tv After Words Newt Gingrich Trump vs. China CSPAN November 17, 2019 12:00pm-1:01pm EST
down in terms of the flow of people in the country whether it's legal or illegal and that's one thing going forward i think we will continue to write about for the paper because it's less well understood than the obvious helegal immigration piece. >> the authors will be selling their book at the book signingng which i think is too tense over. >> thank you guys for coming. i really appreciate it. [applause]. >> next come on book tvs afterwards former speaker of the house of representatives newt gingrich offers his thoughts on the threat the us faces from china. he's interviewed by american enterprise institute scholar. afterwards is a weekly interview program with guest host interviewing top nonfiction
authors about their latest work. all afterwards programs are available as podcasts. >> i'm happy to be here with newt gingrich news book entitled "trump vs china". how are you doing, sir? guest: i'm doing well and i'm very excited and i went to say to our audience that the podcast i did you the other week, you are brilliant and great that you were able to make it apply to modern america. i have been looking forward very much to this chance to chat with you see when thank you. i appreciate that and had the pleasure to read through your book i was very impressed with how quickly the book came out. my last book took me seven years to write so i think i need to take a page from your playbook be a little bit more diligent. as you mentioned my
research focuses on china issues so i think we will have a pretty interesting discussion about the challenge the us faces. guest: my ego requires me too ask of you, what page you think as a genuine china scholar which you are and are not? what did you think overall the information the book? host: you start off with a tough question and i would say the underlying recommendation and your view how china is pursuing its goals, i would agree with. we can talk about the people who have different indications but i personally think it's very problematic of how china is trying to pursue power and influence in the world. i may disagree with some the characterizations of china which what i think might start with an asking about if i don't mind, so before we get into the nitty-gritty of the book i was cures because you mentioned in the interim the book at the challenge of china, the threat of china something that you have recently come to really
focus on so what exactly sparked your interest and it's very due to write the book? guest: well, let me start by saying i have been looking at china reading about it, thinking about it since 1960, so it's not a sudden new thing. i have been visiting china before i was speaker of the house and then when i was sick of the house and i continued to visit china in the last decade. i will tell you a quick story that was really a turning point for me. we went to in one of our trips i think in 2005, we went to the pearl factory, which is a big building in downtown beijing, design basically to sell goodies to tourists and we went up to that the sixth floor and i had to people with me who were former national security council analysts both of whom had gone to beijing university and were fluent in chinese and i
had two young grandchildren at the time and i wanted to buy them pajamas. we found a woman who ran a pajama store in the two people with me said however she says come back with 10% of what her prices. host: i would have said half. guest: you will see in a minute. so, i frankly in on the typical american, go to walmart and there is a price and you bite or you don't buy it. you don't goucher, so she once 200 and i come back and say following my advisors i say 20 and they said she will now tell you that you are bankrupting her family and she won't be up to feed her children and that her store will go broke and then she will give you a price so she came back out like 180. they said go up 10, so i went up to max 30. this all takes about 40 minutes.
we finally settle at 50 and my two advisors were disgusted and said she was going to make money at 30. what hit me was her ability to negotiate, her chill from it-- cheerfulness of negotiating that it was a part of her day was unlike anything us trade representative's deal with and americans go into an event to get a deal. i think the chinese would like to have a deal, but they go into an event to negotiate and talk and wait until they get the deal i want and it struck me there was this mismatch of cultural reality and that as you walk through it, you begin to see more and more of it. i finally concluded that the chinese particularly watching the general secretary of the communist party and his consolidation of power and the degree to which they have dramatically increase their police
state tactics it hit me that we were really do verging from the modeled the american elites had built up which was optimistic evolutionary china that wanted to be more like as an impact that's not the real china. the real china has its own history, culture, ambitions as we see literally while you and i are talking they are convening in turkey to help prop up the turkish economy against american sanctions work they are intervene in this way left against american activities, so it hit me we needed to reset our understanding of this extranet country in order to develop strategies that would enable us to survive. host: you think an active characterization of the communist party into the initial records---- i agree with your
assertion in the book that the basis of power in china is the party and that they have no intention of democratizing that's never been a belief or viewpoint of my own and i always thought it was wishful thinking and i continue now, but i want to explore more about how you characterize the party and in particular the relationship with people. the first thing esther at the book refer to the government as a totality-- totalitarian government. in my study of china most of the time we refer to china as an authoritarian government seems like a minor distinction but i think when we are trying to come up with good us responses the distention is important. in totalitarianism it's a society in which the government controlled every aspect and allows there to be no political economic social freedom at all for their people.
