tv Michael Auslin Asias New Geopolitics CSPAN July 19, 2020 3:45pm-4:56pm EDT
that left out the lights sentence. i cannot let him destroy my country. >> that sounds pretty arrogant. islam aisling would've been treated i feel right in the book there are so many parallels between the circumstances in which my family operated and which is country is now operating. i saw firsthand what focusing on the wrong things elevating the wrong people can do. the collateral damage that can be created by allowing somebody to live their lives without accountability. i can do anything, to change the narrative of truth, i need to do that because i don't believe the american me by the entire truth
four years ago. >> her book already a bestseller wabestseller. welcome everybody. we have great session here. really a celebration are brilliant timely new book and sign for us to an important discussion about what is going on in the critical region of the world. of course, the star today's performance is the author of that great new book. michael osman who is a tremendous historian and scholar of contemporary asia. and he is a distinguished fellow. bernie is also a great friend. really is wonderful for us all to be with you to celebrate this permit is to book. ages new politics. in the book is an important book and time about that we shipping
that is going on. anisha is also the author of another tremendous book, called the end of the asia century. one of the most prolific and lucid analyst on what is going on in the region. if you haven't already done it, do what i did and set up a google alert for whatever the essays are published. you get them right away. and of course, in that region, testimony developments ongoing. whether it is from north korea the latest aggressive actions so we could have really a more timely discussion about filing important regions . in joining us, to facilitate this discussion is a brilliant scholar doctor who is visiting. as a series senior fellow at the
hudson institute. as a security advisor for the trump ministration, instrumental in effect was i think was probably the most significant shift in american foreign policy since the end of the cold war. that is the recognition that china is a strategic rival. in the policies of the chinese communist party was a significant threat, really all three in open societies. it is really heavy here to facilitate this discussion. antic it all off, we have congressman mike was just done a wonderful job serving his country as from the eighth district of wisconsin. prior to being a congressman, the duties there on capitol hill 2016. he served country as a marine corps officer. she's a scholar and a graduate
of princeton and a masters and phd in international relations from georgetown. and i will say, i have fond memories of when we first met. you and just returned from iraq. and you exceeded all expectations. he is emerging as one of the most humble new leaders are born policy national security and intelligence. congressman gallagher, could you kick this off. >> thank you hr for that kind introduction and thank you for inviting me here. when i was in uniform, i work for him. so if you see me break out in a cold sweat at any point during these remarks, because i still feel like a second lieutenant whenever i hang around a chart and i get very nervous around
him. i can hear his voice booming in my head. mike, brother, you better hurry up. i was a middle east specialist. in many ways i have been getting up anisha's work and scholarship has been a critical part of that. and there is much in his compelling thought-provoking new book that we should they look forward to talking about today. and she has been warning about china's increasing behavior for a long time but it's only been in the past few years that these warnings have become mainstream. i spent a great deal of time in congress wondering why exactly that is the case why did it take us a long to wake up and what is it the present moment that has awakened the western world to the threat posed by the chinese communist party and so in search of answers because we been
trapped in our basements during the last few months brenda recently sat down and watch the 2017 classico, wolf warrior to abrade the chinese film highest grossing, of all time. at the climax, the antagonist american mercenary and big dad daddy's muscular hero is a former special ops soldier. in his big daddy attempts to gemini into his throat. he gloats and says, people like you will always be inferior to be like me. so get used to it. spoiler alert, he turned the table run and brutally stabs big daddy to death with that bullet that he had worn around his neck. but for fans of the original 2015 wolf warrior, this is a satisfying familiar ending.
is that persons, ended with another american mercenary. in this time the navy seal to the british accent . and tomcats. he manages, withholding of enough to threaten roots of patch of his children with the chinese flag and the horses take a fight for china. a mock stump for being willing to die for his country. but of course the tables are turned yet again. and you met our hero and he manages to step in with no knife. shortly thereafter, demanding general of the chinese unit symbol of the movie's message by saying those who challenge china's result, will have no safe place to hide. i think there's a light to dissect in these movies that may seem like an even more cartoonish version of a michael bay movie here in america. in this chapter on the new china rules, his observation that i
think this could be ripped straight from a fight scene he said with china's strength, has come up bare knuckle abusiveness. often combined with an unexpected sense of insecurity. as increasingly clear the beijing expects the west to change how it thinks and asked, engage in self-censorship and even punish our own workers preventing china. of course we have seen this phenomenon play out as the ccp and its diplomats have adopted wolf warrior diplomacy throughout the coronavirus crisis. responding to general secretary desire to display more fighting spirit and in practice, the wolf warrior diplomacy often is ham-handed and unintentionally comical as those in the wolf warrior movie. and while were in the middle of this plot, or the returns public opinion suggests the wolf warrior diplomacy maybe backfiring in europe in
particular and further turning public opinion against the party. i would submit my be popular domestically within china. what we're seeing today recent events colliding with a long boring current. in a subsequent wolf warrior attitude that the same time in tucson exactly revenue delivered personally around 2015. was both political parties have released this defense strategy rightfully prioritizes indo pacific. but none with the urgency that hr and audio particular. give them incredible credit for the phenomenal work was done in the 2017 national security strategy leading to the subsequent national defense strategy. some of these issues every single day in congress, a time when the country is very politically divided.
