tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN January 24, 2014 4:00pm-6:01pm EST
course kim jong-il was in charge. there is a lot of what was going to happen when this guy was in charge. what are we going to do when kim jong-il dies? it turns out he dies on the 15 december of 2011 and we find out on the 17th ditties that. and then kim jong-un would be the successor. i had not been in korea, so i hadn't hope to mind about what i was seeing. one, he had been educated in the west world, so i was hopeful. but what i watched have been overturned, during my time, as we roll and it's kind of good.
after the death of the leader in the new leaders get on board. we have the 29 february 2012 leap year deal, were not going to do any testing in exchange for two chino subsistence. and then that sales and as a result, they're going to do a satellite. has started eating things change, sars convinced things are not going to be as good as what i was optimistic about. to. i served over there was once a missile launch, a successful missile launch. the missile portfolio, the use
of asymmetric type threat. i had followed general sharp, as you know what the thinking of the children in march were we last 46 sailors. then we had a showing of the young pando island where there was another loss of life. so i was watching all of this. and then we had the largest deal to date that we know of. so what i try to do with not overstate the problem to washington d.c., but to give my honest assessment as the commander of what i was seen from a magic point of view.
that is probably our greatest threat today. i was not that much worried about north korea ground force is. i do think the ground capability but the missile portfolio they continue to develop a long-range missile, they put a satellite in orbit, which could be at some point an icbm. i think it's a real threat. mobile capability is hard to find on the battlefield and not a something in that terrain without pay attention to. so my emphasis during that period of time as i talked to washington was on whatever scene from a portfolio. the wmd portfolio not only missiles is disturbing, but also chemical. they have large chemicals that
piles up there. they also have saber capability. so that's what i think we have to worry about for the future. i think when your talking to washington d.c., it's important not to overstate the problem. that's what i try to do because we dealt with many challenges and it's easy to get things very excited and do the wrong thing. i went back to two things. one, i had to maintain our mistakes and prevent war and preserve options. that's how i look at my job every day. >> i think my message to washington and the people of the united states would be twofold. number one, can jong-un only carries about wanting. he will do anything necessary internally and externally to maintain the regime and has
proven not since he's been in power and his father before him. secondly as people talk about the status quo, the ring that goes a provocation, my message has always been you have to think about that not a status quo, that is a line that is becoming increasingly more dangerous because north korea is gaining to build a nuclear capability and a ballistic missile capability. so i believe that we in washington and i'm confident the republic of korea needs to think about the threat of korea, north korea along those two different axes and be prepared to defend south korea, be prepared for instability within north korea. i do not believe that kim jong-un will change in the
regime and open out. >> you have the longest perspective on north korea. what are your views? >> well, first thing i will say in dealing with north korea is hope is not a method. the fact of the matter is we countered on hope for many years that north korea will change and they have not. you can look at the various sine curves if you will on what we try to do to persuade them and sees him denuclearized him if i can use that term, and at the same time stop their missile programs. general sharp and it's exactly right. when you look at the regime, job one is to keep the regime in power and that's the very danger of the entire situation may appear to be asymmetric peace and nuclear missiles, cyber,
other weapons of mass destruction and the special operational forces pose a very serious threat. on the peninsula. in a very real sense, when you think about the peninsula south, it really is a hub for stability within northeast asia. so what happened there really has a very serious or positive effect throughout the region. general thurman is exactly right. the responsibility of the command favors to keep the armistice, maintain peace and stability on the pavement below and be prepared with our allies to defend the republic of korea if necessary. i do not see, even though we perceive right now that there's a great charm initiative going
on by kim jong-il, i do not need that it's anything different than has been done in the past. we've seen it before. we held out her hand and at one point they get what they want to go back to business as usual. so i think as general thurman said, you have to be calm when you analyze it. we have to look at it over a long period of time. you have to understand what's happening and you don't want anyone washington d.c. to set their hair on fire because miscalculation potentially is the gravest danger. miscalculation is a grave danger. >> i want to come back to that, the first at me ask about the north korean regime.
they often talk about collapse being a potential scenario for ability as much as aggression. i'll are not up to whoever would like to go first in house table the regime in and what the prospects are for the scenario. >> you know, i think that jim jong-un and wendy just date is an example that can learn and north korea have came jong-un and he will go to any means to be able to maintain that ability. i think more and more information is globally, there is really starting to get into north korea and the north korean people are very, very lowly starting to understand how their government now in the past has robbed them of the human rights they deserve and the freedoms they deserve and because of
that, the economy is in such bad shape. i think if you look internally from a north korean dave, kim jong-un is understandably concerned where this is going in the future. his number one concern is how does his regime survived. i think we have to be prepared for possible instability in the future. >> the fact of the matter is i think that kim jong-un will take whatever steps necessary to keep the regime in power. secondarily, with some of the events that have occurred, purging leadership within the regime shows that there is some inconsistent the ideology within the regime on directly where they should go, but he has it under control. i think he has been under good
control. i mean, it easy to control folks with a gun to their head. in my minds eye, when you think of the regime and you think about some of the things that have occurred, i can remember just before i took command and i got briefings from every smart person i could think of about north korea and general sharp was my executive officer and everyone was predicting collapse within my 10 years sink in korea. at that point we develop a plan. here we are many years later taught in about collapse. i think even though the people have been deprived, there are prison camps all over the country. the economy has been on a
downturn were you count a positive face it becomes a half of a percent of the negative. you look at the military. you look at where the investment is going. missiles and cyberknowledge those things. we must focus on the main responsibilities. that is to maintain peace and stability on the pavement dealer, maintain the armistice and be prepared for any contingency that might occur. whether that is a hostile pr-whether that is a hostile provocation or whether that's instability, between iraq and the u.s. alliance, we are strong enough to cope with any of those contingencies. >> well, i think first out that the reason that i was not
surprised. he continues to purge leaders that they are. he has more commanders then both kim jong-un and sub four. that tells me he's worried about the folks around him and he wants to continue that power. i think you have to be ready for collapse at some point. so you build contingencies in the military plan. that's what we do. you have to have good plan and you had to do it, and of intelligence and information and you've got to protect them. that is very important and it doesn't need to be debated in the open public. but i think for the future,
again, it is very important when dealing with first off i don't trust the north koreans. i don't trust what they say and i worry because if you go back through history, that's when things can potentially occur. i think one, was cut to remain dismal outlook that to question the things we see every day. that's why the day-to-day interface that you find on the peninsula with the military with combined forces command is so important because that is in itself a strong deterrent again is what i got out of this. but i think kim jong-un will continue some of this behavior. i think their road to eventual collapse is going to be the economic situation. i really do. you know, if you look at what is
occurring today, we are spending a lot of resources on tourism and what he's got over 200,000 people in political camps basically people starving to death. and then you got also in this day and age, everybody has a cell phone. they got some device. i think access to the western world at some point could be something that can cause a fracture through social media and that sort of business. but i don't think we should ever interest me the impact the regime has had people for the many years that we've been dealing with this problem. as the human dimension to this. when we start trying to predict that, we'll probably get it wrong. >> if i could just add on very briefly. one of the things that kim
jong-un and his father did and i think continue to do is to try to commit the people of north korea that they have an enemy, a strong enemy in the republic of korea in the united states, that they have to be prepared for that enemy and that's what the military policy is absolutely needed and why their sacrifices are needed. we have seen in the past and i believe we will see again in the future away that he ran for his to be able to do attacks, new provocations against south korea and then coalesces military and people and say okay, look, we've got to be prepared to do anything that we need to defend north korea. following along with what general thurman said about the alliance in the combined nature of the, we all worry very much in that type of scenario how do you control escalation?
