tv Politics Public Policy Today CSPAN May 5, 2015 1:00pm-3:01pm EDT
japan, south korea and australia also play a role in the effective missile defense capabilities there. japan very far along on its own missile defense capability. they also their own aegis bmd ships and the standard missile 3 interceptors, pac 3 batteries, early warning radars, sophisticated command and control systems, they're upgrading two of our atogo class aegis destroyers to bmd certification schedule for 2018 or 2019, i believe, and they also host two of our missile defense radars.
they are -- they are becoming a critical partner for international cooperation as well. one of our most significant cooperative efforts in co-development is with the advanced version of the sm-3, the 2-a, and that is being produced in japan. south korea is -- obviously has an immediate proximate stake in preventing missile strikes from north korea. we've worked closely with south korea to ensure that as an alliance we can maintain the capacity to do that. i've already talked about some of the things we bring to south korea. patriot pac 3 batteries to defend both our forces deployed there as well as south korean forces, but south korea is also taking steps to enhance its own air and missile defense, including sea and land-based sensors, upgrading its patriot
missiles and also pursuing its on indigenous korean air and missile defense capability. u.s. and australia, long cooperation partnership on missile defense research and development, most notably with regard to sensors. in the middle east we have robust missile defense presence, including land and sea-based assets deployed there. that's in addition to our efforts to work with allies to build their own capabilities to defend themselves. strong -- we have a strong relationship with israel on missile defense. i was the action officer in 1980 -- 6. for the very first agreement we had with israel on cooperative missile defense research and development. it has just advanced and advanced over the years. they now have a comprehensive architecture going from iron dome to david sling weapons system to the arrow weapons system, and a lot of that is in conjunction with both missile defense agency and then operational cooperation with the united states.
we're working with a number of the gulf cooperation council countries on missile defense including supporting their purchases through foreign military sales programs of capabilities. uae is procuring thaad. the first delivery of that is expected later this year. that's in addition to their earlier purchase of patriot, which has already been delivered. saudi arabia is in the process of upgrading their existing patriot pac 2 batteries to the pac 3. kuwait is purchasing patriot pack 3. qatar has also joined the international community of u.s. patriot partners late last year. and that as the gcc states, begin to field more capable systems, we and gcc partners are trying to work together more on the integration of capabilities across the region including
especially sharing of sensor data among those countries. technology development, let me just say one word about that, about the need to continue to look ahead. talking at length about how sometimes when budgets are tight and you're trying to prioritize, very high priorities, homeland missile defense, regional missile defense, it is the advanced technology, it's your seed corn that gets cut, but we do have to balance the investment priorities to be sure that we do continue to look at advanced technologies that can help us be more effective and efficient and respond to emerging threats. i know you're going to get more on that this afternoon from rich matlock, so i won't belabor the point. all of that is really just a
very brief summary of the policy strategy and priorities that you will see in what others are going to talk about in more detail today. i know that ken todorov will talk a lot more about budgets and programs. and frank rose, who will be on the second panel, cannot help himself. he will talk a lot about allied missile defense. and he has been quite a stalwart in those efforts. so i don't want to steal all their thunder just because i got to speak first but i just want to close by noting that we've made a lot of progress on missile defense in the last several years but we really do have to constantly reassess the mix of missile defenses as well as the role of missile defense in the broader set of capabilities that we bring to bear on dealing with ballistic missile threats in the world. i think -- i think the budget for all of you here from the
hill, i think the president's budget that we've submitted to you does reflect the policy, strategy and priorities that i've just laid out here. so thank you for having me here today. i look forward eventually to questions. [ applause ] good afternoon, everybody. as tom said my name is ken todorov i'm the deputy director of the missile defense agency. it's an honor to be here today and continue this dialogue with you. dr. hamre, thank you for the invitation. tom, thanks for your work in getting this set up and getting everyone here. on behalf of the 8,000 or so employees of the missile defense agency and my boss vice admiral jim searing thank you for allowing mda to be here and talk a little bit about our
priorities, talk a little bit about the work that we're doing, the very important work that we're doing near term and into the future to advance the course and the cause for missile defense. what i intend to do today is give you an operational perspective on the world of missile defense because i'm an operator. i'm sort of a unique animal within mda in that i'm not an engineer. we've got a lot of hugely bright people who are engineers working on these problems. i'm not an acquisition officer, which i'm glad i'm not an acquisition officer some days given the difficulties of that enterprise. but i am an operator.
i come from an operations background and i'm a pilot and in 2009 i came to the united states northern command headquarters in colorado springs. it's a wonderful place to work and that's where i really got into, as they say, missile defense. i was the deputy director of operations there and that officer's job is to be the point man or point woman for the combatant commander for the ground-based mid course defense system. that's really where i cut my teeth in this system. i've been involved with missile defense ever since that day and i've come to love this mission and the people who work it. i want to thank all of you for whatever your role is in this dialogue. it's an important role regardless of what you're to go, whether you're here from the press, if you're here from the hill, whether you're here from one of our foreign partners, whether you're here from government. it's a team effort to be sure. so thanks for what you do and we're glad to be part of that team at mda. now, as i said, i'm a pilot so i like to rely on videos to make my points, simple kind of guy, and i'm also a military officer as you can see, and so no self-respecting military officer can get by without a little powerpoint. so that's how i'm going to walk you through my presentation today. show you a few short video clips and then make some points about the video that you see. so tyler, my assistant over here, if we can roll the very first video, please. ♪ [ ding ]
i didn't say i was good at powerpoint, i just said that i like to use it. ♪ ♪ ♪ okay. i show you that video for a number of reasons. the threat is real in our minds. and i had the benefit every morning when i get to work opening up an intelligence book and i see what's going on in various places around the world. i can tell you that it's real
and the threat is increasing both in quantity and it's increasing in quality of our adversaries. and so as elaine said, we aim to stay ahead of that threat in everything that we do. it's vitally important that we do. in north korea, the kno-8 as elaine once again mentioned is something that we're very, very concerned with. that regime, as you know, is very unpredictable. just last night they had another unannounced short-range test of some of their systems. they're not resting on their laurels. in iran dia assesses as early as this year there could be a space launch from iran. space launch, but as you all know those technologies and capabilities could be translated into icbm. iran has the largest short and medium range inventory of ballistic missile defense -- ballistic missiles in the region. so clearly the threat is real and something that we take very seriously. next video, please.
♪ ♪ >> today's bmds, it's credible, it's reliable, and i can tell you from the war fighter perspective, having been there, we have confidence in this system to defend our nation, both the homeland and our regional interests around the globe. we have confidence in that system. now, we've got a shot doctrine that's set up to deal with some of the issues that the system may have, but that's why the shot doctrine is what it is. i won't get into what the shot doctrine is, but i can tell you we have confidence and the war fighter has confidence from the operational perspective to deal with the threat. the key will be to continue to outpace that threat as we go.
