions which will really determine whether we keep ban dating this sort of country to look for stability of or if we allow some level of stability as long as we realize where that is taking pakistan.
there has to be a balancing act to understand what kind of instability is more political than not. and frankly at this point and i went with this, enter. frankly at this point i think the mindset both within pakistan and outside is one which is obsessed with keeping stability intact and not thinking beyond the two month. not. we may see that benefactors both within and outside and that choosing political favorites, and up meddling in whatever process they displace. whether that is a more centralized policy or military dispensation i don't know but that is the track record. and we may want the economists to dictate our policies which are in line with. [background sounds] macroeconomic policies and if that is the case i think we have got a dilemma because here's a country which will look like stabilizing for months and then
they will say hey where did we go wrong? i think that is the question. do we get the space and are pakistanis willing to take the space or are we going to keep going through this cycle over and over? >> thank you moeed. jonah. >> thanks for having me. i should note that i'm speaking in my private capacity. i make no claims and speaking for the united states senate or the committee on foreign relations, and by the same token those bodies don't speak for me. but has to talk weekly about a couple of questions, one of they does congress he is most likely for pakistan? i was a congress as a whole, probably envisions a medium bad
scenario. growing radicalism, leaving perhaps to a over cloaked military rule. there is disenchantment and congress with the ppp. there is fear of the pml and there is a sense that the army army is the only credible institution. putting on my analyst at i would say this is conventional wisdom and conventional wisdom is only wary of -- rarely wise. where does the hill want pakistan, want pakistan-u.s. relations to end up? i would say it wants to have pakistan cut off its safe havens for the haqqani network and for the taliban. the hill want pakistan to sign on to the u.s. agenda on afghanistan, on nuclear weapons and on counterterrorism foley and the hill want pakistan to shift troops from the indian border and a line of control to
fox and other areas in the west. my analysis is that all of these are probably unrealistic. so what is realistic? i will make four points here to try to make sure i come in under 10 minutes. first, we overestimate our influence. we give a lot of money. traditionally we have given a lot more military aid than we have given nonmilitary aid. we in congress have tried to address that balance with kerry-lugar-berman, but even with 7.5 billion kerry-lugar-berman and even with god knows how much money and military aid, it is not nearly enough in terms of outcomes. ..
>> just to get into the game of buying an outcome. the most we can do, i think, is put forward a pledge of seriousness about genuine engagement, because without billions of dollars, it's all just empty rhetoric. second point, we understand symbolism. the drone attacks which are a core component of our policy, if, in fact, they exist, since i don't want to venture into classified areas.
but i've read some reporting to indicate there maybe some drone attacks underway in pakistan. the feeling in congress, and the feeling in the administration, is that these are unmitigated good. that we are out there killing bad guys. there's very little collateral damage. and anyone complaining about it is just basically running their mouths. i think we really ought to understand that people are not just running their mouths in pakistan. people have some serious issues. they are not about collateral damage, dignity, and just the general optics of having a country come in and killing people in your nation without acknowledges it and explaining it. we probably wouldn't feel good about that if it were happening to us, even if we fully agree these were people who fully deserved to get killed. doesn't mean that the drone program is or is thought a good
thing. it does mean that we should take seriously the very real anger that it does stir up in pakistan. the way that we handle little things, the issue of the moment, one the issues of this moment, of course, is raymond davis, u.s. diplomatic official who allegedly shot and killed two pakistanis who apparently were trying to rob him. and then another pakistani citizen apparently got killed in a vehicular manslaughter in the same effort. now these things happen. for the u.s. response to be nothing to see here, move along, how dare you arrest this guy? once again, if this happened in washington and another country claimed diplomatic immunity, not as a final outcome, but as the starting point, i think it arouse a certain amount of anger. i'm not a lawyer.
not to say this is good, this is bad. it's murky. we want to we say move along here, there's nothing to see. i think we are being unrealistic. congress certainly is no innocent party in all of this. we contribute a fair amount to the bad symbolism that occurs. during the 1990s, we will congress, together with three administrations -- well, two administrations that then carried over into after the 1990s for a while. over the f-16 deal. the very fact that we could sell f-16s to pakistan, and then not deliver them, and not give them their money back and then charge them for the cost of the ware housing the f-16s that we were neither going to give nor to refund, pakistanis are still angry about this. congress certainly has not helped matters in the rhetoric that comes out of various members. i refrain from pointing the
figure -- the finger at any particular members or at any particular chamber of congress. shall we just say there are no innocent parties here? third, we misunderstand islamic radicalism. the story of the week is about how the sunni council has apparently has surprised a lot of people in condemning or rather -- condemning or applauding the murder of salman taseer. praising once again, the assassin of salman taseer. this has caught a lot of people by surprise, frankly including me. these are supposed to be the so-called good with air quotes muslims. where is this all coming from? these guys are not the ones who are supposed to be the one the
taliban soul mates. they are not the taliban soul mates. when we sort of try to put everybody into a convenient box, we ignore the fact that there are a lot more boxes than we recognize. the whole reaction of the pakistani public to the murder, or symmetry. when i was living, looking different than i do now, the way my neighborhoods would have been reading it, not just is it right or wrong for someone advocating the change in the blasphemy laws. who is us and who is them? he's an ordinary pakistani citizen in a lot of people's vision.
who are them? salman taseer, international playboy, part of the liberal elite. we in the west see him, i think, rightly so as a brave defender of values that we hold and believe are core to pakistan's identity as envisioned. and i agree, he was a very -- he was a brave man. i think his loss with the tragedy for pakistan, a tragedy for everyone who has a vision of pakistan going in a direction. but we should understand why so many pakistanis don't see it in exactly the same terms. and the last point i will make here is we misunderstand the pakistani military. we have this vision that they are biddable. well, to a certain extent. we should understand that no matter how much military aid we give to the pakistani military, they will always act in accordance with their institutional interest.
this shouldn't surprise us. every institutional actor acts in accordance with what it believes to be the institutional interest. there's nothing that should make us toss up our arms in surprise. we should accept it as a reality. pakistani military interest, or the interest of the pakistani military will never be a complete match with u.s. interest. why should they be? if pakistan is a separate country from the united states. it will have separate interests. and the pakistani military will have separate interests from those of the pakistani nation as a whole. again, nothing here. we should understand it and accept it and base on policy upon this fact. that's why in my view, i'm bias here, that's why in my view, we should be supporting and defending kerry-lugar-berman as the president has called for us to do. this is, as far as i'm aware, the only big idea in u.s.
pakistani policy to come down the pike in many, many years. as a policy that did not come out of the administration, either this administration or last administration, it's a policy that came out of congress. it's a policy congress had to put through with very little help from anybody else. more help, i think, from the think tank community, the academic community than currently serving or previously serving administration officials. what's the point of kerry-lugar-berman? the point is to try to build up a relationship with the pakistani people. to have a long term commitment to the relationship. and to have a nontransactional relationship. as we pointed out, we can't demand resulting on a quarterly basis. we're not going to get them, and we shouldn't expect we are going to get them. it's going to be tough to defend this in the current budgetary environment. but as recent events in a few countries, not too terribly
distant from pakistan in the past week have shown, placing all of our bets on military strong men, while ignoring the voices and the angers of the population to those countries is really not a recipe for long-term stability and is probably not in the interest of the united states. [applause] [applause] >> thank you very much. chris, and moeed will join in rich remarks and hopefully discussion and debate to all of you. i don't have much to add. a couple of observations, probably more questions than observations. i have not been doing research in pakistan. i think it's important that our views and policies are informed by the empirical data.
toooff, -- too often, especially in this town, our policies are engaged in punditry. it was touched on by chris, which i want to make a couple of remarks back to the issue of patronage, and patronage politics. that's critical to understand how politics have worked in the past, and tell us how it's going to work in the future. i think josh touched on this as well. i did my research on the election politics in punjab in the '90s. the number one determinant of voter behavior was the perception of who's going to win. it's about patronage. it's not about a lot of, you know, other ideological factors, primarily that i talked about. but again if you are the ppp and the military kicks you out, why waste your vote in the ppp? vote for the muslim league?