so it does not spin out of control very, very quickly. the way you do it is to make sure you are one voice, one mind, not during the time of conflict, but all throughout your training, throat arms race. in order to do that. that's why i am confident, general tilelli says we would handle a situation the future as they become more difficult. >> you just started to ask the next question. as far as the frontline piece, which featured others on this date of north korea, i commend anyone to watch that was just in our peace. on calculation in this circulation, that is clearly for any alliance a significant issue for the u.s. iraq alliance. we've gone through this. certainly with the challenge and incident, where you have a
sovereign nation republic of korea that feels it's been attacked. an ally to combined forces command. i would like to hear a little bit about how you walk through with an ally, that dynamic, to make sure we are calculating together in a way that does not worsen a situation and improved situation. any lessons learned from the kansai relator others that you had, where you feel that the alliance was able to reassure and improve the situation by maybe not escalating i skipped just relayed. >> one of the things i inherited from general sharp was the counter provocation plan. in march of 13 we signed it to a
lot of great work in it. the whole purpose of that was in alliance mechanism to solve problems for the alliance to control the escalation and respond to a provocation. i think that is a great example of an alliance working together on some tough issues and emotional issues. people get killed. people get emotional when blood is built. what is important about all of that that i learned is the constant assessment of what is actually going on. throughout the whole process, this is not denying anybody the right of self-defense. that is an inherent right. but in any type of military operation, before you take the
first couple of steps come you better know where you are going to end up and kind of how you want this to end. that was always at the forefront of what i was dealing with on a day-to-day basis that one come you got to be ready. two, you respond to protect people. but if you're not careful, you can get out of control. that's a good example of one of the things that is good for the alliance. again, it is a deterrent -- deterrence that deters the north, but also assures people that you've got two very, very close allies working together and i think that's important. every situation is different. you better take time to enter a situation before you react. if you do it through pure
emotion, you're going to get it wrong. that's what i've learned. i learned that on the battlefield. >> .somehow to be reassuring. >> i think the reassurances exactly as general thurman describes. we have those outlines, counter provocation plan. we have a modality or methodology through which when a provocation occurs together and began going back to his first rules of self-defense is always preeminent. going back to the rules provocation that together you are working to solve the provocation issues and what action should be taken. the fact of the matter is i believe that the statements made by president lee have been a deterrent because the north koreans know now that the iraq
armed forces and the iraq government is not going to sit back and take terrible shot from north korea without some sort of action to those provocations. i think jd has it exactly right. there is a plan. the plan is to work together. there's command-and-control methodologies and plays to react to any provocation that might occur and not react months later, but react quickly enough so it's tied to the provocation rather than tied to some study of a provocation. >> i would agree. i believe that kim jong-un understands if he does another attack like he probably did in
2010, that response coming back not just from south korea, but from the alliance. south korea initially is going to be very strong and precise against north korea. strength than the willingness to use his strength is the strongest way you deter someone from acting. i believe the statements made, the counter provocation that was continued and signed is a fair signal to north korea and kim jong-un come a better not do that again because people would not be like they were in 2010. >> i promise we are going to conclude my proportion that some broad regional issues. we are going to spend time on the nitty-gritty military to military issues in the u.s. iraq relationship. the begin with issues with military modernization and our
transition. general sharp, you have written, which makes either the venture began this conversation. talk about how you think the subs tix is doing in maintaining or upgrading and modernizing forces and what implications that has worked in wishing the operational control forces. >> what they have in this years budget is a good indication the republic of korea is committed to the capabilities to defend the republic of korea as a strong alliance. if you look at isr, if you look at continued discussions about the next jet fighter, this is not a one year shy to deal to do
that. the indications are the capabilities that all three of us have talked about that they need to develop good indication that they're moving along those lines. i'm our transition, i guess i'd like to make a transition. if you look at the ready to command-and-control and the worksite, from my view a do not question the professionalism and capability as the leadership of the republic of korea to lead the worksite, any type of war fighter and stability we would have. we have been with them for 60 years right now. we've all seen them in action, not just in exercises in korea, but around the world and i'm absolutely confident in that leadership. that is point number one. point number two is i really
believe we've got to look at what is the appropriate command-and-control relationship for maybe two different dimensions. first off, i do believe that a combined command center, a combined command structure should say. i do not believe we should go supporting relationship. it has to be some sort of command structure. i think that means the tide of ruling in two dimensions. first up is from armistice or conflict, so the whole dimension of both today and what happens in the future. the second dimension is the dimension of provocation that are getting more and more dangerous, and stability in an all-out war fighter attack. if you look at the six different box if you will, what is the best command-and-control fracture put in place in order to be old to do what may be the
most likely are the most dangerous scenarios to go through. i think that is exactly what the group led by the minister of defense and secretary of defense look at what are the conditions that need to be in place at the best time to do upon translation and what of that command control structure take a look at? the last point and i think general tilelli will save you more about thiscome as you really need to look at it from a regional purse picked it. not just perspective on the korean peninsula, what is best for stability in northeast asia with all the different things going on. i am confident to study the work going on now to determine where should this command-and-control relationship and how should evolve over time will come off looking at all those different that is what the right and are because the alliance has consists wrong and we are willing and able to sit down and type to each other and say
here's what we think across the board. the final point i will make is this a second marriage, but it's a good marriage. we are not fighting like we wanted worse. we are trying to figure out how to strengthen and those rights will have to agree if there's going to be a change or not. >> first off, i agree with what general sharp has talked about. i've spent a lot of time in the transitions. when i first got over, folks say be careful, you can't talk about that. that's at the heart of the matter. command and control. every operation had been a part of. joint combined command and control. first off, i agree completely and professionalism of the military in iraq leadership. i have great confidence.