i think there are pockets of totalitarian-- totalitarianism in china, but there has been-- you would not call it democratization, but there are areas in which the china people have more freedom and according to authoritarianism the party exercises power i would argue within relatively predictable limits for the average chinese person knows what would get them in trouble and what keeps them out of trouble, so given that i think in my view it could get worse i quit pression in china could get a lot worse. we don't have a state like north korea operating in china with the communist party so what is your view of that distinction and why did you decide in this book to characterize it as a totalitarian government even though i think most literature databases that monitor these freedoms are dries it a bit less repressive in terms of authoritarian? guest: i would say first of all
that in my experience authoritarian governments are part limited by their capacity to exert total control, so if you look for example at mussolini fascism, you really couldn't have a to tell terry and stay because he never had an instrument of power strong enough to do that. stalling on the other hand and hitler has systems of power so norma's that they could actually impose the two to totalitarian society so i look at china in the first thing i would raise and i would love get your reaction as the next for is i mean here is a grieving this society which by the very speed with which it spread apparently frightened the central government into a reaction of such ferocity that they have been killing them, locking them up. they themselves would argue that they had been sacrificed in order to harvest organs that are
then used for people that are sick, but even if you don't believe that more grotesque version it's very clear that these people have some type of enormous threat even though they are not particularly ideological movement, but the are social logic lead dvm. the second example, we did a podcast similar to the one you and i did with the gentleman who teaches at hunter college who was disappeared chinese citizen and the government came along and picked him up off the street, didn't tell his family or his lawyer , kept him as long as they wanted to and then released him back out. recently as you know they disappeared the most popular actress in china, a woman who some people believe was the highest-paid actress in the world, they just took her out of circulation for six
months and no one knew where she was that's why i call it disappeared. that to me as a totalitarian culture, not an authoritarian culture and when the two crossed the street what they were saying to everyone once none of you are safe. if we decide to come after you, we can come after you. that's closer to 1884 and a classic definition of an authoritarian system. useful conversation and i would love to get your reaction to that analysis. host: in the book you mention this and even the catholic clergy and their ability to organize and inspire and threaten the party and when the communist party is threatened as you mentioned there are no holds barred crushing dissent. the main question is whether or not they are crushing everything across the board and i think current china compared to old china or like a north korea have a bit more freedom of maneuver and even to
degree within confines obviously not threatening the sovereignty of the chinese nation of making suggestions for the party as a whole, but it brings up this other point that i found interesting about the relationship between the chinese people in the communist party. you brought up this idea of the china nation. you mentioned it's really the ambition of the party and most of your book is about confronting the threat of the party, not of the chinese people but in my experience while a chinese people many are much-- against repression domestically they seem to be supportive of his ambition internationally. they like to see china stand up to the united states so i was curious about what your viewpoints were about the relationship between the chinese people in the communist party because there is a foreign-policy as supportive of that agenda, which doesn't
negate your recommendations and if anything it highlights we are facing eight even greater challenge than we would be if it was just a party. host: i think that's right. degree to which there is a historic china that's 5000 years old, there's a deep sense of pride of being chinese. there is a sense that they have a rightful place in the world. there's a pretty deep belief that there was a century of humiliation in which the western powers including japan did things to humiliate what had been up to 1800 the richest and most powerful country in the world i think all the things are real, and i think to that degree much as he was able to play on ejection nationalism or ataturk
was able to play on turkish nationalism there is certainly a joan-- tony in which xi jinping represents the interest of the chinese people. i also believe that the gamble was correct and by creating so much wealth they have strength in the people's willingness to tolerate the party because in a sense the party has offered a contract that says we will give you a strong nation you can be proud of and we will give you a strong economy in which you have a decent life in return for which you stay out of politics and let us run the country at a political level and i think that contract has worked pretty well. mayor bloomberg in a recent interview went so far as to suggest it's not a dictatorship because they have to maintain the support of the people. i would argue what you are wrong-- watching in hong kong and what you see with the process of disappearances, control, censoring of the internet, the concentration camps of
