not only true at yale but some of the other places. you could study diseases but that was in the lab where you are actually talking about their biological side rather than their historical features. so i felt there was something that someone really needed to deal with those questions and those issues, and that's what became later the book that is now "epidemics and society." it started with my students. .. my name is andrew, i'm the for joining us. i am the director of the robert a smith studies in

monticello. it is my pleasure to introduce kevinvi a wendell who will be discussing his new book the complete victory in the american revolution published it is a splendid addition with color, illustrations and excellent maps. very useful appendices. the battle of saratoga is often as regarded as the turning point of the revolutionary war. as victory one and partly by americans is generally believed the victory persuaded plants in france to unite with the united states. kevin has produced one of the most comprehensive accounts of the battle. it is of particular interest because also for me to it inform her army officer 28 years of service, a graduate

of west point's service included two combat deployments and the professorship at military theory and strategy of the war college in carlisle pennsylvania. his previous book, lincoln's a tragic the life of samuel trump was awarded the william e kobe old board. kevin has agreed to do this program in an interview format more like a conversation that will be followed by questions from our audience. i will be grateful if audience members could put any questions in the q&a at the bottom of the screen. kevin thank you very much indeed for joining us. >> will thank you andrew. i appreciate the invitation and thanks to everybody who is out there attending.

>> host: so, i want to begin byit asking you to discuss how your military background influenced your writing of theit book. >> guest: oh okay. well, i think first of all, it is important to -- you don't have to be you don't have to have military background to be a good military historian. in fact as a the greatest military historian have not had a military background. look at some the great military, written at rick atkinson, andrew hugh, you do not have to have eight military background. but i do think that having extensive military experience like i do can maybe add some different perspectives to your research and writing. little things like i know what like to walk through the woods or the desert, wet, tired, hungry, two hours of sleep for six days straight.

her as a former battalion commander and company commander i can speak with firsthand knowledge about morale and training and discipline, small unite, leadership, resilience and of course the truth of famous statement everything in war is simple but even the simplest difficult. so i understand the things a commander has to do. we think of commanders or a battlefield, they are making important decisions on when to attack, went to withdrawal, those sorts of things. but there's a thousand other things a big small commander has to think about. just thingss like the importance of logistics. as you know in this campaign was critical. i suppose we'll talk about a little bit more. it's absently important. but most will think of logistics they think of stuff,

food, ammunition, things like that there's also things like transportation, maintenance, fuel, which in the 18th century was fodder for your animals. and medical support. all of those things are encompassed in logistics. and how to understand terrain and hopefully how to describee terrain. and i've done 25 years of staff arise in battlefield tours brave lead military groups to civil war battlefields and basically all the civil war battlefields and vicksburg in the west and a battlefield tours and a waterloo in normandy and the bridge in the national line andy sicily and, when you do that i think that adds a

different perspective. i think all of those things all of those experiences have helped inform my research and writing. so he cut the answer to your short question. >> very good. i thought they offered special insights.fi now before returned specifically to the battle of saratoga, i would like to ask your thoughts about the war in general. i think this is very relevant especially in light of america's decision to withdraw from afghanistan. talk a bit about why goliath failed to defeat the david's and lose against much smaller. most also former military officer from military

backgrounds, writes the most detailed accounts the british side in the war for america published 1977. the spoke sometimes obscured by the amount and richness and detailed over 500 pages. i was originally told he was arguing that the british lost in this world war against france, spain and holland. in reality is arguing the war was winnable it was lost by poor military leadership. feels good technicians and best strategists in other words the micro level but not at the macro level. i clarified his unit short essay called could the british of war one the war of

independence. supposed by arguably one of the best scholars of the work, jon shy who's for influenced by his knowledge of vietnam. the british were fighting a counterinsurgency more recently fought by the americans in afghanistan. like the united states their unsuccessful such conflicts in the 20th century. gives the example of a one of their few successes in the land in malaysia. however this was an aberration because the british were fighting an ethnic minority, the chinese, who had no outside or domestic support. it is still and very brutal war. so kevin i'm sorry to be long-winded. no that's great. my question to use could the british of one the american war? >> a disappointed obit in my