and i remember chris sited her example of the parliamentarian from barrage stan telling me about in his consistency, people elect me to be a lawbreaker, not lawmaker. they want me to break the rules. when their brother commits murder, i can get them out of jail. when someone wants a promotion out of order, i can do that. they want me to beat the system, not legislate. i suspect it's similar today. and that leads me, i guess, to my question is, and maybe this is a bit to chris in terms of some of the foundational issues. to me, you know, and i guess also to some of the comments about the need for a period of instability. we need to get the luxury of
that space. i'm sympathetic with the argument. i guess i don't see quite where it ends. because the current patronage based system by definition rewards. the incentives are how to maintain the status quo. those who are in power are actually doing pretty well. the incentive structure for the military could be insecurity. they get rewarded for insecurity in pakistani. god forbid that some of the security problems be resolved, then what would their purpose be? i think that's an important incentive structure for the military and politicians as well. why change what's working well? it doesn't work for the citizens and the u.s. it's actually working pretty well for the political elite in power. is there any way to address these foundational issues that chris talked about. when actually the system is working very efficiently and very well for those who are running it today. and someone else that didn't
really come up, it came up again in the earlier section. it talked about in moeed's paper which is part of bellagio series, it's about youth, and the generation. i have questions, not answers. lots of polling about the attitudes. one the things that came out clear in the falling, youth are interested in politics, they avidly watch the news, but they don't want to engage in it. they are not -- they are disallusioned by politics and disengaged in politics. and so in some ways, i guess, do youth attitudes and opinions matter much, or is it just elite youth attitudes. i'm sort of wondering what is the new generation of politicians. where are they going to merge from? are they going to be the children of today's politicians, we see that as a pattern in the past. for which case it would be really interesting to have more
knowledge about what are the differences generationally between the political elite and the fathers and now the sons and fathers who are releasing them in the assemblies and now increasingly in the national assembly. who will be the new political class and what are their views? i don't think we have much knowledge on that. i'll leave it at that. come back to jonah's final point on the big idea being around kerry-lugar. i think that i am supportive of that initiative. however, i am worried if money is a big enough idea. i think the carrots that we have to offer are carrots of the military and development aid. the real issue, i think, that make pakistan -- the u.s. unpopular in pakistan is not because we don't give them enough money. it's political issues. are there any big ideas that are more political in nature?
you know, that could be explored. because i don't think there's enough money, certainly in the current economic climate to buy the hearts and minds of pakistan and somehow, you know, have a major political impact there. that said, i do think that money can have a very powerful development impact. if it's used sensibly, they will promote development objective, i think there could be good development outcomes from that. if it's used with the stabilization, chances are we are going to use that pretty ineffectively to achieve development or political objectives. i'll leave it at that. maybe some of the questions are for the panel to comment on. then we'll open it up for questions from all of you in the audience. thank you. >> on the patronage, i'm more on the thinking with you.
patronage is in environments where folks tend to be illiterate. there are a lot of studies done. people care more that you can get their kid into school rather than the quality of education improved. so it's really about what your relationship with that person can do for you rather than some global sense of better policies. so i think that's going to be very difficult to do without foundational human development investments. and another example of this is corruption. pakistanis will, you know, whine and holler about how corruption is imposed. i get irrigated. you can take the fine, or you could try to bribe the police officers. you could wait forever to get your phone, or bribe the dude to get your phone line put in. anyone who has the means will do that.
corruption is an efficient way for those who can afford it. those who can't don't have much of a say. civics have been replaced with the bizarre interpretation of the miss and fiasco. until you fundamentally deal with the human capital issue, i don't know how you are going to get out of patronage. i wanted to pick up what you said on kerry-lugar-berman. i agree you with that money is not a big idea. pakistan has a sense of entitlement to our money. if you ask them, they will tell you they are not being paid enough for their sacrifices. okay? money is a bottomless pit. money is not a carrot. we need to think about political carrots, even though pushing those through. on the second order, if we are going to think that pakistanis want a nontransnational relationship with us, we need to think again.
we've offered the wedding band time and time again. what i mean, status of forces agreement. all of our allies have sofa. we put a sofa on the table which is about as close of the wedding band. thawers -- they weasel out of it. we know we found a way of arming them. and they understand full well who was going to happen with pressler. they were part of getting that pressler amendment through. we need to stop the boohoo we screwed you on the f-16. pakistan made the right choice. they made the right choice. we need to stop indulging the
fiction making. more fictioning -- more fiction making, the drones. they plant the bogus story there's no effort to corroborate the story of the 120 odd women and children. it's always women and children that get killed. the story should be we paying a lot of cash. we don't you stop. the strategy should be not eliminating the program, but transparency. the fact that pakistanis are providing the intelligence. they are part of the process. do you really want them back on your streets? do you want that? it's about getting our relationship right with pakistan and we have to stop rehearsing the fictions. they become oses if -- os if oss very difficult to have the relationship. >> i told you it's difficult to
follow chris fair. yet i should give it another shot. [laughter] >> i leave you to take care of that. although i think we are being a bit unfair. i think jonah clearly said this is only an idea as much as you put it on the table. let me just say one thing about the transparency. while i completely have put it in writing many times, i shutter to think what will happen if pakistanis make all dealings transparent, both for washington and islamabad. let's be careful for what we wish for. let me answer and point out about the patronage. i don't disagree. patronage is working well throughout. the point is when you reach the elite consensus, you don't necessarily make everything correct. you may have still had the patronage. but on the issues which actually
matter at the macro level, you may still come out with a con census. i think they are still getting out, the patronage is still there. you have the understanding of what it means to be india. let me say, i think it's something -- some very interesting happening in the pakistani parliament. if you really sit and see what kind of legislation has been brought in, i think the last two years have been better than the previous 60 combined. so while at the microlevel, i think you are right, i think there are changes taking place in the parliament is realizing that they have a role just to sit there and stamp something that the military military says. whether that will happen or not, i don't know. on the ute very quickly, i think
it's not update. new evidence coming out. we need to be clear if you talk about the future of the pakistan, that's the future. if we are going to continue learning about, ten years down the line, we'll figure out we had a problem again. >> might be below. >> might be. >> thanks. talk about being in the moment. chris, i think you maybe responding to statements i didn't actually make. i never said we should cut off the drone program. >> i'm not talking about you. i didn't say you did. the f-16 crap. >> okay. f-16. it is a fact that we sold f-16. it is a fact that we neither gave the f-16 or refunded the money. >> it's the fact they knew the law. >> the law did not say we're not going to give you the planes or the money. what has really gotten under the skin of a lot of pakistanis is the fact that we wouldn't give the planes, we wouldn't give the money, and we charged for them
warehousing planes that we refused to deliver. i don't want to get into a separate tangent, i want to point out it's a fact this makes pakistanis very angry. we have to base our policy on real anger as it really exists. you can say it shouldn't exist. that's fine. but, you know, we can't just sort of fiat away the anger that's will. on klb, again it's not the point of klb is giving money and expecting to buy something. klb is never expected to be birthday cake. it wasn't expected to be we're going to give you $7.5 billion and now we are your sugar daddy. as i said, and as i said from day one in this, this merely gets us into the game. it's merely a pledge of sincerity. when i was first tasked by then
senator biden after years of my telling him, look, you know, boss the current policy towards pakistan needs a new big idea and the administration ain't doing it. he said, okay, smart guy, come up with something. i tried and tried and tried to come up with something that did not involve money. [laughter] >> because every time -- if you think there's something more difficult than going to a u.s. senator and saying, hey, boss, i want you to take billions of dollars from your constituents and send them to people who hate you. and then i want you to convince 534 of your colleagues to do exactly the same thing. that's not exactly a task i really wanted to sign up for. so i tried to find somehow, some big idea that did not involve money. i couldn't do it. if someone else has a big idea that does not involve money, come on. lay it on me. yeah, this would be nice. what klb does is it gets us a
