tv Christian Keller The Great Partnership CSPAN August 17, 2019 8:45pm-9:53pm EDT
[cheering] >> you are watching tv on c-span2 with top nonfiction books and authors every weekend. book tv, cell division for serious readers. >> good afternoon. welcome to the theater at the national archive. i am the chief of archive reference services and that's a fancy way of saying iran these on the other side of the building. and david was scheduled to provide welcoming remarks today. he sends his regrets that he get up here but his presence was needed at another one of our facilities. i am filling in and will seal
his line and say welcome to my house. i am pleased you could join us and whether you're here participating through facebook or youtube, welcome to those of you who are joining on c-span. today we listen to christian teller discusses most recent book the great partnership, stonewall jackson and the state of the confederacy. doctor keller is the eisenhower chair of the national security and strategy of the united states army war college in carlisle pennsylvania. this year he became a director of military history program. in many articles he is the author, co-author or editor of several previous books on american civil war including the germans ethnicity and civil war memory. in the introduction in the book he lays out clearly and
concisely several things. including the value of this book. historical and what you'll find in his notes versus the text itself. i greatly appreciate him confronting ahead on interpretive value and reliability of material particularly confederate wartime sources versus postwar sources former confederate. this military history takes you through chronological elation ship between lee and jackson and includes a chapter on the getty works campaign following the death of jackson after the battle. he also provided a chapter by including in appendix a provides insight on leadership from the partnership from the injection. you can tell with the results are reaching out via today's political military leaders.
before we hear from doctor keller about his book, i would like to let you know about another program coming up later this week on thursday august 8 at noon, douglas waller will present a lecture on lincoln's spy, the secret war to save a nation in which he would describe union agents, george sharp, elizabeth van lu and baker. please visit our website at archive.co.gov. please join me in welcoming doctor christian to the stage. [applause] >> good afternoon everyone. thank you very much for that fine introduction and i would
like to think tom, doug and the staff were running the audio visual component of the presentation. you have been very helpful and it could not have done it without you. i would like to think back at the army war college, one of our techs to make a johnson without whom i could not have put this together. so a shout out to tamika and all the stuff in the department of national security and strategy. it's an honor to be here, i've spent many hours working in the archives previously for my earlier books on ethnicity in the civil war and to come back in this particular way is quite ratifying. i am happy to be here. as a heads up on how to proceed, i am going to read for a while
and provide background to me feces that trevor mentioned and you will get two different presentation styles which mimic in many ways the two different presentation styles that are utilized at the army war of college in carlisle. finally i would like to say that my words are my own and do not necessarily represent the official policy of the department of defense of u.s. army or u.s. army war college. the late afternoon sun of may 10, 1863 was warm and pleasant. just bring through the young trees of the virginia wilderness and creating a quilt of bright and dark spots on the floor. here it focused on the fern struggling to unfold into life, there it landed on a burned
corpse or newly dug grave. spring came to virginia but so have the war. shattered rifles, shell fragments, broken canteens and even the remains of a drum littered the sides of the stage road down which a small group of men were galloping full speed towards fredericksburg. those men had just been at the home of thomas chandler who lived in a small hamlet on the richmond fredericksburg called guinea station. all that sunday they waited outside a frame house on his estate and. for the man lying on the bed inside offering supplications to the almighty that he may be spared and return duty. at 315 they found out that their prayers and those of thousands more in the army of northern virginia had not been answered. general thomas jonathan stonewall jackson was dead.
