maybe i will stop there. >> okay. >> and you talk. >> thank you. steve, you want to take up the story? >> sure. we'll save memorandum for the q&a. if i think you look at how the arms control has played in the obama administration and in the last eight years, i guess there are three phases. the first was reset from 2009 to 2011 and it was pretty clear that when barack obama became president he wanted to do something big on nuclear weapons and we saw that in april of 2009 where he embraced the world without nuclear weapons and also be realistic this may not happen in our lifetime. we have to have a deterrent that's secure and safe and reliable. going back to the first panel, you know, obama and reagan were the ones that had a passionate belief about really doing something significant about getting rid of nuclear weapons.
you had in those -- the first months, early progress on new start so when president went to moscow in july of 2009, they had already guidelines of what it would look like. that reflects, i think a return to traditional approach. the russians are more comfortable -- complaints i heard about the bush administration, yes, we understand the american desire to limit war heads but you limit deployed war heads but you don't limit reserve war heads or missiles and bombers, how does not create a huge breakout potential. the russians are more comfortable when the obama administration indicated that it was prepared to go back to traditional approach eliminating war heads but also strategic vehicles and missiles and bombers.
new start gave a boost to reset, early progress was good for the broader u.s.-russia relationship. and just a comment on reset, a small and decreasing people but i see this as success in terms of what i understand it's original purpose was, not to get the u.s.-russia relationship to nirvana but to get out of hole with russia in 2008 and get russians to do something that the obama administration defined as u.s. interest. the strategic nuclear arms agreement, more help on ending iranian nuclear weapon and help in afghanistan in terms of getting supplies and forces easier to afghanistan. and on those areas in the first couple of years, the obama administration went back achieved important things. by 2011, maybe may or june, the reset run its course, maybe come up with a new term and that term would have failed, but looking
at the new start treaty it was also very clear and the president made this public, he wanted to go beyond new start and not only negotiate further cuts in strategic weapons but also bring in nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and so for the first time the idea that you might have a u.s.-russia negotiation that was looking at everything. later on you see russians pull back and trying to figure out, interesting question and we can speculate. they were content with new start at least at that point in time were not prepared to go beyond it. i think part of the reason was the russians look at nuclear as political tools above and beyond strategic value and it gets into moscow's self-perception as russia as a super power and really the only way they can compete is lots of nuclear weapons. another part of it is and this maybe changing and certainly in 2010 russians still saw themselves with significant gaps vis-a-vis nato and other
conventional military forces and they saw nuclear weapons as part of the answer to that gap which was nato's policy during much of the cold war. a part of it was missile defense. the conversation that came up in the first panel about just how much the russians feared sdi. when i got there he would talk to soviets about sdi. there really was this fear that in ten years the americans are going to put us out of the ballistic missile business. it's really kind of interesting how much faith the soviets and the russians have in american technology. now i think in '87 people like sardoav, look, boss, this is really rocket science. it's hard to do. ..
when he was talking about the european stage. he said we know there's going to be a phase four, five, six and seven. so there's this fear that somehow the americans are going to be clever enough to come up with something on the missile defense aside that will change the equation. but our missile defense, one of the interesting things was it started out as fairly a positive issue between washington and moscow. in september 2009, the obama administration announced a reconfiguration for europe, replaced the bush plan, and originally that seemed to be winning approval in moscow. it seemed the missile defense have been diffused as a u.s.-russian issue.
so in 2010 yet a nato-russian summit. the agreed let's see if we can come up with a cooperative nato-russia defense. in early 2011 what it heard from both american and russian was there's a lot of convergence in thinking. agreed, there can't be a single system because nader does a lot of work for russia and russia doesn't work for nato. central command centers. what would be at data fusion center, we take early warning data from nato senses and from russian sensors, bring it, combined and enhanced back to both sides. the second center, and operations in which the threat to europe and how do you do with it. but the russians begin talking about they wanted a legal guarantee, a treaty that american missile defenses would not be going, oriented against russian strategic forces. they said it has to objective criteria.
when you have that, limits on numbers, velocities, locations. it was the resurrection of the abm treaty. the obama administration didn't even pursue that, recognizing was no chance that treaty would not have consent until. when the secretary for arms control begins to drift a bit, you see the russian position on missile defense begin to harden. the russians begin to bring other questions, we can talk about reductions but there has to be missile defense. went to do with advanced conventional strike weapons, conventional arms control in europe, and to begin to sort of make all these wrinkles that make it hard to unravel. and then you two things happen. both english and the trench of presidential elections. arms-control goes on hold during that period from late 2000-2012.
the result of that is that instead of obama, i think of something of the chemistry, you have obama and putin. the chemistry there is there but it's not the chemistry. [laughter] there was on the part of the obama administration in order 2013, can we reinvigorate arms-control picked up afford a new idea on missile defense transparency but it got no traction from the russians. part of the partner was in moscow the context that change, is that vladimir putin when he came back when it is going to run and i think september 2011, there really was i'm going to run but he was going to also be the president or the intellectual is merely a formality. but mr. putin in became a talk in terms of russian nationalism, russia's great power, russia reasserted its place on the world stage. and a significant bit of anti-americanism mixed in with that. it looked like there is a big part of the how russia looks at
itself in terms of regime legitimacy. so you have domestic politics now driving and more at israel stands towards the west and arms-control doesn't really fit in well with the. that becomes a problem. the third phase comes after 2014. it falls russia's illegal seizure of crimea, support for armed separatism condition ukraine at that point you have a u.s.-russian relations crashed the lowest point since the end of the cold war. the administration moved to isolate russia politically, worked with european union to avoid economic sanctions on russia and also generally ratcheted down normal diplomatic this is but it did hold out there was a car about, except it was arms-control. but there really was no engagement on that. also in 2014 you and the questions arise over the treaty of intermediate range of nuclear force when the u.s. government concluded or made public its conclusion that rush had tested
a ground-launched missile to any range in violation of the inf treaty. the russian on with the charge of american violations. but your arms-control now is becoming a problem on the agenda. and begin your more and more russian completes the missile defense. so arms-control which at the beginning of the administration was a positive and contributed, but ask of which is has become a negative in some ways it seems to me this is something like both clinton and the bush administration experience come at the beginning arms control and even though people say arms control wasn't on the top of the george w. bush list of things to do, it did do some things in a way that were positive in terms of u.s.-russian relationship in the second term, the clinton administration a bush administration and in the obama administration, arms-control patients were racing pushes like national defense, or the, problems.
>> thank you both very much. before the questions i wonder if we could just say if both a good like to sell about what happens if we have not decided the russians have violated the inf treaty? one of the applications that? >> well, we have pointed a finger at the russians. >> right. >> we are determined russia's testing missiles but they are in excess of inf range and, therefore, these tests are illegal. i'm not aware made a funny to deploy those. although one would suspect if you're testing, they're sort holding out the option. going back to my time in the bush administration, i had conversations with russians where it was very clear, they're unhappy with his treaty.
in fairness to the russians do have some legitimate complaints. this is a treaty that forbids missiles of a certain range, but the only countries that are subject to this provision on the united states, russia and some of the of the successor states to the soviet union. iran is not subject to the north korea thus subject to. korea, india, pakistan not subject. so if you are russia, surrounded by all these countries are free to deploy these missiles and some of them are deploying. you start to wonder why, how are we supposed respond? respondwith we are forbidden by this treaty, it's from a different time with a party that is pretty far away from us. is this really durable over the long-term. i guess relations are getting better with cuba now but if we're you were to point inf range missiles, how much
patience with the next attempted to that we can't reciprocate because we got his treaty with russia, 1988. it's been my central long time at some point the russians are going to pull out of this because they're going to save his treaty is -- it seems we're saying it's been taking steps and depression getting ready to do that. my advice would be let's not do the russians a favor of determining the treaty ourselves if we can avoid it. they just terminate the plutonium disposition agreement, was it yesterday or this week. so they took a hit on that the let them bear the honors on that unlike was on inf, should they proceed to deploy inf range missiles in violation of the treaty. i would hope that they would terminate the treaty in accordance, in respect to the decision.
