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tv   Irans Missile Program  CSPAN  February 20, 2018 9:04am-10:31am EST

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good morning everyone. i'm barbara sladen director future at the atlantic count and i'm very happy that we have yet another extremely topical panel as you all know, the trump administration has apparently requested some sort of understanding or o follow on agreement on the subject of missiles. regarding iran to have on o the nuclear program so very topical to get real experts to talk about the nature of iran's
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program to what extent it is a threat or not to its neighbors what might reasonably be expected in way of any kind of follow agreement perhaps any agreement is not feasible at this time. and so we have assembled quite a panel and i'm going to briefly introduce them and turn over the moderateing responsibilities to my director at the south asia center -- he in addition to directing our south asia center, of course, our iran program is part of the south asia center. he is a true rocket scientist. he managed the program in arms control disarmament in international security at the university of illinois at champagne overu saw developing projects on south asian security issue ors. he's also worked with cornell university and he is a true rocket scientist. he had ph.d. with a
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specialization numerical accusics i don't know what that is. buts that's brought and then we have a terrific panel. the go to men in washington on all things missiles mike senior fellow for missile self-defense at the international for study and wi rks and dos area iran ballistic missile capabilities assessment, long bio you have it here. he's the go to guy and then we have persuaded melissa dalton senior fellow and deputy director of the international security program at the center for strategic and international studies. to come and provide perspective on particularly on the gcc point of view, melissa has long worked on these issue. she's also served in government and we're lucky to have her, and last but not least our own doctor aaron stein of the center for the middle east he's an expert on turkey, he's been following this situation in
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syria as well, and we look forward to his comments sop so thank you to the fund for supporting our program. if you're going to tweet, please tweet at the ac iran and i'm also delighted that c-span is joining us this morning. so with that let me turn it over to you. tnches thanks barbra. [laughter] good morning and welcome to you all and it is my blood pressure pleasure to welcome our guest and -- [inaudible conversations] to this exciting panel. mike are you going to go further so launch with you and the booth -- who is in the coolest -- coolest and you will do the reentry. mike. smg well dr. once said my job to make a missile go up wherever he goes down in someone with else's department. what i wanted too was briefly talk not so much about the history of iran missile
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program -- although we can address that in the question and answer period, but i wanted to look at what -- you know, the, this common claim that iran's missiles are all developed they must be -- must stop allowing them to develop these systems because they could eventually deliver a nuclear weapon to increasingly longer ranges and in the future. and you know there's just sol broad generallyization how we define what it means to be nuclear capable. now, of course o the reasons to be concerned -- this is a priority area as barbara mentioned a lot of discussion on going within the administration and with the european allies over how to address the missile issue. so let me start by saying you know international standard -- , though, it is not recognized
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law for their determining inherent capability of a missile is threcialtd established by 1987 missile control regime established to export of technology that could help someone build missile systems that deliver a 5 a 00 kilogram payload to 300 kilometers. what we have seen today is people generally use that -- those threshold values to define what is, quote, nuclear capable. well if we do apply those the eight current systems -- you know which is the largest most diverse arsenal in the region exceed that threshold. and thus are deemed to be nuclear capable. other five all of which are some version of the 110, family of miss missiles currently lethal especially when shipped to
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hezbollah for use against israel they clearly do not bust through the 500 kilogram 300 kilometer range threshold. but it's important to remember that capability does not is not equal to intent. so the empty guidelines -- should be a first step evaluating or assessing iran missiles. when u.n. security counsel drafted resolution 2231 in july of 2015 to accompany the iran nuclear deal that was reached earlier that month, the element of a intent was actually added to the resolution that addresses the missile issue itself. whereas previous resolution talked about missiles that were, quote, capable of delivering nuclear weapons the 2015 resolution calls, calls upon iran not to engage in afnghts concerning missiles, quote,
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designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons. so, obviously, intent was captured, resolution 2231. so what does it mean to be designed a nuclear capable? judging intent is -- subjective. but there are some technical clues, intelligence information, i think that can guide an analysis the soundest approach in my view to the various missile systems and assess design intention on the basis of technical capabilities and the lean yag of these systems from where did they come? in doing so who embarked to examine this in more details and should have a report coming out later this week or early next week on the iiss website i don't know if hard copy will be produced or not but we looked at this in it detail and we conclud
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that short range missile systems the baseed on the soviet export version of the b and c designed to carry conventional weapons not nuclear weapon. the export versions are about 20 centimeters shorter than nuclear version fielded by soviets. soviets assign unique identifiers to the nuclear and nonknew nuclear version and speckly crafted for exports. these systems do exceed the empty c threshold unless carrying weapon but incorrect to claim in our view that the export versions were designed for nuclear delivery. iran's reason for acquiring the first place in mid-1980s were for retaliatory attacks against iraq using conventional
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foreheads. but at the other end of the spectrum in materials of the intengt there's strong evidence that iran's system was designed with a nuclear payload in mind. as well reported on a computer hard drive there were handed over by defector in 2004 demonstrate efforts to resign the reentry vehicle, the shahab to accommodate what appears to be a nuclear implosion device. solid fueled and liquid fuel have the same baby bottle shaped nose cone and thus can also be said presumptively to have been designed to carry a nuclear weapon. u now the case of the is less clear because it appeared after the intelligence surfaced, and it was primarily put on the because it separates warhead unlike the sea and more
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aerodynamically stable using that baby bottle shape. but conclusion, though, they designed for nuclear weapons delivery is also supported by its origins from the north korean, shahab three which is name that iran gave it is imported can also be said to have been designed for news clear delivery. is not entirely clear -- from -- where the nodang design originates from north korea or the soviet union. but we know both would have for delivery. external dimensions by the way are exactly scaled to those of a nuclear version of the b and not those of the import or exported b that's conventionally armed. iran's missile which made a debut in 2015 is a variance by
