tv Capital News Today CSPAN October 29, 2012 11:00pm-2:00am EDT
americans if they only knew how it was being used. i and many of my colleagues have sought to find out what the heck they're talking about, and we still don't know. so, um, you know, i suppose maybe someone would say we shouldn't know because it's classified, but i have a feeling that, you know, it's very tantalizing when a senator says the public would be outraged if they knew what i know, and you're o not able to find out. that's sort of impressive, and that's a little bit of a change in the atmosphere. >> scott horton, let me go back to you because scott shane made a point which reinforced a little bit of what david said which is that don't we know about the drones? using that as an example, haven't, hasn't the system worked in the sociological way that david sketched out that there has been significant leaks, and what is it that remains to be known? >> well, readers of the new york
times know about the drones, i guess. [laughter] i think we can say that. no, i think, i think journalists have done their work in developing a lot of information about what our national security apparatus thinks, how it's motivated and how it's acting. i think that's true. but what we, but we have not had a fundamental policy discussion in the country that we need to have. and i think -- and i think we can define that along many different lines. but for me the key issue is, um, if we look at what's going on in pakistan, for instance, you know, we have the cia engaged on a traditional, in a traditional theater of war in what historically have been viewed as military tactics over a sustained period of many years
involving hundreds of strikes with clear military objectives. and is that a correct use of an intelligence service? i think that's a very fundamental question, and we've got the same issue with respect to yeaman, i think -- yemen, i think, potentially other places. so this is the cia growing outside of any reasonable interpretation of its original mandate from the time of its birth. that's a huge issue. the cia has been astonishingly successful in keeping that caged in and not discussed. so there's a lot to be talked about. i think, also, the leak process itself has led to a bit of a distortion of the reporting. i mean, i think this is an area where your public editor did a very, very good job of reviewing the situation. that is, you know, many publications in the u.s. are really focused on our national security apparatus and what it's doing, what it's thinking, how it evaluates things.
and that's what gets this tremendous effort put into ferreting that information out and reporting it. well, a lot more to the story that's not being reported. what's actually going on on the grounds in pakistan are the claims that they make about efficacy of the strikes and the number of civilians dead correct claims? whether the broader consequences of this effort for u.s. relations with pakistan. for instance, if at the end of the day we wind up killing several hundred terrorists and would-be terrorists with minor collateral damage but we turn pakistan once defined as one of our closest non-nato allies into an irreconcilable enemy with nuclear weapons, that's not a success. >> david, i don't know where you come out on the drone thing, but let me just pose this. it seems to me as a person on, you know, litigating this issue that the government wants to have it both ways.
they want to talk over and over again about the drone strikes but never tell us what they don't want us to know. and that -- doesn't the leak system fail? and you deny pain sociologically, but isn't that the failure that the cards are all held by the government? >> yeah. this goes to what i was trying to get at earlier about the necessary constructive ambiguity that the government wants in this area. if what you said is right, that the government, the government wants to have it both ways and the same people who are trying to deny these foia suits are the ones in some concerted way leaking, then we have a real basis for cynicism. however, since leaks are not this monolithic phenomenon, we don't really know who's saying what, there's a lot of quasi-authorized talking, it's hard to pin down that charge on the white house since it's hard to say what they might have disclosed through leaks versus anyone else -- >> but why should we divide the government like that? isn't it one government?
>> yeah. so i think this is, um, kind of the dark side of what marty was in a sense celebrating, i think, in the last panel which is that most principled justification for playing the game of, um, talking in an unattributed, you know, leaky way about the drone program while asserting the defense to these foia suits is something about the special diplomatic currency of nonofficial acknowledgment, that puts it in the best light. the most negative light is, um, that that kind of just allows the government to get all the upside without allowing domestic watchdog groups like the aclu to leverage the disclosure for details that matter to a lot of people about procedures, legal standards, collateral damage and the like. um, i think somewhat complicating the question of, you know, the normative question of whether this is, um, good or bad or just or not is, um, the
counterfactual. you know, in a world in which there wasn't this kind of quasi-authorized or authorized talking about droneses, do we see, you know -- it's not necessarily a world of more frontal, official acknowledgment in which we're having a more pristine, you know, rich, democratic conversation about drones with more integrity. it might be a world in which there's no disclosure or far less disclosure about drones at all. so it's, i find, very vexed and difficult these kind of high-level, normative questions about is this good or bad for, um, for democracy, the system we have, um, and i don't -- i have no sharp answers, you know? but i think there are, um, i would agree with the proposition there's a real cost. let me say one other quick thing on whether it's good or bad. you also, you mentioned earlier the common, um, critique that who is scott shane in "the new york times" to publish these secrets, um, and this is an
affront on democracy. you know, we have elected leaders,. >> yet the -- and yet "the new york times" or the individual leaker is talking about drones. i think what i was saying earlier provides a partial response which is that that rests on a very thin, implausible conception of democracy in the sense that our elected leaders have effectively blessed talking to scott shane about these things, um, in their practices if not in the laws they technically, they put on paper. no senior government official has ever been prosecuted for leaking. there's been hardly -- there's been almost zero disciplinary action. there hasn't been much energy or resources invested in finding leakers, much less going after them. in light of that longstanding background, it's not crazy to think that the government has in some practical sense, um, actually has kind of blessed "the new york times" to play a certain role within bounds. >> yeah. i mean, i guess the hard part i have is i agree with you at the
sociological level, but there's no sociological defense for drake. those guys can't -- >> [inaudible] >> right. they can't come in and say, well, the big shots are doing it, and can it's good for society, but, you know, that's not a defense. >> this is why you're legally vulnerable. but i will say the jury plays some role here at least in espionage act prosecutions in channeling -- i gave the case for why at least in technical terms it's very hard to see why every classified information leak isn't prosecutable. one answer might be that the jury notwithstanding what the laws say or the instructions they get from judges has, um, developed some kind of sense of hypocrisy, sense of fairness and that the jury would be amenable to arguments in the experience by you allowing this week to occur, how can you go after me, i think that's sociological. but it gets filtered into the legal system as a jury as a real check here. >> and it concerns many of us on
my side of the aisle that then the southern district of new york decided to prosecute the guy that's advocating jury nullification to make sure that doesn't happen. but, scott, back to you. public editor right, it's really our fault that this stuff is not out there? your fault, not mine. [laughter] >> it's not his fault. >> well, um, i mean, actually, yeah. for those of you who did not see a column on sunday by our new public editor, margaret sullivan, she, you know, sort of, um, gently chided "the new york times" for not doing enough coverage of drones, of targeted killing, quoted some folks, um, critically. you know, i guess the one thing that i would say was to scott is that, um, he's absolutely right that most of our coverage has, you know, has certainly been weighted towards, you know, whao do -- what do the people in washington say about drone
strikes, how do they make these decisions as opposed to the poor folks in villages in yemen and pakistan who see them coming down on their neighbors or on themselves? but that is not really related to -- that's our, um, that's the inherent difficulty of doing that reporting. it's nothing to do with the fact that it's classified. you know, the classification certainly doesn't keep us from going to pakistan and walking around the tribal areas and asking a lot of questions. what does keep us from doing that is that the tribal areas are a very hazardous place between the, um, the militants and the isi, the pakistani intelligence. very difficult to travel around. and if you do, you know, having done it, if you do talk to people who try to do it, some pakistani journalists try to do it, they often find that the people they're talking to, they are uncertain as to their
reliability as eyewitnesses because they are sometimes intimidated by the militants, sometimes they're sympathetic to the militants, sometimes they're intimidated by the isi, sometimes they're being paid by the isi. so even if you do that reporting, t very difficult. but i would certainly agree that we ought to do more of that. >> if i could just respond quickly, i don't agree with your conclusion that secrecy doesn't help frame it. i mean, i think secrecy has played the key role in framing the issue in a very narrow way and avoiding the broader policy discussion. and i think without that broader policy discussion, there's also less interest in seeing the facts developed and the reporting developed. but i would give you a little bit of credit because i think the public editor was right to say there's too much missing from the reporting. still, if you compare "the new york times" with other u.s. publications and broadcasters, new york times has actually offered more reporting out of
pakistan and about pakistani affairs than most of its competitors. but it's still a huge issue that's being missed. >> scott, scott shane, isn't bradley manning, isn't bradley manning and wikileaks different? i mean, don't you feel a little uncomfortable with what is an indiscriminate, wholesale providing of document as opposed to the guy who, you know, he's a drake-type situation. drake sees something he doesn't like, he can't get remedy within the system, so he's accused of -- and i guess he actually does -- he makes that public so the public can do something about it. that's not bradley manning. shouldn't we feel differently about bradley manning they with do about the thomas drakes of the world? >> well, there are differences, and you just articulated them. but i think it was interesting that earlier i think it was ken wainstein who said, who made this distinction which seemed to be, um, you know, on behalf of
"the new york times." because there is a continuing grand jury investigation of wikileaks -- and presumably julian assange and the other folks who have worked for wikileaks -- if they actually brought a successful prosecution, it'd be the first time, correct me if i'm wrong, that a nongovernment employee would be prosecuted successfully for disseminating classified information. so even though there is a distinction between the tom drakes and the bradley mannings, i'm very uncomfortable with the idea that there is, um, a very clear cut distinction for two reasons. one is, um, i feel somewhat awkward say, oh, yeah, that manning, he was completely irresponsible, and that assange, you know, he deserves what he gets when i spent months writing stories based on the documents that they, in effect, stole and provided to the new york times. [laughter] so that would be somewhat two-faced of me and, i think, of
"the new york times" to take that position. but the other thing is i don't really see -- i see a difference in scale, maybe in motive and so on, but i don't really see how we are, um, you know, i, you know, one could say that i spend a considerable amount of my time trying to find out classified information and make it public. and so if julian assanges go off to the hue cow for that crime, you know, i'm going to be looking over my shoulder. and so, you know, i'm, i'm hoping that that doesn't happen. >> bill keller once asked me whether "the new york times" would sign onto an amicus brief on behalf of julian assange. he chose to do that while we were making a presentation to the board of directors of "the new york times" company. i sort of changed the subject, which i'm going to do right now. [laughter] david, do you buy into the premise of my question that if bradley manning is a different
not only in quantity, but in quality? >> yeah, i definitely do. i mean, i think government just looked at from the perspective of the government and the executive branch can tolerate some amount of whether misguided or noble, discreet revelation by individual employees of perceived abuses or problems on the order of thomas drake, um, it can't tolerate as a matter of just kind of internal governance, um, someone who has a much more subversive aim of, um, you know, condemning the whole system. bradley manning wasn't -- at least by the time he was finished -- wasn't trying to expose a particular concern he had or, um, you know, bring to light some particular perceived flaw. he was, basically, he basically found the u.s. government, i think, to be an awful force in the world and was trying to, so had a much more fundamentally subversive aim.
