the director of national intelligence testified on world threats the director of the agency also testified.

[inaudible conversations] the committee meets today to receive testimony on the worldwide threats facing the united states and our international partners. i'd like to welcome the director

of national intelligence, the director of the defense intelligence agency lieutenant general scott. thank you both for joining us and please express our gratitude to the men and women of the committee for their critical work. we must start by addressing the illegal war in vladimir putin's war on ukraine for the past two andd a half months the unprovokd aggression has horrific suffering upon innocent civilians in ukraine, threatened european security and caused serious consequences on the global economy. in the face of this senseless violence the ukrainian military has performed tremendously supported by the united states and the international community. an array of our global allies and partners that joined in solidarity and provide support to ukraine.

for the unprecedented skillful relief the past several months that exposed the aggressive intentions and deceitful activities ahead of ukraine, intelligence officials are understandably cautious about revealing insights on adversaries but the strategy has proven highly effective and strengthening the international community's response and creating dilemmas. this is a great example of competing effectively in the information domain and i i hopee will continue to make use of this creative creative. it seems to be evolving. they would ask for your assessment of the conflict on the international order as well as the implications of security in the european war going forward. we must also say focus on the

long term strategic competition with china in addition to its economic and sociopolitical growth, china studied the united states way of war and focused on the advantages. beijing has made progress in this regard and holds its own expense of geostrategic conditions as we seek the other nations of the world responding to russia and considering the potential invasion of taiwan, scrutinizing the playbook and at the international response. however, there is a broad consensus with our partners and allies in the region and globally. it should be at the center of any strategy for the indo pacific region and the maturation of the security dialogue and presents a strategic opportunity.

i would ask that witnesses share with military and nonmilitary factors are likely to impact chinese decision-making with respect to action against taiwan. the turning to iran and the four years since president trump pulled out of the joint comprehensive plan of action were the jcpoa, we've made key nuclear advances in the breakout of time for several weeks from a year under the previous amendment and this increased uranium enrichment to 60%. they hardened the infrastructure and replaced the damaged equipment with more advanced models and width of the jcpoa the final outcome has not yet beenne determined. beyond the uranium proxies continue including iraq and syria with u.s. military

presence. saudi arabia and also the united arab emirates have also come under attack. they've given these dynamics on how best to de-escalate tensions in irrigon while preserving space to return to the jcpoa. finally, this year's threat assessment highlights the challenges posed by environmental degradation from climate change. ipo understand it's the view tht climate change will increasingly the national security interest as issued like rising temperatures, changing precipitation patterns and other climate effects are likely to lead to an array of challenges such as food and water and security in threats to human health. we live in a complex and dangerous security environment with aggression in europe, china's influence in the indo

pacific and other maligned actors around the world prevailing the resolute strategieses and i look forwardo the insight to these issues and think like them again for their participation. now let me turn to the ranking member, senator inhofe. >> when the witnesses testified before the committee last year, we had witnesses that provided a dire assessment of the threats to national security and it's clear i cannot overstate this the security situation we face today is significantly more dangerous and more complex than it's ever been a year ago. the chinese threat is beyond anything we've dealt with before this year. beijing announced the budget increase with no signs of

slowing down as the chair man eluded to with unprovoked aggression against ukraine shows the danger and those of our allies and international order. iran's be online behavior continues throughout the middle east and terrorist groups like isis and al qaeda are growing in strength. presidentis reality,, biden's budget request is inadequate and doesn't deliver the growth the military needs. that is the 3-5% increase we established some five years ago. inflation is now the new sequestration we consider today and it's making everything we do more difficult. so i look forward to hearing qufrom both of you about how the

threats have evolved since the last year and how the intelligence committeeee is changing to respond to the national security strategy. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, senator inhofe thank you mr. chairman and members of the committee. i want to take a moment to thank the men and women of the community for their extraordinarymm work to keep us safe. i know how privileged it is to be part of this committee of talented people to be given the chance to do something useful and i think you for your support for the work. broadly speaking this year's assessment focuses like last year's assessment on adversaries

and competitors, critical threats and conflicts and instabilities and the categories often overlap for example as a transnational threat also being ita threat that emanates from state actors. one of the challenges is affecting how the various threats to identify the interactions that may result in fundamentally greater riskss to the interests that introduce new opportunities. highlighting the connections as it provides the baselinet of the most pressing threats to national security. the assessment starts from ski kid actors including the people's republic of china that remains anan unparalleled career ready for the intelligence community. and with russia, iran and north korea all governments circulated the capability to promote the interest to cut against the u.s. and allied interest. they are coming ever closer g to

becoming a competitor in those with national security pushing to revise the global norms and institutions to end its advantage into the challenging of the united states in multiple arenas economically, militarily and technologically. with a coordinated whole of government approach to demonstrate the strengthe and to compel neighbors to acquiesce to its preferences including its territorial andho maritime clai. in the key area of focus is the determination to force unification with taiwan on beijing's terms. china would prefer the careerist unification that avoids the armed conflict and it's been stepping up diplomatically economically and military pressure on the island for years to isolated and weakened confidence and democratically elected leaders. and at the same time prepared to use military force if it decides it is necessary. the prc is also engaged in the

largest ever nuclear force expansion and arsenal diversification in its history is working to match or exceed the capabilities and the cyber espionage threat to the private sector networks is a significant focusks on the tragic invasion f ukraine in february that produced a shock to the geopolitical order with implications to the future that we are only beginning to understand. and as you know provided the plans but this is a case where i think all of us wish we had been wrong. russia's failure to rapidly seize kia and deprive moscow if the military victory that it had ioriginally expected would prevent the united states and nato from being able to provide military aidid to ukraine. the russians met with more resistancefrom ukraine than thed

and at the performance revealed the challenges forcing them to adjust their initial military objectives. the next month or two will be significant as the russians attempt to reinvigorate the efforts butt even as they are successful we are not confident that the fight will effectively end the war. we accept president putin is preparing for the prolonged conflict in ukraine during which we still intend to achieve goals beyond. we assess strategic goals are probably not changed suggesting he regards the decision in late march to refocus the russian forces is only a temporary shift to regain the initiative. with a buffer zone to circle the forces from the north end of the south to the west of the don to

crush the ukrainian forces who are fighting to hold the line in the east and consolidate control of the land bridge russia established from crimea and occupy and control the water source that ishe to the north ad we also see indications that the russians military wants to extend the land bridge. while the russian forces may be capable of achieving most of these near-term goals in the coming months, we believe they will not be able to extend control over the land bridge that stretches. it's increasingly unlikely they would be able to establish control over both the buffer zone theyd desire in the coming weeks. but putin most likely judges that russia has a greater ability within the adversaries and he's probably counting on the u.s. into the eu resolve to weaken the shortages, inflation, energy prices get worse. moreover, as with russia and

ukraine believe they continue to make progress militarily we do not see a viable impact forward the nature of the battle that is developing into the war of attrition combined with the reality of a mismatch between his ambitions and russia's ascurrent conventional military capabilities remains among the unpredictable and potentially escalatory trajectory. at the very least, we believe the dichotomy will usher in a period of more ad hoc decision making and russia both with respect to the domestic adjustments required to sustain the push as well as the conflict with ukraine and at the current trend increases theme likelihood that putinin will turn to more drastic means including imposing martial law, reorienting industrialal production or escalatory military actions to free up the resources needed to achieve the objectives as the conflict drags on or if he

perceives russia is losing in ukraine. the most likely for escalation is increasing the attempt to interdict western security assistance, retaliation western economic sanctions were threats to the regime at home. we believe moscow continues to use nuclear rhetoric to deter theia united states and the west from increasing needed to ukraine and to respond to public commentsts the u.s. and nato allies suggest expanded western goals in the conflict and the united states is ignoring it may try to signal to washington the heightened danger and authorizing in nuclear exercise involving a major dispersal of the violent continental missiles andor strategic submarines. we otherwise continue to believe president putin would authorize the use of nuclear weapons if he perceived an existential threat to the russian state or the regime, but we will remain vigilant in monitoring every aspectap of the forces.