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lineage might be said to be nuclear capable or designed to be nuclear capable. though it is a little less clear that's exactly the intent that the iranians had i think presumptive iferly we can assign it in that category. iran tested missile and much harder to judge because there's a date of birth of really good information about this particular missile but it appears -- and i want to stress the word appears -- to be based on the r27 technology that's north korea used to build the unsuccessful musadan in any case if it is based on that particular technology it would be logical to assume or reasonable to assume that the original r27 was designed by the russians or soviets at the time to deliver nuclear weapons and north korea certainly had those designs in mind. and in addition --
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iran is developed to satellite launch vehicles and this is real controversial part. but in my view it is not controversial at all. now, both these carrier rocketss are optimized designed technology is optimized for satellite launching not as a ballistic missile. neither rock et has been tested as a ballistic missile. and they would require some -- you know wrath arer extense movedificationings for use as a ballistic missile. for sure they use similar technologies -- allowing to carry nuclear weapons but it is a satellite launch vehicle. it's interesting, though, to note that no country is ever converted a liquid propellant satellite launcher into a ballistic missile. it's always gone other way around there's sound reasons for this and they usually draw around operational requirements. but nonetheless if we look at the north korean program it is
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kind of -- the best example. the two icbms they're going and the 15 look nothing like use very different technologies to design features than the satellite launcher that gives you an example of why people don't just convert. satellite launchers to missiles -- now girch central role that ballistic missiles play in -- iran defense it isly tun likely to give their missiles up, however, i think it's important for us to focus on the priority issues opposed to those kind of on the margin. now, departing a little bit from the discussion to so far -- just is leak to take an opportunity to say that -- you know iran has said that it does not require a ballistic missile capable of traveling more than 2,000 kilometers.
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we should take them at their word we should take them up on it. we should negotiate ban on missiles, travel further than 2,000 kilometers. i think it's something they might agree to iranianing that i've spoken to seem to think it would be -- it might be acceptable. and in this way we can first step to limiting iran capable and foresaw what the administration itself worries about most. and that is a nuclear armed icbm -- from iran. they look at the situation in north korea and they don't want to see a repeat of what has happened there in iran in the future. now, under such an agreement you would have to deal with iran's satellite launchers i think there are ways to verify if iran is is willing to be transparent that their ises are designed for
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satellite launching and you could put restriction on some of the technologies they use to make it much more difficult to actually take your conspiracy from satellite launches and apply them and build a -- ballistic missile based on the technologies you're using for satellite launches so i'll end there. thanks everybody for coming thanks mike for that run down. i want to start by just laying out u how i think this problem says is conceptionized because it is turned bilateral in terms of the u.s., iranian rivalry or relationship however you want to define it and within this idea of the guidelines that all ballistic missiles particularly in the middle east all for an intengt and designed at least from the outset to carry wmd our weapon of mass destruction what
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they understand or at least the idea that these export versions of the scud even slight variation are relatively well done variations like -- how did you pronounce it? and so inaccurate from a u.s. or western perspective they are entirely worthless as tools of war unless targets are extremely large they can't hit it and therefore the only feasible thing to do request them is to make sure your warhead and blast is big enough to cover up for inaccuracy therefore it is best suited for chemical either chemical or nuclear with biological tailing along there because how difficult that is. i think it's important to challenge that assumption particularly as this administration wants to try and think through policy option itso in their words improve upon to
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include a separate multilateral tboarkted limit on ballistic missiles with with iran in mind. so i think the way to think about this is how many countries have ballistic missiles in the middle east. their cousins -- and drones pulling off of that ill get into that. and more importantly how many can can produce these really tiferly simple scud offshoots. and then stemming from that, how frequently they have been used in conflict to their fore challenge initial assumption about thinking about ballistic missiles. and i have a small list but i have left some off but ill just start in the arab israeli world they can fire scuds at the israelis the first use of ballistic missiles since wold world war ii 1980s probably most familiar with iran, iraq war what we now call the war of cities. same time period you have you
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have the afghan soviet war with use scuds large scale is by soviet forces. praption afghans as well. you have the yemen civil war where you have soviets supplies and scuds -- you have after the canyon in 1986 u.s. strike on -- on gadhafi assetses in libya libya decided to shoot in sicily. you have 1991, you had iraq firing scuds at israel and saudi arabia and one of the largest casualty incidents for the u.s. forces would be one of the scuds land value u.s. base. you have the 2003 invasion of iraq and iraqi use of both -- sort of modified two ballistic missiles an cruise missiles against u.s. forces. you have reports of transfers at the stop at 110 from -- excuse me from iran to -- hezbollah and how that interplays with israel. the current syrian conflict
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where you've seen a lot of scuds and -- yemen as i said the civil war and uthis if yowpght to expand thatout you can look at the georgia war with the russian. the conflict -- so point of laying this out saying these tools about used relatively frequently since the 1970s. and states have taken notice. so if you did a march around the region if we just go off as we say in a totally agree iran has most advanced -- and diversified missile program in the middle east. and i think importantly has emerged as a technology supplier from missiles and therefore outside o of cartel, nevertheles have other states in the region who have ambitious programs themselves --
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you have egypt. that continues missile program in production camibility. you have the syrians, despite this war that has been going on that has probably missile production capabilities and facilities. and you see repeated israeli air strike on what they say are missile bases. you have turkey like real country of expertise basically imported a chinese production capability for its missile. calls bora -- you have the saudis which have imported chinese missiles on two different occasions. you have the united from the dprk at least twice. you have the huthis may be able to at least fabricate kits or addition asystemmable iranian missiles have have internal capabilities a little wishy washy to me. that's just on the ballistic side and on the other side on sort of the cruise missile
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cousins i said breathing cousins you have a rapid proliferation proliferation -- their use in yemen today. their use in 2006 by hezbollah israeli forces. their use by iraqi force against the united states in 2003. and acquisition of more and more capable systems by a sensible american allies, and the saudis, with the purchase of european made storm shadow for air launch systems. so my point is, is that while we in the u.s. rightly because of the history of, you know, shenanigan with a nuclear weapon in iran is pouked on iranian ballistic missile program. it should not be separated from what i think is -- a wrath ere obvious prolific race in the middle east. and so if you want as the trump