i think, um, this puts a lot of pressure on the model i was describing on how leaks have been sort of self-regulated within government for years because he's so far beyond the pale actually on two levels. one, kind of invim thattiveness of what he leaked and the internal norms that are supposed to constrain the environmental laws and, two, he is in no sense of the term either legal or everyday use authorized to do any of this. he's at a very low level. he's a rogue actor in kind of every respect. so, um, the case is so extreme that i actually kind of wonder if it, um, misleads as a guide to how the government deals with leaking generally. however, i do think it raises these big issues going forward as to whether it's kicked us into a new and more troubling legal paradigm. >> and before we go to audience questions just quickly, prosecution of bradley manning -- excuse me, of julian
assange, good thing or bad thing for the system? >> is that to me? >> yeah. i'm going to ask everybody. >> oh. i incline strongly against it. i don't know that i have a very, you know, well thought out answer, but, um, i tend to side with, you know, people -- [inaudible] has a big piece, well known scholar in this field about the functional indistinguish about of wikileaks from "the new york times." and i tend to think there's a lot to that. and i, um, maybe i'll just leave it at that. i think, basically, scott called it a functional system we've groped our way towards where leakers are much more vulnerable than the press. i think that probably strikes a decent balance at least in the absence of a conspiracy which doesn't seem to be, you know, doesn't seem to be proven in assange's case. um, i think "the new york times" is very awkwardly situated
vis-a-vis wikileaks. a bad ruling for wikileaks is maybe ominous for "the new york times." in that sense you're natural allies. on the other hand, there's, um, a concern to distance yourself from wikileaks to show the kind of ethic of responsibility that has in part been seen to justify the legal latitude that "the new york times" has operated with for so many years. so i understand -- i think it's a very tough case for you guys. i think, um, anyways, i think it's always going to come back because of the way things are playing out. but i might guess informed by no inside info that the u.s. government would not have prosecuted assange given the backlash it would have caused. >> scott horton, likely prosecution and how bad would it be -- in first of all, bradley manning, i agree completely with your analysis of bradley manning. he is not a whistleblower by any stretch of the imagination either under the institute, nor under the common use of that term. and moreover, as a member of the
military who's engaged in this, i think there has to be disciplinary action, there has to be a court-martial. strikes me that that's unavoidable. the big mistake in that case is the demonization and the harsh treatment which i think were just, um, what did p.j. crowley say, knuckle headed? yeah, i think that's exactly what they were, just dumb. but julian assange is a really different case, and i, i think -- i'm not sure exactly what the theory is that would be used here. it seems to me the theory would wind up being something of a stretch under current law in any event. but it just strikes me generally that this would be a public relations disaster for the united states to do. not a smart thing. you're going to turn him into a martyr, a martyr in the eyes of people all around the world, that doesn't advantage the united states. and i think the u.s. has already made a number of mistakes in
this case with overkill and overaggressive accusations against him, which he's used very much to his benefit. i mean, if you looked at the asylum decision that was given by the ecuadoran foreign minister consisted o after long recitation of things that were said by public affairs spokesmen, by department of defense, by american diplomats, american public officials and so on. i was just listening to this, like, stunned at it. so it just seems to me that that would backfire. >> so questions from the audience in the short time we have here. anybody want to ask anything? there's a question back here. >> on the subject of leaks, i think we have to ask "the new york times" how often do you get leaks that are just so egregious from a national security point of view that you just step back from? i'm sure you get a lot of boring stuff that you just don't want to write about, does that happen very often?
and, scott, what is your preferred way of getting leaked material? [laughter] because, obviously, your phone must be monitored in some way. so does it come in snail mail, or i guess that's a subject to itself. but i believe the state department did an internal assessment of the damage from wikileaks which, of course, they did not admit publicly, but i believe it was leaked. >> on the advice of counsel, i'll answer just the first question. [laughter] if i understood the first question, it was how often do we get something, find something out that we then do not publish because we think it would be too damaging, you know, it's, it's not rare. i mean, it happens, you know, depending on, you know, how, how precise your definition is, you know, maybe in my bureau it happens a couple dozen times a year that someone finds out something significant that they choose not to put in the newspaper.
after talking about all, you know, the news value and the potential consequences. and in terms of how i like to get information, um, i'll tell you what, it is getting -- this is, actually, a very important point that hasn't come up today. it's getting very tough. one theory as to why there have been six leak prosecutions is in i think at least four of them, there are e-mail exchanges between reporters and government officials, the defendants, that are, you know, becoming part of the evidence. it takes, you know, they, the government has the right to look at government e-mail just like anyone's employer can look. and they see a story they don't like in the newspaper, they can take the byline, the reporter's name, plug it into their e-mail system and, you know, .003 seconds have a list of everyone who's exchanged e-mails with that reporter in the last, you know, two months, and then, you
know, they're off to the races. so all the discussion earlier about how difficult this crime is to prove and so on is becoming less and less true. so just to be very clear, i like things in brown paper wrappers -- [laughter] >> lives under a rock. >> 1627 i street northwest, suite 700. [laughter] >> other questions? yes. questions over here. >> quick question, mr. horton. i was wondering -- [inaudible] pretty much agree with everything that you said. i was really surprised, though, to hear you characterize bradley manning as not a whistleblower. i was wondering if you felt the same way about daniel else burg. and mr. ellsberg thought it was pretty hard to distinguish between the two of them. >> yes, he has said that and, in fact, i publicly disagreed with him once. no, i think a whistleblower is disclose you are specific --
disclosing specific information that he's found that relates to some wrongdoing or something that the public urgently needs to know. and what bradley manning was doing was just global. it was all the confidential cable traffic that he was able to access. he was turning over. so that's really not the sort of filtering and not the sort of motivation that i associate with a whistleblower. i think, by the way, the one major unexplored question concerning bradley manning is who authorized him to have access to all those cables in and when i see the demonization of bradley manning, the constant attacks, i constantly think, hmm, somebody doesn't want us to ask and explore certain questions. and i think, you know, the fact that he was given access to those materials is something that is well worth being fully explored, because somebody made a major error in judgment. >> there's a question here. yes, please.
>> um, i think, you know, we're forgetting the flavor of the month from a while back, the valerie plame case. and i would just like you to speak to the difference between that kind of a leak which seemed very pointed to, in fact, do damage to personnel's integrity in terms of their safety and that kind of thing and the questionable source of that and then "the new york times"' capitulation with that whole deal. >> "the new york times" -- what was the last part? "the new york times"' -- >> cooperation or use of that information, however you want to frame that. >> um, i mean, i guess i can address that briefly. valerie plame wilson was, of course, the undercover cia officer who, um, was, whose identity, you know, whose employment with the cia was
classified and so "the new york times" and everybody else wrote about, and there was this long-running attempt to find out who was responsible for that that ended, as often these inquiries do, with scooter libby being prosecuted for perjury. and, you know, i guess the only thing i'd say about that is you do have to be careful on the receiving end, you know, to sort of think about are you being used in some political way, um, what is the news value of what's being revealed, yo u.n.? are you inadvertently being used as the tool of some political party or vendetta? >> one last question over here. >> i think we all agree that the informal use of leaks, however we define it, has worked fairly well for the administrations, at least since the roosevelt administration during world war ii when they brought publishers
into the cabinet and had very, very routine, informal meetings with newspapermen, told them things that probably they didn't want published and then threatened them with prosecution if they were published. but perhaps we've passed the high water mark with recent statements by the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff who has said that retired military personnel -- particularly senior military personnel -- and former military personnel don't have the right to speak in political context. and there's been really a paucity of any comment from the media about that chilling comment which i think is really the way that the message is sent in the political world in washington. people don't get prosecuted. somebody comes up and puts their arm around your shoulder and say, gee, general, it was nice that you retired. however, if your corporation wants to do business with the government, you'll shut up. and we just don't see much except for a little piece published in the "wall street
journal" a few weeks ago. >> [inaudible] >> i'm familiar with some of those cases. they go back now about five or six years. i think into the middle of the bush administration. i talked to some of the flag officers, retired flag officers who were involved. i mean, got phone calls threatening that their pension rights were going to be under review and things like that. no, i think that was a completely outrageous statement. there's no reason why -- i think, obviously, serving military offices is one thing, and there they have all sorts of obligations that limit correctly their participation in public debate and public discussion. but once they're retired, they're completely free to speak, and i think they can play a meaningful role in public debate and conversation. and then to use the power of government to silence them is completely outrageous. david? >> yes. well, they're not completely legally free. >> secrets. >> the -- they will all have signed, you know, agreements not to talk about classified
material even postretirement, and there, too, i would just note that almost no -- even though a number of cases in the late '70s, early '80s established that the government could bring civil lawsuits to enforce those agreements barring publication of a memoir, seeking damages, money damages for something published, the government has not gone there. but again, back to the point of you put it well of maybe the arm around the shoulder doing the work. i can't really speak to that, but i think it's right that, um, the -- to the extent that there might be chilling going on, um, it's of the behind-the-scenes flavor in the legal system. i just wanted to say a quick point on the valerie plame thing which is that, um, that's a very unusual case, um, for the government and legally in the sense that there was a special prosecutor, patrick fitzgerald, appointed to run that investigation. political pressure made it so that doj felt it had to do that.
we did a conference at the center for five years ago. this very topic. that listen to today, we are really -- we think ravenous similar conversation, but were not. where now looking toward solutions and remedies and where we stand in terms of law and policy. but you know when not we have actually come some distance. at the next panel where guys talk about. some coffee, and some cookies and come back. thanks.
