tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN May 23, 2014 2:00pm-4:01pm EDT
began nation to nation relations and mutual trade treaty. about a year ago, i had once invited to gentlemen with the names of mr. dan lytton and peter underwood. they were the descendents of those who founded the university medical center. these american missionaries came in the late 19 century and founded hospitals and schools. they did many work for the people. in 1945, after the u.s. rose the tories from the pacific war, korea was liberated from japan's colonial rule. however, the disarmament of japanese troops north of 38th parallel was hindered by soviet union. as the soviet union forces
occupy the north, the peninsula became divided and suffered structural problems. after our liberation, the united states, who is in charge of militarization for south korea, withdrew their forces before june 29, 1949, as the republic of korea government was established in 1948. they left only 479 members at the korean military advisory group. also, january 1, 1950, the secretary of state, mr. dean acheson, excluded korea from your specific development line. because of these, -- [inaudible] all those series of unfortunate events cost the peninsula divide in the korean war occurred.
the u.s. swift intervened to rescue south korea. the communist invasion, the u.n. forces advanced all the way, but the chinese communist forces advanced and the peninsula was not able to be survive. they to achieve half the victory entry rss. after the armistice, the two countries signed a mutual defense treaty october 1, 1953, and officially launched the alliances. after the korean war, relies was very successful. as i've mentioned already, there has been small and large north korea provocations by the alliance has been successfully deterring all out world with north korea. boosted by the rok combined event, the republic of grid was
able to achieve tremendous economic growth and establish a democratic society. the alliance worked just one-sided. the rok also provide assistance as an ally in vietnam, afghanistan, and iraq. rok naval ships are conducting calendar pirate operations. i, myself, also had a personal experience to flight alongside u.s. forces as a multinational division commander during the operation enduring freedom in iraq from 2005-2006. to this day, the alliance has successfully deterred north korean threats and contributes towards peace. roughly, 7.5000 -- servicemembers separated from their families, and under the
command of the general. they also contribute to the security of northeast asia. rok and u.s. forces continue to develop to respond to the north korean threat and all-out war, and through regular combined exercises. in order to respond to north korean provocations, the two ministers signed the joint plan. in addition to these we continue to develop plans to respond against a variety of contingencies and master them. i believe that the rok gnus alliance possesses the capability, commitment and to respond to any threats by north korea. the rok and u.s. alliance is beneficial not just for the rok. the rok forces have never fired against the u.s. forces. instead we have been fighting together in the spirit of a
life. the rok government has been supporting the u.s. of case case since 1991 according to the special measurement a grant. and providing more and more support each year. the rok government is providing budgetary support for the land partnership plan between u.s. bases all over korea into several hub bases. we're also supporting the relocation plan that relocates the combined forces in order to ensure stable conditions for the usf k. also the rok is providing -- the united states is our -- rok soul seoul and beneficial allies. at the same time i believe the republic of korea is the u.s. is allied solution. in northeast asia, the use has over 600,000 rok servicemembers
who are on the frontline of democratic. there is no other country in the region that can be more beneficial to the u.s. and the rok. the rok and u.s. allies have been successful but i believe there are some areas in which we can improve upon. the first area is to improve our capabilities of the alliance. the rock armed forces to facilitate projects continuously to a higher -- strike capabili capability, isr capabilities enabling warfare in the future. as the north korean missile and nuclear threat continues to rise we must prioritize the position of korea anti-missile defense system to neutralize north korea's systems before the launch. the u.s. fta should also steadily maintain -- usfk,
stationed in korea and maintain most modernized. the u.s. should provide sufficient bridging capability that includes information capabilities like isr for the rok forces. second, alliance must display the robustness of the alliance and reaffirm our commitment to utilize our capability. when president obama visited korea last month, i believe that the two presidents visit to the combined forces command proved to be an effective deterrence against north korea provocations. as you know, north korea has been threatening to blow the big one painting at a nuclear test but hasn't done so far. i believe that this is because the two presidents displayed the robust our lives.