with tensions thisre high theres always an advanced potential for the miscalculations that we believe are to help mitigate. moscow presents a serious diverse space competitor and one of the most serious threats to the united states using its intelligence services proxies, wide-ranging influence for the russian government seeks to not only pursue its own interest but also to divide western alliances, undermine the global standard, amplify the discordance of the united states and influence u.s. voters and decision-making. to finish with the threats and influence of the middle east and its influence and project power in the neighboring states and minimizec threats to the regime stability. meanwhile, continuing to expand and enhance pyongyang's nuclear and conventional capabilities targeting thee united states and its allies periodically using

aggressive potentially destabilizing actions and to reinforce as a de facto power and a number of key threats including global health security, transnational organized crime, the rapid development of the destabilizing technologies, climate, migration and terrorism. i raise these because they pose challenges in the fundamentally different nature to the national security into those posed by the actions of the nationstates even powerful ones like china and russia. we look at the russia and ukraine warren imagine the outcomes and even though palatable and difficult similarly we view the challenges of the chinese actions posed and can discuss what is required and how we think about the trade-offs, but the transnational issues are more complex and require significant sustained multilateral efforts and we can discuss the ways of managing them, all of them pose a set of choices that will be morena difficult to untangle and

perhaps more sacrifice to bring about meaningful change. this reflects not just the interconnected nature of the problems, but also the significant impact increasingly nonstate actors on the outcomes andng the reality some of the countries who are key to mitigating those by nationstates are also the ones we will be asking to do more in the transnational space. for example, the lingering effects of the covid-19 pandemic is putting a strain on the government of societies fueling the humanitarian and economic crises, politicalge unrest in te geopolitical competition, countries with high depth space continuing recoveries and exacerbated in some cases by increasing food security resulting fromol the russia ukraine crisis and the ship space bar migration around the world including the southern border. thecu economic impact go back years in terms of economic development and is encouraging some in latin america to look to china and russia for the economic andoo security assistae

to the new reality. the complex challenges that is exacerbating the risks and national security interests across the board but particularly as it intersects with environmental degradation and global health challenges. with of the threat to the persons and interest at home and abroad the implication in africa for an example where the terrorist, groups are clearly gaining strength the growing overlap between terrorism, criminal activity of smuggling networks undermine the stability attributed to the erosion of democracy andex resulted in the country's turning to the russian entities to help manage the problems. global transnational criminal organizations continue to pose s direct threat to the united states and the production of trafficking with lethal illicit drugs, massive staff including cybercrime, human trafficking and financial moneydi laundering schemes. and in particular the threat from illicitug drugs is with moe

than 100,000 americans drug overdose and driven mainly by the robust supplies of synthetic opioids from mexicans transnational criminal organizations. in ann short the interconnected security environment is marked by the growing of the power competition while transnational threats to all nations and doctors compete not only for our attention but also for finite resources. and finally the assessment turns to conflict and instability highlighting the challenges of importance to the united states. inin the violence between israel and iran. with a volatile mixture of the democratic backsliding and continued threat of cross-border terrorism and finally, most

important of all we are focused on the workforce into their family. we continue to contribute to the governmentwide efforts to better understand the potential causal mechanisms of the health incidents and remain committed to ensuring afflicted individuals receive the quality care they need. the safety and well-being of the workforce is the highest priority and we are grateful to thee members for your continued support on the issue. inthank you for the opportunityo present the assessments he and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you very much madame director. in general, please. >> it is a privilege to testify as a part of the intelligence committees 2022 assessment of the threats to the national security. on behalf of the defense intelligence agency i want to express how much we appreciate your support and partnership and thank you. we fill the unique intelligence role by providing strategic and motivational and intelligence to the were fighters and planners,

policymakers and acquisition community. we examine the conflicts across all domains and understand our adversary'ssp intent. at the dedicated professionals in partnership with our intelligence community colleagues, analyzing foreign partners deliver timely and relevant intelligence on threats and challenges facing the nation. we've overcome difficult challenges posed by the pandemic and today my goal is to convey to thewe american public on the evolving threat environment as we understand it. as i look at the landscape today i want to begin with russia and its invasion of ukraine and its third month. at the capabilities of been used to violate the sovereignty and independence of ukraine and pose an existential threat to the national security and that of our allies. the invasion demonstrated the intent to overturn the us-led rules-based cold war international order expand its control over the former soviet union and reclaim what it

regards as its rightful position on the world stage. moscow's underestimation of ukraine's effective resistance russia's substantial battlefield lossesov and the western results important to undermine the assault and to improve the prospects ukraine can successfully defend its sovereignty. moscow has now shifted its focus to eastern ukraine where it appears to be prioritizing defeating ukrainian forces. in response to the resistance, russia has resorted to discriminant methods that are destroying cities, infrastructures and increasing civilian deaths. negotiations remain as both sides focus on the outcome of the battle and while partnerships with ukraine and warning of a potential the potentialescalation remain e priorities. turning to china it remains a threat and major security challenge. beijing has long viewed the united states assess hr strategic competitor and china

is capable of combining its economic, diplomatic and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system. it's already fielded sophisticated weapons and instituted major organizational reforms for the operations is nearing the status and is a competitor in the region. the united states faces threats particularly from russia and china who have and are developing capabilities the cruise missiles, growing nuclear

stockpiles, modernized conventional forces and a range of measures. our the threat will persist and we need to understand more about the lessons learned from the experience with intelligence operations in afghanistan and the middle east. turning back to my own organization i take the health, safety and well-being very seriously. we remain actively engaged in investigating the anomalous

health instances and my agency has a process and procedure in place r to quickly respond to reports from employees or their families who believe that they have been impacted. we are also partnering with other members to determine the origin and the cause of the events. i'm honored to lead and my intent is i hope this leads to help congress understand the threats into the t challenges we face from foreign adversaries and competitors. i look forward to questions and thank you for your continued support. >> thank you, general. let me remind colleagues at the conclusion of the session there will be a classified session and the witnesses may differ some responsesth to that. director with the battle of attrition over the long-term and that the objectives of the

russians are to destroy the ukrainian forces and also disrupt the international coalition through economic pressures, gasoline prices in andother factors we are witness. thatth leads us to at least how effective are our economic sanctions and what more can we do to bring pressure to the people so that they are less supportive of this effort. >> thank you, chairman. from our perspective, the economic sanctions and export control have had a pretty significant impact on russia and among the indicators one might look at for example the fact we are seen close toha what we predict approximately 20% inflation in russia that we expect the gdp will pull about 10% possibly even more in the

course of the year. we've seen not only the sanctions enacted by the united states and europe and other partnersur around the world havg these impacts, but also the private sector taking action on its own so things like the fact that oil production services and companies pull themselves out and will have an impact on russia's capacity to produce and puts a major revenue source obviously for russia. we've seen other indicators and on export controls things like how export controls on semi conductors and soin on are affecting the industry so that's a significant impact essentially although obviously time will tell as we move forward. >> any popular in terms of the

economic factors that could translate into political resistance to the regime? >> i know many of us have a protester that erupted after the invasion and then the crackdown that occurred essentially including passing laws that would provide for very significant punishments in the event one protested on these issues and so we've seen those reduced actually and when we've looked at effectively the pullig absalom that indicates where it is that the russian people are, what we see as the majority continue to supportg the specil military operation, and i think it's very hard, frankly, for information to get into russia, they have a perspective that they are being fed by the government during this period. ..

against taiwan and how difficult that might be. there probably also. thinking about should they entertain thoughts or operations like that. >> thank you. and a final question director haynes, i think you indicated in your testimony that cyber interference in our election is a distinct possibility. is that something your agency or

the agencies are following a taking preemptive steps? >> yes absolutely senator. we are well-positioned to essentially monitor for the potential of election influence and including efforts through cyber. >> one of their final is that,ro are you surprised the russians have not used cyber attacks against third parties or against the united states directly up to this point? i thinkai that was a concern we all had from the beginning of this operation. >> yes. i think what we have seen is the russians have obviously attacked ukraine we have attributed of variety of tax to them and that context including for example destructive wiper attacks against ukrainian government

websites, attacks against the financial industry. they were also engaged in attacks intended to get at command-and-control communications in ukraine during an invasion. that attack had an impact we assess they intended to focus in on ukrainian command-and-control ultimately end up affecting a much broader set of very small terminals outside of ukraine including in europe. and yet we have not seen the level of attacks to your point that we expected. we have a variety of different theories for why that might be the case including the fact we think that they may have determined the collateral impact of such attacks would beth challenging for them in the context of ukraine. also that they may not have

wished to essentially sacrifice potential sacrifice and collection opportunities in those scenarios. and then in terms of attacks against the united states they have had ace long-standing concn for escalation in cyber that does not mean they won't attack at some point. be interesting to see what they have during this period. >> think it mr. chairman purposely both the be the lack of the independencee intelligene community significantly worsened putin's decision-making in ukraine. what do you think president she in china's learning about his intelligence community both of you? >> thank you, i think it's a really interesting question.