[inaudible conversations] >> heavy rain and wind from hurricanes and the prompted the closing of the federal government monday and tuesday. still expected to hold pro-forma sessions on tuesday. debates in campaign events along the east coast have been canceled. president obama and republican nominee mitt romney canceling their tuesday events. and just tonight we learned that the final debate in the massachusetts senate race scheduled for tuesday evening between senator scott brown and elizabeth warren has been cancelled. wednesday from the producer, because of daylight savings time in the u.k. this week promises
questions we will air at 8:00 a.m. eastern and said its usual 7:00 a.m. you can see it live here on c-span2. >> i especially like watching the gavel-to-gavel coverage. also enjoy newsmakers. the book program. i like that the commentary is only intended to let you know what's going on. there is really too much analysis. there certainly isn't opinion, and i appreciate how i can really see through and understand the programming itself and i can get my. [indiscernible] elsewhere. >> justin drolen watches c-span on comcast. c-span, created by america's cable companies in 1979, brought to you as a public service by
your television provider. >> now more from the florida law school conference. next, we hear from former cia acting general counsel john rizzo and former justice department inspector general ballantyne. hosted by the center for national security, this is an hour and 20 minutes. >> okay. we have been charged with finding all the solutions. luckily, i'm only the moderator, saw only after charges review with giving a some solutions. the way this panel was recognized was to provide context for what you just heard and haven't quite realized over go so well.
wheels of the right people to submit the context, both in terms of the law, in terms of the post september 11th decade where is taken as demand terms of the self regulating institution function of government to figure out its own problems, make its own recommendations and maybe suggest its own solutions and in terms of what all this means from the point of view of working in the field on the ground inside a covert rome. so that's -- for going to try to tie this all together by looking at some of these issues. and i have trust that we will get to some answers. our panel today is very distinguished. first, steven product who is a fellow at the center of national security is your who is a law professor at american university. somebody i think many of us in the audience know and have always wanted to meet who is now a partner at baker who was the
inspector general for the department of justice for many many years and it is going to talk to us a little bit about what exactly that is. it has been referred to some many times during today's proceedings. john rizzo is the former acting general counsel of the central intelligence agency who is now partner and fellow at the hoover institute and to you will be so happy to know has a book that he is written that will be coming out soon called the company's man. so i think we should just get started. and thinking this started with you, john, to talk about what has come up with all of these -- the references to leaks which was not how the day began, but was out the government officials who were here decided to cast a tone of the day. state as -- eight state as a thread throughout. can you contextualize this. not the present moment, but generally have how we appear in
the context of national security and the intelligence community. >> thank you. it's a pleasure and honor to be here with all of you. this has been a fascinating thing to listen to, all this dialogue today from people. it's -- someone whom i have not met before now but to have respected from a distance. i was interested to see how this discussion has largely evolved into the issue of leaks because i know we are supposed to be looking forward, but since i spent the last two years writing a book that was strictly looking backward i'm going to exempt myself and charts about predictor of future. and my bottom line, 30 years for now -- did anyone hear anything before now?
anyway. you didn't miss anything. thirty years from now i predict that there will be a similar panel, different people. discussing the phenomenon of leaks and what to do and how the problem is just getting worse than ever. and distinguished journalists on the panel, decrying the government's efforts said jill the news media and make the job much harder. the point is that i was fortunate and cursed simultaneously for having to live with the issue of leaks from my entire career. i served under six demonstrations in both parties. every administration decries leaks. every administration thinks the leaks occur on its watch or of the worst and most egregious in history.
in the administration, including the current one, also come into office clamming there will be ended transparency with the american people, which historically in my experience roughly translated into we are going to be transparent about what the guys before arrested, but in terms of what we're doing, we're keeping it secret. so, there are certain rhythms solve this. i was interested. i thought i was going to make it through this entire day without anyone mentioning the valerie plain case. so i'm glad, actually, that it came up briefly because to me, obviously, that was the -- suddenly the most self prosecution during the bush administration. and it crystallizes, to me, the
sort of confounding -- many confounding issues that surround the subject of leaks. frankly, i became cynical over the years about leaks, about how bad they were relatively speaking, how to investigate them, how and what should be in new legislation, leaks legislation. i had it three file cabinets in my various offices during my career filled with nothing but legislative proposals on leaks and league provisions. it has been tried, of course, never really gotten anywhere over the year. but i imagine, as we speak, new efforts. the prosecution, first of all, it was my duty at the time as
chief legal officer to the agency to support the leak of the name to journalists. that is what the office of general counsel is doing, reporting leaks, unauthorized disclosures in the media. it was a bad thing. it was a bad lead. the very confident, very discreet to covert officer. her name should not have been exposed like that. there was no question but that it was something we had to report to the department of justice. that set, and the range of leaks and later on, perhaps i can get into sort of the game about the number of leaks currently as opposed to ten or 15 years ago, but the truth is, and the scale of things that was not -- that
leak was not terribly damaging to national security. which was fortunate. the fact was it well all the leaks. i became aware. the other thing, the other criteria, the other characteristic is that was typically does not make for fruitful week investigation. many people inside the government necessarily that this works for the agency. those are two main lens bends. whether that can be effectively investigated or prosecuted. that case is not in that category. and yet what ensued was a four year investigation and
prosecution, as was mentioned during the special prosecutor with unfettered powers whose subpoenaed a journalist. eighty-four days in prison. refusing to testify before grand jury. and it all resulted in the conviction of a man who was not the leader. the actual party was a senior state department official who early on said to my screwed up, i did. so that is sort of why at least in my case, i have become very, very cynical about -- about a new idea, new initiatives about leaks. we are always going to have them . it is the nature of the
business. we may have more in the future, and it may be for a number of different reasons. one of which, ironically, has to do with the post 9/11 reforms, i think, and that because of this need to share more information, the idea of breaking the stovepipes to more classified information or secret information is shared among much more -- many more people across the government and made more generally available. you know, that, in essence, is what caused wikileaks. the state department and the military decided that the only way to more effectively communicate with one another is to put it all up on the super gnat. and that was how private manning got ahold of it. so i'm trying not to be overly cynical, but i just think we will be living with the phenomenon for a good long time.
my friend briefly alluded to a so-called opera disclosures. that is a phenomenon that is not a partisan thing. i remember during the bush of restoration. terribly frustrating to us that the agency. heavily involved in the post 9/11 programs. to get a directive passed down from the white house, we would cooperate with bob woodward. what turned out to be too buxom zero about the war on the chair. we were basically directed to make ourselves available to him to discuss matters that certainly in my case i thought were classified.
now, i'm on the outside. reading stats, david sanders piece. it's easy to become cynical. you know, it doesn't take judge roberts scholar to realize that most pieces that were seen, government officials that were talking to these journalists. and my point is, the message that says down to the rank-and-file, to the career people in the intelligence community is that they see this scene years talking. not only with impunity to journalists, but yet, you know, they are, at least at the agency, the fear of god is put into them about not talking to a journalist about anything. and, again, another reason over time i grew somewhat cynical, being a real effective way for a year to deal with this matter.
let me -- leaving right now, and i have other comments that time permits i will jump in. >> i want you to talk a little bit, to pick up on what john was saying in talk a little bit about in addition to what it means to be inspector general and where your role is to me how much of it is retrospective and how much of it is in the mix of the discussion. but i would also like you to get at the topic of how you view this when you no longer -- and maybe you haven't been out long enough, but how -- is there a change of perspective as, you know, you're working government is behind to a little bit? does it really stayed the same? and i'm just curious. >> well, i'm not sure i have been out of government long enough to really make that transition. i still talk about the office, we did this and we did that.