i'm actually struck by the amount of consensus on the basic premise of those documents. even the president's detractor are not necessarily taking issue with the promise of his grand strategy prayed luckily we have the work of insightful clear scholars like you think that way for waking s up to the challenge that we face from the chinese communist party effectively have a new direction in u.s. foreign policy is going to take a long time for us to figure out how to navigate this new set of challenges in all the different crosscurrents that were going to have to navigate around for decades to come. thank you for your work. hr nodded, thank you for your leadership. thank you for not firing the hr over a decade ago. as i was a precocious second first lieutenant and i'm really
excited for this discussion and i'm honored to be working on this with you in congress. >> thank you for those great introductory remarks. this couldn't come in a more important time. i think what is happening, this diplomacy in this approach, i think that many people great believe in his propaganda. i think it's one of the reasons that we are facing said dangerous. now. so far, what were going to do now is facilitate discussion. and some of his insights. from the superb essays in the book braided that facilitates discussion and that will go on for about 45 minutes past the hour. in the meantime, two questions and i'll be reading them is a discussion goings. in the final 15 minutes i will
close to the doctor some of your questions . this will be for our viewers. thanks again. the great introductory remarks and i will turn it over to the doctor now . >> is much . it is a pleasure to be here this afternoon. as great to be back as old friends. i thought i would start because i think it comes from the gallagher a little bit earlier. i thought i might direct a couple of questions to him and then a separate i do want to say however, you have proven my point braided years ago i wrote an article about the importance to recount movie lines. to really make it in the national security and foreign policy field. see, identity again. you see how often that actually is important. usually is the godfather. so would like to ask you soap in
the past couple of months you been really busy at home writing to something interesting one and sensually, talks about the problem of rep capacity in the u.s. china relationship pretty talk about how twitter is the platform and refusing to enter in the united states is a platform but rules in relation that prevented this for china itself. and then second i would like you to come in the little bit more about your more recent it talks about the possible cold war between the u.s. and china. for criticisms of that pretty couple of days later. wrote a letter to the editor. i thought it might be interesting. thank you. to take it to the godfather the releases very much like the
godfather. every time involvement backend. on the first question . i recently did an hour long interview with bill who i'm sure every one is assuming that they know as a publisher which has become essential reading for people to pay attention to these issues and deceit. these platforms are absolutely essential to the ideological strategy. it is the water in which that strategy slams and without it, that strategy really has eight tough time taking hold. so what i suggested after seeing day in and day out, go on twitter and suggest conspiracy's in the american media. i wrote a letter to jack dorsey.
and suggested that is a simple rule, fair role in my opinion would be that the countries that denied their own citizens to this platform. i.e., china, should not be allowed to propagate conspiracy theories that platform. then i'm sure there are unintended consequences to that. ... ... our democracy. we just went through a bruising debattle for years about russian disinformation leading up to an election and this is more pernicious and we're in the midst of an elect right now. so i'd be open to thoughts on the way to thread that needle in hr spots. as for a new cold war, i'm open to a itber analogy. i think you have been critical of that analogy so i welcome the push back.
my only point is there's something in between hot war, particularly nuclear war, and status quo, doing nothing. we can call it gray zone, warfare, you know, we could call it lukewarm warfare think the cold war analogy is useful bulls it includes into certain similarity with the original cold war, the need to re-invent the national security apparatuses that we built in the old cold war, had a whole society effort, invest and research and development from a federal law and clues us into the many, many differences. for most the fact we were never economically enter twine if we the soviet union lick the chinese communist party, and i just like cold war history, as he referenced in the peace, joseph mccarthy from any district, i'm a second marine intelligence officer from wisconsin, elected to congress and that it may be a dubious
distinction bit it should warn us we can go overboard but as long as we retan the capacity for self-correction can this is michigan we can win and i'm exterior go on. can't hundred but think the ccp goes on state tv every day and criticize its cold war thinking and mentality, and us summoning the ghost of mccarthyism but a they don't want the new cold war to end the way the old car did, we minimum and they lose. i rest my thoughts. >> a perfect opening, history historian misha. i want to turn to you the featured guest of the day. i loved your book. i would like to say that each of the essays is elegantly forecasted and they're perfect for both those who are new to this subject and experts as well, and michael howard, the famous historian who wrote about strategy, really would have been proud. i think you're an example of what he was talking about. so, let's start at bit misha on
just with the title of the book "geopolitics. "tell us what you mean by geopolitics? it features so -- it's the theme that runs throughout the whole book and it's important for the audience to understand a little bit what you mean and a little bit tell us about nicholas as well because efeet temperatures in self essays and phones a framework to understand the chapters. >> thank you, i'm happy to do that. i realize now that the title of the book probably should have been wolf warrior jayeow politics. don't know -- geopolitics. that's not asking representative gal fer for the title. let me give a few seconds of thanks. thanks to hoofer institution for allowing me to publish the book to go with the idea of a book of essays which a lot of people don't like. tom gillly began, our director who is very supportive of this, chris daughter -- chris dour and
his entire steam who published. is this best experience publishing the book and this book is beautifully done as a piece. it's nice to hold. erin and her team, our colleague neil ferguson who kindly wrote such an excellent forward that put it into the context of where we are today and i appreciate him taking time of course all of you guys for coming on and i know how about you are and representative gallagher helping run the country, worried but very impending wonderful family news. so everybody is busy and i'm glad you took time. we have to take time because april important. and it's important in a way those who have been doing asia for decades have waited no are and now it's here it's a little built like the dog who catches the car. what would you do now? everybody is focused on it in a way you were sort of a lonely voice any wilderness and one way
it's helpful to think is this older concept of geopolitics. representative gallagher taj but the water that the ccp swims in. we used to swim in the water of geopolitics. used to think but it all the time in relation to our strategy, our goals, our desires for what the world should look tike and then at the end of the cold war we dropped it just hike he folded up strategic air command and said we don't need it anymore. i think part of it was the end of history that the idea that we were the end of history. the idea that we didn't have to really think anymore about a global challenge or therefore different areas of the world. i think also some of this may have been related to thinged both hr and mike gallagher went through the revolution of military affairs and thought we can project power anywhere around the globe with precision and don't have to think but geography.
