tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN November 4, 2013 8:00am-10:01am EST
>> c-span, created by america's cable companies in 1979, brought to you as a public service by your television provider. and as we continue our series on "the communicators" talking with some of the telecommunications associations headquartered here in washington, week we're joined by shirley bloomfield who is the head of the ntca, the rural broadband association. she's here to talk about some of the legislative and policy issues that her association faces. ms. medical bloomfield, what ise ntca, first of all? >> guest: a national trade association, and we represent 90 small local providers that are in pretty much every state in this country who provide what used to be, you know, just basic telephone service. they're now broadband providers. they've also become kind of the
one-stop shop tech service providers for tear communities. they do video, wireless, data centers, they do whatever technology needs their communities actually require. so they actually represent their interests here in washington d.c. >> host: just to give us a sense of who you represent, who are some of your members? >> guest: so we have everywhere from the largest cooperative in the country which is telephone communications cooperative down in this south carolina which has about 100,000 subscribers to, um, we've got numerous small companies, family-held, locally owned in iowa that have four or five hundred subscribers apiece. so we kind of serve all across the country. if you actually looked at a map of the united states, we serve about 40% of the land mass but about 5% of the customer base. so when you think about, you know, here in washington, d.c. where you have a large provider providing service, they have 130 subscribers, my folks average about 6 or 7 consumers per mile. we've got a lot of land out
there. >> host: are your concerns, your legislative priorities different than the verizons, the at&ts? >> guest: absolutely. by definition, peter, when you think about what a rural community looks like and the fact that you've got a huge obstacle of distance, geography that kind of works against you, so again, if my folks are out there stringing fiber which is an incredibly important part of the few technology to their subscribers, their schools, their hospitals, they're going through a lot of land where you don't have a lot of people. you may have more cattle than people out in some of those areas. if you're a service provider like verizon or at&t or some of the larger companies here in washington, d.c., you get about 136 subscribers per mile. your costs are the same because the fiber doesn't get any cheaper based on where you're putting it in the ground, but the number of customers you have to sustain those costs is very different. and yet at the same time in rural america in some ways it's
even more important that you bridge some of those handicaps of distance so kids can have access to educational opportunities, access to health care activities. so the technology in some ways takes on an even greater role. >> host: so given especially the geographical issue that you've been talking about, what's a legislative or policy issue that you're promoting here in washington? >> guest: so one of the tenets that is incredibly important that i represent is the concept of universal service, and that is the idea that all americans no matter where you live should have access to comparable and affordable telecommunications services. so as we have gone through this evolution over the last several years of going from plain old telephone service to a broadband world to an ip world, how do we insure that rural americans have access to those same services and those same applications that come across on those networks? and so that's really been a big focus for us both legislatively and certainly with the fcc, talking to them about how
important it is to remain the tenets of universal service, what that means and how that mechanism has allowed folks in rural high-cost areas to actually have comparable services. >> host: joining us is matthew schwartz, appropriator with "communications daily." >> thank you. ms. bloomfield, in 2011 the fcc instituted massive reforms of the universal service regime. they reduce the amount of support they give to rural carriers in some instances, they implemented a formula which has been the subject of much be angst at the fcc where they now compare rural telcos to their similarly-situated peers. how have these affected your members. >> guest: it's phenomenal the impact it has had, and when you said it's created angst at the fcc, you can't begin to imagine the angst it's created outside of the fcc.
23r5u8, just understanding what the analysis does, it's an incredibly complicated, complex statistical model based on all these variables that try to compare apples to apples. so when you're trying to compare the cost of a company up in alaska, for example, where they've got basically three months where they can do investment to a company that's down in the panhandle of florida, you can't even begin to come up with a model that works all the way across the country for these different geographies. so the biggest impact, your question has been the carriers that i represent and, again, 900 carriers have felt such a chill about regulatory uncertainty that they've really slowed down their investing. and at a time where i think we as a society look at broadband and we say, you know, broadband's going to be so important as we make sure that vets have opportunities to get health care white driving four hours to a hospital or school children have, you know, broadband access to do all the
things today need to do to make sure they stay comparable to their urban counterparts. i have seen my member telephone companies and broadband providers really been slowed down in their investment. matter of fact, we did a survey recently, and about 70% have either stopped or slowed down some investment and builds that they had planned and on the books because you can't, you know, you're putting money in the ground in a very capital-intensive industry. if you don't know if you can rekoh those costs -- recover those costs, you're pretty nervous about putting that next dollar into the ground. >> you quantify how many dollars it's actually cost the industry, or is it just 70% generic? >> guest: 670% of those -- 70% of those, i'm always nervous about throwing out that number, but it's literally trying to go state by state to figure out what projects have been pulled. a political concern has been a couple of years ago under president obama's first administration there had been a big stimulus effort to do
broadband funding, and stimulus funding for broadband support. and what we have seen is a number of those projects, you know, aren't going to get done or a lot of folks have turned those projects back because it's a partnership. and they can't be sure that they can return their portion of the stimulus investment. so that is where you just see, um, it's really a shame because one of the things we have found is that every dollar that goes in the ground for broadband has a multiplier effect in terms of the local economy. and not even necessarily so much in the rural areas. as a matter of fact, we found that two-thirds of the kind of economic boost actually goes to the urban areas. >> surely that couldn't have been the fcc's intent when they passed the rules, to slow down broadband buildout. wouldn't they argue that the rules have actually eliminated waste the this some areas allowing some companies to more efficiently build out broadband? >> guest: you know, it's one of those things where i hear where you're coming from, matthew, and it's so complex. a universal service system is actually a very complicated
network with a lot of different rules, regulations, how it applies to different carriers, you know? and then you take along, you know, the e-rate, the lifeline, there's a lot of moving pieces in there. i think the thing that i think was a little bit difficult that we sometimes do here in washington, d.c. is we become so academic. we think about it from an academic perspective there must be a formula, there must be a model, there must be an answer from an ivory tower. i think what would have really helped the fcc would have been getting on the ground, seeing how these carriers actually make decisions, how do they make investments and what does it mean. i will give the fcc huge amount of credit for the fact that we are now working towards a seventh order of reconsideration which really means that throughout the course of the last two years since the order came out they basically have come back and said, yeah, you know what? we know there's some tweaks here, we know we need to make some changes here, so we continue to stay at the table and have some very, very constructive dialogues with them
on how to actually make work in the real world. >> is that because of the new commissioners that have come into the fcc? have they brought a different mindset to this? >> guest: the new missioners -- commissioners have neither one voted on the transformation order. both are incredibly thoughtful individuals. commissioner rosenworcel in particular has long been familiar with these issues. so she came in with a very steep background. and i think both of their reactions have been this is so complex. it's so complex that how are carriers supposed to figure this out, and until they can figure it out, they're going to feel regulatory uncertainty, and while they are, they're simply not going to build. so they actually really understand the connection between that. so to your point, how do you build into a broadband world, you know, how do we take this usf order and while it needed to be done, reform was necessary, how do you turn it to create
incentives for broadband deployment? and we have some ideas. >> host: well, shirley bloomfield, you've identified the problem that you're member company, your association members face, but what are -- what is the solution that you're advocating? >> guest: well, i think there's a few things. to be honest with you, i think, one, let's uncomplicate this. it's become so complicated, and it's done on an annual basis that let's say you, you know, figure out what your usf support is going to be next year, well, the formula changes for the next year. so when you're putting in telecommunications plant, you're building it for the long run. when you put fiber in the ground, you're not says this is a one-year project. typically, it's long term, and you've got to figure out how to recoup your capital, so, one, i think we need a longer run on how long these provisions stay in place so that we can better assess the impacts. and companies can feel better about it. the other thing that we need to do is we really need to create a fund that will support broadband. so right now the way it has been
structured, first of all, there is no connect america fund for rural carriers. that is the fund that is really the broadband fund. it's been put in place for the large carriers, and the mid-sized carriers, it is not in place yet for the small carriers. >> host: why? >> guest: we are still working on that. i'm hoping that's the next part of this process where we actually designate a connect america fund for those 900 small companies. the other thing that we need to do, the way the order's currently written is your universal service support is tied to voice service. so what we're seeing across the country is a lot of people are dropping their land line telephone. they just are, you know? young people, people on a budget, they're kind of, you know, the redundant value of that network isn't apparent to them. so if you are out in a rural area and you have dropped your voice service, your broadband provider can't get usf support to provide you broadband. just naked dsl, naked broadband,
stand-alone broadband. so the cost becomes prohibitive. so that's where i look at this and i think if this was partially an initiative to deploy broadband, tying it simply to voice service in an era where, frankly, voice is not the driver anymore, broadband is, we've got to make sure that that stand-alone broadband usf support gets tied to broadband services. >> host: but with three commissioners currently has the fcc been at a standstill? >> guest: you know, it's harder without the full complement, and i will be very honest with you, i'm very excited about having tom wheeler and mike o'reilly have their nominations move through the senate. i think a full complement of commissioners at the fcc increases the depth and the breadth of the discussion and debate, and i think it also kind of spurs the, you know, it's time to start taking action on some items that have kind of been languishing for a while. i do think that'll be very, very good for movement on all of the different issues facing communication providers.