when you start bringing a lot of joint capabilities in to put together a joint command-and-control coming you better have a failsafe system of command-and-control. i think that needs to be talked about. one, supporting unsupported doesn't work. in my mind, in an operation that could potentially occur independent of the because it could happen very fast. you do not have time to start going from arms is into crisis and start talking about how you're going to command-and-control. it won't work. i've been part of these operations are we threw together a c-2 apparatus and bomb people and all of that. today, you have people training together every day for a common
purpose. i think as you go through and evaluate joint capabilities, that means to be a determining factor in the number one fact you're has to be the architecture. that's how you rapidly bring joint capabilities together. anything that happens on the payment is going to end up a joint worksite if we get back into that situation. i agree completely about the fact that you have to plan that from arms this through the whole spec drama potential conflict. i think as you look at capabilities, and i would agree this year budget has gotten a good mix of capabilities in there and you have to follow through. you don't hope that in one year. it takes time to do that. but i think over a period of
time, with the alliance is evaluating a constant evaluation of where the roc military is that in its sole joint capability portfolio is something that needs to be looked at on a recurring basis. >> i would say probably about four innings and try not to be redundant. i must be redundant on one thing. the roc forces and leadership are well-trained, well disciplined. that is a given. the second part when they think about transfer, the republic of korea has come back to the united states of america and not the united states government to delay transfer and make a commission based. in my minds eye, that has to be -- we have to abide by what
roc allies desire. it should not be as ready on day. as some of you know in the spring, i oppose transfer dates from the very beginning where it should be condition based come up with based on conditions and conditions have to do with the threat. conditions have to do with capability. conditions has to do with the mission. in my minds eye, the clue that has held the defense, the stability, the relationships on the peninsula militarily have been the combined forces command. so many think about condition based company not only think about capability. you have to think about threat. you have to think about the organizational -- the organization itself.
some would say it is an issue of who's in charge when you're working towards a common goal, the common goal is the same, it doesn't make any difference as to who's in charge. i don't know who said it, but someone said if it's not rove, don't fix it. cs e. and the arrangements we have within the combined force is not broken today. i think that is the peace be with a very tenuous situation in the north, new leadership, nuclear capability, long-range missile capability that the roc president national defense of the best organizational construct in this particular time at these particular conditions are to keep the cfc and transfer condition based.
should it be studied for the long-term and in the conditions are right, defining what those conditions are i agree. but my view, we should agree with the request i.d. or rack administration to keep it as it is today until the conditions are correct. >> i am going to let that for the q&a. i think there's some interesting differences became drawn further if folks are interested. general tilelli, let's talk about china. as i said before, you really have the longest perspective on the pennant to the end the rule of at least the way the united states policymakers have come to see china's role vis-à-vis dependence to to date has grown, a growing sense of the world that china has a major role to play here. what are your thoughts on the
north korea china relationship and china's potential role, positive or negative in terms of potential conflict on the peninsula? >> well, again, i don't think it has changed much. i think that china and the korea has been one of, for lack of a better script, providing those assets, resources necessary to keep the regime in power. that's been done over time. now, it is almost like a family relationship that you have one of your family who is dysfunctional. north korea is a dysfunctional. but the fact of the matter is china is important.
they may not like the activities. they have taken steps to stifle some of the dvds. nuclear, for example. missile tests for example. in some cases, they've been successful. in most cases they have not been. china could play a very critical role, i believe in modifying the behavior of north korea. to this point, i don't think they've been very successful. at the same time, do i believe that china would like a benign buffer state between china and the republic of korea? yes. so, the consequence is i think they play a big role.
i think they have played a role in six party talks. i think they have played a role in modifying the conversation with north korea. i do believe they could do more and i believe that the united states and china have to agree on what that more is. not only can talk the talk, but you have to walk the walk and do something about it. the other issue becomes a very tenuous situation. when you turn to stick it on and off with resources, you have to also understand, as jd said, one of the first consequences of that occurring. so china is in that role now. they have to stick it. they can turn it on, turn it off, they could modulated, but they must understand the consequences of everything they
do. so i think china has a big role. i don't think they have exerted the muscle they have to modify the behavior of north korea. >> general thurman, thoughts on the role of china? >> i would agree with a lot of the comments that general tilelli just spoke of. i think china is okay with us having a north korean problem for the u.s. and i think often times they are quite satisfied that we are there. and i say that because we are stabilizing factor. while at the same time, i think the u.s. as they threaten to the the overall region with the military. i think china plays a huge role in trying to control behavior of
north korea. i don't know if they're able to do that to the extent that we would like to see them do that. i think it is important today to have good mill to mail relations with the chinese sent to work close together. the economic side of the house drives a lot of things not only from the pennant do that, but for the whole region when you put all that together. i think as we move to the future, i think one of the key things that we need to be an particular observation of this the whole economic situation. you know, from the international currency and the cost of doing business in that region i think it's just something that will eventually be a deciding point
from an economic standpoint. but i do think it is important for the chinese to keep a stable penance to the. again, it is what north korea does in the future. i've exceeded chinese are more involved in controlling north korean behavior. >> i'll just add one thing that china, just like every other country will do what is in our vital national interests. if they or any other country takes a look at it. china is starting to be concerned about their vital national interest as a result of some of north korean activities. i'm convinced china does not want a nuclear north korea. i'm convinced china does not want a chance to proliferate through their borders and it be a reaction. do i believe they've taken enough steps in order to be able to prevent that and prevent escalation because of strong
provocations, no, i believe they could do more. they are to be working hard and trying to work hard with china, republic of korea, japan and other parts of the region to determine what is the pre-unified in its bill look like and how does an increase of vital national interests above the countries involved? i believe that's the ultimate solution to thinvolved? i believe that's the ultimate solution to this. >> one of the consequences of more recent north korean provocation for further u.s. deployments in directors want to die, which are then communicated to china as a reaction from the u.s. was north korea, but of course deployments that the chinese do not welcome into the region and that brings me to the final piece i wanted to talk about before we open it up to the audience and that is to rebalance. i'd be interested in each of your days to the extent you think the u.s. is living up to
the rebalance theme, how well you think tenet of resume in the region and moving, a few well, even how you think about the u.s. as a stabilizing influence for issues such as the dispute with the chinese or korea japan relations and what the rebalance midbrain with regard to stabilizing the region. >> well, i think for the whole rebalance ratio, what can that not only military, but all of the diplomatic information economic things that occur inside of rebalance. i think from a military point of view and i'm going to use peak for the peninsula.