if they don't i guess that's what our hand is forced. i don't think we should make it easier for the russians to deploy inf range missiles. in the meantime i'm all in favor talking to them to try to persuade them to step back off the ledge. but a defenseless the rest of the world -- lots of countries but at the traction is probably not realistic to expect the russians to live under the inf treaty, over the long-term. >> i agree with a lot of steve's point. i do some understand the russians position where you look at the countries that are developing intermediate range missiles now. we look in the panoply of other russian forces, strategic forces, conventional forces commits that like every and any range missile to match what the chinese have, the indians have. that would be the first point. the second point and agree with steve, if the russians start to the problem the way to do this not to treat.
is to excise the provision which is built into the treaty, to withdraw from it. i think steve is right if the russians don't want to do that because they don't want to bear the political responsibility of telling inf. just a comment on the obama administration's response. so far the charges that russia's test but not yet deployed anything as long as they haven't deployed, a cautious response makes sense. if they do begin to deploy these missiles is going to change the game. one of the reasons why i believe the obama administration has been relatively cautious at least on the american side, there's not any specific metropark at this point in time for building an american intermediate range missile. if you want to build as response russian violation you have to put it someplace other than the united states. having gone through the dual-track decision in the early 1980s when we did deploy missiles and bob are known for as long without as well as some
others, it's a pretty painful process. we ended up doing it and deploy those missiles in europe was whether key reasons why we got behind that treaty. but i don't know anybody on either side of you who want to go through that experience again. and so the question is what we want to build an enemy range missile, where would we put a? we couldn't put it anywhere that would allow to reach russia. our options are limited in terms of response. >> is also the missile defense response. deploy systems which shoot down -- >> before the questions i'm going to exercise my chairman's right. if you don't mind, calling you professor william hill, the great expert avi kozak memorandum said she read a book about this. i think a lot of this is a red herring but i would like to hear your comments if you're willing to about was this a major issue that really scuttled -- >> are you going to make me start regretting -- >> and could you give professor hill is that i still check my
russian foreign policy class that it would only be teaching at this time. i want them to listen to this, too. >> there may be a quiz. [laughter] >> thanks. are maybe, i don't know, congratulations or commiserations. the argument in the book is that the russians took, what they took is disrespect and really embarrassing their president. >> could you maybe just explain to people what happened? >> the kozak memorandum was in the room negotiated by putin to deputy chief of staff, at the time sent down to parallel the osce negotiations for a settlement, and appreciations that i was heading. i talked with kozak and couldn't get in to join the efforts come and he claimed they wanted to do
it simply. the president abe the russians wanted to do it separately. they keep with probably the russians really desired to keep a pretty meaningless troop presence in -- as a political hook both on moldova as a whole on and on ukraine, that being down southwest of ukraine. but they rushed through the memorandum just ahead of the osce present and agreed memorandum to the two sides. and one that they should give me to get western approval did not have three key articles in it which had to do with a long-term russian troop presence in the country. when the version with the troop presence was leaked to me, i sent it back to a couple places,
and the u.s., the time some in the u.s. ambassador had to go in and make a demarche. salon was able to call himself real-time. i think his words were you can kiss european -- or just moldova's european future goodbye if you sign this. he agonized the night before putin was to come to the country and signed the memorandum and called him about four or five in the morning. the russian press was already on the plane. putin was preparing to fly down, and this happened two days after -- carried out of the georgian parliament on live tv, and i were moldova and citizens protesting with nooses entries outside the presidential building. in any case, the russians to get her safely. the point of the book is the russians take the near abroad much more seriously than we do. thank missiles in cuba are
russians in cuba. you remember the cuban brigade in 78-79 when that broke. anyway, the fallout, it really, it was about that time and what it was georgia, whether it was moldova, whether it was all bound together, it was a clear turning point in what had been, in my perception, on the ground after for my own foxhole of a russia that we were able to cooperate with at some point, or on some things. and russia that was more suspicious and less willing to let westerners of the very sort, sorts in. the attitude, whether this is accurate about but certainly a week later, he screamed at us from across the table at the meeting stating when you intervene in the balkans, we
didn't like it but we didn't stop it. and we can get an agreement, a settlement in our area, and you wreck it. things went downhill from that time, but as you pointed out they go up and they go down again. they go up again, they go down again but they remembered far more than we do because it is really in their backyard. the position at the time was equivalent to steve hadley. so you can imagine what would've happened had there been an appropriate mirror image. in any case, it's part of an area that's sensitive to them, remains a sensitive, as you and others have noted. and one that we sometimes don't appreciate the importance that they attach to these countries, and we saw that again in ukraine and 2013-2014. >> thank you very much.
>> a footnote? i was actually deputy secretaries signed instruction to the american ambassador in moldova responding to the kozak memorandum. the way president of erdogan change is coming to the ambassador, had this memorandum, the kozak memorandum. i proposed to send. i would like an american it doesn't. i think he was asking europeans to do the same thing. we took a look at the memorandum at our conclusion was is unworkable because it basically gave them the breakaway piece of moldova the ability to veto foreign policy, security policy. moldova said want to draw closer to the european union. we went back and said look, it's not our place to not decide this. you can sign this but we're not going to endorse it. and the sense of the embassy was he wanted to be able to go to his by bush because he thought it would be domestic perspective the americans and europeans by making them do this.
[inaudible] >> the first version is the one you look at and came back and we told them the osce do the same thing, told and we couldn't support it, but we felt it is going to sign it we couldn't steer him off because you have not yet seen the portion or the articles where the true presence. there was a two-part thing. he definitely wanted western, both u.s., osce and eu approval of doing it. he told the russians this, allegedly, he told me later that the russians told him that the osce he had approved, which was not the case. but it's clouded in stores that each participant who claims that it -- got a bit one way or the other. the point is at the end of the day with putin sitting in moscow, kozak at the airport really angry, and threat by
wondering what he had done, he would resume its on all sides of something that had been that close to settling one of the things and it failed spectacularly. sort of like other -- >> here we have the dueling narratives problem vividly explained. we give time for questions. on arms control, on other aspects of u.s.-russian relations, responding to what you have heard. we will start off with you. >> you identify yourself. >> my name is jeff, i'm a masters student at american university. in the last panel to discuss the reykjavík summit great deals which is very fast and is wondered about the legacy, specifically of gorbachev and former ship with the traffic and the impact that has on putin and any future russian leader.
because of gorbachev so widely despised in russia today, and i believe any future russian leader would fear looking weak, especially on substantive arms control. do you think is negatively impacts future negotiations? >> good question. who would like to take that up? >> i mean, i'm having a great insights into the russian psyche on the issue, but i do think we need to understand, russia is going to do, it's a great nation. rushes going to do what's in its international interest. conventional wisdom is that countries that you week in unconventional terms, in terms of their conventional forces, often fall back to nuclear weapons as a safeguard for this entity. that's a we did during the cold war when we felt we were in theory are conventionally to what the warsaw pact was able to
deploy. today complete the walls -- today clearly the roles are reversed. a few week. and so i hope this doesn't come to a shock, like obama's agenda and we will abolish nuclear weapons from the face of the earth. that's the nice aspiration but i think you'll find zero support in high levels of the russian parliament from the other direction. so if that's her objected to negotiate the abolition of nuclear weapons, apparently was on offer in reykjavík, i don't think we'll find takers in russia. is that because gorbachev dashed out of the to the it's a hardheaded calculation by the russian leadership of our national interest lies in the current global security environment. maybe i will just go further.