just the day before the leader dispatched his friend and chaplain the reverend beverly tucker lacey from his bedside to army headquarters near fredericksburg. his mission was to conduct sunday morning worship for the troops as usual and he preferred to stay but jackson insisted. the spiritual welfare of the men was paramount. regardless of what happened to him. the chaplain complied. leaving the service to a flock of 1800 soldiers and their army commander robert e lee. the great victory at chancellorsville have been achieved primarily by jackson attack on may 2 and now at the height of his military success, he faced the possibility that his most trusted lieutenant and advisor might soon leave his side. hearing of jackson admission he
asked lacey to express my affectionate regard and say to him he has lost his left arm but i my right arm. that was three days ago in jackson amputated arm healing nicely despite the troubling sign of the secondary infection, pneumonia. now despite prayer and the best medical care in the confederacy, he had to admit to his commanding general that the end was near. they normally stoic lee was surprised and shaken at the turn of events. surely general jackson must recover, he told lacey before the service, god will not take him from his note we need him so much. his faith and his subordinates recovery seemingly strengthened by the chaplain sermon he approached lacey "after words" and said i trust you will find him better when a suitable occasion offers, tell him that
i. for him last night as i never. before. these were brave words spoken by a brave man and a devoted christian but lacey saw through them. lee could say no more insight of the troops and turned away in overpowering emotion. the writers, their horses fatigued at the long hard run from guinea station and reigned in at least headquarters at 5:0a person commanding general tent, how exactly they convey their disturbing news and what immediate reaction lee may have exhibited is unknown but the response from the soldiers in the ranks was immediate as the word spread. the sounds died away as if the angel of death himself had slapped his muffled wings over the troops. a silence profound mournful,
spitefully and oppressive as a funeral paul descended over the camps. veterans of the 70s of fredericksburg and some of whom who had fought with jackson in the valley cried like babies. the shock to the living party. in the evening the news went abroad in the sob swept over the army of northern virginia and it was a heartbreak of the confederacy. indeed it was. lee managed to restrain his sadness and the simple message to richmond. it becomes my duty to announce the death of general jackson it began. he continued for a few brief sentences that describe the transport of a body to the capital and abruptly ending the wire, the next day he issued general orders number 61 to the army and attempt to hang over
but they left no doubt that he himself was still in shock. the daring skill and energy of this great and good soldier by decree of an all wide providence are now lost. but why we mourn his death, we feel his spirit still lives and will inspire the whole army with his and the indomitable kerch and confidence in god as our hope and strength. let officers and soldiers emulate his determination to do everything in the defense of our country. having newly erected the bold public front for the benefit of others, privately the commander could not check his emotions, when he attempted to speak about jackson to william pendleton that same day he broke down in tears and had to excuse himself. the strong religious faith the help cement the bond between the in jackson doubtless comfortably
in his moment of despair and he wished the entire army to no its effects. yet his prayers, those of countless others have not saved jackson and his death left a great void, one with strategic consequences for the cause it ended. privately he confided to his son, it is a terrible loss, i do not know how to replace them. on may 11, president jefferson davis reinforced his dread with a simple telegram from richmond. a national calamity has befallen us. faith would help him move forward personally but the death of jackson was a professionally mortal blow from which a confederate chief and the confederacy would never recover. at the heart of this book, are for historical feces, first that the lee jackson command team was
professionally successful because it was rooted in personal friendship underpinned by trust and shared religious faith. initially the personal relationship was weak, long di long-distance. but by the end of the winter of 1863 it had grown into a powerful bond that cemented the already strong professional relationship even enhancing it. second, that it was within the unique relationship that the most successful elements of confederate strategy in the eastern theater first germany were operationally implemented and with jackson's death permanently signing. jackson became lee's chief strategic advisor as well as his preferred operational lieutenant. lee intern was his primary