i was asked to take a look at capabilities. so we did a little capability review. so that is why it was clear to me we need to strengthen them of the crown capabilities and we were able to modernize the u.s. army forces on the ground. we were able to strengthen missile defense. these are altering capabilities. the whole purpose was not to increase capabilities to cause a lot of anxiety, but if you look at what we've been able to do, we added shares. i asked for helicopter squadron two pre-brought back in there. it's all about mobility and the peninsula and it's a mix of joint capabilities that you got
incited cfc. it also gives us more experiences in that part of the region. but i think some of the things we were able to do from the military side was nothing more than strength and in the capabilities inside. i felt that was needed over there. but i think as you go forward and look at the region as a whole, a lot of times rebalances looked at as a threat not only to the chinese being number one, but also with the north koreans as they see what were doing militarily. the greatest threat to rebalance i believe is the budget because when you reduce force is, that is one of the aims the defense department has got to deal with globally through the to the
future. i have tried to maintain a very close relationship with admiral sam locklear who is to pay, commander at the looked across of pay,, all the regional assets were available that we could use not only in five, but also the peninsula. this is something that continues to develop. you can't do that overnight, particularly when you are involved in afghanistan and trying to reduce the u.s. military. >> i think rebalance unfortunately is not well understood. sometimes used by people appointed to the u.s. doing some things they think the u.s. should be doing. when you look at rebalance, sge said it's really much more than just military. it's about diplomatic with more ties, diplomatically between the
united states and countries within the pacific. more diplomatic visits to make sure we understand. more free trade agreements to make sure economies are continuing to improve in militarily to make sure we are prepared for any instability or conflict within asia. i think the rebalance when viewed from the perspective of what we're trying to do is to work in an area that is of vital national interest to maintain peace, security, verity around the world and especially in that region is the proper thing to do. in many cases, we are putting our people, putting our money behind it to do that throughout the region. >> i would agree with skip. the fact is the united states as a global power. we must look at the quote rather than one area.
it does include all the elements of national resources as chip and jd described. it includes engagement with all of the countries in pacific. we had a hard time to find two people who ask about what does that mean? so we went from focus to rebalance. so in that context, you could see there's a little bit. we've changed the dialogue and the narrative. rebalancing is the right word at this point. but it includes his relationship around the pacific. it includes engagement around the pacific. it includes all the elements. diplomatic information of military and economics. for all sorts of reasons.
for example, do not take the army pacific commander's conduct in many engagement exercises in the pacific right now, which have nothing to do with riot. it has to do with engaging in an indian in cooperation. that is the sm many people put the trappings of a military wrap around this rebalancing, but that is not the rapper. that is part of the means if you will as he think about engagement in the region at. so in that context, it the right and to do. we must remain focused globally to ensure around the world are vital interest are protect did -- protect it and maintained. >> we have covered a lot of ground and yet there are many
topics we have not touched on. i'll be interested to hear the questions from the audience. we have microphones the local around. if you raise your hand, i will call it you come into your name and affiliation. wait for the microphone. >> i have my own microphone. so this is being live webcast and it's also on a live twitter feed. with some questions that came into twitter. one of the questions is you have a lot of stars on the stage. at about the name any movie stars for general stars. the question is for each of them, what was your biggest surprise this commander and what is your fondest memory? >> who wants to be cannot?
>> the biggest surprise i had was the volatility of the media. i was not expect and what i found out. i've been a guy that had done a lot of media engagements. what was interesting what i've picked up one of the papers, it's got my picture on the front page and it says general ferment is bullying the media. well, i hadn't even talked to anybody. so this guy apparently wrote an article because he thought i was holding something back. i suddenly realized that is how people are. that was probably one of the surprises i have but i probably should have prepared myself a little bit better for her. of course i was back in
washington. so i get a couple of calls, hey, you can get a call about it nine times out of 10. the early bird doesn't exist anymore i don't think. but that was one of the things. so it was instructive to me because he told me we had to develop a good outreach campaign and to make sure we are in line with the ease inside of not only the department of defense, but also here in 10. my fondness memory was the close relationship and a friend that i established. one was with general paxton help, who is a two patriot and also a size that an observed the
60th anniversary of the armistice. and i watch people who have gone before me and drove to panmunjom and look at the look of the korean war veterans. that struck home to me. it also showed me the importance, once again the alliance that were shared in blood and sacrifice. and so, that is the best milk to mill partnership ever had. >> i think my biggest surprise came in how hard i had to continue to work to make sure people in washington in d.c. and united states understand the importance of this alliance and understand the importance in relation to peace and security
in northeast asia and how strong this alliance can be in the realm of peace and security. as some of us have talked about, you know, the u.s. during the time i was there was primarily focused on the middle east, what was going on and area in afghanistan and not part of the world. to be able to say look what is happening here and if we want to maintain peace and security, the alliance going on within korea is important not just the korean peninsula, but the entire region. that took a lot of work not just by me, but kathy stevens, other diplomatic folks that are there and i am convinced are not completely realize what the ships come in to rebalance in the pacific as we are as i said earlier, putting our money where our mouth is that this is an important region to us.
what is the best memory is along the same line as a personal relationship and personal friendships that for general tilelli and myself go back to name 296 and still have friends reestablished and i speak for myself, but i'm sure the same that we established in july 1996 when he first got there. friends is, we still see on every visit over there. it is also not just a personal relationship and friendship, a professional also that you can publish the trust and confidence between our two nations enter two militaries you can really sit down face-to-face and talk out what are the issues and how are we going to raise all this as an alliance is one? >> i think the biggest surprise in my personal view was when you
get a bit of intelligence information, how the interpretation of that information is so different among two or three different people in two countries and the consequences of that. that always was an issue that surprised me but was always resolved. my fondest memory are not memories because they are truly to the east right now. one is the combined forces command which is tremendous headquarters and there's tremendous between the republic of korea a noncommissioned reason u.s. officers, but that the families. the other piece of it, which is
one of my fondest memories is the graciousness of the korean people overall. they are the most gracious people at ever dealt with individually and collectively. so just like skip and jd, when i go back to korea, i see friend of his dalglish over a long period of time when they come here, we get together each and every time an indian term communicating by e-mail or other means. when you think about the roc alliance, what has the csc bread? it has spread relationships with stance frictions over time. you as connected back to those relationships and that is the fondest memories i have.
>> if i could mention one more thing because it's important to recognize what the republic of korea has done to honor our veterans that fought there 60 years ago. i know of no other country in the world that thinks veterans like the republic of korea does. the thousands the republic of korea pay for her to come back to the republic of korea to see what their sacrifice was developed over the past 60 years. to all koreans, we are off in full for the past and veterans in the united states and the u.n. nations around the world did 60 years ago. that is to be greatly congratulated. >> very good. other questions?
