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tv   Hearing on Government Investigation of UF Os  CSPAN  May 20, 2022 11:20am-12:53pm EDT

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us to talk about the 16th president, the memorial's creation and democratic ideas the memorial has come to represent and at 2 pm eastern on the presidency or when gelman with his book campaign of the century where he re-examines the 1960 presidential campaign between richard nixon and john kennedy and the close outcome of the election. exploring the american story. what american history tv saturday on c-span2 and find a full schedule on your program guide or watch online anytime at c-span.org/history. >> the first congressional hearing on ufo sightings in more than 50 years pentagon officials told lawmakers extraterrestrial life is not the cause of what the government calls unidentified aerial phenomena. scott gray deputy director of naval intelligence told lawmakers and after a ufo
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sighting was reported an investigation usually results in one of the following categorizations. airborne clutter, natural atmospheric phenomenon, us government or us industry elemental programs or an adversary systems or unexplained sightings that merit more investigations. this is just shy of 90minutes .
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>> the subcommittee will come to order. without objection the chair may declare reset at anytime. i want to recognize a moment of silence for the victims of the white supremacist hate crime in buffalo newyork. the subcommittee has focused intently on that threat in open and closed hearings . this is utterly devastating to see more victims of this violence. buffalo our heart breaks for you. with that i asked my colleagues to join. we will now turn to the business of this hearing. more than 50 years ago the us government ended project blue book, an effort to catalog and understand sightings of objects in the air that could not otherwise be explained.
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for more than 20 years that project treated unidentified anomalies in our airspace as a national security threat to be monitored and investigated . in 2017 we learned for the first time the department of defense had quietly restarted a similar organization tracking what we now call unidentified aerial phenomena or transcends. last year congress rewrote the charter for that organization called the management synchronization group or aimsog for short. today we will bring that organizationout of the shadows . this organization and oversight work as asimple idea at its core . unidentified aerial phenomena are a potential national security threat and they need to be treated that way. for itoo long the stigma
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associated with uap's got in the way of good intelligence . or reporters were laughed at when they did. dod officials relegated the issue to the back room or swept it under the rug full of a skeptical national security community. today we know better. uap's are unexplained, it's true but they are real. they need to be investigated and the many threats they poseneed to be mitigated . undersecretary mulch three , thank you for coming today. but first we need you to update us on the status of aimsog. the legislation passed in december, the deadline for implementation is fast approaching but the group does not even have a named director. we need to know servers the status of the organization and obstacle togetting it up and running. secondly , you have to convince the audience today and most especially our military and civilian mediators though culture has
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changed. that those who report uap's will be treated as witnesses, not as kooks. thirdly you need to show us congress and the american public whose imaginations you have captured your willing to follow thefacts where they lead . you know, we hear sometimes the dod is focused more o emphasizing what it can explain , not investigating what it can't . looking for you to ensure us today that all conclusions are on the table. one final note we are mindful today that aimsog is not starting from scratch. this is the third version of this task force in dod and civil society groups the mutual ufo network, mister korbel and others have been collecting data on this issue for years. i hope you'll explain how you can leverage the knowledge and experience of our prior work on this matter to move
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the aimsog along. the last time congress had a hearing was half a century ago. i hope that it does not take 50 more years for congress to hold another because transparency is desperately needed and i now turned to ranking member crawford for comments . >> thank you mister chairman. thank you for coming here today, we appreciate it to begin the open dialogue between congress and executive branch. while this topic evokes creative imaginations of many aside from all the hype and speculation there are important underlying issues by uap. despite the serious nature of this topic i'm more interested in our understanding of russia and china hypersonic weapon administration on why this administration was so slow to share intelligence . and as much as this topic may help us understand unknown activities, i am on board. the intelligence community has a serious duty to our taxpayers to prevent potential adversaries from surprising us with unforeseen new technologies.
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as overseers of the intelligence community this committee understands what you are doing to determine oiwhether any are new technologies and if they are where are they coming from? in general the ip spends much of his time trying to understand what we call known unknowns. when it comes to foreign nations weapon systems and sensors known unknowns are those features we don't fully understand yet. the challenge associated is that they are completely unknown and require more expensive collection efforts. the intelligence community must balance known threats to our nation's national security with preventing technical surprise. we must follow the facts where they leave and ensure there are no technical surprises. the ip must take it seriously when there are credible observations that seem to perform in ways that could pose a threat to save life operations or develop a p'strategic technological
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surprise against the united states. it's also essential are pilots and others feel they can report uap without any stigma. this is the open unclassified portion of our hearing and we will have a closed classified part later. it's important for the public to know that classification of this information exists to prevent national security not to try to hide the truth. we will try to determine if any uap are new technologies developed by foreign sgovernments we will inevitably run intoclassified information about what new systems and technologies we do know are in the works . but where information does not risk national security should dabe shared with our allies when feasible. i hope we can have your assurance to this end today and it's my hope the intelligence community will try to determine thenature of uap's and will keep congress apprised of all developments . i look forward to this hearing and oversight with the intelligence community on this topic and with that i yelled back . >> now we turn to our distinguished chairman for any comments he wishes to chmake.
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>> thank you for holding this open hearing on unidentified aerial phenomena and for your leadership on this issue. holding a portion of our discussion in open session is critical to the cause of transparency and openness with with which was congress's intent and funding this new task force. the larger effort that is being undertaken to study and characterize reports is an important step towards understanding these phenomena. what we know and don't know. and i look forward to hearing more during both the open session and closed setting about how dod and theicr undertaking that task . reports have been around for decades and yet we haven't had an orderly way for them to be recorded without stigma and to be investigated. that needs to change. uap reports need to be understood and as a national security matter and that message needs to go out across the whole of the us government and when we spot
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something we don't understand or can't identify in our airspace is the job of those we trust with our national security to report that. that is why it's important we hold this open hearing for the public to hear directly from the department of defense on the steps istaking to track , analyze and transparently communicate the work being done on this issue . it is also the responsibility of our government and this panel to share as much as we can with the american people since access is secrecy only builds distrust and speculation. i look forward to hearing how the uap taskforces being stood up and how this committee can make sure the task force isable to shed light on one of the world's most enduring mysteries . i thank you gentlemen for your work and i'd be interested to hear what you have to say to me among the most fascinating questions are these phenomena that we can measure? that is, instruments report there is something there.