seat at the table. it is not simply a perpetuate of the fast fast -- past policy. it was all about buying off the pakistani military. this is about establishing a relationship with the pakistani people. to give you an example of what it is trying to do. here's the success that i think probably we all would say was really one of the few unabashed successes in u.s. policy. our response to the kashmir earthquake. terrible, terrible tragedy. and how did we respond? we spend $1 billion. but it wasn't by cutting a check. it wasn't here, here you go. it was sending coo nooks, u.s. service members, and the fact of seeing u.s. troops saving the lives of pakistani people, that meant more than the $1 billion price tag. what i was trying to come up with a formulation for what was then biden-lugar, i was saying
how do we replicate this effect. do we have to wait for a natural disaster, or can we do this as a matter of policy? and do end on a slightly more appropriate note, chris, you asked for a wedding ring. which would be saying i actually quite literally delivered. in the course of the chanook, helping in a small way by helping the sergeant that was operating the winch open and shut the hatch each time that we were delivering gray. and very, very cold. each time i'd put on my gloves take them off. after a morning of doing that, i was rushing off to meet then senator kerry not as chairman, but as a middle ranking member of the committee, and i looked down at my hand and saw there was no ring there. so, of course, if i had to
choose between upsetting my home boss and someone who at that time was not even my boss at all. it was easy. we went back to the flight line and scourered to try to find the wedding ring. i realized the only possible way it could have been happened at one point it went out my glove and out the bottom hatch, and somewhere in kashmir, -- [laughter] >> -- a citizen was bending down for his morning prayers and out of the sky there came a small band of gold courtesy of the united states. >> thank you have much, jonah. to open up with anyone who has questions, i'm going to start with a couple people sitting in our overflow room. the first question is directed to moeed, in the decentralized
pakistani, how do you see the future of the bah lieu somewhere stan? we'll take two more questions and let you respond and go back. >> i'm harlem. observation first. unlike united states, politics are a blood sport. you've had three families ruling the country, and two prime minister murdered along with a president and governor. i think you have to realize there's an emotional issue that goes beyond politics. therefore, it does condition the way a lot of this seems to work. second in the terms of the economy, the consequences of the flood have never been really
corrected. that's going to make it extremely difficult economically, and it could impede. techtech -- textile relief woult cost us anything. assuming ppp is defeated and political chaos, what should be america's alternative strategy that pakistan drifts further apart and seeing itself either a country that's going to be more independent, or a country that becomes fragmented because of political chaos. >> one more question. then we'll give the of panel a chance to respond. >> pakistan is not one nation. it was several nations dominated by the punjabis. and one has to look back at
trauma of that. slice the country up. this is terrible. it is absolutely the most vicious form of deformization. okay. iraq is another one. the other thing is with the fundamentalist, they don't have a vision of the future. it's a vision of the fast. a bit like our tea party crowd, the vision of the future could support the budget and in the different context. anyway, i think this is -- this reversal of time actually started with the em poorer
there. my question is are you sure about this future business? >> thank you. >> quick responses. and then one last round of questions. >> i'll take two of these, bah luge stan, good will come with the bad. if we think they will have more economy and people will be happier. no. soon the debate in this town will be decentralization. but the providences have no include what to do with it. the money is leaking more than it used to. what should we do? what we should do is try to build the capacity but not pull back the system to centralized. decentralization needs much more support now. i think you will let me be the only one to reinforce. the capacity building is necessary. there's no question about that.
if the ppp losing, no election. there will be a new job. pacny will be ruled again. whether they are willing to cozy up to us or not, we'll see. they are not going to come about because one party has lost. this is exactly it. if the previous political crisis in pakistan, let's just look at that crisis. had ppp government fallen, what would have happened. no confidence vote. either from the parliament or the election. but the institution was in tact. that's a huge improvement over the '90s, where, you know, the street would have asked the military to come in. the military has always responded to something.
i think there's an improvement there. i don't see any change which will bring chi -- chaos in that sense. >> even greater unrest. what's happened in karachi is going to be greater. >> the question was the weakness of the economy. i completely agree. i don't buy the argument the program is going to go south and they won't know what to do. it has gone through and they will find it within the next mine months. you live on until you get to that consensus. of course, there's no guarantee again. i think that's more likely than putting their hands up and saying sorry. >> jonah, quick response. >> very quick to harlem's point about textile liberalization. this is something that wendy pushed when she was ambassador. i tried to carry as many pails
of water that i could. as wendy recalls, we ran into the bipartisan buzz saw which i believe is still there. if we were able to get textile reform through, i think that would be an innocent initiative. >> chris? >> yeah, i had a few comments on harlan's point. while i agree that your precipitant is perhaps not the right precipitant. i think there are some pretty likely precipitating scenarios that could put our relationship in a glide path to disaster. obviously, if there were to be an attack on our soil that was tied to lush car, we know full well. that would be a tipping point.
i think we should ask if it friend or enemy? lakhdar is one the few groups mentioned. that's why we need to figure out the groups. let me go back to the new deal. i have taken grief, but i believe it to be true. why? when it gets down to, pakistan and the united states, we don't strategic difference. we don't see the region or want the same region. how do we have a strategic alliance if we thoughts differ? you will see and hear people say we think at the end of the day, you and the indians and massad want to make us out.
with pakistan on a very different basis and very different logic and specific set that klb thought to achieve because we will waive those conditions. putting that out on the table creating an enormous base for us to talk about what can you, pakistan, do to deal with the strategic issues over which we differ. if pakistan says we need it because of india, we could put in the place security. negotiate with the indians. it doesn't have to be go invade india -- ridiculous. put things on the table thing ts they say they care about. at the end of the day they still say no, we have clarified the limits with pakistan. that in and of itself with use the elements of hope and dispair as strategy. >> thank you.
three more questions, quick questions. and then responses and we'll try to finish up in the next five minutes. >> i have two quick questions. one on drone and other on terrorism. on the drone issue, we've been hearing from the issues that there are 100 to 200 in al qaeda and pakistan border. and the drone started to take them out. including obama bin laden. since 2004, there had been 240 drone strikes. but we'll be hearing that people are being taken out who are unknown militants. like we don't hear them. we just see a figure, 12 militants taken out. 13 militants. some are still alive. so my question is that how longer will it take? and how much more fights will it take to take out osama bin laden?
number two -- >> very quickly. very quickly. >> there was something about exporting terrorism. islam was exporting terrorism. we see like islamic or uzbekistan that it's coming from, arabs there, afghanis, there are iranian in pakistan. and then you see there is all enrollment in the providences. we don't have the countries to stop and you also have americans coming to pakistan. so we are not pressuring these countries to stop your members, stop your citizens from going to pakistan and committing terrorism against the people of pakistan? >> thank you. okay. one. >> elaine sorayo, fellow. this has been a great spirited
panel. thanks a lot. we've heard the saying many times before credited to o'neil, all politics are local. and so what in the particularly the spirit of the klb do we see maybe more engagement? of the pakistani diaspora to link back into pakistan to provide underpinnings for future development and ongoing dialogue at the populous in pakistan? and maybe this could be the new frontier. you know? and i sort of sense -- since the klb came out of country and didn't -- they managed to push it through to maybe jonah would like to respond to that first. >> okay. last question. >> hi. sophia, british embassy. a bit of the discussion is been
relationships and making friends of pakistan. i wondered if you the panel would comment in the future we can see who the constituencies in pakistan might see as their international friend and what that means for us? thank you. >> thank you. if we could start with chris and move to jonah and moeed and try to keep your remarks to two minutes. >> drones, you know, it's -- drones are straightforward. pakistan's elements of it's government lie to it's people. for example, despite the fact that there's been countless images of the drones based in chauncey, and jalalabad, they have the ideas that it's serious. the idea that drones are trampling is fiction. on our sides, it's ridiculous to say there's no drones when the president says he'll send drones
to the jonas brothers if they mess with his daughters. we need to know the droning, and the operational significance. one the big shift and more of a partner shift, we've been killing more of their enemies than in the past. in the water event, he was not our enemy. that was pakistani's enemy. he wasn't sending us suicide bombers. more often than not, what pakistani military folks say is we want drones ourselves. we need to be a little bit more sophisticated in our discussion of drones at least keeping up with the drone debate. we need to have more transparency to get to your question. i also am very sympathetic to your point about international terrorists or militarist coming to pakistan. i see it differently than you do. sympathy and demand.
