forward. >> this is becoming an important talking point for putin. much of the exports are going to rich countries. thank you all. i'd like to thank the panel for the conversation and i think we are wrapping up now, but we will be moving to the third panel immediately after this. thank you. [applause.

>>. [inaudible] >> let me welcome you all to the third and final panel. of the 2022 night for reform on geopolitics. i should begin i guess by introducing myself. i'm bill ralston, senior fellow in government studies. yes, government studies . so i'm having that little

stockdale momentfor those of you of a certain age . it's i think a ritual for the moderator of a panel to describe the panel as timely unless it's a velocity conference. but in this case i think that much overwork adjective is literally true. let's consider what has happened in just the past week. as i think you are aware, indian prime minister modi delivered a rebuke to putin. he said today's erais not an era of war and i have spoken to you on the phone about this . for his part, vladimir putin

publicly acknowledged china's concerns and questions about the war in ukraine. the chinese leader delivered a rebuke in his unique chinese way when he talked about the need for russia and china to work together in an object stability into the turbulent world. at the same time challenging russia's primacy in central asia. in a very direct way. and then just last night, in response to the question so unlike ukraine us men and women would defend taiwan in the event of a chinese invasion,?

yes, president biden obliged. as always the right house insisted that this didn't represent beijing policy but at the very least it was a step towards what i can call strategic disambiguation. to help us understand what all this means, the organizers of the conference have assembled the brookings all-star team. robert kagan, my immediate left, i guess stage right wills stephen and barbara friedman, senior low for policies . at the far end, director of brookings india project and trish kim, the dave rubenstein fellowin foreign policy . here's how will spend this hour. a little roadmap. the first segment of our

conversation by prearrangement will address the question of how the war in ukraine has changed the global and regional architectures of security and segment to, will talk about what all this means for us policy. segment three, if time permits their belt will be follow-up questions on individual panelists either from other panelists for from me as your faithfulmoderator and finally , we will turn to questions from you so bob, get us started please. >> i'm going to talk about topic two in your first session but i'm going to talk a bit about what the american reaction to ukraine says about america's perception of their interests and what i want to say is that what

we've seen in terms of that response follows a current pattern in american history in the sense that if you had, well, as you probably all were had been part of the foreign policy discussion prior tothe russian invasion , i think the general tenor of that discussion was that ukraine was not within the ambit of us vital national security interests. it was not something that we would engage in conflict with russia over which we had yet begun to do but in that in general it was russia's sphere of influence both presidents obama and biden had taken a position that wasn't really an area for us meddling. and of course since the invasion the united states has immediately become deeply

involved in supporting ukraine against the russian invasion and i think that raises the interesting question which is how do americans in fact regard their interests and it shows yet again, and i do think this is not only recurrent but almost constant in american foreign policy that despite our discourse of what our national interests are which are usually framed in classical terms having to do with security as a nation, what americans really think of when they think of their interests when confronted by these kinds of aggression is world order and particularly liberal world order. and if you think about both world war i and world war ii and i could get into this in q and a if you want to, in both those cases long before the united states was directly in any way threatened in terms of its

own national security, americans became deeply involved in conflicts in order to vent some dictators aggression against neighboring states. europe in particular but not just in europe but also in asia. and at a certain point in the 1930s again, before american interests were directly threatened, americans began to see both in europe and in asia a generalized threat to the liberal world order which led to them to take various policy actions in both places that they would not have taken if the question was simply one of america's direct national security interests. and this is what has happened in the case of ukraine as well. you know, when mitch

mcconnell says that ukraine is a vital court interest of the united states, what is he really saying, is he saying that if ukraine falls to russia america's immediate security is directly threatened? obviously not. what he's saying is the world order that the united states has supported is threatened by that kind of action by russia, as i say many people would believe the same would be true if china were to invade taiwan. and i must say there has been i would say this junction between what americans think or are cold or is part of the discourse of interest and what they actually act upon is as their interest is one of the great sources of confusion in american foreign policy. and it would be good if we began to understand that our

interests are actually involved in support of a liberal world order and are not about natalie focused on our immediate national security. whether we will learn this lesson or not as a result of ukraine, i would say as a scenario again the answer is no. we will conceivably oscillate between the sort of very narrow classic realist definition of our interests but when actions are taken out by these aggressive dictatorships, we will act in fact on the basis of a world order concept of our national interests which in my view is the correct understanding of our interests. >> thanks bob. india and anything, any other area want to push.