as elaine rightly mentioned, a point i like to make about this system is it's not designed to be sort of a stand-alone catchall system in and of itself. it's part of a larger continuum of capabilities that the war fighter brings to bear both offensively and in this case defensively. we have to continue to look at the system that way and not as some kind of a fly catcher or catcher's mitt, i've heard a lot of analogies used when talking about the ballistic missile defense system. it just doesn't make sense. it's part of a larger war fighter tool kit. next, please. ♪
♪ so i don't want to belabor the points on this slide or in that video. all of you in this room are probably intimately familiar with the ground-based mid course defense system but what i do want to talk about are priorities and the things that we're working on in the very near term. we've got a flight test coming up in december, ctv, control test vehicle, ctv 02 plus. we're going to really ring out a discrimination scene in this flight test that we've never done before based on the results of the last flight test that was very successful. want to continue again to outpace the threat. that flight test will be a huge hallmark for the ground-based mid-course defense system. we're going to continue to work on reliability issues of the kill vehicle and of the interceptor, testing our alternate divert thrusters, testing again end to end discrimination. and another priority for the ground based mid course defense system and it's in our budget
and elaine mentioned it is the redesigned kill vehicle. very much a priority and at the forefront of the work that we're doing with the agency. really designed for four things -- reliability, availability, predictability, and performance. all of the new redesigned kill vehicle that will help us maintain our edge on that threat that continues to develop. and finally sort of on the big rocks pile amongst gmd i would be remiss if i didn't mention the long-range discriminating radar. we've asked industry for help with that. we're evaluating those bids right now. this is going to be something that we turn the lights on, if you will, in the year 2020 and it will be a sort of a crown jewel, if you will, of a complement to the sensor array that we have today. and again it will have end to end discrimination for threats from north korea but also iran if they develop in that region as well. so a lot going on from gmd.
at the missile defense agency. so i like to take personally all the credit for the success of ftg 06b, and i often do, but a lot of hard work went into that, obviously none by me since i arrived on the day that happened. but that was a hallmark event for our agency and for the nation. i think the conversation would be a lot different today had we not had the success we is it. that's a credit not only to the missile defense agency but our friends in industry and a lot of people that helped us with this. but it was a very important event, to be sure. and i like to say it was necessary but it wasn't sufficient. in other words, we had to do that test, we had to find those
things out, we had to make sure that we gave that war fighter even more confidence in the system, but it wasn't sufficient to rest on our laurels so a lot and this really is lags laying the groundwork for the next gm flight test and the next gm flight test out into the future. you see in the center of that screen the sbx. there's been some things recently about that platform. maybe some of you had seen it. i just -- i want to go on record and just respectfully disagree with what i've read recently about the sbx. i can tell you from the war fighter perspective again, the operational perspective, this is absolutely the most important sensor we had in our tool kit when sabers were being rattled anywhere in the world but particularly with north korea. it's the first thing we thought of in a combatant commander's headquarters when we saw some intelligence cue that the regime in north korea might be lining up something to shoot in space or potentially at us. the first question was how soon can we get sbx underway? i was sitting with general jakoby in spring of 2013, he was then the commander of the united states northcom and norad, he had the responsibility to make
the recommendation to the secretary of defense and to the president ultimately whether or not we were going to release ground-based interceptors on a potential threat. i remember looking at him and i said, boss, how are you feeling? we were waiting for the launch to happen, waiting for intelligence that said it was imminent. and he said i'm feeling really good because the nation has options to defend ourselves. and i'm feeling good because we have sbx in the right place in the right time. that's how important that system is to the war fighter. it's the best sensor out there for discrimination. it's laying the groundwork for everything we're doing in the design of the lrdr. it's a hugely important sensor to the war fighter. but it's not just an operational asset. interestingly, it's been a huge asset for us and vitally important in the test work we do as well.
let me give you some statistics from the year 2006 to today. how many times we've deployed this assess. 13 real world special tankings. to include burnt frost, 2008. to include numerous cycles of provocation. every cycle of provocation since 2012, we've had sbx underway. 11 individual flight tests that she's participated in. six ground test events. you don't hear a lot about the ground test work that we do. but the flight test gets all the press, right? but there's a lot of work that happens before flight tests or independent of a flight test where we do analysis with ground tests. sbx has been a vital part of that as well. three separate events supporting the united states navy and the work they do. air force flyouts. stockpile reliability testing, making sure that those systems are operational and reliable and credible. the sbx is in my mind a huge -- has huge value for the taxpayer. it's versatile both in operations and the war fighter wants it every time and it's hugely important for tests. as i think the numbers bear out. and as i mentioned, it's informing the work we're doing for discrimination on the lrdr. to call it a flop or call it or say it never should have been built, again, i just have to respectfully, based on my experience in the war fighting headquarters, and now at mda, respectfully disagree with that. so i just wanted to give you my perspective the sbx and how valuable it is to us.
>> so this is a really good news story. there's some navy brethren in the house today. this is a homeland defense asset and it's a regional defense asset and an asset for the united states navy globally. we're very proud of the work that we've done on aegis bmd. we continue to advance the cause and advance the ball. 35 aegis bmd capable ships -- excuse me. 33 today. we're going to 35 by the end of fiscal year '16. a very successful fall test campaign that we underwent. we really proved out the spy array. we did a test called ftn 25 where it really taxed out the array on the platform itself. both with a ballistic missile threat at a high and cruise missile surrogate threats flying low, simultaneously, the system handled it beautifully. it's really the basis for the work we're doing in aegis bmd
phase 2 capability via the aegis ashore facility in romania this year, this calendar year. and that project is moving along. and we're ready to put the shovel into the ground in poland not more than a few months after that and start the next phase of this campaign in poland. so we are maintaining our commitment to our friends and allies and partners in europe particularly in this case with the aegis ashore capability. it's a fantastic capability and proven time and time again. there's a facility on the island of kauai that participates in numerous flight tests for us. it's a fantastic capability. and, again, things are going really, really well as we continue to be on track to deliver and keep our promises to our friends and allies. ♪
♪ 11 for 11 in flight tests is thaad. it's a great system. the war fighter loves it. we've got soldiers today in guam for the last two years defending regionally and homeland in guam. and you talk to the soldiers and they're satisfied with the system, they love the capability it brings. the united states army loves the capability it brings and the combatant commander loves the capability the system brings. we're continuing to develop it working with the army on future requirement. we've delivered four batteries already to the army, working on
a fifth and beyond. we're also delivering an additional 48 interceptors by fy '16, giving us a total of 155. and studying the future of this and studying the future of this system and how it may actually -- we can adapt this system to an evolving threat. a different threat down the road. so thaad is turning out to be, i think, a remarkable investment. and again, not only for our nation, but our friends and allies around the world who are looking at this as an smf case. ♪
so that video covered a lot of items. we don't have time to get into all of them. a couple of highlights. you saw the radars that are deployed in various places around the world. we just declared an operational capability this past december in kyogo-masaki in japan. once again, that was on time. we delivered it when we said we were going to. it's already plugged in into the war fighter suite for united states pacific command. it's soon to be plugged into the united states northern command. so it's an asset that regardless of where it is around the world can plug and play in various and different systems among the
bmds. we're also -- again, elaine mentioned but co-development with our japanese friends and partners, thank you for the sm32a. it's going to save the taxpayer. it's also a great initiative that we're partnering with our japanese friends on. and i'd be remiss if i didn't offer kudos to our friends and partners in israel. i think you've probably seen the press in recent days. we're still crunching the data, but we think very, very successful flight tests of the system, which you briefly saw in the video there. lots going on in international cooperation. we can talk a lot more about it in the q & a. so, again, i covered a ton of ground in a very short amount of time. again, i'm open to your questions in a moment here. one area i didn't talk about is technology, and what mda is doing in the technology realm. and that's because we've got our chief technologist here. mr. rich matlock, who's going to talk to you in the third panel. i don't want to steal any of his thunder. suffice it to say, though, in my mind having been around mda now for going on a year, close to still the bread and butter. lost sight of that. think of the bmds after next.