source of strategic advice of fact well substantiated in secondary literature. third, jackson was himself, a strategic level leader, a general who thought early in the war about how to win it for the confederacy, offering numerous suggestions to lee, the president and others that rank higher than his own and even dabbled in policymaking through his relationships with congressman. and four, his death following the campaign in may 1863 the confederacy suffered a strategic inflection point, a contingency that held momentum implications for the future of the young nation. spanning all for historical arguments has a larger observation that has significance for political military and business leaders today and the future. the command relationship between chief leader and chief advisor
is extremely important. especially at the highest levels of responsibly. because it was within that association that the best strategic ideas, ones that win wars and save corporations for instance are created. every senior leader needs a trustworthy advisor or group of trusted advocates. . . . occasionally events occur that witness a a complexion of the levels of war. what is called an nexus. whereby tactical actions for instance may determine operational outcomes which in turn might strongly affect the
interest at her strategy or national strategy and for those who may be confused at this., i'll show you some slide that will clarify very shortly. the history of the civil war demonstrates all of these levels of war were at play just as they are today. although it is participants may not have used the same things as modern practitioners, they understood the different layers of command-and-control and had at least a common sense understanding of how they interacted. as in modern war however, the confederacy's senior leaders make mistakes sometimes fusing the levels together accidentally or earnestly applying ideas and concepts working at one level to another. this was due in part to the week theoretical education they received at west point in the years and to the state of military theory at the time which was in substantial flux with important works such as things in war and not yet
translated into war. into english. we should not.them for their errors. the leaders of both the union and the confederacy made the decision they thought best based on what they knew at the time combined with their personal experiences personalities and command structures. much as we still do today. by the winter of 1862, to 63, the eastern theater of operations i.e. estates of the east of the appalachian mountains had become the most strategically theater for confederate hopes for national independence. if the war was to be one, and needed to occur in that theater. and that meant the union's principal fueled army the army of the peloton may, would have to be decisively defeated. robert ely had tried with jackson's assistance throughout the spring summer and fall of 1862 to affect that very result, but several opportunities
alluded him. civil war armies are notoriously difficult to destroy the field. in reality that lee and his command teams ultimately consisting of jackson, james long street and james ewell brown jeb stuart, faintly came to understand. time and again, during the seven days before and after second manassas and the fredericksburg and chancellorsville they had realized the challenges inherent in transforming tactical/operational victories into strategic ones. in each of these successful companions, lee jackson discussions both private and in consultation with the other leaders molded can federate strategy attempting to ratify this problem. jackson's early strategic thoughts in 198061 into the spring of 1862, about writing
the north and bringing a quote hard war to the enemy. this was not only wise counsel fairly then be in military advisor and effective general in chief but also reflected the strategic reality contextually facing the confederacy. the loss of much of tennessee and mississippi river valley in northern arkansas by mid 1962, meant that recovery in the western and trans- mississippi theaters was unlikely. there the confederacy can only hope to delay rent the inevitable but in the east, the war could feasibly be brought to successful conclusion. northern and southern and european public opinion focused on the east, it could be more strongly influenced by events on the battlefield. there than in the west. union civilian morale could be directly affected they could endanger political base in
future elections. transportation and manufacturing centers in pennsylvania could be disrupted. thereby undermining federal logistical power. jackson's correspondence with lee before he left the shenandoah valley, to join what became known as the peninsula campaign are the seven days in june of 1862, revealed the strategically or with thinking mind one that quickly made its mark on the future commander of the army of northern virginia, and would continue to influence lee's own strategic and operational thought for the remainder of the war. but lee's personal preferences combined with the constituencies of the political arena he had to operate in managing it one davidson's expectations and leading the eastern army. this meant that he could not immediately and unconditionally accept jackson strategic thoughts. obviously the union army also dictated many of his actions.