and geopolitics, do don't want to dish from geostrategy. it's the infront of geography on police exactly and international real estates and how foreign policy interact inside a geographic space. think when you think about china, there's no other way than to understand that they are looking at the world geopolitically, we're very used to talking about one belt and one road where the first and second island chains but those are geopolitical conceptions for the chinese, but but the way they're approaching it is through a geoing strategy and identity clunky ask i'm not a huge fan but it's an important distinction weapon talk but geopolitic that's what ir is, foreign policy is geopolitics. geopolitics is not necessarily what you do the u.n. or "the hague," but when you think about access to resources, when now think but lined communication, think about linking different parts of the world together to benefit your own national power
you're trying to affect power through the geographic space and you do it through a geostrategy. for those on this side of thinking about policy we should be thinking about it in those terms. one belt one road is a geostrategy. i found -- i'll wrap up here. found the think are that started will the germans give it a bad name and there's a long history there i found nicholas sprinkle spikeman, a geopolitician who unfortunate died during the war, died very young, but wrote a couple of just incredibly insightful studies one geopolitical competition played out, and up like mckiner who came to spikeman's way of thinking, as opposed to thinking but they heart lean the steppeey in the part odd rescue and china and talked but the rimland. it plays out in the inare seas whether it's the met terrain yap
or the inning lisch channel or the east china sea and the south choi sea, where the people and are the productive facilities are. and so that is where competition really happens. doesn't happen in the middle of the pacific ocean except if you're trying to tack a place that gived you midway that gives you access. instead it's competing in rimlands and pikeman really helps us understand what beijing has been trying to do for the past 20 years in terms of securing what in the book i call the asiaalishing met terrain yap this, i integrated strategic space, the sea of japan, the east china sea, south china sea into the indian ocean. it behooves us to understand what the chinese think about geopolitics in order for us to have the right geostrategy. >> i actually next going to ask you a little bit to expand upon the concept of asiaatic mediterranean and what is happening there. maybe over the past few years in terms of the development and
then if you can link that to broader concept of the -- how it fits in. that's also another important theme of the book. talk about the what is hang in the asiaatic mediterranean developments you think are important and for us to continue to watch? of. >> this is actually a term used by spikeman in 1942 in this last book. the structure of world politics. i'm blanking on the name up fished at the time of the death and then finished by his colleague. he said let's think but is interconnected seas like the met terrain yack all the great powers ringed round them. the lifeline into and out of the region think of the east chinasaw sea and the south china sea and taiwan, goes town do and node from what we used to all asiaatic russia, sigh beera, down into what are we those
productty areas, japan, south korea and china, the northern part of china if the most productive parts of the world economy in terms of production, and then from there, or into there all the raw materials throw and out of there all the finished goods float. we don't the can -- we think of them as a sea separated from another sea. it's certainly not how the asians think of it nor aspirated from the indian ocean. now you get to he indian ocean different ways, through the then you flow direct by other into the sea and then the indian ocean and that leaded to part of the world we're more familiar think can but it's an gig brateed space and integrated strategic and battle spay, why the china have turn that dish don't think use much anymore, they were building a string of pearls, and that was to flee -- hr remind he, the gee geographyy
of the peace. it's just lucidly written and helped you understand why you need to have a forward defense because you don't want to be contained in either you're hemisphere or your -- you need a global defense and you need to think about integrated. it's why the china are building bases in -- access points in packston or burma to allow them to have strategic place into throw from the productive neighborhood they're fireworks into where these goods good and then if you look what i sometimes call the maritime silk road, component of the land based one belt one road, the maritime silk road followed or the bases follow the road. it's the their nag following trade or the other way around but they're creating access opinions. why the indians are so concerned.