i was in the office for long enough. i feel committed to it and committed to the role of the inspector general in various ways, particularly in the transparency issue because i do think that inspectors general, and we heard this this morning from a number of sources, an important function in the federal government to help transparency and effectiveness and oversight over the government. some would like to talk a little bit about the role of the inspector general of what we did and how it can increase transparency even in the national security world. so there are inspectors general in every federal agency. i was the inspector general of these just prefer 11 years. most appointed by the president confirmed by the senate. appointed for bipartisan consideration. i remain in the administration
for the clinton years, through the bush years and through the obama years. so for 11 years i was there. my role was to detect and deter a waste, fraud, and abuse and improve the economy and efficiency of the agency. i believe very strongly, and we believe strongly that it was important for the citizens to know what their government was doing, and that's not only in the law enforcement context but in the intelligence area as well and we did a number of very sensitive reviews and intelligence matters ranging from the review of the robert hansen case that the fbi, why was it that robert hanson could be a spy and the fbi's mr. several decades without them finding out. when it initially came out the fbi said, well, it's because of his widely trade craft. the new tax politics system. rasta look at it and determine that was not true. they have a lax internal security methods and that he needed improvement. not only do we do that report
from, but we also made public the findings of that report. a lot of people said how can you do that? a very sensitive area. top-secret. but the push very hard to make an executive summary, the conclusions of that report now because we believe strongly that the citizens deserve their right to know what was happening in their government, and we also believe that focusing attention on a matter in a publicly could have a positive and the effect. and it was true. and i do remember when we gave the report to the fbi, we don't have the authority to declassify intermission or to let information out that the agency believes is classifier too sensitive to release. we do have unfettered access to all the information in the agency. they have to give us the information, and we handled appropriately. but then we read our report we ask them what is classified are too sensitive to be released publicly. they will often to what i would find happen quite often was that they would over classified
things and redact whole paragraphs, if not pages. we would push very hard and that and say to them, well, what is it about this paragraph, what is it about these sentences, the specific words that would harm the national security if it was released? and we found we had our time explaining it said redaction is then made. and we often found that this was not a science. someone said this morning, it was a mathematical. it is hard. and you will have people disagree even within the agency about what can be released and what should be released and what is too sensitive to release. we would get very significant reductions. give it to another person, much less significant, and it would argue with each other as to what could be released. we felt very strongly that it was not sufficient to simply
with a broad stroke redact all sorts of information from the report that they needed to justify why it would harm the national security which is the standard. by pushing back the information in the public that it turned out to be was not able to be released and give the public and insight on what was happening within the agency. inside having access and permission we have the ability and roll that is almost unique in terms of the institutions that are overseeing the federal government because you know what is happening within the agency. you know where the bodies are buried. you know how the agency operates. you have an ability to push back when the agency says you can look at that area and police that affirmation. i found it was also very important to get the support of the head of the agency, the
attorney general for the work we did, and i was very fortunate because although i worked five attorney-general sir, attorney-general reno, the zealous, casey, holder, everyone of them supported the role of the ig, did not interfere with their work, recognize that we were trying to improve the performance of the agency and to increase transparency in the agency to the extent that it could. and we did that in a number of very sensitive refused from the hansen case to the fbi information, what they had about 9/11, intelligence before the attack, how they treated detainee's after the attack. but the fbi witnessed at guantanamo. afghanistan and have the fbi handled nestle security letters, some of the most sensitive areas of the fbi. or it will to look at an apartment of justice.
it will to look at and able to the provide sunshine on those areas and make recommendations. the fbi, and apartment of justice to his credit, very receptive to the recommendation. they often would try to justify the policies but would agree with the recommendations and after all, that was what we were trying to do as well as provide transparency on the actions of the department's and the intelligence agencies of the department of justice. a lot of what we did was retrospective. we would look at things after they occurred, such as the 9/11 attacks and what the fbi and the department of justice knew about it, but a lot of it was we were getting information as programs were ongoing, and we would look at them as the programs were going forward, so, for example, with nestle security letters we get information about the misuse of national security letters and
we decided to do it as they were being used. so as it was ongoing, and i think that was very important. we had, i think, a unique ability to go in there and find problems with it that, to the extent the fbi did not know that there were these problems. and when we found and there were surprises and also willingness to make change because of the things we had found. so we were real to do it both on a real-time basis and also on a retrospective basis and we tried to do both of those. so i do think that there are many entities and institutions that are important to promote transparency and to promote oversight over our intelligence agencies. we have heard about them this morning. the congress's role, the role, which i think is critically important. we have heard about the role of the courts which also has critically important. as well as the role of outside advocacy groups and interest groups that can have an important role, spurring action
on behalf of federal agencies, but i also believe that an internal mechanism such as an inspector general's office, strong inspectors general office that will take complaints, that will look for problems, that will make things transparent can have an important effect, even in the intelligence area weather is very important national security information, some of which cannot be exposed to my belief, but much of it can be made public without harming national security. >> a couple follow-up questions. you write these reports. judy you think your audience is? >> we have multiple audiences. our audiences partly -- we have an obligation by statute to report those to the attorney-general, the head of the agency, and to congress to keep them currently fully informed of any problems. so our audiences are multiple. the agency itself, the people who are actually running the program cannot help them improve the program. the congress which has oversight
over the programs and that think they have an important right to know. three, to a large extent the american people. the american people have a right to know how the government is operating, if it is having problems, how it can be improved, and we shot -- we thought we should make that known and bra are reports. so i'll still people, you need to write it so that the technical expert understands it and recognizes that there are benefit in the report and the findings. many to write it so that a member of congress to picks it up will understand what's going on and what needs to be done. we also need to write it in no way that the lay person, the public can understand what's happening and what should be done as a result of our report. >> so ultimately when you look at -- and you have written, i think, the most serious ig report to come out of the past decade, the post 911 decade. when you look at what you have done about detention, how did you parse the conversation to
talk about what is withheld for national security reasons in terms of clear national security concerns. maybe it was a malicious or intended and where it just really is an attempt to just not space will was done. >> i think there is to some extent tendencies, the human tendency to minimize and not disclose embarrassing information and we find that sometimes when we provided the report to the entity and particularly this sensitive area, people who were involved with the program would be much more interested in having more of it redacted then i think some of the standard people or professionals who have dealt with the matters and declassification issues on a regular basis. so i do think there is that natural tendency. i think it's important to push back and make the entity justify
why a particular, down to the sentence got down to the word would harm the national security if released, which is the standard, after all. why is it that this would provide information to the bad guys that they could exploit in some way as opposed to simply saying a program is not working and needs to be improved because i think that embarrassment or showing weakness it is not sufficient to make something not disposable. what should happen is they improve the program rather than simply say we need to withhold information about a failing program. >> i want to come back to that, but i want to turn to steve. so, you have to start the point of this conversation, which has to go with, where do we stand between secrecy and transparency right now in terms of where we have come over the past decade plus and where you think the big challenges going forward given what you for today? >> so, i mean, i think john put
it rather nicely when he suggested that 30 years from now. i actually think i might be on it. so because actually, if you go back and look, the late 70's there was all this. john breaux way as the hearing transcript is file cabinet and all these hearings about how to amend the has been hijacked, the problem of national security, leaking command up to strike a balance between the media's right to pursue national security investigations by keeping secret, and there is actually all this beautiful rhetoric from one of the predecessors at the cia. the difficulties, individuals and his positions. because of what -- how a group called the non determine if. so i think we have to start from that observation. the structural problem is not new. the sort of structural tension here is not new.
but at the same time i also think -- there is something different, qualitatively and quantitatively about the last decade. and i think the differences although the law has not moved that much in defining the parameters and the boundaries between government and the media , i think the net result has been less information to the public. and part of the reason for that has nothing to do, but rather with the general growing hostility and the extent to which it has been that much harder far outside the national security, but inside the national security concept for a private individual to sue the government under almost any claim, under almost any theory, especially in national security cases, but not uniquely. and so that in turn has put more pressure on individuals and his colleagues and those to serve the function for the better part of 25-30 years. the public has been cooperative
research in, complementing insofar as exposing not just waste, fraud, and abuse, but government illegality. the igc cancer of very important function, but there are too few minutes. i think we have seen reports about other ids to have been less rigorous in their pursuit of statutory duties, but their mandate is not necessarily to investigate all wrongdoing. their mandate is more precise. i'm not sure we want them to be the people tested with this responsibility. the conversation has to proceed into different directions. one, how can we restore the role of the public in actually obtaining this information. how can we bring back the sort of utility a public rights litigation, not just a national security concept but especially in the national security context
and second, what role can congress plan, the you think it's congress in changing the substantive law that is driving this conversation. we heard a lot about congressional oversight and how congress were to supervise government action. what i think was missing from that conversation must congress can also play a more direct role in actually legislate the rules that govern these cases. it's sort of taken as a given by and far too many people that congress does not have the constitutional authority to interfere with the executive branch classification powers. if that is true then it is belied by historical practice because there are actually several statutes. energy being the most prominent where congress has specifically legislated rules for classification, procedures, standards, rules for declassification and so on. i don't mean to say the atomic energy act is the answer to this question. we all walked away from this. what is the answer? atomic energy. no.
but i do think that this is, you know, where i think john and i part company is that i don't think this is sort of how it is, how it always has been in now and always shall be and therefore we should accept it. there are parts of this other going to always be intentional. a great speech in 1974 reset the media is always going to want to try to obtain classified of affirmation and the government is always going to want to try stop them. that's never going to change. i think we do have to have a serious conversation about how much less the government, the public knows about what the government's up to. what will congress and then through congress the courts complete in every situation that debate. that is where we start. >> he think the american public really believes that it does know that much about what's going on? they know about torture. they know about rendition. and know about whenever we want say about 1 ton of. they know about the predator drawn killings. they may not know so much about
it, but do you really -- what is actually going on? is there a public that is clamoring for more information? you'll hear the word transparency, but what is it that you think the public, and i don't mean just the new york times to the public wants that they are not getting? what is bothering them? >> i'm glad it's important we distinguish between the new york times and the public even though i am a new yorker. i do think -- i think it is a tricky conversation because i think karen is exactly right. the public knows a lot, probably more than john successors would like to know about what we're up to. the flip side is, there is knowing in and there is no link. and actually do think per the earlier conversation that there is a lot to be said about the government formally knowledge what is and is not doing and that plausible deniability is not, you know, just a joke anymore. plausible deniability is part of what this whole conversation is
about. if the government refuses to a knowledge's it can always say, oh, that didn't happen. so you know this better than anyone. the tortured conversation. still plenty of people out there is say, no, we never tortured of withstanding the senate armed services report, the icrc report, any number of, to my view, you know, incontestable sources suggesting that we did. and so i think part of the purpose of formal acknowledged knowledge, i weird construction, is to provide leverage for those who want to sell that conversation once and for all. right? i mean, if you get away from this context, the holocaust controversy, the most important thing that happens in that conversation is the ability of folks on one side of the denver live shells of the world to say actually, here is all of the official documentary proof that we have.