ratifying countries abc, there are few places where you can get the terrorists finishing school. it remains one of those places because of the patronage iten joys. if you want to be a terrorists and you will pissed off for reas that are local, there's few places go to take your terrorism aspirations. similarly if you are international organization and you want a place to operate with impunity, you already have the militant enstructure in places that have the swiss cheese instead of american cheese. i see this more in terms of supply and demand. pakistan has to do more in cleaning up the supply, the availability of these amenities. all of the country that is are involved in this have to deal with some of the issues that are printing the demand for
militancy and to become militants. >> take -- just quickly for elaine's question about the pakistani diaspora. i think yes, whether we have provisions in klb encouraging that and we have a variety of exchange programs. but ultimately, this is something that has got to come from the diaspora, and from the relatives who say behind. it's not going to be america that saves pakistan. it's going to be pakistan that saves pakistan if pakistan is to be saved or watches as pakistan -- if pakistan is not saved. and i think we really have to be aware of what our mim -- our limitations are. we are help and make it easier for the members of the diaspora to send money and travel back and forth for freer exchange of
people. this is going to be in the hands of pakistani there and here. very quickly on the drones, i agree. we need more transparency. i have often advocated for openly and above board double flag the drones. it is u.s.-pakistani endeavor. neither u.s. or pakistani officials have shown any appetite for that approach. >> thanks. let me just generally make two or three comments. one, i think this relationship basically can be summed up by the phrase duplicity for all. it's not pakistan, it's not the u.s. everything here is due police sit, and everybody is lying. i'm the biggest advocate for transparency. the problem is not only drones, everything that both sides are doing should be transparent. if there are things not in the country's own interest either u.s. or pakistan is doing, it
should be stopped. i don't think we live in an ideal world in that sense. i think the question about international friends was a very good one. what that points to is what pakistan thinks of a stable and prosperous pakistan is may not be what we think our partnership with pakistan should be like. if you go to pakistan, you will not find the u.s. even in the top four or five, i think. you know, the chinese will show up the, the saudis will show up, the uae will show up, maybe the brits, they have started looking very good after what has happened in the past decade. the u.s. will not. i think we need to be cognizant. jonah is right. we can do .01%. the rest of the problems are pakistanis and the solutions have to come from pakistan. that's what we have to do. they have to put their house in order. that's number one. we can push it and prod and nudge in the right direction. final comment, i think this panelist is a good example and,
you know, any talk that i go to on pakistan, this comes out. everybody agrees it's a country on the verge of falling apart. let's be careful and l.e.t. be realistic. there's no plausible way that pakistan will be able to deliver on most of the things that we want it to in the next six months, one year, two years. this has to be efficient, long-term policy. i think there's where the lens of the kerry-lugar bill is correct. you have to project it forward in a number of years to see if something will come out. what you need to be careful about, i think what i'd be worried about, if there's evidence that the military is not divorcing ties with the extremist. if there's evidence that there are and still kill the problem, that's okay too. because you need time for them to do this in a sequential fashion. i think we need to be very clear on what we should expect versus what we hope. >> okay. thank you all to our panelist
>> four u.s. presidents. he's also chaired e -- chaired the review for the american policy in 2009. bruce, over to you if you would introduce the panelist and we'll take it from there. >> thank you very much for that kind introduction. thank you all for coming out. i real you are now more than four hours into pakistan and pakistan fatigue must be beginning to set in. but i promise you that this panel will, i hope, be the jewel in the crown of this performance. we have two of america's foremost experts on pakistan, on pakistan army, and u.s.-pakistani relationship here today with me. you can read their bios. i won't read everything. shuja nawaz is a director at the
south asia council, to be more precise, he created the center for the south atlantic council. it has become one the most important go-to places for studying pakistani issues and for studying south asia. his book "cross swords" is a must read for anyone who wants to understand the future of pakistan. and if you like what you read in it, you should ask him for the unedited version of it which goes on to well over 1,000 pages and has an incredible amount of information within it. steve cohen has the author of 12 books, and he's the father of the pakistaniers in america. at least that's what we like to
call him. he has given us the breakthrough books and he's the principal sponsor of the bellagio papers who brings you all here today. i'm going to ask shuja to speak first then steve then i will speak for a few minutes. we're going to wrap up at 5:00 promptly so we can get on to the road before the ice starts. shuja. >> thank you, bruce, and steveing, for inviting me to be part of the conference and then to speak here today. i should also mention that for a more recent understanding of the pakistan, u.s. relationship, you should also definitely read bruce's latest book "deadly embrace" which connects all of the dots for you.
obviously at the end of a rich afternoon's discussion, there's not a lot that one can add in terms of the issues. so i was given the task of asking a bunch of questions such as how does pakistan course correct? and what will pakistan have to do internally and what should the u.s. and international community do? and what are the optimal policies from within and without, and what does it imply for the future of the pakistani relationship? in short to provide in 10 minutes the silver bullet answer that washington has been trying to stumble around and look for in the dark for the past ten plus years. i think to be begin with, how
does pakistan course correct has the implication that pakistan is on a course. and that it knows where it's going. and this is, you know, i've often called it yogi berra's famous statement about if you don't know where you are going, any road will take you there. and steve has, i think, the one that first brought me -- brought that to my attention. so i don't believe that pakistan has a clear vision. and i don't believe the civilian government has spent any of its time in the first two years producing that vision and trying to get a national understanding of that vision. in a manner that it could then bring along the other parties and perhaps also manage to bring along or congeal or convince the
pakistani military to move towards the clearly-divisioned vision of what they would like pakistan to be. that's one the reasons why i brought up the issue of the democratic shift. that's the reality that pakistan is going to have to deal with. unless and until the political system changes, because of those natural causes, it's going to be hard to expect the politics to change it in a manner in which it goes against them. they are not going to have the par. nor the cartel that they -- [no audio]
>> the conflict with the part. in economics, there's a famous theory. the jacob theory is based on the presence of a certain systemic infrastructure and underpinning of whatever policy that you want to have. if you know the kind of calls that you want to make, particularly in the economy and you are willing to make that effort, then there will be a preventive care and conclusion and in the costly transition and so. it started going down and rapidly moving up. so this is unfortunately what they said today. the references to the fact that
the most immediate critical issue facing pakistan is the elements. and this is not something that we can be waiting six months for nine months. we need to wait out the period that's granting pakistan. because in my view essentially, that was on its way. in pakistan, they will not have the capacity to start paying back. soon even if the u.s. will believe, pakistan will have very difficulty in accepting more money because they won't be able to pay it back. --
>> they were in parliament for the reference. so i don't see out of this chaos and confusion something good emerging. for those that know me well in washington, i've been accused of being an optimist. i must say now i find it difficult to maintain that optimism. unless, there is my point, unless there's an internal effort in pakistan to resolve it's issues. and unless pakistan stops working outside for solutions. we are at a critical junction.
and the rest of the pressures are not just economic, but demographic. there's the question of insurgency and militancy. the pressures are whether we like it or not, u.s. policy and those of other countries is quite heavily tied to what happened in afghanistan. because without pakistan, they can't be a stable solution to afghanistan and vice versa. domestically, the issue is still the 18th amendment. good idea. they should finance the good idea. there was no capacity in the providences to actually implement the national finance award or to have helped the 18th amendment. suddenly when you hand over responsibility and revenues to the providences, they have no incentive to produce surplus budgets.