the combined exercise by rok and u.s. alike has been greatly contributing to the transfer north korea prof edition. in addition, the north korean threat was being tightened even a brief deployment of a hide -- effectively deterred north korean provocation. there will be a time in the future when we must display our commitment again and utilize our allied capability. 30, the rok and u.s. forces must maintain posture. although we have the capability and commitment come if we do not possess the appropriate posture to utilize this capability, in a continent, we cannot defeat the north korean provocation but it is important to have posture against north korea, korea nuclear test. especially now when the threat is ever increasing. we must have a more detailed
plan for extended deterrence and maintain the posture to execute it by conducting regular exercises. only then, only in this case we can effectively dissuade the north korean nuclear threat. fourth, combined forces are very important. as agreed by the rok and u.s. president, the transfer -- will take place with the condition. many people have great -- in the timing of the transfer. however, what more important than the time of transfer is what sort of system can be established that will allow the rok and u.s. combined forces to swiftly and effectively fight
under a single plant and under a single command. the fifth requirement is that the rok and u.s. allies must coordinate to rule of china to effectively manage the north korean threat. china often denies its influence over north korea. however, china has decisive influence over north korea. that's what i believe. over 80% of north korea in a trade is conducted with china, and almost 100% of oil entering into north korea is from china. without china's support, the north korean regime cannot survive. the rok and u.s. allies must work to convince and apply pressure for china along with the international securities to china put a more positive role in a proactive manner to make north korea see these provocations. so rok and u.s. alliance began as a military alliance but now
we have advanced to a more comprehensive strategical allies. the rok and u.s. alliance is stronger than ever and has been more successful alliance in the world. a great achievement will further the strength of the alliance and develop it into an even more successful one. thank you for your attention. [applause] >> thanks, general. >> now, the floor is open. but before we go any further, larry. >> at me just ask -- let me just ask general jung to questions. about future changes in the
military situation affecting korea. one, that you mentioned, is japan moving towards a policy of collective self-defense? now, japanese officials explain this as a policy that would enable japan to render much more direct military support to the united states in various types of military contingencies in the east asia western pacific region. south korean officials have consistently expressed misgivings about japan adopting any such policy. and have specifically stated that any new policies of japan under collective self-defense should not be applied to any military contingencies on the
korean peninsula. given the potential areas of increased japanese support for u.s. military operations, military operations emanating from u.s. bases in japan, do you see any benefits that increased japanese support of the u.s. military operations could have in terms of enhancing u.s. military capabilities as applied to the korean peninsula from u.s. bases in japan? now, my second question has to do with russia, and i think it stems from your comments about russia seeking to expand its
influence, not only in europe, but globally. we saw a graphic example of that just in the last two days with the news coming out of shanghai of this big chinese-russian natural gas deal, and xi jinping's speech proposing a continental security alliance involving, among other countries, china, russia, and iran. i would note that president rouhani of iran attended the shanghai conference. this got very little news coverage, but i think that is significant in and of itself. since the collapse of the soviet union, we know that every time
there is a high level meeting between russian and north korean officials, north korea presents an extensive shopping list of modern weapons that north korea would like to purchase from russia, especially modern tanks and modern fighter military aircraft. now, you mentioned in your remarks that north korea, in these areas of weaponry, basically is out of date in terms of the types of weapons that it has currently. i didn't go russia since 1991 consistently has said no when north korea has presented this list. of weapons it would like to acquire from russia. recently, however, president
putin has canceled 90% of north korea's debt to russia that was accumulated during the soviet period. this potentially would open the way for north korea to purchase these kinds of weapons from russia if president putin should change the traditional no reply of russia to a yes reply your if president putin should do this in order to cause a lot more military problems for the united states, what kind of impact could a supply of more modern russian weapons have on the military ballots in the korean peninsula? >> thank you, larry.
>> thank you for your good question, especially in slow and clear english. and thank you for your good translation. to your first question about japan, i understand that japan is now pursuing some amendment in constitution, or the translation of constitution. and i also understand that the u.s. welcome japanese increased
role in the regional security. personally, i support the close relationship between u.s. and japan, and the close cooperation, especially on the military side, close cooperati cooperation. but what we have as a concern is we do not support the japanese, japan become a strong military. it's less than a century, japan tried to conquer the region. we have a very bad history.
so if japan wanted to do something it must be very, must be made in kind of open way. it must be transparent. so that's what i think. you know, japanese support is even very important to the military operation of united states, even in korea. i understand that. i once visited some you in bases in japan to understand those kind of support is very important to the u.s. military operations. so i hope the u.s. and japan maintain the very close to operation relationship. but these days i will that the
general cover the very good topic the next hour. the u.s. like to have a trilateral cooperation. to make it happen i believe japan should be changing. for example, look at the history. japan still deny the pact, mutual in history, mutual in the past. so the examples are sex slavery or the are many bad behaviors. there were many bad behaviors, but they denied them.
so with the improvement in their historical understanding, and some official expression, those cooperation can be achieved in the future. second on russia. i understand as i said in my speech, there are some possibilities that the cooperation between russia and china may increase. and as russia influential, especially in east asian area, the russia, russia made shared interest to north korea.
so they like to support north korea more than what they did in the past. even north korea, they like to have what call -- can you understand? they can set their true foot on one, one foot on russia and one foot on china. then with the situation, situation changes, they can select one. so in that case, russia may support more military support to north korea than before. that's what i believe. >> thank you.