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administration earnestly says it to try in their words improve upon jcpla because they're not satisfied -- with u.n. security counsel resolutions of 2231 as the all encompassing catch for -- to limit further iranian launch of ballistic missiles. then you have to begin to ask yourselves, what insen tifer does iranians have to limit their own ballistic missile capable when everybody us around them is inquiring. and -- is an overarching security framework that places limit on ballistic missiles in the middle east a good idea? and for now the u.s. policy options have and towards counterforce so -- again, the export of more capable and more accurate systems to strike iranian targets before they get off the
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ground. and missile defense -- without really asking the questions, with and by the way, i support these tex ports. but does the rapid proliferation of more and more capable missile self-defenses incentivize to build more missiles. so you exasperating missile proliferation dynamic by trying to reassure skiddish allies -- to try to prevent their worst nightmare which is -- sort of bolt from the blue iranian ballistic missile attack. so with all of that said, i do have some policy recommendations that i think builds off of, you know, taking yes for an answer a 2,000 kilometer cap on ballistic missile ranges in the region i think is ultimately good idea. i would be interested to hear
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how you would verify that because i'm sure that would come up. but other o one is -- the region sticks out in that i believe that the only country in that area that -- that there's a member of the mtcr is turkey. so you would like especially if you want to get together at cartel or it is a cartel to prevent the exports of certain missile xoangts i believe up to 44 countrieses now. you have iran sitting outside of it. that bust sitting outside your cartel you don't have a cartel. now nobody wants iranians in the mtcr but you know along lines of abiding by mtcr guidelines for exforts something that the chinese to. to varying degrees of success. but again you're keeping bar very, very low recognizing that most of these things i'm throwing out there will probably fail.
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and -- you know everyone something along lines of all of the states coming together adhering to the code of conduct. now this idea that you have -- you know, at least declaratory policy to be registered before pane launch vehicles something along those license because missile flight times in that region are so short that tensions are so high that you know, trying to grab everything at once so trying to maximize leverage to force capitulation in a region where there's not really a history of that working versus settling for managing an issue in what is good enough maybe the best policy option going forward. >> okay. >> okay. delighted to join the panel today and comment by colleagues looking forward to the discussion. you wanted to run out discussion
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by offering some thoughts on the ggc also u.s. policy and a posture and a the gulf but then also more broadly -- with iran -- you know, and starting with an acknowledgement that the united states itself maintains a considerable president in the gulf to deter iranian afnghts of a various labor but to include missile dimension that includes strike assets based on shore but also -- via the occasional think through of the strike group as well as several missile defense installation it is in several partner gulf countries. but over the last two decades the united states is also embarked on several cooperative greems with partner in the region to build their own capacity that has largely functioned along bilateral lines given perennial tensions with gulf partners multilaterally.
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but, starting a bit with -- the gulf perception what is really driving their, their interest to make these capabilitity investments spernl for the saudi and uae facing significant challenge emanating by iran's missile buildup both in the ballistic sense as well as the crews missile defense and the relationship and force projections that iran maintains along coastline with its maritime capabilities that is forming small boats. it's drone capables that haven't in previous years impeded some of the commercial shipping throughout the gulf which had is, of course, a shared interest strongly with the united states. saudi have made significant investments in partnership with the united states to combat
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that. that array of challenges but to include the missile defense area. smaller gulf states i think fear more being caught in the cross hairs of a potential conflict between iran that the united states and primarily targeting saudi and of course trying to hedge their bets in a relationship with iran. in, you know, these -- these shared interests shared threats perceptions are really based on a view that iran leverages its missile capability as part of its cohearsive tool kit as part of a core strategy that is largely asymmetric and iran strength lie in ability to operate below level of conventional warfare but it uses array of capability unconventional but also conventional such as missiles to project that. that power influence. and the ballistic missile
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capability in particular i think iran views as its ace in the hole following, following the jcpa significant point of lemple in terms of its national prestige, and its ability to project power. in the rooj but despite the gulf shared perceptions with threats perception in the united states and despite its investments in its missile testifies capabilities, i think at the a end of the day, the gulf you tend prioritize focus and certainly political attention against some of the other capables that the iranians try to bear whether had of support for proxy threat network and information afnght and its cyberactivities you see that reflected in both public statements but i think also -- in ongoing to with a debate in
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terms where have level emphasis needs to reside in terms of a shared strategy for their region and certainly saw that play out in the obama administration and i think it continues in this one. but i think we're seeing frameship when it comes to the missile challenge in the region that both michael and aaron have touched on, and that is largely due to yemen and fact that primary challenge in many way for our partners that u.s. partners in the region isn't so much that it is emanating from across the l gulf but more through the back door through yemen that strikes, within saudi territory -- against commercial shipping in the men have shown both to partner the region as well as to the united states that there's a different missile challenge emanating from iran and
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leveraging its pot proxy assets in the region. outside of its traditional relationship with hezbollah i think this raises interesting questions in terms of -- u.s. strategy where u.s. assets are a raid from a force foster perspective ongoing consultations with the saudis in materials of whether to some of their assets to the south to address the challenge and i think you know a good process of lessons learned to talk about -- the strike in saudi territory in what may have or not happened in the response to that. pane thinking more holistically in the maritime do main about commercial shipping challenge that's not just in the gulf and its immediate vicinity but really one that stretches from the gulf up through the babel looking as a holistic picture