>> out stick to india given there's a lot there and maybe come back in q&a to the others . amy spoke a little bit about the global south and the second round. i do before i start want to get group on it as others have partly because while others have talked about during the course of this phase russia's side i will say both personally but institutionally our work on india would not have been possible without sir talbot who invested in a study of the region in south asia more broadly alongside the war it was called to do so i wanted to put that out there. i will talk a bit about kind of how india sees in fact the russian invasion of ukraine has had on india broadly and not just in termsof the year . to put us in, the bottom line is several indian interests have had an effect by the russian invasion and in the

immediate sense the invasion endangered the lives of 20,000 indian students and others who resided there one of whom was killed in russian shelling. and india had to get those. those were not out but also a political one. secondly and crucially delhi has been facing a more constrained economic environment thanks to the invasion . this took place just as india was trying to come out of the pandemic and like many other countries economically recover from it but we seem high commodity prices that are significant in terms of what india imports. this multiple problems for the government not just in terms of energy security and food security but also it has fiscal implications and has political implications for

the government as well. moreover the impact of the global economy has also been adversely affected economies of several of india's major markets as well as the sources of foreign direct investment so that's something. on the defense side the invasion has affected india's military radiance readiness by jeopardizing the russian and ukrainian nation india's supply chain on which their forces depend and this is particularly crucial for india at the time to border a standoff between china and india in 2020 still continues and put could potentially escalate down the line strategically , the complications arising through the russian invasion has put pressure on some of india's crucial partners in particularly western indo pacific partners that have become crucial is not

essential for indian security and economic objectives. the invasion also complicates what has been a long-standing indian objective and by long-standing i mean since the 1950s of trying to keep russia and china as far away from each other as possible. india wants to see a russia that helps them balance chinese power and not one that is aligned with china . from delhi's perspective they see questions about what india thinks the invasion will lead to a russian independence for china and this raises questions about what a russia more beholden to china will do if beijing asks moscow to take actions that are against indian interest . such as an international organization that the un security council benefits or perhaps the india china boundary in the event of another crisis. all or will beijing demand that russia take its side

more actively in the indio pacific, something it has not done. in response in the short term has not been what we would think which is to say okay, we need to move on but to actually try to keep russia from moving away from neutrality in the case of the china india crisis to move to more china's side and this is crucial because of the level of india's military dependence on russia most of its equipment is 70 to 80 percent by some calculations is dependent on russian or russian origins and equipment. india has also been using the russia relationship to take some pressure off the indian economy through the purchase of lower price commodities and to keep its ties with russia despite all these concerns i laid out it's also

bolstered by legacy ties including indian memories of a russia that was far more reliable as a partner to india in the 1970s and anybody else was. but it's also bolstered by the fact that while there are several divergences in perspective of this russian invasion even before that there's several divergences in the russia relations and the trajectory of the opposite of that of india's relationship with thewest . despite those divergences and that declining partnership russia's still remains relevant for several indian interests particularly the defense also a multilateral arena where it can either help indian interests or be very harmful and as feel to help you too could even be punitive to india's interest down the line. so i and with just saying what the situation has done for india is as it thinks about sort of various embarrassments the indian government has two balance is a russian invasion highlights