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it's not the human eye confusing objects in the sky. there is something there measurable by multiple instruments and yet it seems to move in directions that are inconsistent with what we know of is explore science more broadly . to me poses questions of tremendous interest as well as potential national security significance. we look forward to hearing what you're able to report in ckopen session and i want to thank chairman carson for his extraordinary leadership on this issue and i yelled back . >> chairman yields back and with that we start our moultrie ecretary the chair is yours distinguished members of the subcommittee it's a privilege to be here with you to address your questions regarding unidentified aerial phenomenon or uap . i'm m pleased to be joined by mister scott ray who will the navies unidentified aerial phenomenon task force which laid the foundation for the efforts we will discusstoday
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. first i'd like to thank congress for supporting the departments uap efforts. the nda for fiscal year 22 has helped us establish a dedicated office to oversee processes and procedures for the timely collection, processanalysis and reporting of uaprelated data . what are uap ? quite simply, uap are airborne objects that we encounter cannot be immediately identified. however it is the department's contention that by combining appropriately structured collective data with rigorous scientific analysis any object we encounter can likely be isolated, characterized, identified and if necessary mitigated. we know there are that our servicemembers have encountered unidentified aerial phenomena and because
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they pose potential flight safety and general security risks we are committed to a focused effort to determine their origins. our efforts will include a thorough examination of adversarialplatforms and potentialbreakthrough technologies , us government or commercial platforms , allied or are systems and other natural phenomenon. awe also understand that there has been a cultural stigma surrounding uap. our goal is to eliminate the stigma by coordinating our operators and mission personnel into a standardized data datagathering process . we believe making uap recording a mission in imperative will be instrumental to the effort of success. the defense intelligence and security enterprise provides real-time support and mission personnel across all domains to optimize the departments uauap work we are establishing an office within the office of secretary of defense. that office function is
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clear. to facilitate the identification of previously unknown or unidentified aerial objects and methodical logical and standardized manner. these goals will ensure we are working closely with operational personnel on training and recording , developing data and intelligence requirements , standardizing and integrating processes and procedures for collection operational surveillance, leveraging our research and developing capabilities to improve detection, characterization and identification of uap's, mitigating solutions and identifying strategy and policy courses. this will maximize collaboration and build upon existing relationships with the office of the director of national intelligence, faa, dhs and fbi. we are also committed to strong partnerships at the department of energy, noaa, dea, nasa and the national labs and this most importantly our international partners. with regard to the importance
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of transparency, the department is fully committed to the principle of openness and accountability to the american people. however, we are also mindful of our obligation to protect tentative sources and methods . our goal is to strike that delicate balanceba. one that enables us to maintain the public's trust preserving those capabilities that are vital to support our service personnel. in closing the department is committedto this effort and welcomes the challenge. we thank you for your support and look forward to your questions . >> chairman schiff, committee members, thank you for the opportunity to highlight the enongoing work of the department of defense regarding unidentified aerial phenomena. since the early 2000's we asseen an increasing number of
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unauthorized and or unidentified aircraft in military control training areas and other designated airspace. reports of sightings are frequent and continuing. we attribute this increased to a number of factors including our work to destigmatize reporting and increase in the number of new systems such as helicopters and unmanned aerial systems, identification of what we can classify as clutter, balloons and other types of trash and improvements in the capabilities of our various sensors to detect our airspace. almost 2 years ago on august 2020 the secretary of defense directed the establishment of the aerial, task force within the department of the navy. the task force was built on the foundation of the navy's initial efforts to respond to our aviators om on unidentifiedobjects observed in ourtraining ranges . the basic issues then and now are twofold . first incursions in our training ranges by unidentified objects is in
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serious hazards to the safety of flight and every aspect of naval aviation safety of our aircrews is paramount. second intrusions by unknown aircraft or objects pose potential threats to the security of our operation. our heaters train as they would fight. so any intrusions that may compromise the security of our operations by revealing our capabilities, ourtactics, techniques or procedures are of great concern to the navy and department of defense . from the beginning we took these reports very seriously. chwe instituted a data driven approach to the investigations where we could collect as much data as possible and use all available resources orto analyze and make informed decisions on the best way to address our findings. our main objective was to transition uap efforts from a narrative based approach to a rigorous science and technology engineering focused study.
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the data driven approach requires input from a wide variety of sources. in the early stages the task force worked the standardized reporting processes to make it as easy as possible for personnel to report any engagements so we were getting that wide rangeof reporting we needed . we spent considerable efforts engaging with our naval aviators and building relationships to destigmatize the recording sightings or encounters g. and we worked with naval aviation leadership to provide additional equipment to record any encounter. navy and air force crews have step-by-step procedures for reporting on uap in the cockpit and in their postflightdebrief procedures. the direct result of those efforts has been increased recording with increased opportunities to focus a number of sensors on any objects .
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the message is reclear if you see something you need to report and the message has been received. in fact recently i received a call from a senior naval aviator with 2000 flight hours. he called me after landing to talk about an encounter he had just experienced. those were just the initials. we made a concerted effort to assemble subject matter efforts from the intelligence community and other agencies and departments to fort partnerships with the development communities, industry partners and academic research labs and brought many allied and international partners into our discussions on uap. additionally subject matter experts from a wide variety of fields including physics, optics, metallurgy to name a few have been brought in to expand our understanding of areas where we may not have organicrtexpertise . in short we've endeavored to bring an all hands on deck approach to better understand thisphenomenon so what have we learned ? any given observation may be fleeting or longer.