i think obama, a big part of obama's problem negotiate with russia is just such grandiose objectives. it is projected. putin has not embraced it as his subjective. obama's success is being measured with reference to how most -- how much success he achieved. to make progress in the design agreements with russia. if you are the russians, obama wants something, you are not really enthusiastic pickets of the flip side of we during the bush administration. it with the enthusiastic once the agreement, we worked and so we got to impose our terms. today what obama faces is he's the one who has the political need to sign the arms control agreements with russia and the russians it would have that need. i think they're basically satisfied with the current arms control regime. new s.t.a.r.t. will expire and we will deal with that later. i don't think the russians want
a nuclear arms race, but they don't need nuclear reductions. they want to make obama happy, they would probably be prepared to agree to some for a price. but it would be a price we would pay, not a price they would pay. that's obama's frustration of course, that the russians are trying to make them pay a price. i think he might have more success if he had that length is the greatest objection and hitched his own medical fortunes to his success in trying to achieve it. >> i think the reykjavík legacy was much more in the short term, were as despite the summit failed within what, just look it over you yet the inf treaty for the first time and an entire class of nuke a weapon for a couple years later you at the start wintry. pretty significant achievement. as a make the point as ken adelman said, give me think about going to zero respectable. i personally think, he supports
the idea of a world without nuclear weapons. i don't we can get to pick that space into reasons. wind is i worry that nuclear deterrence while it succeeded during the cold war, couple times came very close to breaking down. the result of a break-in within 400 million dead. the question is do you live with that risk? i think given, if you could have a verifiable nonnuclear world, that united states given geography, alliance structures, getting american conventional power, the risk in that kind of world are less than a nuclear world. i think mr. putin doesn't buy into that at all. he looks at a situation as has wait, i am the leader of a declining power with a stagnant economy. i have 1.5 million chinese next door. nuclear weapons are about the only way i secure my secretary i think that's why moving in the direction cynically would be
difficult. the russian perceptions is very different from the way we would look at it. >> okay. >> i am a masters student at georgetown university. i got the impression from your particular comments about the inf treaty and the possibility that russia may in one way or another find itself outside of the treaty or not that's usually ago because of the political consequences but break it. and i was wondering, it seems to me like then it does have, russia does in this case, have an interest in maybe an update of the treaty as opposed to backing out of it. an update to include the circumstances of today's world and the presence of nuclear
weapons in other actors are not included in the treaty. it seems like on this particular issue they may have more interest than some of the other areas. and i was wondering if there's any possibility that that could come about? >> well, in terms of modifying kind of treaty, the what ideas you often hear suggested is instead of getting rid of the inf treaty, why do we globalize it? so in other words, address russia's concern by expanding it, a group of countries that are subject to its restrictions. in principle that sounds like a great idea, but i think you need to talk to the chinese, the indians, the north koreans. how many of them are actually interested in doing that? i think opponents of that idea
argue that proposals to globalize, proposals to mount an effort to globalize the inf treaty will probably translate in practice to the abolition of the inf treaty because the affable been noted, it will fail, and then those who try to globalize it is not a good excuse for explain why be decided -- since the rest of the world has expressed an interest in this treaty, why should we keep it? that would be a conclusion one could draw in its efforts to globalize the inf treaty collapse. short of globalizing it, i'm not sure how you adjust it. maybe you could try to come up with geographic certain areas, russia could have inf range missiles but not in the european theater. that id i'm sure was discussed at the time the treaty was originally negotiated, but missiles of that size are mobile. if russia has been in one theater, they can move into another in a crisis. i'm not sure that would be a
modification we would be very comfortable with. >> i think in the second bush term, i think in either 2007 at 2008 the russians made a proposal which government support to globalize the inf treaty. there were no takers. it hasn't been pushed really since then. >> yes, over there. lady in red. >> christina mccallister. -supported u.s. nonproliferation programs for about 10 years. i was just curious with elections coming up and recent dim elections in russia, what nonproliferation arms control called would you recommend for the next administration? >> good question. >> i guess you that nfl's about iran's nuclear agreement. maybe i shouldn't take us there.
>> you can take is whatever you want. >> you know, with russia i'm not optimistic that great progress is a prospect. in fact, i honestly think that united states looks kind of ridiculous come in asking for deep reductions in nuclear weapons when rush is sort of on the margins in places like ukraine. russia must look at us like we're from another planet and we don't quite get what's going on. but set aside russia for the most part, the big problems on the horizon are in north korea and iran. i think especially if it's a hillary clinton administration, i think it may be consideration given to some sort new diplomatic initiative to try and replicate the perceived success, iran, on the korean peninsula.
i'm skeptical that any negotiation with north korea basically involves bribes that will give them to stop doing bad things. i think history of the last 25 years demonstrates the north koreans are very happy to accept bribes. they are not actually happy to deliver on the part of the bargain. i don't know why like a different outcome -- the clinton administration tried that. the bush administration tried to to its credit the obama administration has not tried it. i think they recognize, fool me once, shame on you. fool me twice, shame on you. fully a third time, i don't know what you say about that. that's basic where we are at least are trying to bribe the north koreans to get them to give up their nuclear weapons program. iran, you know, lots of people celebrating how we solve that problem. i personally think we put on hold for 10 years and it will be back in much more virulent form
with his having signed off on a much more robust nuclear weapons infrastructure if that's what they want to have. basically no ability to restrain them should they wish to break out in 10 or 15 years. >> i think the next administration intends of arms control and nonproliferation, the urgent issues going to be north korea. the best part, russia is kind of a bit player in that. it's not that have huge influence with the north koreans. i'm not sure that figures in a big way on these russia agenda. a few got back to some kind of a dialogue between the united states and russia on arms control, if you wanted to move forward you would have to reconcile i think what are two very different approaches, which is what has been a lease in the last eight years an american desire to move to further reductions but also bring it nonstrategic nuclear weapons. the russians are to focus on things that missile defense, advanced an official strike, third country systems. there may be ways to bridge
those differences. it would take quite a bit of work. >> university of washington. i was fascinated by the way you talked about how negotiation and enthusiasm and element affect the negotiations. i would like you to reflect a little bit more on the moment of unilateralism at this period of time, and unilaterally the united states decides one thing and the weight you are narrating it, the russians would come and say put in a treaty, please, treat us as equal almost. and then somehow there's a change in the context in moscow. the national context in moscow. that there is more aggression moving forward. so if you can piece of these two episodes together, do you see that that moment is the reflection or a response to a
moment of more strengths on the united states' part, affording unilateralism, and now this is the time to pay the price you were talking about, but kind of justified our rational price. >> do you want to start? >> yeah. i think you look at how putin looks at the nest is, there's pieces, part of what is driving them is a domestic politics. it goes back to 2000-2008. putin was good at economics because the price of oil went up and the economy grew. living standards rose. this is what regime legitimacy is all about. when he came back in 2012, the economic situation was much more complex. that's where you see i think that's the beauty of russian nationalism, restoration of russia to great power. that's been a big part of it. another part of the goes back, and this got back to both the bush administration also the clinton administration, is putin
has this huge chip on his shoulder, the sense of grievance that the united states, the west, mistreated russia. he cites nato enlargement. is version of nato enlargement is nato enlargement was organized by the united states, britain and germany to contain russia, to bring military force up to russia's borders. i think it was very different. it was designed to respond to appeals by central european countries who basically said we want to be full members of europe. likewise, a look at the way he talks about the arms revolution is to the orange revolution, these are not manifestations of populations that same point, our election was stolen, or we're unhappy with bad governance. the way putin described it, these are western plots, american plots again designed for regime change and the ultimate target is regime change in moscow. he talked about so much better think he believes it.
i think it really is very different but from his perspective he has a sense of grievance. he has the sense that he's defending against an encroaching west and that may explain things why he's less interested in arms control, what he worries more about missile defense. he has this perception which i think parsley is long but perception can be a reality. >> you use the term unilateralism. when that term was thrown out of cash with the bush administration its usual criticism. but the unilateralism that criticize was not a decision to you only to reduce nuclear weapons. other unilateral decisions that were criticized. it was the unilateral, i mean, it was not a negotiated nuclear reduction. we decided to make and we
invited, george h. w. bush for the nonstrategic nuclear weapons announced unilateral u.s. reductions that would been reciprocated i president yeltsin. that i think basically the bush vision, george w. bush vision, the hope was in announcing nuclear reductions from our side, strategic nuclear reductions that the russians would match them unilaterally, as happened with the nonstrategic never weapons. but in the end of the russians wanted a treaty, and i don't, i think, in fact i'm sure they were frustrated because they like using the treaty negotiating process to try and leverage used on other issues like missile defense and conventional strategic weapons. they have a whole list of things that they want to try to slow the advance their interests by taking arms control negotiations hostage. that was a history of the new
s.t.a.r.t. negotiations took much longer than sugar because the russians were trying to link it to other issues to see whether in obama's enthusiasm to get this treaty he would be prepared to make concessions on things the u.s. previously had not been going to talk about. >> it's coming this way. >> can i encourage the panel to comment on the proposition, intellectual architecture of arms control as we knew it during the cold war? is, in fact, and anachronism today. and arms control as we've understood in the past is not very important, not very relevant. and no matter, whether we attempt agreements which is not to attempt agreements, it isn't going to make much difference. >> steve pifer first.