the leaders that the party is quite happy to the contract that is passive and compliance by prosperity, but it's prepared if challenge to use whatever level of force is necessary to impose continuation of party rule on the country. host: you bring up hong kong. i just got back from china two days ago and i found as i have recently found a lot of my conversations with my chinese colleagues increasingly frustrating that frustrates me the most that i'm interested in getting your take on is actually the way china justifies some of its problematic behavior in the international system is not to say their unique core chinese, they say they are exactly like us. i don't know if you've heard this argument but when usually china does
something they said the us does it to. the recent nba flareup i found myself debating you don't have complete freedom of speech in the us either. for example you can't engage in hate speech that incites violence and i would say there's different limitations. china is much more limited in what they can say and the fact that the chinese government is trying to influence the americans ability to speak freely in the us i find problematic, but it's this debate that is becoming increasingly difficult but only with the chinese on the international stage to articulate how the us is different and how we behave differently than china does, so i think we haven't done a great job at this pic what are your viewpoints and how we should be presented foreign-policy as being distinct from china instead of competing with them for influence and power? guest: let me start and say to add to your examples two things,
one i talked with a bay near-- very senior chinese leader about the concentration camps for the people in western china and with an absolutely straight face he looked at me and said you should not think of them as concentration camps. think of them as bordering schools. now, someone that can deliver that wine without flinching is first of all and master diplomat and second how will you have an argument with him because their position is insane yet that was the party's position. he was prepared to say it and is probably prepared to semi- believe it. the second example of what to give you is from the soviet era. reagan collected anti- soviet jokes in the first time he met up with gorbachev he wanted to start with a joke because he wanted to remind gorbachev that we actually had moral superiority and in a
joke that he told them was the guy says to the press i'm as free in russia as i am in washington and the reporter said how can that be and he said look, i can go to washington, i can stand up in front of the white house and i can say ronald reagan is a war monger and fool to the guy said yeah and he said i can go to the kremlin and stand up in front of the kremlin and say ronald reagan is warmonger shouldn't a fool some equally free that's part of the argument you get into. they take what's happening with the uighurs of over a million people in the camps and compared to guantánamo where we bend over backwards to protect the koran of everyone of our prisoners. they i think are very good at defining a reality they would like to believe in. i think our best challenge to them is about freedom. we are not afraid-- in a
way you have to be a pretty frightened the government to chase down people who do breathing exercises. yesterday a pretty frightened government to disappear your most famous movie star. i think we should be much more aggressive on the human rights front as we were with the soviets over time and simply asserting that the chinese people have every right to have to speak freely, and every right of access to the internet and there is an enormous gap between the kind of things they accuse of us and the kinds of things they actually do and i think we would be better off with a more aggressive pro- human rights policy and communicating with the chinese people in developing something like the kind of communications program we had during the cold war. host: there's a section of the book, not to skip to the back but it's one of my favorite
called something like it's not china's fault in which you list a lot of the ways in which the us is not competitive with china but it's not the fault of the chinese government is the father bureaucratic politics, issues with us education, entitlements or what have you so i have a few questions about that section but along those lines since you brought up democratic norms and values, do you think that the current-- that president trump in his approach to our democracy in many ways being unique in his approach to democratic norms if i can put it that way causes difficulties in the us asserting its moral high ground with the competition with china? guest: i think maybe in a limited sense it does, but there's a big difference between president trump's style, which is at times clumsy and offputting particularly-- [inaudible]
you just saw this twice in the last two days the president had an idea which i thought was truly terrible to put the g7 at his golf resort and within three days the popular reaction was so overwhelming he had to beat a hasty retreat and compare that with the chinese banning tv shows because they make fun of xi jinping or i think they banned-- i can't remember which of the comic characters they decided was like xi jinping so. host: winnie the pooh. guest: winnie the pooh peer when you are so-- with peter roosevelt was enormously popular and say date baby grizzly bear cub and that became known as teddies bear which became a teddy bear when it was made into -- by a brooklyn manufacture who produce little teddy bears.