deferential loyal friend, jackson first endeared himself to lee as a military and professional who could effortlessly follow his attempt in achieving operational objectives. sometimes late but never failing, the valley general earned lee's respect to his performance in the cedar run, second and asses and sharpsburg campaigns ensuring his lackluster performance in the seven days was viewed as an anomaly. even then, however, he began to confer regularly with lee and started the process of building personal trust. that trust in turn was buoyed by share devotion to even jelly coal presentism. although approaching their christianity from different denominational perspectives, jackson's unswerving adherence to god's law and spreading of the gospel among his troops, made a strong impression upon the deeply religious lee who by
the winter of 1862 to 1863, was attending worship services with jackson. the reverend beverly tucker lacey an old friend of jackson's brought in by the general to serve with his core chaplain, and the spiritual reforms they walked together and were instrumental in the development of those religious bond between lee and his subordinates. this connection in turn, strengthen what had become a strong personal friendship during the wintering camp outside of fredericksburg. by the time of the chancellor's campaign, jackson had superseded james long street, as lee's primary lieutenant and along with stuart, when integral in helping the commanding general receipt victory over the federals against long odds. yet, fickle chance intervened in the woods on the night of may 2nd, 1863, as it had so many times both for and against lee in previous campaigns, shot accidentally by his own men and
stonewall was dropped twice from the letter carrying him to the later rear and surviving the amputation of his left arm, succumbed to pneumonia ten days later. it was a personally crushing blow for lee who lost not only not a man who have been kim a) but also his chief strategic advisor and battle field operator. the damage done to the confederate war effort was perceived by nearly all in the confederacy from jefferson davis all the way down to the common citizens in texas. even little children. regardless, of postwar confederates who attempted to use his death as a lost cause excuse for rebel defeat, jackson says sudden demise was a strategic turning.in the war was recognized as such at the time. this reality became startling clear and the ensuing pennsylvania campaign. it was apparent that jackson's accident left a gaping hole in
lee's command team and badly impaired its efficacy. tragic cascade, a secondary and third order effect, impacted the results of the operation and insured the failure of lee's new theater strategy for the east. that in turn, hastened the final defeat of the confederacy. so at this time, i will turn to some slides and i hopefully will answer some questions that you may have in your head after hearing this introduction. i am also going to give you a brief primer on classical military theory. it's infused throughout the book and serves as a fundamental basis for much of my analysis of the lee jackson relationship. of the top there, you see carl with whom i mentioned and his principal fundamental theory war is mary the continuation of by the rains really directs in many
ways the actions of both lee and jackson in their attempts to win the war for the confederacy and eastern theater. both lee and jackson understood that war is a political act, and an intern influences policy and politicians and political decisions and aunts, my argument that lee was constantly trying to win decisive victories that could make the northern morale suffered to the.that the northern people would doubt the ability of the union to persevere in the context. jackson very much agree with him in this regard. also, was a bit more aggressive and wanted to bring hardware into as i mentioned which would punish the people of the north for attempting to subdue the rebellion. that block there with a red stool in it illustrates one of
the fundamental strategic periods with each of the war army war college. the ideas of ways ends and means. ends representing objectives, and strategy and ways the concept of the methods employed to reach those ends, and means of the resources that are employed in the ways to reach the end and in many ways the waves themselves will be considered strategies that connect the resources in a workable way to achieve the ends of a given strategic operation. below that, you see the elements of national power. sometimes called the instruments of national power, the diplomatic informational military and economic at the army war college we go with this acronym the dime. national defense university and other senior service colleges might use other acronyms. this may extend the time into other instruments and that's fine. we think that pretty much
everything is encapsulated underneath those four major instruments of national power that in the civil war as today, were exercised and utilized by national governments in their attempt to win the war. the war is not just about winning militarily. it is also about the diplomatic aspect and the economic power that supports the military operations and then the informational impact that often influence political decision-making in democracies. and we see the levels of war and i promised in the talk that i would explain this. there are three fundamental levels of war. the strategically operational and tactical and you can see that very clearly how we align those. notice that there are areas where they intersect. i argue what many in the dod are
arguing now, and that is even a tactical level can range upward and intersect with the strategic so that there are these nexus points where something at the tactical i.e. the battlefield level can have profound strategic level affects. the low the war winning level of strategy. what one might call perhaps national militaries national strategy is theater strategy and i speak a lot about that in the book and mentioned it also in my prelude there this refers to the strategies that are particularly designed for the theaters of war in american civil war the eastern the western for the trans- mississippi. ideally they would be orchestrated tour work together towards the political object that either side had in mind. often in reality, they did not. robert he lee quickly came to understand that only in the east
could the confederacy achieve those political objectives i.e. winning objectives. winning independence. you see a little triangle that gives you an idea of how they correspond to levels of war. strategic level leadership at the strategic level, but it extends down to the operational level which was also where robert e. lee found himself operating and stonewall jackson both when he was an independent army commander in the valley. direct leadership generally applied the tactical level. organizational is almost exclusively at the operational. so let's talk briefly about what the ends of both of the sides were in the civil war. i do this exercise so everyone can understand the context in which lee and jackson in his great part partnership operated. they did have a fundamental grant of these theoretical concepts even if they didn't call them by the thing nomenclature as we do today.
obviously the national policy objective of the confederacy represented thereby jefferson davis and in robert e. lee, on the left, his independence and they wanted to achieve independence from the union. for the union of the federals, represented by abraham lincoln and initially winfield scott, who will later be replaced as general in chief by henry demille alec the primary fundamental policy objective was preserved the union and later as you know, it was joined by amanda as a national war policy or end. let's turn to ice. at the national and theater levels. for the confederacy, their overall national military strategy for all three major theaters of war was primarily defenses. the idea was they would exhaust the northern will to fight.
and northern people being in the democratic republic would eventually say enough already we have lost too many boys and it's not worth it anymore. then they went forth republicans under abraham like in and out of power. in a strategy not graded by davis in 1862 called the perimeter defense, was a complete failure and attempted to defend all of the frontiers of the confederacy and was proven to be unviable. due to liberal confederate means. it was replaced by what was known as the defensive and offensive. in rough military strategy as i explained in the book and not always taken into consideration by all of the theater commanders but that's what it resembled. he had more success, robert e. lee in the east particularly embarked upon this method in this particular theater and the idea was exhaust in order to repeated infrequent repeats of
the in the unites states army. if could get a strategic level to destroy the potomac in particular, that would be the best possible scenario. lee and jackson are causally trying to get to that theater military end. but they never quite get it. from the north, they are national military strategy, can be characterized as a defensive. i.e. defeat the south by force of arms, and utilize attrition. as necessary in this particularly became prominent in the last two years of the war. there was also an unaccounted plan that general scott came up with and was roughly adopted by his successors. enabled blockade and you can see scott's great sink representing that idea. the idea that you're going to squeeze the confederacy from without while you are striking down from the north inwardly.