>> good morning, gentlemen. i worked at the two of you and it's great seeing you general thurman and general shark. i want to a question about china. be it a instability, that result in the u.s. in intervening north korea. you have the chance of the peers the intervening as well. the u.s. in iraq have entered into north korea. you have its own interest. how do you keep the alliance from unraveling in this situation because of differing goods on how prc intervention should be handled so you accomplish the object is that both sides want? thank you.
>> i would get my purse no opinion. i think the assumption that they would be intervention may not be correct. first of all, i don't see the u.s. alliance unraveling number one. secondly, i think providing information and discussion with china's leadership before any of that was laid out, the intent of the alliance, before the event might mitigate any, for lack of a better district is -- descriptive, whether it be instability or a crisis. ..
line of communications between the alliance to make sure the intentions of where we are going and that they are clearly understood and how the free countries, and i will include japan also, the four countries can work together to resolve the situation as quickly as possible. that is critical to be able to continue now. >> i would add a couple things to that.
where you run into the problem is where there is a surprise of which reads mistrust. and i think that is what is important today with the specific rebalancing on their relations so there is a better understanding of true relations. when you don't know the intention of something then that breeds speculation, and it causes uncertainty and it causes a lot of anxiety. i would agree 100% i think understanding what you're in the state is going to be up front when you get involved in any military, use of military force has got to be paramount and if you don't understand if it's been to be the reunification of the peninsula or whatever if you don't understand where you're going with that that could cause a problem but i'm confident the
alliance can work through that like the other gentlemen are and will stay close but it requires close coordination and exchange of information that can be protected. >> all the way back here >> the republic of korea. first thank you for sharing. to strengthen the capability, [inaudible] with the level of threat which might end up in the arms race. i would like to ask is there any prospect of washington that would strengthen the key devotee
making more nuclear bombs or chemical weapons after the joint military. >> i think we had a hard time hearing that you were asking if there is anything they can do. >> is there any prospect of washington that would strengthen its capability after -- >> strengthen the u.s. capability? let's broaden this out a little bit to a question on the u.s. nuclear deterrent overall for the republic of korea, is their anything that can called into question if that gets in the issue and what prospect should you see for the proliferation or
what the u.s. might do to strengthen that deterrent if necessary. >> i think there's an agreement between the republic of korea government, the united states government that the united states will protect the republic of korea under the nuclear umbrella, so that is the question is there a need to strengthen that? i think the agreement is rock-solid and there's been discussions between the various ministerial and also between the republic of korea and the united states so i think it is a rock-solid agreement right now. if you're asking me if the question is should there be nuclear weapons placed on the peninsula i would say absolutely not.
>> i agree with the alliance is moving forward in the right direction to strengthen the alliance of the capability to be able to detour and defeat a nuclear type of threat. if you look at what south korea is buying on the increased capability to strike, that is the right type of system in order to be able to detour the use of nuclear or any other type of weapon. i think it is moving in the right direction. i do think that if we move forward that increased intelligence sharing especially with japan is critical. i believe that there should be an intel sharing agreement in the alliance because of the capabilities that would bring in order to detect what's going on in north korea. i applaud what they have done
looking at buying more of the lower tier system and if they need to look at an opportune system as well. so i think we are moving in the right direction. capability why is, i agree with what they said. it is strong and steadfast and we are prepared to be able to respond to the nuclear threat and we do not need nuclear weapons on the peninsula to make that happen. >> i would say the same thing. our policy of extended deterrence is the right policy and there doesn't need to be any of the entrance on the peninsula. you are talking about a global and regional issue that needs to be looked at, and i think the policies are right in regards to that. i think that the government is making the right investments in the missile defense.
i remain concerned about the growing population when you look at seoul and how close it is to the denuclearized zone. the other things that's something we should be mindful of is a nuclear disaster of some sort that can occur at one other test facility that is one of the greatest threats that we have to be prepared for because it's lonely going to affect the peninsula. it's going to affect the chinese come the russians and the japanese and it's going right side along people and that is a vulnerability that we need to be paying attention to for the future. >> the alliance of the proliferation, the gentleman is not stupid and i sure if he
could sell something to the terrorist organizations he would do that and being able to make sure that the proliferation is not happening is absolutely critical. i'm going to put you on the spot since you most recently left, and there has been talk in south korea is my understanding and the government circles about south korean nuclear capability. what is your sense of what i would do to the regional dynamic of the south koreans were to pursue their own capability? >> i think that would potentially tipped the scale on the balance of the deterrence and the true intention. i think that would excite a lot of folks and i was asked several times about that. through the policy of the
extended deterrence, there is a capability and we talk about the nuclear war and folks need to examine what that really means. and the threat of that. so, again i think as long as you have got the right mix of capabilities, that should be sufficient deterrence. i think our greatest threat would be if the regime is threatened to sense that they are going to lose it all then that is something we ought to be mindful of what the young leader may or may not do and the protection of that nuclear capability. it's something we need to pay attention to and remain absolutely vigilant, but you shouldn't put nuclear weapons back on the peninsula.
there is no reason for that. >> all the way back over here. >> general shark has brought our attention to japan on a couple of occasions and i'm wondering if you can comment on what you have tried to do to improve in the coordination with japan so that we have more trilateral activity and how you've been disappointed by things that haven't worked. >> as the commander looked at the perspective i think that we will all agree if you have coordination and intelligence sharing between not just the republic of korea and the united states and japan, that would greatly enhance the deterrent in the capability.
so specifically, we try to work through the intel sharing agreements that did not work and we tried to work having more combined exercises with the public of korea and the united states around search and rescue and humanitarian assistance kind of things to establish the coordinating mechanisms between the military's. i think that if that needs to continue we need to try to find ways to be able to work together and i understand the issues that are out there on the side of the president and others have done in the recent past and not taken responsibility for what that country did many years ago and i understand those concerns, but i would hope that we are able to continue and work with japan in order to be able to come up with mechanisms that if we had to go to war, because i'm confident if
we had to go to war in japan would be there on the other side, but i would rather work through the details of how that is going to work rather than waiting until after the bullet starts to fly. >> i agree with general sharp. you have to work behind that. you can't have that hockery during the crisis. two of the capabilities that would not only strengthen the alliance and strength in the region and be if you will positive in the agreement and second where both parties are front-end very seriously, so to be able to pursue these things i think is very, very important for both the republic of korea in the united states and japan.