although they seem to have worked it out and spend the money because their job is to get reelected. so even with the very good program with the support program like the world bank as provided finance for. things are becoming the political structure. because the whole trust of that is going to be to try to get the reelected whenever the elections stay close. internally, in terms of the insurgency and militancy, we are finding a state of equilibrium of sorts where the military has cleared a lot of territory. most of the fatah has cleared. they are finding it difficult to hold. they certainly find it impossible to transfer. because there is no civilian capacity or administrative capacity inside fatah. there needs to be a very rapid move towards recognizing the
nexis between the counterinsurgency and the counterinsurgency report on the council. but on this side, the civilians have for the last two years created the idea of a national counterterrorism authority and then done nothing with it. : to part in the. and unless it's filled, based under the prime minister, it's going to be hard to imagine a pakistan military participating in that venture, particularly if it remainedoused in the interior ministry. there are real problem, but to go back to the issue raced during the discussions, i think there's need to be a focus on something that accepts the madrassa as reality and builds
them up and mainstreams them into the educational stirm. can go in and are not going, it is not going to work. unfortunately, on this i don't blame the current government. i only blame the musharraf regime, because they an opportunity and they messed it up. they didn't move forward to get that approved. finalry, looking at the opportunities for the international community and the u.s., i think the very short run in order to prepare for the medium and long run, there he's in to be very careful look at what kind of asichlt forget the idea, again, the idea not to buy love but to use tough love to suggest to the pakistanis that they need to take action's
support afghanistan society that aren't actually working at the ground letter and you're not simply recycling the assistance to the elite or back to the united states. now, mr. holbrooke did a great job in trying to stop the old model of bringing old money back into the beltway. now we have to make sure that it doesn't stay with the provincial capital that it actually gets out into the feetd. we have to recognize has 45 tu. pakistan won't have exactly the same but will you good friends. once you recognize that, i think there is an opportunity to see what kind of changes can occur. yesterday, the comment made by chris, in are things the
pakistanis didn't expect from the u.s. the civil nuclear deer was one, and, of course, the access of pakistani goods to the u.s. market is another. all the nicks toint to that. there's a great study, development that gives specific information on this, and i suggests you look at that, for that. and finally, let me end on one point. it is time for pakistani politicians to act like politicians. and not by businessmen. it's in their political input, because if they mess this up, pakistan is going back to square one and we've seen this movie before. and it doesn't have a good ending. thank you. >> good.
i'm tempted to say that i agree with everything that everybody said, then sit down and answer some question, but let me say a few thing about the project and my own views about policy. first of all, i do not know -- i've only lived in pakistan a month at a time, although several nos, and, really others know the country much better than i do. i did get interested in pakistan years ago when i look at the role of the indian military and role of the pakistan military. from what point on i kept and open interest because i knew in the long-term they would be critically important for the future. unfortunately i was right and this last trip to pakistan, my hosts for a couple of weeks, and i would say that unfailingly. honest in their response. they always give me great access
to their soldier, and to their officers. even when they know i strongly disagree with what they're doing. the army may not be part of the probably, but it's certainly part of the solution. let me talk briefly, say first of all that chris' suggestion. i don't know what's successful in terms of american policy but i know what failure would look like. failure, crisp suggestions we ought not have a continuing policy against pakistan. if that happens, we have utterly and completely failed. that's also in the possible policy. you can't contain a country of 250 million people from this distance and the i don't think we want to affect a relationship with indian as well as other countries. so containment may be a policy but it's unworkable in the long run. how do we get to get it linked as a policy? in the short term, talked about a lot of steps which could have been, should have been done and weren't done. speaking of american policy and this is as much a pakistani
policy problem than an unrollieness to put 1/100 into normalizing the straight agreement with pakistan and the nuke letter deal -- pakistan, a new ally against terrorism. where was this case? where were the textiles. they were willing ing to congrp overcome opposition. i believe india, but no effort from the u.s./pakistan textile agreement. under the calculations bean r behind it, the first thing i'd hear from pakistanis after 9/11. we want to sell you taxtiles, and we wouldn't do it. the second kind of policy fix that has to be done was a nuclear -- in a sense while i was in some way in fraver of a nuke letter deal i don't know why we couldn't offer to the pakistani if only to get a
different dialogue going. three countries nuclear weapons states but outside the mpg and no administration has been interested in even thinking about this. again, what you get, they did all of these pad things in the past, therefore you can't talk about it in the future. struck me as amateur policy. before pe did things in the past, we want to talk to them about the future and this could be part of the future, but we're not going anywhere. so i think there were a flub of medium policies could have been should, have been pursuing which we're not. i'm not sure i carry lugar in that mix. the pakistani, completely misunderstand stand. i guess it's rathery lugar berman. but that was largely jonas doing the right policy at the right time. hard to -- because of the position of the united states. we've talked about that. on the medium term a big idea.
borrow chris' term. it shouldn't be pakistan but pakistan in its regional context. if you talk to pakistan's military, the one thing they're worried about is america in their land and on their board easy. while they largely exaggerate this, with regard to indians, they've got nuclear weapons. that's what we did, we, the soviets. adon't worry about the number ever india an kraft use yourary kraft one day earlier. you're supposed to. >> hearon an owner using their. that's a natural strategy for pakistan, blut in the long retun this is unstainable. pack thanh has to have relations with others, and there's been zero to little interest in this
yt. i think that should be the big idea. only two pieces i've read recently, reviewed by steve kohl, the "failure of america. then i'll send out a piece byna interested in peace so it doesn't break out into a nuclear arms race between pakistan and india and also the survival of pakistan in coherent fashion. i think that's what at stake. whether this administration or the next to can do this, i doubt. i think, as that bounces off people. in fe and they rightly suspect once the reasons are fulfilled, we will disappear. suspicions of american ficklists, frankly borne out by history, also by their other pair noiy. that's how it contributes to it. this should be a normalization
of south asia relations. begin with borders. all these xrunts unacceptable borders, yindia pakistan, india and china. pakistan, afghanistan. the borders are 50, 60, 70 years old in cases and they're still unregulationed. i would begin with but china's part of this and i'd look at arms control. india and pakistan are acquiring the capacity to blow themselves up many, many times over. in my last lecture i spoke to both colleges and said you could be consent killing 50 million pakistanis or indians. that should be enough to keep them out of your back pocket. i said, it's not how much weapons you have. of the other side you kill. that was satisfy for the french in terms of soviets. you should be satisfied for
ind india. and to look at us and our relationships, they've learn more is bet perp we're trying to undo misjudgments of deck dadad while we see this. hundreds of weapons, comes as no prize. areas where we have a legitimate important role to play in terms of normalizing the relationship between pakistan and its neighbors. especially in afghanistan. how do we do this? i'm not sure. i do think, ta take up a suggestion of bruce riedel in his last book, which i've got in my paper, in fact, looking at how we ogz ourselves to deal with india and pakistan, or pakistan, i think that we're doing a little research on this. as i understand it, i did work
for the murphy kpligs in the 1970s. bill did not want the same general or admiral going into india and pakistan. so they divided india into peking. used to be a different name. and pakistan incenseham. the same admiral or general would not have to visit each country. then he told me, he's serious about this. of course the policy will be carrying the other baton. i assure you it is not. there's no linkage except casually and accidental. i was in the white house for the briefing rollout of the last afghanistan. i said what about india in afghanistan? he said, well, that's on our to-do list, quoted from the paper. there's no serious thinking about that. the restructurings will pay place, security council,
assigned someplace else. against serious issues. until we get that straight, nothing much is going to happen. let me conclude by two cbms. conference building measures. academically speaking. one conference building mercker should be what i try to do in the paper. limit it to a limited degree. compare pakistan with a range of countries similar but not -- you'll see names. another islamic revolution, perhaps, indonesia. farcherable example of malaysia, another exemption of political transformation. we need to systematically compare pakistan with like countries. they're not all aidentical but pakistan sheaed some features with all of the above. the second conference building mercker would be the big idea nap is, india/pakistan
nommalization. i don't see this in the near future, but before we go to policy containment, where we see pakistan as a threat and enemy, we should try to get out of the box, out of the cut. try to avoid that conclusion and do whatever we can. it's a country. from doing that altogether. >> thank you. >> i was asked to speak shortly, briefly, about the u.s. foreign policy in pakistan. now, i can't help but start by looking at the current state of u.s. pakistani relations. although both claim we have a sta treechic dialogue and engaged in strategic engagements and although we have more meetings of all time thafren before, the truth is, the u.s./pakistani relationship today is in the deep state of disrepair. there is intense frustration on
both sides. i'll just speak about the americans, though. the chief of station at the cia in islamabad was outed earlier this year. it's not a secret. it's in every newspaper in the unite. that's an stroid jae. even in the most hostile state, and this is supposed to be our friend. more extraordinary, immediately it was put out by the cia who was outed by the isi. by the pakistani interservices intelligence organization. i don't know whether that's true or not, but when intelligence relationships have deteriorated from that point, we are in very deep, bad waters. on top of the frustration, there are constant cries of impending doom. that as bad as it is today, it could get far worse. after the events in times square last may we saw a whole --
traveling with a simple message. if there's a mass casualty terrorist attack on the united states that goes off successf successfully, the u.s./pakistani relationship will go to a place it has never been before, and for those who couldn't fig wrer that place was, bob woodarded to us. 150 targets are already set in central command. again, i don't know if that's true, but this is a very dangerous and bleak situation. i agree fully with what steve just said. containment won't work either. that's not an option that has any relegs i agree with something jonah said earlier. we have to be realistic. the united states' influence in pakistan, over pakistan's future, is extraordinarily limited. i'll actually adapt his point just a little bit.