>> host: matthew schwartz. >> you said that the rules affect broadband build scout investment in infrastructure -- buildout and investment in infrastructure. do they have even a more grievance effect on the continued viability of certain companies? for example, a per-month, per-line cap on the amount that the fcc will support, $250? i've read that there's been a lot of waiver requests? >> guest: yes. >> the fcc hasn't been too eager to grant. >> guest: there haven't been many approved, have you noticed? >> identify counted one or two -- i've counted one or two. >> guest: that's about it. >> are your members in danger of going out of business? >> guest: i certainly hope not. we have to figure out how to correct this and how to create a broadband future for their consumers. i think the big part of that problem with the cap is that it's retroactive too. what it's also doing is applying to investments you've already made. you didn't know what you didn't know. you put money in the ground
thinking you were going to complete the fiber bid to the school, to, you know, the next community, and suddenly you're finding the rug kind of pulled out from underneath you. that has been a real -- that's tough for folks. i think prospectively if we can get the caps to instead of being caps to be triggers, i know what the fcc is trying to get at, they're trying to say, look, we need to make sure folks aren't spending too much money, that things are within a budget which is important to the fcc. but instead of making those hard caps you said let's make it a trigger, okay, you've tripped the trigger, we need to look at your costs, why are they so high, what does this mean? what i'm seeing right now is a couple of things. i had a company in indiana last week that laid off 45 employees. 45 out of 200. they serve part of iu, indiana university, they serve a lot of medical clinics, you know? that's a big chunk of your work force. that means a lot to the community, it means a lot to what you can do going forward. so we're seeing a lot of that.
the other thing we're seeing, frankly, is folks trying to figure out new ways to get new revenue streams. that's not an unhealthy part of the process, how do you then monetize your network, how do you then provide different video service, how do you open -- you know, maybe you need to open a data center, maybe you need to think more aggressively about some of your i.t. services. so, you know, that's, that entrepreneurial spirit is what i'm hoping will pull our folks through. >> i guess i'm still trying to kind of get my mind around what is so wrong in practice with comparing similarly-situated companies against each other to see who's most efficient. >> guest: yes. so i think there's a couple of things. first of all, there's a lot of data that gets put into that formula, and i think you've got to make sure you're comparing apples to apples. so, again, what you've got, you know, a but years ago the fcc through the world task force had taken a look at putting a model on to rural carriers, can't we put everybody under it. and what they pound after some
intense -- found after some intense analysis was things like soil content, here in west virginia you've got a lot of rocks. that changes what it costs your company to plow fiber into the ground. alaska, montana, north dakota, you've got three months a year you can actually dig. you've got some things that are very different. so as you go through a complex analysis of looking at the amount of road miles or the amount of stop signs, the things that get thrown into it, you wind up comparing apples to oranges, and that's where a model just gets tough to work with as opposed to actual costs. >> is it possible to compare apples to apples? if they could come up with a model that takes into account road miles and soil and the difficulty of building and they could actually make it similarly situated this that model, would that satisfy ntca? >> guest: i think that's going to be your next task, and i say that jokingly. it's a tough model and, again, think about my 900 carriers. they are all so unique.
it is one of the things that it is not a homogeneous kind of industry. so i think it's been harder, it's been tried, it's been difficult to do. i think if there were models that could be created and folks could choose to opt into those models if they thought that might be a better path, you're always going to have unique circumstances that i don't think we're going to always be able to address. kind of with a one size fits all. >> host: you're watching "the communicators" on c-span. this week we're looking at the ntca, the rural broadband association. shirley bloomfield is the head of that organization. matthew schwartz is with "communications daily," a reporter. ms. bloomfield, aren't the economies of scale against your smaller members anymore? >> guest: it is not easy. i will say that, you know, again, when you're putting that plant in, you know, it's tough to do it when you've got a small population base that you're bulling out towards. however -- building out towards. however, there's a couple of things that i think has really
helped in terms of scope and scale. some of it my folks are kind of realizing there's a lot of synergies they can get from working together in different business areas. so one of the initiatives that i find very, very exciting is in about 30 states. my carriers have come together and built state fiber networks. so they all become owners, as you will, of their own state fiber network. and these state fiber networks are doing an amazing job of doing backhaul for the large wireless carriers, for connecting a lot of large institutions, and they're a able to kind of share that network not only in their own service territory, but then share the revenues they're able to generate by being able to kind of create that scope and scale coming together. so i think there's more initiatives that we're seeing in that regard. the flip side is the beauty of these locally-owned and controlled companies is they are all about their customers. we should hope to get this kind of customer service. you know, they're running into
the general manager in the grocery store and it's like hey, you know what? you haven't brought broadband out to my place yet. they're really connected with their customer base. i actually had a ceo the other day say that he started a terrific working relationship with the local health clinic building a broadband network so people could do home heart monitoring because he was bringing his mother every day to the heart clinic and kind of had one of those v8 moments of, you know what? i provide broadband, i should talk to the clinic about how we can get senior citizens connected up using telemedicine. so it's those kind of initiatives that, actually, it's the best part of why, you know, sometimes big boxes aren't always the best fit. >> is telemedicine the kind of thing that really wasn't contemplated in the last iteration of the communications act, and does ntca have a position on how communication act should be revamped going forward? >> guest: that's a really good
question, matthew, and there's probably so many different pieces of that act that we could take a look at. and you're right, you know, when enyou think -- when you think of the fact that internet was only mentioned a handful of times. telemedicine is an interesting one in part because you've got the transmission piece which is kind of part we worry about, you know, what are the rules, what are the regulations, how do you do cost recovery, but some other interesting pieces that are outside of what i would consider our typical realm -- medical licensing of doctors, doctors actually have a very tough time being licensed across state boundaries. when you're doing telemedicine, by definition, a lot of times you're going over state boundaries. i know it's something that commissioner rosenworcel has taken a look at, how do you make some of those ore rules in the medical field easier so you can generate more interest in telemedicine? we, for example, run a health care trust for our own member companies and their employees, so we actually provide health insurance for tens of thousands of rural americans who work for
rural communication providers. we actually changed our specks a few years ago so we allow payments for telemedicine, but you've got to get insurance companies thinking this is a covered service, and i think some of those initiatives will take off. i am very bullish for the opportunity with telemedicine. your parents live in a rural community, you can't check on them, how can you use that technology to make sure they open their fridge or their medicine cabinet? i think about, you know, again, the diagnostic things that can be done. it's pretty amazing. >> what can be done from washington with the statutes, revamping the statutes to encourage that sort of technology? >> guest: yeah. so that's, you know, again, when i look at it from our perspective, and you might get a different answer if you were talking to the american telemedicine association who we do work closely with, mine is my guys need to be able to build those networks. if they can't build those broadband networks, and dsl
isn't fast enough to carry a will lot of the diagnostics, and a lot of my folks while they're 100% broadband capable, a lot of them are still providing dsl service. you need the fiber in the ground to do the things you want to do with telemedicine. so i guess i would go back to i need to find ways that my companies can do effective cost recover so they can put that plant in the ground that allows those services to overlay. >> host: does that cost recovery include federal monies? >> guest: universal service is actually a support mechanism between carriers. so i know folks like to kind of think universal service, it must be a tax, a subsidy. absolutely not. it really is a mechanism whereby the funding is collected from the other carriers pooled and then redistributed based on costs. the entire cop sent behind that was that the value of the network increases the more people you get on the network, and it was kind of a notion and a place my that was adopted, you
know -- philosophy that was adopt inside 1935 with the first communication act had the principle of universal service. so, and that becomes part of the cost recovery mechanism. >> host: before we run out of time, want to get your take on the upcoming or potential upcoming spectrum auction. >> guest: spectrum is a very exciting initiative. i will tell you, you know, again, i think spectrum is a great opportunity. we're all mobile. we all, you know, we all want spectrum mobility. my concern on the way the past auctions have gone is probably about 80% of the spectrum is held by two large carriers, and, you know, we see more and more of that nationwide presence. what happens is when a large carrier buys that spectrum, they hold buildout requirement, and that's by population. so they can essentially build out in their urban areas and never have to build out to their rural areas. we'd love to see some smaller licensing areas so my carriers -- about half of whom already do own spectrum, they