because you can prove that certain things happen in a way that settles the the basic you can move on, and i think the public made no sense. the public doesn't know. that's really weird. >> john, you should weigh in on this. because one of the things that is set whenever talking about the intelligence committee, one of the things that is assumed, i think, is that however much we know there will always be some much that we don't know. and so i guess one of the questions is, when you're thinking about classification bursas not declassification, but classification versus public knowledge, is there a sense that there is always going to be a certain amount known and we need to decide whether what is not going to be known on how much is going to be known. is there a sense of obligation to the public in this regard? >> yes. this was brought to me most graphically obviously in the
post september 11 era. sort of a self indulgent you. that has evolved from being an under their radar lawyer to a notorious public figure overnight. so some personal bias in this, but i think, you know, now that i'm out, i think, at least from the agency's own institutional protection and self-interest, we should have pressed the white house and the final analysis, these things are white house calls, not agency calls to be more, more transparent, but more forthcoming about what was being done in the war on terror and what wasn't because there were many leaks that were absolutely accurate and others are not.
and we should have done that. i mean with respect to the program in particular, i personally think it was a huge mistake. i take responsibility for this because it is a position where i could have done something about it and should have known better. we were not at least more forthcoming with the congress. we camped in a very tight box. the leaders of the committee, as a result, elected representatives in nothing. all the new was what they were reading in these press accounts. and i think it certainly did the agency considerable damage, you know, it did -- it -- many career people were caused a lot of anxiety, subject to investigations, so it was a traumatic experience. and i think now knowing what we know, of course, it's much easier, but we, as an agency, should have been looking more to
what we felt could be made more public. rest assured, still a lot of sectors that are secret. it's not like everything. >> some good ones. so i don't want to be overly gloomy. secrets can be protected. they have to be tightly protected. in my experience on covert action programs, no matter how compartmental they are, they leak. the leak. >> the truth will out. >> the following question to get to the remedy it works in a way that you nothing would have worked well, what mechanism
would you have the? was it just being willing to say it in a certain context to back to you need some kind of normal way of going to congress, and ig? what is the mechanism that you think would have made it right? >> well, i think -- i mean, i am anachronistic person in this way. the fbi is much better at this and always has been imprisoning a public face. what the public thinks about the agency is, you know, the spy shop. the movies and the spy novels. i always thought the agency could have, and this to answer your question, to me, the optimum way to do it. have the cia director's term for instance, get more frequent press interviews. you can go on meet the press, face the nation. present a public face. and explain, as i say, as the
controversy of the interrogation programs dealt during the post 9/11 years went on, go in front of the american people and explain one, you know, why we're doing this, what it was yielding and the kind of -- the kinds of mechanisms that were being put into place to try to minimize or certainly a short that there would not be these flagrant kind of abuses. i think to me that would be terribly effective. i'm just a regular guy in the public. i would like to see it. >> so instead of going directly to the public, in some ways, maybe not the cia director, but the way the obama administration has chosen to put official after
official in front of the public, whether it's john brennan or harold koh. >> and say what? >> right. but i think you have to first get out there. time consuming, but i'm just saying. >> there are things that we cannot tell you about, celesta you and loose terms. let's make sure you are aware there are things we can't tell you about. >> right. and the other thing we have not done to is the distinction between talking about procedural issues rather than substantive issues. but get out there and talk to you about sensitive issues in our context, this being the administration, but what the public really wants to know, and this is one of was trying to get up before, what are the procedural issues? how you decide you're going to have the started killings against. how you decide who is your enemy? >> into is deciding this? >> that's what i mean. how do you decide to make and sell when you ask the question what is it the public wants to know, one of the things they want to know is what is the process by which this is happening. maybe in some way is a
development of the whole conversation because may be getting to the procedural issues and the who issues is important. >> also, they want to know what is the process for making that decision, the oversight mechanisms. the attic and supervision of those decisions, whether it's reporting to congress on a regular basis and not only to their chairs of the committee or the gang of rage, but to a significant number so that there is by end to the actual decision making process, whether, again, the inspector general or another internal oversight entity, and i do -- i believe they have a pretty strong inspector general at the cia who has done some very, very important refused. do have a little bit more of a line set because of the nature of the work in the agency that the reports are not going to be made public. there can be reports that can be made public, even if this is to the extent of very general basis on what is going on or that type of oversight that is being done that can reassure the public
that there is adequate mechanisms to make sure that there is oversight over very top-secret and closely compartment to programs that is not simply decision makers making the decision on their own without any oversight whatsoever >> and in that regard, one of the more interesting moments in this conversation is after the new york times "washington post" leaked the warrantless wiretapping program in december december 05, the justice department puts out this white paper in january 2006 that is basically, you know, they're ready for prime-time version of the alito arguments in support of at least a publicly reported aspects of the terrace program. and, you know, i had substantive objections to some of the analysis and the white paper, but it was, enormously useful, as the development of from the administration development and so far as putting out the legal rationale and from the perspective of solidifying what
were and were not the actual legal objections to the program. even when the internal report or whenever can be released because it contained sensitive material, that doesn't mean as the end of the conversation and there is no other way for the government to actually share that with the public wants to know which is why you think you can do this. ..
the. >> i do believe there needs to be better guidelines on what is encompassed by those terms than what harms national security. it is to individualize now those doing the classification review. there should be better uniformity for what is classified. >> could it be across the agencies with criteria of
national security? >> there could be more. if for no other reason than so much caa is intelligence the/counterintelligence. treasury may have a different adieu of financial transactions. but the effort is worth it. it should be one set of uniform criteria with some adaptations. >> one of the things to be interested to think about what it means for something to be imminent and how do distinguished? there is any sense can use say something is a threat to to the united states can
for interest in -- instance we could not capture and al qaeda dieing from the early 90's that suddenly turns up after 9/11. there is no intelligence indicating he was a continuing or direct threat. but it is easy in conferences and the law school. but when the target appears on the screen the lawyer at the cia says can we? we will lose them and 30
minutes. it is very hard. i know instinctively we like regulations and criteria across the board. he is right. intelligence community, the caa will fight to to thin veil to be shoehorned about what constitutes national security. it is just not going to have been. i will bet to anything it is not in the cards. >> they can speak to the institutional side better
than i can. but to be imposed on them relating to information of national defence, up presumably congress has content. i am with john and glenn on the point* but think a solution is a proposed set of standards and they have to show up outside the context where the politics may skew the consideration and to say here is a general category. that would be an interesting exercise. >> with perhaps video to changeover time? >> i think the threat can be imminent or long-term but the reasonable threats that needed to be addressed in a
national security context and in a review. was struck me is not the imminent argument but this alone is combined with this and invest. so broadly anything could fit and as a result remain classified. there is a tendency for a potential abuse that is why we would push hard. what is the scenario? if there is a reasonable theory, we would accept that. why this should remain undisclosed.
>> and institutional question how government functions. writing about this for the bush administrations and how when the caa briefing was given to the bush officials there was a lack of knowledge of what it meant and the context. when you get with a new administration, a new president, new team, one of the mechanisms? who are the people that brief them that they can help you shepherd the conversation about how to assess the threat to in this scenario where some many different scenarios could be laid out? we need people that can lead in the conversation with
more of them long-term understanding. >> i was a liaison as a transition from the bush to the obama administration and. typically presidential candidates, even the nominees even with president elect bush did not get the sexy stuff. the nominees of the party are offered intelligence briefings by career cia. they are analytical.
their analytical. not operational not giving a lot of specific details of agents are agent operation. that only happens once the election takes place. with the new president, if obama is reelected it will not have been. that is when they reviewed the covert action programs. that is when the president elect got his first briefing on enhanced interrogation. by that time anybody had 85% but that was his first briefing. that is when presidential candidates, it is a crash course. him and his incoming national security team have
to get briefed quickly and be ready to act literally from january 20th. and there were threats 2009. it can be a frantic process but a lot of things about the system it seems crude output -- screwed up but we seem to muddle through. that is our happens. >> we would always brief the incoming administration, the attorney general, transition team to have a list the talk was always counterterrorism. we would assess whether department was where it needed improvement, what programs we had reviewed and it was an important briefing and i opening the challenges
they faced. >> you had them ahead of the fbi in the transition. one thing to think about this institutional memory and the people that are chosen. said the deal we will be here and 30 years. [laughter] to discuss this again, it would be nice if it was not the same turn of the wheel. then a complacency sets said. that is not exactly where we are at. >> elevated is the longevity. and career civil servants. my sense is the above a
administrations was surprised how deeply ingrained approach saying -- approaches are understandings of the world were. not negative but the identity cannot just change. if that is true then it is unrealistic to think any president can say i will close guantanamo. that answer is not on the executive branch but more of an inner branch mechanism, a dialogue and a day contemplated role. congress had a very defined role.
it can be a serious conversation about policy agenda. not because it is qualified as a candidate but congress wants to be on the record. is not a coincidence the supreme court did what it did. it said show was what you got. we will give you another chance. there will always be pressure on the executive branch to go as far as possible within the limits and of the law. we should want it that way and except that will be true to put to a pressure on the other direction. >> we should open and up. we don't have a lot of time
left. if anybody has questions. >> picking up on what mr. rizzo said this caa willow resist any standard of what constitutes a threat to national security, and also the national interest of the united states states, thinking back historically, if the cia perceived national interest with the elimination of the chilean president or the
iranian president peak has that i think the store clear to events that created major problems for the united states subsequently. problems with fire ran today directly achievable to the elimination of motion deck assuming it was the cia. i wonder. is that something we may face again with the independent free ranging cia? >> i am not old enough to be around the cia during those events. nor the a bay of p.i.g.s.. some a asked how they handled the bay of p.i.g.s.. its was very depressing.