>> thank you, dr. king. thank you, general jung, for your great remarks. i think it is the remarks that you made about the allies are very, very important. and there's nothing that you said that i could possibly disagree with. it is good to hear particularly on capitol hill and in america for you to outline how strong and important the allies is. i don't think we can emphasize that enough, so i thank you very much for that. there are many issues that i think we could discuss, but i will come to one question. i would just like to mention, i think readiness is important to i think the command structures are important. i think the conditions based for transfer is very important. i do wonder, you know, what is a better command structure than the combined forces command. my opinion is i don't think there's any better structured than the combined forces command. so my personal opinion, i would like to see that remain and
evolves to the next level. but my real question is something that you didn't talk about and something that if it is very important. and that goes to president parks recent speech and the dresden initiative. i am of the belief that we will never be able to solve the north korean nuclear problem and the north korean human rights atrocities that are being committed every day until there is a unified korean peninsula. and i think that president park's initiative is very, very important and that it is time to really focus on unification. and so i ask you as a former military leader, a military expert, if you were to advise the united states, in other states military, how would you envision the united states military supporting korea in unification? and so that would if you could give us some remarks on how you would think that the u.s. could
is very good. so even after the wartime option is transferred, the whole wartime option for the korean forces are transferred to the rok side, the importance is we should have a single command like current -- [inaudible] make the future command structure, we should have single plan under single command. that's just the defense post. that's what i believe. second, what you can do for reunification of korea, thanks for the question. you know, the stability in
northeast asia can be achieved only when korea is unified. that's what i think. saw help the united states officially come officially spells that it supports the unification. but the neighboring countries like china or japan may have different understanding about it. japan -- united states should explain them, how beneficial the unification is for the regional security. and on other doctor we should think, we should present -- present intervention of third countries. if china or russia intervenes in
the process of reunification, it is, i don't believe it is the end of problem, but it is another beginning of problem, that's what i think it is. so we should urge the neighboring countries to support the reunification of korea and not to intervene the unification process. thank you. >> thank you. >> thank you, dr. kim, for the invitation from and thank you, general, for the very apprehensive remarks. this question is probably a variation of the ones that they just asked about unification. you mention in your remarks the
incredible leverage that china has economically over korea. and you gave some very impressive statistics about how totally depended north korea really is on china. and yet you also said that china has refused to exert that pressure against north korea, vis-à-vis the nuclear and missile programs. because it fears a collapse of the north korean regime, and supposedly and exodus of massive numbers of refugees across the border. that also is the view that is expressed by many in this country from henry kissinger on down, the so-called realist view of the events there. that we should be understanding of china's position because it's concerned with this impact. but my question is how realistic is that? is a really viable to argue that
if china threatens north korea with economic sanctions if it does not cut back its nuclear and missile program that north korea will commit regime suicide? it seems to me china has never actually tried to employ that pressure on north korea. because china cannot want the survival of the north korean regime more than the north korean regime wants its own survival. so it seems to me there's tremendous leverage their that china has not used, which then begs the question, does china really, concerned about north korean nuclear missile programs next it seems to me it does not. it has served china's strategic interest for the last 20 years for the u.s. to be distracted and averted by north korea's
activities. it has enabled china to play the role of the so-called responsible international stakeholder, and a critical part of the six-party talks and other negotiations. so china has derived great benefit of the north korean threat and, therefore, i question the assumption that china shares the world's concern about the north korean nuclear and missile programs. [speaking in native tongue]
north korea can be perceived as a kind of buffer zone for them, but the buffer zone with nuclear weapons. i don't believe it is not a good buffer zone anymore if north korea has nuclear weapons. so i believe united states and china may have more room than before so that china has more positive role to deter north korea to develop its nuclear weapons to graham. so there will be some -- picking the some common understanding between united states and china, especially if it's dealing with
north korea nuclear issue. i believe, sometimes we call china is one of g2 countries. it must be, function as a responsible country in the international society. we should persuade them to have more positive role in dealing with north korea nuclear issue. and i believe it can be possible, can be possible. i don't believe that china wanted north korea to have a nuclear weapon either. that's what i think. >> thank you, everybody. now, the floor is open.
anybody? would you please go to the mic? would you please go to the mic? in the center mic, please. >> general jung, my question is on the transfer. you mentioned that most of the form of ofcom is the single command and single plan. would you elaborate a little bit more on that, that meaning? and in my thought, you are talking about that in your opinion, the open transfer is not needed. the current form is the best
one. are you saying on that? >> thank you for a good question. and the combined operations can be made in various forms of command relationship. you know the only one way which is the current combined forces command, but there can be many types of command structures. it must be decided by the cooperation between korea and nimby and u.s. dod and korea and u.s., but as i emphasized in my
speech, if two forces are commanded by two different command channel, it is the different with the principle or the unity of the commander, principle is very important in military operations. so when the open transfer is made, the command relationship can be a little different from what is now, but i believe they can make, can make a single command relationship, who has a single war plan. that's what i believe. >> thank you.