i prefer to answer perhaps in closed session with that be all right sir? work that is fine. any comment to make question. >> i suspect that thank you. the bite administration has offered significant sanctions relief to the 2015 iran nuclear agreement. general would you expect iran to spend at least some of the sanctions relief on the terrorist proxies and missile programs you agree that of additional money they would increase their targeting or could they increase that targeting? >> yes they could increase targeting as ourr partners in e region as well as u.s. forces if they had increased funding recollects. >> thank you, mr. chairman.t >> i also want to recognize

senator shaheen was worse thank you good morning thank you both your testimony this morning. i returned a couple of weeks ago from the western balkans we visitedd serbia, bosnia and co- servo. it's a great deal concern about russian meddling and the potential for that to further destabilize the country. are you all following what's going on in that part of europe are you equally concerned. >> thank you dear senator shaheen. i will start in hand over too mike colleague this is something we've been working with nato on in particular to help them be more resilient cyber issues

worldwide in this crisis and beyond will be a critical aspect of her work moving forward. before you begin, general, can i ask you to speak to nato because as you know the authorization s going to end this fall and bosnia there is real concern about russia's willingness to allow that to continue. what are we doing to ensure the troops are not taken out of bosnia and avoid what provides a real vacuum for instability. >> senator, i think that is a policy question i would refer to the department of defense.

that or to your earlier portion of your question i believe this is a key component of strategic competition have to be able to identify that malign activity and expose it and help our partners and future partners be aware of it and do more to counter yes, we are aware of it for a. >> thank you for i would say that policy decision needs to be viewed very closely by everybody so we do not wind up with theli vacuum there, that we are not able to address. i want to go to what is still happening with isis. as you both know we have thousands of isis a family member still held in camps in northern sierra. they are posing a persistent challenge but only as

humanitarian but the potential is breeding grounds for terrorists. are we watching closely what is going on there? what are we doing to try and address what's happening in those camps? >> from the perspective of the department of defense we are watching very, very closely what's happening in those camps. what happens in seat break-in. with the partners trying to monitor isis capability as it evolves over time it what's happening with those families and why they are moving for this is a probably partner with so to the national counterterrorism center is a huge focus for everyone. >> to haveth a strategy on how o deal with it? >> have an intelligence to monitor it. experiencing taliban in afghanistan reneged on everything they said they would

do post troop withdrawal. obviously one is continuing those relationship on terrorist groups and afghanistan. how can survey might see terrorist activities to the rest of the world? >> senator, i am more concerned about isis k and afghanistan and the fact they've had some successful and catastrophic attacks within afghanistan does not well for the future. al qaeda has had with reconstitution leadership. toph a degree to their word was something we very, very carefully. >> there's an election in the philippines yesterday winner of that election was not likely to

have as positive a view to the united states. are you concerned is going to have an impact how china is going to view activity in the philippines? do we expect there might be any spillover in terms of illegal substances from the philippines now it's no longer doing his extra legal killing of peopleo suspected of being drug kingpins? senator i think it's early inei the process with the elected to determine whether or not he will be anti- u.s. or pro- u.s. i know we would like to have the philippines is a key intelligence partner in the region. i think there's a lot of effort going on to do that. we willpr wait to see what percolates of all this in our end itnship i will

there. >> thank you, thank you, mr. chairman. >> mr. fisher please. >> thank you, mr. chairman welcome to our panel today. last week and the strategic subcommittee undersecretary research and engineering, heidi stated quote strategic competitors of the united states are rapidly developing their nuclear arsenal and new anden novel ways with a clear intent of increasing their reliance on these weapons and their security strategy". director haynes, do you agree with that statement? >> yes. >> general do you? >> yes. >> there out the war in ukraine putin and other russian leaders have overtly threatened nuclear use including russian state tv airing and animated video showing the british isles being completely destroyed by a nuclear attack.

general, in the united states a view weapons primarily as tools of deterrence. but do you think what we are seeing indicates russian leadership views? nuclear weapons as tools of coercion and intimidation? >> i believe they view those as tools of coercion and intimidation. >> thank you. general, also defense intelligence agency 2020 report on china's military power states quote the accelerating pace of the prc nuclear expansion may enable the prc to have up to 700 deliverable nuclear warheads by 2027. the prc likely intends to have at least 1000 warheads by 2030 exceeding the pace the dod projected in 2020". i know what you say is limited in this setting.

but is that your assessment that china's forces will stop expanding when it reach that point of 1000? >> it is my assessment they continue to develop the weapons they have. >> director haynes, is that view shared by the rest? that china's arsenal is going to continue to grow past that point tin time? >> hours basically says china will continue to essentially expand their nuclear arsenal for a period of time. it is unclear how long that will be. >> you anticipate it will continue past the 1000 warheads we have looked at in the past? >> for us to get into numbers we should do that in closed session. >> thank you. general, the statement notes

china's nuclear expansive is larger than previous assessments projected. admiral richard has a similar point noting when he first testified here we were questioning whether or not china would be able to double that stockpile by the end of the decade. they are actually very close to doing it on my watch". what are the implications of the fact this threat is evolving faster than we anticipated? how should we factor that into our assessment? et cetera we get into much more detailed the closed session. i would just say from a strategic competition perspective and nuclear deterrence this makes it much more challenging for us to defend. when you factor in russian nuclear capability with chinese capabilitynd i think it is a problem for strategic commands and the department. >> thank you.

general if we could move to a different theater now if isis and al qaeda are able to without consistent ct pressure how long does the intelligence community assess it will take for either organization to reconstitute their external attack capabilities? >> we access isis a year slightly longer and longer for alal qaeda. >> last october we heard from secretary he told the committee we could see isis k generate the capability and six -- 12 months and then in march we heard from general mckenzie the capability might be 12 -- 18 months. so i look forward to hearing more about how and why these intelligence estimates have shifted forward. i think that is important for this committee to know. it is important to understand

when we look at the dramatic reduction we have seen an houre intelligence collection in that region since our withdrawal. thank you, thank you, mr. chairman. >> director haynes, thank you so much for your testimony. i want to talk aaw little bit about advanced persistent threats. and i want to know what type of support are you providing, critical infrastructure f providers to deal? specifically i am concerned if this war in ukraine does escalate attacks from russian it will come to american businesses in our critical infrastructure. i know this is generally the job, on your engagement critical infrastructure providers were the biggestst areas of need that they have shared with you? are there any additional authorities that would be helpful to you and enable you to support criticalov infrastructue support suppliers and supporting their network? what i notice is been a major

issue focus free of the fact you have supported some things have been done in a new york with reserves for example this area which have been really effective. and they're looking at expandina that. i think for us, we have quite obviously heightened awareness of cyber threats to critical infrastructures been a driving force behind a number to support others. one is lowering threshold for supporting. that is critical for our perspective and able to identify with the threat is. another is just making more information publicly available we are increasing the amount of information we released to the private sector. both help combat the rights and cybercrime efforts doesn't

potential cyber attack something we been trying to get out to do significantly more briefings on effective more resilient in these circumstances it is included some releases to dampen malicious cyber actives before mitigations can be put into place. another has been significant outraged partners held over 90 engagements with more than 10,000 partners. just even on the rush of peace includes preventative measures to help these partners and mitigate vulnerabilities another has been facilitating hunt teams on networks who also has company owners to actively hunt for russian techniques essentially on their networks and facilitate and provide a list of vulnerabilities and indicators proper mice look on her company's network those are some of the things areia focused on

helping on the infrastructure piece thank you for.di >> you need any additional authorities or resources to amplify this effort? >> we have asked for resources in fy 23 budget that are designed to help with this effort so absolute in that sense. we have not identified particular authorities we need but i will tell you we will come to you if we do, thank you. >> thank you. director haynes and general barrier saw the annual threat assessment notes advances in dual use technology could quote enable development of novel biological weapons or complicate detection attribution treatment". i've advocated for health security poetry incorporate people of multiple disciplines including the intelligent committee to increase our bio defense. and prevent the next pandemic. on the context of ongoing biological threats how would you suggest we develop a multidisciplinary approach like

this? where can we prepare and prevent both naturally occurring diseases but also deliberate threats? >> i can start on this. i'm very passionate about this issue i completely agree with you we have nothr how much in tv intelligence community been able to work with other parts of thee federal government even in the scientific community within the government as effectively as we need too. we have been developing mechanisms in the intelligence community to do more work they worth the national may have before working withe hhs, was cc with others who try to make sure we are also supporting their work and we can understand some of the issues that they see is critical to our work. that is been a big piece of our effort in the intelligence community within the national counter proliferation that we have been doing a major effort on essentially working with global health we now have a new

national intelligence manager's on these specifically helping to support that kindh of outreach and be happy to give you brief at some point in more detail if that is useful. >> thank you. quick senator for di it's about partnership ai' partnership between the defense counter proliferation center as well as in cpc the role really for din and cmis to provide warning and passion about as well. in some areas it's going to expand in the coming months and years look forward engaging you on this topic for. >> thank you, thank you mr. chairman. >> general, what is your assessment on the state of deciding between russia and ukraine eastern and southern ukraine today? what center i would characterize it as the russians aren't winning on the ukraine's aren't winning.