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and what sort of capabilities that does the united states and its partners in the region need to be bringing to bear to address that that flow in to keep it free and open for global shipping. from a u.s. policy perspective trump administration is clearly limiting ballistic missile program to its one of the four conditions essentially for continuing u.s. commitment to the jcpa stated publicly. and since the beginning of the administration, the trump administration has made very clear that it does not necessarily separate the jcpa from iran's broader broader strategy. it has clearly disparaged previous administration in materials of deprioritizing iran's other o afnghts and capability development in the region. and capable clearest linkage
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between those broader afnghts. but really looking at them as one comprehensive whole which is in many ways imperialed the jcpa but also statement helped -- strengthen some of the -- support from gulf countries believing they have deprioritized some of the other elements of a iranian focus and i think they have -- in some ways appreciated that trump administration linkage between the two although -- that has made maintaining the commitment to the jcpa more difficult. so you know, both of a benefit but also a weakness in kind of making that linkage together in u.s. policy. and trump administration has been quite clear in he's one arm of its knew strategy that of
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trying to expose to the public iranian missile afnghts and more broadly destabilizing afnghts you recall ambassador haley public unveiling of iranian material. that has been collected in yemen now on display at the air force base for think tanker to come and view by invitation from the department of defense you may have seen that on social media from thinkers and town. so clearly, the trump administration is trying to expose the level of iranian investments in its missile capable to try to build some momentum for -- further strengthened action against it just last week there was also a new report that came out that was discussed at the u.n. that many of you may have heard. speaking to experts describing
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iran noncompliance with u.n. sanctions on its weapon and ballistic missiles, development specifically related to yemen again this is likely to be leveraged as -- a tool to build international support for -- for a follow on push to constrain iran's missile development. we've also seen -- increased sanctions from the u.s. treasury from the administration against ngtties responsible for different stages of the development and production of iran's ballistic missiles. i would presume that we would see more of this, of course, follows on -- sanctions efforts pushed in 2017. and it seem it is that the -- up tick in sanctions is in some ways a continuation of what the obama administration had been building towards in the last year or two. of -- its administration, in fact, that is 2017 sanctions i believe
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some of the information for justifying the -- those sanctions was a case that had been built during the obama administration. so somewhat of a continuation there. but clearly that is another leg in addition to exposing that pressure through sanctions as another leg of -- of the administrations policy and then you see the reflection on capitol hill. in terms of sanction measures to address missile development but also the broadering array of iranian destabilizing activities that is now been handed over to the senate. and in some ways as a hedge i believe in my analysis to how administration may end up on the jcpa to show some resolve to try to, you know, convince administration that congress is taking this issue seriously. but i believe the fact that it has not progressed beyond the
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senate is probably because of that ongoing dialogue between the hill and administration in terms of trying to uphold the deal diet is the broader concerns. and you know, how this plays into the, with exposure with sanctions being processed how that plays into them is a diplomatic leverage to potentially be mustered in a follow on agreement. i think it is fund mentally comes down to whether this administration which is taking a very hardline attack will consider what iranians actually want out of -- out of the equation out of the negotiations. and whether that dialogue is possible in this current political environment when had this administration has taken such a hard line stance. and even if a negotiation results in a range cap as the
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two dozen kilometer limit which i think is well and good and should be pursued reflecting back on the challenges in the region as a frame has shifted to yemen. and some of those regional challenges being preeminent for some of partners as well as for u.s. and global commercial interest. so that get us as far as what we need to go in terms of addressing iranian challenge? i think i'll stop there. >> okay. thank you. i think what i hear from all of you is -- not a technological problem because these are relatively easier technologies compared to many other technologies to acquire master. and it's it shall also legally binding framework for you to address this problem but broader problem is lack of political framework or political challenges either be the u.s. interest as well as the iranian
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interest as well as our interests. but i wanted to -- but through the technical issue that i've -- i want to go back to you, and i want to start is request drk i used to be attesting engine i worked in high. and -- topic is putting iran nuclear program in perspective the united states loosely speaking the united states missile 30 to 40 times before it declares it operational under really conditions and you watch the iranian missile program much closely than i do, and i have to say i don't think iranian subject themselves to those conditions. >> i would -- >> i relate it to the next question an you mentioned the -- the possibly cult and one provision under the conduct is
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notification of any -- so this also which means this also provides me an opportunity to technically look at this program and also politically an opportunity if you want to iran program international framework. you'll see this. because the reason i draw this is -- my own region where work they have a bilot rile agreement amongst them under a prenotification agreement of ballistic missile launch notifications and that word very well -- despite the political relationship have the worst of conditions. so is there an opportunity that more or less you can draw are from here? >> well, let me address the question of testing. i agree request you that historically countries and u.s., france, the soviet union would test dozens of times before
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actually deploying a system. but we don't see that necessarily in other o countries and i think there's a number of reasons why. in iran i think they typically test five, six, seven before they actually go to deployment. they may announce deployments earlier but i don't i'm not sure that they're truly deployed but i think it is very instructive to look back at the development program. this is a two-stage sol willed fueled missile capable of traveling about 2,000 kilometers. they began some ground testing and i think the first launch was in 2009 if i'm not mistaken. and they did like five or six tests. but they haven't tested it at all since february of 2011. and i think what happened is they encountered technical difficulties that they wouldn't sure they could overcome it became less of a priority with
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the shelving of the nuclear program or at least placing the nuclear program in advance and then they set this system aside that shows how testing can reveal your inability to master something. i thinking they were also efnghted by the, quote, accident in -- in november of 2011 '12 at facility where upwards to 15 or 17 iranian missile scientists were killed by a series of explosions in -- area which would not have had energetic material but you be draw your own conclusionings. i think that's that set their program back as well. but my point i want to make is, most of the missiles that iran you know, is developing are
