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tv   Key Capitol Hill Hearings  CSPAN  November 15, 2013 10:29pm-11:00pm EST

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it occurs, it's economic, not military. where in a -- what do -- robert cooper call it, a post-west failing world, and that somehow working together sharing sovereignty, focusing on the rule of law will make the 20th century, as you remember mark leonard saying, the 21st century europe century. i think some of the reality of that has come back home, and, no, actually, to be a real strategic power in this world, it is not enough to be economically strong which, by the way, in the last five years doesn't look that good, to have civic power, that's important, but you also need good old-fashioned hard military power. how far that has penetrated at the elite level isn't clear to me. it certainly hasn't penetrated enough in the parliamentary level, and we need to do a much
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better job in explaining why it is important that nations who would like to be taken seriously in the world require military capabilities to be partners in the larger endeavors that confront us. but let's be clear. it's not clear that in this country there is the kind of support we may need for defense spending at large, and it is definitely clear there is no support or no knowledge for nato. much of our parliamently -- our congre congressmen and senators don't know much about nato. most would be surprised that nato continues not only to run the afghan mission but have between a third and a half of the troops there from european countries. so we have done not a particularly good job of explaining the importance of nato to our own security, to our own -- to what it is that europe and nato contribute to what we
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do day in and day out. so before we start lecturing our european friends about how important it is that they go out and tell their parliamentarians how central nato is and defense spending is, we have a job to do here ourselves. >> our interim general scocroft that when we're thinking here how to engage in capitol hill that narrative. i'll take the woman in the back. >> thanks. my name is trina flocrant. while in washington i'm at the trans-atlantic academy. what you said about the nato issue is music in my ears. i just wish it had been said by the defense and deterrence program or defense and deterrence posture review what's going on. because one of the things that was very apparent during that time was the silence from -- and
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i know that you as ambassador could probably not say what you said now, but from an american perspective, there was very little said to actually push the europeans in that direction you just outlined. i can say this because i'm a european. i think without the americans taking the lead, and quite frankly, lecturing and pushing the europeans on issues like this, there's not going to be movement on the nuclear front because there are so many holy cows buried in the nuclear issue that will prevent the alliance from taking that step that i think is necessary. and you saying euphimisms, quite frankly, referring to the life extension program, calling the nuclear -- nato's nuclear weapons must be safe, secure and deficient, which everyone knows means spending that $10 million or $10 billion that you were referring to. i think what is needed on nuclear weapons issues to take the necessary step forward is a
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lot more clear talking. so thank you very much for doing it today. but could i also ask american policymakers, those who may be listening, that actually it's time to start talking clearly to what would be good for the alliance to be able to move forward. thanks. >> let me hold that real quick ask pick up another comment in the back, if we may. >> it's scott harris. i just want to say having spent 10 years working for lockheed martin in europe on these defense industrial issues that everything you said, ivo, is true times 10%. very important comments that you made. i have a different question, though. the united states has very important bilateral relationships with european allies. perhaps none has been more important to the success of the alliance than the u.s.-german
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relationship which today seems to be undergoing a few stresses and challenges. and i wonder if you would comment on how we get this relationship back on track, how badly off track you think it is and what the implications might be for the future of the alliance. >> terrific, thanks. >> on the nuclear issue, i would just say it's much easier to have an individual opinion than a collective opinion. but more importantly, when you are dealing in alliance, you need the agreement of 28 countries. let me assure you that nothing that i said today would come as news to any of my colleagues in brussels. or, indeed, in the u.s. government. and so there were many times where the kind of arguments that you heard today were -- right, stefano -- were being mentioned and pushed aside. but ultimately a nato document
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is a document that gets signed off by 28 countries, and if one country says no, it doesn't get done. and i learned a lot about consensus building in my four years, and that means that sometimes you don't get all that you want. but i would argue with the deterrence and defense review, we got a lot. and i think it's an important document that needs to be written not only for what's in it but much more importantly for what's not in it. if you compare this to any other statement on nato nuclear weapons in the past, you will see what i mean. scott -- >> do you want to come in on this point in particular, fred? okay. >> first, i hope you agreed with me 110% when you said times 10%. that means you disagreed with 90% of what i had to say. i will take this as full agreement with what i said, which i appreciate, because much of what i learned about
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industry, i learned from you when it comes to europe, so that's good. on germany, i think you're absolutely on the mark in the sense that the fundamental relationship within nato that we have must be with germany and germany being a strong and critical player. and that makes what the last few weeks, last few months a very, very difficult time for all the reasons that we know. germany's strategic interests lies as germany has decided since 1949, and really, since it became a member in 1952 in nato to be at the center of nato. it has gone through some hard and difficult issues itself, not least in the decisions it made with respect to libya. it is now going through some difficult issues with regard to the relationship between the united states.