we haven't lost sight of that being a priority for us. it's exciting times. rich is going to give you more details. so i'll close again putting my war fighter hat back on. you can say what you want about missile defense generally or about the system or about the cost and the expense. and we used to banter this around in cheyenne mountain on a lot of cold, dark nights when we were in the mountain on alert or doing exercise or for a real world contingency. we used to talk about the value of that to us. and a lot of times we would sort of come to the conclusion, what is it worth to us? is it worth seattle? or san francisco? or los angeles? or increasingly now colorado, denver, the heartland of america. potentially in the future eastern seaboard, boston, new york, washington, d.c. is it worth the investment in these systems to pretend --
excuse me, to protect what we value the most. that's our homeland, our way of life. i think the answer, my personal answer is yes. and so i'm an optimist about this. not without our challenges. we continue to deal with those challenges. we've got the best and brightest people. i can tell you. i wish you could meet a lot of them. phenomenal people working these issues. i'm really proud to work with them and be their deputy director. i'm humbled to do that. they're doing some really important work. and i thank you all again for your contribution to this debate. look forward to your questions. thank you very much. [ applause ] >> so now we're going to open it up to questions. i think we've heard now repeatedly just how much the -- how much the conversation's changed in the past decade and change. that it's no longer a question of whether, but how and what way
and talk about if you walked through just many of the systems that we're actively deploying. i guess one word that didn't come up is sequestration, that 13-letter word. and given everything budgetwise, i wonder if you might first of all, elaine, speak to the relative weight given to the missile defense mission that you feel in the pentagon. and perhaps general you might weigh in for mda's priorities in answering that a bit. >> you know, i'm not sure that i'm totally objective because i am the dasd for nuclear and missile defense policy. so i spend a lot of my time on missile defense. but having been in broader meetings on setting budget priorities in the demag and so forth, there is a lot of emphasis on missile defense and the pentagon. there's, as we've said, a lot of combatant commander demand for the regional missile defense.
there's a lot of focus on weather north korea is in kno-8. so it is a high priority mission. it is a balancing act, as i said, we have to constantly reassess priorities, where are we on technology development, where are we on fiscal constraints. and it's homeland defense highest priority. some commitments we've made on the regional missile defense side, following through epaa, combat commanders, who want more, can't cut the seed corn. that's a balancing act. you see that balancing act in the request for the missile defense project. and that's at the president's
request level. cuts just hurt. they hurt all the way across. it's the old story. >> so, as you mentioned, it's and all of you know, you know, resources aren't aplenty. so we've got to make careful decisions and choices about where we invest within the work that we're doing at the agency. so we obviously get our guidance from the department. so our priorities fall into the lump, the broad sum of homeland defense and maintaining our commitment to european phase adaptive approach. within those sort of subcategories, i would say that clearly the work we're doing for gdi reliability, the work that we're doing in the upcoming flight tests, the work we're doing with rkb as i mentioned, falls at the very top.
follow -- or 1 and 1a, if you will, discrimination. making sure that as this threat matures and evolves we've got the capability to continue to outpace it. and we are concerned about a growing threat. and new capabilities to try to outmatch what we've got today existing. so for homeland, i would say gbi reliability discrimination, as well, at the very top. and again, maintaining our commitments to the european phased adaptive approach. and i think we're in a good place for all of that. all the while thinking about seed corn technology. rich will talk to you more about it. never losing sight of bmds after next. >> are we outpacing the threat or is it outpacing us? >> today on the homeland side we're outpacing the threat. we're ahead of the threat. yes. >> i would agree with that. i would say that sequestration, which you mentioned briefly, is a dangerous thing. and my boss has testified -- he used these words. he said should sequestration come to pass and we're forced to take cuts in the program that imbds has the potential to be outmatched, or overmatched i think is the word he used. that's of concern. but to answer your question, we are outpacing the threat. >> all right. well, why don't we take questions from the audience. we've got some microphones going around. i see one at that back table. i think that's bruce. why don't you identify yourself and go ahead.
>> hi, i'm bruce mcdonald, adjunct at johns hopkins. and i'm doing a study with the federation of american scientists. i've been to china a couple of times in the last few months. and thaad got a nice mention here. and it'll be no surprise to you seated up there that in china we hear a lot about thaad. they say listen, we have no problem with the interceptor, we understand the rationale, but that radar, boy, that gives them a lot of heartburn. and so my question to you, i worked missile defense for a long time, but what is the right response to that issue that is raised about why china -- they're worried that the thaad radar would give us an enhanced capability to neutralize their strategic deterrent. what's the right way to respond
to that? i have to say, my response i discovered, i said, listen, if we wanted to go after china we would be deploying our missile defense forces differently than we are. you can be sure. what's your perspective? what's the right answer to give the chinese on that? >> first, i need to clarify. you're talking about u.s. deployment, potential u.s. deployment of thaad in south korea. >> yes. >> and i just want to make it clear that while that is something that the u.s. forces commander, usfk, is interested in because it would provide defense for certainly for u.s. deployed forces and south korea, we have not had formal consultations with r.o.k. about our deploying that. so the concerns are a little premature. that's one. two is that the threats from north korea, especially scutse and nodong are why usfk commander would like to look at that. and so it's north korea that drives this. and i think any decision if we do have consultations with iraq on this would be for the u.s. and r.o.k. to decide. so this is just not about china. >> nothing else? all right.
how about right here? wait for the microphone. >> good afternoon, i'm charles newstat from the state department. but i must immediately add that i'm not speaking for the department at all. this is just me, the physicist in me speaking to you. and my question is this. given that mr. putin is increasingly behaving like he's the dictator of the soviet union
rather than a more benign russia that we saw during the gorbachev et cetera era, how can you be so sure we don't need to have defense against russian missiles or for that matter, defense against a china which has tremendous capability, admittedly they're saying no first strike, but what does that mean. and admittedly, they appear to be on a somewhat reasonable course. but that could change instantly. and how are we prepared to respond to that? >> there are a number of ways you can deal with other countries having ballistic missiles. missile defense is one of those. it's not the only way. the soviet union, when it was the soviet union had many ballistic missiles. we had a missile defense system, it was not about defending
against soviet ballistic missiles. that was about deterring their use through the threat of nuclear retaliation during the cold war. so if you look at countries where it's feasible to have a homeland defense and countries where it's not feasible to have a homeland defense, russia i think falls into the not feasible. given the capacity, the numbers as well as the sophistication of their ability to develop counter measures, to -- the sophistication in many ways. numbers and sophistication. the same can be said of china if it wants to be able to hold with the u.s. it certainly has the economic capability, the technical capability. and so the question becomes how many gdps would you like to spend on trying to defend
against it. with countries such as north korea, iran, where again, there are multiple reasons. one is more limited capabilities, less sophisticated capabilities that you can't foresee being able to stay ahead of. the other is how much confidence do you have in your ability to deter a tax on the homeland. all of these we're talking about homeland. the homeland. how much confidence do you have in deterrence. we can never be absolutely sure about deterrence. i also do deterrence. but i think if you put confidence level about deterring a tax on the homeland the larger, more capable countries, russia and china i'd put on one side. and countries such as north korea, potentially iran i would put on the less confidence about other ways including deterrence. i'd put having less confidence there.
so there are several factors in why we have not chosen to try to defend the homeland from russia and china. >> anything on that? all right. we've got one up here. actually, while we're waiting on this question, i guess i wanted to follow up on that a little bit. what are the big muscle movements on the fy '16 budget that keep us ahead of the threat. this may be more for you, general. discrimination, you speak a little bit to that about, i know you talked about rdr briefly, for example. you gave us insight into how you might feel about sbx a little bit. but what are some of the other big muscle movements? >> yeah, i think i probably touched on them. but just to sort of for repeat, certainly reliability to the gnd system, big muscle movement. the long range discriminating
radar as you mentioned. another large muscle movement for us. we are doing, rich will talk about this, we are doing some things in technology i think that will start to change course, the course a little bit. we don't want to -- we can't wait until we're -- the threat materializes or we're behind it to try to catch up. we're doing things to try to stay up and you'll hear more about that in a moment. those are probably the biggest parts of the work that we're doing. >> now we're good. >> hi, scott moscioni with inside the pentagon. if the iran deal does come to fruition, would that change any of our plans for the homeland missile defense and would it stay the same, would it give us more leeway when it comes to scheduling things further out?