>> i wish to follow up the question on the unification and military, the u.s. and rok. no matter how unification comes about, in the aftermath of unification of the question has to do with the rul role of war status of north korea military at that time. every time dick peter schiff falls, the military organization remains as the single most powerful organization in the aftermath of the fall of saddam hussein, for example, or gadhafi or mubarak, or anybody else. and then things like fallujah happens. they have weapons, organization, structure, they have history. the people who really push for peaceful unification, what
should we held north american -- north korea military, what a weight that's the aftermath of unification? how can we directed them to a peaceful course instead of obviously much, much worse course. >> thank you, jay. >> thank you. thank you for a good question. there must be many areas just to start, when we have reunification. reunification is not simple, that's what i believe. just as you mentioned, maybe the military unification, unification and the military side may be a last portion of the reunification. we may have some lessons learned in germany unification, but it
depends upon what type of unification we may have to. it's decided by the type of reunification. it can be very peaceful. it can be not so peaceful way. so the military unification can be decided by the type of reunification. >> grace. >> yes, general jung, thank you very much for your excellent remarks. my question is a two part one. what do you think north korea would do if in the united nations they required it to
reform the human rights situation, opened up the prison camps and crimes against humanity, or else consider north korea de- legitimate and eventually remove it from the u.n.? and then the second part of my question then is if north korea collapses suddenly, is it understood that the whole peninsula is to be under the republic of korea? what are the plans in terms of who would be in charge of the northern part of the peninsula? thank you. >> thank you, grace. >> let me give my answer to your second question first.
in the constitutional republic of korea, the north korea is, territory of the republic of korea. illegally -- so legally if north korea collapse him we would have the responsibility to control that part of korea. is it an answer to your second question? [inaudible] >> my first question, i talk about -- [inaudible]
>> so, what do you think north korea would do if the international community took that tough to from a position that it must govern correctly in the northern part by respecting human rights? otherwise, it is not a legitimate government and should not be a member of the united nations. and that, in fact, the republic of korea should govern the entire peninsula. what do you think north korea would do if the international community took that position? >> in my understanding, the united nations declared the republic of korean government is the only one legitimate. the government in whole korean peninsula.
so even though we don't have the control over north korea now, it is very natural to have the control in the north korea an area if they collapse. that's what i believe. and we should remember, you know, korea has been the one unified independent country for 1000 years before, before the japanese colonial rule. if south korea does not control the north area, then i don't believe that is the answer to any situation. it is just the beginning of a lot of problems. that's what i can say. >> thank you. please go to the microphone,
please. >> thank you. first, i have two questions. one on north korea nuclear issue. as you said, they have about 40 kilometers -- >> excuse me. would you like to speak slowly, please? >> many americans and koreans -- we didn't see any progress, discussion and result in north korean nuclear problem. and six-party talks are not held in many years ago. and so, and we don't see any will or willingness from the united states government on result, nuclear north korea
program. do you have any suggestions to the united states, what should obama administration do right now to solve north korea and nuclear problem? second question, america -- the u.s. seems to be more interested in defending the united states from the threat coming from north korea rather than rolling back north korea's nuclear threats itself. one option is, one of the best -- missile defense program, and trilateral cooperatively, the united states, japan and korea. do you think that korea should participate, officially participate in the missile defense program, or anyway,
>> to start the north korea and nuclear development problem, the rok and u.s. alliance and the international society should cooperate together to press north korea not to continue the bad behavior again. i believe sometimes it's worse. when we remember a few years ago when there was an issue, north korea was very nervous to have
sanction from the international society. so the united states and korea and the international society should cooperate closely together. to your second question, on missile defense, korea has the very -- korea's anti-missile defense system, sometimes we may co-op rate intelligence side or something else, but korea has its own missile defense system. that's what i can answer to your question. >> thank you. now -- [inaudible]
>> dave, please. >> i just wanted to follow up into grace's question. not really a question but to support general jung's position. i don't think united nations will ever have another resolution on korea because china and japan will veto it. i mean china and russia will veto it. but i think in terms of unification, i think that the rok is important but we should remember our history of what the united nations has done. you engender a similar resolution 112 and 376 talk about the korea question and it has to be resolved by the korean people. the armistice, paragraph 60, talks about the korea question and the importance it be resolved politically. but i think we really need to go back to u.n. security council resolutions 82, 83, 84 and 85 that continue in existence today which call on member states to support the republic of korea, to defend it against the threat. and if north korea collapses since we remain in a state of
war, to this day only interrupted by the armistice, if north korea collapses then it no longer exists as a nationstate and, therefore, the u.n. command as the belligerent from 1950-53, it was one of the co-belligerence come has responsibility as a vector for conducting post-conflict operations, and really the way to look at it is when north korea collapses the u.n. already has said that it should support south korea. and now unification is the ultimate resolution of that war. and so i think we can look to history into existing resolutions to provide legitimacy to support unification. in addition to the south korean constitution which is so important. >> okay. please. >> can i just say one -- >> make quick, please.