>> you give the supporting argument. >> i think that's largely true. arms-control comment history of arms control was we were in a nuclear arms race, and that was kennedy, johnson, nixon administrations. the first goal of arms control was to stop the arms race. and then under reagan we move to trying to roll back weapons levels. i think we do face a different security environment today, and there's no nuclear arms race that, no countries going to spend billions of dollars, more than billions of dollars to try and a nuclear advantage in the current environment. and i think in a lot of ways the arms control can be actually an obstacle to improved relations, because you set up these
processes. i mean, especially the way, i have some sympathy for the russians. they are playing a weak hand. that's what we are facing. you are playing a weak hand and they are, what do you do when you have a weak hand? you better play pretty well because you don't have much margin for error. they use these processes to create advantages, create linkages to achieve concessions in other unrelated areas. i do think it often ends up messing up the relationship. we are indifferent to this negotiations, arms control agreements. we will be one with you if it makes you feel better but we are not going to spend six years in geneva hammering one out and letting you know all this other issue on the agenda that we don't want to talk or in geneva. take it or leave it. here'here is what we are preparo agree to.
i think obama's problem is he's got this agenda of abolishing nuclear weapons, so he needs agreements to make progress towards this objective. like i said earlier, that invites the russians to making pay a price for doing that. that's what they need to do with the we can't they are forced to play. >> the case for arms control. >> i think there's deal is value come using arms control as a tool to reduce the number of nuclear weapons that could strike the 20. you have to be smart about how you do the negotiations. but i think bringing the numbers down does make sense. also arms control agreements often produce a lot of transmits. i think the joint chiefs, their support for new s.t.a.r.t. was based on the idea that you get notifications. you get inspections. you get data changes we know a lot more about russian nuclear forces and you would purchase using your own unilateral and. i think there still is a place
for it. i guess on the lateral side, steve, the bush administration did make that yes, we're going to go down to 2200 nuclear weapons and refined to you do what you want. if the russians come back said fine, we will be at 6000 weapons. i do think there is a continued place for arms control in terms of containing a competition that i think is potentially, the risk is small and a breakdown but if you give a breakdown in nuclear deterrence, the results are catastrophic. i do agree with the obama administration conclusion that to the extent we can decrease the role of nuclear weapons in u.s. policy and shifted more towards conventional weapons, that's why think there are significant disadvantages. that's in our interest. >> yes? give him the mic over there.
>> i'm an undergraduate student at georgetown in dr. stent's class. sofronas do i get the sense great difficulty facing future on control agreements is the fact that russia perceived threats from its nuclear neighbors what to do a railway that the u.s. has. so obviously want to avoid making concessions from his perspective. how would one approach future negotiations tds rushing into the idea that making and reducing these arms numbers is important, ma but from the perspective that they don't want to do this? >> i said earlier, russia is a great power with lots of intelligent people in leadership positions. in fact nothing makes the russians angry or than to be lectured by an american about what's in their interest. they really get mad when they are lectured by americans but what is in russia's national interest to the idea would could educate them about of to better deal with the chinese nuclear
threat that they perceive, or how to deal with iran. we need to be careful and we need to be realistic about what can be achieved. progress will be possible on arms control when russia concludes it's in russia's interest to do and arms control agreement. i think right now they're basically happy. steve was talking about the transparency, the verification aspects of arms control. i do think that's important to the u.s. it's also important, frankly it's more important to the russians because we have much better surveillance, satellite surveillance capability we have a much clearer idea what's going on on the ground in russia than they do in the united states. so the transparency under these arms control agreements, it's important to both sides but i would argue more important to russia than the united states. that's what it's astonishing we look back at the negotiation of
the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty with the rush skip to do was pare back to verification. it was way of sticking it to the obama administration and they were trying to take away things that they thought were more useful to you has been into them. i think it's a tribute to the way the u.s. sort of back into that negotiation. president obama needed to give more than they did, politically. so they were able to try and bring in all these issues and also pare back the verification. but at the end of the it's in their interest to have verification. i think if we approached negotiations with them less enthusiastic, less breathless manner, we will actually get a better result. >> i guess i would go back to under the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty russia is going to have 1500 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, and the federation of american scientists estimate the
russians at the arsenal now of between 4000-5000 total nuclear weapons. i think that allows them to give preventable against north korea or india or pakistan or saudi arabia a random countries that have intermediate range missiles but they don't need to insist there be some involvement by these other countries. the russians have now said there has to be some kind of our multilateral aspect for the next negotiation. what the russians have instead is how they would envision a multilateral negotiation going. they haven't said that because when you try to think it's are it's very good difficult to come up with a negotiation that doesn't i've asked whether the content is lots of britain, france and china or ask if those countries except unequal limitations which they're unlikely to in a legally binding treaty. maybe begin to get winners were at the united states and rush were to do and other grave going beyond the new s.t.a.r.t. you could ask britain, france and china to make a unilateral commitment that they will not
increase as long as rush and the united states are coming down. you will not get much in terms of third countries where there's huge gap with china and russia each maybe 45 o 4500 weapons and nobody else above 300. >> jill dougherty. i'm with a fellow with the woodrow wilson center and also a former student of angela stent. and i just had a question. not positioned on arms control but on the modernization of nuclear weapons. we have president obama who talks the reducing the numbers and yet we look at this proposed $1 trillion, i believe, it could be spent over number of years on modernizing the united states nuclear weapons potential for a nuclear armed missile, to do. could you bring us to the russian perspective on this?
i know they've been doing some modernization of their own, but what is their $1 trillion plan. are they going to match this? what's their view? >> the russians announced, i think was a $700 billion plan to modernize all of the military forces. what that target specific on the strategic side is cut over 10 year period we are not about halfway through it, i think it was building 400 intercontinental ballistic missiles. if you look at the force that looks like russia wants to have within the limits of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty, that looks like about the right number. part of what the russians are doing like what we will be doing in the 2020s, they're building new missiles replace old stuff. but a lot of i think missiles and the russian inventory that had to have the money back in the 1990s or the early 2000 they would have replaced 10 years ago. a lot of it is replacing old stuff, and it looks like i'm downsizing force within the
level of the new s.t.a.r.t. agreement. there will be a similar process on the site. one of the things, modernization is was hard to talk about something because we are never in sync. and russians are doing a lot. they are building new submarines, new subway ballistic missiles, 10 years from now there will be done. we will be building intercontinental ballistic missiles, new submarines and a new bomber. a lot of it again i think is replacing old stuff and it's necessary. we look at the u.s. strategic marseille shiver i would question certain aspects. what does worry me is when the pentagon says here's our plan, and by the way, nobody in the pentagon has that idea how we are going to afford to build this. we are leaving a time bomb are leaving a timebomb for whoever has to manage that problem 10 years down the road. maybe you to think more in a long-term sense about of the ways you can design a modernization program. i think we should continue to maintain i tried to i would adjust some of the numbers.