just can't do much with it due to interoperability and access to handsets -- but they can build out within their own commitments. >> smaller licensing areas and what else would enable more small carrier participation? >> guest: so i think the licensing is key because i think the licensing is daunting for them to even get into was you're not going to buy the lexington market when all you really want to do is serve eastern kentucky. you really don't want to serve, you know, all the metro areas. interoperability, you know, being able to get that interoperability between the carriers and some of those roaming agreements are really important so that you can actually hand off that traffic. my guys can make a business case out of it. i've got a hundred companies that own 700 megahertz and very few have the ability to do anything with that spectrum. again, as i think customers continue to yearn for the speed and the capacity that fiber can
build, you want to augment that with mobility with the spectrum. >> i'm curious, if we can jump topics now -- >> guest: absolutely. >> -- to the problems your members have been facing with calls not completing. this is a big deal. a lot of people in cities might not know it, but rural call completion is something that's been tasking the fcc for the last couple years. has the fcc and their increased focus on it done anything to solve the problem many. >> guest: you know, this is a heartbreak issue, and to your point, you're right, people outside of washington don't understand it, but what's going on is that i might be calling, you know, my grandmother in michigan, and what's going on is that call gets handed off to an intermediate carrier of some sort, and usually carriers look for a least cost router to carry that call, and then that call gets completed, those least cost routers because the access on the other end is higher than the middle piece are simply choosing not to complete the calls. i've actually done these test
calls and it's horrifying when 20% of the calls you're making simply end in dead air. what it's doing to small businesses and people's safety, we've had numbers of cases of people not getting through to the surgeon or the health care clinic. to it's a real epidemic. the fcc's put some attention on it, that's been terrific. i find every time they do, we see a tamp down for a couple weeks and then everybody does their new territory, and it runs rampant again. so there's an order that the fcc is planning on voting on in the next week. i think that will be a really good start. i think there is more work to be done, to be honest with you, to insure that folks are getting penalized when that is happening. that is a life threatening -- >> host: and what is the order they're voting on? >> guest: it is an order on call completion, so they're going to be taking a look at ways to do remedies that will tamp down some of these bad actors. >> host: and, unfortunately, we're out of time with shirley bloomfield of the ntca, the rural broadband association.
matthew schwartz of "communications daily" has been our guest reporter. >> thank you. >> c-span, created by america's cable companies in 1979, brought to you as a public service by your television provider. >> just ahead, the the chief of the international atomic energy agency talks about his organization's role in nuclear safety and the monitoring of the nuclear programs in iran, north korea and syria. then live coverage as members of the president's privacy and civil liberties oversight board discuss changes to the nsa's data collection and surveillance programs. and later the senate's back to work on a bill to end workplace discrimination against gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender people followed by votes on judicial nominees to the u.s. district courts.
>> the woodrow will soften center recently hosted a discussion with the chief of the international atomic energy agency, yukiya amano. he addressed his agency's role in the monitoring programs of iran, north korea and syria. his remarks ran about 50 minutes. >> good morning. welcome to the wilson center. a special welcome to our guest this morning, director yukiya amano of the international atomic energy agency, the iaea. i'm mike van diewns, executive vice president. modern technology kept our president and ceo, jane harmon, on the tarmac in new york city, rather, at laguardia airport for over two years ago this morning. she has just landed and will be here shortly and will make a
closing comment. she apologizes, but we wanted to get started. the wilson center is a public very private institution created by an act of congress. it sevens as the official -- serves as the official national memorial to the 28th president. we tackle global issues through independent research, open dialogue and actionable ideas. we seek to provide safe political space for addressing key public policy issues. nuclear proliferation issues are a lane of excellence for the center. our nuclear proliferation international history project is a global network of individuals and institutions engaged in the study of international nuclear history are through archival documents, oral history, interviews and other empirical sources. the wilson center has very strong ties with the los alamos national laboratory. joe from the lab is here this morning. the wilson center has followed the nuclear talks on iran
especially closely and recently had two international ground truth briefings on these talks, conversations with experts in the field. and we're very proud to have michael adler on the podium here as the senior scholar at the wilson center. michael was the press correspondent in vienna covering the iaea for years, and he is now writing a book on the iranian nuclear negotiations. michael will moderate today's session. d.g. amano, as i gather he's called in the corridors of vienna, is here to help us understand the iaea, help us understand how the iaea is helping preserve the nuclear non-proliferation treaty's grand bargain. he is uniquely qualified to do so. his career spans 36 years in the japanese foreign ministry, and he has served with the iaea
since about, since the 990s. 1990s. he played a key role in securing an agreement to shut down chernobyl's unit number three as chair of the g7 nuclear safety group in the year 2000. and was chair of the iaea's board of governors when the agency won the nobel peace prize in 2005. please join me in welcoming director general amano, michael adler -- director general amano will speak briefly, and then michael adler will have a dialogue with our guest for approximately 15, 20 minutes, preserving half the time for your questions. thank you for coming to the wilson center this morning. director general. [applause] >> good morning, everyone. it is a great pleasure more me
to be invited -- for me to be invited and given the opportunity to speak to you. i had meetings with some high u.s. officials yesterday, and today i'm delighted to meet michael again who i know very well and michael knows or very well about the iaea. four years have passed since i joined the iaea in 2009. and today i would like to explain a little bit about the activities of the iaea. the iaea is known as a nuclear watchdog especially if media, but with i would like to same that the iaea's activity is much more extensive than a mere nuclear watchdog. for example, we are very unique
stakeholder to attain that millennium development goals. just for an example, cancer is a very serious problem many developing countries. -- in developing countries. some people think that cancer is a problem in developed countries. it is totally wrong because 2,000 deaths by cancer occur in developing countries. and countries in africa do not have even single therapy machine, radio -- nuclear therapy machine in the country. hay come to hospital too late, and it is not possible to provide life-saving treatment. this is very unfair, and i am insisting that cancer control in
developing countries should be established as a global health agenda. the nuclear technology can contribute a lot to save life many developing countries. everyone knows that in the coming years food shortage will be a serious problem as the world population expands. and here, too, the nuclear technology can contribute by accelerating plant mutation, but applying -- by applying radiation. we can prolong the shelf life of food, or we can eliminate the toxicity from food. water can be better managed by analyzing the aquifer by using
nuclear technology. the iaea has a huge project in sub-saharan countries to better understand the water resource and its use. if i keep on talking about these things, it become withs endless, so i stop here. but the point is that iaea has the technology, we have the function and encourage people to use it safely. iaea is a unique player to contribute to the promotion of millennium development goals and its follow up. i never thought that there would be such a huge nuclear accident during my tenure and in japan. i had to use a lot of time and energy to address this issue. if if you have interest, i will come back to this issue, but the
iaea adopted an action plan to improve, to enhance the safety of nuclear power globally. action plan is now implementation, and i can say that nuclear plants are safer now compared to the time before fukushima accident. despite the belief on some people, many countries continue to include nuclear power as an option in their energy mix. of course, urn non-proliferation which is one of the important tasks of the iaea, we are providing a regular report on iran, syria and dplk. these are different and
complicated issues. in particular, iranian nuclear issue is very complicated one. but when i joined the agency, i announced a very simple -- [inaudible] every country needs to implement the comprehensive safeguard agreement between iaea and member state and other relevant obligations be there are any. -- if there are any. i mean, for example, that united nations security council resolutions. this is a universal standard, and all of the countries including iran need to abide by. by this standard i can say that material and facilities placed under safeguards in iran are staying in peaceful purpose.