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it may be e reported or not. it may beobservable by one or multiple assets . in short there's rarely an easy answer. let me share with you the first video wehave here today which shows an observation in real time .there it was. that's in many cases that's all that a report may include. and in many other cases we have far less. as we detailed in both the unclassified and classified versions of the preliminary assessment released by the office of national intelligence this limited amount ofhigh-quality data and reporting hampers our ability to draw firm
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conclusions about the nature or intent of uap . as detailed in the report if and when individuals are result likely fall into one of five potential categories. airborne clutter, natural atmospheric phenomena, us government or industry development programs or an adversary systems for and other been that allows for a whole new bit of difficult cases and the possibility of surprise and potential scientific discovery will we stand by those initial se results . the task force database has now grown to contain approximately 400 reports . the stigma has been reduced. we've also made progress in resolving the character of a limited number of uap encounters . let me show you another video image taken years apart in different areas. in this video u.s. navy personnel recorded what appears to be triangles, some of flashing recorded several years ago off the coast of the united states. this was recorded while the navy ship observed a number
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of small unmanned aerial systems in the area. and importantly the video was taken through nightvision goggles with a single lens reflex camera. these remained unresolved for several years . several years later, and often a different coast, u.s. navy personnel again in a swarm of unmanned aerial systems and again there nightvision goggles and an slr camera recorded this image . u.but this time other u.s. navy assets observed unmanned aerial systems nearby and we're now reasonably confident that these triangles correlate to
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unmanned aerialsystems . the triangular appearance is a result of light passing asthroughnightvision goggles and then being recorded by an slr camera . i don't mean to suggest everything we observe is identifiable but this is a great example of how it takes considerable effort to understand what we're seeing in the examples that we are able to collect. in this example we evacuated significant data from two similar encounters from two different times and two different geographic areas to help us draw these conclusions. that's not always the case. we recognize that can be unsatisfying or insufficient ng in the eyes of many. it's a popular topic, there's series as to whatobjects these may be and where they originate . by nature we are curious and asked for lifelong intelligence professional i'm impatient i want immediate
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explanations for this as much as anybody else. however understanding can take significant time. that's why we've endeavored to concentrate on this data driven process to drive fact-based results and given the nature of our business we had to sometimes be less forthcoming with information than many would hope. if uap do indeed represent a potential threat to our security than the capabilities and sources we use to observe record study or analyze thesephenomena need to be classified at the berea levels . we do not want potential adversaries to know exactly what we areable to understand or how we come to the conclusions we make . therefore public disclosures must be carefully considered on a case-by-case basis. so what's next? were concentrating on a seamless transition to a new organization with future analysis of complicated issues will greatly benefit
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from the infrastructure of the process and procedures we've developed to date. i'mconfident the task force under navy leadership has forced the path forward that will allow us to anchor assessments . we remain committed to that goal as i know the organization does as well. thank you very much for your interest in continuing support. your teams made a lot of progress but we are establishing the foundation for the more detailedanalysis yet to be done and with your continued support we can sustain that momentum to produce data centric analysis . i look forward to your questions this is the third version of this task force and to be frank one of congress's concerns is that the executive branch and administration of both parties has been sweeping concerns about uap under the rug by focusing on known events that can be explained and avoided that events that cannot be explained.
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what can you say to give the american people confidence that you aren't just focusing our attention uron low hanging fruit with easy explanations? >> congressman, i'll start and then mister bray can feel free to weigh in. so the way we're approaching it is with a more thorough standardized methodology than what we have in the past . the secretary of defense is chartering this effort . this is not someone lower in the department of defense and he assigned that task to the office of secretary of defense, undersecretary for security, that's me because i'm responsible for lookingat intelligence matters . this is potentially both so when you start concerning ourselves with the safety of our personnel and our
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installations and bases there is no higher priority than what we have and we have been assigned that task to actually stand up the office of aimsog which i believe the name will change but we've moved forward in terms of establishing that office . we have as of this week a director for that effort.ha vvery established and accomplished individual. we've identified spaces. we've worked with personnel across the department of defense with the services and worked with dic which is on board in helping us work through this standardized methodology for now and the end data, analyzing that data and reporting that data in the appropriate method and appropriate means so we can either get it to our service personnel to ensure their safety or get it to you in the congress and the public to ensure you have oversight
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so standardized and really a methodical approach it's something that we're doing has not been done before. >> can we get assurances that your analysts will follow that where they lead and assess all hypothesis? >> absolutely, we're open to any conclusions that we may encounter. >> quickly before i pass it to the ranking member and chairman schiff i want to thank youboth for taking the time. i had a great time meeting with you , secretary moultrie. it's fair to say that you are a science fiction fan, is that correct ? >> it's fair to say i am an inquisitive mind who has spent 40 years in the intelligence field and have focused on both science and science fiction . my generation grew up looking at space sagas and the apollo
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program. to all of us who grew up in the 60s were just thrilled by watching our first astronaut land on the moon. this was an occasion. two people who were of a different generation some of them didn't believethat happened. i still have relatives and friends whodon't believe it happened . but to us , that's the progress that we make. so i was enthralled by that and i've taken that to heart. i enjoyed the challenge of what may be out there. i've mentioned to you that yes, i have followed science fiction . i've gone toconventions, i'll say it on the record . got to break the ice somehow. but i have that but there's nothing wrong with that. i don't necessarily dress up but i do believe it's important to show that the department of defense have character and we are people just like you.