we are cheerful about making fun of ourselves and i think the rigidity and insecurity of the regime by that kind of behavior. i would also point out the mean if xi jinping was in the middle of having the communist party congress openly investigate him, i don't know what the chairmanship of china would look like, but we are very, located in a clumsy in a noisy society, but on balance that's also how we preserve our freedom. host: i think some of the differences as you point out is important to be projecting those not only to the chinese people but also in our foreign policy and how we entered act with nations around the world. guest: let me give you a parallel example. back after the russians launched sputnik and we got into a frenzy and then they launched sputnik to and we were
really trying to catch up and we had a rocket that blew up on the launchpad on national television. part of the reaction in russia was the americans are so confident that they can show off their failures because it doesn't frighten them. i think we need to go back and have that attitude. yes, we are a country with great turmoil. yes, we have political leadership divided. yes speaker pelosi doesn't like president trump, but this is a free society and therefore if one of our great strength is with all this turmoil we produce a sense of new synthesis and we move up or. that chinese-- in fact i think they will find themselves deeply crippled because if xi jinping continues to escalate the degree to which he's trying to control everyone the things like the social credit system he will find in 10 or 15 years
create much less flexible society of people who are mostly frightened. host: interesting. there's a lot of mirror imaging on both sides of sometimes it's hard to predict or see things from a chinese perspective and just an anecdote after president trump was elected there was a woman's march with 1 million people took to the streets and neither-- my chinese friend called and asked if the us government had been overthrown because in her mind if a million people take to the streets that same violence and of the system type of act in which i had to explain in the us we have the right to peaceful protest and that is not the end of the world type of occurrence that this mere injury-- imaging is problematic-- you mentioned one of your recommendations that we need him more americans who understand china and these are old statistics i looked up how many us traditions study in china and how me study in the us. it won't surprise you that is very astute. you have maybe 12000 or
around tens of thousands of americans studying in china and over 350,000 chinese studying here and one of the concerns at least as the professor part of the educational system is that a lot of students are worried about studying in china because they think it will close them off to being able to work in government when they come back into the us because of clearances and other issues, suspicion of their time in china so it's an ongoing debate in the scholarly community so i'm wondering if you have ideas or recommendations about how we can encourage americans not only to study in china and understand china the few like they are safe at home for having that kind of interactions with the chinese. guest: i think part of it is that it's how well we do the vetting process. we have this experience when the cold war began and we realized we had
far too few people who had studied the soviet union, who understood the nature of communism and he was prepared to develop the kind of program we needed and we had to invest a great deal with the central intelligence agency investing very heavily and education programs and i think we may be in a similar situation where you have to have some level of concern because they are very good at what they do and they are very systematic. the chinese is very systematic in trying to recruit people and trying to intimidate people. at the same time, i think understanding china and having enough people around who are fluent in chinese and who are capable of interacting with fluidity in chinese circumstances, this may be one of the great p key paths to our surviving the country
and we simply have: how to do it while at the same time preventing people so we make sure they don't impact being chinese agents for you and impart to book you talk about how china, the different tactics china uses to fulfill its-- the rejuvenation of the chinese nation to be a dominant power at least in asia and you mentioned six strategies struck the book you talk about in detail. can you just for our audience described the strategies and why you thought these were the most problematic in terms of what china is doing. guest: you mean the chinese strategy? host: ride, the five c to look, first of all we were very struck and you will probably find this naïve on my part but we were struck to the point which had been made by lieutenant colonel at the army war college in and picked up by henrique hitch-- enrique kissinger and that is that the most common sophisticated chinese game is not chess, it's go.
the go which is originally a japanese game is a radically different model of success than chess so we asked at the national go association here to come and teach us and spend time with us and walk us through how you think in go terms and part of that is you think very long-term and you think about the whole board. you never allow yourself to be sucked into looking at only one think so if you think about the long-term and again i try to tell people if you want to understand chinese strategies it's much more important to reach -- clause is a german writing in response to the wars. writing is describing a really different system. a system that uses long-term planning, uses psychological warfare, it's uses spies, bribery
, uses a deception. he says at one point the greatest of all generals when bloodless victories so not just writing about cataclysmic that was thought of as a central battle, he's actually saying if you are really creative you will never fight a battle because you outmaneuver your opponent until they collapse one of the best examples is the south china sea, which actually starts preferred the current chinese dictatorship here in the 30s the nationalist party issued a map of the south china sea that showed a series of dashes and basically said everything inside the slide is china. now, it's the extraordinary-- it's about 50% of the size of china itself and one has ever claimed that you could actually occupy that kind of see as a sovereign territory. well, long after the