we are at a bit of a stalemate here but what's been the most interesting evolution for me watching how the russian forces a misstep is a non- office corporate think but a small unit tactics how this has unfolded between ukraine and russia to big piece of this length ukraine said that about right. folks who faces a greater risk from a stalemate russia or ukraine? >> i think we have to take a wait-and-see approach on howkr this evolves what is in the decision calculus for putin and his generals as this unfolds. >> stalemate to be clear does not mean an armistice or peace it's continued but indecisive fighting which both sides are losing personnel, equipment, weapons and vehicles, right question request is attrition warfare that depends how well

the ukrainians can maintain without going on with weapons and ammunition and how the russians decide to deal with that either through mobilization or not you decide to go with what they have in the theater right now. >> which side you think right now is more capable of generating additional combat power mort trained and motivated troops russia or ukraine?oi >> ukraine. events one third theng side of frussia? >> yes break works where you say that? >> ukrainians have it right in terms of grit and how they face the defense of the nation i am not sure russian soldiers from the military districts really understand that. i think you defense one's own home from the of aggression is highly motivating factor is in it? >> yes it is. >> russians probably are not terribly motivated to be the next wave of recruits in the

vladimir aggression were. >> not based on what we have seen. >> if that is the case the stalemate as your coat continues not just for weeks but for months, which side faces a greater possibility of an decisives breakouts? the russians with the ill trained and motivated troops or ukraine with their supremely motivated troops were. >> senator think right now the stalemate stands of russia does not declare war and mobilize the stalemate is going to last for i does he break out either side but they do mobilize and do declare war that will bring thousands of more soldiers to the fight. even though they may not be as s well-trained and competent they will serving mass and a lot more ammunition.

arts what are the prospects catastrophic collapse of morale and will among the russian forces? >> remains to be seen. think the russians still a learning if appropriate lessons are plagued with leadership that might turnth around. >> you the current count on how many generals have been killed in ukraine on russia side? >> i think the been eight and ten pickard student how many generals we lost in 20 years of war in iraq and afghanistan? >> not many picassos we lost or happenstance the guys got a lucky shot at a convoy or helicopter. >> yes precook the fact russia loosing of his generals and as you pointed out they have no train core suggest you generals are having to go forward to ensure their orders are executed in a way general barrier would never have to go forward if he was in a combat command the count of the captains on the

lieutenants and sergeants to execute his orders? >> yes. >> it sounds to me like the balance of forces here are moving more decisively in ukraine's factory will continue to over time as as we continue to support them with the arms and the intelligence they need. >> welt led forces that are motivated and have what they need can do a lot, thank you. >> thank you sitter cotton, et cetera blumenthal please. >> thank you mr. chairman. want to pursue sitter cotton's line of questioning if i may. in my exchange with the secretary of defense and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff several weeks ago i commented that our approach to

ukraine seems somewhat schizophrenic. we say we want ukraine to win but we are afraid of what putiny may do if he loses. i've heard since 2014 we provide more lethal weapons to ukraine. when he visited ukraine recently most of my colleagues in bipartisan trip one of them asked president zelenskyy are you fearful about the russian prospect of invasion? it was number weeks before thehe invasion. he said the russians invaded us in 2014. we have been fighting them since then. and in my view the implication is that we have failed over a period of years under different administrations to provide

ukraine with the arms it needs to counter and to deter increase russian aggression there. so my question to you is do you agree we should increase the kind of military aid as well as humanitarian system of economic sanctions that we have been providing orders of magnitude that will enable ukraine to win? would you also agree if we simply provide more of that kind of aid, tanks, artillery, armed personnel carriers, even plaintiffs stinger and javelin missiles all of the arms that ukraine needs to fight lethally and defensively that putin may engage in sword rattling,

threats and implications of what he might do. but enabling ukraine to win ought to be our objection. let me ask you first come in general, rec center at your statement really gets the national level decision-making water policy should be in regards to arming ukraine. my role the director of dia is to keep an eye on this conflict provide information to decision-makers so they can make the kinds of decisions in terms what putin might do to us cleansing the best we can do on. of them describing what those measures to be is to understand what they might do and be ready in terms of indications of morning to build to notify decision-makers that was actually occurring or about to occur. and i leave the policy torr decision-makers.

do you and i will ask haynes the same think there's a serious immediate prospect that putin would engage in tactical nuclea weapons? right now we do not see that. that's a huge warning issue for us and something we are very, very focused on. thank you, senator. i think on the first part of your question, the general said we obviously tried to provide the intelligence to help policymakers who make this decision. among the questions that come up in that discussion are whether or not frankel ukraine can absorb additional assistance and how much of it. that is very hard for us to tell. we have more insight on the russian side than we do on the ukrainian side.

do something obviously for the defense department to work there essentially as they go through this. we obviously get asked this question of whether or not certain actions will escalate things with the russia if you as you indicate if so how big is the second prettier question. obviously we are in a position of joy divide were supporting ukraine we also do not want to ultimately end up in world war iii we do not want to have a situation which actors are using nuclear weapons. our view as a general indicated, is not an imminent potential for putin to use nuclear weapons. we perceive that as indicated in my statement something he is unlikely to do unless there is effectively an existential threat to his regime into russia from his perspective. that could be the case in the

event he perceives he is losing the war ind ukraine. and nato is in effect either intervening or about to intervene in that context which would actually contribute to a perception he's about to lose the war in ukraine. but there are a lot of things he would do in the context of escalation before he would get to a nuclear weapon. also he would be likely to engage in some signaling beyond what he has done thus far before doing so pick. >> thank you my time is expired. >> on behalf of the chamber chairman senator blackburn. >> thank you mr. chairman. and thank you very much each of you for being here today. as haynes i want to come to you. we have talked a lot about ukraine and russia this morning and i appreciatess your franknes in this.

let me ask you about the proxies and what you are saying not only inin ukraine, but also what you are seeing what comes to libya and other areas and the aggressiveness of the use of the proxies. >> thank you, senator. we can probably go into more detail and close session i can say more generally we do see being used in effect in ukraine we see that is. >> how about africa? >> yes absolutely. historically been present in africa that is a more recent event obvious in the current crisis russia deployed them effectively in ukraine. >> okay. all right, general barrier do you have anything you want to add on that?

>> hundred we track isis and other places will get into richard discussion the close session about isis, excuse me the operations in ukraine, sorry. >> okay that is helpful but let me ask you also by the way thank you for the china map. i will say this i think we could have a picture of the globe and say that is where china is seeking to be aggressive. it is something that is not lost on me that they are anxious right now to expand their reach. but let's talk about dia and how the dia is collaborating with our allies and partners to counter beijing's cyber espionage operations. >> editor we are closely

collaborating with our partners are strolling in and a zillion partners on this very issue longer partners of the national security agency. there is a concerted effort to understand these activities in cyberspace emanating from china we are working that very, very close so we provide more detailed close session. >> can you provide us with some of thefr lessons learned from te russia/ukraine conflict that help inform some of this work? cyber activity question or.he >> yes, sir. >> i think the key there would be information operations and disinformation operations or level of effectiveness from the russian side or ineffectiveness on the russian said look at the level of effectiveness on the ukrainian side perched on high compare and contrast information operations i think ukraine to been much more successful in the information operations and space. russians have had some success with cyberpa activities i need o

ukraine the prc are lookingng at all of that as a sort of unwind this conflict and learn lessons from that.i >> and ms. haynes how is the intel community utilizing ai and machine learning as they look at applications, look at how beijing is continuing to move forward. how are you preference and some of the new technologies that can help us in this effort? >> thank you, senator. we are using artificial intelligence in a particular machine learning across the board for our mission sets. to give you an example of the kind of things were able to do with it, it has been extraordinary in terms of helping us with analysis.

being able to focus in on certain data sets we are able to effectively manipulate more easily without as many human resources to identify patterns were able to use that the -- have the analysts that are educated and experts take that informationfy and use it in ther analysis in different ways. as in the intelligence unityn project that is really looking across the intelligencent community and different application of different artificial intelligence learning and try to leverage those so we can allow other elements to build up the work that is being by another element they might not have thought of before also doing a cheaper cost and so that's a variety of ways to looking at it. it's hard to talk about it an

unclassified way this is a major area of effort we can provide you with further d reduced full. >> thank you my time is expired i will come to you for a writtes response of the recent article that quoted the senior intel source about referencing the uptick in l shabbat activity. so thank you very much. >> on behalf of the chair, senator warren put. >> thank you, senator king. it isn't paramount to our national security we keep our most sensitive secrets properly protected and classify protecting sources and i method. but i am very concerned about the levels of over classification and pseudo- classification that we are seeing across the federal government. everyone understands the need to protect information of our most sensitivear capabilities more enemies. but our classification system has spiraled out off control.