>> i would agree with general sharp. i think first of its particularly important in the ec area to do more trilateral military operations. one that allows you to get a better common understanding. now, i spent a lot of time on missile defense just like both of these gentlemen i'm sure to read the most important thing with missile defense is to make sure the joint assets, whether the ground-based missiles or airborne platforms are in the right place, you have to share information to read you have to have connectivity. it's important not only for the peninsula but it's also important for the region the missile as an example that had a 30-kilometer range. that's a good distance. everybody is in that so it would
be nice to be able to share that type of data link and information. i've watched this come together several times whether it be the missile launches and they were able to talk to each other not only inside of the iraqi and u.s. but also japan and that is something for the future that we really need to strengthen. and i know that there are some deep-rooted historical problems. but, what i was reminded of in our military operations particularly in the combined forces command, and the matter is there are seven state basis that are in the republic of korea devotee necessary -- i'm sorry, in japan if there was some type of situation where you
had to reinforce the peninsula i am confident that is going to be available. but i think that is one of the things we have to keep chipping away to get past the old historical problems that are out there. >> right here. >> [inaudible] ayaan understanding he indicated that he wants some troops stationed and as an indication of deterrence. do you read that view to go on as scheduled and as agreed upon
>> i can take that on. i know a little bit about that. when i look at the relocation, again, i think that it is all conditions based and i think that we have to be careful with setting the date. everybody is repositioned at this time because you have to look at the threat. the fact of the matter, one of the most significant threats outside of the missile is still long range artillery that they have. it is 240 ml and 70 guns and the close proximity so examining the combined perspective, joint and combined is an important and there is a timeline to move that, so maybe you have to look at where you move that keep the devotee and make sure that you can protect the peninsula.
so, one thing that got my attention up front, the commander of the combined forces command is held accountable for the defense and the protection of the people. so, you have to look hard at that. but i think it is a review conditions based, and examine that with the minister of defense along with our department of defense and make sure that we have got the threat covered and the right mix of capability. >> as a commander you have to do the running estimate everyday so you understand that threats around you and make sure that you are living up to your end of the bargain if everything goes wrong so i think that is what this is all about and having the right readiness that is expected
for the joint and combined forces. >> let's do one last question please. >> from the heritage foundation, my question is any event of the regime collapse in india what role do you see the military playing in providing humanitarian assistance to ensure that there is not a great her human rights crisis on the peninsula? >> i will pass off here. we have a responsibility for humanitarian assistance always and in our efforts we always plan for that. if there is a collapse over, i
would like to see lead because these are cory -- korea people taking care of korean people. we have the balance with the military capabilities. but there is planning that goes on all the time with that. if there is a humanitarian crisis in the collapse, getting a common understanding of how bad the situation is is going to be important. whether it be medical capability or a whole wide range but that is something we always need to be prepared for because we already know that there are problems up there and when it comes to the tradition in medical and the threats of other diseases.
>> i would agree. we have learned in iraq and afghanistan that they start from a number one when the bullets start to be able to make sure that the people are protected and taken care of as possible and in a situation like north korea, mind you is that it's even more important because the indoctrination of the north korean people since they were born at how the south and the united states for complete enemies and all they care about is killing you. if we don't have plans, which i know we do, plans that the all along with the way to destroy the north korean military give them a check at the same time we are trying to help people get the right information as to what our goals are in north korea, then i will be much more difficult to regain stability.
we have learned that and we have forces that can help with that in being able to get supplies and information in north korea and it is a critical part of the plan that i agree should be led by the republic of korea. >> certainly, general sharp and general thurman are closer to the existing plan, but i'm very confident that every contingency starting with the humanitarian support through the crisis has been planned for an ultimate detail by the republic of korea and the united states in the combined forces command cylinder a confident any contingency that might arise has been fought through know the detail and who does what to whom it has also been fought through so is that part of any plan of course of
this and how its executive has been planned for. >> that concludes our morning session. i'm going to turn it back over to victor. >> again i thought a wonderful discussion. i don't know if any of you are on social media, but the social media was exploiting the questions you would be happy to know that usfk was using the things you were saying. [laughter] so, a couple things. first we will take a break and served for those of you out on the concourse level for the guests if you would be seated, lunch will be brought to you. we will have the doctor from the white house joining us despite the blizzard and the last things
[inaudible conversations] if you haven't had a chance to get something to eat. thank you for joining us for the second part of the program where we are very happy to have with us sid is a good friend both personally and academic and i want to properly introduce him for all of our guests here because he doesn't get out much in his line of work. [laughter]
dr. seiler is their -- the director for the white house security council. he is one of the experts on both koreas in the current administration. for the past 32 years he has worked in multiple intelligence disciplines including the national security agency, the directorate of intelligence, director of operations and a cia coming and the foreign broadcast information service. he spent 12 of those years in south area korea and was the manager for north korea. having joined the service line was established in january of 2006. prior to the dni, he serves with the national investment service at the cia and is the author of a very good book, kim ilsung the building of a regime. i regret that during the research for my own book and
decided quite a bit in that book. dr. seiler received his ma from youngstown graduate school of international studies and is a graduate of the language program at the university and got his undergraduate at the university of maryland. so, syd and is a pleasure to have you with us today. we will proceed as follows. dr. seiler will have some comments to start us off and then we will have a discussion and open up for just a couple of questions. while the rest of us will be going home after this he has to go back to work. he has a full day. syd, back to you. >> thank you for those kind interruptions. i thought i'd take an opportunity to build on the excellent discussions we had this morning to look at the alliance going forward. with the context of a largely the to broaden areas. first of all, what we see with the evolving north korean threat
implications for the alliance in the next six years and what we have already began to do to meet that threat and a deal with that threat and to leave the course for future cooperation to build upon the great work that these three former commanders of the combined forces have talked about. you know, the last five years have witnessed i think a change in the environment on the korean peninsula. it overlaps with the administration of president obama. it overlaps with a period since we last had a meaningful six party talk discussion, and i think it reflects the transformation that had the wrong plan that came about both
in terms of the capabilities and the clarity of intentions. it's important to remember in january of 2009 when president obama was inaugurated with an author to freeze out the hand of those that would clinch their fists that the north koreans shortly thereafter responded by making preparations for the individual test and that would lead to a presidential statement on the united nations security council, which itself would then lead to the second nuclear test or the first one having been and 2006. and after the diplomatic dust settled the special representative in december 29 in 2010 north korea turned its intention to words the south as everybody remembers we had a
sinking of the corvette in march and forced the showing of the island literally under an hour after i had flown over it with ambassador basra on our way to china to talk about the north's revelation of the enrichment program. the three lessons emerged from these two years. first of all on the security side, when you think about the nuclear test missile launch, thinking of the iraq navy vessel shelling of an island, the alliance demonstrated its resilience and it grew stronger to determine what is secured, the deterrent security. and in the process, koreans, south koreans and people strongly because of the relationship salles the washington cooperation and responding to these events. and the lesson on the diplomacy