the largest naval procurers will be be the indian navy because they're very concern but maintaining access if why the japan japanese are building because no one handed to they're strategic space some crunch they cannot enter the global economy. we have responsible use to operating operating in global champ commons answer an island nation that we have lost the sense that it can be cut off from us. for 70 years we have not had to think about. i we have to think about it now. it's whine when you writing the national security strategy we thought you had exactly right etch the competition which is a sort of theoretical, what are they competing at? this is hour they con peopling. they're competing in space and we have to understand that to maintain the freedom and the free and open pacific concept that for us goes back to the 19th century, a free and open pacific and indo-pacific, just as we have happened our ability to get from the continental u.s.
into maritimes in asia. >> a nice segway to the concept of the indo-pacific which was introduced national security strategy and had been talked about for many years by others as well and also like to comment on the hills perspective on it because it is an area of consensus among -- in terms of the term and needs and hr do you have any thoughts about in the indo-pacific as well and how maybe also what is happening more reachedly in term of the way the administration is thinking, how ill policemen implementation is going. misha, do you want to comment on that and i'll turn to mike gallagher. >> very briefly. i'm happy wear talker but indo-pacific. when i taught at yale or studied you would be he department of east asian studies and in the state department you have the
east asian pacific faired but the asians don't think pout it in they way. indians look east, or japan's quasi-alliance with india. all integrated and we need to catch up. dod gets it right with the asian -- the area of responsibility for endopacific command is exactly rite. encompasses the entire region. we need to get the rest of government and academia to work in an integrated we but that's come a long was since i started doing this 15 torn years ago. >> -- from the hill i don't think there's anyone who is questioning the renaming of -- no the overall prioritizeddation geographic prioritization it presents. think -- this is not just true in congress or a cutely true in congress but i think more broadly in the think tank community, i certainly sense a
lack of focus on india, and i don't think -- while we have a growing number of china focused scholars, i think that's an area where neither members of congress nor the broader foreign policy community have chosen to focus on and write about with some notable exceptions, of course. and then i think more broadly, just as it pertained to the work the national security strategy and the respect for eurasian rimland they misha lays out. while recent polling suggests that americaned in wake of coronavirus have an unusually negative view of china in general, and even canadians. once you piss off the canadians you know you have screwed up. don't think it's a palpable sense of clear and present danger that would allow us to make the necessary military,
intelligence and economic investment its think we need to make in the pacific. i think people in my district in northeast wisconsin felt the threat of jihaddist terrorism in 2015 and 2016 in a way where they don't feel the threat of the chinese communist party bus it's more insidious and it's different and i think that's true even after coronavirus. i think we all have to do a better job of explaining why we don't want to live in a world in which they're even allowed to be a regional hegemon, where asia for asians displaces the u.s. as the dominant endopacific power and that's a harder case to make at a time when people in both parties embracing a more isolationist view, and don't understand how hard it would be to move across the pacific to get to the fight in ways that' misha does understand and this book brilliantly lays out. >> hr did you want to make my
comments? >> i think i'll pass and i'm synthesizing the questions. some great questions from our viewers. >> all right. i'll ask a few more and then open it up to viewer because i know that's what it's about. just would like to highlight that i should have done this early on, the become is actually more than just about china. there's really interesting, interesting two chapters on japan, misha is an historian of the region, has written but japan for maybe yearsment one of the chapters had a very interesting description of how japan managed to balance the problems of globalization, the opportunities and the drawbacks. and i think you very clearly explain how japan balanced between the two and asked whether or not those lessons had some relevance for us today. so misha would you like to comment about that? i thought that was a great chapter. >> yeah. the chap is indicate -- the
title comes from a japan poem and the gods set up eight fenced around japan to keep it safe from the world and also be a divine land and in many weighed with hey an exotic view of japan and japan mass maintain emt beyers to world which most in the west would find questionable if not problematic. but i wrote the book because honestly i lived in japan in the 90s in parts of the 2007 and you get very used it to and then i was black and was actually there during the terrible paris massacre in 2015 i think it was, and i was in tokyo, and all the news was coming coming in and immediately as i -- someone who live inside america your body reacts physically and boy body
reacted physically. my god, here's another attack. what is next? what sky too in and thin realized i'm in tokyo. i'm perfectly safe. that's -- japan had an instance of domestic terrorism in the mid-90s, but the type of terrorism we had been dealing with for at that point 15 years and it's post 9/11 iteration bus for decades and japan didn't have to worry about. you live in a dangerous enabled. have to worry about knocker north korea and china, and looking at is and simulation and open border and the like, japan has a different set of answersment out of that -- this is say to understand in a broad sense japan's choices and whether they might not be better than we gave them credit for. and very simply asked for the popping of the japanese bubble in 1989 and also lost interest in japan. wouldn't make is rich and didn't care so exactly what will happen