>> well, as far as blockage by china, russia, i was thinking of the general assembly and in reference to the same sorts of revolution shahzad. i see the general assembly as the logical way to start resolving this question, and i think it would be diplomatically to have another resolution on the korea question in which the notion of rok encompassing the entire peninsula was made clear, despite the u.n. membership of the dprk. >> thank you, grace. >> thank you for good lecture, general jung. i have question about north korea forces nuclear contact.
country used there can be many options. it depends on the situation. thank you. >> i think in th the korean military group is influential in south korea. as you know nobody wants another war they have to have a coexistence, but for example, he just acquired the budget but never respected the leaders. you think the group ready to
accept the north korean leaders who felt because the military group was a great influence in south korea. thank you. >> okay. let me answer a question. >> as long as north korea is north to south i don't believe the south korean military have any respect to the north korean military. did i answer your question? >> ladies and gentlemen, one
more question quickly, please. >> the title was north korean military threats. i understood because of the reverberations in the room whether you emphasized the threat of the conventional war as well as the nuclear comment to me it looks like north korea isn't simply waiting to becoming a clear war capable and the conventional preparation to just wait until the next time, but it indicated that we have a conventional war. if that is what you meant, then the end what way do you think that north korea will attack south korea in the conventional
let's give a deep round of applause. [applause] now it is my pleasure to introduce david lee. general gregson. i have the honor of introducing it to make the lieutenant general wallace. general gregson graduated from the naval academy in 1968 and began a distinguished military career that would stretch over the course of 36 years.
during the operation restore hope in japan. through his career he served at every level of command working from the platoon to a service component commander. during the service in 2005 in the marine corps forces specific the command of general the marine forces specific and the commander of the basis specific headquartered at the camp in hawaii. during the tour of service at the marine corps specific the general also served as the component commander for the central command during the freedom and operation. following his retirement in may of 2009 until april of 2011 with vss and secretary of defense for asian specific security affairs
where he developed u.s. defense policy across the asia-pacific region. he also served as the direct specific affairs in th and the e of the secretary of defense for policy to the director of the central intelligence. he is now the president of the company he is a senior fellow at the international and announcement and solution. he serves as the senior director in the china specific program at the center for the national interest and travels frequently to asia business and discussions under brazilians responds, security policy and military strategy. the general also helps the strategic planning from the naval war college and international relations in the regime college and has been a
doctorate in the public service by the university of maryland. he's a member of the marine corps association with the naval institute and council on foreign relations. he's a trustee of the marine corps university foundation, board member of the u.s. naval institute and former rector and treasurer of the semper fi fund. he is also a past honorary advisor to the development international council. he's here to address us on the topic of the washington security partnerships about which he's indisputably qualified and well versed. we look forward to hearing your remarks on the issue. please join me in welcoming the lieutenant general wallace gregson. [applause] >> thank you for that wonderful introduction.
i see you're studying at the university of pittsburgh. that is my hometown. you are in good shape the institute of studies for giving me the opportunity to speak today and thank you, doctor. before i start let me offer my condolences for this sinking disaster. it touched about everybody in america to decide the circumstances there. the specifically soul tokyo washington security partnership. one dictionary has this to say about the meaning of the word. a partnership is an arrangement in which parties agree to
cooperate to advance their mutual interests. it's not a marriage or oath of loyalty or profession of friendship, and it's not meant to be forever. it does mean agreement among the parties on that the mutual interests are. of course the soul tokyo washington partnership on security matters would be very helpful. we all know, however, that there are a number of matters that get in the way of that partnership. we can't even agree to sign the same document on the information security. as a former dod official and as a career military officer i could talk about the military factors. we could get to that but for first it's important to discuss the regions that discuss the
security concerns asia continues its economic rise. the rise is a dynamic prosperous country as a major driver of this asian prosperity that raises birds of millions and the poverty to high standards of living its the 13th largest economy in the u.s. seventh largest trading partner. this economic miracle travels by sea. because of this, wealth, prosperity and power in east asia will increasingly be determined at sea. at the same time and with no surprise to this audience, the history has always been driven, not always favorably, by its location.