our capacity for harm as the lft 60 years show, is quite large. we can make bad situations really bad situations, but our capacity to make good situations better is very, very limited. the future will be determined by pakistanis, not by americans. so the first place i start thinking about u.s. foreign policy as the yu -- don't make it worse. given the history that this president inherited what i refer to as a witches' brew, found that will be in itself an extraordinarily difficult thing to do. one flies start is where christine left off in the last conversation. which was more transparency. more honesty, for let's get down to what year really doing on both sides.
that, sourof course, sounds so simple and becomes extraordinarily difficult when the secretary of state or the president of the united states does it on national television. but i think there's much to be said for that. so what beyond transparency should we do? i have a lot of suggestions in the book that shows you, and steve both kindly agreed to plug, without my even asking them to do so. so i'll refer you there for moi law priority you number one. wom show no under estimate the process. we have done it over and over in the past. it's always easy to go to the chief of army staff and get something fixed in 24 hour. whether it's a u2 base, money for the mahajadeen.
the civilian democratic leadership is as shuja pointed out, lacking in leadership today. they don't really have an idea where they're going. i would just amend that. i think there were a few ideas about where he wanted to go and those all died in the mumbai massacre and i think that was one of the points of the mumbai massacre to make sure any good idea he had went nowhere at all. retrieving them would be really difficult to do. several people have stressed the importance of symbolism here, and i think that's right. how we deal with the fact that -- sends in warmest signals to the entire pakistani people about who we think is in charge, who should be in charge and who
we're going to deal with, and in 2011, this administration is going to have two very, very important opportunities to get the symbolism right, and it's going have to make those efforts, and make that right, and what is going to be very difficult environment. opportunity number one is going to be when president zardari comes to the united states, which i gather will be sometime in march. how we deal with that, as the president pakistan. not as mr. zardari, but as the president of pakistan, is absolutely important. if we send the signal a that we think all he is is a crook and a bum, then everybody else in the world will see him that way. if we bad-mouth him in the media coming out of the white house and the state department, then everyone if you don't believe me, go ask hamid karzai. we know what happens when that
happens. we need to give him an opportunity to present his case to the american people. i think the congress of the united states should invite limb to come speak to a joint session for the united states congress. i think the american media needs to give president zardari every possible chance to explain where his vision this day is. if shuja's right, we'll be exposed. let's hope he can come up with better talking points. more than that, though, it's also an opportunity for him to fight for what pakistan needs. we talked a little about the lugar legislation and about textiles. i can tell you, if you think it was hard to get kerry lugar through the last congress, the tea party's going to teach you a lesson about american congress and how it works that you won't forget. do you think it's hard to get textile legislation through the last american congress? >> delegations now have a lot of
supporters all over the united states of america and the republican party and in the democratic party, it's going to be very hard to sell. let's let the pakistani government try to make its case on its own. and then there's the second opportunity. president obama promised that he's going to go to pakistan when this is through. this is aneenormously important. the president needs to get out of islamabad. talk to opposition parties, he needs to connect with the pakistani people. the secret service is going to say, are you out of your mind? they've told me that many times before. thankfully, i won't have to answer the question this time, but he's going to have to use this opportunity to send all kind of messages about where the united states is. the second point is about our
diplomacy, and i think here we have two challenges ahead. what i call the small diplomatic challenge is in afghanistan. if general petraeus is right, and we value to hope that he is right, that we have now halted the momentum of the taliban, then the process of trying to find a political process in afghanistan is in front of us. the logic of the president's policy in afghanistan and since the begins was changes on the battle begin to open the door to changes in the frill sphere. pakistan has to be part of that process. if it is true as i believe it is true that if you want to talk to the shorea, the bet way to get them on the phone is call general pasha. then the way to get there is to call general pasha.
general pasha shouldn't control the process, but one thing's for sure. if he doesn't want it to happen it will never happen. if we treat pakistan as a spoiler in afghanistan it will be the spoiler, so we have to find a way to bring pakistan into this process and see if they can be part of change in afghanistan. the second part is the big idea. and here steve and i are exactly in the same place, that we're in such violent agreement on this it's almost frightening. we even used the same terminology. the big picture for the united states is not just winning the war in afghanistan, or defeating islamic extremism in afghanistan. and pakistan. it's somehow stabilizing south asia. for the last decade at least, if not more, certainly since the cargo war if not beforehand, we've been playing russian
roulette in south asia. by my counted we have now at least explored three rounds. you know, there -- if we have another terrorist attack on the scale of mumbai or on the scale of new delhi in 2001, i think all bets are off the next go-round. i know all the reasons by india show restraint in the past but i also know at certain points politicians don't listen to reason. they listen to what they have to do. so we do need a big idea. big diplomacy. something that would be very complex. the good news here is there are a lot of stakeholders who also share or interest in trying to do something about this. for example, china. china used to have a south asia policy all about using pakistan as intended. now china has a huge economic relationship with india. it has a more subtle and more
significant relationship with india than it did in the past. the pakistani nuclear program described in "the washington post" today, gives a lot of other people a stakeholder in this as well. this is a very complex, and it has to be done in a way that is sophisticated, subtle, and where most of what the united states does is below the radar screen, now many of you will say, well, that's not america. we can't do it, but rime convinced i'm convinced that we can do it if we put our minds to it. this president has invested a tremendous amount of interest in activity in india over the last two years. it wasn't this is his first state visit. it's not an accident that he's the first american president in more than a quarter century to go to india in his first term,
in fact, in his first two years in office. i don't speak for the president, but i think his accesses sh act show he does understand the big idea. whether he can translate it into success remains to the seen. i just want to conclude on the same point that steve could be cluded on. organization. organization is very important. and we are very poorly organized today for dealing with this part of the world. afghanistan, pakistan or af-pak as it was inappropriately named, the other half is actually the bigger and more important part, and that's pakistan-india, and we do need to reorganization ourselves to see the region holistically. deal with is hol risksy. my good news for my comrades and friends in uniform is we've already got a base in the region for your forward deployment
headquarters. you're going to love yegg oh garcia. and with that, we're going to open it up to questions, and ask everyone who's going to raise a question, come to one of the microphones. please, identify yourself very, very briefly, and, please, raise a short question. i think what we're doing is take three or four questions and then have a round of the panel and then take one more. as i said, we're going to properly close in a half an hour. >> ladies first. >> trudy ruben. bruce, given the political constraints that both you, that all three of you referred to in what this administration can do
or could get through congress, where do you think they might start, where they would have a chance of making headway? is reorganization symbolically a place to start? is it starting in the conduct as you described of -- what is achievement in the remainder of this president's term? >> thanks. i'm not even sure whether i am supposed to answers the question, but let me just throw two things. one, i think i agree with most of what has been said here. india seems to bed single bullet as far as pakistan is concerned. the real question ask what can be done? yes, i mean i accept bruce's point there is leverage, but i'm part of a number of -- india,
vociferously disagreed with any channel, back, front or any. the pakistanis want that, of course. is there something specific, beyond saying that we have leverage? what is it that the u.s. and others can do, if anything, or is it that we're going to leave these two countries at the mercy of the next mumbai and see what happens? i mean, in the context of what washington can do when it looks at pakistan and the reorganization and the messages that the president has to give, i think one other message i would add, and i think i completely agree with what is being said is that perhaps somebody from washington needs to explain islamabad. just how a place washington is, because there is a sense every time i talk 20 people there, you've got this new machine, knows exactly what they're doing, and the fact of the matter is, islamabad is probably a more organized place than i'm thinking than washington is. i mean this seriously. because if this can be conveyed,
perhaps a lot of the responsibilities will be put to rest. that everything is being done under this grand plan of perhaps dismembers pakistan or whatever i keep on hearing. >> one more. >> my name is zarif from polytech. if you talk to anybody in pakistan on the street and ask, what is the problem, in terms of extremism? they'll say once u.s. leaves pakistan, everything will be solved. is there an understanding with the military or the military exact relations on what is the root cause or how it will be solved? >> i'm sure -- would you like to take the last -- >> sure. i don't think that we should be looking for solutions in the military to military relationship. i think the military to military relationship really is addressing a very limited number of issues, which are either
related to the u.s. and coalition efforts in afghanistan, or in tempting to try and keep a handle on militancy inside pakistan in a way that could deter the -- the emergence of any new attempts as bombing the mainland of the united states. so that's really not going to provide the solution. i do want to mention on another question, bruce what can be done. yes, india does interpose third-party inks vengs, but historic buy it's only known when it's inest interest and you have to go back in history to an agreement and even before that to the duncan-sands intervention in the run of kuch.