win china's bubble pops. i'll forget about china. i won't be a way to get rich women thought we had the go-go 2000s the 90s some so son and japanned seemed stagnant but by any metric japan does well, whether it's a crime metric, a health metric, a social stability metric, education metric, it has enormous problems and i recognize that, but it made choices we said meant it wasn't very modern and it wasn't opening up and completely open borders, or complete integration with the world and he questioned whether a hundred years we might look back and made choice that were as legitimate and possibly better than ours. it was meant to be a controversial chapter but i think that i would just simply end by saying when i travel how to asia, everyone knows that money can be made in china. but the place that everyone aspires to be is japan. clean skies, green parks, safe
population that supports its government. they all want it to be japanese. none want it to be chinese and we should be aware a of that. >> one last question but one of the most interesting chapter on north korea. it's not a line of discussion that we often hear so seemly i'll summary very quickly you argue that we should be more realistic about the dangers north korea poses in terms of potential accidents involving nuclear materials and components and weapons and that we should actually consider working with them on safety issues, and i think that is interesting. i don't think a lot of people talk about that. so why don't you comment a little bit about that and when you wrote that chapter issue forget the date when the original version kale couple. did you've get pushback? what was the responsible for that. >> i'm breaking out in a sweat because i'm nervous about hr
coming down on me. i. >> you're hoping we wouldn't notice the chapter. >> no. itself what meant to be controversial and i did get a lot of pushback but i also got weird invitations from people who had never invited me before. here's where i went -- got my cold war geek on. mike wrote a whole dissertation on strategic adan addition in the cold war out i've been very interested in the nuclear we, going college in d.c. in the 80s, big topic, and it steamed me the real issue with north korea -- i see them as very rational actors that dance up to the line of craziness but never cross it. is not that they're going to wake up one da, whether it's kim jong-un or his sister or whoever it and decide to nuke san francisco. it is that there's go to be an dent and we had dozen of accidents. we hat a titan 2 missile blow up in arkansas some a fully loaded with a nuclear warhead and blow
the warhead hundreds of meeted away. we had planes crash. we don't know where since of our nuclear weapons are. they disappeared during accidents in the cold war, most of them oddly off of the carolinas coast. so maybe a bermuda triangle thing going on. accidents all the time. an explosion to this day we don't now how damaging in the soviet union misworry -- we spend billions and billions of dollars only nuclear asurety, nur nuclear safety and able to interview formedder commanded of strategic command and down to missileers and ballistic missile subcaptains and they talk about the main job is keeping it safe. so my fear is that how do we know that north korea will keep it safe? we don't know at the design of their weapons. we don't in whether they have per per permissive action leg.
don't who has the responsibility to launch. what i if the phone lines are cut and someone says they -- let me launch. we don't know the early warning. two of the episode its talk about in the chapter are how close we almost came to nuclear war with the russians, once with the soviets and once with the russians where malfunctions -- misreading of sensor data from satellites led the russians to believe we were launching missiles and only because humans intervened and said the doesn't make sense they didn't launch. petrov who just died, back in the '83 and then under boris yeltsin. so we have no idea -- they don't have satellites in the north korea to what heap if they see a b-352 circle and say that's it? my point was my fear is that having a safe nuclear arsenal is so difficult that if -- i say if -- we don't denuclearize them
which has been a core goal of all administrations but if we don't denuclearize them, if we live in a world with north korea and nuclear weapons how do we keep them safe? that's the key them. deterrence is part of it. but what about the accident that where a missile can launch or blow up. so crazily it's the do we try to help -- i don't think they'll let us help or the chinese but it a world where our kids live under a north korean nuclear shodow. it was men to be a provocative chapter and goals through the cold war history how it's hard to keep this things safe and we have done an extraordinary job but with incredible work at it and just don't know if the north koreans will do the same. >> congressman gallagher, one mint on than and then to hr with
the questions only because your nodding and nodding and i don't 'oknow that's because mesh extra is contracts or right. >> i agree emfattily with everything the said. i do think that at least on the hill most people welcome the policy of maximum pressure north korea, and i think most people even those on the hawkish side of the spectrum are willing to test the diplomatic outreach. i think it's fair so say we have taken two steps forward and one step back in term ode north korea poll same lot of us, myself included, who believe there's know we do can to empose pressure including chinese banks and businesses who geoff an economic lifeline to north korea, and a lot of times the people that are advocating return to the status quo are saying we are going overboard in term odd more confrontational approach to china will cite a variety of areas to cooperate and stability on the corn peninsula is one of them.