korea has a long coast faces south, west and east and many capable ports. it is surrounded b by bigger powders and profits greatly from its record-tying trade and economic connections to greater asia and the world. by contrast mongolia might be the example of the disadvantages of being landlocked. but hazards wait beyond the success. the demarcation line is one but not the only geopolitical fault line in the region. because the growth and prosperity is inextricably linked to the maritime environment, the security concerns will increasingly be found in the maritime environment not only in the immediate region, but also in the greater asia and pacific region and the world. korea seeks to make its position
among the bigger powers into an advantage to become an indispensable hub for trade, commerce and politics. the foundations of the power, economic political and military will increasingly be on the sea. the realization of this economic top political and military success requires an international system that is orderly and operates for the good of all. ththe man appointed as is the global comments and the united states is a strong advocate for unfettered access of all to the global comments of the sea, air and space. the notions of sovereignty of the strong over the global commons requiring all others has no place here.
complicating and expanded view of the maritime future remains divided into demilitarized is in the vicinity of the 38th parallel remains the most fortified demarcation line in the world. the threat of a north korean, the threat of a second of north korean invasion has declined due to the state of the north korean economy. as one example, the north soldiers are smaller now than they were years ago likely due to malnutrition. at the same time the threat has become much more dangerous in terms of weapons of mass destruction particularly nuclear weapons and the deadly provocations. despite a number of efforts over the years, the u.s., korea, japan, china and russia, five to
six of the six parties as well as the rest of the international community have been singularly unable to prevent the democratic people's republic of north korea from marching towards the nuclear weapons capability. we haven't seen it demonstrated yet that is a very cold comfort. as it is well known the alliance grew from the events of june in 1950. kim il sung invaded soviet support and the u.s. during extension of his efforts to other parts of the world felt obliged to counter this invasion. it became the first campaign of the cold war. over the decades the alliance has been successful to date in the touring the repeat of the
invasion. the alliance has grown and adapted to become an extraordinary model of military cooperation. it's of the integrated nature of the forces with military personnel working side-by-side on a daily basis. it must continue to adapt as the threat continues to change. the conventional threat declines but north korea poses a growing threat to the maritime environment. the schelling reminded of the alliance of the threat hiding behind its missile and potential nuclear threat north korea can pose a challenge to the safety and security of the maritime trade commerce.
think of a submarine attack on a container ship as it leaves on the pork infrastructure. history drives the policy towards north korea and causes china to value stability among all else. in 94 and 95 it was fought on the peninsula and then came the japanese protectorate followed by the colonization and followed uby the invasion and then china became heavily engaged in direct combat during the korean war losing by some estimates over a million men.
at the outbreak of the u.s. move ships to the taiwan strait to protect the former world war ii ally. this effectively prevented them from completing the unification. china does not want another era of change on the peninsula. the u.s. maintains a significant force. over the years as president has changed as the capabilities of the forces have grown. our presence now is much more focused on providing unique support capabilities and providing for strategic offensive options should they be mandated by the national leadership of the korea. most are offshore. to prevent the use of the most
dangerous weapons. u.s. forces and bases in japan are the foundation of u.s. military presence in the region. they are essential to any emergency on the peninsula. given the range of weapons in the arsenal it is hard to imagine how any general conflict on the peninsula could remain confined thus we are tied together by security issues like it or not. as the economic and security concerns grow in the maritime environment, so will the importance of other capitalistic maritime nations who support the rule of law and the peaceful settlement of disputes. the vast there are more partnership opportunities despite other issues that might exist between such a potential
partner. the history also shows the resource issues can be a cause of conflict. we face many trends that if unresolved can destroy peace and stability and these may qualify as matters of interest and partnerships. some of the more powerful trends include the demographics, energy, food and agriculture and freshwater. all our interview made it -- related to the energy production and use. the use of hydropower to produce energy often reduces the availability of agricultural land and fresh water. othe world will add 16 million
per year reaching over 8 billion by the 2030s. most growth will be in developing countries. it's expected to add 50 million people. those counting on american retreat will be disappointed. europe, japan, russia and korea will join those countries and absolute population decline. china will add some 770 million by thof the population will be g and predominantly male. in contrast of a blend of 320 million people becoming the world's most populous nation before 2030. welfare systems in the developed countries are based on assumptions of moderate economic population growth. therefore aging and declining populations will stress support
systems. flows are of the states and in 2007 the top three recipient of the remittances or india, china and mexico. a disruption or alteration in thanatural disaster or other phenomena can affect peace and stability. when the economic conditions, india will continue to grow risking tension between the rich and the poor. in much of eastern india's most important security challenge according to many.