[laughter] the cia is uniquely an arm of the president. every president has been that way. some have come in suspicious or with president carter hostile. moynihan said now it is his cia. they tend to get very aggressive. the careful what you cause to happen with reverberation down the line. they should not forget this day did not dream up the idea.
even in the wild west this cia did not conduct plots against castro because it thought it was the right thing to do but because the white house existing at the time directed them. the difference today presidents have to go on the record. the presidents have to write a presidential finding that their reports to congress. i came and right after i was 20 years old bided not know anything. the finding process started on that day. my a observations they can be so bring instruments instruments -- instruments.
sign here. i have written a piece of paper. sign it. you can see it is a deterrent effect within aid you work for us. this is what you will do. that possibility could rise again. from what it was. >> mostly focus on the american public keeping policies in check. legal arguments can help international debates with the legality of certain programs. for 70 countries have drums for in the absence of
official statements there's a vacuum for these other countries to draw their own limits. do believe the proliferation of drone technology will compel the u.s. to have its own label justification to inform international debates? >> i have no idea what is classified at this point* and what is not. i am a bit constrained to get to that level of specifics. with those public legal justifications that seemed to be controversial activities, it is surpassingly ironic the
obama administration basically a declassified all of the memos used to be called the torture memos. my name was on all of them. but it the program was over. we need transparency. the american people deserve to know. i am only speaking now as a private citizen. all i know now is what i read. but the above administrations is resisting making public the legal analysis why it is inconsistent to conduct the collections against an american citizen. there withholding that.
i do not understand i guess is what i am saying. >> i will interrupt to ask a question i should have started with. this losses are raised many times today. between all of these abates we have come to a way to deal with the gray area between secrecy and transparency? we debate, of the leak and some things and not either -- others but it is a way that makes us happy. >> i think so. but the reality virtually
and figure out a way to get the worst so that true damages not done. we did not like it with the cia but as a practical matter historic we no one will prosecute a journalist. it will not happen. there are some exceptions but the notion he take this situation and muddle through on the government side and somewhere in the mix
mix, information and comes out. frankly to the american public that the same time in some instances it does minimal harm to national security. >> jarret is lots of information that is sold that has never come out. >> the story argo that was my first exposure to covert action. i would have thought that would be a state secret 300 or 40 years but it was declassified 1997. i don't know why. on his way.
people ask me? i don't have an answer. put tony mendez was writing books but basically someone in the agency foia a section decided it was time to be declassified. now it is still technically classified. sorry. >> the pendulum swings right after 9/11 to protect classified information and the first major report redid was the treatment of undocumented immigrants and we were chastised by certain
individuals for disposing information that would harm counter terrorism programs. that is the first report where we criticized that have rose. which has gone in the other direction towards full disclosure and that is a good thing. we do have a robust institution i do get concerned about the ability to disclose information which is much more widespread because of the proliferation because of the availability. we will always be struggling and there is a natural tendency to compensate as time goes on.
>> i come from a different perspective. but if in the guantanamo habeas case the detainee cannot be shown back to him because it is classified? us statement that he made to his lawyer cannot be shown to him. without a head case will assertion it cannot turn over the report renown now in large part is because it was caused the air force negligence nothing to do what was on board with the plane. i am worried about is system with a check on in the
government abuse in the context of secrecy. that is an incredibly important role as the special prosecutor not deputize to be the independent reviewer. one of the things we found remarkable was my colleague road a post absolutely a positively that there is a time to be insufficiently aggressive. it is not the "new york times" job. whose job is it? if it is not going to be the times, that leaves a vacuum. i thought the responsible
government would feel that as opposed to law professors. i do agree with john the debate is not different. more the better part of the last 70 years. but we're leaning more toward public accountability them what i am accountable with. >> is a little uncomfortable to talk about the pendulum swinging back when the actual accountability for so much that has happened has not occurred. the think tanks and the press to see who is
responsible? the government has decided they will not pursue this accountability. with this of the conversation not been very optimistic, that is rather interesting. if you are in the government to where our part of that to you see what has been covered. you don't feel that same pendulums swing with their reports and the exposures and the authorized leaks but the full story has to include accountability.
some kind of narrative but instead we see a chilling effect on to prosecute somebody from "the new york times" there is a ripple of fear and the media included a nine just who is being labeled the enemy. i am happy to hear it has long but maybe it has gone back. >> the one place i have support from academic observations i testified. it is not an overstatement to say members of the
majority were very enthusiastic margin list should be subpoenaed to testify. if they would not, indicted. not just for contempt for obstruction of of violating the espionage act. it is true of the principal constraint on government overreach is sound prosecutorial discretion it does not matter what party in the oval office republicans or democrats and bush himself were adamant about not using the espionage act not pushing the envelope to keep it from coming to out of kilter but it is political and not legal constraint her of the real question is ultimately it is only as good of the politics at the moment there will come a point* if there is another attack more
damaging national security leak and refined out leaked and the security plan for the consulate on the website imagine a blow back. it is perfectly right to say it looks okay but i am not convinced there's the same protection. >> i would argue that does not mean it will not swing back again of a momentous nature but i a agree with the earlier panelist to said the reporters are -- there is a push back from many different late -- levels not everything gets out nor should everything get out.
we have the institutional structures pushing very hard much harder than i first got involved after 9/11 i do see advocacy groups and whistle-blowers the airline to come forward or to congress and actually have some pretty strong whistle-blowers british say perfect spot where issue to be constantly addressed i do believe in there is a strong institutional framework to help transparency poker not the least of which is the inspector general's as well. >> that is a good no to some
of. i should make a few comments over the course of today when do think it is clear when you are not living in a bubble of the year you can discuss the issues rehab something like 9/11 in your face it is i you define national security so going forward our challenges will include the cyber threat to whatever happens without caid and the middle east. issues will come back some maybe wary weekend and today is the closer law-enforcement in the and
second s can get to be on the same page to the ngo groups and others at one transparency to be on this earth the closer again now the better it will be for the next door around i will leave you with the thought alternately the truce will come down and thank you for coming. [applause] [inaudible conversations]
know so little about it. and was a journalist writing about the local city council. i knew nothing of israel palestine. due to the inadequate distorted media coverage we have on this very important subject. just to set the scene i will mention a few years ago we did studies on u.s. coverage but being at how the u.s. news media covered death of both populations. rediscover the first year there were 28 israeli children and 131 palestinian
children killed. how was this covered prime-time news network? would get the chart a we've boarded israeli children's death and 14 times greater than palestinian deaths of many americans have no idea that they are being killed at all. the final chart is "the new york times" report the first curve year times reporting on israeli children death during the first year. mess -- next to see the actual death curve and it is the light blue column following a similar kerf although little lower
because they had follow-up reports. for the palestinian children who were killed the first year is the red line and follows a similar curve to the israeli children death in is lower but similar then we see the actual death curve killed by israelis fall 2000. the bizarre pattern we have found and all studies associated press, regional newspapers and through the networks my most americans don't know what is going on in. i am so grateful to bring it
up panel to you about palestine today. this is a distinguished panel. they'll take questions at the end there's a card to write your question today they address the title policies challenges pertaining to geopolitical dynamics. the first speaker is mr. mark perry the author of conceived and liberty. thank you very much. [applause] >> thank you very much. into my fellow panelists for being here and dr. anthony
for inviting me again i was completely energized by the last panel with a discussion of the arabs bring. i hope you don't mind i open with the story. i travel often to the region the last time i was there talked to a good friend of mine named osama. he is head of the resistance movement for hamas and spend as much time with them as icahn. a good friend bert often in beirut dies spend hours with him he tells me about hamas he asked me a lot of questions about obama and romney and the like toro college.
going. we said no, we are going. it was a saturday, and we are all going. and she said, i am not going, one of my friends is having a birthday party and i'm going to the birthday party. and we said no, you're going with the family. because this is our family does. >> she says i'm not going. and i said, you're going, or you're going to your room. off she went to her room. i came to work. that night, i came home late and she was in bed. i went into her room. i said, the people want to change the regime. [laughter] >> so the arab spring has had an impact. i have chosen as my topic this morning whether there can be two state resolutions with the
israeli palestinian conflict. before you go to sleep, i want to warn you that i believe there can and must be a resolution of the conflict, and that there will be and must be a two state resolution of the conflict. it is not too late to have a solution to the conflict. in fact, we have a model order the resolution of the palestinian conflict. i will begin by pointing out the obvious. that the readily available model of conflict is already in existence, and it is a palestinian state and ghazi -- and then ghazi. >> americans don't like the idea
of how this was created. or be -- perhaps it was because it was by who it was created by. the gaza state was created by palestinians after years of violent struggles that led to an israeli disengagement in 2005. that is to say for israel, the cost of staying there outweighed the cost of leaving. with the result the israeli government ignores the
protesters and the threats of gaza settlements. i suspect that the reason they choose to ignore the gaza model was a creation of the palestinian state. it contradicts president obama's reading of our own history. in which african-americans engage in the successful nonviolent struggle for their rights within our own republic. mr. obama has transferred his views to the palestinian struggle. he has done this on several occasions. noting that the palestinians fight for their rights.