answerer. i think it was yes they had a chance up through 1777. i think after that only the americans could have beat themselves. could have destroyed washington's army in the fall off 76 had he really vigorously followed up his victories in new york. which she didn't do. i think that was their first opportunity. the second opportunity was in 1777 but not what the plan quickly think the best opportunity to win the war was to go to philadelphia, lure washington into this decisive battle i t think by that time by early 1777 special after trenton and princeton i think

he realized washington and washington's army was the american center for gravity could destroy washington and washington's army thatnd would end the rebellion. he offices not able to accomplish that is not able to get his decisive victory he beats washington a couple times but he cannot get that final decisive victory. after that the war goes into that different phase were ultimately goes down to the south and then you really have a much more of a counterinsurgency like conflict. i think by that point again think only the americans could beat themselves at that point. that is my personal assessment of a that. when you look at how the search of the campaign played out, one of the options which

actually does present he presents and a throwaway afterthought manner, is, one thing we could do would be to use the navy, load up the troops who are up in canada, sell them back around too new york and now how would have this immense army and that army -- that i think that army could have been big enough to track down and destroy washington in the philadelphia campaign. that does not happen obviously. but he think that was their best opportunity. just t go back to what was being talked about strategy. i think their strategy failed them in that respect in 1777. i argue that in the book. >> that leads to my next question which is your book is one of the most comprehensive studies in saratoga. i wish i would have had it at

hand. the timelines are normatively useful it's very well written and constructed. but you conclude with the generally accepted view that the british lost because of poor planning and a failure coordination between the chief architect of the war in lender , jon and sir william howell. think you got a slide of those three. >> i do. go ahead. >> what you might like to do is show your slide and also give our audience a little background as to what the plan was. and aware went wrong about getting into the actual battle. >> sure. >> out ultimately like you to stay which commanders do you

blame? >> okay, can you see my slide there? >> yes. so i'm not going to talk about strategy here. okay, these two gentlemen of course, you talked about these folks and your wonderful book the men who lost america, on the leftists are william howell who was commander-in-chief in north americaig and escada. and on the right is his brother admiral richard howe who is the royal navy commander-in-chief in north america. there is of course george washington the american commander-in-chief. these are the key folks who worked out the strategy and 1777..

clockwise from the top we've got king george the third, and then on the right there you have general so william howell. on the bottom general jon and on the leftist lord jermaine who is now secretary of state for the colonies and responsible for managing the war in north america. so early in 1777, the commander-in-chief general sir william howe there on the left and then general jon who was in a london so he is there in london with the king. both present plans for 1777. they both argue these are going to be award-winning plans. the complex but imaginative plan. in some ways it isom a repeat of

the first british invasion of new york in the fall of 1776 which was commanded by general sir guy carleton who is the commander in chief in canada. so this plan calls for three columns advance to albany, new york. they see the first one would be the larger column from canada going down the famous lake champlain hudson river invasion corridor to albany. a secondary column a secondary effort d sometimes called more of a diversionary effort. this amount goes down the st. lawrence to lake ontario and then down the mohawk river also to albany. then the final column will be

the main british army inat north america would come up the hudson river, all meeting at albany and then from there they really don't explain what they want to do. but the bottom line is they think they're going to split the more rebellious new england colonies away from what they hope they thought were the less rebellious middle colonies and southern colonies. then they would conduct some sort of follow-on operation into connecticut, into massachusetts and sohu on. and that's the plan. the king really like this plan. frankly i think there almost obsessed with this kind of thing using the lake champlain corridor. but again, remembering how by this time had recognized