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based on scud or no dong engine they imported large number of these engines from the koreans -- you know back in the 90s early 2,000s. that reduces the requirement for testing because the engine and guiding system are two real challenges and we don't really have a good idea of how accurate their systems are because when they're testing new one, new system or new modification because we don't know what the end point is. presumably we don't. they may not either. it is hard to tell i think this is one of the issues that koreans have right now is they have no idea how accurate or inaccurate their current long range missiles are and i want expect to see them testing more. but you're right they don't test a lot. one other note -- the iraqis in the middle of their war with iran wanted to
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extend range of their scuds to reach tehran so what they did is cannibalized it three scud missiles to create two kind of longer airframes that allow them with lighter payload to reach tehran i think it was 600 kilometers away. they tested that thing -- ten or 11 times over the course of a year, year and a half before they actually started launching them against tehran. and that gives you an example of if you really serious about creating new capability you have are to do a lot of testing. and they did it. they learned how to make that system work as a result. so people would argue you know, not everyone holds the same set of the requirements. yeah that's true. but if you want to achieve something, you cannot avoid doing the necessary number of tests. >> i can talk a little bit about intent because i think it's important. i don't think there's anything technical holding back the
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iranians from developing longer systems if now i know they're going to run into problems i completely agree with that. but i think if government commits the resources and puts the political backing behind it, you look at a time frame over a decade maybe a little longer, these challenges will probably be worked out. reason why i say this is because -- i think it's pretty well established particularly on u.s. side is that data exchanges or at least technical cooperation between the dprk and iranian -- and if question see some -- some e ternal proof of this where second stage looks a lot like iranian which is one of their space launch vehicle. and within the u.s. treasury designation the linkage is about the 80 ton -- rocket engine the engine where there could be cross -- i would like to challenge you. because i know that there's
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disagreement in the community about this. but i think a point that there is agreement in the community about this suggest that we don't really know how technically capable they looking from the oe this. but when you look at intent, it look like iranians through this lack of testing or this push towards -- longer systems have chosen not to for this period. i think that choice is ultimately reflective of government policy. so you don't always have this push to go locker longer and longer even though you have a technical capacity to do so and about the idea of a framework or or bilateral that's a good idea to me. i mean, within the overarching of -- framework of the region and question is everybody willing to do something that simple and i think that would be the challenge for the diplomat. >> someone -- the cooperation between iran and
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north korea to me is the clearly the exchange ideas in some information. i don't think there's -- much debate we could have about that to do degree to which they're cooperating, however, i think is -- it's not as deep as some qowld suggest. not suggesting that you are one of those, but if you look at design say the satellite launch vehicles. they actually use a cluster of that's a large issue if that's what you got. i think engineers would readily conclude the same most engineer it is you have these technologies this is what you can do with it. but how they arrange them, how they fit the steering engines on there and power them, they adopted two very different approaches. so if you look ath details of the designs they are different.
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tben with the r27 steering engines one we're not quite sure when second stage is and how the second stage and 14 or 15 are configured but more conjecture based on data that we have. i happen to agree with that assessment but again it's making due with what you have got and i don't know who created that -- idea fist whether it was the iranians or -- north koreans but i would say that the degree of cooperation qowb severely limited by the security both countries impose on their particular system. that is they come compartmentalize them and they all said the same thing. independently. yeah we knew so and so was supposed to be in iran or in north korea at the time western working. but we never saw them because we
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were stuck with a surgeon group of people those were only people we discussed very specific things about. so if you have that type of program structure it is hard to be cooperating on a grand scale. last thing on the 80 ton, quote, engine the actual sanction says working on an 80 ton booster a booster is typically a full stage. not just the engine but both first stage of the satellite launchers happen to weigh about 75, 80 tons so i think it's in reference to that. i've been trying to find out exactly what they meant and who wrote it and why. because they may not distinguish between booster and engine so far i'm leading to booster o opposed to engine but it is a little bit unclear. >> i'll come to you but i wanted to touch on your point about
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north korea and iran. the other interesting point that strikes to me is both of these countries programs are inherently -- meaning like you said they do not know where their aim is headed with but also they do not if they're head hg in the right direction so it makes sense to refer to countries compartment. and collaboration that the strategic level to know that, you know, my designs are accurate or heading in the right direction that also plays into a level of -- validation of testing if one, one up this, and tested here. then if my designs are based on those designs shelf life of my -- missile and also validated for next years. so i will -- you know not discount that. but -- no i think aaron and michael have visually covered more
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technical element of this. but just more from a policy perspective that the value of -- of pursuing technical discussions in the context of a broader framework has multiple sources of value. there's the information that the international community can gather in the ross to given some of the gap and understanding in just better knowing the iranian capabilities and their trajectory. there's the confidence building that occurs by forging those technical links upon which you can build perhaps broader political, and policy level discussions. and even if you aren't age to pursue the longer term agreement, you at least have that baseline level of understanding a bit more information on the technical basis, and perhaps a launching pad down the road. to be able to resume policy, political discussions if the
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diplomatic scene and the political players shift in the few years time. j one thing on that. i think it is interesting as an outsider looking in on this because we're watching from the outside looking in. is how iran has used its missiles in syria and yemen. i think multiple uses has been at least for me particularly enriching because you get to learn a little bit about how it works. how accurate it may or may not be i think welcome see the limits of its range and type of payload with which we particularly saw with the attack on the saudi airport. and then -- the you know this -- iranian missile that after the islamic state attack in iran they fired it into eastern syria. and the way in which they used that and i conceptionize on u.s. side is yemen is like a playground testing things out you know they're going up