i do question the need for new long range cruise missile when you're going to spend $80 billion to build a new bomber that supposedly has stealth capabilities. we will have to come to grips with this. i think the next administration will have to deal with those questions otherwise it will find itself in a position around 2025 where it's talking about do we build new intercontinental statements of dubai after different aircraft or do we buy frigates? i don't think the pentagon has come to grips with that. the next 10 years will have to do that. >> if you're with president obama and you think we are on the cusp of the abolition of nuclear weapons, hopefully during his lifetime, the yardstick he put out a, then these investments make no sense. why spend all this money to produce weapons of within dismantle. if you don't actually think that that goal is likely to be realized, that's for the category i mean, then, of
course, you have to spend the money because we are going to be in this business for a long time to come. weapons assistance, b-52's built in the 1950s, they are not going to last for ever and they need to be replaced and the replacement is going to cost money. i do get exasperated with this trillion dollar 50. that's a 30 year cost estimate. i don't know what the 30 or cost as well as for obama to but we never heard in the debate because at least from the proposed of obamacare because it would've been such an enormous number it would've scared people off. when you start coding 30 years numbers go is with vintage. scare people off. the right number to look at is the annual cost. you to look at how much of a debate over the lifetime of the mortgage. if you have ever done that you would never sign a mortgage. so what is the annual cost of making these investments, and how does that compare to the
sons we spent in the past on the nuclear enterprise. the relatives is a lot less money than we spent during the cold war on nuclear weapons. we somehow, we managed to fund national defense throughout the cold war. the numbers are not quite as daunting as the critics would have us believe. speed we have been a green too much so they push back on a couple points. >> let's end on -- >> i disagree. i think president moment in prague put up this notion of nuclear weapons but i disagree. i don't think it really has been operationalized. if you look at the strategic modernization program at the obama administration approved, they are talking about 12 ballistic missile submarines, six and afford intercontinental ballistic missiles, a new cruise missile. they're basically, he's going along with everything the pentagon would've wanted. i am not sure i see in that program, and i don't think i see in the absence of senior level
things the administration could've done the last few years if it is pushing towards that vision. i agree with edition. i think he did go down qualifiers in prague wasted as long as there are nuclear weapons we have to have a reliable deterrent. they are doing push back on the cost question. want to talk about 30 your numbers, that's difficult. if you look at the current budget environment and if you look at projections for the growth in social security, medicare, interest rates, i really think it would be unwise for the panic on to make an assumption that 10 years from now a part will appear is going to love and to avoid hard choices between building intercontinental ballistic missiles and f-35s in things like that. if we think like that my guess is what we are conducive start spending a lot of money on programs and then curtail those programs after we've done the development, after we bought the
first 20 years better at this cost but before we get down to whether cost become cheaper and we will end up with i think a less effective defense establish an overall. >> we will have to reconvene in a few years to see whether that's true. these join in thanking our panelists for a very informative panel. thank you. [applause] [inaudible conversations] >> a day after the vice presidential debate democratic nominee contain his campaign in philadelphia. people talk about the economy
and jobs live on c-span at six eastern. >> charlotte observer reporter tim funk said this week about a new quinnipiac university poll that says republican richard burr and democrat deborah ross are tied at 46% in the north carolina senate race. tonight on our companion network c-span will have a series of debates in state races. all of those state races tonight on c-span. >> homeland security secretary
jeh johnson, fbi director james comey, national counterterrorism center director nicholas rasmussen testified on capitol hill last week about security threats come including efforts to track and count basis, cybersecurity them up border security and preventing encountering violent extremism. from the settlement security committee, this is three hours.
[inaudible conversations] >> good morning the committee will come to order a one to think secretary johnson and director comey and director rasmussen it is not dead and -- uneasy task did not envy you to keep the nation safe and redo truly appreciate your efforts eyeball ask unanimous consent to have a statement entered into the record. , i will keep my comments
short want to hear from you. i was in new york one of the representatives to the general assembly united nations had meetings with other delegations said ministers some of the coalition partners it is fair to say unfortunately the general feeling is america has not led e.f. as what president obama layout to years ago to defeat isis. to the sheer cia director john brennan testified before the senate intelligence committee that unfortunately despite our progress and we have made progress, our efforts have not reduced the terrorist capability and global reach. before resilient it is a at me but director rasmussen
not to still your thunder but i have 2.0 with your testimony would director brennan stated that it is fair to say we have more threats originating in more places with more individuals than any time in the past 15 years. despite this progress on the battlefield is our judgment that isis will have terrorist attacks abroad is not been diminished and the isil activity is a reminder of their reach. you have a very difficult task to defend our homeland to keep america safe. but i want to make the play did has been two years since the president laid out the goal and it took us four years to defeat nazi germany and imperial japan. defeating prices on the
battlefield to destroy caliphate is essential for step to reduce those threats that largely have not been diminished. thanks for coming i am looking forward to answering questions and i will now turn over to senator car her. >> how was a plague on getting into this but how are you doing he says compared to what? compared to two years ago he was going to syria and iraq like through georgia and now round the world there is 2,000 month. last month 50 per month showed up and from the united states not even one per month so to capture from the triangle from of mosul and it is a just u.s. but the coalition.
we made a decision not to have boots on the ground. we have trading with intelligence and support and air power together the coalition is as be say is kicking something and we are kicking them all over i racking and syria and libya. they are not 12 feet tall. but what's going on right now they're losing. of the battlefield in when they go to libya we will take care of them as well. how are we doing the coalition is doing pretty well. having said that mr. chairman thanks for putting this together today. thanks for the hard work and dedication of law enforcement officials. those attackers were identified before they could
fully carry out their plans. likely they save many lives as that is an important reminder if we see something we need to say something. the investigation into these attacks is being determined that these are carried out by two americans in fact to spend most of their lives and our country. they underscore the fact that the latest threat to doesn't come from overseas or syria or those under the visa waiver program but now comes from within. american citizens or vehicle residents u.s. spent most of their lives in this country. the staff may recall the words of peterborough did you testify before this committee when he said every person has been killed by a.g. hottest terraces and 11 has been killed by american citizen.
think about that. many of those are carried out by americans favor up knowing nothing else. but some have suggested to be an entire groups of people beginning entire groups will not prevent attacks like those from those attacks in new york and new jersey coming here since the age of today grew up as americans. so they fundamentally misunderstand how to stop the homegrown attacks. the reality is its stock -- it starts with reaching out to local communities in making the american dream accessible to all. fortunately they are doing just that.
i am proud the committee passed a bill for bipartisan support to work with the muslim community and other terrorist organizations. to another important wave of battling homegrown terrorism of the up propaganda radicalizing were fellow americans. that is why it is important to take the fight to license to conduct continued to defeat and destroy as it portrays itself as a winner. every age race and religion and nationality. isis is on the verge of defeat and for example, it once held the body of land over the past two years has a big chunk of that back.
also taking 45,000 isis' firefighters off the battlefield and thanks in part to diligent efforts we grew radically the number of fighters from that part of the world. vice this is really good as social media when they were winning. but not with they we're doing so well there doing good of social media. but not about every '02 fight that battle was well. this may be secretary johnson's last title for this meeting i just want to thank you for your the addition of. you took over like the commercial this is not your grandfather oldsmobile this is not the d.a. just that you took over. you have, longways with great leadership. i think my colleagues that you have that leadership team and could you do better
yes but also what banks for your leadership and to make that is part of the record. >> earlier this month and nation marked a terrible day in history 9/11 the unprecedented attack. i would like to have this committee to have a moment of silence to a knowledge that terrible day. please rise and raise your right hand. do you swear the testimony will give before the committee is the truth so
whole truth so help you god? please be seated. or first with this topic is secretary johnson 1/4 secretary of d.h. just. prior to the being was general counsel for department of defense and general counsel from the u.s. airforce. >> thank you. senators of the committee, you have my prepared statements. i will not read it but i will say briefly, i have talked repeatedly how we see the global terrorist threat evil thing as a threat to our homeland he vaulting from terrorist directed attacks to a global threat environment that no includes
terrorist inspired attacks of the types we have moseyed recently in our homeland that is self radicalized, without ceding direct orders from a terrorist organization, and as noted spent most of his life here. can be a u.s. citizen and borne here. but seems inspired by the things he sees with the internet, a social media, and the like. and it makes for a more complicated public safety environment i speak for all three of us when i say the prospect of the next terrorist inspired attack on the homeland is what keeps us up that night most often. within this set -- within the d.a. just one of the things i have been very active in promoting it is
building community partnerships. in this environment it is critical to do that. to encourage them if you see something, say something. it can make the difference to build bridges, resources. this threat is challenging. did includes not just terrorists inspired attacks will have a new category that we refer to as terrorist enabled a tax that is between directed and inspired everyone so while the would-be terrorist validated with a maid takes something -- take credit after the fact and i am sure we will discuss much of this today. i have been active very lately to promote the assistance that my department can't provide to state and local election
officials with their server security with a run up to the november 8 election. we are working with the state and local election officials to help them with their separate security when they ask. we're pleased that 18 states have come forward to request our assistance with their separate security efforts. the last thing i will say, i am very appreciative of the efforts of this committee to codify much of what we have done to move forward on my initiatives and build the better department of romance security. to hire that acquisition process, all of you are aware of the joint task force of border security it isn't all the aid mission but it counter narcotics mission.