rapid development in china, india and other countries create a relentless drive to issuer adequate supplies of fuels to sustain the growth, maintain satisfaction and prevent internal chaos. multiple disputes over access to the resources in the south china sea regularly fill the news. of the additional production and refining capability is needed to overt research shortages as the world population grows. japan is currently coping with energy shortage caused by a natural disaster illustrating the fragility of much of our infrastructure is under heavy pressure. the search for affordable energy invites upstream countries to build hydroelectric dams on
rivers coming out of their mountains. this can cause devastation on the cultures that depend on the nutrients in the rivers to sustain the dependent lifestyl lifestyles. they have a poor record of the dispute settlement. ocean fish stocks are under pressure from overfishing and illegal fishing. without some agreement a code of conduct on the effective enforcement needs many species and nations are in danger. recently such disputes caused the death of a korean coast guardsmen at the hand of the chinese fishermen contributing to the interdependence.
conflict in the view of me is not possible because it would be so ideological. this year is the centennial of the beginning of the first world war. and noand allergies like this ce overdone but we should at least consider the review of 1914 before an unemployed tuberculosis retained her after was that the war was a logical, bad for business and therefore impossible. the rising power was well known in germany. as part of history is well known enough that china produced a popular 12 part tv series on the rise of great power. australian and u.s. statesmen including kevin, henry kissinger and kurt campbell among others, entered on the dangerous
similarities between that date and hours. today's rising power is ours and it is the fastest rising power in world history. that same history shows the world feels more often tha thent to maintain the peace while integrating or reintegrating in china's case the rising power into the existing international system. athens is the classic example of this trap named for the historian to first document th this. in early 20th century japan are other examples. china's history exerts an influence on current events. china remembers the century of humiliation came to china in the form of western traders.
the territorial concessions, opium, civil war, the collapse of the dynasty and invasion followed. the leadership makes a frequent mentioning of the pivotal role in the reversal of the humiliation and in the creation of the economic resurgence. today the majority of the gross domestic product and business are all on the coast of the east and the south china sea. 50% of the commercial and one third of the value and trade traverses the sea. if the world has a commercial intersection this is it. traditional international law as fevered calls for freedom of navigation and peaceful settlement of disputes. this is being increasingly challenged by china claim of historical rights to the entire
south and east china sea. they are pressing claims generating coercion with military -- maritime assets and in the case of vietnam the navy vessels fostering the arms race. this is an unprecedented chinese move. china has never placed one of its rigs in the exclusive economic zone of another state without prior permission. this was accompanied by as many as 80 ships including seven people's liberation not something usually done in the undisputed waters. the countries were cited in the title of the recession and let me say a few words about the prospective and you can determine whether we have eventual interest.
the degrees of competition and cooperation are inherent in everything from human interaction to business and international relations. a relationship with china has elements of both. the u.s. welcomes the riots and reintegration into the international system. we sponsor of a succession to the wto world trade organization in the 1990s. we have a strong economic relationship with china and so does every one of our allies and friends. how strong is our relationship? exports to china are up 542% since 2,000 compared with the rise of 80% of imports to the rest of the world in the same time. some 30 u.s. states exported 1 billion or more in goods to china and another ten states
exported over 500 million. there are 122 sisters city partnerships between the united states and a china that leverage economic ties to expand people to people contact and then use the context to create more business. the ties provide a strong basis for cooperative relations in part by creating powerful constituencies in each nation favoring india joined in the future policies that should seek to increase the number of stakeholders in each country. at the same time, we have serious security concerns involving china and other nations. some scholars say we have three policies managed by different parts of the government. the promotion of the economic growth is the most familiar policy and it's the responsibility of the u.s.
treasury. confronting china and the un in the asian international forums and elsewhere is the province of the state department at least under secretary clinton. the department of defense maintains counterbalancing alliances and partnerships. our strategy requires a mix of assurance and persuasion combined with the deterrence and inability to prevail. this is an important component of the emphasis that was described by secretary clinton. she said we have to be systematic about where we invest our time and energy and one of the most important task of american statecraft over the next decade would be to walk into a substantially increased investment, diplomatic economic strategic and otherwise in the
asia-pacific region. note the employer priorities, the security presence is a hardly the only part of our national effort. in the future o the military forces will assume a more widely distributed politically sustainable operationally resilient posture combining the basis as they are configured with wide ranging periodic deployments of elements large and small throughout the region. operations with allies will become more integrated. containment is a political and economic policy directed at a country with a closed system in the declared enemy of the united states and in the free world.
i entered active duty in the sierra. what we see now is not containment. the only country that can contain china is china. the challenges are bound to continue peaceful development and prosperity in the region. hopefully we can want to place a priority on our mutual interest and continue our positive efforts despite the obstacles. thank you very much. [applause] thinks general. >> is about a five minute break to stretch out because the reception needs to be set up and then we will proceed. thank you.