but as some additional protocol and other obligations are not implemented, we cannot give the assurance that all activity in iran is for peaceful purpose. we had long negotiations with iran in recent years, but in october, on october 28th and 9th, 29th of month we had a meeting with iran. in fact, after the coming of president rouhani, we have carefully observed we had a meeting with new president of atomic energy organization of iran, mr. salehi, and we had two meetings and on the 28th and 29th we did have a very productive meeting. and i'm sure that you have interest, and i'll come back to
this issue. on syria in 2011 i drew conclusion that facilities that were destroyed was very likely a nuclear reactor that should be reported to the iaea. and while we are very confident that our conclusion is correct, there remain some possibilities that we would like to clarify. and while syria commits to cooperate with us fully, no follow up has been made so far. but we also need to understand that syria is in a very difficult situation. dprk, viewing from vienna iran are the most important and only issue. i come from other part of the world, japan, and from seeing from tokyo or asia this issue of north korea is also a very
serious issue. in one sense the situation is worse because they have declared to have withdrawn from the npt, expelled all the inspectors and tet nateed nuclear weapons -- detonated nuclear weapons. but one positive thing in that where are with respect to dprk, six-party talk it is quite dynamic. it is not functioning now, but countries are working formally and informally to reactivate this process. the iaea is ready to send back our inspectors, and we belief that we have -- we believe that we have a central role to play in the verification of the denuclearization of korean peninsula. there are many of -- many others that i would like to mention,
but let me say that iaea is an organization with multiple objectives. essentially, it is a technical organization, but we are working in a very highly political environment. now i will stop and be happy to converse with michael and later take your questions. thank you very much. >> thank you. it is an honor and privilege for me to finish and for the wilson center, to be host willing amano. mr. amano's one of first part-time i interviewed when i came to vienna as a journalist just over a decade ago when he was japan's ambassador to the u.n. nuclear energy. director amano will start his second term as the head of the iaea after taking the helm in 2009. he has starred the agent -- stamped the agency with his own style. in that spirit, i hope we can
have a good session with my questions and with the audience's. first, getting follow up on this meeting which you had with iranian deputy foreign minister and then it was a meeting of the two sides, the atmosphere of the talks, as you said, was better. but the question is, when will we see concrete progress such as a visit to the parchin site? >> yes, we had a meeting with iran on the 28th and 29th of october. this is the second meeting between iran and iaea after mr. rouhani became the president. and the first one took place at the end of september. it was a get to know each other meeting. last meeting was a very positive meeting, and there was some -- it was productive, and there
were some positive developments. and important ting that there was a change. -- thing that there was a change. there was a change of tone, yes, and there has been a change of tone is since the coming of president rouhani. but in the last meeting, there was some real change. i would like to mean that iran made a proposal, and it contains some substance, and the iranian proposal is based on step-by-step approach. iran and iaea agreed to resolve all the present and past issues through cooperation and dialogue. the next step will be now we are
working, i mean iaea and iran, are now working on the new proposal, and we -- and carried forward at a november meeting. if agreed sometime in the future, it will be a step forward. but by no means it means the end of the process, and much more needs to be done. this is where we stand now. >> you say there was real progress made. you have one -- you have several key demands. one is that you be able to go to parchin and the problem there is that a site which once was a container in the open now has a shed over it, it's not certain if the container is still there, and they've actually asphalted over the ground. so the question is, will they finally let you go there? and if you go, can you find anything? and then there's the other question which you differed with them in the step-by-step approach, you want to be able to go back and ask questions at any
time. iran wants one file to be closed, you move on, you can't go back to the file, and you had problems with that in a previous work plan. .. that i issued in november 2011, we have identified 12 areas where we need verification from iran. parchin is one of these 12 areas. we have agreed that all the
issues will be resolved, and the access to parchin will be a part of the process. we are now working on them, on other issues. and how to move forward. regarding the question whether we can go back now to the place again or not, we have not discussed that much into tales at this time, but the basic agreement is that we will resolve all the issues through cooperation and dialogue. this is very important and there's a basic agreement. >> okay. so, i wish you luck going forward and i hope you can make some progress. another question about iran.
are you currently inspecting iran in a full in a way to be able to detect any breakout effort to make in a weapon grade uranium for a bomb? or would have iran have, say, two weeks where they could do this? >> we are quite confident that we can find any changes, any deviation in a reasonable amount of time. if there is any facility that is not declared, we don't have that assurance. >> and are you concerned that sentient not been applying any additional protocol since 2006 that they would be able to be hiding things from you
elsewhere? >> additional protocol is essential and very helpful for us to have better understanding, or there is not undeclared -- the implementation of additional protocols will give us more confidence on the peaceful nature of iranian activities. >> the advanced centrifuges they have which they install, they haven't put nuclear material in them yet, or as of the last report. how good are those centrifuges? do you think they will work? >> we don't know yet. they are not operating. we can tell different they are, but the main purpose of our inspection is not be verified how effective are how effective they are. our main objective is to verify that the material and facilities
state in peaceful activities. >> and regarding bmd, which is a huge sticking point, is the agencies aim to uncover details of all alleged activities are simply to verify that iran is no longer engaged in such activity? >> we would like to seek -- we are seeking clarification through iran and would like to clarify the present and past activities. how far we can go, how far we can detect, it depends. we have not started so we cannot tell for sure what would happen, but it is essential that iran cooperate with us to clarify these issues. >> if iran cleared up the past where they get sort of amnesty? in other words, do they control if they clear up the past and it wouldn't be measures against them for this, it would just be
one step towards going towards a deal? or would have to be some kind of sanction -- a bad choice of words. >> resolving iran situations that there are two routes. one is on the iaea iran root him and another is on the p5+1 or eu 3+3 root. these are different, independent and separate. the route between iran and iaea, the main focus is on verification. therefore, we would like to see the implementation of additional protocols, more timely of information which is caused modified code 3.1 but simply it means timely information about the iran nuclear activities. and on the clarification of
possible -- [inaudible] policies that these are iran and iaea. on the other hand, p5+1 or eu three dialogue is dealing with some lifting, possible lifting of sanctions, possible limitation of enrichment activities, as i understand. the parties involved are different. three countries are from eu, russia, china, united states, and they are negotiating with iran. an important meeting will take place on the seventh and eighth of november, next month. >> as you pointed out, the two
tracks are really separate from each other. but hasn't iran said very clearly actually that there can be no progress in vienna until there's progress with the p5+1? and doesn't this inject an element of politicizing the iaea which stymied your work? >> i haven't heard that since president rouhani started. in the past, there was some medications, sometimes there was such indications. sometimes there was no indication. i can tell you that after the coming of president rouhani we had a number of talks with them, including a meeting with mr. salehi, but we haven't heard this language. >> so that would be a truly substantial change? >> i think so. there is some substance in the
new proposal by iran. and we would like to carry it forward in the next meeting scheduled on the 11th of november. >> you arrived here in washington. you met with secretary kerry and you met with susan rice at the white house. what are they telling you about how they see hopes for progress in iran? and what did they tell you about the iaea and how they feel you are doing? >> we have, i have met with them, secretary kerry, susan rice as most others, and we discussed iran nuclear issue. certification, or with some other support to the peaceful activity, peaceful application
of nuclear power, wide range of issues. i sensed strong support of the activities of the iaea. but it's a diplomatic purpose is not to talk about the ongoing discussions. [laughter] >> did they give you any idea about the upcoming talks in geneva? >> upcoming talks in geneva. not much in -- i take into account a discussion that just took place indiana, and p5+1 is preparing for the next meeting. -- in geneva. but i don't have much to report to you on this issue. >> just two quick questions and then i'll turn it over to the audience. the first is on syria. out those sites been affected by
the civil war? is there still a place you can go to do proper verification? >> in syria we have them so-called reactor that has some small amounts of high-enriched uranium that is under iaea safeguards. we visit that facility regularly, and that facility is standing in peaceful activities. recently we haven't visited because of obvious reasons. but we don't have any indication that things are getting worse. >> and at the other three sites that you want to go to three
>> we have different things. one is the syrian nuclear facility and safeguards. the military reactor is the one that i mentioned is under safeguard. there is another issue of the destroyed facility located in another place. we drew a conclusion that it is very likely that it was a nuclear reactor. but nuclear reactor does not mean it exists independently. we have interest in verifying that functionally radiated facilities, there are three, but these are not under safeguard.