some of the contradictions and competing territories in india. you see this on balancing internal imperatives where short-term economic and political objectives are leading the modi government to take advantage of lower commodity prices but it's getting india's ties with countries that are economically andstrategically more consequential or india . you're also seeing this kind of competing narratives on the strategic side where you see an india that wants to align, is aligning with like-minded workers to balance or even counter china . it's also been aligning in terms of quality which russia has opposed but it doesn't want to align with those countries that isolate russia and trying to do this even as russia and china are aligning with each other so i think a lot of what you've seen india with its balancing imperatives is trying to balance what this tight rope

which frankly has got trickier and trickier as time has gone since the original invasion itself. this and reconciling these has been quite high maintenance for india i think this i would say briefly we could come back. to it in the q&a is you saw the results of these kind of different imperatives in terms of theindian response . and particularly why does modi come out and say what he did which is this is not a time of war. this echoes a remark he made in 2014. alluding to russia and china. he was in japan and in a speech said this is not an era of development, this is an area not an era of expansionism, it should be an era of development. and he criticized countries with 18th-century mindsets that were encroaching onother countries lands .

so he's echoing something he said before about the fact that he's gone public is significant. i think india's support for russia has been exaggerated in the past and i think now we're in danger of maybe over reading the rebuke because do not expect india to give up that russia relationship but it is nonetheless significant that india has for modi has spoken out publicly and expressed those concerns, concerns expressed privately in the past because they recognize the longer this continues the more the damage those interests that i outlined in the beginning as well as the fact that they recognize is not costly strategy to be seen amongst other partners as seeming to only support for kind of not speak out against russia so i stop and can say more about the intuitive attrition. >> thanks very much, it's an honor to be here with my colleagues and to be part of the inaugural flight. i'm going to start with

china's response to the russian invasion of the ukraine and try china since the beginning has been to say that a neutral third party to the conflict. it supports peaceful negotiations and it respects territorial integrity. while at the same time amplifying russian narratives at nato enlargement and disregard for russian security interests. are basically the reasons that the cause to have no choice but to respond. china's insistence of neutrality has been with skepticism because 20 days before the russianinvasion of ukraine , president genting hosted president putin at the opening of the beijing olympics where the two sides were issuing an unprecedented joint statement and is in this statement we affirmed or reaffirmed their so-called no limits partnership and air

their grievances vis-cvis the west making the case that western democracy should not have a monopoly over what a democracy is but they shouldn't impose their standards on others and they basically accused the united states and its partners of violating what they call indivisible security and it's pursuing their own security at the expense of russian and chinese security interests. now there have been various discussions aboutwhether , how much xi you about putin's plants. whether he greenlighted these plans and while we may never know exactly to what extent the chinese new, i suspect that beijing was probably taken aback by what has happened in ukraine.i think they've been taken aback by the global backlash against china and reputational cost it has paid for supporting

the russian narratives on ukraine. but beijing has decided essentially to double down at least rhetorically on its alignment with moscow and it has shown that is unwilling to directly condemn russia's war of aggression although it hasraised concerns or questions at the sco as mentioned at the outset . and this, these actions have raised concerns here in washington as well as in europe and asia about china's intention. it's long-term outlook and its front global scrutiny on the situation in taiwan. which is not in beijing's interest. so this raises the question why has beijing stood by russia? why hasn't it distanced itself more despitethese costs and i think there are several reasons for this . so first i think it's clear that chinese leaders see direct parallels between their situation and russia's predicament. they see nato enlargement as similar to the strengthening of us alliances in asia with the growth of new security packs like the plot and they say this is western and

circle meant and western plans to try to contain beijing and moscow. beijing certainly does not want to make an enemy of its nuclear powered neighborhoods and to be bogged down by a rivalry with russia that it was preoccupied with during the second half of the cold war. especially at a time when china really needs as many strategic partners aspossible as it looks at long-term competition with the united states . so it's china basically sees russia as a great power partner in pushing back or pushing for what he calls multi-polarity that is countering what they see as a western dominated global order. western dominated global financial systems. what they call western long arm jurisdiction with sanctions and the imposition of values. it sees russia as a good partner. and finally i think the fact that xi jinping has invested