chinese communist win they gradually think about this and they begin to develop it so they go out first in a series of skirmishes with the vietnamese on the filipinos and their other neighbors and then they come up with a clever idea that they will build artificial lines so they build a series of these artificial islands where they say initially now this is really not going to be militarized. it's really not a threat. we just want to support our fishing fleet, which is after all he peaceful fleet although nowadays a large part of their fishing fleet is actually the equivalent of a coast guard or coastal maritime unit mobilize a ball for a variety of national security reasons. then they gradually add an airfield and then they bring in missiles and what they are doing is they are creating a framework of islands
which forces the u.s. navy hundreds of miles further away from the chinese coast in a wartime environment. it's a brilliant strategy. second example would be their whole building road initiative where they have now made it open-ended, so india for example has announced they are interested in being part of developing the road initiative for the arctic ocean because the chinese are building a huge number of icebreakers. the us has i think one new icebreaker being built and i think the chinese have like 15 or 20, huge to severity and if you look the map of the world you think why do the chinese need this many icebreakers. well, they are thinking about using the arctic first four looking for oil, but second if you shipped from china to europe through the arctic you save an enormous amount of time and money and so they
are systematically looking at 20, 30 years and thinking in that kind of title. through their addition they are also going into places like africa where i think currently there are 46-- 46 different ports it be developed by the chinese. my wife is the ambassador to the vatican so we spent a lot of time in italy. italy recently signed a contract with china-- host: yeah, they recently signed on. i was in rome at the time. guest: so the biggest pour in italy will be run by the chinese and the port which leads into austria and south of germany will be run by the chinese. 20 years ago that was inconceivable, so i think they have this very long-term, very gradual approach doing the same thing in space where they are now the first country to be on the dark side of the moon. they are just all sorts of things happening that we don't fully appreciate and i think
you have to frankly have a sense that these are very smart people with very long time horizon who are very patient, but are working very hard to be the most confident and most capable country in the world. host: there is a lot in their tactic is interesting especially about the belton road and south china sea. from my viewpoint one of the challenges of dealing with china is that they are pursuing power in a way that is different than how the us is used to doing business, not only in terms of practices you already mentioned which are problematic, but also outside their region they rely largely on economic and political power. and they see the us power-- desire to be the global policeman, getting involved in domestic politics as something costly and the reason for our decline. when i read chinese strategist they talk about the military is yes, they want to be dominant militarily in
the region, but then they just want the economic and political power beyond that to ensure other countries accommodate their interests. in the book you want to talk about china wanting to dominate the world. my own viewpoint i wrote up in a foreign affairs article is that i think they want to militarily dominate the region and under xi jinping the region has expanded beyond northeast asia and southeast asia to include maybe southeast asia, but i don't think they want to be able to challenge the us militarily in europe for example or even in the middle east. is that also how you see china trying to exercise its power? guest: you know, i would try to distinctions and i think what you said is largely right, but with the yacht-- yacht that in the age of space and capabilities you can become a
global power without rebuilding the american military and in fact one of our weaknesses may be that we are so wedded to an end of the 20th century military system that we don't realize how many changes are underway. i would start their. i don't think that the chinese have any great planning certainly in the next 20 or 25 years to try to take us on militarily in a traditional sense, but i do think they are trying to build the kind of cyber capabilities and just as part of where wally's extraordinary natural asset to them and they think they are trying to build the capability of space both of which have global indications. they are also 2-degree we underestimate gradually extending capabilities. they have even begun cooperating on some small military things with the germans so you have a russian and chinese collaboration
where they are now doing joint controls in the pacific and you have activity now between china and germany. i think the chinese are open to working with virtually anyone and i think their goal would be to create an alternative coalition, not china by itself to take us on, but if you look at for example with the china russia india and china russia iran coalition, it would be fairly fermentable and i think very hard for us to see how the us would win a conflict in which they were allies. host: some of the examples you just mentioned that china is happy to work with any government regardless of how they treat their people you know china has state owned enterprises they can direct and also laws on the book that makes it to compel their private companies to support the overall objective and we know there's issue of corruption along the belton road.