we need negotiation with and have access to them, and when not yet have access to these facilities. we don't know how these facilities are for now. >> do you know if the region has been affected by the fighting? >> we don't know. >> my last question. on north korea, you explain very well the situation. my question is, if and when the iaea returns to north korea what would be the verification approach, given that a continuity of knowledge has been lost? would safeguards be enough with tools like additional protocol for wider inspections? >> according to the united nations security council resolutions, north korea has to implement all of the iaea safeguards. but the reality is north korea has declared to have its own.
there is some argument on the bigger procedure of the withdrawal, but the reality is north korea is not acting as a member of the npt. it is also clear that north korea has withdrawn from the iaea and north korea is not a member of the iaea. so in order to do any activities in north korea, we need, first, political agreement among the major stakeholders, and we need the consent from the board of governors. that means the policymaking body of the iaea. what can we do with respect to north korea? i think first that we can take a small step. perhaps we will send back our
inspectors to kill me on where they have nuclear facilities. this will be a small step, but i think it has a lot of meaning. and when we had inspector in pyongyang up in april 2009 we had better knowledge. that we continue to monitor but our knowledge integrating. the next step we need to take is to send back our inspectors. >> thank you very much. i would like to open up questions from the audience. members from the press, please hold your fire. we will have a press conference later. and we asked a question, please wait for the microphone to be passed to you. state your name and affiliation. and as always, please ask a question. we don't have much time. we want to get as many questions in as possible, so no speeches.
>> thank you very much. him one of the p5+1 goals is to secure more quote unquote interested inspections by the iaea. what would these more intrusive inspections involve? what is it you need to do that you are not doing now? >> this is on the issue of discussing p5+1, i cannot give a definitive answer. but when we say inclusive answer, basically it means there are measures contained in the additional protocol. additional protocol is more inclusive from our verification
measures than normal comprehensive safeguards agreement. but intrusive inspection can mean more, more than the major additional protocol. sometimes it is needed. did i get it fine? to the answer your question? >> thank you, director general amano come and welcome to the wilson center. i like to ask a question with a broader optic and timeframe, the discussion up to now has been on specific countries of concern. more broadly, looking ahead, there will be an expansion of nuclear energy for energy security reasons and he does it is the primary source of low carbon energy going forward.
how will that expansion of nuclear energy, notwithstanding the setback that has been in japan within fukushima reactor problem, but broadly it advanced and daschle societies and developing countries will increase reliance on nuclear energy, how can that expansion be accomplished without creating proliferation risks and what does that in turn mean for the iaea's mission, its resources to get you address that broader situation? >> according to latest estimates, there will be increase in the use of nuclear power by 2030. lowest scenario would be 17%, and highest would be 19%. we foresee that there would be a
steady increase of use of nuclear power. what does it mean for us? it certainly increases the workload of the inspections. therefore, we are doing maximum efforts to rationalize, make the inspection more efficient without the same amount of money. we cannot accept big increase of fun in the coming years at least. another very important thing that we are doing with other countries, especially so-called newcomers, is to recommend them that we call myers don't document to embarking on nuclear power is a huge project. it takes a lot of years and it requires some meticulous preparation. in countries that want to embark on nuclear power, needs to
strengthen nuclear infrastructure. by nuclear infrastructure i mean the verification of major conventions, and establish regulatory bodies, and that domestic laws, and train people, and to make a good selection of sites and technology. we have identified 19 steps to prepare for the embarking on nuclear power, and we are insisting these countries. we are not encouraging or discouraging the use of nuclear power. but if countries use nuclear power, they must do it safely, securely, without increasing the risk of proliferation. i hope that these countries can use nuclear power without increasing the risk of
proliferation. >> over here, please. >> good afternoon, mr. armando. i'm a retired diplomat. mr. amano, can you speak to the nature of the iaea's contacts with israeli officials, seen and not so senior? and this is by iaea officials to israel. >> we have some regularization, regular contact with the ambassador india. and the senior staff in the general conference. the general conference is the most important meeting of the iaea, and that takes place in september. and also, for example, when i attend other meetings like dow
close -- like davos, i have contact with senior officials of israel. so we have regular and normal contact with israel. and i believe that it's helpful to have a good communication with israel. >> i'll come back here in just a second. >> thank you. sarah williams with the partnership for global security. i wanted to ask about if you could speak a little bit to the iaea's role in nuclear security summit process and how that has developed over the years and where you see that going, following what we expect to be the last summit in washington in 2016. thank you.
>> the first big event for me after i joined the iaea was to attend the nuclear security summit held in washington in 2009. i was asked to make presentation in terms of president obama them and i was thrilled and i was excited, but i did survive. after that i regularly attend the nuclear security summit, and we make our input. the iaea has a central role in the nuclear security. we have the information and we have the capacity to analyze. we have traffic and database. this year, we have already had over 100 information on the illicit trafficking of fissile
and other me just a information is very important to let the capacity to have countries, and to capacity building for donation of equipment. we can train people and we can establish conduct like nuclear security. through all of these, therefore, we can strengthen our nuclear security in concrete manner. we make input on the nuclear security summit and the summit participants give guidance and instruction to the governments in their own countries on the nuclear security areas. one of them, one of the areas is the entry into force on the
amendment of the convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials, and this is a complicated a but we called cpp in, and it's a minute. the convention itself, its scope is limited. amendment expands on the scope. that amendment enters into the force, nuclear apartment for example, on the land can be covered by this convention. so we are promoting a force on the cppn amendment and with that we believe that we can enhance them. iaea has held a huge meeting at
minister level on nuclear security in july of this year. it was attended by 1200 people that was one of the biggest meetings of the iaea, and we will continue to hold these conferences and we will strengthen nuclear security and promoted to our division. >> hello. >> barbara slavin from the atlantic council. welcome to washington. my understanding of the iranian proposal is that they want to keep the facilities that they could have and perhaps even build new nuclear infrastructure, but in return they would provide much greater transparency to is that also your understanding? and as part of the transparency,
do you understand that the iranians would agree to 24 hour monitoring with remote cameras? thank you. >> by that, you mean there will be a live stream? >> online. >> so it actually b-24 seven. >> on the iaea, iran route we are not discussing that much details at this stage. we have agreed to resolve all these issues through cooperation and dialogue, current and past, and iran made a proposal based on step-by-step reports and it contained some substance. we are working on them and we will carry to the november 11 nuclear conference.
we'll see. >> thank you. daryl kimball, good to see you. i have a question about special inspections. under the comforts of safeguards that iran has and other countries, the agency as i understand does have the option to conduct a special inspection. so my question to you is with reference to the questions about potential military dimensions, has the agency considered this? could it be useful in resolving either the kurds or the past questions about those activities? and then on technical cooperation, the agency provides broader technical cooperation to states regarding nuclear energy. with a question about that before. what steps is the agency taking to ensure that that tactical cooperation does not provide assistance to nuclear weapons
programs? for instance, pakistan has got technical assistance for uranium mining, as well as heavy-water reactor operations, and it is used uranium mining and heavy water facilities to produce plutonium. so what assurances can you provide that that tactical operation is not directly or indirectly assisting in the manufacture of nuclear weapons? >> we are giving them some technical cooperation through the facility that is under safeguard. we are not assisting nuclear activities at all. the four countries that are not yet embarked on nuclear power, we are helping them to adhere to the conventions, to establish a regulatory system, safeguard
system, and help them in every way to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. for the special inspections, certainly special inspections is a tool available under the iaea comprehensive safeguards agreement. but it has some conditions, and we can call for special inspection and special circumstances, and it was called for in the case of north korea and romania, and the case was a bit different but i'm not, other cases in which we have called for special inspections. >> we are not that successful with north korea.