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we have our inquisitiveness. we have our questions. we want to know what's out there as much as you want to knowwhat's out there . we get the questions not just fromyou but family . we get them night and day not anjust the committee here finding what's out there is important but first and foremost it's important for us to do that so we can ensure our people, our personnel, our bases and installations are safe and os then curiosity factor is something that we just want knto know because that'sthe human in us . insatiabledesire to know . >> ranking member crawford. >> you said you don't necessarily dress up. that wasn't a real strong statement . [laughter] gentlemen thank you for being here. we appreciate it and thank you mister moultrie for
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breaking the ice. the inability to understand objects is tantamount to intelligence failure. it's not about finding alien spacecraft is about delivering intelligence across the spectrum. my question is how can aimsog lead to intelligence surprises? >> i'll start with that. the goal of our effort is to integrate it into what we already do on a normal basis which we look for the known unknowns. across all domains. we've been looking at the space domain and space objects, looking at space phenomenon. we've been looking at things in the air domain and as you know i'll talk more about this but we have a very concerted effort to understand adversarial platforms and adversarial development ofprograms and we
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do that on the ground domains . we're interested in france so if there are objects if there are objects that aircrews are encountering and their sensors are detecting these objects we wanted to bring that into the normal process we have for identifying unknown objects. we want to make sure we have ncthe intelligence allows us not only to look at that event from the time it occurs but maybe to retrospectively we want to go back and see if we can get to the left of that event to say what our development of programs that we see your technical surprise issues are, that we should have known and if so how do we put that intelligence requirement in place to ensure that we are following an adversarial development or any other development that maybe out there. that's what we want to do in terms of normalizing this and
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bringing it into the normal process. >> it's important to document the relationshipfrom the navy as the lead agency on this . how do you interact with space force, air force to create that degree offidelity ? a i guess where i have concerns . with many of the images that we see commonly in this committee and even in open-source the resolution and clarity that would allow a robust technical intelligence analysis is challenging. so is aimsog apparent to address the quality and quantity of data collection collected on uap and du have the adequate sensors you need . >> one of the lines of effort is sensor capabilities and to understand whether or not as the videos show that displayed sometimes it's very
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fleeting data that we have on some of these topics and we want to make sure that one, our systems are calibrated. to actually be able to llcollect on the objects and our sensors today are calibrated or specifically we want to make sure they are calibrated for things of this nature , things of this size and velocity if i can use that term. we want to make sure once we have that data is stored in some analyzed metric that we can extract and we can feed into our system so it will uttake prolonged time for us to get to that data but our goal is to have that fidelity and information that we get from all sensors and we want to integrate that with what we may have so whatever you may have on the ground or from other sensors that we may have in different domains we want to integrate that and get it to you as i said with any other unidentified object tior thing that we're tracking
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as part of ournormal intelligence responsibility . >> last question mister bray. i'm a navy pilot. i've encountered a friend five. walk me through the recording protocol once i see something that i think needs to be recorded? >> the first is that aviator would do after landing as a part of their normal debriefing they would contact their intelligence officer. there intelligence officer would walk them through first filing data preservation. to ensure whatever data may be on aircraft that would preserve back so that it's available for later analysis. secondly they would fill out a form that includes detailed like where they were operating, altitudes theywere operating, what they observed . whatever sense of data they may have recorded from dthat then that report is filed goes to places. it goes through the operational chain of command
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so the operational units are aware of what's being observed and also to the uap task force so that they can take that data, database it and quite often have individuals from the task force contact the aviator and ask them additional questions if there were things that weren't clear in the report. that then goes into a database where we can compare it with other observations that we have. again, comparing four locations and altitude, speed, she. if any rf emissions were detected from the platform. all that so we can reach ha conclusions on that. >> gettleman yields back, chairman schiff. >> can you rerun that first image, and look like it was outside of a plane window and if you wouldn't mind going up to the screen and tell us what we'reseeing .
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not then you can necessarily tell us what we're seeing but explain what we should be looking at in that first image . >> the one i'll ask is if you can stop at a certain point. are we looking outside of a civilian aircraft window, is that what we're looking at ? okay. [inaudible]
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>>. [inaudible]
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>> can you point to the screen what we are supposedto be looking at ? if you could stop that frame.
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i think we're having a hard time stopping it. >> .. >> describe what we've seen in that. what are we observing? >> what you see here is aircraft
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that is operating as an anti-u.s. navy training range. this is absurd spherical object in that area, and as they fly by they take the video. it looks reflective in this video, somewhat reflective and it quickly passes by the cockpit of the aircraft. >> and is is one of the phenomena that we can't explain? >> i do not havee an explanation for what this specific object is. >> and is this one of the situations where it is, that's the object we're looking ats right there? thank you. is this a situation where it was observed by the pilot and also recorded by the aircraft instruments? >> we will talk about thens muli sensor part in a later session. but in this case we have at
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leastas that. >> in thehe director of national intelligence 2021 unclassified report, the odni reported 144 uaps between 2004-2021. 80% of which were recorded on multiple instruments. and i take it with respect to some of those you had a pilot seeing them, it was observed by a pilot and get multiple instrument recording it. so you will have three s sensor, the human sensor and two technical sensors detecting the? >> for the majority of incidents that we had in last years report, the majority had multi sensor data. when40 i talk about the 400 reports we have now, that number will certainly go down because a lot of those newer reports are
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actually the story reports that her narrative based. that percentage will go down just as a factor of the fact that the d stigmatization has resulted in more narrative reports. >> that's the object we're looking at right there? >> that it. >> last years report also said that of those 144, 18 of them reportedly appear to exhibit unusual flight characteristics, appeared to demonstrate advanced technology and some of them appeared to remain stationary and went aloft, move against the wind, maneuver abruptly our move at considerable speed without discernible means of propulsion. that's pretty intriguing. to answer're able this in this setting, are we aware of any foreign adversary capable of moving objects
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without any discernible means of propulsion? >> i think, without discernible means of propulsion. i would say we are not aware of move anrsary that can object without discernible means of propulsion. the question then becomes, in many t of these cases we don't have it discernible meaning of propulsion in the date that we have, in some cases there is likely sensor artifacts that may be hiding some of that. there's certainly some degree of something that looks like signature management that we've seen from some of these uap, but i would caution, i would simply say you are a number of events in which we do not have an explanation, and which there are a small handful of which there are flight characteristics, signature management that we can't explain with the data that weat have. those are obviously the ones
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that are most interest to us. earlier when we asked about how you were technological surprise, the biggest way you avoid technological surprise is by collecting this type of data and a poorly calibrating the assumptions that you go into with how you do that analysis. within the uap task force we have one basic assumption, and that is that generally speaking, generally speaking our sensors operate as designed. and we make that assumption because many times these are multicentric collections. we make no assumptions about the originin of this or that there y or may not be some sort of technology that we don't understand. that i think is the key to avoiding technological surprises by calibrating those assumptions. >> and finally with respect to the second two video showing the small triangles, the hypothesis is that those are commercial drones that, because of the use of night vision goggles appear
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like triangles.tr is that the operating assessment? >> some type of drone, f, some e of manned aerial system, and it is simply that that light source resolves itself through the night vision goggles on to the slr camera as a triangle. >> and how we can order to prove that hypothesis flown a drone and observed it with the same technology to see whether we can reproduce the effect? >> uap task force is work-study set of that meant. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i yield yield back. >> the gentleman yields back. dr. wenstrup. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you all for being here. through this process where there's been sightings, have the sightings been stationary or have they always been sighted from a moving object, from a plane or a ship that may have been moving.