my son was in ethiopia about two years ago and found out-- i was asking about the railroad infrastructure and that the us and other countries had offered a grant to build that road , but instead they went with the chinese and the rumor was because some of the officials had been taking bribes to allow that, so i often wonder and i'm curious about your response to this, do our democratic values make it harder for us to compete with china on the international stage or do you see them as an asset? guest: i think in the short run it makes it harder just as it made harder to come be with nazis and they made harder to compete with soviet union. in the long run the problem with corruption is that it leads to a very sick state in which no one can trust anyone. as gorbachev discovered when chernobyl occurred the bureaucracy had been so corrupted that the only accurate
information he could get was from norwegian and swedish television and the whole system was correct. one of the challenges and by the way as you know because you are a scholar on this stuff, one thing that's happened with the chinese is in a number of countries particularly africa they make promises they are not hate-- keeping and in a number of countries they said they would build a bridge but they did say they would send 12000 chinese to do it so it's a critical local jobs they increased the resentment, so it's not like the chinese anymore than the soviets with the nazis. they're not 12 feet tall they are not infallible. they have significant weaknesses. in the short run, bribery is effective and in the long run honesty is actually more effective and i had an australian diplomats say to me recently there are a lot more folks in the world that want to join the american club than
1228 the chinese club that's certainly true. host: to go back to the south china sea, i have been working on this issue and tried to push this idea this critical nature of the south china sea and the us competition. militarily, you mentioned to some problems with the us being pushed further out and i think-- and otto-- [inaudible] it's-- when i look at this administration, they obviously have recognized the challenge of the rise of china and brightly articulated that we are in competition with china, but for some reason the south china sea has not been at the top of the agenda. the last i checked president trump has never tweeted about it during his time as president and as far as i know in terms of public records it's never come up with discussions with xi jinping.
why do you think-- given how important it is and that you clearly outlined its importance in your book why you think it's been an issue mainly-- mainly among scholars and not risen to the national leader level? guest: of course, one level is it's an issue with american military and they are vividly aware of it. on the other hand, i think strategically what we've done is wrong. as you know we rely on the motto that our ships will go within 12 miles of the chinese islands and we will routinely go through there and we have been organizing sort of french and canadian and australian and british and other ships have gone through there to maintain the right of passage. i think in the long run that's a dead loser because in a conflict environment you could not maintain it and i have argued-- by the way zero affect. what we ought to do is take the chinese model
and say this is terrific the idea of building islands in international waters is great and build three islands to the west of the chinese islands between them and the chinese mainland. the minute we announced that they will go nuts and we would didn't be in a position to say look you either demobilize these islands and turn it over to international body or we are going to build the islands that interdict or islands, but we are going to let you establish to the dominance in the region and i think the challenge here i'm guessing, okay maybe upfront as we been involved with conversations with the administration and i know a large number of people are aware of the south china sea. i think part of the challenges there are so many components of what's going on, you know you worry about stealing intellectual property? a do you worry about the degree to which they cheat against american
companies? you try to figure out how to offset the national association model? you worry about roads? there are components under way that i think it's that hard to get a coherent grand strategy and i really think part of the reason wrote the book is to make the argument that we need to recognize this is not all of government, this is all of society. that's the real lesson that we are in a competition where we need to think about all of the chinese society competitors and how we are going to over macs that and that's going to take fairly significant amount of time. in the cold war took us from 1946 to 1950, to finally think through what we were doing and now, we have a generation that is used to thinking on a huge scale. very few people in the current bureaucracy who are capable of doing that kind of thinking. host: along those lines i was
recently testifying on the hill and a colleague mentioned this statistic about the difference between the soviet union and china. it went something like the soviet economy was half of what china's economy is with her sick to the united states, but the us is spending have as much on its military to deal with the challenge, so it seems that we were in a better resource position, perhaps then we are in the competition with china. given your experience in congress and in american politics, what you think are some of the changes that we need to make domestically to make sure that we do have the resources to compete with china? guest: that's part of why write that chapter but it's not china's fault because a lot of what has to be done is not china. you know, when you have six schools in baltimore in which last year not a single student and six schools, not a single student could pass the
state math and writing exam, you have a crisis that would be there whether the chinese existed or not. so, we need dramatic d performs at our own system. we need to reform the pentagon. this is a tired bureaucratic structure. i try to remind people that it was built in 1943 so that 23000 people used carbon paper and manual typewriters could manage a worldwide war. now, we have ipads, smartphones etc. and we still have 22000 people. its maniacal and of course this was everything down and make something too expensive. you have huge zones of reform that we need. the chinese currently are mopping up all sorts of international organizations by basically bribing countries and they will end up either being the leader or having picked
the leader with the amazing range of national organizations. we are not even prepared to think about a campaign on the scale and complexity that we will need in places like the food and agricultural position or the world health organization just go down the list and it's astonishing how methodically successful they have been. i think we are going have to-- if we are serious, and we are determined to overmatch the chinese, we are going to have to really get our act together. we will have to go through some very painful and very profound reforms a part of the reason i wrote "trump vs china" was to set the stage for people to this conversation and to recognize everything the president is doing, which i think is the right general direction is about 10% of what we need to do if we're ultimately capable of competing with china. host: i'm happy you're especially wrote about the
bureaucratic inertia of the pentagon. i have in my own career had experienced that firsthand and made a number of suggestions, but given on the bit lower on the totem pole they have not been widely accepted, but i would say the us military as you point out that south china sea situation, the high strategic level they get the threat and the us military has understood this as a challenge long before president trump articulated it publicly, but the overall bureaucracy is still not focused on asia. i will give you an anecdote. there is a professional military education in the air force was just revamped to allow for studies for regional studies once you get to field grade officer level including every region but asia and this is the new revamping c-2 you are kidding? host: i'm not kidding. just came out. they are putting it online now's as in asia specialist i find it frustrating. guest: that's painful.