i think people women peter mattis, has done a very good job of systemically dismantling the argues. and even on the terms of that argue. it's failed because the chinese communist party has not proved a cooperative partner. i think north korea policy is something that we have been content to just sort of praise maximum pressure but ignore some of the disconfirming evidence we have gotten in recent months. >> thanks. okay. now, to the audience. thanks for hanging in with us and hr, the floor is yours. >> what a great discussion. so what i've done is to give you a heads up, i grouped these in seven a questions and they'll be rapid fire. >> right. >> we have a great international audience here and you're asking just wonderful questions. thanks to everybody. for greg, john, dylan, math mew and david -- matthew and david
their questions who what but the flash points we are see in south china sea, along the indian border, with the extinguishment of freele and to individual rights and free only of speech in hong kong think threats against taiwan. what is happening and why? what is china trying to achieve? is -- is this new aggressiveness connected to the covid crisis? how do you see what china is trying to do along these flash points and what do you think prospects are going forward? >> it's a huge question. some points i sort of hesitate because i'm getting back more to historian mode than pundit mode and trying to look forward. i think it's important to go backwards in a sense and say, why did we get here when this was obviously the point we didn't think we would get to, and we're conflating -- not
conflating but combining things that are domestic in china with the party with its geostrategy, what it's doing on the out and how it sees things like taiwan and hong kong. what is clear is that the strong e that beijing has become, the more assertive and aggressive it's become of the interpretation is why, why is that? doing it out of confidence or out of insecurity? and i think it's a little bit of both we can't forget it is always the strongest country in asia, it has to be. just by nature of its own geography, but also understands it faces very strong neighbors and strong partner/adversaries such as the united states and so think there's an element where it feels it can bully smaller nations. it's too ease you to say i did that historically but in the mindset and dna of the chinese bureaucratic state that this is
how international relations are ordered and also a party and a leninist party state that knows it does not have much legitimacy, even at home. particularly with the economic slowdown. that it is facing enormous pressures going forward, whether it's a slowing down macthrow economy, the fact beijing is back under lockdown because of the coronavirus that it did not handle that as well as it led the world to believe that pollution is terrible. that's a little bit of what tried talk but in hi last book. ... because time was not on his side and i think there's an odd combination in beijing with feeling so much stronger around him even where it's come in the
past. the past two decades or so. but at the same time, not knowing in two decades hence some are very historical. we are seeing 20 indian soldiers being killed in a clash with the chinese just over the past couple days. these are border disputes back from the 19th century. so they are played out in a modern setting but certainly didn't develop just because suddenly china is strong. these go back for centuries. of course 50 years ago, over 50 years ago, nearly 60, the border war between china and india. think if japan and the united states were still fighting 's permission over world war ii in 2000, that's 1940+60 is 2000. what's clear is that nobody has settled the problem i think that's the biggest reason we
have the flashpoint. asia cannot figure out how to get past these things whether south china sea, east china see, borders on land it's not just china, it's japan and russia. cambodia and thailand. it's a whole bunch of different nations but clearly it's the assertiveness of the parties desire to be seen again as a hegemon. clearly as the hegemon in asia that's driven so much of this. and the concern is that eventually flashpoint's can multiply. you can lose control of the situation ultimately the scenario i talk about in the word chapter future history of the war between china and the united states but we should be very worried not that we would go to war tomorrow but very worried that after decades of economic growth and political economic position it has more interstate conflict than it did before. they have not sold it. that is a bad data point for us to be looking at.
>> joshua, felix, lawrence, had questions about, what is driving this from an emotional perspective from an aspirational perspective this kind of behavior from the chinese communist party what it does china really want? what is the agenda of national rejuvenation? how do you see it? lawrence, who's listening in watching from berlin said, is this a modern day version of lebensraum? what is china really hoping to achieve and what is driving it in this agenda of national rejuvenation. these are extraordinarily important and hard questions and i know that ãbthe eminent chinese historian ãfrom oxford is online and asks one of those questions i'm always hesitant. i like to point but i don't think i can. i don't want to make it too easy but i do think it's important to listen to what the parties state says. we spent a lot of time interpreting it from our own
views but the parties state is fairly valuable if not always transparent in the goals it has whether xi jinping fought on foreign affairs and diplomacy. things like document number nine, the infamous document number nine which talks about basically the ideological war between china and the west. i think it's fair to say that the party wants to survive. he wants to remain in power. everything flows from that. that can be from a sense of pressure or advance but this is about maintaining the party and the strength of china so that china supports the party, if i can put it back crudely. the legitimacy. that it is both fulfilling part of the social contract that was, we will give economic
growth for no political reform the reverse of what the soviets tried, has been in many ways, although not fully filled by china over the past generation the second part about returning china to a position of greatness in asia and by extension, the world. it's where i think the party is working now. and it's what rising powers do. i think there's a really interesting debate now over the question does china want to supplant the post-world war ii order? get rid of it put its own? or cooperate? does it actually want to take it over for itself in a way. you see it building analogy structures two things that were built by the west such as asian infrastructure investment bank or the one by one road itself. the shanghai cooperation. we go back to look at things that the parties state has put together. i think it's fair to say that
it sees itself as a great power. it's hard not to. because that, it's acting in ways to maximize that power or express that power. it often does so peacefully and through diplomatic form and it does so through trying to get economic advantage and diplomatic advantage. but there's always the question of hierarchy. the key u.s. policy and i think the white u.s. policy realism and how you can see that play out but from china it's actually hierarchy it's returning to a natural state of hierarchy. what professor daniel bell in a book called just hierarchy. they talk about just hierarchy between the states.