in his partnership with houston makes it ethical for the chinese political system to declare that xi was wrong. the two leaders have met 39 times since xi came into power which is remarkable. despite the close ties between the two top leaders beijing's behavior since february has shown there are some limits to this partnership. beijing this time was notably less enthusiastic at the summit between xi and putin in pakistan last week. also china hasn't given direct military aid to russia so this suggests there are indeed some limits and although beijing has stated publicly it opposes also to crawford will continue normal trade relations with russia again, china has supplied weapons.

it hasn't extended direct military aid. chinese banks and businesses have been on hold largely complying quietly with international sanctions. and even though we've seen a boost in energy trade and semiconductors, chinese companies have filled the gap that american companies and european companies use to play in the russian market for exports to semi conductors for instance but otherwise i think we haven't seen as much a flow from china to russia as would expect if it's between two powers with the so-called no limits partnership so these choices suggest to me that while beijing wants to maintain its ties with russia for the reason that i laid out earlier it doesn't intend to undercut its own interests so that weapons where the chinese stand right now we're

off to a terrific start. and now i'm going to turn the conversation to something that was i would say questioned ever so delicately in the previous panel as sort of american centric inking. but i think to some extent we have to engage in it. so here is the question for the second segment. what impact does your analysis of the meaning of ukraine for the united states , for india and for china have on the way the united states should be thinking about its foreign policy conducting its foreign policy. and i think i'm going to reverse the order so i'll go straight to patricia to follow up for her comments i

think the russian invasion of ukraine has raised urgent questions about taiwan's faith and of course many parallels have been drawn between ukraine and taiwan predicament. i think for those who work on asia, there have long been concerns about the shifting military balance in the taiwan strait. there's been a recognition that this balance has shifted largely to china's favor in recent years and of course this has raised questions about what more can the united states do to ensure that taiwan coulddefend itself , to ensure china can stand up to growing chinese aggression which has escalated across all domains, military and economic and diplomatic vis-cvis taiwan. i think for the united states and its allies, this has, the ones in ukraine i think especially for european countries and realized we don't want something similar to happen in asia. there's been an explosion of

interest and desire to support taiwan.there have been a number of high-level visits by asian and european officials and of course us officials as well. and i think there are also, there's greater willingness by certain asian allies of the united states like japan to talk about contingencies in the taiwan straits to make sure we are prepared if there were to be some sort of kinetic action there. but i think it's also important to know that there are different investments for the situation there, different investments on what asian allies or european allies even think or the right balance of us policy should be towards the taiwan strait. i think everyone at the end of the day once to avoid war at all costs. and of course turning to taiwan i think the people of taiwan watching the situation in ukraine this has been very sobering and it's kicked up this desire to be better prepared.

there's a lot of enthusiasm for civilians learning about first a for instance. there is growing support for expanding military training for men over the age of 18 which right now is four months but they want to increase it out to a year so i think it's really added energy for this desire to taiwan to beef up its defenses and finally for china i think it's been really interesting to see how china has been reacting to these comparisons so beijing has been the staunchest voice for making the case ukraine and taiwan are not the same. and they said this is because taiwan is not a sovereign state whereas ukraine is beijing has accused the united states of exploiting the situation in ukraine to try to increase support for taiwan and they blamed washington for allegedly emboldening independent forces or independent forces in taiwan so that's kind of

where china is coming from and it says that the united states is asking china to have a double standard. is calling on china to support ukraine's territorial sovereignty and integrity whereas it's undermining china's own sovereignty. that's the argument we've seen over out of beijing this is exactly why china has worked so hard over the last several decades to push it's one china principle so if and when there is a fight over taiwan they can say this is our territory and everyone recognizes that so that's been there diplomatic strategy for china watching russia's invasion of the ukraine and its isolation has confirmed for beijing that it needs to continue its push towards self efficiency. to reduce its reliance on foreign components, to the risk its own supply chain and its own vulnerability to western sanctions so i think it's enforced this idea that