i find that obama's reading of history, the painful memory of burning cities. it was also at the heart of the african-american struggle for their rights. i grew up in this era. and i think that we will remember if we delve into our memories of the president in 1968, lyndon johnson, could not employ the 82nd airborne in vietnam. though he wanted to. because it was in detroit.
palestinians are not fighting for their rights. they have their rights. they are inalienable. even to them, as it says in the declaration of independence. they are inalienable by god. it is an entirely different kind of a struggle than a struggle for rights. the struggle for freedom includes a different kind of tactic. especially when those engaged by lunch counter citizens or bust boycotts. so let's be blunt about this
trouble. violence is a fact of history. it is certainly not lost on the palestinians of the west bank. there is this. it simply happens to be true. you can check the record. simply happens to be true over the last 35 years, from the point at which israel occupies land of the west bank, and also gaza, the only time settlement construction ceased -- it was really during the second time.
when attacks on israel were at their height. when israelis were dying. the times at which israel's construction was at their peak is one palestinians were quieter. that is to say now. there are also some other burials about israel's relationship with the palestinians of gaza that are interesting. i will finish quickly on the snow. vacillating and corrupt, they
have descriptive leadership in gaza bordering the leadership. weakness is not one of them. there is a lot of rules that is more akin to the relationship between national adversaries than between occupied and occupier. salute recoils from any suggestions of the reoccupation of the enclave. my claim, therefore, is that what we might see in the next four years is a reemerging strategy among the palestinians of the west bank. a strategy that has manifested
and it's not working. of nonviolence, and the cooperation with israeli 30 forces. and what that means is an uptick in violence and it behooves us in the united states are prepared for what might in fact be inevitable. thank you. [applause] >> thank you very much for a strong speech. is important to understand as most americans don't, there was this massive nonviolent movement in gaza and the west bank in which dozens of people have been
killed by israeli forces, including several americans. the next speaker, i am happy to introduce is mr. jeffrey steinberg. mr. steinberg has been a policy analyst for nearly 40 years, he authored groundbreaking work on the neoconservative movement during the bush cheney administration and a great deal else. >> i would like to thank the national council and thank all of you for being relatively awake at this hour. i'm going to talk about israel. on september 17, 2012, the highly respected and sometimes authoritative gossip columnists of the "new york post", cindy adams, quoted back to henry kissinger, warning that there will be no more israel. now, there is some dispute given
the source of this quote over whether or not kissinger ever made the statement. in fact, in eight denied the report. i am told that the quote was accurate. it was meant more as a warning than a forecast of something inevitable. in any case, the mere fact that such an account of the statement would receive wide news circulation and it says a great deal about the current state of affairs in israel and in the u.s. israeli relationship. it did not occur in a vacuum in the past five years. the liabilities of the u.s. special relationship with israel has become the subject of widespread public debate. i can tell you that behind the
courage, the debate is even more intense. in 2007, it was written that unconditional support for israel is undermining u.s. allies casting doubt on america's wisdom and moral vision. helping inspire a generation of anti-american extremists. and complicating u.s. efforts to deal with a volatile region. in short, the largely unconditional relationship between the u.s. and israel is no longer defensible on strategic grounds. in june of 2010, there was an essay of us by the center for strategic and international studies, posing the question, is israel a strategic liability?
he warned it is time that israel realized that it has obligations to the united states, as well as the united states and israel. and that becomes far more careful about the extent to which it tests the limits of u.s. patients and with the support of american jews. this does not mean taking a single action that undercuts israeli security, but it does mean realizing that israel should show enough discretion to reflect the fact that it is a tertiary u.s. are teaching interest in the complex and demanding world. now, i could go on and on, but i think the point is clear. at least some strategic thinkers in the united states have come full circle. back to warnings that were issued on dozens of occasions by the joint chiefs of staff, by then secretary of state general
george marshall and other top american officials at the close of world war ii. prior to her truman's decision. supporting the establishment of the state of israel. the second volume of the official history of the joint chiefs of staff covering 19471949, devoted a 30 page chapter to the agonizing debate over how to deal with the future of palestinians at the close of world war ii and the end of the british mandate. overwhelmingly, support of secretary marshall, james russell, and every american diplomat, was opposing any form of partition. having just come out of the second horrific war from two generations, the top american military people made their use absolutely clear. on october 10, 1947, the chiefs
unanimously wrote to the secretary of defense that the decision to partition palestine, if it was supported by the united states. it would prejudice strategic interests in the middle east to the point that the united states influence in the area would be curtailed to that which could be maintained by military force. they then went on to prophetically worn that there was grave danger in such a decision would result in serious disturbances throughout the near middle east. it was of great strategic importance to the united states to retain the goodwill of the arab and muslim states. however, these states are strongly if not violently opposed to partition of the states. lloyd henderson, department of
african affairs, had written an identical report to secretary of state marshall on september 22, 1987, on behalf of nearly every member of the foreign service or of the department who has worked to any appreciable extent on middle eastern problems. opposing and arguing strenuously against any american involvement in the event of a partition. the joint chiefs of staff proposed significantly. the united kingdom should be put in charge alone because any u.s. participation would invalidate entirely current estimates required strength of the army and navy and air force. a subsequent study prepared for the secretary of state and assessed that any peacekeeping role for the united states and palestine would require an initial deployment of 104,000
troops and that the troop requirements would triple in the event of any outbreaks of conflict. the proposal to saddle britain with the security of a partition palestine is a particular significance. general marshall and most every other american wartime military leader had gone through many exasperating experiences. the wartime policies were colored by the postwar british empire. this has been a source of friction tween prime minister churchill, who was catalyzed by roosevelt in these memorable book writings. it goes even more detail. reactions to their british counterparts. general marshall had been
involved with all of this british town stuff. it was later informed the british and french israeli forces restore egyptian control over the canal. president eisenhower's actions, like general marshall and the joint chiefs for any positioning of palestine in turn palestine, in the entire postwar period. in palestine and in india, is an attempt to the postwar revival of imperial policies that he and fdr have come to detest throughout the wartime alliance. as everyone knows presumably, president truman opted to endorse partitions and was the first leader of a world power to
recognize the state of israel. he had informed her truman that if a separate israeli state was involved, he would not vote for him in the elections. he has participated in the meeting where general marshall avoids the opposition to partition. and marshall has taken issue with the fact that clifford was even allowed in the room if he was a. name: lobby her. supporting partition in recognizing israel, sadly, the warnings of general marshall and the joint chiefs of staff proved beyond their wildest dreams. israel has not only squandered a special relationship with the united states, but the actions
of successive israeli governments over recent decades has created an actual existential crisis of israel's own making. although the 2003 overthrow of saddam hussein's government and the unraveling of serious in the past 19 months are virtually eliminated as the sovereign military threat to israel and the rival state in the neighboring region. israel is facing its greatest security crisis. this was candidly acknowledged by the head of the israeli military intelligence director in his annual report on the regional security situation on august 27, 2012. the general warned that israel could face regional instability and chaos at any moment.
they are now in serious jeopardy. they are facing their greatest existential crisis in generations. the underlying actions of zionism itself. the essence of tragedy is when people cannot see their own underlie -- underlying problem. the accused will always be persecuted whenever they are in a minority. it is based on a permanent majority state. the current leadership is also committed to the idea that israel must secure buffer areas, assuring that there can be no durable friendship with their neighbors and the palestinian people have denied a viable home on land, i will skip to the very
end. and i will end by quoting the great scientist, albert einstein. he has said insanity expects great results. after heeding the warnings of some of our great wartime leaders, it is time to return to sanity. thank you. [applause] >> thank you. they give her another interesting talk. anyone interested on the history of u.s. relationships with israel, will be quite interesting to many. on the council for the national interest website. our next week or is the william cannon distinguished humanities professor.
the religion complete guide to religious studies. check out. [applause] >> thank you, allison, and let me add my thanks to doctor anthony and his staff for another wonderful conference. we have done so much work and come together so well. and i would like to thank my colleagues who are very enlightening. i don't want to have too much overlap, but what i will do today is focused on palestine as a regional conflict. in 1990, the eyes of the world
turn to the middle east and saddam hussein launched his disastrous invasion of kuwait. in 1991, the u.s. launched the gulf war. seeing that occupation of another country was illegal and had to be stopped. that was a principal. when palestinians insisted that the same principle should apply to them, policymakers and pundits are geared that there was no linkage. the link between the two conflicts. saddam had invaded kuwait, and that was intolerable. the palestinian and raise israeli conflict had a different story. the legality of occupation could be considered a principal come only if it was applied consistently. otherwise, it would be perceived
not as a principle, but as an excuse. the conference was not received well. by those who insisted on exceptionalism in the case of the palestinian territory and the further suggestion that an independent palestinian state would organize democratically and serve as a model for the region. bear in mind, this was during the early days of allegations. it was inherently undemocratic. now, more than 20 years later, the arab spring has again brought the attention of the world to the region as a whole. egyptians and tunisians and the democratization progress has been generally well received. not uniformly, but enough to dispel the myths that they don't want democracy. in light of ongoing democratization, one would hope
that we can finally dismiss these fantasies. arabs and muslims alike. everyone else prefers government by and for the people. again, palestinian concerns are being bracketed. even in the context of limited economy, focused has been on the reform of government than on the results. particularly in the case of gaza, as we discussed already, and it's election and hamas leadership. as happened with algeria 20 years ago, we've valorized democracy. that is when we don't like the result of the democratic choices. actually, democratization seems to have adversely affected the israeli and palestinian peace projects. israel has never felt secure in the region. but least authoritarian regime
>> this playing self governance unprecedented in the region. despite predictable love those of patronage patronage, corruption, secta rian based governance at the national level. i will leave gaza said to my colleague but with the oslo accord the palestinian 30 has established constitutional government
complete with a separation of powers legislative council pride minister and cabinet ministers in order to strengthen the government's the institution building program for accountability how to exercise these rights? the great international effort has failed could regional effort be affected? the new the democratized democratized -- democratized ever? i think it could. says we heard ambassador free man yesterday mentioned and ambassador smith income
of viable alternative from the peace initiative from the arab summit to interest at the 2007 riyadh seven college for compliance and withdrawal from occupied territories. including us citing of the peace agreement. israel has not been persuaded to respond positively. firewood it make any difference? it has brought to a number of changes its new government represents overwhelming public opinion that supports the
establishment of of palestinian state. cairo who stood the largest group with the agreement aimed reconciliation. september 2012 egypt's president spoke of the new egypt to regain standing among nations stemming from the will of the people as will as the legitimacy. the first issue to exert all efforts on the basis of justice and dignity meanwhile the senate -- assyrians civil war forest the syrian leadership from damascus made is the support that has allowed hamas to remain
aloof. february 2012 the agreement with hamas was reiterated that doha and last month turkey prime minister join together to oppose the support of palestinians. that powerhouse of turkey and egypt with the economic power of the gulf could provide ballast to move region no peace process forward. progress is essential to consolidate democratization in the region. be no justice delayed is not justice denied. with palestinians to set an
example justice denied a rowboat to evade develops built rejection we have to recognize hamas now deals with another day at -- dynamic currently attempting to do real democratization as we have seen the attack of israeli checkpoints borders the north and the south and chaos is attracting policy activists who do not recognize our respect national borders to destabilize those borders seen that already paul into lebanon.