washington as an the main american army is the primary center of gravity. how is the commander-in-chief in new york city and what howe argues is, i want to go to philadelphia where the seat of congress is. and if i do that washington is going to be forced to defend philadelphia and then i can trap him and destroy the american army and thus end the rebellion. at first he considers it marching overland to philadelphia. but if he b does that it could lead to all sorts of problems. he would have to protect his lines of communication back in new york. and of course he was burned and late 76 early 77 with the trenton princeton campaign that washington conducted against him. so he decides to use the mobility of the royal navy and

is a of course commanded the royal navy. he loads his troops on ships. and his plan is, let me go back in seconds, so his plan then is to load on ships and take his army by c. and they will ultimately end up going up the chesapeake bay, land south of philadelphiach and then he will march on philadelphia. that is house plan. again, fairly straightforward. obviously these are two very, very different plans. it is up to jermaine to coordinate these plants but there's jermaine in the center and then he is got howe off to the left there and we are going to the right. the problem of course is there is tierney a distance of 3000 miles between london and new york. new gotan the commander-in-chief

sitting in new york 3000 miles away when you got messages that can take two to three months to go back and forth across "the atlantic", it makes it very, very difficult to coordinate a campaign. decision-makers in london and in new york city coordinate these two plans and of course ultimately what happens, we cannot get into the details here the short time we have, ultimately what happens of course is borders blue cross communications will be modeled, misunderstandings and confusion will take place. and basically what happens is they approve house campaign

with the understanding that once he finishes it and he also proves campaign. which number one again it's very uncoordinated and confusing. shows birth jermaine amber glands in some ways, there miss understanding what it takes to conduct operations in north america. especially what it takes to conduct operations in the wilderness of new york. they think that these things can be done very, very quickly and they can be turned on a dime and move very quickly to another location and of course that can't a happen. maybe you'll have on the plains of europe but it's not going to happen in north america. so anyway again i'm sorry that long.

>> very a lot to get in there but very useful background. i want to play devils advocate i am in a minority of one this is not the received viewpoint. but i've always been confused by this idea that is just misunderstood by the commanders. but the plans of 1777 was the same plan of 1776 when march down from canada and link up with how and albany. it's difficult to believe how was unaware he was meant to meet and albany when heather right from london, begged to go north instead of philadelphia. he spoke as though he needed

no help. i just throw that out. my question is, if howe had marched albany and met them would it have changed the outcome? what was the plan once they met in albany? if this was so important why did he not just simply sailed to new york and join how to go to canada. even if the two armies had met , half of the ever withheld lines between york and canada? great there's a lot in those questions there. me take the last t one first. why didn't he just sail around and meet howe. when he submits his detailed plan for the king and jermaine, i can't be the exact date is

in february 1777. correct this long memo called thoughts for conducting the war on the side of canada. long, long memo. about 95% of the is describing how he would conduct the invasion from canada. like three lines of it talks about the other thing we could assail route and reinforce how in new york. clearly that was meant as a throw away and not to even consider it. and even said after he said that in hisd memo says but, we wouldn't get the good payoff. the strategic impact of that would not be as great as coming out from canada. he basically says he out to do this but don't even b really think about it.

so he considered it and rejected it in my mind. i think jermaine and the king probably never even thought about it. they really love this idea coming up lake champlain, heading south on lake champlain. i think that was not even part of the discussion. oddly enough, "after words", after it was all said and done one of the criticisms of the many criticisms against jermaine was well, i told you we could've sailed around and reinforced how and new york city. you did not pick that option. although he did not pick that option because he didn't place any emphasis on it at all. so he was being very

disingenuous about that after the fact. the other part of your question what if he sailed up the hudson and they'd all met it albany? i'm not sure he ever would've made it albany no matter what. even if how would sailed up the hudson. say they had. so he was able to make his way to albany and how was able to get up to albany as well. well, number one maybe they could have done that but they never could have felt the ground. mcdaris and all of the fortifications they would've need to establish up and down the corridor and matter how much royal support they had, and hamilton i think wrote this great letter in the late spring of 1777 i'm thinking he