we need to have more decoupling on both sides of china as well as outside china i can't resist breaking ranks just a little bit and asking you to follow up. in the course of what you just said, you remarked that everybody agrees that we must avoid war with china at all costs. that didn't sound like the policy that president biden articulated last night. what is us policy, what should it be? >> it's not that i don't know if it's at all costs. basically nobody wants war in asia because that would be devastating for everyone involved. whether it's china, the united states, taiwan, everyone. so everyone wants to avoid it, the question is how do you do that and there's debate about whether us long-standing us policy towards taiwan must be to and this is where you get the debate about strategic

clarity or strategic maintaining strategic ambiguity. president biden has come out and said multiple times that he would send in us troops to taiwan if china were to invade and china gets upset about this because they see this as undercutting sort of the us recognition of or the united states long-standing one china policy. where i stand on this is we need to be doing everything we can substantively to strengthen taiwan so it can defend itself. i think there's a lot of good workunderway to do this . but taiwan is certainly not thereyet . i don't think you can necessarily compare taiwan and ukraine in their readiness so we still have a ways to go but it's certainly going in that direction and i think the united states and its allies should be supporting that. while making it clear to the people of china that we are not trying to necessarily prejudice the outcome of the

resolution across great differences, that's a question the people of china and people of taiwan must come to an agreement on. peacefully and that's kindof what we stand for, making sure no decisions are made under coercion and that both sides can negotiate peacefully . >> let me just t up the question about us policy towards india with an observation based on what you said in the first round and you said that india has always been interested in maintaining if i understood you correctly allied separation between russia and china rather than an alignment between them. i suspect that most american foreign policy experts would agree with that overall strategic concept. we don't want a close alignment either. as far as i can tell. so what can american foreign

policy in addition to all the other aspects of our relationship with india do to try to further that long-standing indian objective of increasing the distance between russia. >> will come back to that partly because i think it's become much tougher to then it would have even been a year ago. the answer would have been a year ago that to do what president biden did not this summer but the summer before which is trying to not have necessarily a rehearsal, have some sort of engagement with russia that would give it options that are not striking but i'll come back to that maybe. i think this is all caught up. india's us relations with india as well as how russia china relations actually operate. i think what we've seen in terms of impact on us policy

it is it has complicated us ties with the country and complicated ties with a country that now since about 2000 all-american administrations have invested a considerable amount of time and effort and resources. partly on the kind of resumption that india per se but also india in alignment with the us and its allies and partners would serve as a balance and contrast to china. as several administrations have deepened, this has complicated through some kind of relationship. this is not new. one thing about us india ties for versus european partners is the differences over russia have been known and they've actually created problems even as recently over potential defense

systems for india but i do think india's response has raised questions in the administration, but in the establishment more broadly about what india's response means for its view towards the international order more broadly and kind of you seen potentially whether india would be similarly represented in the event of its contingency in the indo specific. whether it's a crisis over taiwan or the south china sea. it will india? i think at the very least what people in delhi should be concerned about is the impact on not necessarily the trajectory of the relationship that would deepen but that it doesn't in certain domains but doesn't it lower the level of enthusiasm which i think it

has amongst certain quarters in the us about the india relationshipand indian investment . and in a time when there are debates about whether to do something with india or not or for india and not within the administration how is this stance impacting the battle between the internal democratic battles between the transatlantic and india pacific or for instance is it going to as your thinking about limited bandwidth the administration is thinking should we be investing so much versus other relationships and mechanisms so how is this feeling and i think that potentially could have an impact nonetheless i mentioned some of these contradictions inindia's relationship . one thing from the us perspective is also a contradiction in terms of us interest because what bit us wants to do is see india move away from russia but also