>> first, if iran, we foresee will continue to deploy ballistic missiles, but they're not being nuclear armed would be a big deal, a very good thing. almost everything, well, everything we're doing we want to do for the north korean threat in any event. and we do have protection now against north korea as the threat could be even if it becomes operational. and iran. it might affect future, how you go forward in the future. but for now, in this year's budget, i don't think it would matter. >> it's a very good question, one we kicked around in the last week as this thing develops. i would argue that it might make missile defense broadly more important. again, to outpace the threat,
stay ahead of the threat, we were concerned about a breakout capability. i'm not going to speak to the policy piece of the treaty itself. but we can't, you know, take this as our pencil's down, we've got a breather now. we've got to continue, i think, to forge ahead. the threat is not just iran. there are other threats out there. as i mentioned in my talk, iran has the largest short-medium range ballistic missile inventory in the region. it's a regional threat as much as well. i think it ups the ante in the game rather than allows us to relax at all. >> charles in the back and then right here. >> tom, thank you, charles ferguson, working with bruce mcdonald on his project looking at china missile defense. i was recently in china about a month ago. my question i'm thinking about outpacing the threat. and could we imagine the scenario where north korea, and i've been there a couple of times, i've talked to actual north koreans, and went to their technological museum. they're very proud of rocket development, space launch
development. they don't call it missiles, obviously. but that's the way we look at it. could you imagine a time in the future where their threat is so advanced, they have such advanced capability including counter measures, decoys, the whole raft of things they could deploy against us, where it might become cost-prohibitive for us to try to outpace that through further and further defenses and such that china enters the picture, and china gets worried and china says uh-oh, u.s. capability in the region is getting so advanced to deal with the north korea threat, that's our intention, but china feels now we've got to build up and china may feel they have to build up because of india developing missile defense and further missile capabilities. i guess my question to both of you, you're playing out these scenarios, thinking about there could come a time where the north korean threat becomes so sophisticated where we have to think differently? >> always good to have your
challenging questions, charles. yeah, as north korea assuming north korea just keeps advancing and advancing, then we go back to what we said earlier about regional missile defense. it's true today, even when you are trying to deal with their missile defense, anything that north korea could throw at you, that it is not the only capability that we have. so then what's the role of missile defense in the overall mix of capabilities then becomes an issue. it doesn't -- it doesn't assuage part of what you're getting at, my interrelated, the gears that are interrelated where you're turning one gear that is response to north korea's nuclear missile programs and others are watching that, thinking it's about them when it's not. you know, and it's that what action do you take about some problem that others then take reaction that is not what you were trying to do in the first place.
it is a complex -- you're working on some very complex issues there. but if you get to the point where missile defense against a north korea hypothetical, always a problem for officials to talk about, hypotheticals. but then you have to reassess, as i said, we are constantly reassessing what's the role of missile defense against which threats and what's the role of other capabilities in dealing with ballistic missiles. you're talking about future reassessment of that issue. >> i put my war fighter hat back on. and tell you that, you know, again, sitting in the cheyenne mountain, these capabilities, particularly if we go the route that we're going in terms of our
programs, the work that we're doing, that i have already mentioned, the technology work that rich matlock's going to talk about, never say never but i'm not sure that that's achievable of a goal for the north koreans, first of all, for them to outpace us, if you will. and as a war fighter, again, what i said about a continuum of capability for the war fighter. an offense/defense mix, this is just one piece of it. any capability, maybe not designed to catch every single thing that they could lob at us. but long enough to buy our leaders some time to be able to make an assessment and have options, if you will. the nation would have options. so i continue to believe that we're on the right path. that's part of a larger continuum of capabilities. and i don't think we ever want to give up on the idea that we have some capability in the missile defense tool kit. >> all right. i think we'll take one more question right here. wait for the mike. >> yeah. i'm anna wilderman.
for the first and only time in history, i attended the 35th reunion of the graduates of the philippines science high school 1970, and this is, i call it learning trips, okay? and this is what i learned because they're assessing, because i'm an american, okay. and this is a reminder to me by the general, joint chiefs and economic minister, remind the americans that to us, zero-based budget is zero, nothing. we don't have anything to spend at the end of the year. so that means, you know -- >> all right. >> that's easy, but i retired from the navy. >> let's keep it on missile defense. >> good-bye. >> thank you very much. >> we have about seven minutes before our next panel. we're going to have frank rose,
assistant secretary of state and steve pifer from brookings, and we'll be back in about seven minutes to continue our conversation for some international dimensions. thank you very much. thank you both of you. >> thank you. >> thank you. [ applause ] democratic presidential candidate hilarylary clinton will be in losas vegas today. c-span will have her comments beginning at 5:45 p.m. eastern. copping ingcoming up live tomorrow program on global health issues. elton john, the founder of the elton john aids foundation, and pastor rick warren will testify before a subcommittee.
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industry and funded by your local satellite provider. like us on facebook and follow us on twitter. and we have more now from the forum on missile defense. this panel looks at the international implications of u.s. missile defense including concerns of russia over advancements in u.s. technology. speakers include frank rose the assistant secretary of state for arms control verification and compliance. >> well, we're going to now resume with our second panel on the international dimensions. there was a comment made by general todorov about disago disaggregateing the missile defense. this panel is going to be on the international dimensions, in part, working with allies. and to begin this discussion we're going to first have assistant secretary of state frank rose, who is always flying somewhere to talk about these
issues. followed by ambassador steve pifer to talk about some other things as well. we're going to start with assistant secretary rose. >> well, tom, thanks very much for that kind introduction. it's actually good to be back here in washington. by the way of introduction, my name is frank rose. i'm the assistant secretary of state for arms control verification and compliance. and my work at the state department is focused on enhancing strategic stability around the world. arms control verification come pliegs -- compliance are some of the tools to reassure our allies and partners that we will meet our security commitments. missile defense is another tool to do just that. at the state department, i'm responsible for overseeing a wide range of defense issues,
including missile defense cooperation with our allies and partners around the world. in this capacity, i serve as the lead u.s. negotiate for the missile defense basing agreements in romania, turkey and poland. i'm pleased to be here today to discuss our efforts at enhancing missile defense cooperation with our allies and partners. one of the key goals from the 2010 ballistic missile defense review or bmdr. now, you've heard from elaine bunn and general todorov about our missile defense policy and operations. instead, let me focus my remarks on three areas. one, the significant progress we have made in implementing the european phase adaptive approach and nato missile defense. two, cooperation on missile defense with allies outside of europe. and three i'll conclude with a few points on russia and missile
defense. before i do that, i do want to reiterate one point that you undoubtedly heard from elaine and ken. the president's fiscal year 2016 budget protects and enhances our important missile defense priorities, such as the european phase adaptive approach and reflects the priority we place on the efforts. the u.s. commitment to nato missile defense and the sites in poland remain as former secretary of defense chuck hagel said quote ironclad. with that, let me take a much moment -- a few moments to discuss where we are with the president's european phase adaptive approach in the united states's station contribution to the north atlantic treaties organization missile defense system. in 2009, the president announced that the epaa would, quote provide stronger, smarter and swifter defenses of american
forces ss and america's allies quite relying on quote capabilities that are proven and cost-effective. since then we have opinion working hard to implement his vision and have made great strides in recent years. i just returned from turkey and romania last week and had the opportunity to discuss our progress with these two key partners. turkey was the first country to receive epa elements in phase one, with the deployment of an antpy 2 n radar to the country in 2011. at the same time, we began the start of a sustained deployment of egypt's missile defense, capable of ships in the mediterranean. with the decklaration of capability at the nato chicago summit in may 2012 the radar in turkey was transitioned to nato
operational control. additionally, spain agreed in 2011 to host four capable ships at the existing naval facility as a spanish contribution to nato missile defense. in february of last year the first of four missile defense capable ships uss donald cook, arrived in spain. a second ship, the uss ross joined her last june. during 2015, two more of these multi-mission ships uss porter and uss carning will deploy to spain. they will conduct maritime security operations humanitarian operations and support u.s. and nato operations including missile defense. currently, we are focused on completing the deployment of a site in romania as part of phase two of the epaa.