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have these reports been from a stationary object observed in the sky? >> the uap task force has reports from a stationary observer. >> there's a difference observing something when you're moving as well as, physics, that's why i asked that question. are we capable or have we made any breakthroughs to be able to sight something and make some determination at all of its km significance, whether it's a solid or a gas? is there any such capabilities? >> from-- >> i'm not asking what i'm-- >> from some of the returns, it's clear that the majority-- it's clear that many of the observations that we serve are from the physical objects from the sensors that we have. >> well, gas is a physical, and do you see where i'm going with
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this. i'm trying to determine what it is we're looking at so we can decide if something is a solid or a gas and has there been any conclusion on its capabilities. like the capabilities of movement, of turning, going 180 degrees or 90 degree turns, something along that line that we've been able to determine? >> within the-- i should point out that there's not a single explanation, they're made up of a lot of different things that are identified. >> basically we really don't know much on that. that's all i'm trying to get. i'm pleased that you have protocol right now for our military, but are there any non-military reports coming forward of similar events or is it all coming from military? >> the uap task force has a good working relationship with the f.a.a., with other parts of the u.s. government so that we can ingest reports from those reports. >> do we have any reports
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non-military? >> yes. >> thank you, that's my question. and do we need to put out protocol for civilians in that arena through f.a.a.? do you think that would be appropriate or helpful? >> i think that standardized reporting without a doubt is key to helping us get-- to ascertain what some of these are. >> i would think it would be important as well. do we-- there are, as bow sides the u.s. that have these experiences and record those, correct. >> that's correct. >> is it all of our allies or is it alleys and adversaries? what have you learned publicly? >> some of that, sir, i think we'll save for closed session. >> and that's my next question, publicly have others made neg, that would not be considered closed. i don't want to you necessarily say what they said. >> and china has its own
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version of the uap task force so clearly a number of countries have observations in the things in the air space that they can't identify. >> do we share data with some, with all, are they sharing with us? >> we share data with them and some share data with us. >> but not necessarily all that have reported something? >> that's correct. >> and i think a that's an important thing and for the other session, actually that we don't discuss that now because you know, obviously, something like this can be a national security challenge for us, know he doubt about it and if they're developed by an adversary through some breakthrough technology, they consider it disruptive to our military actions, or at least serve as disruption, my thought it would be be careful who we share our data with and don't
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necessarily trust some of the data that we may get from someone else. with that i'll yield back. >> the gentleman yields back. >> thank you, mr. chairman. one of the objectives of this open hearing is to try to erode some of the stigma that attaches to, in particular, our military men and women reporting this. it's obviously really very serious because should one of our adversaries have developed a technology that we don't know about it. we need to know about it yesterday and obviously, any sort of stigma that prevents our military from reporting this data is comprehensively as possible, is it not, security threats. the chairman asked that we run that video again. most people when we see a video we're used to seeing things from a car, seeing things from a sidewalk, very few people
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have the experience of observing something through night vision goggles at mach. talk about it, whichever of you is most appropriate. how radically different observation is at high speed and three dimension than for most of us who walk around and drive cars? >> so the first thing i think is important to note about this, there are lots of things when you are moving very fast and an object is between you and a stationary reference point like the ground, it gives a lot of different impressions about how quickly something is or isn't moving and actually means that it is challenged, especially with narrative based data, to get a lot of information on that. that's why the sensor data is so important and things happen quickly as you see there and sometimes things that happen very quickly, something may be moving slow. the aircraft is moving fast. how fast that object is
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manufacturing as it goes by is probably very slow. i guess my point is observation, either a visual observation or an electronic observation, looks radically different than it does to most people. even instruments, instruments are on gimbles and that sort of this i think and that create an unusual crew, to those of you used to seeing things in two dimension. the second question, i think mr. bray, you said something i want to unpock a little bit. a number of these uap's, you said, we can't explain. and again, in the service, sort of reducing speculation and conspiracy theories, we can't explain can range from a visual observation on a foggy night, we don't know what it is, to we've found an organic material
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that we can't identify. those are radically different worlds. when you say we can't explain, give the public a better sense where on that spectrum of we can't explain where we are, are we holding materials, organic or inorganic that we don't know about. or lights that are infrared. give us an indication when you say we can't explain. >> when i say we can't explain, there's a lot of information like the video we showed, there's simply too little data to create a reasonable explanation. there are a handful of cases that our analysis hasn't been able to fully gather what happened. and those are the cases where we talk about where we see some indications of flight characteristics or signature management that are not what we had expected. and when it comes to material
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that we have. we have no material. we have detected no immunizations within the task force that would suggest it's anyone nonterrestrial in origin. when i say unexplained. everything from too little data to we simply, the data that we have doesn't point toward an explanation. we've made no assumptions about what this is or isn't and we'll take that wherever the data takes us. >> when you say we can't explain. everything you can't explain is in a bucket called data. is that correct? that would mean data collected by sensors, observations and everything that we can't explain quote, unquote is in a bucket called data. >> a narrative report, the victims had a little
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information on it would be in our data base and unresolved. >> i would add that it's insufficient data, that's one of the challenges that we have. insufficient data on either the object sits he have. or insufficient data to plug into the organization or agency that may have had something in that space at that time. so it's a data issue that we're facing in some instances, congressman. >> understand that, yield back. >> the gentleman yields back, mr. gallagher. >> thank you, mr. chairman, thank you for allowing me to join this hearing. i appreciate the witness's testimony. mr. moultrie, as the chairman mentioned, there were initiatives called project blue book. it's reported in our recent projects, and could you describe any other initiatives that the dod or dod contractors have managed after project blue book ended and prior to a-tip
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beginning. did anything pre-date project blue book? >> i can't explain what reinstated project blue book. everything that people talked about over the years. i'm familiar with blue book, i'm familiar with a-tip. i haven't seen other documented studies that have been done by dod in that regard. so you're not aware of anything between project blue book and a-tip. >> and what has been done in those, it hasn't been brought to my attention. >> additionally, are you aware of any other programs focused on uap's have a technological engineering perspective? are you aware of any of those focused on the topic, other than to he is in the investigations? >> i'm not aware of any contractual programs or anything related to this other
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than what we're doing in the navy task force and what we're about to launch in terms of our efforts. >> same question for you, mr. bray. >> same answer, not aware of anything outside of what we're doing in the task force. >> just to confirm, you're not aware of any engineering resources focused on the efforts besides what we've mentioned today? >> once again, i'll say no contractual or programmatic efforts involved. the reason why i qualify it that way. i can't speak to what people may be looking at in the department. i'm looking at something that may be identified and i can't speak to that and speak to the official programs on the record. >> it's been reported there have been uap observed and interacting with sensitive, not just ranges, but some in the nuclear site, and 10 were
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rendered were inoperable, a glowing red orb was seen. i'm not commenting on this, but i'm asking you about the accuracy of that report. >> that data is not within the holdings of the uap data force. >> are you aware of the report? that the data exists somewhere? ... >> it's a pretty high-profile incident. i don't claim to be an expert but that's out there in the ether. you're the guys investigating it. who else is doing it?