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i think the administration and the soon-to-be new government will work out on this issue. they have to. it's not all that difficult to figure out how to do that, to recognize that we have an intelligence relationship that is extremely important and that good judgment about how we use the technology capabilities we have is important for the relationships that we have with our allies. the really fundamental issue is to question whether germany is willing, because i think it's able, but whether it's willing to take on the leadership role not only in what it has done on the economic side but increasingly on the strategic and political side. within europe and, indeed, within nato. i think that the united states needs that strong leadership from germany, a willingness to stand up and be part of not only
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a collective but, indeed, a leader of that collective within nato and within the european union, and broadly speaking, in order to ensure that the united states will have this partner, not only in berlin, but indeed, throughout europe that we all need. germany is the big kid on the block. it is militarily the big kid on the block. it doesn't have the expenditures on nuclear weapons that others have. it is transforming its military into a force that is quite able to conduct military operations. its efforts in afghanistan are underappreciated. they are -- they have been a leader in the north, a true leader. they are the first and only country so far to have stepped up and said that they will be there. not only other countries have joined, but they were the first country to say they will be there post 2014 with specific
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ideas about how many troops, and that is the kind of leadership we want, broadly speaking, from germany throughout our operations in nato. >> ivo, if i could just real quick, because the praise you had this your remarks refer to the smaller allies, estonia, norway, and the red flags you put up were related to the united kingdom in particular, france, and germany a little bit of a different take. what's happening within the alliance and how do you see sort of the key allies of the u.s. and defense bilateral relationships we've had with germany. has something shifted, or are you saying the united states is stepping back? >> i think the french organization has been extraordinarily important because it has made france -- given it a sense of responsibility for what happens in the alliance and has made the alliance stronger. no, our relationship with the
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strong allies, and i would -- those that are willing and able to provide military capability is going to be key. a strong u.s.-estonian alliance is great. it's important to estonia and important to the united states, but it can't be the be all-end all. our relationship with the u.k., our relationship with france, our relationship with germany, our relationship with italy which has stood up every time when we rang the bell, they opened the door, which is always welcome and then stepped through it with real capabilities. those are important relationships. and those countries will have to take the lead in providing the capabilities that are necessary for nato to be partners. it's not going to be done by the smaller allies, even those who are -- and they're small in number -- even those who are willing and able to step up to the plate. it will have to rely on the u.k.
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it will have to rely on france. it will have to rely on germany. my point on germany is that it is perhaps underperforming on the strategic level in a way that isn't good for the united states. i will leave it up to the europeans and germany whether it's good for germany. >> terrific. let me come to the last round. we'll take a couple questions here and turn first to fred. >> thank you for doing this, ivo. fred campo, the atlantic council. during the chicago summit, one of the more significant moments aside from your rendition of "take me out to the ball game" during the 7th inning stretch of the cubs-white sox game was the 13 global partners. and now it doesn't seem as though that's moved ahead too far. is it time, when you talk about political will and capabilities, that one does something much more dramatic with these global partners? i'm not sure if it's global, nato or what it is, but what
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should be done? and also if you could give your view on turkey and where is turkey going within the alliance? >> good questions. let's pick up one right here as well. >> thank you, mr. ambassador. steve shapiro, a councilmember. if you could just expound a bit on the difficulties demonstrated in the afghanistan operation by conflicting rules of engagement and caveated forces. i think that's a complex issue i don't get to hear enough about. >> just on that, i mean, every operation has -- every country that operates within a coalition perspective will have its own specific issues of concern. we have caveats, the united states. the issue is whether those caveats affect the operational effect of the force.