in the east, there are several campaigns designed to take the confederate capital of richmond and recall of those on to richmond campaigns, they all failed until 1865. in the west, the major objective in that theater was control the mississippi river. with the drive that concurrently through tennessee and ultimately those were very successful. robert e. lee reddick realizes as early as mid- 1862 and knew then the pressure was on him to perform a miracle in the eastern theater. it had happened there. if it was going to happen at all because the west and trans- mississippi on the other side of the great river, were almost hopeless causes in his opinion. and that comes from his original statements in the records. in 1863, abraham lincoln, came up with the identification of a confederate center of rug gravity they wouldn't have known it but they understood what it was implicitly. the major power which was broken
will debilitated an eminent enemy in war. the center of gravity that lincoln identified and then made his generals understand was that the confederate army himself need to be destroyed. after 1863, this will be his primary methods to his field destroyed the field armies and do whatever is necessary to bring them down as a corollary to this we see the idea of hard work against the south later under william sherman. if you hit the home front, you're also going to be hit that in armies which are supplied by the home front. when we turn to national strategic means, these next two slides give you an idea of the disparity between the north and the south and the civil war and this is been is in the beginning. as the war progresses it just gets worse. for the confederacy indicating to robert e. lee that the clock is ticking and he must act
quickly and decisively because the longer the war goes the worse it's going to be, as far as means are for the south. he did realize and think that somehow prevent lincoln's reelection and 64 and the means wouldn't matter as much but until that time, he had to find a way to win victories and oppressed northern morale because the disparity in the were so a blatantly obvious and you can see these for yourselves. really the only place on this chart south lee and valued slaves. railroads are something often message a lot by authors in the civil war very clearly a huge disparity. at three to one in favor of the union. the naval power and the mercantile power of the union with that shipping. what is the south have on this chart in his favor really just the fact that it has a lot of cotton. one of its diplomatic strategies, was called king cotton diplomacy and it was the idea that the value of cotton to
great britain and france and european great powers would ultimately bring them in on the side of the confederacy somehow and that did not happen. what was the national strategic situation by late april 1863. it was the second full year of the war. and with jackson's help, robert ely had won the battles of second masses. he had scored a stalemate and antietam though forced to retreat, and had one very lopsided late at fredericksburg. it's important to to realize that part of the antietam campaign though technically a strategic defeat for the south, did include an operational victory it of high magnitude which is the capture of harpers ferry which would in the result jackson's doing. as i mentioned in the book, it was the capture of harpers ferry probably seven let if i'd that lead jackson trust. a professional level of trust because lee then realized this man actually can do it and i can
rely in him. he had tried them out in previous campaigns did not do well in the seven days around richmond and his debut with lee. then he did very well at second and asses and there is a period of time in between where they try to captured a union army not because of jackson, that did not work out. now at the fall of harpers ferry jackson has proven to robert e. lee, that he can be relied upon indefinitely to achieve these theater ends. in the east therefore the confederacy is slightly winning the war. but in the west, pittsburgh is threatened and tennessee has been taken almost two thirds by union armies, and the united states the federals are blending clearly in the western theater. only small sections of the mississippi river run break. most of the mississippi is under control of the union navy. the union is also winning the d
resenting the diplomatic's writs of power heavily in europe but his. as well as the informational which is connected strongly with the d. particular lay in overseas diplomacy and also within the union itself and there is some resistance in the north, the most of the union people are still resolved. these are very strongly reported in northern papers. that they will hold on. they will continue to support the northern war effort. so by may 1863, the beginning of that month, things are looking good for the south in the east but not very good and the other two theaters and overall, the outlook is somewhat bleak. it is in this context, that the newest of lincoln's generals in command of the army atomic will see the operational initiative and outrank robert e. lee at fredericksburg.
this was after the winter and now lee is out planting outnumbered and what will be known as the chancellor's campaign will commence. i show this like to remind us all folks that at the strategic level it is easy to lose sight of the cost of war at the human level. these represent actual pictures taken on the battlefield some of them are very familiar to you. the great iconic by alexander order of the number church and the dead in front of it. the cost of war, was becoming very apparent to the people of and the confederacy and then realized that it could not go on forever. lee is also aware of the cost of war and in his letters home to his wife marion and to his daughters he indicates that jackson wasn't perhaps a little more immune to the terrors and horrors of war than lee was in the sense that lee historical record both men were aware of
the human cost. that their victories have created. these are the union general's have been defeated. up to the chancellorsville campaign. joseph will not yet be defeated on may 1st 1863, that he will eventually go down. all oliver alward it was his core the 11th for that will be outflanked by several jackson's great march at chancellorsville and all of these gentlemen george mccullen, fitzjohn porter who was a core commander, john help, rose burnside fredericksburg and then howard at chancellorsville will all of the most fall to the lee jackson command team. making lincoln despair, could he ever find somebody who could defeat these two confederates. over the top we see in 1866 print depicting prayer and
jackson camp as i indicated in my opening statement there, one of the fundamental lose that brought the a jackson together was undying belief in human genetic jelly goal as it was understood at the time. they both believed in divine providence, the idea that the lord had everything under control and if he didn't predestined events, he certainly controlled how events would unfold. we believe that there was some human agency that was allowed within this understanding and the people could choose to do right or wrong if they did wrong, and they got spanked and that could extend the holy up to the national level. he feared therefore the confederate people were not devoted enough to the lord and they were sending a idols of man instead of idols or altars to the lord. jackson was especially concerned of the latter issue. he did not believe as much in the idea of human agency.
he believed that the lord controlled more than we did. the differences didn't make much of how the two generals interacted. how they jointly understood the role of religion. in their lives and in their decision-making. jackson's often portrayed as being a little far on the extreme and in fact he was on the one side if you will of the spectrum most 19th century americans were on at the time but he wasn't an extreme as previous authors has made him out to be. where they portrayed him as being nuts, not at all. robert e. lee was more conservative than jackson but they were both on the same spectrum and on the same side of it. the picture on the bottom on the matter date picture of the manor where jackson had his wicker headquarters between the fredericksburg and changing bill and he spent a lot of time in an office on the grounds there.