was probably simply repeating in this letter washington was thinking. basically this letter was one of the assemblies in new england. i think it was the connecticut assembly. this basically telling them don't worry, even if they do this they will never be able to hold onto that territory. it would take an immense army to be able to hold onto that territory. and i think he's exactly right. don't think there's any way the british had the combat power to be able to link up there armies in albany, conduct military operations to the east into new england and hold onto the hudson river portal to maintain supplies and so forth. and to keep the new england state separated from the

middle states i just don't think they had the combat power to do it. so i think the entire plan was based on some false assumptions. that number one, just merely linking up these armies good things would happen afterng tha. think that wasn't assumption they made. and of course the other assumption being there so many loyalists in upstate new york they would all flock to his aid, that was a bad assumption. another assumption about nativeio americans >> you did not get the french-canadian support either. >> no he didn't. the final peace of the question you said about how had to understand he was meant to go up the hudson.

i think that was true. remember his plan had also been approved. by the king and jermaine. i got that in the appendix that he mention, very explicit orders saying yes, the king and i have approved your plan to go to philadelphia and defeat washington. and then after that, once you do that you need to go back and help burgoyne. t so, how is the commander-in-chief, he is reading it as a commander-in-chief would okay, the boss approve my plan. the secondary part of that is i will go help and i am done. who knows when i will be done. so he reads that is i think any commander-in-chief would the boss approve my plan, so let's go to philadelphia. >> and want to hold that

thought about the miss assumptions that delay the campaign. will come back to my ramp up and introduce our audience questions. we will move on to the battle itself. course the very name of the battle of search either confuse me for years, really a misnomer. it was not fought in a modern saratoga a series of locations over several days is thater a fair comment? >> yes. in fact i think of saratoga i think of the saratoga campaign. a series of military operations. talk about the saratoga campaign got to all the back to july of 77 the battle of our skinny and the siege of fort stanwyck. then of course the battle of

benton in the first battle of saratoga also called the battle of freeman's farm in the second battle of saratoga that was fought to a half weeks later usually called the battle. it's a series of military operations. and yes that i was bothers me to it hear people say the battle of saratoga. there was no battle of saratoga. it was a series of battles and engagements and to seizures. many complex military operations, river crossings, all sorts of things. >> i don't think i ever told you i took a west point staff writer to my first visit to saratoga to see military history fellowship and of course marvelously done. i see you have been influenced

by your teaching and for college because they have the best ability for a campaign. in fact part of the purpose of the fellowship they also use excellent video to take a lot of this. i have to stay study scenery are excellent. as there are several of them in the acknowledgments of your book. i certainly encourage anyone interested to go and visit the hudson area for west point north is really spectacular. >> it is. i could not agree more. and i would say that not just saratoga. and saratoga is wonderful, eric and his team up there are just tremendous. but also the little tiny battlefield of hover ten i

mean you really have to want to go there to go there. there is nothing else around it. but even that tiny little battlefield there, the staff is tremendous. as you said the scenery is absolute spectacular up there. so if nothing else, the scenery should draw you to it. and the history is a bonus, just when i cannot agree with you more. >> so i have to ask you, how much credit should be give to that figure benedict arnold the american victory at saratoga? sometimes forgotten just what a hero he was here hear him as trader in the british regarded him as really the best commander after washington. in fact the most successful british admiral suggested the

british should make him commander-in-chief in america and he did of course become a general in the british army and in virginia occupying richmond. >> rights. he obviously plays a central role. corsi played a central 17761st invasion of canada of course. but then in the saratoga campaign, went to ticonderoga falls and general schuyler who is the commander of the northern department and the northern army the americans nor the garment and northern army, he is really almost at his wits end after ticonderoga falls. in one of the first things washington does as commander-in-chief, aside from turning to buck him up and