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>> that something was officially brought to our attention we would look at it. there are many things out that that are not officially brought to our attention. >> how would it be officially brought? i'm bring it to your attention. >> certainly there is authoritative figure that says there's an incident that occurred would like you to look at this but in terms of tracking what may be inundated this is something occurred at this time at this place, there's probably a lot of leads we would have to follow on. i don't think with the resources. >> i don't claim to be an authoritative figure but i d like you to look into it. if you can dismiss it and said this is not worth wasting resources on. finally are you aware of a document appeared around 2019 sometimes called the admiral wilson memo? >> i am not. i'm not personally aware of that. >> this is a document in which a given not commenting on the veracity, hoping to help with that in which a former head of
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dia claims have conversation with a dr. eric wilson and claims to have sort of been made aware of certain contractors or dod programs he tried to get full access to and was denied access to you. so you're not aware of that? >> i'm not aware. >> in my ten seconds remaining i would ask mr. chairman, unanimous consent to enter that memo into the record. >> without objection. >> thank you, mr. chairman. appreciate it. >> mr. krishnamoorthi. >> thank you, mr. chair. tank you to if you for your public service. first question is, there have been no collisions between any u.s. assets in one of these uaps, correct? >> we have had at least 11 near misses. >> maybe we will talk about the 11 near misses or any place where there's close proximity. i assume, tell me if i'm wrong,
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there's been no attempt, there's no communications or any kind of communication signals that emanate from those objects that we detected, correct? >> that's correct. >> have we attempted to communicate with those objects? >> no. >> so we don't even put out an alert saying, you know, u.s., you know, identify yourself. you are within our flight path or something like that. we have said anything like that? >> we have not put anything out like that. generally speaking, for example, in the video we showed earlier it appears to be something that is unmanned, appears to be something that may or may not be a controlled flight and so we have not attempted any communication with that. >> okay.
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and i assume we've never discharge any armaments against a uap, correct? >> that's correct. >> how about wreckage? have come across any wreckage of any kind of object that has now been examined by you? >> the uap task force doesn't have records that isn't explainable, that is inconsistent with being of terrestrial origin. >> do we have any sensors underwater to detect on submerged uaps? it is in that is in the ocean or indices? >> i would be more appropriate addressed in closed session. >> okay. i think one of the biggest questions that i have is, we say with a lot of probability, we say quote-unquote probably do represent physical objects, closed quote. when we say probably, is that because we cannot conclusively
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say that their physical objects? >> in the task force report when i say probably represent physical objects most of them represent physical objects. there could be some that are more of a meteorological phenomena something like that that may not be a physical object in the sense that most people think of something to go up in touch. >> the ones would you say most of them represent physical objects can you say they are definitely like with with % certainty that they are physical objects? >> i can say with certainty a number of these are physical objects. >> okay. we can't rule out some of the may not be physical objects? >> some certainly could be a sensor anomaly or something like that, some could be. >> now how about with regard to uaps, we talked about uaps on training areas but obviously
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there's some sensor bias. i think we put sensors in training areas. how about with regard to non-training areas? do we track what's an open source and what civilians and others have tracked, and have found similarities to what they have observed in terms of uaps in non-training areas to the ones that are in training areas? >> the task force has worked very hard to make sure the data set will working with is a data set that we are have very gd control over that data. so we had some partnerships with faa so we get some of that so we get the reporting in but if it comes to just open-source reports or someone says they saw something that generally does not make it into our database. >> basically it sounds like we have good partnership with faa, but apart from fa we don't have partnerships with other agencies or other entities that might be
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tracking so we can and large our data set to make a person. >> was we will. that's the goal of the next effort will be to expand the relationship with, over the rest of government and the interagency. so we can understand what they are seeing, what we are seeing, we can correlate on each of assaulting -- >> sorry to interrupt. i think we might have a bias right now going on with regard to just reporting on uaps being in training areas when we don't really track what's happening elsewhere. last question. have our encounters with uaps altered the development of our, either our offense, offensive or defensive capabilities or even her sensor capabilities? >> best in closed session. >> great, thank you. >> mr. lahood. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and i want to thank the witnesses for being here today. obviously this topic of uaps has attracted a lot of interest in people that are curious about this hearing today.