>> when we called for the special inspections, they declared to withdraw from the npt. >> negative reaction. >> thank you. director general, i wonder if you could comment on the general state of health from our perspective and from the iaea's perspective of the additional protocol, both as a framework and also as it's been implement with specific countries? additional protocol approach has been around for a few years now. how do you in the agency feel that its work in terms of strengthening your ability to safeguard nuclear materials? and if there's anything you would change whether in terms of the diplomacy part of it or the technical or scientific aspect of it, what would you seek to change in the future? thank you. >> the immediate objective for
us in the near future is to universalize the additional protocols. we have been investing, expanding the application or implementation of additional protocols. when i joined the iaea in 2009, there were 93 countries that implemented additional protocol. now, 121 countries are implementing additional protocols. additional protocol is an additional tool to exclude the possibility of undeclared activities. and we would like to see more countries adhere to the additional protocols. whether we can do more or not, i think that the priority for now
was come is to universalize our expand a number of countries that implement additional protocol. >> unfortunately, unfortunately because the questions are excellent, every single one, we're going to break off the session now so our dear leader, jane harman can -- [inaudible] spent the honorable jane harman. >> dear leader reference is a little uncomfortable, but mr. amano speeded we will be the last couple minutes of this program to go live now to the president's privacy and civil liberties oversight board. their meeting this spring to discuss changes of the nsa's data collection and surveillance program. members examining one program online basque election phone records. another targeting internet data. this is just getting under way. >> as chairman i will be the presiding officer. i'm -- all five board members
are present and there's a quorum to the board members are rachel brand, elisebeth collins cook, james dempsey and patricia wald. i will now call the hearing to order. all in favor of opening the hearing say i. upon receiving unanimous consent, we will now proceed. pclob is an independent bipartisan agency within the executive branch established by the and limiting regulations of the 9/11 commission act. is comprised of four part-time board members and a full-time chairman. the board's primary missions are to review and analyze actions the executive branch takes to protect the nation from terrorism. and ensuring the need for such actions is balanced with the need to protect privacy and civil liberties. and to ensure that liberty concerns are probably considered in the development and implementation of laws, regulations and policies related to efforts to protect the nation against terrorism.
essentially the pclob has to function, advisor and oversight role with respect to our countries counterterrorism efforts. i want to thank the many panelists will be participating in today's hearing for a greater share the -- to share their views with the border i wanted thank sharon, the board's executive director, to rangel, chief administrator officer, and diane, chief legal officer for their tireless efforts in making this event possible. pclob has agreed to by the president and congress with a public report on to federal counterterrorism programs. that section 215 program under the u.s.a. patriot act and the 702 program under the fisa amendments act. the 215 program sometimes referred to as the business records collection program. one of the things the government collects under this program is telephone metadata for intelligence and counterterrorism purposes pursuant to order by the foreign intelligence surveillance court. 702 program involves collection
of foreign intelligence information from electronic communication service providers under foreign intelligence surveillance court supervision. the purpose of today's hearing is to consider possible recommendations the board might make regarding these programs as well as the operations of the foreign intelligence surveillance court. just to be clear, the questions the board members posted a do not necessary represent either their views or the use of the board. the purpose of this hearing is to explore a wide range of recommendations to assist their benefits, costs and possible unintended consequences. the board believes it will be in the best position to make its recommendations by having public discussions of these options. there will be three panels today. the first will consist of government officials whose agencies have varying degrees of responsibly for the surveillance programs to be the subject of our report. after the first panel we will be taking a lunch break. this afternoon the second panel will include a former foreign
intelligence surveillance act judge and two lawyers who have appeared before the court. one on the government side and one represent the private sector client. finally the third panel include a former member of congress, for academics and respond to the discussion during the first two panels. board members will each pose questions during each panel with 10 minute question round for the first panel, a five minute rounds for the other two panels. panelists are urged to keep the responses brief to permit the greatest exchange of you. this program is being recorded and a transcript will be posted on www.pclob.gov. written comments from members of the code public are welcome and maybe submit online at regulations.gov, or by mail into november 14. since we're still waiting for one panelist, we might take a few minutes break and -- or we can get started. it might be helpful to maybe just take a few minutes break.
[inaudible] >> you want to get started? okay. will jump in and then pick up with the rest of the panel. i want to introduce our panel is, country whose agenda counts general counsel of the national student agency. patrick kelley was the acting general counsel for the federal. of investigation and brad -- brad wiegmann was a deputy assistant attorney general at the national security vision department of justice. there are allegations in the press last week that the nsa is secretly broken into main communication links that connect yahoo! and google data centers around the world. under something called project muscular which allows the nsa and the british intelligence agency government communications headquarters, or gchq to copy data flows across fiber optic cables to carry information among the data centers of these silicon valley companies. could the panel please explain what the program is about and what impact it has on the
programs that are the subject of today's hearing which is to 15 and 702 program? >> i can't address the veracity or lack there of, the details of the article but i think it's worthwhile making a few general points for everybody. even by the terms of the article itself, there's no connection to the 702 or 215 programs that we are here to discuss. i would suggest though that any implication would seem -- and the press coverage of this issue that nsa uses executive order 12333 to undermine our troubled that or get around the foreign intelligence surveillance act which is simply inaccurate. as the panel one oh and as a public should know, fisa is a statute that has particular jurisdictional coverage. you are either covered by fisa or you're not covered by fisa. historically fisa was intended to cover that type of collection
that most what impact u.s. person privacy and the key factors, which many learned scholars and folks like david crisp have written about are things like the nationality of targets, location of coverage complication of targets, where the collection is undertaken. i would note that it's -- as a general matter, any collection in sa does would involve minimization procedures where they are approved by the attorney general, or if this coverage were under fisa, that has rules in place to minimize the collection, retention and use of any collective u.s. person information. the last point i'd make is, and i would employ you in the public, as you read articles that may or may not be true, just read them with the rig you would expect a to read about activities. and so in some of these articles i think, i noticed you would have a line, paragraph two of the article that says nsa is well-positioned to collect vast
amounts of u.s. person information. somewhere around paragraph 30 you might have a line that says, it's unclear how much u.s. person information in nsa collects or retains. and so i think it would be useful for everybody to read coverage with a certain amount of rigor. >> i want to turn to the subject of today's hearing. as you know there are a number of legislative proposals that have been introduced to a range from a polished the program to modify the program. and a lot of concerns have been made about the scope of collection, information held by the government. what is your response to the proposals that the 215 program should simply be shut down? >> why don't i speak to the operational part of the program for a minute and then i can they be turned over to brad for
justice's point of view. and, obviously, to the fbi for whom this program is beneficial. so from nsa's point of you i think we've made a few points publicly, which is found this is a valuable program, that along with many other surveillance tools contributes to our mission. it was intended to help cover a team can make the connections between foreign threats and any -- they might have. i think i would make the point though that 215 in particular, which is the telephone m.e.d.i.c. program, maybe i should just start with a success odyssey the panel is well versed in this program, only involves telephone metadata. does not involve any content of telephone calls. does not involve any identifying subscriber information and an essay does not collect any location. this tool is used about as a discovery to in order to to discover, on earth potential is
to domestic to the international threat but if such tips are evidenced when over to the fbi for further investigation. i think though that in the public debate there's been a lot of discussion of name applaud without this tool inevitably what happened and i think that's probably not the right question to ask. from the intelligence community's perspective, intelligence is a function that is brought together by lots of different tools that work and complement one another, and i would also ask, suggest that any particular plot, its rich are going to find a situation where some particular event was only unearthed or only stop a result of one particular intelligence tool. anything that probably misleads the debate in terms of the value of the program. but i would ask my fbi colleagues and doj colleagues to weigh in. >> we find the 215 program to be very helpful to us.
we since 9/11 have been charged not with retroactively solving crimes which we continue to put on the national sector decide to prevent terrorist attacks. that's only different and much harder thing to do. so we need information. this is one tool. it's not the only tool. it's not a tool that we can say is absolutely must have. it is extrinsic critical though, helpful to us. when we try to connect the dots, the more dots that we have to connect, the better off we are in the publishing our mission of preventing terrorist attacks. so the program that we have here -- good morning. spend sorry i am late. transportation averaging is a little difficult although i will no the panel started early. >> as i said, the 215 program, as indicated, provides us with metadata. does not provide us with content of communications.