romania's strong support for the timely completion of the arrangements needed to implement this deployment and romania's provision of security and infrastructure efforts have been superb. in october 2014 the u.s. navy held a historic naval support establishment ceremony at the missile defense facility at the air base in romania. this ceremony established the naval facility and installed its first u.s. commando. currently, this site is on schedule to be completed by the end of this year. and when operational the site combined with bmd capable ships in the mediterranean, will enhance coverage of nato from short and medium range ballistic middles from the middle east. finally, there is phase three. this phase includes a site in poland equipped with a new sm3 block 2a interceptor.
the site is on schedule for deployment in the 2018 time frame. for example, the president's budget includes approximately $200 million for the establishment of this site. the interceptor site in poland is key to the epaa. when combined with other epaa assets, phase three will provide the necessary capabilities to provide ballistic missile defense coverage of all nato european territory in the 2018 time frame. so as you can see, we are continuing to implement the president's vision for stronger, smarter and swifter missile defenses in europe. i would also like to highlight the efforts that our nato -- of our nato allies to develop and deploy their own national contributions for missile defense. a great example is that today patriot batteries from three
nato countries are deployed in turkey under nato control and command to get turkey's air capabilityies in response to the crisis on the border. voluntary contributions are the foundation for the nato missile defense system. there are several approaches allies can take to make important, invaluable contributions in this area. first, allies can acquire fully capable bmd systems possessing sensor shooter and command and control capabilities. second allies can acquire new sensors or upgrade existing ones to provide key ballistic missile finally, allies can contribute to nato's missile defense capability by providing essential base and support. such as turkey romania poland and spain have already agreed to do. in all of these approaches, however, the most critical requirement is nato
interoperability. yes, acquiring a ballistic missile defense capability is of course, good in and of itself. but if that capability is not interoperable with the alliance then its value as a contribution to alliance deterrence and defense is significantly diminished. it is only through interoperability that the alliance can gain the optimum effects from cooperation and enhance nato bmd through shared battleship awareness. let me now turn to some of the other regions of the world. the united states in cooperation with our allies and partners is continuing to bolster missile defenses in other key regions such as the middle east and the asia pacific in order to strengthen regional deterrence architectures. in the middle east we're already cooperating with our key
partners bilaterally and multilaterally through such things as the recently established u.s. gulf cooperation council strategic cooperation forum. at the september 26th, 2013 strategic co operation forum secretary kerry and foreign ministry counterparts reaffirmed their attempt first stated at the september 28th 2012 strategic cooperation forum, to, quote, work towards enhanced u.s. gcc coordination on ballistic missile defense. several of our partners in the region have expressed an interest in buying missile defense systems and some have already done so. for example, the united arab em rab emrab em rats have contracted to buy
that'd bat thaad batteries. it will enhance the capability and regional stability. the uae has taken delivery of the batteries which provide a lower tier point defense of critical national assets. we look forward to advancing cooperation and interoperability with our gcc partners in the coming months and years ahead. additionally, and separately, the united states maintains a strong defense relationship with israel, and our cooperation on missile defense has resulted in a comprehensive missile defense architecture for israel. israeli programs such as iron dome, the weapon system, in conjunction with operational cooperation with the united states, create a multi-layered architecture designed to protect the israeli people from varying types of missile threats. turning to the asia pacific, we are continuing to cooperate
through our bilateral alliances and key partnerships. for example, the united states and japan are working closely together to develop the interceptor which will make a key contribution to our european phase adaptive approach as well as being deployed in other regions of the world. we also recently completed the deployment of a second aradar to japan, which will enhance the united states and japan. finally, we're continuing to work on enhancing interoperability between u.s. and japanese forces which will be aided by recent changes to the u.s.-japan defense cooperation guidelines, which we expect to be completed soon. we also continue to consult closely with our allies in australia. for example, as a result of u.s.-australia foreign and defense ministerial level consultations over the past
year, the united states and australia have established a bilateral missile defense working group to examine options for potential australian contributions to ballistic missile defense. additionally, we are also consulting closely with the republic of korea, as it develops the korean air and missile defense system which is designed to defend the republic of korea against air and missile threats from north korea. the republic of korea recently announced it plans to purchase pack three missiles to enhance its capability to defend against the north korean ballistic missile threat. finally, let me say a few things about missile defense inand russia. prior to the suspension of our dialogue on missile defense as a result of russia's illegal actions in ukraine, russia continued to demand that the united states provide it quote legally binding guarantees that our missile defenses will not
harm or diminish its strategic nuclear deterrent. these guarantees would have been based on a criteria that would have limited our missile defenses and undermined our abilities to stay ahead of the ballistic missile threat. the ballistic missile defense review is quite clear on our policy. u.s. missile defense is not designed nor directed against russia and china's strategic nuclear forces. however, at the same time we have also made it clear that we cannot and will not accept legally binding or other constraints that limit our ability to defend ourselves, our allies and our partners. the security of the united states, its allies and partners, is our first and foremost solemn responsibility. as such, the united states will continue to insist on having the flexibility to respond to evolving ballistic missile threats, free from obligations or constraints that limit our bmd capabilities.
let me conclude by saying that we have made a great deal of progress on missile defense cooperation with our allies and partners around the world over the past several years. this was a key goal of the 2010 ballistic missile defense review. in europe, implementation of the epaa and nato missile defense is going well. for example, the missile defense radar in turkey has been operating since 2011. in the site in romania, it's scheduled to be operational later this year. in the middle east we are continuing to work bilaterally and multilaterally with our partners in the gcc to deploy effective missile defenses. for example, later this year the united arab emirites will get its first thaad battery. we continue to work with israel to expand its multi-layered architecture to protect it from missile threats.
in the asia pacific we're working with our allies to enhance our missile defense capabilities in the region. on that note, we completed deployment of a second missile defense radar in japan which will enhance both the defense of the united states and japan. finally, we continue to oppose russia's attempts to impose limitations on our missile defenses that would limit our ability to defend ourselves, our allies and our partners. suffice to say, defense of our allies and partners through assistance on missile defense cooperation is and will remain a key priority for the u.s. government. thank you very much, and i look forward to your questions. [ applause ] >> first of all, let me thank you for being on the panel. it's a pleasure to follow in frank's footsteps. he talked a lot about
cooperation in the missile defense area, between the united states, europe and asia. i'll talk a little bit about to potential cooperation that might work out but hasn't yet. then i'll pick up on the remarks on nato united states and russia. missile defense has been one of the truly contentious issue on the u.s.-russia relationship. there have been attempts to explore the possibility to resolve the issue, to look at possibly cooperation between the united states and russia, or nato and russia, thus far without success. back to 2007, a conversation between president bush and president putin about, could there be a cooperative effort between washington and moscow. when the george w. bush administration plan was to deploy ten ground based interceptors in poland, accompanied by a supporting radar in the czech republic. the russians were opposed to the plan. what you had was an offer from
the russian side to make available to the united states radar data from the russian radar. i think it's been closed down now. also a radar under construction. both of the radars having good views of iran. the problem was the u.s. government was interested in that idea, in addition to american plans. the russian proposal was providing the radar data in place of the plans to deploy missile defenses in europe. that never really got started. the second attempt came at the end of 2010. at a nato-russia summit, where the summit concluded with a meeting between the leaders of nato and the then-russian president, where they agreed to explore the possibility of nato-russia cooperation to defend europe. in 2011, you had active dialogue including between the pentagon and ministry of defense.