big states and small states. the question is, from the chinese perspective, how you act responsibly in the hierarchical relationship without trying to pretend it's equal, not westphalian. that's what the party is attempting to do its ãbnot in taking over terry t that believes is rightfully his lot such as taiwan. it is strategic spaces the best way to put it. let's be honest, they achieve most of their goals already. of turning the intercedes into free operating zones for what 30 years ago is basically a coastal forks. because of that is forcing the other states in the region to accept this unequal structure.
we are coming in with a different model not the vertical model, the horizontal model. >> am thinking about the term built one road which was revealing after president trump made a speech in which he said we built many roads. >> there just all chinese coming back to the did you u.s. and a multinational response. was it business to be asked a
question about chinese information warfare and he gets to your point about reciprocity. this gets the influence over hollywood in connection, great report on this that hoover did about a year ago ãmake a plug right now for a wonderful group of programming niche is integral to which is china sharp power. that larry diamond and others are working on as well hereof hoover. zach said i guess the question is, why did it take us so long? why are we in seemed to be not adapting to the information of this. you have any ideas on how to respond to the parties are effort that influenced us in such a way we don't respond
effectively to the various forms of aggression? >> and over getting down to the last minute.this is such an important wonderful question. i try to address all of this in the chapter called the new china rules. the china rules was more mellifluous. you're absolutely right. the report our colleague larry diamond data on the chinese operations. as a touchstone everybody needs to read it you can get it on the hoover site. hr is essential to it as well in terms of taiwan and the sharp power. because we really have woken up to it. i want to be an optimist. it's a great day here in dc it's raining in fact but i want to be optimistic the optimism is that it took us long to get it right because we really are hopeful this is gonna work out well. our hearts are in the right place. as a nation we thought we were to bring china in to the post mount china into the world of the community of nation that we
get involved in all these international organizations. we help develop and become wealthier. we see the benefits of all this. i think beijing fully understands the benefits of all this. it's happy with a more subordinate position within that. i believe that the party is very serious about saying it's not can modernize. we certainly see that in xi jinping. it's not, letting western influences it's not the related concepts of democratic equality and the like because that's existential for the party. but we were wedded to historical concept that all nations that become part of the world and benefit from it were liberalized in some way. there are we having elections like in peoria but they will liberalize in some way and certainly act in cooperative ways abroad. that's being tested.
there's a lot of self-interest though. i think we really have to look at the world of corporate america more carefully but this goes back to the very beginning of american relations with china when the first american sailor was arrested by king authorities for a crime that he did not commit and the merchant community. this goes all the way back to the ãbi think we've learned this comes at enormous price. hundreds of billions of dollars every year stolen intellectual property. information taken that we will never get back. the self interest should shift. understand how to protect yourself. think with the information space. we have 600 confucius institutes around the united
states in one form or another. and only 28 american centers that were shut down. it was unequal. confucianism reciprocity is actually considered the ultimate virtue. it's the golden rule and they actually say in the analects, treat others as you want to be treated. it's almost word for word from the golden rule. it's not our idea you should act reciprocally and equally and treat others equally with equal access were right. it's a confucian idea from 2500 years ago. the party doesn't want to do that. it is something that i think should be guiding us as we understand now our hopes for the last 40 years as we are lined up with historical point our hopes for the last 40 years were in some ways fulfilled important to our economy but the deeper hopes were not fulfilled. we have to understand were not going into the first period of
hoping. to have a policy and set a policy that works with all of our friends in asia. asia is much bigger than china. in order to protect their interest and put us on a road where hopefully one point in time beijing will understand that the course is chosen may in the short run be successful but in the long run alienate, isolate and impoverish it. >> i can't think of a better way to end the question and answer period but i'm gonna ask you to maybe make closing remarks after nadia. i want to sum up some of the questions. i think that nick and chris and shelley were all asking about what are the weaknesses. is the aggressiveness of the party swinging back against them? i think, nadia, the point you made frequently is that competing with china doesn't foreclose the operation.
>> the rest of the questions from nick and about in the questions from others about what about allies in the region are they doing their part? misha, your chapter on u.s. japan and china together is a wonderful chapter. i highly recommend that chapter 2 peter and clients and joshua and michael and jack asking about alliances. and as the navy up to it? our allied navies up to it? chapter 8, i love it because you are a historian. you act as if you are historian looking back on future events. i recommend that chapter as a how the competition can play out. we see some of the flashpoints come to a higher level of providence. it's a wonderful book. congratulations and i will just tell everybody, order it now, just scratch the surface i'd
like to turn it over to nadia first. >> i think we cover as much as we could in an hour. i wish we had more time. i would've brought up some of the additional great parts of the book the chapter on india as well. really interesting chapter about the role of women in india. i encourage the audience to pick it up and read it. i don't have any more to add. i think we had a longer time i would've commented on the usaa question. the rule of allies and partners and thinking about what we are facing that's been an interesting shift of the past few months. very probably covid driven shift. a very significant one as well. i think an idea for a future
panel would be to get more europeans and allies and partners from around the world, australian, japanese, on this type of program. thank you so much. >> misha, you have the final word. >> there is so much we could cover and we talk about a lot. the good news is we are paying attention and i know congressman gallagher had to run to do a hearing but the work he is doing, the frontier bill to boost science and stem amtech are here. the new strategy the white house put out the strategic approach to people's republic of china encourage people to read it starts with what you guys did in the national security strategy and takes it to basically a position of reciprocity and says that's what can you guide us. i think the navy gets it. they understand it. they were warning about this. a decade more going out and visiting what was specific command now indo pacific
command. they be talking about we are losing blue space and water space and how do we react? i think the pieces are there they were just in isolation and now they been driven together in the point is to have a strategy whichever administration comes in to office next january i think this is the new road and does not foreclose cooperation with china we should be thinking about china from the position of strength because we have enormous strengths it does have weaknesses. and we have an alliance and unparalleled alliance network if china could only dream about. china's allies are north korea and pakistan. we have allies. we need to work with those allies, especially japan and australia. deepen the relationship with india. these are all easy things to say things we talk about a lot of the think tank world. i just want to get people to think a little bit differently.