just data such as the number from which a call is made to the number that it dialed, the length of the call and the date of the call. primarily of interest to us because we may have telephone numbers from our own, other tools, investigative tools, but we may not realize the significance of the number without the 215 abilities that nsa has to analyze that data and then provide context to us. in turn, we may not realize the significance. it provides us a way to be agile but it provides a way for us to respond more quickly. time and counterterrorism investigation is a very important element. it has resulted in several cases over the years, more than several, being opened and we may not otherwise have opened. it is also permitted us to focus
resources. we may have had a preliminary investigation, for example, open and then when the information came to us that this number we had was contacting a known or suspected terrorists saved us for example, overseas. it and would provide us the articulation of facts to escalate that preliminary escalation to a full investigation. that in turn allows us to focus our resources better and focus our energy and our investigative efforts. i think that over the years we've had a number of open declarations, a file that gives us indication of the value of the program. 2009 director mueller filed an affidavit with the fisa go to indicate at that particular time there were 27 i think full investigations open. it's very difficult in any particular investigation to say that this fact or that fact is
very important, but over time we can say that these things are extremely helpful to us. so we do think there is value in the program. >> if the program was discontinued, would he be a practical option at some of suggested to just gather information from the telephone company provided rather than having nsa maintain data on all americans phone calls? >> let me -- [inaudible] >> if we did not have this program and used other lawful investigative ways to obtain particular phone numbers from particular subjects, we wouldn't be able to see the patterns that the nsa's program provides us. we would be able, for example, the use of grand jury subpoena our national security letter him on a national sector, obtain information about a particular phone number and we would get
the first tier of the phone numbers that that number had connected with. but we would not be able to go into a second tier or a third tier, which the nsa program provides. additionally, we would be able to perhaps go to service providers, the service provided to service provider, then individually tried to connect those dots but without the ability to look at all the data in a composite way, it would be much harder, much slower, much more difficult for us to do that. so with those two indicators there, we would be less agile, we would be less informed and we be less focused. and we think as result we would be a lot less effective in preventing the attacks that the american people want us to prevent spent i see that my time has expired. ms. brand. >> thank you, mr. chairman.
let me just follow up on that and your time ran out to buy some questions related to the same subject. even if you're able to use the grand jury subpoena or and nsl to go provider to provider to us with information, with the information the their without a record retention requirement? >> that's a very good question. without the 215 program, it would be up to the service provider to determine how long they would keep the record but i think fcc regulations require them to keep these things for 18 months. the nsa program keeps them for five years. so the likelihood without the 215 program would be that much of the information would simply not be there. so there would be no dots to connect. >> is it speeded may i have something on that? >> sure. >> it's my understanding that -- i'm not an sec lawyer by any means but the fcc regulation relates to pull billing records
but it's not that alter to me thathat if all providers move ta system where they're no longer -- that doesn't include local calls. second, if provided with an environment where the, none of them are building for toll calls, whether those records would be putting even pursuant to the fcc regulation. >> thank you. you just answered my next question. that's good. relatedly, we heard some talk about sort of a competition downward in terms of requirements where it's not required by fcc regulation that providers for sort of commercial competitive reasons would decrease their own records retention periods. have you seen any evidence of that actually happening, or is that more theoretical concern? >> i can't speak to that particular issue, but one of the point in addition to what bob and pat made to go to run a program like 15 program the data has to be provided or kept in
the way that allowed them to be integrated. so i think in addition to the availability of the record they have to be available in a way that would allow for the sort of analysis the 215 program allows. >> can you come any of you, speak to whether there might be some privacy concerns that would be created if, just posit for a moment if there is a regular retention for two years or perhaps just a bill calling records, does that in your mind create additional privacy concerns? and relatedly, would there be any reason why those retained records could not be sought in civil litigation, divorce proceeding, criminal proceedings, immigration proceedings, or any other kind of legal process? i don't know who wants to take that, maybe doj. brad? >> is a record that the companies keep for some period of time now, and they can be obtained as patty mentioned
thread nsl or grand jury subpoena whatever. they don't enjoy fourth dynamic protection. but -- fourth amendment protection for as long as you require companies to keep them then that david has been kept by a company for a longer time. so if you create a five year period, and that's information that is available and can be subpoenaed, private lawyers can subpoena the data. i mean, the data is not, it's not private in that sense but to the extent people have concerns about the data being held with the help of a grid of time by the private sector to record. so that's at least conceivably concern for the. >> once the bid is destroyed by the company come of course it's not available, which is on the privacy side, a good thing because hackers can't get into it. and as you indicated in your question, it couldn't be used for other purposes. i've been told, for example, if
the data exists other levels of law enforcement from local, state and federal would want it for whatever law enforcement purposes they were authorized to obtain it. and civil litigation could also seek to obtain it, or if such things relatively mundane as divorce actions. who is calling who, your spouse, if it's a contested action, for example. so if the data is kept longer by the companies, then i think the privacy consideration certainly warrants some scrutiny. >> the hacking point that you raised is, to my mind, both a national security concern and a privacy concern, but i have to ask in light of some of the recent revelations. is the data in the government's possession more protected from hacking than it would be if it were in the possession of the private sector? what are you doing or what can you do to make sure that it is?
>> i think that's a great question, and i think any evaluation of where else to keep such data should take that comparison into account. so we don't have any reason to believe based on current assessment that edward snowden have access to raw material in the business record database. why is that the case? i think i would make the case that the current program is one of the most highly read debated programs in the federal government today, and i think that goes to the benefit of folks have privacy concerns or interest in the protection of such data. so what do i mean with its highly rated program? for one, pursuant to the order, but it has to be kept segregated from all other types of raw intelligence your number two, the purpose of the program is purely for characters and purposes the data can't be used for other, for other purposes as we have just been discussing might be the case, in other circumstances. three, the program is
reauthorized every 90 days by the foreign intelligence surveillance court. we at nsa together with justice report to fisk every 30 days on use of the data. the program is audited every 90 days by the department of justice. pursuant to the court order, only 22 senior officials may approve wary into the data and those queries have to be based on a reasonable, our digital suspicion that the number used to associate with a specific foreign intelligence organization. only seven officials by court order or authorize to disseminate information to the fbi, for example, if any u.s. person information is involved. there were significant technical controls limiting access to the data. so, for example, a typo in this case can't go through in a query because there are technical controls but only allow approved numbers to be used as query terms. and, finally, pursuant to the court orders that are rules for
the inspector general at nsa and, of course, we have oversight from the department of defense. >> i want to follow up on the reasonable standard. i have a question which will continue in the next rent if i need to but can you explain what that means? giving an example of how much information would be enough to meet it. is it something more? what is it speak with this is a legal standard that does sort of have origins in kerry's top pitchers but it will turn to brad and to articulate that, but what that would mean is exactly the same standard that's used for stop and frisk for law enforcement officer to pat down somebody on the street. every single ras determination has to be documented before a query is made. >> by giving an example of what, give me an example of sort of the basis for ras? >> it could be for example,
through other intelligence known connection of a telephone number to an al qaeda operative, for example,. >> okay. >> the intent of the standards is to be significant enough that a query can be made on a hunch or for no particular reason at all, but sufficiently able to be met so that the too tool can int be used as a discovery tool to discover unknown operatives, which is the whole point of the program. >> and what is the paper trail? >> so every fisa -- ras is kept in a computer database. they are only come every ras determination is only valid for a set period of time pursuant to the court order, it's 180 days. if the u.s. number, 365 days if it's a non-u.s. number. as a meta- proactive compliance, we examined determinations half of that time period every 90 days the justice department comes to nsa and audits ras
determination, written ras determination's. and after their inspector general pursuant to the courts orders. >> and after the 180 days does the ras collector disappear? can you get it re- authorized? what happened to? >> it may not be used to conduct queries an unless a new ras determination is made or continued spend what is that reauthorization process? >> is it simply relied on the evidence that was provided the first of august that have to be reverify to? >> it certainly has to be we verified at the time of the determination. so anytime a ras determination issues, it has to be to the best of our knowledge current at the time of the determination. >> someone suggestion that we have heard to improve the process would be for doj to have more involvement in the ras process, the process of approving a particular ras selected i think it very there is that doj is more expense would determine whether standards of proof have been met.