i have a whole chapter that describes his time there. it was during this period that the lee jackson relationship was flourishing and was apogee and where their friendship was married in their professional respect for each other. they begin to plan what would become the pennsylvania campai campaign. they plan to gather what would become the pennsylvania campaign and during this time, the winter months of the early spring of 1863. the sad thing for robert e. lee and for the confederacy if you will go so far as that, is that jackson is cut down before lee can even get into pennsylvania which is a huge handicap for him because he has planned the campaign with jackson. that's part of the reason that we are going to have huge confederacy in problems and what will become deaconess beat gettysburg and being. there were three areas of consideration that were
explained nationally in the confederacy right at the advent of the chancellorsville campaign after which jackson will die. virginia or the eastern theater represented by number three, the tennessee theater represented by number two and the mississippi theater represented by number one particularly the pittsburgh. robert e. lee, and jackson will determine well before, the battle of chancellorsville that number three needs to be if this is for the spring. they had tried to get prepared to move north before just a full care in army of platonic did but lee fell ill. it delayed their ability to get the jump on the federals. instead hooker outflanked them. he is we have the chancellorsville campaign. after jackson's death robert a lee went to richmond to a series of conferences and convinced the command authority there that number three is where the
infosys needs to be. they need to take the war to pennsylvania if there is any chance for independence. davis had to be convinced of that. what was the late jackson relationship therefore, on the eve of the faithful jezebel campaign the great contingency.ir given the book. because of lee's ultimately to jackson's death in the shattering of the team, jackson is least cheap operator because long street's accident. he is on detached duty on the southside virginia near petersburg. jackson is least chief strategic operational and tactical visor. both wish to bring the war into the north. jackson is one of lee's few personal friends. their relationship is built on a foundation of professional trust undergirded by christian faith and jackson and stewart the calvary leader are also quite close which created a solid level of second-tier leadership and chancellorsville and potentially jaunt. the stewart jackson relationship
is fascinating and if you read the book, you will see. just how close they were. what was jackson significance to the confederacy in the spring of 1863, he had a public reputation as a winning general rent he was paired in the public eye with lee. i.e. the two together, where understood by the confederate public as the winning team for the south at that time. his moral character was tied in the public eye also to the righteousness of the overall confederate cause because he was such a christian and this was very well-known. everybody believed that jackson represented the goodness biblically of the confederate cause. the public also understood his value to lee personally and particularly professionally as his chief and tenant. he was viewed as the protector especially in the valley of virginia and he had a very strong and rising reputation in
the government particularly in congress but also with the jefferson davis. they had a little feud in the beginning and then by this time it had ironed out. but unfortunately, as i indicated they will intervene and jackson will be shot accidentally by his own men on the night of may 2nd, 1863 and ultimately will be brought to that house up there on the chandler plantation. he will die on may 10th. depriving lee of all these things. as a means of kind of evidence indicating what that collaboration had done up to that., the bottom picture shows a map of the northern counties of maryland and the southern counties of pennsylvania. which was drawn at jackson's apartment for jedediah hodgkinson who had traveled in pennsylvania before the war and of the area and jackson wanted to have an accurate map for what would be the spring invasion.
that meant will be used by the rest of the confederate command team but this time without jackson when they do finally get into pennsylvania in june of 1863. i have a chapter that describes the reactions to jackson's death. it really proves the argument just how bad this was seen in the south and it was understood as a contingency. lee himself said who can fill his place i do not know but yet try to comfort himself with the idea that these are jackson spirit may be diffused across the army. officers and enlisted men in the army of northern virginia said it was a national calamity like the chief executive. there were tears. some said god's will be done. some of them had words such as all hopes of peace and independence are vanished forever. it was actually a statement in a wartime letter and there were others like it. government officials enrichment.