why the real competition i think in asia is between china and japan not china and the united states because that's an internal one in a sense. what u.s. strategies been since the 19th century. we should be very proud we've had a strategy of a free and open indo pacific since the mid-19th century. not something new. people say we don't have strategy and we don't think strategically, we do. we thought that way for a very long time and we should be proud of that. no conditions change so the goals of the goal of the free and open and the pacific hasn't changed since the 19th century. we need a strategy for it. all those things i try to punch on. there's a lot to worry about them a lot that can go wrong but i really heartened that people care, that you guys made it a priority. that mike gallagher is making it a priority. to paraphrase winston churchill, we always do the wrong thing until we do the right thing at the end. how we will deal with china and
the broader indo pacific. thank you all, thank you for everyone who viewed and took time to watch and for new hr nadia, taking time out of your schedule to join me for this. i appreciate it. >> thanks to you and thanks to our viewers. congressman gallagher had to go to vote, he senses best wishes to everybody and says thanks. nadia, brilliant job facilitating. misha, all of our viewers to the hoover website for even more information about this and the many other challenges and opportunities we are facing during this covid crisis. and going forward beyond that. best wishes to all of you, everybody stay welcome the best to you and your families. it's been a pleasure to have you here at the hoover institution. have a great day everybody. thank you. >> here's a look at some books being published this week. author and political commentator ben shapiro argues that americans are being divided over our history in
"how to destroy america in three easy steps". in twilight of democracy, put suppliesãb nicholson baker describes trying to navigate the freedom of information act in "baseless". in always a soldier, army veteran rob smith reflects on his life as a gay black republican. also being published this week, journalist blandin soderberg and betty norwood's report on baltimore's country's task force which they describe as america's most corrupt police unit in "i got a monster". in the book "unacceptable" the wall street journal melissa coren and jennifer levitz investigate the recent college admissions scandal and avarice magazine editor-in-chief say were darby profiles woman from the altar rights movement in "sisters in haiti".find these titles this coming week wherever books are sold and
watch for many authors in the near future on booktv on c-span2. on tuesday president trump's niece mary trump released her book that is critical of the president titled "too much and never enough ". wednesday on good morning america she reflected on her relationship with her extended family and your visit to the white house in 2017. >> i had been on the outside of this family for a really long time. and after my cousin evolved as wedding, which for reasons i still don't understand i was invited to, my aunt marianne and i started talking. we developed a relationship, which we never had before, quite honestly. and it mattered to me. it was the first time i'd felt part of the family since i was a kid.
somehow it was very easy for me to put aside all of the things that happened previous to that. when i got invited to her birthday party i felt i should go. >> you go, you see the president in the oval office, you told him, don't let them get you down. did you mean that? >> i did. actually. that was four months in. he already seemed very strained by the pressures. i didn't mean i want you to keep doing what you are doing and get away with it. also so much of what's happened since then, had yet happened and i thought his response was actually more enlightening then my statement.
he said, they won't get me. so far it looks like he's right. >> if you're in the oval office today what would you say to them? >> resign. mary trump's book " too much and never enough" had an initial print run of 600,000 copies. watch for her in the near future on booktv on c-span2. >> c-span has unfiltered coverage of congress, the white house, the supreme court, and public policy events. you can watch all of c-span public affairs programming on television online demo or listen on our free radio app. and be a part of the national conversation through c-span's daily washington journal program. or through our social media feeds. c-span, created by america's cable television company as a public service and brought to
you today by your television provider. >> booktv on c-span2 has taught nonfiction books and authors every weekend. coming up this weekend, tonight at 9:00 p.m. eastern on "after words", wired magazine editor and large stephen leavy discusses his book "facebook: the inside story" interview by author and financial times global business columnist at 10:00 p.m. eastern time former speaker of the house newt gingrich offers his thoughts on why president trump should be reelected with his book "trump and the american future: solving the great problems of our time". watch booktv on c-span2 tonight. >> we thank you all for tuning in. what we can describe as ãb grateful for the opportunity to