host: it is painful, the amount of time i spent learning about key leadership engagement with tribal leaders and while we are very relevant and important to the complex of the us wars in afghanistan and iraq will not be relevant to this competition so recommendations of how to influence the bureaucracy is the lower level not only the military but other aspects of the government. our students really taken into account that it is so amazingly important when you talk about the threat to the united states, you mentioned in the book that you think it's an ex- essential threat. my own interpretation i kind of look at what china is doing and i think they are challenging the us on the global stage. i think they are a military threat to the us in the region. besides maybe harassing a few us companies or americans who are deeply engaged with china the average american does not feel the influence of china, but in your
book you talk about how you think it is annexed essential threat, so i was wondering if you could articulate a bit more about why you think it is a deeper threat than potentially other that has previously characterized it as. guest: i think it is an existential threat in two different ways. the first is if they work at it and were dominant off, they could create a coalition which would have a balance of power against us in a way that we have not experienced in american history because for much of the first hundred years we had behind the royal navy and for the second hundred years we had a huge worldwide alliance, so we don't know what it's like to live in a world where there is a hostile dominant force that has a coalition capable of overmatch enough. that would be in excess essential threat from the outside, but they are also threat and i think it's the problem with the national basketball association,
the problem with winnie the pooh, the problem with the cartoon that's now banned from china because it had a show in which xi jinping was sort of ridiculed. they are beginning to move into defining-- by the way a new top gun i think if i remember correctly they got tom cruise to take the taiwanese and the japanese flags off of his flight suit. just to release it and there's a pied underway now with tarantino refusing to edit his movie to meet the needs of the chinese censors. if that willingness, not just to tell us what happens inside china, but to start telling us what ought to happen over here and i can't that is why as it's a genuine existential threat. host: i would mention a great book by a professor called i
think "hollywood made in china" that outlines the various ways china uses its markets to compel movies to take one plot line over another plot line and every time i watch a movie in which the chinese coming as the heroes i know to look for who has financed the movie. that definitely does i think have influence. guest: i know i just got a future podcast. five to trackback guy down to see if he would talk about it. i love movies so it would combine two of my passions into one podcast. host: she knows a lot about this topic and i have found her presentations on it quite interesting. i myself have not focused on military issues and the conflicts between china and the united states. one of the things that i look at a lot our allies and partners in the region.