improve his morale a little bit through letters and things izzy send some key leaders up to help him out. i think the two most important key leaders that he sends up there are benedict arnold and benjamin lincoln. both major generals. and i think both of them are critical for the success of saratoga for the americans success of saratoga. benedict arnold because of his fiery, aggressive, just outstanding leadership from the front kind of guy. and benjamin lincoln because of his unique ability to work with the militia. both of those are things that really schuyler does not have and his subordinates don't have it. think washington recognizes that. he sends these two key leaders up there and almost from the

moment benedict arnold gets there, he is everywhere. you see this guy, he is right at the forefront. he is giving schuyler advice, he is right in the lead, he is leading a raids on the forces. he is at the head of the column that is sent to relieve fort stanwyck and all of that kind of thing. he is the right guy to send up there. this dynamic leader and that is what schuyler needed. and again, i think benjamin lincoln he does not get as much press but i think he is also critical to american success at saratoga. he is not one of these guys who is leading an attack, although he is wounded at the end of the first day of the

last battle, seriously wounded leading an attack. that is was not his major role. his major role was to get the militia out and be sorted that liaison liaison between the commander of the northern department and the militia. he does a brilliant job at that. so these two key commanders along with other key leaders course at daniel morgan is famous, elite unit that washington sends up there along with others though. those folks are all critical cogs in the american machine that will ultimately win the saratoga campaign. but then when it comes to the actual battle benedict arnold plays absolute critical roles in both battles. in the first one, he is the

one that gates assigns to sort of manage the flow of troops into the battle. he is not actually ups in the front leading attacks or anything like that. but he is the guy who is feeding troops into the battle and sort of managing it. he does a great job there. in the second battle of course you absolute critical because he leads the final attacks on the british fortification that end up outflanking the army from forcing him to ultimately fall back his exhausted army andd ultimately of course you will be surrounded saratoga benedict arnold is crucial for americans as such. i do not call him the victor of saratoga though. some people do. ie think gates can truly be called the victor of saratoga even though i'm not a big fan of gates.

but benedict arnold is absolute critical for american success. >> i wondered if you're going to make mention of gates, he of course was a former british officer and he was always suspected of conspiring really to replace washington as the commander-in-chief. he was later defeated by lord cornwallis at the battle of camden.. really destroyed the continental army in there south. and famously took off on his horse and fled the battlefield. always felt alexander hamilton very cruel when he estimate the pace at which he must have left. [laughter] that wasch quite a pays for man of his age. hamilton at the time of course was a very young man.

the german -- their ability to get part of the blame and the failure of the search of the campaign. >> yes. my assessment of the german troops -- i think they did a solid job. the german commander was a solid commander. i think burgoyne's -- i think a lot of that is the next factor blame game peace. you see almost immediately, even beforeor his surrender he is blaming or he places a lot of the blame on the german troops. and i think he is just grasping at straws at that point. and of course they find out about that months later

because burgoyne resenting about him but is troops performing poorly. i think they are solid. they were a solid contingent of troops they did a decent job. burgoyne uses them badly i think. i think for instance the bennington the battle of bennington, we can called the bennington campaign there several pieces to it. they are the absolute wrong troops to send on the expedition. simon fraser the commander of the british advance core said that and argued that. he thanks simon fraser was exactly right. they were the wrong troops to send on an independent operation like bennington. the perfect trip to sin would have been simon and his advance they would have been the right folks to send. so coins using them i think in

a inappropriate way. just as soldiers, and the line of battle they are great and that is o how they should have hbeen used. sending them off on the easel independent operations liken bennington is just a misuse of their capabilities. >> has it blame for trenton as well, it's so important in delaying door moralizing his campaign, reducing his troop numbers. i always thought it was almost a mirror of the campaign the northern campaign that cornwallis'rn march north is somewhat like with jermaine essentially overwriting his commander in new york and