when it means for example our own four-star generals cannot share information with their fellow three start it's hard to see how that level of classification is making america safer. so over classification also reduces public scrutiny of important issues and it can hamper accountability. director haynes you lead the intelligence community, you have years of experience in these matters. do you think over classification as a national security problem?. >> i do, senator. i have stated this explicitly i do think it is a challenge, sunk the bank government frankly there been blue ribbon commissions that have looked at this and said there is significant over classification this is challenge as you indicate from a democratic perspective it's also challenging for national security perspective because if we cannot sharesa information as easily as it might otherwise be up as a properly classified that

wouldon obviously effects our capacity to work on these issues. it is a very challenging issue is a note you know well. other of their technical aspects too. >> let's talk about that just a little bit. and i want to say i agree with you over classification has been a problem across administrations. obama administration put up two different executive orders aimed at improving classification and information sharing. but that was more than a decade ago. obviously the problem persists. let me assess aon different way. director haynes would you support the administration releasing a new executive order on classification practices to ensure we are protecting national security information while keeping our commitments to open governmentpr? >> without knowing exactly what it's would say it's hard for me too say i would support an

executive order on the consul looking for different ways to try to help address this issue. i have a number of ways were investing in the intelligence issues were. >> i appreciate that that are not asked to sign a blank check. you are the presence advisor on intelligence matters i am just asking if you'd be supportive if the president wanted to take thatar step? >> i am supportive of what the president wants to take within his authority the appropriate policy toep do. so yes and that since i would be put. >> okaypp let me ask this from e more perspective. during the ukraine crisis we have seen a well functioning declassification system can be incredibly powerful. he worked by the biden administration to expose with the intelligence committee knew about pollutions plans seriously

hurt russia's credibility and strengthen our response to it illegal and immoral war. my understanding it took reshuffling of resources to makp that happen. and i applaud that but we need more of that. the most recent numbers i have seen we spent $18 billion protecting the classification system. only about 102 million, do the about 5% in your head of that number on declassification efforts. that ratio feels off in a democracy with that in mind director haynes either any lessons learned from ukraine about how we can expedite declassification when there is a compelling reason to do so? >> of them to our to be learned from ukraine. it will be easier to talk about this in closed session.

there is some value we could discuss in closed session on those issues. i do think it helps other people understand the value that we are insuring games of the proper level declassification can support for pulse in different ways. that is all to the good. >> in a democracy we have a duty to be accountable to the public. we keep secrets from americans or needs to be a compelling public interest in doing so.to too many cases in public officials air on the side of secrecy because the information could be embarrassing. or even worse just because it's easier to be not accountable to the american people. i urge all of our agencies to address this problem and i look forward to working with you, thank you. >> on behalf of the chairman, senator turberville. >> thank you, senator. good morning.,

director haynes, and your past assessment is russian intelligent closely monitor our secretary of defense? >> russian intelligence tries very closely to monitor all of her senior leaders. >> you believe noted when he said russia weekend in the u.s. will move heaven and earth to tharm ukraine, do you believe tt this right that he should say that? >> i think the secretary of defense should say. >> you think russia blames u.s. intelligence to shoot down a russian plane carrying hundreds of people? >> i'm sorry circular pete the question? >> you believe russia blames us, our intelligence agency for ukraine shooting down a c plane with hundreds of troops on board? you think russia blames us for that? >> which plane are you thinking

of? >> there is a plane recently shot down a russian plane that y 100 troops they believe are intelligence agency for that? >> i don't know sir. >> sinking their flagship? do you think they blame us for that? >> i don't know sir we have not seen you direct response by. >> to what extent do you access believes it is at war with the west and the united states youwe think they believe they are at war withh us? russia has historically believe they are in a conflict in effect withes nato and the united stats on a variety of issues including cyber and so on. >> you believe they are fighting us that they are fighting us as well as ukraine, correct? >> in a sense theirir perceptio. >> yes because we are arming them and we are talking okay. general. the united states ukraine have air superiority over the war

zone? which onee has air superiority? >> senator i would call that an error standoff right now by the russians can fly tactical aircraft over the line of troops and local area. but they cannot expand into western parts of ukraine without coming under an error threat too. >> ukraine is more than we are, the united states obviously were not involved. >> no we are not involved regards would you say russia has strong air defenses? >> the russians have very credible air defense systems progress does ukraine have anyul countermeasures to thwart russia artillery rockets and long ranges ukraine have any air defenses? >> ukraine hasat air defenses fr the also havee counter battery readeres that allows them to defend themselves from incoming artillery. >> do you agree anyone in ukraine right now is under serious threat customer obviously are for. >> i agree they are by. >> in the past two weeks we've seen several high profile visitors take trips to active

war zone section of state, secretary of defense, speaker of the house, first lady. this is for both of you. what does our intelligence community doing to lessen the risk of ae high-ranking offici, how are we protecting these people going to ukraine, our people going to ukraine? >> senator i think that will be a discussion for closed session. >> okay. so we could guarantee the first lady was safe when she went to ukraine, we could guarantee tht one 100%, correct? both of you. i am just asking. >> i would not say that no. i would not say that. >> thank you. is it your best advice we don't go to ukraine right now, any of us? any of us in here? >> and i wouldn't that i was havedv proper planning and

coordination it is possible or general one 100%? one 100% can weul guarantee goig into a war zone i worked secretary of defense executive state went on a train brickwork senator i don't think we can ever guarantee anything one 100%. thank you. that is kind of the point i am making. we are kind of poking the bear here. saying we are bragging about it. even president biden said today wait a minute, we've got to cut back on pointing how many generals have been killed and we are part of it. i totally agree with that. i totally agree that hey, we want to help ukraine obviously we all do. but we do not want to take that step forward to where we get a lot of our men and women involved in this. and it looks like to me we are taking way too many chances of sending people over there for a photoshop other than doing the right things which we are doing. we just do not need to step over that pathway thank you for what you are doing. i think all of us seem to look

at that point of hey, there's a point of no return here if we cross that line. if we were on the other side, same weight. if we had somebody helping that a plane shot down, a a ship sank and then bragging about killing generals a center cotton said we are walking a tight rope here. that is just the only point want to bring up, thank you very much. >> on behalf of the chair senator kelly. >> t thank you, mr. chairman. director haines, again looking at your office 2022 annual threat assessment it is clear there is a lot going on in the world right now. and i understand resources are finite. trade-offs often have to be made. that is a large part of what makes your job very challenging. clearly the situation in ukraine is taking up a lot of bandwidth

right now. i would presume andll opaque coe a significant amount of resources as well to fully understand the threat environment. i was at his two things are related what about some other regions of theic world? in the worldwide threat you've articulated here today you for the intelligence community has the necessary resources in place the understand the threat environment by other places such as afghanistan, northern sierra, iran?an and >> thank you, o senator. like all good we could spend more money on those issues there is no question. certainly that is true. we are doing our very best as you indicated to ensure we are not taking our eye off the ball essentially across the globe and of critical importance of the

once you have identified. >> thank you. the reaper drones. air force has been reluctant to invest in upgrading the platform and proposes to retire at potentially like in 2035. even as thehe demand from combat commanders or the system remains high. their argument has been the platform is not survivable in a china/russia scenario. i think it is pretty clear it would be survivable in a russian scenario now. do you have an opinion on the continued utility reconnaissance such as the mq9 particular as we face increased activity in the so-called gray zone below the threshold of armed combat?

>> senator i have been the beneficiary of mq9 operations over the next 20 years it's an outstanding platform is done great things. with increasing threats emanating from china, their ability to reach out and touch those kinds of things. i totally understand why the air force. the efficacy ofd that in the coming years and low intensity conflict counterterroriv operations will be used full in the low air defense environment and a high-end environment i don't think it's very viable. >> we have looked at russian surface to air missile threat environment as high end. turns out, like a lot of things they wanted the wars much different than day 60 or 90 or 180 of any conflict. so i am concerned not only this platform but we look at

divesting from platforms that could providee incredible utiliy further along in the timeline. general i've got another question for you here.cr in my last minute, any satellite van testing the administration late recently announced the policy i agree with russia, china, they do not share thisth goal nor do they abide by any similar policy. the russians or the chinese both over the past decade and a half have performed tests. the russians more recently. dia 2020 report shown security and space list orbital debris as a significant challenge. space operations and concluded the debris endangers spacecraft of allor nations and lower orbit including astronauts and cosmonauts among the iss china has a space station as well.