and the committees of congress are seeking to codify that into law that is where the homeland's security mission that i appreciate support for much of our initiatives. i think you know, the l. lulls of employee satisfaction improved significantly this year with a efforts of our leadership team to link h. though workforce to help them with their jobs. we are building a better and more effective and efficient department and with the support we have received from this committee. they give very much. >> we appreciate your efforts. the next messages director comey director of the fbi also served as u.s. district attorney seventh district of york and the department of justice and also in the
private sector. >> mr. chairman and senator corporate is good to be back before you again. this may be the last time my set next to my old friend secretary johnson that we served together many years ago and i will miss his presence. i will be here another seven years. you are welcome back laugh laugh as the committee knows counterterrorism remains the fbi top priority for good reason. but very briefly in addition to the written statement submitted in advance will give a status report that comes through those group of savages that calls itself the islamic state. so as we are on the three-pronged of the threat the first is their effort to newer those troubled souls to travel to their caliphate . as senator car her said the
traveler phenomenon has changed radically this started to go down the last summer and has stayed down muses california attend trying to go to the so-called caliphate we are now down out one or less that brand seems to have lost some of its power. the second dimension that secretary johnson mentioned is the effort or the ability of the so-called islamic state to inspire, enable or direct those in the united states to engage in acts of violence. that is the center of the fbi challenge. finding those deals in the haystack with those pieces underpay of pay before they have party is the center 247. very hard work. and but it is what we can do perfectly in that december gold.
day after day after day. not just because of the threat but we are increasingly unable to see the communications of those that have become most dangerous as they go dark progress retry to mitigate and drive the conversation around the united states. the third element we cannot take our eye off of. and i assure you we have not , this so-called caliphate will be crushed berger the challenge is there will come hundreds of very dangerous people, they will not all die on the battlefield there will be a diaspora sometime in the next two or five years like we have never seen before. we must prepare ourselves and our allies in western europe to confront that threat. when isil is reduced to the insurgency and the killers go out they will go to western europe and here to
kill innocent people. we have to be ready. i ensure you it is not covered a lot of that work is under way every day. lastly i believe very much we have changed as the nation standardization the last 15 years. one of the most profound changes of counterterrorism is the way we work together. not just federally but state and local. i think you saw no better example than new york and new jersey in recent days where we had everybody surging to work together in ways that were unimaginable in 2001 there was friction between state and local or federal authorities across the hudson river. no more. that is a testament to the quality of the people doing this work. i am proud to represent them. i look forward to your questions. >> the final witness is
director rasmussen director of national counterterrorism center, previously served as deputy director in various functions on the national security council staff and positions with the department of state. >> thanks very much for including me in this conversation this morning on our homeland security challenges. i appreciate the opportunity to discuss what concerns us the most. secretary johnson has noted we have made great success and progress in rehab made progress at reducing the extra zero threat was from those terrorist groups whiff that large-scale catastrophic attacked from 9/11 but that said those recent attacks on underscore the ongoing threat to from individuals are that shoes relatively simple attack benefits in having passed of
the 15 year market is fair to say it is a broader or wider or deeper. that threat to landscape is less predictable than any point of postmen 11. to attack resources with manpower and funds with what they have enjoyed air the ingredients that are looked to as being critical with the amortizations capacity to mount the extra attacks. so this echoes of what was said to shrinking the size of territory remain same topic but to constrain the capacity to act as a terrorist group with global reach. is active again progress has been made in these areas. but it is our judgment that
to date has ability to carry out attacks and it has been significant lead diminished. the terrorist activity in europe and other places around the globe is a reminder of that global reach. this extra operations capability is entrenching in real big that the battlefield and territorial losses alone are sufficient to completely degrade their capabilities. necessary but not sufficient for close tremendous efforts i want to stress the various outside the affiliate's are a concern at top priority with the pakistan region still aspires to strike western interest we do not assess if it is capable right now attack on 9/11. but that altai did global
network remains resilient it with more connectivity in adjudicate despite the pressure there. aqap is one of the most capable affiliate's to conduct attacks in the west we are concerned about 20 strengthening the global network with the remaining leadership to take advantage of the safe haven. as you note taking steps in july to hide ties by changing the group's name and claiming to separate from t20. we believe this is enable the and a group remains part of al qaeda supporting the ideology of focused on attacking the west. stepping back there are two concerning trends i want to flag. first the increasing ability of terrorist actors to
communicate with each other with encrypted communication as a result the intentions is increasingly difficult. second with a decrease of frequency of large scale to spend months or years much more rapidly evolving and the flash to bank ratio where the individual decides to attack and that is extremely compressed and allows very little time for law enforcement to get their arms around it. any help to end doer to counter the appeal of terrorism is dissuaded in the first place and we continue to refine and expand our work force enclose the was secretary johnson and his team met teach us, director comey and colleagues at the department
of justice. this is more emphasis is an area we can continue to do more into area we have a jury great support from the committee and a look forward to working with you on this issue. i will stop there. i look forward to your questions. >> it is such an important hearing will let the questions go seven minutes but not one second over if you ask a question i will ask the answer be submitted for the record. general is relatively safe to say that most activities activities, obviously some intelligence gathering could be used but what you try to do with dhs and fbi had counterterrorism center is playing defense. irresponsible the football game to play defense if you get lucky but you need to go
options. director rasmussen i want to talk about we have had two years with the caliphate. yes we have reduced their territory but according to your testimony but not their capability. the diaspora has already begun. we have done damage but the killer bees are leaving behind to set up the new hive. director rasmussen talk about what you know, of in terms of trading, inspiring a lone wolf now potentially a wolf pack whether reprisals or in stable - - install i have heard of children and the caliphate being trained. and i do like your description of savages and barbarians. can you talk about what you know, of the effectiveness
of their trading in the caliphate and those that continue with the social media we witness that in new york and new jersey as well. these are all mine. talk about that. >> to your question at the peak of the caliphate with that geographical expands when there was certainly a greater share of territory was available for isil to conduct this activity the flow of foreign fighters that t11 referred to at its peak about 18 months ago and at that time we were concerned of the physical space that isil owned in the ability to use that physical space to collect the foreign fighters to train, deploy, equipment, and create a cadre a potential terrorist to be deployed
back out around the world. that is why the shrinkage of that has spent such a high priority of our strategy to defeat isil. we have a knowledge all lawn or the intelligence fell to their would-be lag between the time of territorial success or be able to constrain their attacks overseas. much of that of a structure set into motion who will have to be hunted down and destroyed systematically not just taking territory to been ad battle in a place like bozo. -- most old. but if we do not minimize the territorial success of coalition has had not in any means whatsoever in fact, to destroy that physical
caliphate is a condition of that narrative to improve the of lives behind isil social media outreach in the ways that secretary johnson talked about. with the timeline comedy of fax will be delayed or lag behind that physical progress. not surprising, with a period of sustained for the abilities that we are not comfortable with but it is a reality. don't you agree that they still controlled territory? we will make the same statement that we have not reduced their global reach of terrorist capability because of the of the other affiliate's class. >> behalf to be destroyed. we cannot move around the edges. if we are sitting here one year from today i hope we're
in a position to say we put considerably more pressure on the component of isil to focus on operatives overseas to do a great deal more work to render that lease -- less capable. at the end i don't know if i can predict that. >> with that diaspora that is already occurring my concern potentially is as the operatives are coming into the united states but when i look at the of global risk whether refugees or the b cell waiver program or the southern border i am more concerned. . .
so, we have certainly gotten more additions and processing and dispersing, apprehending and dispersing and let's face it a lot of them just turn themselves in. my concern is because we have not stopped the flow or reduce the flow because we have enormous incentives for people coming into this country we haven't succeeded in doing that. i am concerned about resources on the border having to take care of what remains i think of the humanitarian crisis. hats off to your agency because we have gotten better at handling it but we have not stopped the flow. can you talk about the concern you have of the southern border being diverted still working on these problems.