kings mountain plainly same role as an bennington in terms of upsetting his campaign. >> that is a great point. spigner getting close to my introducing questions from the audience. before we do so i want to come back to the real failure and miscalculation. it seems to me more united all of the british commanders and an error that we continue to make in the 20th and 21st century is to miss calculate the extent of support of the revolutionut that expected little opposition after taking fort ticonderoga he could take philadelphia and return to new york, jermaine was always optimistic about the extent of support when he marched south,

he had an army twice the size of schuyler but was heavily outnumbered. i think it was when he reached saratoga it's really amusing to read he said people were appearing from nowhere, settled in modern-day new hampshire. he couldn't believe it he also could not believe the training of the continental army. there is good as the british troops. >> yes. all of these assumptions that everyone is making i don't criticize the fact when you're

planning obviously never have one how tola present information. so in order to fill those gaps you have to make certain assumptions. that is understandable. soap making assumptions are not bad in and of itself. you also have to if you're going to make an assumption, you also have to look at what if my assumption is not true? so, what if a loyalist don't come out in droves in new york after i take ticonderoga and help fill t up my logistical shortfalls and things like that? what happens if they don't? you have to at least think through that. and of course, none of these key leaders did that. they did not think through what if my assumptions are wrong what do i do then? how do i plan for that?

or how do i at least consider if it doesn't hold true then maybe i need to stay ticonderoga until i change the dynamics somehow. either with a better logistics or whatever i'm able to recruit more loyalist, whatever the case may be. they did not do the sorts of things. those are important for military leader to do. >> is going turn toward audience questions now and encourage people watching to start riding in questions. thee first has from jane she said if albany was the focus, did burgoyne think washington and his troops would have come there and been captured, defeated my wasn't burgoyne really worried washington would also march north?

ironically jermaine was much more concerned how being attacked by washington. it's very real possibility that washington could have gone north. >> rates. in fact duringac the period to get my dates rights, when how loads the troops onto ships, but he has not left yet, washington really doesn't know he's going to do. washington assumes he's going to go up the hudson and try to meet up with burgoyne. once they fail washington still doesn't know where they are going. they could be going to newport, rhode island. they be going all be down to

charleston they could be going up the delaware to head to philadelphia or they could again be going up the hudson. so washington is trying to figure out what is happening during that period and it is a real -- when you read his letters during that period he is very, very frustrated. and fact he says on more than one occasion if only with something like the royal navy. because that provides the britishus with all sorts of unlimited mobility. so in fact washington thought about moving up the hudson. but it wasso more to intercept how than it was to deal with burgoyne. he was counting on schuyler to deal with burgoyne and washington was much more focused with the main armies much more focused on what how is doing. i think at how gone up the

hudson, washington would've obviously been compelled to follow. it would've been very interesting to see with the military results would have been with something like that so great w question. >> this is actually a compliment from a member of our audience, your book is excellent, going to be using it on a trip to hudson and local valley this summer ass a guide and follow the campaign through your accounts of the battle. as an amateur hobbyist historian setting the american war of independence i found your book to be the finest i have read, thank you. >> thank you david thank you very much. that obviously made my week. >> host: this is from pamela, greetings from troy new york. as a lifelong resident and want to thank you for your present appreciation of our

scenery are history, these are all very complementary. let me just ask you something we have not covered and that is the role of militia. it seems to me you got from two schools that revolution, the people who really emphasized militia play in the british defeat. the army school that argues a lot of conventional military battles with yorktown and excellent examples critical they could wed down the british army and say we use to be very effective. i don't -- i think green understood them better than

anyone. and yes, this is a myth perpetuated by gibson with the patriots, he is watching a conventional battle and said this is all nonsense plays into the idea of citizenry. but clearly, how do you see the militia figuring into this? >> i think they are absolute critical to american success. the big battles, when i say big battles i'm in the final two battles of saratoga, the combatants the american combatants are primarily continental legends. but, the militia are absolute critical. they are the ones manning the fortification.