jefferson davis said it was a national calamity. secretary of war james said his loss is irreparable. three pages long had a eulogy to jackson in his report to congress in 1863. in virginia, particularly in richmond and in the valley our utter despair. he has fallen and a nation weeks and one editorial. in the carolinas and the deep south, the despair was mirrored and sometimes exaggerated even more, the most serious loss we have set yet sustain said one newspaper editor. a national calamity was the renter aided by another. he was absolutely in viable to a cause and yet another and in one paper, they said there is universal poem across our community and this was several weeks after jackson's death. it was persisting, he went on for weeks. in england, in england and his papers pick this up as well. one of the major papers, i think
it was a time, surely the most fatal shot to the war in confederates and yet to in the north after his death generally could not replace him. that was oliver otis howard who said that. so my final conclusion here, is very visually conveyed. this is what the armory in northern virginia look like at the advent of the gettysburg campaign. jackson of course is dead by then, and will be replaced by two other core commanders. richard ewell and ap hill. that's just a soldier who is serving as a placeholder notice the reorganization indicated by the chart below. that reorganization ir given my final chapter, was what created the cascade of tragic events that resulted in confederate defeat at gettysburg. it wasn't that jackson was at
gettysburg, and i want to make that clear. i do not say that. a lot of fanciful writers would make the argument that jackson had lived he would have taken cemetery or. i make the argument instead that his death inspired a beginning it makes the campaigned so profoundly different. if for nothing else just the reorganization of the confederate army. the entire character of the pennsylvania campaign will be utterly different and then you have two core commanders who have about two weeks to get used to the new position of authority before the movement north. anybody who has served understands that when you are put into a new position of higher authority, he takes time to become seasoned. these two men did not have that time nor did lee have time to counsel them. they both had served under jackson who in different command style from his boss. so in the end, so what of the
death of stonewall jackson. it was seen as a great contingency.strategically at the time by the confederate people and the confederate leadership, and it also directly impacts at what i think was probably the most significant campaign if not one of the perhaps top three most significant campaigns of the civil war which would be the pennsylvania campaign in the summer of 1863. as we moved more he will not have jackson and that folks, makes all of the difference. thank you very much. [applause] i'd be very happy to take any questions and remind audience to go up to the microphones positioned here on the sites. >> thank you very much for the talk radio couple questions about the generals on both sides that occurred and i am just curious from the perspective of when someone dies early, they show up on money and other
aspects of people believing in them. would you think would possibly be if he did survive or lived or not shot, the cracks that perspective warily might have said these are the things i think are not doing well and is the pressure built, we need to replace you jackson. for religious reasons or health reasons, that might've been escalated as the war and 64 and 65 continued on. >> great question and that takes into consideration one of the major points that we emphasize that the war college when we study history which is causation as well as contingency. certainly the union army would've continued, i do make the.in the book several times that there were opportunities throughout the civil war and the used where lee had the chance to crush the army literally crush it and these nexus.saluted him
for one reason or another. in the seven days it was primarily jackson's fault that did not occur. would jackson have underperformed in the pennsylvania campaign, he might have. and woodley then have centered him or done something. i wonder. i tend to think because the relationship personally was so strong, he would've tempered his remarks. we did what he did after the seven days. he would've dependent how bad lee cascade effect when admin from jackson's weaker theoretical performance in a pennsylvania campaign that concluded him. i think that would've been a very contingent kind of situation. i think that if jackson had really made a mistake, i think lee the professional would have eventually done something. now what that is i don't know. i think that we know we believed that the command team of jackson
controlling half of the army and long straight controlling half of the army restored running the calvary, lee said and he came down and record to jefferson after jackson's death, i had wanted to create a third corps for some time. it indicates to me that he was probably thinking about that before jackson's demise. i think he probably would've it done a third corps and i mentioned this in the final core in the final chapter. is don stonewall would've made it into the door, he would have not had probably control of half of the army. he would've had a third. there would've been another who would've been raised and then that changes the entire possible time stream thereafter. who would've done what and when. my main.is that the absence of jackson and leads to the next chapter and creates a lot of things that happened in gettysburg that we know actually happened.
the antecedent and of all of this is the loss of jackson. not all of it at a great deal. the union army had something to do with this. >> thank you very much. i am here because i have in my living room the only portrait of stonewall jackson and his union uniform. it was given to my family by jackson's widow. because they shared a few in the church in lexington virginia. i recently have been returned home from being abroad for number of years found a photo of robert e. lee that's inscribed by lee to his relative of mine. your talk was very appropriate. and interesting. my question is about the religion. you talk about jackson and lee both being so religious. how are they able to justify
their stance and support of slavery given this religious background and what was the thinking of the religion at the time. this was a presbyterian church that they were and met it. i am really interested in that aspect. >> at the time, the great denomination in the right growth protestant denominations were split between the north and the south. the northern peep is palin's obviously sided with the north and tended to be antislavery and the southern episcopalians tended to be proslavery and you can do this for their presbyterians and the lutherans and all of the other major denominations. it depended where you are geographically. you could find the bible justification either pro or against slavery as many of you probably know. for leah jackson personally, at the time in their context, they
did not see anything antithetical or inherently contradictory to the ownership of human beings. with their strong religious scruples. now we know that jackson did actually for a brief time operate a sunday school for slaves children in lexington. you may be aware of that. lee inherited most of his slaves. from his wife and was in the process of emancipation when the war broke out and he couldn't complete it. we know basically from what other authors have said and ice to clear of this in the book because its military history and there's a reason for that. we know the both of them did not see slavery as inherently antithetical to their religious scruples. i think that they are definitely there was and i will state this as a general historian having studied them for years, i think they both knew it was wrong in some way.