>> yes sir. the underlying conditions in central america still exists. the poverty and the violence in central america still exists. fy15, the numbers of those apprehended on the southern border went down considerably and by 14 the total number was born in 79 and by 15, 3931 and my projection for fy16 is it will come in around 407, 408,000 after headed on the southern border. that's a fraction what used to be but still too high and you are correct chairman and that we have gotten better at processing the uac's in particular on the front end. we have added resources but the push factor still exist. i am concerned about what we refer to as the special-interest that comes from the other end of the sphere that turns up on our southern border. they don't see this very often.
it's a very small percentage of those who are apprehended on our southern border that come from the middle east region. we now have in place systems to almost immediately investigate that person when we apprehend him. i can place a working group within my department over the last several months to work with the law enforcement components of other governments in central and south america to interdict these people before they get to our border and to share intelligence about what we are seeing. the smuggling organizations that focus on migrants from the middle east are relatively a limited number and so what we are doing and what i want to do more of is focus on law enforcement efforts on quiet trading with the law enforcement agencies of central and south american government to break
these organizations up. you began your question by referring to migrants from the ambit -- the other hemisphere and that's a legitimate concern and we are focused on it. >> senator carper. >> how much time do i have mr. chairman? i have it couple of yes or no questions to ask secretary johnson if i could. last week a house hearing there was confusion about whether the departments office of community partnerships is being guided by a strategy and i just want to ask the office if the partnership as a strategic plan? >> we have a plan. >> my second question is can you present that plan to a sometime next week? >> i have given the opposite deadline for giving congress a plan. i believe that the deadline i gave them was sometime in the month of october. >> so you will have a plan in the month of october. all right, thanks.
following up on that, when challenged at the face with stopping homegrown terrorism is as we heard it's no longer solely a law enforcement matter. we simply can't arrest our way out of these problems. stopping homegrown attacks means we must focus on stopping americans from becoming violent extremists in the first place in and the department of homeland security's office and community partnerships have taken up the difficult task of relationships with communities in improvement. it gets a new office. it has a tough job and with that said we cannot put all of our eggs in one basket is a question for each of you. we will start with you about what ari to be done to prevent the recruitment of americans by terrorist groups like isis and what else can and should we be doing? i love your analogy mr. comey about squeezing isis and isis
looking for a fingers and going to other places but how do we make better sure that they are not successful as they slip out to other places and maybe more importantly not successful in radicalizing people from afar and folks here in the u.s.? >> thank you for the question senator carper. tcc plays roles in countering extremism and prevents terrorist recruitment particularly if u.s. persons. we provide the analysis that underpins much of the community's effort trying to understand the process of radicalization and the way in which individual sitcom or find themselves vulnerable to this particular poisonous version of extremist ideology so that analytical understanding helps inform the strategy and policy that secretary johnson's task force is leading at the department of homeland security so there is that baseline analytical work we are doing to
support the strategy and policy work. beyond that though i have offices with nctc who are practitioners in this area serving on the task force at dhs. we were happy to make her contributions of our share of the interagency quota attacks of officers to contribute to this effort. i only wish we had more experts that i could send over to do more. i think this is a capability area that we are trying to grow inside the central government. we have strong expertise and i think we need to build more of it in that starts with my department as the first instance. >> thanks so much. director comey. >> we have two main responsibilities in that area in the first is obviously it's our job to try and find those who may be headed in that direction from acting on it so that involves building a complex and very productive set of relationships with communities, teachers and religious leaders and then also in the on line space making sure we have the
sources and the under coverage in place to see those who might be going from consuming violence. >> my sense is we are doing a lot better in the on line space. >> we are in one sense and we are not in another sense. where making good progress with the help of companies like twitter and chasing the islamic state off of that space. the challenges we have chased him to a place where they are less able to proselytize broadly and more able to communicate in a secure way. so our mission is to try to get into those spaces to see what those thugs, let the savages are talking about a. that's our primary responsibility that we are also working with nctc and dhs. we have a lot of indicators of mobilization to violence because we have worked literally thousands of cases the one of our jobs is to supply the partners in the government and the state and local law enforcement in teachers and religious leaders were the indicators of someone headed in that direction so there can be
appropriate disruption. those are two responsibilities. >> secretary johnson same question. talk further about what the department of homeland security is doing to prevent terrorist groups like isis and what we can be doing with our support. >> we have done a lot in my judgment to build bridges to serving communities in this country who are -- through our engagements which include the fbi which include local law enforcement. in my view where we need to do a lot more is not only chase these groups off the mainline internet but help muslim leaders and community leaders build a counter message. i would like to see a greater partnership between community leaders and those in the text that there who are willing to do this partner to develop that positive message.
it exists at some level but it needs greater amplification. i think we are off to a good start to the other thing i will say is i'm very pleased that congress for this fiscal year gave us some grant money. it's only $10 million. we need to do a lot more of that in the future. we will be making some grant awards in the calendar year without money that we need more of that. i think that's a critical part of the future. >> when isis is rolling through georgia they were robbing banks, taking up oilfields and really doing quite a financial building in treasure. my understanding is they are ability has been greatly diminished. we have attacked their actual cash and destroyed it. it's one thing to defeat isis on the battlefield and we are doing
that. it's another thing to engage them on the social media and it sounds like we are doing that fairly effectively. the other thing we talked about is how do we undercut and take away their financial ability and the resources to help fund operations around the world and what are we doing in that regard? >> senator the very way you frame the question highlighted some of the ongoing work we have undertaken to put pressure on isis ability to raise finances. the coalition military campaign has prioritized all along the effort to go after isil's capacity to exploit iraq and serious oil resources. that becomes a recurring business because in many ways they can reconstitute. isil affiliated individuals work around and they end up being back on the target list because it's literally an ongoing effort. the same time we have also worked with the iraqi government to restrain the flow of iraqi
government funds into isil held territories that the iraqi government was engaged enduring some periods of occupations in major cities. that again has shrunk the amount of money available to isil. as you rightly noted some of the sources of income that isil hazard nonrecurring and soy it is a concept that will continue to shrink over time but one of the things we have learned about terrorist organizations it does my stake a massive amount of money to fund the terrorist arm of the organization. the resource intense bit of isis program was running the caliphate over running resources inside the caliphate. the business involves applying operatives overseas are recruiting officers to send overseas does not necessarily the most resource intensive part what they do. >> thank you very much. >> thank you senator carper. i want to be very respectful and
we have so many members here and i want to give them all a chance to do seven minutes last members and witnesses to watch the clock if there's a question at the very end just asked for the answer to be written just like we do written questions after the hearing. with that senator paul. >> thank you. one common attribute to many of the recent attacks has been that they were previously investigated by the fbi and they were found not to be credible threats. the sabeedra the boston bomber the underwear bomber and the orlando killer and the most recent new york bomber. we are all fallible and i'm not here to say gosh it's terrible that we have missed these things but the fbi is unwilling to admit they have made mistakes. every time this comes up the fbi says we made no mistakes and we did exactly what we should have been the conclusion is right.