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at least since i was involved in this operation since 2009, the answer is no, that most of the caveats that really did have an operational impact were removed, were dropped in one way or another, and the effectiveness of the force as a totality to do what it needed to do was not affected by these caveats. but let's be clear. caveats is a reality of coalition warfare. and it's a reality that affects us as much as anybody else. and it is -- it is -- it's a myth that somehow there's some countries that have caveats and others don't. that's not quite how it works. the issue is can these forces cooperate in a way and fulfill the mission in the best possible way without causing problems from one country to the next? and the answer today is absolutely. i'm now a cubs fan, by the way,
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so this allows me to be -- but nobody remembers the fact that i sang, which is probably not a good idea. >> i think it's on youtube. >> no, i don't think it's on youtube. many things are on youtube, but that's not it. but there are pictures. it's a great question. and i think -- on the 13 global partners. that was supposed to be the big thing. and it's something that the president personally felt very strongly about, that in the 21st century alliance, it is vitally important for the 28 members of that alliance to recognize the contributions that are being made by a wide variety of countries that are not members. some will want to become members, others won't or can't. and yet in the 21st century, it is not enough to think that 28
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countries can do everything. in every single operation that we are involved in, we have non-member countries centrally involved in what we're trying to do. and these 13 countries in particular were recognized for that reality. it is unfortunate that this view is not necessarily shared by every member of nato. and this is not just a turkey issue. this is also an issue about the european union. it's an issue that goes across the alliance in one way or another. our view of nato as a central hub for security around the globe is one that is not shared by every country. we will continue to work this issue as best we can because we
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strongly believe, i believed it, the president believed it, i thk our entire administration believed it and there were a couple very key other allies who believed it, that having nato at that core and bringing in these other partners from as far away as australia to as close by as sweden is critical for the success of our operations and, frankly, for the success of our ability to conduct operations that go beyond article v. just what was the difference between libya and syria? it remains the fact that the arab league not only acted to ask for intervention, which allowed the u.n. to move, but then key members participated in the operation. as they do in afghanistan. and that provides a legitimacy, it provides a capacity to act that the 28 members of nato
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themselves provide in a lesser extent. so for us this is critical. but it is not an issue that people agree on. >> ivo, thank you very much. i think that you couldn't have been clearer with saying if the alliance is focused only on collective defense, it's headed for an irrelevant future, and i think after fred and others, we picked up on these thinking global partners was the undeveloped part of the summit agenda where there is still much work to be done. >> just underscore, i'm not saying the collective defense is unimportant. collective defense is the core, but it can't be the sole core. you need to have the cooperative security element, too, and that's what i think the new nato is all about. >> absolutely. thank you very much for your time. thank you for coming to the council and giving your thoughts and reflections after stepping down as ambassador, and thank
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you for serving our country. [ applause ] >> we're going to make a quick transition into our next panel and move into the final line-up, please. here's a poem that comes directly out of my boyhood in detroit. it's called those winter sundays. sundays, too, my father got up early and put his clothes on in the blue black cold. then with cracked hands that ached from labor in the weekday weather made bank fires blaze. no one ever thanked him. i'd wake and hear the coles sput tering, breaking. when the rooms were warm, he would call, and slowly i would rise and dress, fearing the chronic angers of that house,
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speaking indifferently to him who had driven out the cold and polished my good shoes as well. what did i know? what did i know of love's austere and lonely orifices. >> robert hayden, i think, is one of the best poets of our time. i go over his books again and again. his poetry, principallilyprinci also his prose. i think one of his features is that all of his poems are written in different styles, different voices, different forms and techniques. he was very deliberate about this from the very beginning. many poets write well, but they write essentially the same poem over and over again. but hayden was determined to try to make every poem unique, as unique as it could be. so he writes historical poems,
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he writes personal poems, he writes comic poems, he writes very dramatic poems. so he is a fascinating figure because and all the way tloou -- through the depression, the war, the after math of the war, the life that people lived in the '50s and '60s. he was a chronicler of the civil rights movement. there are so many areas in which he has written beautifully and compellingly. i am delighted.
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more from the atlantic council discussion on the upcoming nato discussion in great britain. let me echo fred kent's welcoming to all of you in the audience and our team. this is a conference on nato's deterrence and collective defense. this first panel discussion is on new challenges and new tools around deterrence.