side just began to emerge for the first time in many years the traditional cycle of provoke and rushed back to the table, provoke, gain concessions from the nuclear is asian dialogue that gained the appearance but in retrospect it was only an appearance, that cycle was broken. pyongyang was caught in the 29-2010 period that would receive nothing from the threats of provocations. only further diplomatic and economic isolation to drive a wedge between seoul and washington and the so-called strategy. its efforts to influence politics in the public of korea and to fail. they began to learn that that behavior would no longer be
reworded. at 60-years-old, the alliance simply was too smart for that. the fertile loess then i would like to take away and focus on was the analytical less than. here i risk taking off my current policy maker had going back to my old analyst days but there are three significant lessons learned that fighting will have implications for years to come. with the may 25th test, the second nuclear test closed the book on the question that did north korea really intended to acquire a nuclear weapons capability or is it simply pursuing the nuclear to devotees to gain the attention of the united states in the world to engage in a dialogue nobody realistically after the test believed that the program was nothing more than a negotiating
ploy. the question in that regard was largely in answered. this was seen with a number of other launches since then an indication that intended to pursue and improved the icbm capabilities to take whatever devices and billed to the united states. and of course to do so under the cover of satellite launches hence the replete to try to check the so-called boxes in much the claimed to be a peaceful and legitimate sovereign right of the dprk launches in spite of the security council resolutions to the contrary. and finally, the island in said been exposed -- both
demonstrated that they intended to use propagation, even at times lethal as a course of diplomatic tools of intimidation and violence and as general sharp and the general thurman had this challenge, the impact on the alliance and none of these three conclusions were surprising and many analysts said they were not kidding when they were going to pursue the nuclear capability that was intended to be the delivery mechanism and the provocations or nothing new for anybody watching for 60 years. but i do believe that the clarity with which they have become the defining element, the conventional threat is still there and the scenario and the possibility of the unification and the forced remains on the
table but what we see is an evolution of the key devotees and the intentions that the alliance would have to respond to. i will go through these one by one in reverse order. first in the provocations of course and diplomacy. this really demonstrated the importance of cibula -- the deterrence and equally so the close integrated real-time u.s. roak cooperation. but the general mentioned earlier in that challenge of gaining the situational awareness any two or three people gathered in awareness has different ways in which they receive that, how much even more so when you have two large countries integrated looking at the development, the country as a opaque and the shared
conclusion of how to respond. the incident of 2010 emphasized the alliance and this is a context that we pursued the counter provocation plan which of march 2013 was brought to the conclusion. here we have the two mechanisms in place and capabilities in place and more importantly the ongoing planning that gives an extra advantage of that is a force multiplier to have the experience on the ground for about six years an armistice but the experience working together to respond is that such tied a provocation where north korea is provoked and our intent is to respond accordingly. the u.s. commitment here i should add can never be any more
clearer. ambassador rice mentioned this in georgetown that there will be significant costs to the future provocations by north korea. pyongyang has a choice to continue to pursue this path and encounter greater isolation and economic reservations, or take a new path and sign a chance for the peaceful development and global integration. the missile threat is another area in which the alliance has had to work together more closely. they encounter a threat that i remember i first went to korea and 1982. we used to say jokingly we all were hoping we were the target because the accuracy was so poor that there was certainly not to be hit. that's what they talk about when they are young and inexperienced but the emerging threat is real.
this has also always been an existing threat to the metropolitan area with north korea capabilities even more of the peninsula in larger numbers come under threat. this was the context in which the alliance met the challenge with a revision to the guide lines. in 2012 we came to an agreement on the dotted line which allow them to develop the missiles 800 kilometers in range and committed to improve the intelligence surveillance reconnaissance capabilities. so if you are going to shoot at a target you have to know where it is and what is. it included enhancements to the working together on the command and control so that when we face the situation that we have to use these capabilities we have to do so deliberately. we are developing -- we will continue to develop a comprehensive approach to the
missile threat. this is crucial given its evolution. finally on the nuclear side, i think that there are four overlapping yet reenforcing lines of effort on how we deal with this nuclear capability. the first is denying the benefits of nuclear conversion. the most immediate that we threat is that on any given day in north korean provocation whether it be some type of conventional provocation would have that concern and the way to stand up to the bully on the playground who has this capability or the alleged capability in his pocket is to have transparent and seamless coordination like we do. real time close cooperation said
that when we get into this period there is no splitting of the alliance and we deal with it smartly and the value of pyongyang is strongly diminished it means to elis at the desired response from the counterpart and the best way to deny the value of the provocation is to not respond in the manner that they are hoping to get you to respond, and that is where the close cooperation in all periods of the cycle is so crucial. noeth rewarding bad behavior. don't underestimate the value of even the diplomatic areas of having strong values and encountering of the north korean nuclear deterrence and then finally, to inflict the cost to
denuclearized it takes away some friends of mine when we get in the discussions they say are we in essence being outmaneuvered by north korea, and i would just say the nuclear missile capability aside, look at the diplomatic explanation and that isolation and the number of countries that joined in the nuclear test. look at the support that we get in the united nations security council after each and every missile launch and test resolution after resolution. so, in addition to the disrupting, when it comes to disrupting the progress of the nuclear program, the united states uses a range of national multilateral sanctions. the sanctions target and there is a design to curtail the profits from the exports and access to the critical technology and components abroad
and this has the effect of slowing the growth of the program. and the of the quantitative and qualitative growth that north korea seeks. determinism other way. we talked briefly in the conversation of the deterrent strategy. i quoted from the communique from the 44th held in october where the secretary reaffirm of the commission to provide and strengthen extended deterrence for the republic of korea. using the full range of military capabilities including in the u.s. nuclear umbrella, conventional strikes in the missile defense capabilities, to freeze is here to focus on giving it full range and united states. full range, united states. i don't think that there is much more to say besides the deterrent. you will get no better guarantee
that we are prepared to meet the threat posed by north korea and its eve solving nuclear missile capability than what is represented by the wording and the deterrent strategy and what is represented by that determines, the full range of the united states capability. and then finally, the fourth element of the efforts against the north korean nuclear program and what we do on the denuclearization diplomacy realm under the six-party talks umbrella in other words all of the diploma with the people of china, russia, japan, the republic of korea all in accordance with the principle and the spirit from the 2005 statement or to reduce and detour the north korean threat. work with china in particular has demonstrated that it as well as all of the other four
parties, three parties subtracting north korea oppose the nuclear north korea and all of which are committed to the nuclear is asian on the peninsula. multilateral diplomacy has built a strong consensus and will continue to do so going forward. life or carry a lot easier as it tries to pursue its policies. the policy of pursuing in tandem of the economic development and expansion of the nuclear forces. my colleague during one of our recent trips to the region i would like to reinforce that today. north korea is learning from the united states and the republic of korea and in him the entire diplomatic international community that it will not have its cake and eat it too. so, that's probably the way that we are dealing with in the concept of the united states the
relationship with these new threats that we are facing from north korea. north korea will continue to test us. north korea will continue to push the limits. a lot of these cycles go in and out of the provocation cycle in the census and we have seen them before. and as i mentioned to a few of you during the break, it is not a trivial throw away talking point when we say we will judge north korea by their actions and not by its words and when we continue that close cooperation that we've demonstrated through the last five years of the program has developed in its behavior and has been so unpredictable is that the strong alliance continues to be the best deterrent to the threat is posed by the north. and with that, i will take some questions.