a lot of people would argue it's a key strength for the us, that we have partners like australia and japan that are supportive of us goals and we are working together in our competition with china. in terms of your recommendations, what are ways you think we could revamp of the alliances or do more with the alliances in this competition that goes i guess the on the region to broader issues in terms of china's impact on our society and also china's impact on the world? guest: well, i think we have to look at a-- it mysterious way and what we will be doing to knit people together on a more permanent basis. for example, in the south china sea we probably have an interest to get india to join us because they have a huge interest. the south china sea i think has one third of all the world to shipping go through it, so every maritime country and exporting country has a huge
interest in the south china sea and we also have complexities not-- i was in japan a couple weeks ago and the entity that still exist between korea and japan going back to the japanese occupation of korea from 1905 to 1945, that's still very real and makes it harder to get them to work together in alliance because there still so much friction particularly on the korean aside, so at some levels you have to constantly work on opening those up. i think in the case of the australians, i think eberly turned the corner i think they discovered from some painful experiences that the chinese are not necessarily good partners and the weight of china can be very disruptive and very uncomfortable, so i think we are in good shape there, but in the long run we also went to knit together i think all of the smaller countries. we have done a bit of that in the past, but i think it has to be more
methodical because the chinese are pretty good at institution building. they have action taken over something we used to do well in the british used to do well and i think we have to get back in the competition. when we do go there, we have a huge success, i mean, people still have a bias of being afraid of the chinese and wanting to keep the us actively as a player in the region, but we had to pay our dues and have people, the president, the vice president, secretary of state and others actively engage with those countries so they have a feeling we are taking them seriously. host: i agree the smaller countries have become increasingly important in this competition. in my book "the cost of conversation" i specifically lay out how china often times leverages smaller countries to pressure the us to restrain our ability to act on contingencies so the idea is that the us has to be more competitive paid attention to alliances and other countries that may be
part allies the countries like malaysia and india that play a critical role in the region is an important way. guest: i think in that process money say that's part of why we have to think about society on society. we need to have our charities, our corporations, we need our military and diplomacy all aligned in the same direction working with the small countries in which case we can have a norm is simply because we still have huge advantages in that kind of a competition. host: being the security partner of choice is no longer enough for a lot of countries even if that is what the us offers, given economic power and cloud of china us needs to offer more than an attractive partner so all those agencies actually a whole government approach. the chinese people you have a government approach and when i speak to them they are worried about it and i wish we were as organized as they
believe we are. guest: i would go beyond that. we need a whole society approach, i mean, it's a brilliant example of creating a corporation that is competitive on a global basis, subsidized by the chinese government, but nonetheless it's a corporation. there is no american competitor to them and we should feel disgraced by that. we dominated telecommute patients. reinvented most of modern telecommunications and yet our big corporations are so loaded down with debt, they are so much looking inwardly at the us, so bureaucratic and lacking in imagination they have basically yielded the field to a chinese corporation. you could not have imagined this 20 years ago. host: it's been great talking to you about your book. our time is running out. if you just have one last sensor take away the final say to readers about what they need to take up way from your book what would it be? guest: it's very simple.
xi jinping is a general secretary of the communist party. the chairman of the military commission and the people's liberation army is an arm of the party, not the government. he's president of the people's republic of china in that order and as long as we remember you're dealing with the general secretary of the communist party, you understand all the negotiations and all of the meetings to medically better than if you allow them to get away with pretending that he is a normal western executive. host: thank you for that. it was nice chatting with you. guest: thanks stephen this program is available as a podcast, all afterwards programs can be viewed on our website at book tv.org. >> the house will be in order. >> for 40 years c-span has provided unfiltered coverage of congress, the white house, the supreme court of public
policy events from washington dc and around the country so you can make up your own mind crated by cable in 1979. c-span what is brought to you by your local cable or satellite provider. c-span, your unfiltered view of government. >> next week and anonymous person believed to be a senior official in the trump administration will release a book critical of the president. it's titled "a warning" and published by 12 books. according to the "washington post" which received a copy of the book ahead of publication the author reflects on why he wrote the book anonymously. i have decided to publish this anonymously because this debate is not about me, it's about us. it's about how we want the presidency to reflect our country and that is where the discussions should center. some call this cowardice and my feelings are not her by the acquisition nor am i unprepared to
attach my name to criticism a president trump. i may do so in the end-- and due course. the anonymous author is expanding on an op-ed a row for the "new york times" in september, 2018, titled i'm part of the resistance inside the company ministry and. in the new book the author corrects an assertion they made in their opinion piece from last year. i was wrong about the quite resistance inside the trump administration. unelected bureaucrats and cabinet appointees were never going to steer donald trump the right direction in the long run or refine his malignant management style he is who he is. next weekend but tv will host a journalist discussion on a warning. the "wall street journal", "politico" and jeff mason journalists will be our guests. in addition you will hear from joe who was a longtime anonymous author of the clinton era novel primary colors.
check your program guide or book tv.org for schedule information. >> tonight on the tv at 9:00 p.m. eastern on afterwards, former harvard law school dean martha minnow talks about her book "when should law forgive". >> we are so punitive, the people who serve their sentences have these collateral consequences of their crime, not allowed to vote in many places, not allowed to have a professional license, not allowed to keep their children, not allowed to get housing in certain places. i think enough is enough and we should find ways to acknowledge forgiveness. we are imperfect as human beings. >> at 10:00 p.m. eastern for un ambassador nikki haley with her book "out of respect". watch but tv every weekend on c-span2.