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in essence it is a project to help sharpen the purpose and relevance as the aalliance as we head into what fred characterized as an inflection point in history. we are keen on insuring the summitt next year is not just the last afghanistan summit but is a summit that kicks off a new chapter of nato's future. the aalliance was about deterring the soviet threat. in post '89 it was known for helping to transform adversaries. with the dissolution of the former yugoslavia it became an
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institution of first resort for crisis management. whether it was the taliban or the missiles originating from facilities in iran or whether it was from unknown hackers in cyber space we saw an alliance beginning to think differently about the approach to security. the question facing us is now what? what is next? the washington treaty doesn't identify an enemy. at the end of the day the alliance is about binding north america and europe together. it is about deterrence rather than a particular enemy. what does that mean in today's world when we have non-state actors, new actors, disruptive
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technology, asymmetric threats. i think on november 8 nato concluded a multinational exercise involving 6,000 troops from 28 nations. called exercise steadfast jazz. this was one of the most important exercises the alliance has done in recent years. it raises the question of what type of exercise, what type of deterrence is this alliance preparing for for the future. to get us into this conversation, we have four terrific panelists. barry pavel is the vice president and director of the scope center. barry will update you on the work we have done and laying out a new concept for the alliance. he joined the atlantic council after a long career in the pentagon also having served as a special assistant to the president for defense policy and strategy at the white house. and played a heavy role in strategy issues at the pentagon. to his left is the newest
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atlantic council senior fellow. welcome. it's a delight to have you with us today. he also holds positions with vice president of the group. but he's on this panel discussion because he served not only as diplomatic adviser to president of italy, but as a representative to nato. he's also served diplomatic service in washington, moscow and the united nations. to his right, the policy director for the norwegian ministry of defense. he served as director general or security policy director for the norwegian defense since 1995 and in that capacity really became known as the father of nato security policy. it's a delight to have you with us. he also served at nato headquarters and is one of the architects of this project that we're working on. and finally next to me, jason heely, the director of our
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stieber -- cyber initiative here at the atlantic council who will speak about the cyber realm. he served as a policy director at the white house as executive director of goldman sachs asia is an intelligence officer bringing those works together recently published a fierce domain, a first history of conflict in cyber space. so with that, let me come back to you and turn to you to kick off this discussion. given the world that fred laid out, given the new challenges the alliance is facing, what is the relevant meaning of deterrence today as we look to the future? >> thank you, damon. and thanks for the really easy questions that you posed to me. but seriously, thank you to our norwegian partners who have been wonderful to work with. it's been a pleasure to addressing these critical issues at this critical time. i thought fred kemp did a fantastic job of sort of summarizing the essence of our june 5th conference which started this effort, sort of
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where the world is headed in the medium and long-term. these major changes that are underway and our job is how do we posture nato to be as ready as possible for the surprises that will come for the contingencies that may be likely and for sort of deterrence approaches that are reasonable and effective in light of the budget constraints that we all face. so i think the types of issues he addressed, in particular i think one that i would add is this rise of individual power. individual empowerment governed by the rise of a global middle class, largely focused in asia but also by disruptive technologies that are giving individuals and groups for the first time in history the ability to take strategically significant action in a major way.
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with biotech, with 3d printing, with other technologies, i think it's clear we're going to have to spend more time in the future as planners looking at the individual level of challenges and opportunities, as well as at the state level, which we're much more comfortable dealing with, which our institutions, including nato, are much more comfortable dealing with. so i'll start my suggestions for new deterrence approaches with sort of two contradictory principles. one is, i think, for deterrence the first question is always, for me, deter whom from doing what? i think it matters a lot what deters one leader from taking a specific type of action may be different, because they act in a different context than what deters another leader from taking a different type of action. but the second principle is, we are just terrible at predicting future threats and contingencies. time and again, we get surprised. we can go through the long list, i'm sure most of you know it, so the problem is, it's really hard to specify with precision what military contingency will be the next big one.
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i'm sure in december of 2010 if someone had said nato would be operating an air campaign over north africa, they would have been sent to an asylum, but that indeed happen in the following year over libya. so with those two principles in mind, even though they create some complications, i think it's really important to think after 2014, what could nato's priority missions be? there's a lot of things nato does, but what should really be the focus areas? and i'm going to pose three as suggestive and would love to hear from you in the discussions about whether these three are about right. and in no particular order, i think, first, nato's going to have to engage in some form or fashion in what i call the greater middle east. this is an area that's going to be unstable for generations to come, and i don't think we can have the entire underside of eurasia in turmoil.


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