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against high end u.s. systems. again not operated by u.s. personnel but nevertheless more or less what they would face. in a showdown over the gulf -- and they're doing pretty well. i think we have to acknowledge that and figure out how these -- tech no lodgely less developed systems are posing unique challenges to american hardware. particularly in yemen -- you know syria, far more conventional and and if i was sitting in the u.s. military i would be watching every single day i'm sure everybody is. writing down notes saying wow, like this is how they plan to employ these things quite -- they're quite creative i should says, and how they're ruling these things out. sm just if i could just -- aden addendum to that differentiator is a problem that
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we might have in drawing lessons from the yemen context versus how -- showdown might occur and iran has been increasing its context with at the end of the day the relationship between iran and husi is not as close as it is with lebanese hezbollah i think those dynamics might be different in a situation where you have a conflict in the gulf or iran is primarily actor itself. >> yeah. you shed light on this but i want to simplify if i hear -- if whatever i'm reading -- i get the feeling that iran and north korea is most transfer in missile -- because everybody is looking at them. but nobody is looking at -- close placing other o countries in such a microscope. so what is -- do you shed a light on the other capable with the intent arntiond
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the gulf? >> i think saudis paraded a few years back which was quite shocking. and it was at the period when iran was testing a lot of different systems it was also when iran before jcpoa et cetera i think they were trying to advertise their capabilities. the emirates have received scuds from north korea. they may have a base where they have them an may be stockpiled somewhere. they have just a small number of them and i have no qlad they would use them for. you know, presumably if they're attacked by ballistic missiles they would launch them against the iranians in retaliation. but not going to really do much. much damage -- you know they kind of lack the range to hit anything but -- the base right across the gulf from there and whatever it's
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called. so yeah, the egyptians you know they've had missile development programs since the 50s, and they launched how many? go ahead and half a dozen scuds at the israelis and -- 67 or 73 -- 73. yeah. so yemenis had a lot of -- scuds that they purchased from first the soviets or were given to them by the soviets during civil war and after. ...
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israel, which i found somewhat interesting because israel doesn't really test the listed missiles. they use the jericho two, three are essentially the same elements as their satellite launcher and these are solid propellant systems which are different and you can transform them for missile or space launch used more easily. but it's interesting they really haven't tested jericho in two or three as a ballistic missile. the one time they were accused of doing it was a failed launch. at least what i have. it's easy to do with the list of many countries.
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>> i have another technical question and one thing that keeps coming up, the ballistic missiles, and the other where nu suggested the modifications needed. could you elaborate on those modifications. >> yeah, in the case of the iranians, the second stage about their satellite launches are two-stage systems. the north koreans have another interesting departure between the two. but the second stage uses the steering engines from the old soviet r. 27, submarine launched missiles. they'll see is a more energetic, and that they loath rest. when you launch a satellite, that is okay.
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the satellite launcher goes up and then it parallels the surface of the earth so you are not fighting gravity in the same way. you are trying to accelerate the earth service to get the orbital speed you need. it goes to in the case of the iranian safety 200 or 400 kilometers. long-range missile, icbm is a maximum range torture or he keeps it around 1200 kilometers, much higher. so you are going to be fighting gravity of futurity use it as a ballistic missile with the long, low threats to, low threats to burn times, gravity will pull it down. and it is going to rob you of a lot of range. so what you're going to do is put entire threats. you will completely refigure the second stage. this can be done. people have detonated in the
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past, but it's usually done the other way around. plus you have to master reentry and you have to test this thing is a ballistic missile because the flight paths are very different. this is something koreans will face. they use is highly lofted teresa. it is actually easier to do some of the second stage starts whether you're in a vertical configuration as opposed to something at 30 degrees. [inaudible [inaudible conversations] >> thanks, guys. i'm just curious on a practical level the iranians have said they won't accept any new agreement on missiles. is there anything you envision the united states and the europeans could agree on in regard to the iranian missile program perhaps over the proliferation of rockets to
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young men. what about the israeli point of view on this? they've been specific about not allowing rocket factories in syria that they feel threatened. how do you see that playing out? in a few years, iran can theoretically buy anything a one including sophisticated bombers. so is this the wrong debate to be having in some sense? iran has missiles because it doesn't have the kind of air force and the saudis have had. [inaudible] >> i can address part of your question. i'll shamelessly plug, but we actually did a project looking
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at how iran might rearm itself in 2020 when they are allowed to purchase things that we look specifically at the air force. they don't have the money to buy air force. they will buy maybe one or two fighter wings, you know, probably something like from china or something. they just don't have the capital to invest the billions and billions of dollars they required. prakash is something the iranian regime knows they face and that is the guns are a better reissue and that's only going to get worse. iran is going to rely on ballistic missiles for the foreseeable future because of back, but also this is their way of war. if you look at the wars fought in the region, data extract the lessons from every one of those wars and it reaffirms their belief the ballistic missiles are there best way to offset the superior air forces and fire
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power of its rivals in the region in the united states. >> yeah, and i mean, i think this goes back to an idea is something introduced in my opening, which is the united states and its allies, european allies, but also regional partners seem to have a conversation in terms of what really matters, where they shared interest tire. the 2000-kilometer range caste boundaries acting to the united states and european allies and so far it circumvents the icbm potential, direct threats to the homeland. in terms of regional interests were original partners like, but also u.s. interests in the region as far as personnel bear, having interests and security of its allies and partners. iranian development using fiscal
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capabilities through proxies in both theory and gannon matter and perhaps as part of a larger conversation about trying to address the causes and drivers and outcomes of the civil wars. does that mean trying to not only interdict arms flows to yemen, which is an ongoing activity for steps the imac in terms of where they actually deploy in target their capabilities. can there be some dialogue on those lines when it comes to celia, the buffer zone that currently exist to a certain degree in southern area cannot be extended further northward. can there be a conversation in terms of the types of capabilities that are deployed south of that upper zone. there should be an internal conversation between the united states and allies in terms of whether those relative challenges arresting wire the shared sense is in pursuing those lines of effort together with the iranians.