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as we talk about, i would say there's a lot of what i would call amateur interest groups that are involved in the uap field. my question is, when there are unsubstantiated claims or manufactured claims of uaps or kind of false information that is put out there, what are the consequences for people that are involved with that of groups that are involved with that? >> so one of the concerns we have is that there are a lot of individuals and groups that are putting information out there that, that could be considered somewhat self-serving. we are trying to do what's in the best interest of, one, the department of defense and two what's in the best interest of the public to ensure we can put factual-based information back into the mainstream, back into
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the bloodstream of the reporting media that we have so people understand what's there. it's important because we are tempting as this hearing hasn't drawn out to understand one, what may just be natural phenomena, two, what may be sensor phenomenology or things that are happening with sensors, three, what you you eat maybe the judgment counterintelligence threats to places that we have our bases are insulations, or security threats to our platforms. and anything that diverts us off of what we have with the resources that of an allocator to us send us off in these chases and hunts that are just not helpful. they also contribute to the undermining of the confidence that the congress and the american people have that we are trying to get to the root cause of what's happening here, report on that. and then pay that back into our national security apparatus so we are able to protect the
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american people and our allies. it is harmful. it is hurtful but hopefully if we get more information out there we will start to lessen the impact of some of those reports. >> suggest taking that a step further, so that misinformation, false narratives, manufactured, so what are the consequences? are the legal consequences? other examples you can give us were people been held accountable? >> i can't give you any examples were somebody has been legally held liable for putting something out there but -- >> i guess what is the deterrent for people engaging in this activity? >> i don't, i don't know. i don't have that answer. that's something that, welcome a dialogue with congress to talk about that with the members who have legislation the laws to say what should be the legal ramifications that we can do to potentially hold individuals accountable, whether it be citizens or information that might be injected into our media
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by other forces or other countries, if you will. >> in terms of dod's review and analysis in this field is there a standard in place when it comes to uaps? is there a guidance you look to that is codified in law or otherwise within the unity that sets out the standards for uaps and what to look for? >> that's part of what the group we are standing up now will be charted to do. for my organization we will be looking at policy and standards we have to come to you and look to you to promulgate them across our government. >> thank you. i yield back. >> gentleman yields back. mr. welch. >> thank you. going to follow on the line questions from mr. lahood. chairman, , what seems incrediby difficult for you is there's to almost competing that different narratives. one is its come no one knows
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whether there's extraterrestrial life. it's a big universe and it would be pretty presumptuous to have a hard and fast conclusion, and that if there is, it's not beyond the realm of possibility that there is some explanation coming here and that and allies a lot of the report you get. i think mr. lahood was asking about that. people must think there's extraterrestrial life and it is not all beyond the pale that it would be a visit here. the other hand, dod has the responsibility make sure that our national security is protected in that if there are surveillance drones or active drones that can disable our systems, that has to be analyzed, has to be stopped. so how do you divide con how do you separate your responsibilities where you get all these reports from folks who may be good faith, maybe not,
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believe that you should be investigating every possible report of an extraterrestrial incident? also with you, mr. moultrie. >> congressman, thank you for the question. it's important that as a part of this effort really build up the relationship that we have with others including nasa. for the reasons you just pointed out. so there are elements in our government that are engaged in looking for life and other places and they have been doing that for decades. they've been searching for extraterrestrial life there are astrobiologists have been doing this. we are part of that same government and so our goal is not to potentially cover up something if we were to find something. it's to understand what may be out there, examine what it may mean for us if there are any
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from a defense perspective 80 national security implications, ramifications. by then to work with organizations whether it's a weather phenomenon with noaa competition for extras life for in the case of extra trust life with someone like nasa. >> the transparency actually is very important. >> completely. >> to the public consumption. >> completely. >> we are going to have a classified briefing. in fact, going into the details of what kind of secrets that we can't share here. what is it, what are we protecting? i don't know if you can answer this question in this open forum. but, in fact, your perception of what it is we have to -- >> right that now which rey important for us to protect is how we know certain things. there are a lot of things we know, whether it be about the thinking of other leaders around the world, the weapon systems being developed or how we detect
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things that maybe threats to us. many of those things on the result some of our most sensitive sources and methods. we would use those thanks not just for this effort but those same sources and methods are used to help protect us from adversaries and others who might need to do us harm. there are not separate uap sensors come separate uap processing computer is not a separate uap dissemination chain or whatever. so it's the same process if it's the same system where that helps us do all that. we need to protect and that because this is something that we're looking at but we are sure there will be other things will look at individual that when he the same stages, same sorts of methods to help us do. we're protecting the fact this nation has developed king abdullah's that enable us to know what may be threat to us and to counter those threats before they become something of a national issue. >> thank you very much. what to thank both of you for
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your appearance today. i yield back. >> gentleman yields back. gentlemen, john videos is there a range of other information that the executive branch has that will be valuable to the american people while protecting sources and methods obviously? the details of individual encounters including the time place and details of an encounter, does the -- have a clear and repeatable process for considering public release as part of the process? >> chairman carson -- >> do you commit to building that process? >> the uap task force, the security classification guide that we have an operating that i approved really was meant to protect the sources of methods and meant to protect any knowledge that an adversary intelligence entity may gain from understanding what we are tracking, how we track it or
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when we are tracking it or if we are not. and so that is been an important piece in the balance between transparency and preserving our war fighting advantage. because the u.s. military does train as it would fight. what i will commit to is at least for that material that's under my authority as deputy director of naval intelligence, for information that we have when it does not involve sources and methods and when we can with a reasonable degree of confidence determined that it does not pose a foreign intelligence our national security threat, and it's within my authority to do so i meant to declassify that. i believe very much in the transparency of this and we work very hard to balance that with our national security needs. >> i will add, congressman, just over the last three or four months i think that the
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intelligence community and the national defense apparatus had disclose more information on various events than it has an probably the previous ten years. you have our commitment to work close with the director of national intelligence and others in the declassification and downgrading of intel apparatus to ensure we can get whatever information we can out to the american people and to the public writ large. >> greatly appreciate it. ranking member crawford. >> thank you, mr. chairman. representative stephani is in route i believe but in the interim if i could if you'll indulge i just have a couple real small questions. one is do have an example, can you cite a specific example of an object that can't be explained as having been human made or natural? >> i mean, the example that i would say that is still