these are judgment calls in the judgment calls were incorrect so i think we should at least admit that and then look at some of the facts. i'm also told that the fbi continues to ask for more power instead of saying maybe we could use our current powers more efficiently and effectively and i will give you i guess an example. mateen dairyland a killer investigated for a couple of years. saying you can't find enough information. internal policies caused you in the investigation and no law says you have to stop it. maybe we should talk about whether or not the fbi's policy should change about how long we keep an investigation up. a team goes into a gun store in the gun store owner calls you, the fbi shows up. the fbi doesn't get the security footage. well i mean local policeman in my hometown out to get security footage. that's the first thing you do in any potential crime scene. couldn't we have taken the security footage, matched it with let's say how many
terrorists live within, terror suspects live within 50 miles of a gun store. we are not talking about thousands of people. and i'd be talking talking about 20 people. couldn't we present a list of pictures of the 20 people we have a suspects to the gun store owner? could we try to match them with security footage? we went back to the security footage weeks later and that have already been arrays. let's admit these were mistakes. i'm not saying let's hang somebody out to dry. let's admit we are not perfect and we have made mistakes here because if they don't admit to mistakes we are not going to get hotter. what is the link of the investigation, should we have longer investigations, are you changing any policy and are you going to tell us he made no mistakes and is just one of those things? and with regard to opening investigations i've asked repeatedly why didn't you get a warrant? and i hear and read the fbi's own internal rules say you have to have probable cause to open
an investigation. that sounds to me above and beyond the constitution and i'm a stickler for privacy and probable cause but to investigate something, i wouldn't think it would require a cost to open an investigation. so i think you have all kinds of tools that maybe we are not using adequately and yet there seems to be a great deal of lobbying by the fbi for new powers, and getting new third-party data getting new metadata, new rules on encryption and technology and trying to get involved with technology when in reality we need to admit maybe there are some problems in our current investigation and also analogy we are fallible and we all make mistakes and you can't be perfect and things will slip through but i think if you say well we said these people were not credible threats but we did make a mistake. they were credible threats. when a parent says my son is a terrorist as a parent i can tell you that's a pretty hard thing
to do that maybe we should try a little harder. the most recent time was in jail you said we didn't investigate them while he was in jail. we never even prosecuted which is a whole other criminal justice issue. you only prosecute them for stabbing a brother but if your lawyer at the time you should have requested in maybe the lawyer says you can't talk to my suspect that someone should have asked. he gets out of jail and after three months he is never prosecuted and nobody ever follows up with a think there's a lot of public information you could have looked at. i think there's no reason why you couldn't open investigation and the standards get lower when investigations are over. the standards for the fisa warrant are relative to the investigation. we can argue about that that is the current standard i just don't think we are necessarily using our adequate tools, using our tools adequately and it's important to admit when we make mistakes so we can improve our technique and i guess my
question to director comey is, is it your position that no mistakes are made in each of these in judging them not to be credible threats? would you not have done more in the gun store that mateen came into six weeks before the shooting? would you not have done more when rahimi was arrested to question him because his dad said he was a terrorist? >> thank you senator. sitting before you is a deeply flawed and fallible human being who believes very strongly in admitting mistakes when they are made. i hope you saw the very painful moment when i admitted publicly we made a mistake in allowing dylann roof to get a gun. as long as i'm director of the fbi we will stare back carefully what we do and where we make mistakes who admit them. we will be transparent and we will get better. as you know i commissioned a look back at our investigation of your land a killer which is just being completed now down the inspector general is going to do another one which is great we are going to squeeze it from the learning we can to get
better. >> what is your opinion on the gun store? >> your facts are wrong there. excuse me? >> your facts are wrong. the gun owner did not call list and brain easily. army vet -- went back to the store it was weeks afterwards of the video is not available. your facts are also wrong with respect to the bomber in new york who is still alive and going to have a trial and hopefully be sentenced to jail for the rest of his life, your facts are wrong about what his father told the fbi that there is while we will go back and scrub our entire contact of that matter carefully and maybe the inspector general will as well which will be great as well and if there's learning we will learn from it. we are not perfect to your we aspire to be perfect because we believe that's what the american people have a right to expect that you'll find is being candid about her shirt comes in our string. >> with regard to length investigations in your internal policy on adding probable cause to open investigation.
>> that is wrong as well. we need probable cause to get a search warrant. you need probable cause to get a fisa warrant or may fisa judge. open our investigation of threshold is much lower. we open an assessment based on tips and upon investigation and full investigations on much lower thresholds because you investigate to see if there is probable cause. >> should we keep our investigations open longer? >> we should keep them open as long as the facts warned to keep them open and there are no restrictions. in orlando the preliminary should be extended another six and another six. we have the policies and the tools by and large we need to do this well which is why we need to look back at each case and say what did we do and who did we end up in what documents did we get and how can we do this better? >> that would be the judgment call. should we keep them open longer? >> that judgment had to be made every be made everyday by professional agents with the review their supervisors. >> senator mccaskill.
>> thank you mr. chairman thank you all for being here. i will have a number of questions for the record about fio funding and watch in retaliation. i'm very concerned about those positions especially since admiral messinger said there have been no action taken in regards to tsa whistleblower retaliation than that is unmatched what's been recorded publicly and i'm trying to figure out the facts are. i went to spend a few minutes talking about prevention. director rasmussen, prevention is really hard. we have spent a lot of time and law enforcement. it is hard to quantify when you are successful incredibly hard to do it on a performance basis in knowing what is working and what isn't. i think all of the experts agree that one of the key foundations to prevention of the radicalization of lone wolves in this country is in fact the
cooperation and working relationship with the american-muslim community. would you agree with that assessment director rasmussen? >> absolutely and that's why what i alluded to in my response to senator carper's question as the officers i have working alongside jeh johnson's officer doing exactly that. they are engaging with local communities around the country to exactly the ends you describe. >> the vilification of the muslim community in this country is counterproductive to the most essential piece of our prevention efforts to the biggest threat we face which is the radicalization of lone wolves which is akin to looking for the veritable needle in a haystack, correct? >> again to reiterate there's no question that we need a cooperative engaged productive partnership with the muslim community but not just muslim communities the communities at large as we deal with the challenge of the lone wolves. >> in that light director comey
when we have had a number of arsons in mosques across the country, is there an effort that is beyond, i was an arson prosecutor a long time ago and i know the great work of the atf and the capabilities we have no technical ability to determine arson. are you comfortable that all the resources of the law enforcement community and the federal government are being used in a display to the good patriotic american muslims whose places of worship are being burned out of misplaced prejudice and philip -- vilification of a certain religion and is there a cooperative effort between both the fbi and the atf and local law enforcement in that regard? >> yes we work very well together on those cases and many others. >> secretary johnson when someone tries to buy an airline ticket that is on the watch list
and they believe that they are on the watch list erroneously, do they have to sometimes miss their flights? >> i can imagine that happening, yes very definitely. >> it might be that they have to go someplace very important and they are not allowed to get on an airplane. >> correct. >> but there's a process that they can then use to get a review of them being on the list, correct? >> there's an adjudication process to get off the list, yes. >> approximately how long does that adjudication process take on average? >> for the overwhelming majority of cases where it is a matter of mistaken identity is pretty quick. i think it's just a matter of days or weeks. >> in the meantime they have been in convenience. >> very definitely, yes. >> it with the same process for someone buying a gun they would be in convenience and rather than missing a flight to an important meeting or to the funeral of a loved one they would be missing owning a gun
for two weeks. >> correct. >> is there any reason we can't put into the process adding those people to a database that would flag at the point of purchase anybody who is on that list in terms of them being inconvenienced by delaying their purchase for a few weeks? is there any reason neither secretary johnson or director comey. >> senator in my judgment consistent with the 2nd amendment and consistent with a responsible gun owner's right to own a gun we should give the attorney general added discretion to deny a gun purchase to somebody who meets certain parameters similar to the parameters for the no-fly list or to the terrorist watch list so the answer to your question is yes to my judgment. as a matter of homeland security or think of something to do. >> do you think i would be more effective? after-the-fact you say we should start grabbing surveillance take
take -- tape can you imagine the human christ we started grabbing surveillance tape and gunshot without probable cause of a gunshot being committed? we don't want to get inconvenienced anyone for couple of weeks. can you imagine what the reaction would be if we started unilaterally seizing purchase video in gun shops? do you think director comey that something the fbi would be comfortable duping -- doing without probable cause or some reason to believe a crime has been committed? >> the purpose of this line of questioning is i do not get why we are having a long hearing on the danger of terrorism in this country and we can even take baby steps of saying someone who is inconvenienced by missing a