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>> thank you. john greenwald, ex-service in international crisis group. thank you for all the good details on the problems and the issues in thank you also for some indication of policy achievements that she think would be useful if one could achieve them to deal with those issues. but one hardly ever get something for nothing and diplomacy in any other part of life. so i would like to ask, what concessions from the united states and other countries concerned about the iranian missiles might be commensurate, appropriate and potentially interesting trini iranian point of view? >> i'll take care. it builds on the first question.
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the first policy recommendation is they have to agree on something. i'm not sure the the europeans agree and therefore they don't agree amongst themselves as allies and you can't maximize leverage on the iranians to try and force possession. to the nuclear question was really, really easy because no one wants proliferation including russia and china and you could win broad-based. so what can iran get in return for cats? this is what my original point was you have to think of the region as the region and not bilaterally. then you have to expand the scope and conversation so everybody would be subject it to the same limits you would want placed on the iranians. this is not some game where they had one violated on the deliberation treaty so there is consensus on the idea you could
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have pressure to bring them back into compliance. this would be something external to god and therefore everybody would have to abide by it for at least a month or something. this is what the iranians say they want and this is extremely easy to say because nobody is going to agree to that. because i think the inspections are anything like that would be so onerous that they would make people come to vote, particularly in the allied countries. and so, they have in my opinion a lot more flexibility because of the consensus among the p5+1 and the u.s. and europeans in particular in like a consensus within the p5+1 adjacent, where they are not willing to discuss the theater. i don't have a great answer to
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your question then significantly challenging far more. >> i had a project on the specific issue i wrote about it in arms control today a few years ago. the two real challenge is besides iran would be in saudi arabia in the jericho systems and israel. i was in tel aviv last october talking to him about this very issue, whether they would accept a splendid thing pretty much the universal answer is why should we? we don't care if they can threaten europe. in fact, we kind of like the idea they can threaten wreck because it puts more pressure on iran on these other issues. they are more concerned with the
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transfer of the rockets in the search for things to hezbollah because they can be fired in very large numbers. the 2000-kilometer range doesn't provide much to the israelis. they don't want to enter into anything that relieves pressure on iran. i can understand both positions. the alternative concession might be as i said earlier, allowing some form of space launch act entity in iran as long as it's very transparent. and they are reasonably transparent with the space launch program by the way. they go to international conferences and may explain in detail the form and function of their launches. but there it have to be some technical limitations on large, solid strap on boosters, for example, would be forgiven.
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the use of cryogenic engines would be not by using the propellant formulations like we see in 14, 15 and 12. those have to be capped. it would be pretty intrusive, but there are things you can consider that might win them over. i wouldn't hold my breath, but it might win them over. >> are you suggesting the quid pro quo -- [inaudible] or would it be isometric -- [inaudible] >> has arrested the jcp away. >> i haven't even not much doubt myself. >> i think it comes down to again what do the iranians want. the most recent example we have a bat with the jcp away
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negotiations in which they did have a broader array of options available. that is not necessarily a total consent is view within iran. there is some element that don't want an opening to the west either as a backdoor way for the last two undermine the iranian basis of government. but i think that potentially could be on the table, but we are in a different frameshift here in the united states insofar as what might be politically palatable for the united state to be able to consider given the stands that this administration, given hardline positions so i think at the end of the day, it would be even more of a european shaft for the trade space might occur in determining what degree of relief could be given to induce iranians on the missiles all at
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the same time maintaining pressure on other area activity that both the united states and europeans care about. it is quite delicate, but i suspect iranians would be interested in a conversation. >> this is the same drama the councilmember. you mentioned all the iranian missiles can be arranged 2000-kilometer by some that are more than 2000 kilometers. >> well, there's 2000 or three guys then? >> it seems like he said most of the missiles in iran are 2000-kilometer range and because of that, they are incapable of having nuclear war. am i correct? >> we concluded those missiles that can fly 2000 kilometers all seem to be either the basis for
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the missile designed for nuclear use weather modification of that missile for example why specifically, and attention to a nuclear warhead on it if you had the intensity of the documents smuggled out in 2004. the presumption is these are all designed to be nuclear-capable. one that is a little less certain we just don't know too much about it. in principle could fly further than 2000 kilometers, but they put a huge warhead on it. we just don't have enough information of what its basis is. >> with the communication in order for it to be able to put nuclear warheads on it aired what should be the range. >> you can put a nuclear warhead
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on anything you want it if you can make it small enough, we put them on daily crockett rockets in pakistan. these are all systems that are less than 300 kilometers. it depends on how small you make it. we have nuclear artillery during the cold war. so there is no inherent limitation. the one comment i would make is no country has developed a missile without first having had a nuclear weapon, which is an interesting thing and i can kind of point that out when the iranians started developing the issue, really concerned me that this is something someone does unless they have been intentioned on the road to do something -- something else.