given the fact the russian and chinese conduct manned space operations what would be your assessment as to why they continue to put their people in harms way by conducting these dangerous tests? >> senator i think they value that capability of asymmetric advantage over our superior technology and continue to pursue this kinds of capabilities but whether they would actually use it is another discussion. >> do you expect them to do more antisatellite test? >> we have not seen evidence that they plant in the near future of doing more put out expect as they go through the development process they'll do more tests. >> think in general and thank you director haines. >> think it senator kelly. senator rounds please. >> think it mr. chairman. let me begin by thanking both of you for your continued service to our country. director haines, april secretary blinken told congress that iran's attempts to assassinate

former secretary of state mike pompeo were real and ongoing. this month israeli press reported an agent for the iranian revolutionary guard force was thwarted from assassination attempt on the u.s. general in germany. why is iran apparently so emboldened right now? how can the intelligence community and national security community at large change this dangerous trend and deter iran from these actions? >> thank you, senator. i think we should probably pick this up in closed session. i think i can just say in open session a fair amount of their motivation and this scenario is in relation to soleimani as part of their efforts for revenge on is a particularly challenging area to deter them from action

in this space but we can discuss more specifics in closed session, thank you sir. >> arvery well. director haines once again the crisis the united states southern border has literally exploded under this administration, continues to deteriorate writer supported the u.s. officials the department of homeland security are preparing for as high as 90000 arrests per day. as the economic and political conditions in latin america spark waves of migration to put pressure on our southern border, how serious does the intelligence community see this as a threat to our country?n and to what degree is the intelligence committee shifting resources to address the surge at our southern border? >> thank you, senator. we have stood up a migrant crisis which is essentially a cell that helps bring together intelligence were across the community to support dhs efforts

rates really looking south of the border at effectively migrant movements that may become to the southern border to help them to prepare an effect for encounters on the border. are you in agreement with the assessment there could be as many as 9000 arrests a day is that an assessment you would concur with? >> i don't look at those particular questions that is within the department of homeland security. >> i am just curious. when you are doing you're planning to determine what your needs are, clearly in order for you to do the planning you have to have an assessment of what the expected flow would be.g i am curious that's not meant as a gotcha question p for a quick snow of course we do not assess our needs along the border it we don't actually have needs along the border but that is the dhs role is to figure it hackley plan for the number of incidents or encounters they will have on the border.

for us what we are trying to do is understand what are the drivers, what are the ultimate flows that are likely to occur and we have similar warning of here is where you are likely see an increase in the flow either south or north or how it is and where it is coming from ultimately. does that make sense? >> itkee does. it just catches me a little bit by surprise that in your planning most certainly you have to have a good communication with homeland security i am assuming there is a good communication there. >> of course. >> based upon what their needs are is really what you are doing is providing them with additional resources. i knew were also at the same time gathering intel based on a possibility, the strong possibility an individual try to come into the southern border. based upon that i was curious. i know we are in a public

discussion. nonetheless it something thattr has been talked about publicly. the factut we've got folks from all of the world are using that as an entryway into the united states and most certainly you are aware of that. >> absolutely. i am not trying to duck the question or anything. we see a very high flow there is no question. : : i'm not trying to duck the question or anything. i think we see a very high flow, there's no question. what happens is the department of homeland security, we have someone who is a liaison that sits within there spaces that tells us here are the requirements. and they, basically, are looking for indications and warning of you are likely to see a flow along this part of the border, that sort of thing. as opposed to us being able to determine today you're going to see x number of people coming through the southern border as a whole. and congress working for and influences center's mission

budget and among other issues but with about 22 midterms we are probably behind the curve a little bit. one ofam the major roadblocks in the intelligence center. >> we got in appropriation basically through the fy 22 budget which has been great and we are building up the influences center. we already have the threat executive so weug have been doig work on what the threats might be to that elections. that is now pulled into the influences center and we effectively have the budget for up to 12 people in the influences center and we've asked for funding for fy 23 to be able to expand to three people and to facilitate what the community is doing across

the board on these issues. >> thankd you, mr. chairman. my time is expired. >> thank you, mr. cherry and thank youmm to the witnesses. i want to ask about two items. first, 95% of global communications rely on a robust network 500,000 miles across the seaboard globally. internet global bankingca transactions, swift system swift systemdiplomatic cables ay communications are a few of the myriad applications that rely on this network. the two nato commands they are controlled by private sector companies in the u.s., france, spain,de japan, china and othere contractors the companies andes contractors who work with them such as google and oversee the planning production deployment

andth maintenance. to whatmp extent is the dod into the nic looking at integrating odand communicating with the private actors so we can monitor the cables? >> senator, i'm going to take that one with other maligned actors that have organic capabilities to map the networks and listen to other government communications i would like to do it in closed session if that's alright. >> i will look forward to that. now a question about the intelligence estimates with the strength of other militaries.

there were a number of estimates of the afghan military would perform much better than they did and a number of estimates that the russian military was much stronger than it is proven toha be. so, what are we doing to assess why we overestimated the strength of both of those militaries recalibrating the way we assess military strength of other nations? it starts with of the relationships with our foreign partners understanding the militaries and their understanding of adversary militaries and working in all assessments to have the granularity. certainly thee overestimation of the capability was an issue but if you back up, you look at

russia's growth since the early 2000's, what they did in ukraine and their operations in syria, and you understand the reforms that they do we solve it from thea, outside. what we did see from the inside was this lack of leadership training and effective doctrine so those are what we have to get our hands around in the intelligence community to understand. >> thank you and i will yield back. >> thank you, senator. >> thank you, mr. chairman. a general, let me quote you from your statement. beijing appears willing to do for the use of military force as long as it considers the taiwan can be negotiated and the conflict outweighsun the benefi. i believe the united states

should prepare taiwan and send a clear message to beijing the military invasion would be costly. i also believe the primary objective of the united states and its allies with regards to taiwan should not be so much to propel a chinese attack, but to prevent it from ever occurring. from your assessment off the capabilities as well as the current defensive posture, what can the united states be doing for or supplying to taiwan in order to prevent a chinese attack from ever occurring? >> senator, thank you for the question. i believe, the prc would rather not do it by force. i think they would rather do this peacefully over time. if there are some things we can do withat taiwan. i think they are learning some very interesting lessons from the ukrainian conflict like how

important the leadership is and how important the nco corps and effective training with the right weapon systems and what a the systems with the right people would be able to do. so i think we have to engage withth our partners and the department of defense the taiwan military and leadership to help them understand what the conflict has been about and what they can learned where theyto should be focusing their dollars on defense and training. >> is it where it should be at thisis point? >> i don't believe it is where it shouldar be. >> and so, the volunteer part of the armed forces, is that where it should be? >> they have a very short period i can provide you additional details in a written response. >> you also have written that

the pla navy is the largest in the world and has the capability to conduct long-range strikes from the submarine and service combatants. you later have written that russia is yielding its, quote, ultra quiet submarine threatening north america from iethe pacific ocean. a general j uss china and russia will continue to grow their fleets and t invest in the capabilities? >> i do believe they will conduct the capabilities and grow their fleets. >> is the united states on pace tito build as many ships as chia is building? >> i would rate for that question to the secretary of the navy and nato operations. >> but surely the intelligence community has an assessment of that.f >> dia has an assessment of the

capabilities and chinese capabilities -- >> dia is familiar with what the plans the public plans of the navy are at this point. >> but i think the navy will make those investment decisions based d on how they perceive the threat as well and collaborate with our partners on any of that. >> let me switch to afghanistan. >> you submitted the office of director of national intelligence annual threat assessment on afghanistan under the reports protect the taliban takeover threatens interest that at500,000 afghan refugees could attempt to cross into surrounding countries and will establish and expand safe havens with which to attack, so madame director, given these assessments in your office's annual threat assessment, what

uss the chaotic withdrawal from afghanistan has left the homeland less susceptible to attacks? >> thank you, senator. i agreed with what the general indicated earlier on about the threat that we are seeing from al qaeda and we see isis k as the more concerning threat at this point. we do not assess that they currently have the capability to affect external attacks directed from afghanistan to the united states at this stage but they could build that capability over time and e they certainly have e intent to do so. with al qaeda we are not seeing that much of a threat and that is something that we are monitoring during this period. >> as the exit from afghanistan

-- >> not more vulnerable but in issue we can monitor those and what they are doing and where they are migrating to. >> thank you very much, senator. >> madame director, i am concerned about the leaks last week and the fact intelligence is being shared with the -- and also are you actively pursuing the source from last week? >> thank you, senator to pursue any information that indicates

anybody maybe disclosing classified information without authorization. >> i hope that you will pursue that because sometimes leaks are embarrassing. i hope this will be an active investigation. to the question we believe the intelligence community does an excellent job of predicting the invasion of alerting the world of what was going on and the dispossession of the russian troopsps in belarus. what we missed was the will to fight of the ukrainians into the leadership of zelenskyy. we also missed that in afghanistan. in 12 months we missed the will to fight and overestimated the will to fight and overestimated the ukrainians willl to fight. the will to fight is less than

the number of tanks and the volume of ammunition or something. but i hope that the intelligence is doing soul-searching about how to get a better handle on the question because we had testimony on this committee and an intelligence committee it's going to fall in three or four days into the war would last two or three weeks and that turned out to be grossly wrong. is this -- are you looking at this question of how to assess the will to fight and domestic leadership? >> you heard from the general, obviously a number of things for the intelligence community writ large we have a process of the national intelligence council taking a look at these issues. i would say that it's a combination of the will to fight and capacity in fact and the two of them are issues that are as you indicated quite challenging to provide effective analysis on and we are looking at different methodologies for doing so.