and the fortifications the american fortifications are really important because they control both the road to albany and the river to albany. so that is one of the reasons why gates clings to the fortification and only commits really a small percentage of his total forced to either one of the battles. much to arnold's chagrin. and it's absent important to that parade there also doing things that basically free up the continental troops to be able to conduct combat operations. doing things like some of the logistics support and things like that. course the militia also theon ones who are the primary combatants during the bennington campaign. so they are important for a number of different reasons. and of course at the end of

the campaign as you mentioned when burgoyne is his less than 6000 troops are surrounded by, we don't know exactly how many bentley 17, 18000 americans fully what to thirds of those art militia. they are very, very important to sealing the victory at the very end. so, very, very important from start to finish in the entire campaign the militia is a very, very important. that is one of the reasons why i think washington is so sure to send it to skyler's eta general to understand the militia and they were very, very well with the militia and they are popular with the militia. both benedict arnold and benjamin lincoln are generals that have those traits.

gates is to the new england militia really likes gates as well mainly because of his work early in the war up around boston. they likest gates cearley the key american commanders at the end when this is all said and doneid we got the primary commander of course gates commander of the army and his two major subordinates benjamin lincoln and benedict arnold. i don't think it's any surprise that all three of them work very, very well with the militia. >> we have another compliment from walter he thanks you for your service in a very interesting talk. he's looking forward to reading the book. also thanks myself with monticello it's really a privilege of course for us. i have to say in my time at west point i was enormously impressed by the american army.

in the officers there. i'd happen to coincide the first iraq war. be happy to back at west point. out of harm's way but was quite the opposite was emotionally involved is also impressed by the teaching that are not officers like you try to blame it on the press.

did any part of the campaign take place in lake george village and fought william henry? the campaign came to the area. especially the logistics. so when burgoyne ceases to conquer oga he moses the army at skeens vert which is the southern tip of lake champlain. and he decides to move his big artillery train, and his large large pieces of his logistics train down lake george to lake george where the network is pretty good to head south. and he decides move the rest of the army self.

so yet they move through that area but fort william henry plays noop role. >> so we are getting close to the end of our time. i just want to come back to my thoughts about counter insurgencies and the problems and get your reactions. it seems to be a key element to these complex support, the rebellion or revolution or whatever it may be. and how often we get that wrong. and we tend to talk to the people who support america or britainn. and to give an exaggerated account. it always amazed that judge galloway is telling people in london just before yorktown that four out of five

americans support the british. and always insisted on that. the situation is fluid, people are changing sides. their modern methods to try to get an opinion poll. even with those methods we often still cannot get an accurate representation. the second things it seems to me as important is finding support. in the french even though they are not formally involved in the war giving sanctuary to american ships, they were really helping to keep the revolution solvent. the dutch were sending vital supplies, that seems to be a common factor in all such counterinsurgency. clearly terrain. british army has always been

very small the real pride was the navy the naval museum is much bigger than the army museum. [laughter] they basically had an army of conquest they could take to any american city but none was occupation. the third of the british army was constantly seeing nothing but garrett's. the british could not have dealt with that if they had won the war, how do you then maintain by force? >> rights, rights. once the french come in now you have to worry about all of your overseas possessions, not just north america of the west indies, gift of worry about homeland defense.

defending the homeland itself. all of those things now start playing into it that they did not have to worry about before. i agree with you completely. after saratoga and the work ms. south, again i really think only the americans could beaten themselves at that point. but it is possible they could've done that. they could've made several boneheaded errors. they are just right enough to win this thing. in the british sending more ships personnel to the caribbean after saratoga. it's very unfair to expect them to win this with fewer troops and less. >> he's handed in impossible task which all goes to show

that saratoga is the turning point and people need to read your book. thank you very much indeed i have really enjoyed this discussion. thanks andrew i have two it has been wonderful. in q2 the thomas jefferson foundation and the whole team there. and thanks everybody for participating a really appreciate it. : : : ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