there was a dialogue going on at brookings, let by the foreign former minister. mow cow was moscow was talking a about the this. the ideas seemed to complement each other. by the spring of 2011 there was a rich menu of ideas out there as to what a nato-russia cooperation on missile defense would look like. included central elements which seemed most of the dialogues were talking about. one was the important of transparency. proceeds from the point that each side had to understand the capabilityies and the plans of the other if you were going to have a cooperative missile defense system. second, the joint exercises, where there was u.s.-russian experience going back to the late 1990s and some experience joint exercises as a way to develop the cooperation. third, sort of essential on both sides, you couldn't have a single combined system. russia was not prepared to work
for a nato commander, and nato was not prepared to work for a russian commander. the idea seemed to revolve around two independent systems that would interact at key points. but with nato retaining the control over decision to launch a nato interceptor and russia with control over the russian launch of an interacceptsepceptorinterceptor. they would interact. one was a data fusion center which would take data information from satellites, radars on the nato side, take information on the russian side, bring it to a single point combine it to generate a common operational picture. then that picture would be shared with both the nato and the russian missile defense headquarters and gif themve them a better sense of what was happening in the environment around europe. second center would be a planning and operation center, where nato and russian officers would talk about things like threat scenarios. what sorts of attack scenarios
were they worried about and what would be the rules of engagement? in the extreme, you wanted to have a situation where if there was a ballistic missile attack coming toward europe, and both nato and russia chose to engage that target, you wanted to know enough about what the other guy was going to do so your interceptors eengage the target and not each other. the official dialogue in 2011 bogged down. then you had, as frank mentioned, this russian insistence on a legal guarantee that american missile defenses not be oriented against russian strategic ballistic missiles. that demand was accompanied by what the russians called objective criteria. when you asked for explanations it meant the limits on numbers, velocity and locations of the interceptors. couple of comments on this. first, 2010/2011, i actually -- it might not have been hard to work out an arrangement.
ten-years duration that would do two things. that would limit missile defense in a way that would address stated russian concerns. even if we did not think there was much basis for the concerns. but would still allow the u.s. over the succeeding ten years to do everything it wanted to do in terms of addressing a rogue ballistic missile threat opposed by north korea or iran. i think that agreement which might have been possible was not doable here in the united states for political reasons. the second observation looking toward the future, if at some point we reach a point there is a greater degree of equivalent between missile defense capabilities and strategic offensive forces we may face a decision where we have to look at a missile defense treaty in parallel with the treaty that reduces and limits strategic offensive arms. the point i'd make is that area or time of equivalent is not now. we are far from it. in fact, there is a huge gap between offense and defense. in february of 2018 when the new limits take few effect
russia will have 1500 deployed warheads. against that, at most 44 american interceptors with the capability to attack the targets. i'd argue at this point in time, a missile defense treaty is not necessary. there was an offer in 2013 from the united states government, as a replacement, to look at an exec sieve agreement that would provide transparency on the two sides missile defense forces. on current programs and looking at ten years. the philosophy behind that was to give each side so much information that the russian military can say, here's where the americans are going to be on missile defense in 2021. here's where we will be. is that a threat? my view is they would look at that objective and conclude it's not a threat. if the threat were to emerge they would have ample time to react. there has been no sign of russian interest in that idea. the question is, where do you go next?
seems to me that arms control particularly regarding further nuclear reductions and missile defense was fairly stuck already in 2013. since then you've had the crisis over crewukraine. that's only going to make the atmosphere more difficult. the question is at what point would the russians be interested in a more serious dialogue and arms control? there may be possibilities there, if the financial burdens, difficulties in russia continue. perhaps, as you get closer to 2021 which is when the new treaty would lapse the russians would wish to explore a successor to new start. then the questions, if you get to that point will the russians be prepared for a more serious and successful discussion on missile defense that perhaps could get back to an idea of nato-russian missile defense cooperation. much is going to depend first of all on the russian attitudes. at this point it's probably not
easy to be optimistic. i try to understand where russia is going on missile defense. it seems to me there may be two or three reasons that explain their reluctance to engage in an approach. apart from the general deterioration. one is i think the russians have a certain fear about american missile defense capabilities and the potential. even if they understand some of the limits of current american missile defense programs, the russians give great credit to american technical prowlness and our ability to do things. when i was assigned to mowscow in 1986 had the portfolio in the embassy, the soviets were still panicked that the strategic defense initiative was going to put them out of the ballistic missile business. that lingers, that the americans can do a lot of if they put their minds to it. i think a second point is also that there are bureaucratic
reasons in russia that argue against cooperation. some are in the ministry of defense who don't want to cooperate because they can hold up an opposing american missile defense program as a vehicle to secure more resources for the russian programs. finally, additional impediment to talking to the russias about cooperation in europe is that means the russians having to accept there will be american military infrastructure in romania and poland. that's something they've opposed since 20 years ago. also the ability to get back to a more cooperative discussion with russia is going to depend on how far and how fast the u.s. proceeds on missile defense. i would argue that missile defense against a limited attack against the united states such as might be mounted in the future by north korea or iran is a sensible part of an american force mix. seems to me when you look at dealing with the larger scale
attack, such as mounted by russia or china offense still has the advantage over defense. one example the plan to deploy 14 additional interceptors in alaska is going to cost roughly $1 billion. my guess is either russia or china could add 14 additional offensive warheads for significantly less. at least until at some point there may be a tech ninological break through that changes that it's not now. if you want to get back to a discussion with the russians on this, which is going to require moving past the difficult point we find in the broader relationship. reassuring the russians that our intention is not aimed at a russian missile attack is going to be key to a productive discussion. thanks very much. [ applause ] >> we'll keep the conversation
going. i think i'll kick it off actually with a comment about an article you wrote this past ten days ago or so. on the limits of missile defense. the anniversary -- the 32rd anniversary of sdi. you gave a history of how the expectations are relatively modest for missile defense in the scheme of things. the offense/defense tradeoff. reminded me a comment by rice where she said what we're pursuing is not "star wars." it's not even the grandson of "star wars." it's so different. in a way, i'm struck by why is it that the russia thing keeps recurring? why do we need to worry about reassuring russia when it is so limited, after all? let me throw that to you first of all. should we be having that conversation? >> i guess i would say, i mean,
you don't want to reassure russia for -- the reason would be to reassure russia to enable you to achieve other things. if you could find a way to diffuse missile defense as a problem, does it make it easier for russia to digress future nuclear reductions? you've had over the last three years the russians, in my view have for whatever reasons concluded they don't want to proceed beyond the new treaty at this point in time in terms of nuclear reductions. they've linked the missile defense, forces three or four others probably. they have these linkages and haven't moved to solve any. seems to be aimed for a pretext of why they shouldn't do more nuclear reductions. if you can get this to a more serious discussion, could you find a way to remove missile defense as a problem? that would be one reason for assurance. again, there might be an advantage if you can get back to a cooperative russia.
you can take an issue that has been contentious and as difficult as it appears, make it a cooperative element in a u.s.-russia relationship. >> i don't have much to add to what steve said. you think he's essentially right. let me go back to a point that steve mentioned in his remarks. about russian concerns. i would say that the russians aren't especially concerned about the current level of u.s. missile defense capabilities. they know that 44 long range interceptors are not going to negate their strategic deterrent. what they're really concerned about is what comes next. and the fact that there are no legally binding limitations on numbers. more importantly the potential for u.s. technology to leap ahead. i remember an interaction i had with a senior russian general.