am not implying palestinians of our the establishment of state and would fix all their woes. but the longer palestinians remain state list the longer the militants could have recruiting causes for their campaign for our number two. the greatest ally not so much israel's western supporters says is often claimed but lack of unity among palestinians and the regional borders. agreed is fear of the current israeli government is not as hot iran. but arab unity and purpose. number three. that unified front of arabs
acting together including guarantees of israel's security will reflect the overwhelming majority of the populace in the region that is another step of democratization by any other name. thank you. >> the final speaker senior research scholar at the center hall where middle eastern stork -- studies. and also from the center for american jewish studies at baylor and the author of a number of books about gaza strip. i have been following her work for many years and i am delighted to add you here today. [applause]
>> i also like to use think the council for inviting me and a quorum for all of us. i will focus my remarks on and gaza and the situation there that people know relatively little. the gaza strip and as 46 your occupation, 21st year of closure and the sixth year as the siege. little doubt the israeli occupation is accepted as the status quo as key actors. the normalization is a compelling form. not like the west bank for it is characterized by a settlement, a government is seen this day this is the occupied territory and the focus of the attention has been shifted since electoral
victory and takeover of the gaza strip. rendering as a legitimate human-rights or democracy. what happens to gaza is no less a progressive assaults on society imposing irreversible damage but if allowed to continue of this there should be no doubt. of happened is catastrophic. in a few minutes i have by way to highlight a critical problem. the government of israel has referred to the closer at -- closure policy as economic warfare. "damaging the enemy's economy is a legitimate means of warfare even when
deciding to enter. but information was released by wikileaks and as part of the overall plan if gaza that and israeli officials have confirmed economic losses on multiple locations a willing keep the cause the economy on the brink of collapse. pushing it over the edge, functioning at the lowest level possible to of '08 a humanitarian crisis. >> the most critical issue economically is the sixth year time that ended normal functioning. it became particular onerous after the hamas 2007 takeover when they wanted the imports of raw materials
and the your trade is fiercely with the west bank. perhaps israel's policy of economic warfare and all exports which remains the case and a constraint of the manufacturing sector and economic growth. the when reports between january and may gaza exported around 4,000 truckloads of 130 truckloads between january and may. around 3% fellow at the 2007 levels. despite budget and the first five months he would exhort 1/3 them what they promised but one day. but a limited number from
the former steve thousand seven but this is quite new. the israeli government has announced the policies in favor of separation that seems to be seen was suspicion. with its tiny economies desperately dependent this. to bid despite imports exports announced by the israeli government allowing him more consumer groups. the member was up of 400 but compares between 4,000 and 7,000. >> it wasn't a limited construction material? or? >> the inability to trade
freely and severe restrictions on the mobility of labor with a possible illustration of impoverishment. unemployment stands at 30% that is a conservative figure. ranking 17th among 196 countries, more significantly yearly 2012 those aged 15 through 29 was 46%. chronic unemployment approximately 39% live below the poverty line in 2011 that would spike for the outrage despite this shortage of food urges faster 44% are food and secure meaning they do not have enough access to give
the diet with the needs and they have that some form of assistance. why it there based on foreign aid or illegal underground activity. with the environment here i will focus on the buffer zone. is that israel's intentions are most visible and cause is the most striking. >> the important part of the economy severely degraded. it is destroyed. key factor is the book that some that has been unilaterally imposed since busta art and then gradually will widen in at the time. they are partially index of
stations sensible. identified by the wynn. consequently the buffer zone with its 14% of the land area to encompass between 48 and 55% of the total land including many water rhodes. 95% is arable. those restrictions is an annual loss of $83,000 of potential produce. the extended buffers down down -- zone 20 nautical
miles or reduce debt three where the waters are fall with a daily switch flow in excess of 23 million gallons. actually the arable land and maritime laws supersede but approximately 7800 said the agricultural land inside and outside of the buffer zone interest trees, crops come under serious, greenhouses. this has translated into the fact one-third of but one is water brown have the time to get into the history but i
will highlight key facts. first of all, 9% above makes assumptions with the sanitation and fisher sure the sewage flow of the gaza strip reaching to elevated levels of nitrates and chlorides which pose a huge risk to humans and livestock. between 60,000 and 90,000 cubic meters partially and treated sewage for the environment. everyday. the ngo working in this area has stated comex 90% of water wells are treated eight times higher" almost all of god's of 117 wells are seriously contaminated
with pollutants. remedial actions are presented -- prevented by the polis the with the and materials needed to upgrade and maintain. which is tuned able. furthermore to be safe for children callback the compound problem lacks proper sewage treatment and disposal system and the difficulties of providing adequate service delivery. >> according but then i figured it was water related. i am not at liberty to disclose but nowhere else in the world can such a large number of people make such high levels of nitrogen for a long period of time. there is no precedent doris
steadies to help us understand what happens to people over the course of years with nitrate poisoning? >> brief, a dog society that i will conclude. declining economically and i have only just touched upon it. with population growth rates. and increasing levels of both nutrition and between but by 60% of the gaza strip which just under 10% of those children suffer from stunting. that is the zero. >> within two rainwater.
and addition and i do suture of -- trouble with anemia according to the problem. >> there reports 68 to 74% ages nine through 12 months suffer from it if from anemia as well as schoolchildren and pregnant women. according to the who the most serious consequence includes poor pregnancy outcomes, and competent development, increased risk of morbidity and children and recreate -- increased and productivity. for save the children with poverty and conflict generating the health care system with the growing numbers of gaza said children. there is rising concern of european specialist with
regard to the reproductive health a report did rise to congenital anomalies and to. another program concerns changing the social attitude. if they would be forced largely into non productivity with a humanitarian aid. it is deliver it and imposes of people desperate to work. not of a israel government so are the palestinian authorities and the west bank for the and internal struggle with the movement into humanitarian aid workers and will conclude
with the words of the 17 year-old palestinian boy for i feel his work captured the essence today. >> what this figure much. [applause] >> that was in eliminating and sad recitation of the fax what it is like and the gaza today. we have seen firsthand the tragedy and argued the aware the american tax money, over a million dollars per day enabling all of this 70 betty wonders why there is
hostility for americans think of that for your children are grandchildren. dr. duke anthony and i will share the honor of asking questions spin my first. >> you say palestinians your distancing yourself from his quote. how they distinctly different? the right to live, the right to a family, i count myself in the un declaration of human rights but denied by israelis for who. perhaps i am making a distinction without a difference. spending fell last year in
the united states. the last year trying to figure out why am i so attracted to the palestinian conflict? -- can you hear me now? i have been traveling less figuring out what it is about the conflict is attractive. i grew up on the edge of the indian reservation. where people have their rights and have had their rights. there is a sign that says this and hill indian reservation. you go.
free both can go. they have the right. they can say with a one to produce steady the history of the native american -- new american movement is the same history. we demanded separate rates, nonviolent, demanding that they keep the prior agreements and it is unbelievable retook the land and demanded that they accept it. be even demanded they farm to these they could take their land. they did it.
who was it? chief justice and -- justice said the allied problem is the only promise they kept it wanted our land and they took it. you can see with this is going in the west bank. the israelis and then to say we would do the rest. >> views really -- israelis who say she is traveling in their own buses, have grown
community centers. but it is different. they don't have their land. this is not a fight for rights but their core belief. if you grow up in the indian community above this occurred go to the pine ridge reservation in south dakota and talk to a member of the american indian movement? >> there are several questions about the media coverage. why it is so flawed and one asks there are suburban tax on christians and another asks about the day dead new dain if we have a more recent data. read do.
if they came five years ago from "the new york times" and on the inane network's news and pretty much what i showed you about the first year. like to emphasize the first year because we know first impressions are so powerful. that makes the context with which they see this issue and they don't know palestinians are being killed they think the actions are retaliatory rather than being aware the violence precedes them. there was another study from fairness and accuracy with npr they found it reported nine 90% of the israeli children's deaths. a similar