so there is, you know, what one says and there's what one does, and i think the u.s. can behind the scenes play a very critical role in helping both sides see the advantage of working out on very practical issues and for the u.s. to provide the wherewithal and the international community to provide the intellectual support for efforts such as updating the interface and the water treaty. or trying to examine the possibilities off a shared electric grid in a manner that power can be equalized and used and owned by them in the board of regions. when there are all of these possibilities, which would not threaten one country or the other, and would still regain sovereignty. i think trudy's question is
really critical. where can one make headway? what's achievable? it's a question of it's trying. you know, i agree with the party support for the carolinas, it's much greater, but there are other members of congress also, and the thing as we vb seen the effort people made. there is this issue and somebody immediately brings up the stop sign and said, you can't do that. all the facts shared with members of congress. i referred to ap study. a very brief study. even busy congressmen will be able to read it, just two, three pages. i think that's the kind of education that needs to be done. it's in the interests of the u.s. to give pakistan the same break that it gives you're e s allies in terms of markets.
>> when when he the bellagio discussions one of the consensus items, one item on which several of us agreed, four or five of the group as we talked about it, was the rolfe india in shaping pakistan's future. to put it in simple, blunt term, india steers the pakistan army, or the pakistan's army perception steering the pakistan army and the pakistan army steers ak stan. so if you warrant to make change in pakistan, which i think would be in india's interest, in the kinds of changes i would like to see. also in india's -- you have to deal with india pakistan's relations. that's elementary. a couple people understand that, probably the prime minister. maybe a few others, but mumbai was designed, i think to destroy the india/pakistan dialogue, and whatever the u.s. can should, should do, myself do. behind the ties. i think it's the first order of priority. not our response shouldn't be,
well, india is important for continuing chine no and into the east and pakistan is important because it's a muslim countries to the west. i think that's defeatist thinking, the wrong kind of thinking. there are two areas where i think the u.s. could be more proactive and one would be in afghanistan, because india and pakistani interests are identical. they both want a mod der -- it' in the interest of the pakistan army, even though they support taliban. it is of interest to see a neighbor to their west. relatively because they are atrade of the blowback from afghanistan. of course, in india, india is obsessed with the notion of the taliban in pakistan. now, we've talked talking about a regional solution for afghanistan. i do think that the obama administration mention whtd it first came in, we should go back to that idea. bricking in iranians. the pakistanis and indians, too,
to neutralize it to develop onettes on. indian cooperation of afghanistan would be welcome by pakistan. we probably have to be the monitor plus nato of the role of each in afghanistan but i think that's doable and the kind of strategic thinking i haven't se seen -- yeah. the other thing i would point out is that unions are beginning to think of what a failed pakistan would look like, and they've discussed -- they discussed the idea with a degree -- at last enemies collapse. when they think about it. think about 100 pakistani nuclear weapons not aimed at the united states. probably india is the first target. they begin to question whether this is a good idea or not, and, of course, the turmoil that would ensue, hundreds of thousand, maybe millions would migrate back to india. you need to understand that the collapse of pakistan which we do
not depict in this. not the disintegration of pakistan, that's that's not good for india. when a normal relationship with pakistan is in india's interests. therefore, it's not beyond human imagination to conceive offen india used to stabilize india. the countries that didn't deal with pakistan i under estimated, but in the long run, the chinese are interested. not north korea which is uncontrol 5b and runs the risk of war with its neighbors. clearly, the indians are -- >> i just want to pick up trudy's question about what is achievable and what is realistic. the results of last november's elections i think are pretty clear to all of us that the congress of the united states is now going to be divided. it's going to be very difficult to get anything achieved. the administration is going to
face a very tough battle holding on to kerry lugar. if you look at u.s. foreign assistance today, most american foreign assistance goes to three countries, leaving aside the war zones. israel -- i don't think they're going to cut aid to israel. egypt. hmm. that could be a big motherload in the next couple of week, but i think that would be a huge mistake and everyone is going to realize that and pakistan. and pakistan is going to be very vulnerable. the reality of pakistani behavior makes it extremely vulnerable. that's one of the reasons why i think it's so important that the pakistani government, when the president comes here, and when obama goes to pakistan, provides opportunities for very serious conversations both in public and in private, and i think the public wants, in this case are going to be much more important than the private ones in talking to congressional audiences and public audiences here and in
talking to public audiences in pakistan. there are a lot of things that can be done that don't require legislative approval. how we organize the united states government is a function of the executive branch. ironically, south asia bureau and the department of state was actually legislatively required's. in 19 92, steve zolar, the man had some bad ideas in his life. a couple good in his life, one, south asia should be split off from the state department where it always had been a second class citizen and made its own bureau. the then secretary of state james baker requested george bush to veto the legislation, because it had that in it. fortunatel lly brent scowcroft the brains to say, this is nuts. we cannot veto the united states
department of state's legislative enactment over a question of what bureaus the state department will create. i think we should now remember the legacy of steve solars and go back to having a strong south asia bureau. it doesn't necessarily mean good policy. there are other things the executive can do, and as i said in my remarks, the symbolism and how we host pakistani president, our president, how he travels to pakistan will be very, very important. i want to say a couple of words about the india question. i think steve is absolutely right. indians are now thinking seriously, really, for the first time, about what failure next door looks like, and i think sing understands that his vision of a glorious 21st golden age century for india doesn't happen
if there's a pakistan next to it that's either a failed state or even worse, a jihadist state. moving from that realization to restoring indo conversations is going to be very, very hard to do. my last point on this would be about american diplomacy. we weren't going to convince anybody in south asia in january of 2009 to listen to anything we were saying about trying to. >> when we on the verge, the university assumption was the tag ban were eveninger on the verge of victory or the united states on the verge of cutting and running. that perception, i think, has begun to change. we actually, unfortunately, gave it additional shelf life when we talk about july 2011 as the date for which departure from afghanistan was going to come. i think the administration in
their last policy review has very carefully and very skillfully changed the timeline. 2014 is now the timeline the people are focusing on, and i think that's the right timeline and, again, as i said, if david petraeus is even half right that he's starting to turn the corner, that opens the door to all kinds of different american policies and different diplomacy who were frankly impossible when it looked like we on the verge of defeat in afghanistan. let's take a couple more questions. >> all right. you guys mentioned a relationship between india and pakistan and the importance of symbolism but the elephant in the room is kashmir. i was wondering what the u.s. policy should be towards kashmir and if there are any confidence-building measures in the interim or short run the u.s. can do to engage both india and pakistan into where there's some sort of dialogue on this issue? >> alexander, when you have someone with a british accent
representing the department of state, i couldn't let the allegation of complete incoherence in the region go unchallenged. and i think here, just a brief word i think about conversations and about structures. i think there is actually a coherence to engagement on south asia from with the state department, across the interagency. every week the discussion of afghanistan and pakistan has presently assistant secretary to south asia blake representing those border equities. people from my office, the office for the special representative of afghanistan and pakistan, we have been to delhi as well as other regional and extra regional capitals to discuss south asian policy on pakistan and afghanistan. the idea of it somehow there is not a conversational connection would be belie both by colleagues in the state department but also i think in the nsc and in the other parts of the interagency. one additional historical facet.