india's ability to serve as a counterbalance to china. as a net security provider in the indo pacific holding the line at the india china border. depend on the millage equipment it gets, its ability to continue to survive so it's military readiness. it's ability for its navy depends on that russian navy. so it's a bit of a contradiction. the indian government has managed this differently as well as could be expected. partly by working from the bottom line that they're not going to let russia essentially lead to the beginning of us india ties which could have been possible saying you're not with us, you're against us and we're not doing anything more. that would have been playing into china's hands so i think that the administration has done a good job. i think though there's a thing that the administration

and some of these governments could do which is because this raises questions about what a contingency in the india pacific is to have a frank conversation behind closed doors if necessary about indo pacific contingencies, what the expectations of each other are and sharing assessments as well. i think if that doesn't happen you want to see a situation where there are again different expectations about what india did will do versus what it will actually do . just very quickly i will say i want to say something about kind of the global south as people talk about it and the reason i put it in quotation marks earlier is i think it is a term that hides a lot of diversity and i will say this when people say the global south has not taken a similar stance. what are some of the most kind of incisive comments on what the russians have done and what that meant for territorial integrity and

countries like kenya and jean and when you keep the focus on that you do see countries outside the west see what the problem with the russian invasion are but you will not see countries outside the transatlantic domain perhaps and australia included. some on the border see the situation exactly the same way so for the us looking at a system whether it's about the china challenge or the russia challenge we need to think about how you actually come up with strategic communications and a narrative that is going to be something that they listen to and things that are not going to be attractive to them even though they might be good from a transatlantic or domestic us perspective are a with us or against us approach or an approach that talks about authoritarianism versus democracy or frankly taking the moral high ground because i think we have to recognize that the rest of the world does not necessarily see our moral high ground as of being

deserving of it given whether it was all war in iraq or frankly the imperial led colonial legacies of several european countries and a lack of recognition about that stance so thinking about that we need to have an approach that is thinking about not the global south but who can actually get to rely on certain positions because i don't think it's one big hole and there can be strategies to get them on board or at least keep them from going over to the other side okay. i'd like to invite you to speculate but let me he up sort of ascience-fiction experiment . you've agreed to accept a demotion from your role as a globally recognized foreign

policy grow and become the national securityadvisor to the president . >> that would be a demotion in terms of lifestyle. >> in many other ways as well . and here's my question. if you thought that you had for years or eight years in that role, given your analysis that you laid out of the way americans actually think about the way we should conduct our foreign policy, as the way the standard realist template as opposed to the realist template of a hard account ofinterest , what would you do differently from what's now having. would you talk about it differently? what difference would your analysis make in the conduct of american foreign and defense policy. >> right now, other than more

of the same, not very much because the united states it seems to me has already ... you know, if you think about the history of foreign-policy it's sinewave. it's an oscillation between period's of significant overseas involvement, usually inspired by some moral /security connection followed by disillusionment and a desire for retraction. it is the case the united states is really unique in its relative invulnerability to foreign attack. obviously people can fire missiles at the united states, conduct terrorist attacks against the united states unlike every other country the united states is not get to the prospect of invasion and therefore for americans all foreign-policy is choice .

i think if you think in terms of world order, america does have i think has in its own interest acquired a responsibility to maintain that americans don't necessarily feel that way especially when things go bad as they inevitably do . so we were after the iraq war and along trough in this isolation and now as a result of the conjunction of events both ukraine and the rise of china, americans are once again worked themselves into the mode of thinking globally about their interests. thinking that they actually have a responsibility. >> ..