>> this is your lane assessing military capability as you testified earlier the reason it's going the way it is is the ukrainians are fighting for their land and the russians don't have the same will to fight. i think we failed on this question in afghanistan and in afghanistan we had a testimony beyond the departure it lasted minus two weeks. is this something that you are focused on? >> ibe appreciate this dialogue because i thinkur there is an important new ones that we have to discuss. one is the will to fight and enclosed briefings we talked about the capacity with the senior analysts that it wasn't going to go very well for the

factors but there was never in intelligence committee assessment that said the ukrainians lack the will't to fight. ukraine would be overrun in a matter ofto weeks. that was grossly wrong. >> but not a question of the willdi to fight. we are taking a look at that. >> though well to fight hasn't been an incredible part of the struggle? >> that's what we didn't know, correct? >> we assessin the capacity to face the size of the russian forces that on the board was going to be difficultas for the. >> all i'm saying is they could do a better job on this issue. a. >> i think the intelligence community did a great a job onoi this, senator. >> how can you say that when we were told explicitly that they would fall in three days, you are telling me that was accurate intelligence?

>> we were focused on the russian forces at the time, so when we backed -- >> we were wrong about that, two mac. the intelligence community did a great job. >> i understand that. what they failed at his predicting what was going to happen after russia invaded. i think that enormity rests on the predictions of what the russians were going to do versus whether or not they were going to be successful. >> if you don't concede there was a problem on this, then we have a problem.. >> i didn't say that. but i think in the totality of the entire operation there is a lot more successes than failures. >> i won't argue that point. i'm just trying to make the point there was a major issue that we master that had a significant influence of how this is folded and had we had a

better handle on the production, we could have done more to assist the ukrainians earlier. >> thank you, senator. >> thank you, mr. chairman. director, general, is it your sense that beijing's things that has a window of opportunity to invadede taiwan before taiwan ad the united states modernize and get into a better position to detour, let's start with you, director. >> so, thank you, senator. it's our view that they are working hard to effectively put themselves into a position in which the military is capable of taking taiwan overpower intervention. we can talk enclosed sessions about timelines and how quickly they think they may be able to achieve that,. but that is something they are trying to achieve even as the general said earlier, to say that they would

prefer not to have to use military force to take taiwan. they would prefer to use other means. there's a lot of dates out there. at 27, 2049. we are not sure what lessons they are taken away from the conflict right now. we would hope they would be the right ones but i think it's going to take some time to sort out whether or not this is a window or whether the time it extended. let meul ask about something the admiral said when he was the commander draft pay calm. he told the committee last march he worried about a chinese invasion of taiwan and the next six years. that's his testimony. the successor similarly said he views the timeline to be shrinking. based on the indicators, director, let me start with you on this. the investigators in the community do you agree the threats to taiwan is a cute between now and 2030?

>> yes. i think it's fairco to say it is critical between now and 2030. i think that is absolutely fair. what is hard to tell us how for example whatever lessons china learns coming out of the crisis might affect aboutir a timelines well as you indicated whether or not the capabilities and other decisions that ought to be made between now and then might affect the timeline. >> general, you set a second, ao you hoped china would've learned some lessons from the conflict. whatti are you hoping they take away? >> how difficult the invasion might be and how dangerous and high risk that might be. we saw -- >> don't you think the chinese military is significantly more capable as it turns out, to pick up what senator king was pressing-- you on, we dramaticay underestimated the strength of the russian military. i would be surprised if china's military strength proves to be

so attenuated. don't you think that we are dealing with a significantly more formidable adversary in china? >> i think china is a formidable adversary. >> one lesson they can draw from the conflict as they determine student work. russia invaded ukraine. i for one don't want to be having this conversation not next year, five years, ten years. my sense of urgency is we've got to figure out how deterrence is going to work because if china is successful in fa to complain but is going to look different than the russians scenario, wouldn't you agree? >> so to that end one of the things they were able to give leadtime on is the potential russian invasion of ukraine. there is a strong likelihood of that and you had months of advance. i'm curious if you think we would get similar strategic

warning about a potential invasion of taiwan? >> i mean, it's too earlynk to tell whether that would be the case and obviously kind of a classic intelligence way we wouldn't promise anything at this stage. >> general, let me ask you about something that has been a concern of mine even more so now than thehe do you worry they mit see an opportunity to convey to taiwan in a very near future should united states get drawn into an actual conflict with russia? i think that's a remote possibility. the possibility china would see that as a window to take advantage that they are probably are not ready to do that right now.

>> so you don't think they have the capacity right now to invade taiwan? >> i think actually can we take this into a closed session? >> sure coming into my time is expired. >> thank you, senator. senator manchin, please. >> you believe taiwan is prepared to defend itself? >> buy your evaluation of what taiwan has been through, everything i keep seeing they want more f-16s and we think that they are going to go to war with china and i don't think so, i think taiwan could do more, sir. >> there's different things they can use whether it be in the sea or land to protect -- >> they are in consultation with the pay calm and the department of defense. >> how about ukraine, can ukraine win now as senator king

pointedd out? we miss read that one. is there the ability to win? on their own kin they win? >> i believe that is a difficult prediction to make. right now the agency, is at a stalemate. the russians continue to do what they are doing and we continue to do what we are doing for the ukrainians. i see that as a stalemate. >> how do you evaluate this? i'm sure you are being kept up to speed on this.r my other concern you might want to answer is the ability to maintain and manufacture the weapons that are needed to not only help ukraine, not only to backfill our allies, but also to keep our own supply chains up. are we running critically low.

>> a few things. just taking the last question first something we can be in closed session to talk about not just our military assistance to ukrainee but also a number of other countries that provided military assessment. are you concerned about the ability to have the supplies that are needed for us, for our allies and to hopefully win this war. >> that's why i was talking about the allied peace. i think between all of us if there is the capacity to provide the kind of assistance that they are asking for. >> can you identify the hotspots we are very much concerned about other than china because we know china's challenges we have. other hotspots we are worried about that stem up and rise up during this very difficult time in the geopolitical unrest in

the world? in iran, north korea, some of the ones you are watching with concern? >> in the ballistic missile development timeline into the potential nuclear testing we are always thinking about your on it the actions they have to pull them aligned influence in the region against our neighbors and certainly u.s. forces. always thinking through how to sustain partnerships to be able to keep a beat on these threats. >> are you concerned about basically the tensions that we have with uae and the saudi's and also the more visual movements and intentional movements to china for support or basically being used now for the payment of energy, things of this sort that also put us in a

more precarious situation with the uae and at the saudi's? >> thank you, senator. i think as you indicated, we are also looking at efforts at both china and russia to make parsers of hours across the world and in both respects. >> cybersecurity is the final word. right now it's convoluted where people read report the private companies in america that are getting hacked intono what's gog on but also who is in charge. where do they go and what is the chain and the federal government and military especially off cyber as you consider what we shouldth be working with, or are we putting things together and are we so fragmented throughout the agency's? >> it's gotten better over the years. i mean, i would never say it's

perfect. it's one of those things thatfrs continues to be worked through, but there is a very clear chain of command with respect to taking action -- when it comes to effective cyber operations into the department ofki defense does so, when it comes to defending, helping to defend infrastructure and critical resilience it's the department of homeland security and the fbi, and everybody has a role to play and we obviously support the community, all of them in the work that they are doing. >> you mean the national cyber security division -- >> all the stakeholders are involved in that. that's why i'm saying the convoluted. who is taking, who is the lead person, the lead agency? >> this isha the main --

>> how do you evaluate that? >> i think they are doing very well. >> no further questions. >> thank you very much. senator sullivan, please. >> thank you, mr. chair man. i want to thank the witnesses for their hard work during their challenging time. i want to focus a lot on the issue of energy and relay a story i had with senator mccain and a russianof dissident who is now been arrested. he's in jail right now in russia. i asked him what was the number one thing we could do to undermine the corrupt russian regime to undermine vladimir putin and he said the number one thing is easy, senator. produce more american energy. reproduce more american energy. so, i want to talk a little bit about that.