my understanding of the creation of central command, was it derived from the iran problem, iranian revolution, but actually prior to the late 1970s, early 1980s, pacific command included both india and pakistan and some of the military agencies planning for whatever one might do, vis-a-vis iran in the early 1980s but led to military commands around that. my question to the panel would link to this objective, which i think the administration would share anyway as strategic ability in asia, but linking it to your implication of do no harm. what do you think in terms of the pursuit of ta goal in south asia would cross the very principle that you set up in the beginning of try to do no harm? >> well, the dreaded k word has been cut on the table, and i asked both of my colleagues to speak to the kashmir regime, if
you like? >> i think the no harm issue was addressed to you, bruce, but -- i'd be happy to address kashmir. i happen to believe that kashmir does have another very critical participant, which is the kashmiry people, and for too long the pakistanis and indians have been talking as if the kashmiries don't exist and now i think they realize that they do exist and are asserting themselves, and that is the recognition that the u.s. should help strengthen, because whatever solution emerges, will have to emerge in an organic fashion over time among the people of kashmir, and then between india and pakistan. and some indication of this was evident in the discussions of
president arafat when he was trying to forward relationships between india and pakistan. kashmir was basically set aside and the whole idea was to let it take its own part and not try and put -- sochl the kashmir problem and then solve all the other problems. so i don't think there is a simple solution. i don't think the idea of an independent kashmir can be immediately laid on the table, but certainly kashmir could be a very useful catalyst for opening borders between india and pakistan, or opening trade, because the natural trade routes from kashmir to india initially went through pakistan, and the rivers flow from kashmir into pakistan. they can be used as a means of collaborating.
so i think kashmir is a great opportunity with pakistan trade and opening borders. >> a couple of yearsing a i was, whenever i'm asked, i would say, kashmir should be subordinated to other concern, which are important. i would always come up with water and environment issues. then, of course, the pakistan and the military picked up, and started treating waters of kashmir with the same emotional and intense feeling. clearly, that doesn't work either, but to find areas where they have strategic areas in common, afghanistan is one of them. might begin there, rather than the toughest one which is kashmir. in dealing with kashmir you're dealing with two of the most recalcitrant in the world. getting them to talk about anything is outrage and just not going to happen i think.
i would begin with anything except kashmir. the united states should have its own view of kashmir. things going on that aren't very at tractive. we into speak up and talk about what this. what they all want is good governance in justice, whatever form the gov nance, whatever shape the governance, we should be interested in them following but obviously should not attempt to come up way solution, and impose it on the regional states. >> one more word about kashmir because i agree with hwhat has been said and it guess back to the president's trip. the president he's going to have to say something about kashmir when we get there. the entire department of state and the national security council can write a million memos saying we don't want to go into this in public but there's an ugly reality that's called a press conference, and journalists have a capacity to raise questions which you cannot just simply ignore and this administration's going to have to have something to say about
kashmir. and i think that we have been given a good way of thinking about it, which is we ought to start talking a little bit about the people and how to make their lives something better than what it has been for the last 50 years. do no harm, i think there are many, many, many things we can do that can make the situation worse. i alluded to one which i want to be more specific about. it's how we deal with the pakistani army and how we deal with chief of army staff. i don't know the ins and outs of how the general got an unprecedented three-year extension in duty, but i have heard from a number of sources that the united states was not exactly a neutral party in that whole decision. i think that's unfortunate. i think we should have been a neutral party. that should not have been something in which we had a role to play. the traditional approach is
always, well, you know, we're better with the devil we know than the devil we don't know. well, the general is a devil we really don't know very much about, and i'm feeling we're going to have buyer's remorse on this one as we go down the road. it should be a pakistani decision, not an american decision and we should stay out of it. the other area of harm is something that people have brought up before, and i raise it again, the question of drones. the drones is a very, very, very difficult policy decision for this white house. we have very few means of putting real sustained pressure on al qaeda and its allies in the federally administered tribal areas. the drones work. they do put preshg on thident b them. he used to be the catty chatty of international terrorism. he put out a new statement every couple weeks.
in 2010 he put out four statements in the course of the entire year, and two of them were less than a half minute in length. it's going to be very interesting to see how long it takes mr. zawahiri to say something about what's going on in cairo. it's, in fact, already quite intriguing that cairo, which should be the issue that's gotten him to the microphone already, so far we haven't heard a word. i think we will hear a word from him. my point is we have disrupted his ops tempo with the drones, but the drones as many people have alluded to also carry very heavy counterproductive impact. whether 120 women and children are killed in every drone strike is irrelevant. what's relevant is what pakistanis think. and the very rare danger that we face with the drones is drone addiction. to get to the point where the drones are the solution to a problem which they'll never be the solution to.
they're a tactical stumeinstrum. they're an incredibly scientific 21st century platform but they're not a strategy, they're just a platform. we have to make sure we don't become drone addicted because that in the end will cause more harm than all the good the drones do. this is a tough, tough call and i'm glad that i don't have to make that decision. i'm glad that president obama has to make that decision, and i have great sympathy
earlier the migration policy institute released a report on the federal government's enforcement of immigration laws. hillyer from unfortunate integration policy analyst. this is an hour and 20 minutes. >> good morning to all of you. i would like to welcome you here on behalf of the migration policy institute and thank you for spending the last monday of the first month of 2011 with us. my name is muzaffar chishti.
i direct migration policy at and white view school of law. today's briefing is to mark the release of mpi's the report delegation and diversions, study of state and local immigration enforcement. this report is part of mpi's research on u.s. immigration and integration policy. the reports and further information can be found on our web site. if you are able to write these to www.migration policy.org. we have a very distinguished panel here to present the report and give us comments on the reports. i co-author and my dear colleague, randy capps will discuss the findings in the recommendations of our report. we will then hear from a jaish of the las vegas metropolitan police department and jerry gonzalez of the georgia
association of latino elected officials. beth gibson from ice was supposed to join us this morning and we unfortunately heard at the last minute that she could not be with us this morning and we frankly don't know why. but we are glad that the other members are with us. their biographies and -- are on your chairs, so feel free to read them but i want to just them separately. i also want to let you know that after the presentations we will have a brief question and answer series and i would also like to tell you this is being videotaped so that any questions that you ask are also going to be videotaped. we are also glad that c-span is here so that this is being webcast across the airwaves. before i ask our speakers to speak let me just tell you very
quickly how and why we got here. i think most of you know that the devolution of immigration enforcement policy from the federal to the state government and locality is one of the most important developments in our immigration policy and the last two decades or so. a milestone in this happened in 1996 when the changes in our immigration policy gave birth to a new section to our immigration and nationality called section 37 g.. section 37 gmac again authorizes the federal government to enter into agreements of states and localities to carry out certain aspects of immigration enforcement. though it was put on books in 1996, not a single contract was signed for the first six years of its existence in 2002. the state of florida signed the first agreement in 2002. by the end of 2005, there were
only three agreements in effect. by the end of 2006 there were the roman gate agreements in effect and the focus of these agreements was targeted for special interests of populations that it was supposed to target. something suddenly happened in 2007 and 2008. about 26 new agreements were signed in 2007 and about 28 new agreements were signed in 2008, so the numbers obviously increased but also something else was happening in the agreement. they were getting more generic in nature and they were increasingly becoming in sherman to pick up unauthorized persons in the localities as possible. by the time the obama administration took office, there was some speculation that the administration would terminate the program. in the summer of 2009, in an announcement by the dhs
secretary, they'd not only decided to continue the program but actually added a few new agreements. and in announcing that, they said the program would be reformed and at the heart of the reform there were two elements. a new standardized agreement was issued which not only the additional jurisdictions were going to assign but all all the earlier jurisdictions were going to sign on to the new remit. and the new remit established a hierarchy of immigrants which are of interest to the immigration and customs enforcement in terms of the targets of these programs. so in one way, there were some speculation that in the new mla and implementation were coming full circle back to the earlier days of the program when it was focused and targeted. so that, when realized in the