he was giving a briefing, showing ships in the baltic shooting down russian strategic missiles. i looked at him and said, general, that's a very interesting slide. can i ask a question? the question is this, how fast are you attributing that sea base missile defense interceptor? he looked at me in all seriousness and he said, well i believe it has a velocity burnout of 10 kilometers per second. now, there has never been a missile defense or any rocket that has a burnout of 10 kilometers a second. i said general, if you can find me a sea based missile defense interceptor that has a velocity burnout of 10 kilometers a second, let me know because i want to buy stock in that company. his response was telling. he goes you may not be there today, but you'll eventually get there. that's really the driver of
their concern. quite frankly, the russians are much more dependent on nuclear weapons in their strategy and doctrine than we are in the united states. if you look at the history of u.s. nuclear policy and doctrine over the last 25 years, through democrat and republican presidents, the objective has been to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our strategy. it's been the exact opposite with regard to russia. from the russian point of view, missile defenses -- and the potential for even more advanced missile defenses -- call into question not just from a technical perspective but political -- the value of their deterrent. that's what the russian concern is. >> speak a little more to in a way, what -- put aside a moment where the technology might lead to ten years from now.
but what more ought we be doing in europe, in the middle east and asia? you eluded to some of that in way of the activities. how much more could we work with allies in a way to alleviate our own burdens? we're putting a good part of our own budget toward regional missile defenses. potentially one might say to the expense of homeland. what can we do to boost our allies further? >> i would say there are a couple of things. first and foremost, interoperability. i talked about this in my opening statement. it's one thing to have a missile defense system. it's another to ensure that we can share information amongst our systems and with our allies. so i think that has got to be a number one priority. we're actually making a good deal of progress in that area. second, we can encourage our
allies to develop their own and purchase capabilities. i understand that we are in tight budgetary times, but i think there are useful things that we can do with our allies to leverage existing capabilities. for example, the netherlands has on their air defense radar called the smart l. they have announced a decision to invest several hundred million euros to yupupgrade the radar. the more information we can share and take advantage of existing capabilities, i think that is really where the focus needs to be. >> all right. any comments on that? why don't we open it to the floor? please state your affiliation and ask the interrogative. >> well, i'm a retired dod, former missile defense agency
employee. but i have been working the last few years exploring this concept of interoperability. you know, even in the dod, interoperability is defined as more than just exchange or sharing of information. it's the ability to use that information for operational effectiveness. so since you mentioned it a number of times, and you've eluded to it when you talk about things we've tried to do and even in missile defense we've done a little in the sea and the command and control of the area with russia as you know, where is the champion or the center of gravity or the interagency effort that's looking at interoperability from the point of view of say, policy of processes, as well as the it, where you exchange and share information? >> you know fundamentally, i think it's a partnership between
dod and state. i think there is a general recognition across most senior-level folks who work these issues both in dod and state, that this is where we need to do a better job. and i think we have made some progress over the past couple of years. that said, is there a lot more work to do to make us effective in this area? absolutely. but are we doing things to ensure that we can share more information, number one and, two, effectively use that information? i think the answer is yes. i talked in my remarks about the u.s.-japan defense cooperation guidelines. we hope to finalize that soon. one of the key elements in there, we hope is increase ways we can work together effectively
in the our ya of missarea of missile defense. >> over in the back. it's coming. >> james, u.s. atnl and cape. i have a fundamental question. is either the ambassadors aware that putin 2007 offer was a re-up of a u.s. offer put together by dr. bill frederick, working for bmdo in 1997, and provided over to the russians in 1998? specifically, one major motivation on the part of the russians may be that they felt that we disowned our own offer. >> well you know, i have worked missile defense cooperation between the u.s. and russia in the clinton bush and obama administrations. quite frankly despite a lot of
politics, there's a certain amount of continuity in u.s. offers to the russians. i'm not specifically aware of that specific proposal that you mentioned back in 1997. but what i would say is that across the spectrum of administrations, on the u.s. side, there have been very similar proposals to work with the russians on missile defense cooperation. unfortunately, none have worked. because we always at the end, come to the challenge of russia wants guarantees and limitations on u.s. missile defenses. and i think that makes cooperation very, very difficult. >> it goes back to the problem in 2007. the russian offer of data, which i think was attractive.
but the price of getting access to the russian radar data would be foregoing the plan deployed of interceptors in poland. you have to ask the question then, if you have the data that shows the missiles coming but you've given up the interceptors, you have negated the plan which was provide missile defense capability. >> richard, right in front. >> suddenly a microphone appears. thank you. so i want to bridge between the points you were making and ask about the potential effect of having the epaa deployments take place at the end of this year and again 2018 time frame. and if we remain sort of consistent with our principle of transparency transparency, say, this is what we told you weir going to do, this is what we're doing, as far as we're doing -- threat dependent. over time, and i'm discounting
the ukraine mess right now because that's stopping everything from going forward. do you steve, or you, frank perceive the possibility that russia's level of anxiety might diminish as they see that we are, in fact doing what we said we're going to do and not going to 10,000 interceptors with vbos of 10 -- et cetera. or do you an sisticipate the anxiety will not change despite the fact we've been consistent and transparent and told them exactly what we're going to do? or is that a basis for maybe ratcheting down the anxiety and maybe thinking about something? because this is designed to avoid instability miscalculation, drawing responses that we would not think are in our interest et cetera. >> well, i think the first question is, do the russians wish to have their anxiety relieved. this is the distinction between the anxieties that they portray
and the anxieties they really feel. my guess would be that the smarter people in the ministry of defense who understand this have a good appreciation for what our missile defenses can do and what they can't do. albeit, i think frank is exactly right. there is the fear of, what will the americans come up with 10, 15 years down the road? there's the distinction between the real understanding of what we can do and what they have chose ton portray. sometimes, i think it's interesting. they get themselves caught up where they talk so much about missile defenses and then you have the deputy prime minister periodically talking about the new icbm, the killer of missile defenses. they're trying to give in message targeted at, the americans are doing things that are concerning us. it's contributing to a bad relationship. what is it getting you in missile defense protection? then they have to reassure the domestic audience that the
americans have these systems but we don't worry too much. the question comes down to are the russians prepared to have those concerns alleviate sndd? if they are, it would not be hard to come up with ways to do it. >> the only thing i'd add is in addition to the technical concerns the russians have on the capabilityies of the future they're also concerned of the permanent presence of american military in eastern europe. their concerns are driven by this. >> i would add what they did in the last year is taken care of the issue. i think the pentagon term, we have, as i understand, four company-sized units each of the baltic states and poland. the pentagon explains it as a persistent deployment. my guess is persistent doesn't have much difference from permanent. those deployments are going to be there until you see a fairly major change in russia.
given the force that russia has used in ukraine. some of the rhetoric coming out of moscow and the fact you see heightened military activities like russian bombers around nato air space. >> we heard a lot this afternoon from general todorov and elaine bunn. missile defense is becoming less exotic. it's one piece of a larger portfolio of capabilities. it's also becoming very firmly entrenched in how we think about the national security. it's not a silver bullet but it's key. in a way, notwithstanding the necessity of strategic insincerity with the russians on some of these things, i wonder if you both might speak about the changing perception among everyone else.