task because i thought his remarks were comprehensive and quite brilliant in the insight that you offered us. the only question i would have is you indicated we are not containing china in that policy but i wonder if there has been a shift in the last five years or so since their own positions have become more assertive or some would say aggressive which raises the question as to whether the entire premise of the engagement policy for the last 40 years is under question that is that engagement of the economic interaction and support from the west from china's peaceful rise with moderate its domestic and international parties and it seems that we are
seeing something quite different and i wonder if you see this same kind of a fundamental reevaluation going on. >> i appreciate the question. i don't have any objection to engagement with the chinese, but i do have a lot of worries about is we need to be clear. the people in our generation were raised in the cold war. we have a designated enemy read-out of casting. everything we did in the united states was geared towards the soviet union. i remember having to hide under the school desk in the fallout
and i remember being told in 1957 after the russians launched sputnik i would become an engineer because after all we've got to. it also happens to be a major economic partner and i don't think the united states has learned how to have two conversations to show somebody at the same time. we need to promote as many positive things as we can d to enhance the good things that are going on between the united states and china but at the same time, we have to be absolutely clear that not only with china but with our allies and our friends what our concerns are. i think the lack of clarity that we have allowed to creep into the relationship has led the
chinese to become assertive and aggressive. the secretary's recent visit was the first time that i can recall that we actually had a public, frank and candid discussion. it was the secretary of defense in our side and the minister of defense from china on the other side of the stage, and they have some profound disagreements with. everybody knows where we stand and the expected collapse of the economic relationship that many people anticipated that we spoke candidly did not happen. i think we need to do more of this. there is no reason for china to
moderate its territorial drive and east and south china sea until there is some objection that matters and we haven't made that clear. >> any follow-up? >> you described the situation quite accurately. >> general larry. >> i would make the point in looking at the japan cooperation that we have seen in the last three years perhaps even longer the limitations of this particularly growing out of the estrangement of south korea and south japan and what seems to be
forming now is another area, another triangular relationship that is becoming as important unfortunately in a more negative way than a potential for cooperation among japan and the u.s.. and this other triangular relationship is the south korea and japan and china relationship because what strikes me is that in the last two or three years, we have seen a martyr act and growing role of china and many
of these issues and estrangement between south korea and japan. and the chinese are becoming a direct part in these issues now into china is influencing south korea to a greater degree year by year and month by month on these kind of issues whether we are talking about the history issue, japanese defense policy, policies towards north korea.
it's no longer between south korea and japan on so many of these issues the maritime component of this which the general talked about is beginning to enter into this kind of triangular relationship as well that the u.s. seeks to promote among the u.s. and the rok and japan. this leads me to the question that i would post to general gregson at this point to get his opinion. looking at in particular the history issue, the maritime
issues between japan and south korea particularly as well as the issue that keeps emerging between japan and south korea, japan policies towards north korea which south korea almost constantly criticizes. my question is has the united states done enough in terms of its own actions, its own pronouncements etc.. in a more positive direction is what i believe to be a more studied u.s. obama administration, bush administration, state department kind of neutrality on these
issues actually serve to worsen the problems and i'll owl this more negative triangular relationship x. weighted by china to develop the way that it is developing now. is the u.s. and action what i ai perceived to be the u.s. and tragedy in which the chinese have stepped in between south korea and japan. you asked about whether the united states is giving enough. i would say the results showed whatever we think we are doing it is not enough.
it is often met by questions from our friends in other parts of asia saying it's all just military, s so no we haven't doe enough and needed to do more. we need to be clear what our positions are despite ended in american tendency to think that because we explained that once everybody understands it but that's not true the united states is in an interesting position, and it's not appropriate for us to jump in
the middle of the historical issues because we didn't let them. we had no authority to make a judgment on the historical matters. we do however, i think, have a right to comment when the pursuit of a historical issue through the absence of any other productive venue starts to damage the american interest. on a carrot for your issue they were asked to be too asked to take a side on territorial issues in the pakistan over kashmir. it doesn't affect anybody in this room at the problem for the united states is if we start trying to act like an international arbiter we are bound to make somebody mad so that is the source that we take
no position on the territorial issue is. it's clear that we don't want to see any coercion or any use of force to settle these disputes, so it's got to be settled in a proper into peaceful manner and one that does not disturb the common security security and prosperity in the region. the short answer no, we have not done enough and whatever it is we think we've been doing we really need to add to it in my opinion. >> larry in a follow-up question? >> i hope your definition of partnership translates well into the japanese.
and i think you laid out mutual interests and it is easy to sit here and say this is a no-brainer we should have a partnership. we can achieve a partnership and we shut because i think it is in the interest of all three nations in terms of northeast asian security to have a functional partnership but in terms of north korea, i think that's part of their strategy has to split the alliance and the partnership between tokyo and washington that i would expect north korea to try to hinder the partnership as well and to attack that it would be a