does the administration have a position on that suggestion? brad, i'm looking at you because you're at doj but anyone can answer it. >> right. i understand that argument but i think the better analogy is to the operator on the street making that determination. lawyers don't make the determination. if there's reasonable suspicion to stop want someone and wisdom on the street because prospective groom to be. i think of the same reason we will not b be in as good a position as intelligence operative is to know whether there's suspicion with a number associate with a particular foreign terrorist organization overseas. so i think we've got it about right where we have it now only that were the operators. the example i would think of, what would be a ras determination? a laptop is obtained with a foreign government arrest a terrorist overseas and that's a laptop that we believe is used to communicate, the terrorist used to communicate with other terrorist operatives and on the laptop there's a bunch of phone
and the oversight to ensure the operator on the street is in fact appropriately using the ras standard. >> as for raj said we do determine each. we aren't doing it in real time because as i said before on the front lines those are the best position to do that. the point i did make is this is designed as kind of alarm system that's kind of rapid reaction program so that the government, when they have this number they want to know right away where that number is going in the united states to see if we can find out if there's any contact and terrorist bombing that occurred. but if given a little bit more time absolutely, lawyers are heavily involved in everything ras determinations if there were enough there so there is that kind of balance. you have the operators and the lawyers after the fact to make sure those are correct and if we were to find a complex problem there would be reported and is reported to the court.
again in conjunction with the 90 review is that raj mentioned. >> if i could have a point on to this. the court orders of the highest in the programs articulate that we in the justice work together on the interpretations of the 215 programs that includes training materials and other things like that. >> something you mentioned earlier, raj. you start off by saying there's a lot of talk about how many plots have been disrupted or thwarted and you said that's not the right questions i have a two-part question. what is the right question, and how frequently is the department of justice asking the question how often is nsa asking the question and is this an effective program? it turns out to be three part question. when you do so, what metrics are you using? >> i found that is a very valuable question to ask across the board for the nsa of
diligence programs and i'm sure that bob will speak for the agency. let me give you the data points for the 215 program. this program is realized every 90 days by the fisc -- >> can i stop you there? i am asking about the effectiveness of the program and not necessarily compliance or whether it continues to meet legal requirements. as a counterterrorism tool, with their rapid response has characterized or preventative as a the effectiveness of the program. >> every 90 days we have a program both from the nsa and the community that articulates of the need for the program and how it is part of the development standard to meet the relevant showing needs to articulate why such telephone records are helpful in the counterterrorism mission to put it in layperson terms. at a minimum of 390 days there is a mechanism built-in to
revalidating program. converse has been adding legislative funds to the profession. regardless whether one thinks that is a good or bad idea, that is a built in idea that congress should be evaluating the effectiveness of intelligence programs. the 215 programs randall frye twice in the last five years and apart from current efforts in to 15 so those are the natural plans to evaluate the effectiveness of the program. the third thing i would mention is like all federal agencies, the nsa has a significant resource constrained come so apart from the mission value of the program we are constantly evaluating expense of programs like the 215 to see if there were the expenditures. and the fourth data point that i would add is there's been some public discussion of another medved data program that was conducted on the e-mail metadata
for that reason that you raised that in part an evaluation was made but it wasn't meeting operational effectiveness needs. >> and if i could add to that, it's very difficult to say we stopped this number of attacks or opened this number of cases or produced this number of intelligence reports. but as i indicated before, we have provided publicly in some members and some illustrations including a plot that was to bomb the new york subway system. so that's one case and one plot disrupted. there was a similar attack in madrid several years ago and hundreds of people were killed and wounded in that single attack. when you evaluate effectiveness, it's not just numbers you have to look at. but you have to look at victims that are no longer victims, there were never victims. i think to put everything in context here it's very important, so that question
deserves a lot of public attention and looking at the full spectrum of the value and includes everything from people who are not victims of to intelligence reports that are produced. >> you mentioned in response to the questions rachel had asked that you could end up with a situation without the 215 program where you would have the data up to 18 months of the age would be 18 months as opposed to five years. to what extent do you in a systematic regularized way assess the helpfulness of the data that is 2-years-old or 3-years-old, 4-years-old, 5-years-old? is there an empirical basis for believing these older records are still in fact useful? >> i am not aware of any study where we have gone back to look at those specifics. and again, as counterterrorism environments, we have to look in terms of very broad program
review. not just of attack thwarted but how the counterterrorism organizations exist, with the finances are, what the objectives are, how they operate. so if we, for example, had a different type of tool to obtain numbers, most of those numbers would be that we would obtain going forward. we wouldn't have the ability to look back. so, if the data is retained for a shorter period of time than our ability to analyze, it is also reduced. so i don't think we can put the precise numbers or definitions on that. but i do think that in the long run, the more dots we have to look at these analytical -- trudy's analytical tools then the better we will be looking at them. >> yes, goodbye still have a little bit more time. you had indicated that there
could be limits on the use of either grand jury subpoenas or nsl's because you would only get the usages. are they consequential nsl's or grand jury subpoenas to obtain exactly that second or third hot type of information? >> i think we perhaps could. i don't know if we could get the second or third of play here as you said without giving repeatedly. we would end up probably going to court very frequently and very routinely. as raj indicated, the systems we have we have to go back to court every 90 days as it is and get the determination of the court on what we are doing is warranted and part of that includes the of relevancy and the value and judgment that allows the system to go forward. >> just to be clear you wouldn't have to go to court to use a
national security? >> no, i'm sorry. that's correct. >> which may be a different reason not to use national security letter, just to be clear on that. >> one come it is a slower process to issue nsl's and has said, you have to do it repeatedly and you have to do it across the providers. so if you have multiple providers participating, then you have to go to provider a and if that number calls someone who the member is from the right of b then you have to issue one to b and c and if those numbers are calling numbers back again across the different data streams from different providers it makes it infinitely more complicated to start to try to do nsl's to multiple providers. so i think that is one of the reasons it is complicated. in addition to the fact you said how long is the data to ensure the legal matter that has to be obtained. it's important to see some of the providers maintain the data voluntarily. but without something like this
order, you don't have a guarantee they are going to keep the data. >> thank you. >> thanks and good morning again. listening to the discussion about the ras coming and thinking about terry versus ohio, which is a specific articulable fact to believe, it seems to be two issues there. one of course is when you think about it, that is very standard that the new york city police has used in its stop and frisk program which is at the very least highly controversial and a lot of people feel has ended up being implemented in a discriminatory way. the police in new york city
would say every one of those stops was based upon ras. second, and the police stop case, the good aspect and the bad aspect is the issue was resolved immediately. either the police find something and they arrest you or they let you go. in new york there was the humiliation of being stopped, which is nothing clearly but it's resolved immediately. and it seems to me that you have picked up the first half of terrie, giving reason to believe. but the second half was that some criminals activity was fought. there was some suspicion of
criminal conduct, which you resolve immediately through the stock, which is the purpose of the stop. but here, i'm wondering about the second half. so specifically articulable factors giving a reason to believe and it seems to get vaguer that it's being associated with the terrorist group and associated with. is there a way to make that more concrete? you cite the example we have a terrorist computer and there were phone number in it. let's find out who those phone numbers were calling and are any of them in the united states. but what else could be
associated with mean and how can you give it more concrete news to avoid this problem? because it seems to me that you make the determination, and then the information is tipped so to speak or given to the fbi to pursue. and it's not the kind of thing that can be so immediately resolved. so i'm wondering, is the terrie example the right reference point here? or is there another way to define what you're looking for? reason to believe a search of the number will be likely to uncover somebody in the united states who may be engaged in terrorist activities for example, something more definitive than this associated with. >> what we offer some comments on that.
the first is that i think the comparison to the kump police -- the police in favor of this program is a considerably lesser intrusion. for one thing i think the actual degree of intrusion based on the determination is considerably less that the stop involves the police frisking you on the street which is by itself a considerably greater intrusion on a person's privacy and simply running a telephone number that is not associated with any individual name against a bunch of other telephone numbers that aren't associated with any individual name. the second thing is the consequences that can flow from that are considerably different. obviously, one of the consequences that can flow from the stock is an immediate arrest without any subsequent review without any intervening review board judicial determination. in this case, the only consequence that can flow is that a telephone number is tipped to the fbi for further
investigation, and that further investigation requires independent legal justice, and in particular if there is any desire to intercept any buddy's communications, any americans communications that requires a judicial warrant based on probable cause. the third difference i think is the degree of oversight. as was mentioned before, to my knowledge and generally speaking, there is no systematic oversight by prosecutors and or inspector general's or other side of the day to day determinations that lead to terrorist stops by police. that's one of the reasons there is the litigation in new york. as raj said at some length, there is a systematic oversight here. so, i think that all of those determinations make this a considerably lesser intrusion than the police terry stop. in terms of the po
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