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>> thank you. this is also to you, michael because you mentioned pointing to the fact that the notion the intention is introduced in the security council resolution. i'm a little unclear on what the political significance as at this point after what you describe that there are in fact a lot of missiles that seem to have intentions. does this make sense in the first place? it seems like it's likely a change that is favoring iran. did that make political sense to you? the distinction today provide any diplomatic outcomes that all or is it the sheer breadth of the intentional nuclear arsenal so great that it doesn't matter. >> when mark and i started looking at this project, what we're trying to do is provide or
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offer a framework for delineating what it means, what it means and what would be prescribed under that council resolution in what would be permitted. and so he kind of threw something up there that was a little more structured than the simple, we'll just use what the npcr says. the npcr was originally seven countries in 1987, the father of the npcr told me how he came up with that definition, which is quite interesting as well. we wanted to put something out there. we may not be right. we've answered the issue. what we want to do is prompt a debate that looks at it. we do know a debate to the
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security council since the passage of 20 to 31, chinese and russians keep saying that is not what it was intended to be a nuclear delivery system following the logic that the iranians put out there. that may or may not be true. do we have a framework for doing the analysis to determine what its intent was whether it the original intent. >> i think one of the challenges of this of the security council resolution was one of those things that the compromise over the final goal line. what i mean by that is the basic framework for the u.s. understanding that this public understanding outlined in the i.t. ea documents was the specific design for a nuclear weapon that would fit in the warhead that michael keeps talking about. and that warhead was on the
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ascension in your also there. you can have the conventional stuff with better aerodynamics that can fly further. but that is what makes this difficult. one of the things we've learned is the iranians are now willing to discuss hard caps on their ballistic missile program. if you are sitting in washington are a different p5+1 capital, are you worried about the missile or what goes inside? ultimately they worry about what goes inside the missile because we care about the design of the warhead in stopping that production rather than stopping the hard cap on missiles. that is for the trump administration has moved things forward and where they can be asynchronous with a lot of the countries involved in this because the missiles are secondary to the issue of what goes inside the missile. the idea of nuclear capability is a good job trying to define.
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nothing but a nuclear weapon on anything. trying to figure this out. that is the hard part and clearly that was crafted diplomatic language in such a way to where it's largely done. doesn't say the restrictions interpreted in the press now particularly in the u.s. >> what about focusing on something that is covered by 20 to 31, which is the transfer of missile technology? is there any realistic way of doing a better job of it or say not? i am trying to imagine the russians with the chinese agreeing to more sanctions on iran after nick e. hailey's dog and pony show. but i can imagine that right
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now. maybe you can. >> i could be wrong, but i believe that some of the sanctions related the treasury pushes and then also sends the legislation being considered is under the auspices of trying to actually enforce. so i think, yes is the short answer to that. >> i think the ultimate difficulty, it is clear that what the houthis are using iranian origin. when they get into yemen. i know on the u.n. security panel of experts they look at us a lot. the difficulty is in the strip legalese is how do you pinpoint data transfer and that's ultimately the problem. at least that's what your friend
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u.n. security council experts to look at this specific issue if everybody knows it's going on, but putting together the case about when it was transferred becomes the difficult things to do in the u.n. security council to be vetoed with secondary issues on the u.s. side to stay within the jcpoa, but to increase pressure. >> i'm interested in the question of how they are transferred and i don't have an answer to it. you know, they've obviously broken it kind of into two pieces to facilitate the transfer because it shows that he was very crudely welded back together. i've talked to a number of people who actually were decision-makers at the u.s. part
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of the navy that operates in the goal and the central command region. and they have their suspicions of how it might be transferred and if those suspicions are indeed correct, i think it would be very hard to interdict. there is a land border between yemen and several countries, too. dry your own conclusion. the rumors are going back around. that is what i've heard as well. that is going to be very difficult to interdict because it would involve watching over her port in many different countries. [inaudible] i try to once in a while. >> thank you. >> thank you very much.
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>> thank you. [applause] >> the next event is going to be march 12th for you here and we have a special treat here from syracuse university going to talk about iran's political elites. so, the families that have governed iran since the revolution they should be very interesting. thank you all for coming. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]
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[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> coming up in just a bit here and c-span2, the george polk journalism award for the discussion of news media coverage of the russia investigation. we'll hear from reporters at the "washington post" and the new
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york times starting at 11:00 a.m. eastern here live on c-span2. adnan heritage foundation has a look at cases before the supreme court, including union membership with political messages on polling places. california requiring certain information be provided at pregnancy crisis centers at noon eastern today live here on c-span2 from the heritage foundation. coming up -- >> c-span come or history unfolds daily. in 1979, c-span was created as a public service by america's cable television companies and today we continue to bring you unfiltered coverage of congress, the white house, the supreme court and other policy events in washington d.c. and around the country. c-span is brought to you by your cable or satellite provider.
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>> you on c-span 2's tonight, tonight on primetime with a look at the publishing industry to begin at 8:00 p.m. eastern with a tour of regnery publishing an interview employees that publishing house. former publisher and editorial for the bloomsbury press will talk about the duties of a book editor. a look at columbia university price on how university publishers work and weekend with editor-in-chief of the right, receiving the editorial excellence work in the biographer's international organization. the tv in prime time on this week on c-span2 beginning at 8:00 p.m. eastern. >> joining masses lanny davis, author of "the unmaking of the president 2016: how fbi director james comey cost hillary clinton the presidency." also served as the white house special counsel from 1996 to match 1998. if you look at it,ic this is at the feet


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