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unresolved at a think everyone understands quite will is a 2004 incident from nimitz. we have data on that and it still remains unresolved. doesn't mean it resolves to being something, right, that is easily explainable or difficult, well, difficult to explain. but i can't point to something that definitely was not man-made but i can point to a number of examples which remain unresolved. >> gotcha. with regard to videos that have appeared in open-source gems can for example, does and salt making little videos is and how to prevent leaks potentially classified it as other material? >> so as we established organization we will have a process for classified and compartmental holdings and we'll find a way of getting positive control over those. we have our sensitive axes programs that allow us to put
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what we call -- about things and is controlled axes programs that last but caps of ethics. we will have that in place. our goal entering we are us sharing that with the appropriate analyst and the appropriate exploiters if you will come with a look at the data what we don't do is bring something in to a dod database or a dod holding and then has so many rapids around is not available to those who really need to look at it and to exploit it. that's one of the reasons where establishing relationships with the interagency, with the icy and others to build to do that but we will do our best to maintain positive control over the materials we have within our holding. >> thank you. chairman schiff. >> thank you, mr. chairman. just going back to the 2021 report under the category of uap epididymis to advance of technology, those 18 incidents in which some of the uap appear during stationary, maneuver
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abruptly or at considerable speed without some means of propulsion that goes on to say in his moment of case of military aircraft systems process right a frequency energy associate with uap sightings. i couldn't tell from that whether that small number of cases was a part of the subset of 18, that is, among the 18 which appear to move with unusual pattern or flight characteristics, did some of those also emit radiofrequency energy? >> i would have to check with our uap task force on that. i believe, without getting into specifics that we can do in the closed session, at least some that we've detected our emissions from were not behaving oddly otherwise. >> and in the significance of
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measuring the radiofrequency energy is what, that we suspect that this was some form of aircraft in which there were radio transmissions? >> the biggest thing you're looking for is any indication of an effort to jam whatever centers that we may have looking at it. >> but i would also add to that, that radiofrequency as you know, congressman, is to control various platforms, too. the fact emanation is coming off of any platform whether it be a uav or another platform could be radiofrequency activity related to that entity transmitting out or something transmitting to that platform. and, of course, we have a sensitivity with our platforms picking it up with you some of the recent we try to prevent people from using their cell phones on airplanes and things like that. it's very sensitive to our emanations. that's a part of what will be
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that a portable will be looking at, what is at this, something that we can collect on and can we start to characterize the signaling environment around the human nations that may be coming off some of these uaps? >> so that energy than that was recorded could be either an effort to jam or could be an effort to control uap or any other communication with that craft? >> i would say that's accurate. >> right thank you, mr.ht chairman. >> thank you, chairman. as the odni report makes clear, one possible explanation for uaps is that we're detecting u.s. aircraft either secret air programs raven test prototypes. i won't ask you in this setting obviously to describe any secret dod programs. that said, i do want to make sure the u.s. government isn't chasing its own tail. firstly, do you have a clear and
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repeatable process to check with compartment programs about whether uap siding is a treatable to a u.s. aircraft? secondly, does the aoimsg staff have the clearances and redounds that they need to investigate all of these incidents? and thirdly, when your staff cannot be read on, are your questions to those who are read on even being answered? >> i will start at that i'll pass that to mr. bray. so wes are very conscious of the potential loop on blue issue, or u.s. on u.s. we have established relationships with organizatione and entities that are potentially flying or developing platforms for their own interest. our goal is to continue. we have a process to deconflict activities that wect may have to ensure that wema are not
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potentially reporting on somethingep that may be a developmental platform or a u.s. operational platform that is performing either testing or performing mission. so we will have that w in place. we have already had those have e discussions with organizations and entities. we wantns to ensure that we are protecting their equities. we want to ensure we are protecting their sources and methods while also getting at what we have here. wewe want to be able to deconflt of those. >> the uap task force had a process in place to work with other elements of department defense and other elements of the government to o ensure that there's a simple way as possible to deconflict of those. when we reference that in the report, i should say that we were simply accounting for the fact that there could possibly be one or two data points that had leaked through, but we were quite confident that wasas not e explanation. >> how are you all doing liaison
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with space command? specifically, how are you partnering with the part of u.s. space command responsible for space domain awareness? and how, if at all, are you partnering with the space forced uaps?lyze >> the uap task force has a very good relationship with space forceit as it is with the rest f the department of defense. we have pulled analyst in from space forced to ensure that we are availing ourselves of that expertise as well as any other material they may have that would be helpful. >> congressman, as you know, space force, they have responsibility for space domain awareness. what we've done is we have coordinated with space for. >> we coordinated with their j2 and she is on board in terms of helping us plug-in to what they
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have andhi for us to this interactive exchange of information and data. we are doing that with all the services, not just with space force. >> thank you, sir. >> any additional questions? chairman schiff? all right. with that i want to thank you all for taking the time out. i also want to thank my colleagues onn both sides of the aisle for participating in this very historical and important hearing. it's one of the few times we can demonstrate some degree of bipartisanship around uaps and ufos, , so i love it, appreciate it. thank you. we will see you all. we will recess this hearing for the moment and return for a closed session at noon. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]
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[inaudible conversations] >> officials from the internal revenue service and government accountability office recently testified on how the irs treats taxpayers based on their annual income. watch tonight at eight eastern on c-span2, c-span now, our free video app, or anytime online at c-span.org. >> american history tv saturdays on c-span2, exploring the people and events that tell the american story. live at 90 eastern on american history tv and c-span's "washington journal" will mark the 100th anniversary of the lincoln memorial dedication with abraham lincoln scholar harold holzer. he'll join us to talk about the 16th president, the memorials creation of the democratic ideas
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the memorial has come to represent. at two p.m. eastern on the presidency, irwin gellman with his book campaign of the century where he re-examines the 1960 presidential campaign between richard nixon and john kennedy and the close outcome of that election. exploring the american story, watch american history tv saturday on c-span2, and find a full schedule on your program guide or watch online anytime at c-span.org/history. >> after months of closed-door investigations the house ingenuous six committee is set to go public. starting june 9, two noon as committee members question key witnesses about what transpired and why during the assault on the u.s. capitol. watch our live coverage beginning thursday june 9 on
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c-span, c-span now, our free mobile video out or anytime online at c-span.org. c-span, your unfiltered view of government. >> treasury secretary janet yellen took questions on the house financial services committee on inflation, rising gas prices and the state of the u.s. financial system. this is her second time on capitol hill in the same week following an early appearance before the senate banking committee. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

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