>> thank you. we have a few minutes for questions let me start us off before we go to the audience. i don't think there is any argument that in this administration you are the one who knows the most about korea and in the past five years you have been doing that at the policy-making level. i would like to ask you to put your analyst hat on and tell us to the extent that you can what's going on with all of the internal turn. what do you think is going on? everybody calls it a power consolidation that is this a path to stability or is it a past kaye whitley? -- capability? >> on the foreign relations and
international relations could be good at the predictive analysis that we would all be rich on the stock market and having more peaceful world since kim jong-un came to take his positions in his father's step to years ago, i urge people to look at the continuity in the north korean behavior, particularly the strategic. north korea always has the element of surprise in its actions and behavior and therefore, you could almost say that north korea is predictably unpredictable. but at the same time there is no particular element of the behavior that is entirely out of character with the historical precedents, so that the differences could be in the style and one likes the joint editorial new year's speeches
but regardless of what is going on in north korea there's nothing that will have a significant impact as far as the critical issues new kebir rise denuclearization it is strategic with their longer-term goals and the long-term goals were actually clarified in the proclamation of the policy last year because we always knew that eventually it was hoping that the world would simply be worn out and acknowledged to tolerate and learn to live with the nuclear north korea and then it could begin to recover and restore some type of relations with the outside. in other words, have their weapons and their economic development. that's been a long term goal and
one would imagine that is what kim jong-un should be for as well. speculating would be particularly helpful with the intelligence matters relatively quickly. but what there is is we see no policy changes so far. we see no policy changes. we would love to see policy changes that we haven't seen any. >> how do you think we are doing with china right now? we have had good cooperation with china. we have the senior level interaction and st. petersburg last year and the vice president visited towards the end of the year and china has made it repeatedly clear that it supports the korean peninsula and that it supports the negotiations that get us to the denuclearization. they see the actions that north
korea takes destabilizing in the region are not in their best interest and so we have been able to make progress with the people's republic of china. we engage with our counterparts and a share understanding of the challenge posed by north korea and the understanding of the urgency of the issue. so, i think that we have laid out the foundation for the cooperation going forward. i know that, you know, people might say that the united states expects to much out of china and i would say that we look forward to cooperating and working with china, but that the same time we know we have to continue as we have over the past several years to take action in our defense and in the defense of our allies like the department of korea in response to the growing threat.
>> i know that you do not have a lot of time so we will just open up and take some questions from the floor. yes. >> just today, china announced on the hot line -- i am just curious how does the u.s. or the white house see this latest development? >> we encourage cooperation between the region, anything that contributes to the production and a fee of devotee to have that type of transparency communications necessary to respond to contingencies in the region. there is no reason not to be.
yes? >> is there any plan for the u.s. government to visit north korea? and then there are some negotiations under the table with the united states and north korea. can you explain what is the condition from the north korean government? >> that is a great question that you should be asking the north koreans. [laughter] the united states has made significant efforts over the
past year since ken f was detained. we have made a number of sustained efforts for his release and we have sought to have our special on voice travel to pyongyang said that he can go and secure the north koreans have been non-responsive in the course of the year and we continue to ask north korea for their part in and we will continue to work for it. i think anything beyond that, we have to wait and see. the challenge with north korea is always when they publicly articulate the desire for the dialogue and yet they try to sit down and have a meaningful
conversation can at times be quite elusive. that does not detour us. it continues to seek robustly his reliefs and we hope that the indications given by north korea central television over the weekend are an indication that north korea is considering moving forward with the progress by which the party can be returned. >> i think that we can take more. >> you talked about a shared understanding with china about north korea.
what is the shared understanding in the development, that is my question. >> when i spoke about a shared understanding i was talking about the policy goals and the korean peninsula marked by peace and stability and hopefully prosperity for the people of north korea when they choose the right path in the international community. not necessarily that we have a shared intelligence assessment of the situation in north korea, but that shared policy goal, that share outlook for the outlook and the emphasis on the denuclearization is where we can have a dialogue going forward
and we can begin to work very closely. >> should i personally know how many hours you put in in this job and how hard you work and i want to thank you for taking the time to come out and join us today in spite of the elements and we wish you well. [applause] >> we have covered several events including a number two of the annual winter meeting and we will show you that later on the program schedule or you can see it any time on line at c-span.org. here is a brief look at the rnc
chairman's comments. >> of the president is now preparing speeches on income inequality. i believe he should give those speeches while standing in front of the mirror because under his watch, everything has gotten worse. he should talk to himself because poverty is worse, food stamp dependency is worse, and more people have given up looking for work under barack obama than any time i can remember. when the federal government tries to equalize out comes, we are all going to end up worse off. but when he makes sure that people have equal opportunities and education and in the job market they have health care, we are all going to be better off. that is the right approach. and that is what is fair.
i think that's what americans expect from their leaders, fairness, and we are about that as a party. it's not fair when the leaders that they trusted like to pass their agenda. it's not fair to the working mom that loses the answer is that she liked because the president didn't like it. >> some of you have been marching for over 40 years and half had many setbacks including the expansion of abortion coverage and obamacare. but it is important more now than ever that we remain strong and stand together. we cannot allow the opponent of life to continually begin the moral fabric of our country. they need to know and they need to understand that we will continue to march and we will
continue to educate. we will continue to advocate, and we will continue to fight for the unborn. >> despite the fact president obama is using the deception and the coercive power of the state to promote abortion violence, the abortion movement is alive and well and is making significant and sustained progress.
over whether the united states would pay its bills or not. who benefited from that fiasco? i've talked tonight about the deficit of trust between main street and wall street, but the divide between this city and the rest of the country is at least as bad. it seems to get worse every year. watch president obama deliver this year's address. our preview program starts live