in your assessment is energy independence -- so a couple of years ago, we were at their largest producer of natural gas and largest producer of oil and renewables in the world. is that good for america's national security, general? >> senator, thank you for the blquestion. as we watched this conflict unfold -- >> i gave a soft ball. can you answer the question is that good for america's national security to be energy independent in the world super -- energy independence is a good thing. >> hows about you, director? >> thank you for the straightforward questioner or answer.k in this conflict with ukraine, what does our ability to produce energy do, how do the russians view that and how do our allies view that and we all know vladimir putin uses energy as a

weapon. howe are you assessing the ability of the united states to fill the void that the germans and others have with regards to getting energy from russia to not get it from the united states? is there a lot of interest? >> i believe they see this as a national security issue for sure and they are taking through new ways of developing and getting after their energy needs for sure. >> how about getting some from the united states? >> if there is excess capacity i'm sure that would be something they would welcome. >> do you sees, that as well, senator? >> yes. >> let me ask with regards to china almost 70% of the crude oil supply came in the form of

imports. what is your assessment of how china's energy dependence could or would impact its military operations during a potential cross street conflict? in your assessment and you read up on the witnesses, are they concerned about their energy dependence with regards to natural gas and oil being a major, major importer? >> if there is a way we can take this into a closed session to discuss that. i do believe they are concerned about the dependents. >> do you see that as a strategic advantage in the competition with china and russia and the fact we can produce energy for our own country and i'm talking all of the above, oil, gas do you see that as a strategic advantage for the nation? >> i think frankly the capacity to work with our allies on this

issue has been a strategic advantage and our ability to work with them in order to help to mitigate against russia using energy as a weapon has been a major issue. >> should there be some kind of conflict between us and china? >> the relationship would be obviously. >> we are getting ready to vote on a 40 billion-dollar package. my team and i are working through it. it's a lot. how do you assess the nato partners commitment finally to hitting 2% of the gdp for the annual military budgets?

we have 100,000 and i fully support with the president has been doing in that regard, but if there's ever a time countries have to kind of wake up and say for four years we've promised the dragon is at the door or whatever metaphor you want, are you seeing a shift because they made a big announcement and my understanding is canada still wanted 1% of gdp further budget. to say it's time for us to pull our own weight. 40 billion, that's a lot of money. my constituents have a lot of needs and we still have our nato allies who just freeload and it's getting a little tiring. what is your assessment of the partners commitment to finally hit the 2% now that it's clear

there is a dictator on their doorstep? >> i think we have seen as you indicated in the opening to the question in a number of countris now announced anto increased budget i think most of them will come around. >> i didn't start by saying the intel that you are providing was exceptional and also impressive, so i appreciate that. >> thank you, senator sullivan. senator peters. >> thank you mr. chairman. director, the 2022 threat assessment faces, quote, china presents the most effective

cyber espionage threats of the government and private sector. a specifically the capacity for china to conduct a surveillance as well as disrupt the critical infrastructure. my question for you is does the odni believe china would use the capacitysu to shape others decisions such as the russians are known to do? do you believe that is in regards as well? >> in particular the assessment is they are pursuing significant cyber capabilities to deter the united states from taking action in the event of the conflict in the region. media coverage during the weeks leading up to the invasion often use the open sourced evidence to support the administrations intelligence estimates. examples here range from images

provided by the commercial satellite network to the russian military communications that werere intercepted by the tech savvy civilians. my question for you, general, how is the proliferation of technology and information accessibility for average citizens impacting the realm of intelligence work within your agency? >> from the perspective of the warr between russia and ukraine, the plethora of open source data that is available to enrich the assessment has been amazing. just think of the third-party damage assessment happening right now using images because most ukrainian citizens have a cell phone it's been really, really rich. forin us it's been an enlighteng and will probably shape how we dohe intelligence analysis going forward in the future. we just have to be careful we use the right rules at the right

time to make sure we safeguard information and we are not violating any laws or policies. >> that leads to the next question and you mentioned you are looking at how you integrate that into information. is there anything congress should be doing to help you better enable your abilities to harness the potential for open source information? >> i think we are budgeted and looking forward to the work as we go forward on this issue. >> the biden administration has done an admirable job of craftingah a coalition of neighbors to impose sanctions and export controls against russia for their illegal invasion. this includes the transatlantic partners many of them who are now giving up on russian hydrocarbons, something that i think we all would have thought was absolutely unthinkable was short while ago as well as our global partners, japan and taiwan actively engaged.

what has been noticeable though is much of the world still is not with us. they may not be with russia. i'm notll saying they are with russia but they are not subscribing to the call for global democracies to stand against ukraine. this includes india, indonesia, nigeria, south africa and particularly other nations in the global south and winch the u.s. certainly has a very friendly relationship with, but we have not yet been able to get them to join the ukrainian cause. as the u.s. will need to build even more robust coalitions in the future to counter potential chinese aggression, i believe it is imperative the u.s. understand how to win over these nations living in a multipolar world so my question to you in your view what steps should the u.s. take to build a broad coalition for potential future conflicts similar to what we are

seeing right now? >> thank you, senator. from the intelligence community perspective, we've done a lot of thinking about how we can help facilitate the communities inan this area to your point and one of the things we did in the context of ukraine that is possible for us to do in other areas that we discussed with the community about is basically working with key allies and partnerspo who are influencers n effect within specific regions to try to get out to them as much intelligence as we can obviously being mindful of the sources and methods, but to lay the groundwork so the community can work with those countries to effectively provide the kind of coalition that you described, and i do think that it's an absolutely fundamental piece. the fact the un general assembly managed to garner 141 votes i think it was on the russia ukraine piece was extraordinary and i think that our capacity to share intelligence in advance of that moment was critical to

getting that kind of coalition together he and i hope that we can do that in the future. >> thank you mr. chairman. >> senator rosen, please. >> thank you, chairman reed. and really appreciate the witnesses and you both for being here today for your service. director haynes and a general, given the annual threat assessment was written before the invasion of ukraine, has russia's loss ande. expendituref military equipment personnel and resources in ukraine coupled with the frankly poor performance changed our overall threat of russia and the military capabilities and like i said this was written before that. how do you assess we may need to adjust the planning going forward to seeing is what we are learning? >> i will start with that one, senator. as wee have watched the russians falter here and the losses that they have sustained, we believe that they are going to be set

back conventionally for a number of years as they try to recoup the losses and replace all of the equipment and soldiers that they have lost. i think that we should back up our assessment for nato and with that threat looks like and factoring in the nuclear capabilities and what that means for nato going forward. >> so i will add to this i think as we talk to the analysts about this and before each of the hearings we discussed this because the threat hearings came after russia's invasion of ukraine and as you indicated it was done before hand and i think the overall threat level is not so much changed as it is the question of how it's evolving. i think our view is the combat forces have been degraded considerably and it's going to take them years to basically manage to the extent that they are able to rebuild that in effect and that may end up meaning that they have a greater

reliance in effect on asymmetric tools during this period so they may rely on things like cyber, nuclear et cetera and that is a shift in the way in which they are exercising their influence. >> and knowing that, we also know to everyone else's point the world is watching, so director, how do you ss the threat levels to taiwan, is it increased, does china feel more emboldened now that russia has invaded ukraine and then i will skip the seconddi part of that o you, general does china see this as an opportunity maybe this period to invade ukraine as we might be distracted, the world might be distracted with ukraine and the crisis. >> inso, it's hard to tell honestly at this stage. what we see is that china is evaluating what's happening in the crisis. they are still evaluating the crisis continues, so what lessons theyat learned during ts

period is not really concluded yet so it's a little harder to tell whether or not it's an increased threat of the accelerating efforts towards taiwan orle less so. i would say that thus far we have not assessed the russia ukraine crisis is likely to accelerate their plan. and the kind of lessons that we think are possible that are relevant, one, they were surprised by the degree to which the united states and europe came together to connect sanctions and that is something they are going to be looking at in the context of taiwan. and the second one i think is this point made earlier to say that one of the issues for them is the confidence they have that they are able militarily to take action in taiwan over our

intervention that will play into the decision-making over time. we think seeing what happened in russia that might give them less confidence in some respects over what it is that is likely to happen. >> on a day-to-day basis with the activity i'm not seeing anything that would tell me they are trying to take advantage of the time thatto they think they might have. >> let me ask one additional follow-up what is your assessment of our ability to conduct military operations in both theaters should something occur? >> we have significant capabilities in both theaters. it would depend with the variables are on each situation and what that meant but that's why we have the four-star combatant commanders. >> thank you very much, senator rosen and thank you, madam

director and general. we have a vote scheduled at 11:45 and we will reconvene in 217 for the classified session at noon, 12:00 and at this point i will recess or adjourned the open session. thank you very much.

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the longest-serving republican in the senate's history but his legacy was more than longevity. he was a close friend with massachusetts democratic senator ted kennedy. the odd couple as he called it. on this episode we explore that side of his senate legacy. >> when the senior senator from massachusetts and i sat down together and we are from two opposite poles in many respects although he doesn't realize he's a lot more conservative than he thinks. he thinks i may be a lot more liberal than i think. but when kennedy and hatch get together people are not hearsay if they can get together, anybody can. >> you can find it on c-span now, our free mobile app or wherever you get your podcast.

>> senate majority leader chuck schumer talked on the senate floor about saturday's mass shooting in his home state calling it the deadliest shooting in the history of buffalo and the worst mass shooting in history this year. the new york senator plans to travel with the first lady and the president to meet with the families of those killed.