>> we are more in that mode that we were in in the late 1930s heading into, not that we are heading into world war ii, but of that mentality and also we were during certain periods of the cold war. so what i would want to try to do is avoid the inevitable downturn, or put it off as much as possible. and already we see the seeds of that oscillation in the way certain segment of the republican party are already deciding to position themselves against american policy in ukraine 11 senators voted against the latest aid a bi. and should something go wrong, which by the way something always goes wrong, there will be a significant recurrence of americans saying wait a minute, wait a minute, how did we get

into this? this is where our confusion about our interest come in because at that point a lot of people will say as rand paul and a lot of republicans say now what is her interest in ukraine? we have an interest along the southern border against immigrants but what is her interest in ukraine? that you can take cold more rapidly than you might imagine in the united states. so the real task it seems to me of american leadership now is to try to conduct this policy in a way that you can establish some consistency in american foreign policy. and that does as you suggesting in your question require and educational element. and i think part of that educational element is for the president, as franklin roosevelt did beginning in the mid, begin with i would say is speech in

1937, to begin saying look, we do have an interest in this liberal world order. you can't use the word liberal apparently, but in this world order. and it is time for us to take that interest seriously again. and so i would like to see more of that, rather than treating this as kind of a one off, and we hope this will end well and we can move on and get back to normal. there is this constant feeling in the united states that we're going to get through this crisis and then get back to normal. and normal means we don't have to pay full attention to what's going on everywhere around the world. while you don't want to tell the americans the truth, i suppose we are in this like for eternity. you do want to make it clear to them that this liberal world order that we support is of great value to us and does require consistent effort on our part to sustain. we did that more recently when

communism was the threat. i think we were overblown about the threat of communism but it worked as a domestic strategy. whether we can do the same thing now i think remains to be seen. but, of course,, and i'll end on this, we are only at the beginning of the series of crises that are going to be erupting. this is an early stage in what's happening in the world, unless we do such a good job of stanching all of these efforts to reshape the international system that russia and china in particular are engaged in. if we are not really quite up to that now we are going to see more crises, and then we were in this for the long term whether we want to be or not. >> perfect. we are right on time, and now it's your turn. there's a sea of hands.

i think we will start with the young woman in the back. yes, you. and i should say we have limited time, so no speeches, please. ask questions. >> thank you so much to the panelist. >> stand up so we can hear you better. thank you. >> i had a question, if you could elaborate on what you're saying on the global south and it connects to the liberal world order comments. so you talked about an information campaign in the global south but when you see current crisis reising, commodity prices, very real implications of the fertilizer and green disruptions. how much of it is an information campaign versus actual investments and made towards our allies and partners in the global south? and how much do you see this as

a priority in u.s. foreign policy circles as a something that is marginalized in the conversation? >> okay. i think our best strategy is to take three questions, and then answers and then there will be another round of questions if time permits. so yes, the young man over -- yes, you. >> thank you. just a guy with an interest in geopolitics. i have a question for patricia. i i was wondering if you could elaborate on the impact of china's domestic economic pressures, especially with the covid lockdowns and the real estate problems and how those have affected how far to support russia and perhaps on how far you might be willing to go with taiwan as well. thank you. >> now for the third question.

yes, young man right in the center here. >> i'm a graduate student at johns hopkins. my question is, you mention u.s. leadership -- liberal international order. so in the indo-pacific we see that the u.s. relationship is -- especially when it comes to the -- [inaudible] so how do you foresee the u.s.-canada becoming more active and more broader as opposed to being specific and showing that leadership in conquering china? >> thanks. okay, panelists, over to you. >> so very quickly, we can talk about this more but i don't think it could just be an information campaign. but i think even on the food, fuel, fertilizer concerns you

mentioned, for instance, using several countries not -- this is where kind of russia chinese effort in terms of their information campaign have paid -- i am mixing my metaphors, but have actually paid off, which is you've seen them it's not the russian invasion that is at fault, it is western sanctions. even though there are not ena sanction on food, fuel and fertilizer. i do think you have seen more effort maybe not at the beginning, i think there was an underestimation of the second and third order effect of the invasion but also kind of the response. i think the administration as well as other countries in the global south by kind of transatlantic space as well pay more attention to this issue. i think the recognition is at the end of the day if you want to get other countries to think about these issues in similar