but forum, loyalty to state to virginia trumped everything. it trumped everything it trumped loyalty to the union any contradictions that might exist about slavery and the religious beliefs, and of course we must understand in the context of the times, anybody who live south of the mason-dixon line most southern southern should i should say, didn't see a problem. as we went today with 2020 hindsight. >> in one of your slides, the strategy was to exhaust the north and at the end of grant's memoirs, grant said that if the south had followed joe johnston advice and made the north continue to come out them, not when in a decisive battles but just keeping them coming that the war would become so unpopular of north that the civil war would be theirs. the south.
what do you say to that question mark. >> a couple of things, one thing grant neglected to mention was that joe johnson had stating command in the seven days campaign, and not been wounded for instance. this would've made a change everything for a grant would've probably not had a very starring role in the rest of the war. it would've ended then. i will say that first fall. we can also look at joe johnson's record in the atlantic record in the campaign where he retreated and gave a grant to the.where he could it be given up anymore. this exhausted the political will of the richmond government ultimately resulting in the sacking and replacement of hud. in a region's error on the part of jefferson davis as many of you might know for what he did afterwards. exhaustion of public will and exhaustion of armies are two different things which is
another.i would make. lee's has come under criticism by many modern authors and even some of the time. george bruce and grant also said lee attacked too much a lost too many men the south couldn't afford it. that was what the confederate public wanted and needed at the time. they needed to have victories. lee also on top of that understood jackson that if you do not win offensive victory you will be able to crack the northern will and exhaust the northern will. so is almost as if they were between a rock and a hard spot. lee's theater strategy in 1864, and guess grant is definitely one. on exhaustion and it's because he had no choice. his needs at his disposal was such that he could not do offensive lightning attacks as he had done in the previous two years. one reason you couldn't do it is
because as chief operators were gone. that combined with the needs steps up ultimately the war of attrition which was what britt wanted. great question. >> final question. sir i just finished shelby foote's first volume. a surprise to read in there that he considers the term stonewall apply to jackson as a critique of somebody who was to enter and not dynamic enough. what is your opinion? >> we know the moniker was applied at the analysis by the bernard b. south carolina general. supposedly he said look something like their stance jackson like stonewall rally around the virginia's. controversy surrounds what the what lee actually meant. if it was meant in some cynical
just at the time, it very quickly transformed into something else. the irony that i found is that jackson rarely stood anywhere and rarely stood as a stonewall, he is always attacking and always flanking and marching and moving. he was an incredible maneuver. so it's really kind of ironic to me having studied him for years that he had the moniker stonewall when in fact he should be called the lightning manner something like that. [laughter] he was always moving quickly which was exactly what lee needed. >> a follow-up with historian said his affinity lemons as he's fighting. >> that is not been proven in historical record that he multiple sources had has not been proven. there is one source of general taylor wrote about this, who briefly served under jackson hand is not have been collaborated by other sources
that at least that i'm aware of. it's become a legend that he was sucking lemons a lot. it's not been proven that that was actually something he preferred to do. now there are under their funny habits he had like sticking his hand up in the air possibly for but blood circulation and praise god. there are when he felt the urge. that has been documented by multiple wartime sources but the linen lemon thing comes from only one source and i wouldn't give it a huge amount of credence but i love it. thank you everybody [applause] >> you're watching tv on c-span two. top-notch speakers every weekend. television for serious readers. this weekend our author interview program afterwards. journalist natalie argues that
the american education system can be improved. when making to the elementary school curriculum. the wall street journal's russell gold reports on alternative energy. one american news networks liz wheeler, offers her thoughts on how to debate the left. hill psychologists discusses the rise of big business in america. check your cable guide or visit book tv .org for more schedule information. i'm booked. >> on book tv discussed sexual assault, including an alleged assault by donald trump. in the mid- 1990s, here's a portion of that program. >> with happenstance this book came out, as trump has gone up in approval ratings at two points. so this story has a increased his popularity. i was afraid of that.
i hadn't really figured that out, does anybody know who george mcgovern is. i once had lunch with him during this bill clinton and he was running for president and he had with the bimbo explosion and i said senator mcgovern, when you think about all of these women coming out after clinton. and the governor said to me is helping him. i think it's true because man who take what they want and they don't have and they do have the choice of women are seen as leaders. that's how this is rating. all of these women and the more women who come forward, he's like genghis khan. alexander the great. he's like the great kennedy. clinton, name them. jefferson. it's a mark of a leader in many people's eyes and taking what he wants. >> to watch the rest of the interview, watch the website book tv .org. search the title of the book what do we need men for?
using the search box at the top of the page. watch book tv for life coverage for the national book coverage. august 31st saturday starting at 10:00 a.m. eastern. our coverage covers author interviews on her book my own words. david troyer, his book is the heartbeat of wounded knee. sharon robinson talked about her book child of her dreams. rick acting's and author of the british are coming. in thomas alone, founding director of the mit center for collective intelligence. discusses his book super mines. the national book festival. life saturday, august 31st, at 10:00 a.m. eastern on book tv on c-span two. >> on our life author program historian lee edwards shared his thoughts on the conservative