way, focus on that violation of territorial integrity and sovereignty. you have to be responsive to the concerns as well, which is primarily going to be on these concerns. i think it's going to get worse before it gets better. you've seen the impact of in south asia, places like sri lanka and pakistan. we will see more broadly where high commodity prices are going to lead to -- which frankly might not of been created by the problems china has enabled or exacerbated but they are not doing very much to help support it either. we also to get on board trying to figure out these longer-term concerns. because i don't think they're going to go away anytime soon. >> on the question about china's domestic economic situation and how that impacts its foreign policy behavior. i mean, the slowdown in economic growth in china because of its strict zero covid policy as willis well as problems in the real estate industry and other industries, it has definitely made an impact

on china. this is definitely something that keeps xi jinping and the communist party of that night. under the ccp, china has had phenomenal economic growth for the last several decades. i think the reason why many chinese citizens have tolerated their monopoly over power is because they have this implicit contract. they have made life better, at least materially for many chinese, and so this has worked for now. but there's a slowdown and so i think that makes a lot of chinese leaders nervous. and to deal with this, the ccp and president xi has really sort of double down on state intervention and sort of the state sort of pushing its global, or is common prosperity campaign and send in more oversight. i don't think this fits well necessarily with the people of china and so there's a lot of people who are unhappy with the tightening and the growing

ideological turn on the country. so this is a lot for xi to deal with. there have been arguments i've seen recently because china is economically slowing down preps it might strike even faster on taiwan one has the chance to do so. this is a debate that has become popular in washington right now. i don't think we can say definitively that if that is the case or not. i think president xi has held his own strategic ambiguity about his time went on taiwan. he said he doesn't want the problem to be passed down multiple generations, that it needs to be taken care of in order for china to achieve its full national rejuvenation. by the don't think that means there's a d-day mark somewhere and that the chinese are going to move on a certain date. i think they are preserving their ambiguity. they have a lot to deal with at home. they need to preserve their legitimacy at home, and i think that serves as a source.

>> i just, you know, i think it's possible to overstate and i slightly disagree with tanvi on this. how the united states messages itself around the world. i think it's pretty clear that most countries around the world want to know what's in it for them in any given situation. and tanvi is listed the things that these other countries want, how their interests have been affected by this war. i think the real question is is the united states and the transatlantic world in general capable of meeting some of these needs or not. i think in answer to your question, when the united states is most effective it is thinking globally. it is thinking about exactly the question of what is it that is motivating and the countries and what is it that they need.

and to the degree that it is possible to meet those needs, then the united states can try to do that. now, i would say the united states is, , like any other country, tremendously -- not necessarily always attuned to what other countries want and need, and much more attuned to what they want and need but, of course, that's like all countries. certainly like india. but that is the goal. the goal is dry to meet the various needs. i don't think think it matters very much quite honestly -- to try -- whether the united states has every single country in the world on the right side of the russia question. there really are a limited number of countries whose actions fundamentally matter. most of those in the current situation are basically on the same side as the united states, for their own reasons. you know, i don't think -- some

of it is ideological but when you look at countries like japan and other asian countries, they are worried about china taking aggression and what the effect will be on them, and a look to the united states for security. either the united states is offered offering to provide that security or isn't. if it is been there basically on the united states side. america has been hated around the world much more in the past than it currently is, you know? if you think about the late 1960s or the 1950s, american officials were obsessed with the fact that the world hated them. it's a common fixture of international relations with the united states. and we should try to make, insofar as is possible not have countries hate us. but i think the way to do that is to focus on the very specific usually material and practical means and desires of the

countries around the world. >> with that, i wish there were time for more questions, but it's my sad duty to bring both this panel and this over all knight forum to a conclusion i want to thank our panelists very much for such clarity and offering their views, and to all of you for taking the time and the trouble and the modest covid risk to attend. not you who are watching. [applause] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]