among our allies, for example, about the an tide forppetite for missile defenses. in the middle east, they're putting real dollars behind it. certainly in asia. nato, it was part of the 2010 strategic concept. that is going to be rewritten sometime in the near future. probably not doing any less. where do you see the appetite for all this going? >> up, only up especially as the threat continues to increase. sometimes here in the united states, we try to separate missile defense from our larger national security strategy. i think one of the things that the ballistic missile defense review from 2010 does a really good job at is putting missile defense at the heart of our overarching national security strategies. quite frankly effective missile defenses are a key enabling technology for our other defense and foreign policy goals,
especially as countries try to keep and deploy capabilities to keep the united states out of regions. it is a key enabler. i think cooperation is going to continue to expand. i also think that, again, missile defense is a key element of our overarching national security and defense strategy. >> any thoughts on that? all right. bruce in the back. >> hi. again, bruce mcdonald. federation of american scientists, peace institution johns ss hopkins site. >> the russians say they're going to develop more missile defense. that's of interest to us, the work we're doing on what's looking a little bit more into the future, as a multi-polar missile defense world. u.s., china russia india. of course, they say they will.
my questions to our esteemed guests here, what have you heard russians say about what they plan to do on missile defense? more importantly what do you believe? what's bluster what's beef, what are they up to? >> that's a good question. maybe steve has some more insights on that. i've been trying to ask myself this question many years. >> i think there's a disconnect you see between the way they talk about american missile defense and when you look at russian missile defense programs. yes, 300 yes 400 s-500 they're all designed to replicate capabilities we have in thaad, pack three and the sm3. so it's not unusual for the russians to say one thing and do something else. i think they're looking at these missile defense capabilities as a logical part of their force mix. >> in the back.
>> rick arms control association. frank, you mentioned the importance of the sm32a deployments in poland by 2018. for providing territorial defense for all of europe. there has not been yet an iranian icbm flight test. there's not been a north korean icbm flight test. that would by my calculations, mean that this threat is 12 years overdue from the commission's prediction. when does the more slowly developing threat start to impact the adaptive part of the european phase adaptive approach? >> well, that's a good question. i would say the sm3 block 2a which will be deployed in poland in the 2018 time frame is not
designed to deal with icbm class threats. but medium and interimmediate range threats. you may recall back in 2013, the administration decided to restructure the sm3 block 2b missile for a variety of reasons. financial chances. a number of other problems. the bottom line is phase three of the european epaa is designed to deal with medium and inter intermediate threats. the fact that iran has not yet developed an icbm today they are continuing to develop medium and intermediate range class ballistic missiles. therefore, we are working with our friends and partners to deal with that threat.
>> presumably stay ahead of it. >> presumably staying ahead of it. >> gentleman in the front. >> thank you. edward from georgetown university. i was the last u.s. commissioner for the abm treaty so i have mixed memories of these issues. let me come back to the question of why are the russians being so on obstinent. all of the u.s. assurances are in the presence tense. we are not. almost by definition, assurances have to be in the future tense. we will not. that's what the russians are asking for. that's what we've been unable to do. find a sentence that begins with, "we will not," and then finish it in some way we can live with. seems to me, that really is our fundamental problem. thank you. >> as you noted it's been the administration's hard policy not
to agree to any legally binding restrictions exactly that way. >> let me say a couple of things. one, we're not just looking at -- well, we're not looking at russia when we're dealing with our missile defenses. we're looking at other capabilities. quite frankly, sometimes, we are surprised. for example, two years ago when we made the decision to deploy the additional 14 gbis in alaska, it was driven by the fact that north korea had paraded a new mobile icbm. we had not seen that before. so i would say, number one, we need to have the flexibility to deal with surprises like north korea's new mobile icbm. secondly, the u.s. budget process is fairly transparent. you can, by reading the missile defense agency's annual press
release, when the budget comes out, you can determine where and how many missile defense capabilities that we currently have and plan to have. i would argue that the u.s. missile defense levels have been very structured to the threat. you're not seeing hundreds of long-range missile defense interceptors. you are seeing 44. so i think, you know quite frankly, we're not going to agree to limitations. but if you look at our budget projections, as well as our deployments, i think it's very, very consistent with our rhetoric. >> i think i understand the dilemma as you described it. but it's a little surprising for me that the russians didn't pick up on the idea that administration operating in 2013 of the transparency, which would
have put, as i understood the proposal, laid out here are the plans out ten years. here are the numbers. they would have had not limits but they would have had a very clear picture at a time where i think, the numbers of missile defense interceptors would have been way below anything that would pose a threat to ballistic missile capabilities. you could have handled the problem that way. then they go up, you have to look at the question of legally binding limits if you want to get to further reductions. the russians didn't seem to pick up on that idea, at least not so far. >> we're not there yet. i think we're going to cut it off there. going five minutes for another panel. final panel will be mr. rich matlock matlock. also admiral archer macy. on future directions, both technological and otherwise. five minutes and be back for that. thank you, gentlemen. appreciate it.
[ applause ] coming up live tomorrow here on c-span3, a program on global health issues. musician elton john, the founder of the elton john aids foundation, and pastor rick warren, the minister of saddle back church. starts at 10:00 a.m. eastern on c-span3. democratic presidential candidate hillary clinton will be in las vegas. c-span will have her comments beginning at 5:45 p.m. eastern. presidential candidates often release books to introduce
themselves to voters. here's a look at some recent books written by declared and potential candidates for president. former secretary of state hillary clinton looks at her time serving in the obama administration in "hard choices." marco rubio talks about restoring economic opportunity. mike huckabee gives his opinions in "god guns grit and gravy." potential presidential candidate rick says we have to focus on the working chance. massachusetts senator elizabeth warren talks about the events in her life that reshaped her career as an educator and politician. scott walker argues republicans must offer bold solutions to fix the country and have the courage to implement them. kentucky senator rand paul who
declared his candidacy calls for smaller government and more bipartisanship in "taking a stand." more potential candidates with recent books include former governor jeb bush in "immigration wars." he along with clint bolick argue for policies. john kasich calls for a turn to traditional values. webb looks back on his time serving in the military and the senate in i heard my country calling. bernie sanders recently awe lyly announced his intention to seek the nomination for president. his book "the speech" is his eight hour long filibuster against tax cuts. in "promises to keep," joe biden looks back on his career in politics and explains his guiding principles. ben carson calls for greater individual responsibility to
preserve america's future in "one nation." in "fed up," former texas govrp governor perry says government is too intrusive and must get out of the way. another politician is lincoln chafee. in "against the tide," he recounts his time serving as a republican in the senate. carly fiorina shares lessons she's learned from her difficulties and triumphs in "rising to the challenge." louisiana governor bobby jindal criticizes the obama administration and explains why conservative solutions are needed in washington in "leadership and crisis." in "a time for truth," texas senator ted cruz recounts his journey from a cubean immigrant son to the senate. remarkable partnerships. iconic women.
their stories in first ladies, the book. >> she did save the portriat of washington, which endeerared her to the nation. >> whoever could find out what she looked like, who she was seeing, it was going to help sell papers. >> she takes over a radio station and starts running it. how do you do that? and she did it. >> she exerted enormous influence because she would move a mountain to make sure her husband was protected. >> first ladies now a book, published by public affairs. looking inside the personal life of every first lady in american history. based on original interviews from c-span's first ladies series. learn about their lives, ambitions, families and unique partnerships with their presidential spouses. first ladies presidential historians on the lives of 45 iconic american women. filled with lively stories of fascinating women who survived the scrutiny of the white house.
sometimes at a great personal cost. often changing history. c-span's first ladies is an illuminating entertaining and inspiring read. now available as a hard cover or or an e-book through your favorite bookstore or online book seller. this third panel looks at the future of missile defense systems and the technology behind them. retired admiral who heads the navy programs at cypress international. finish business development and defense all take part. >> both on the technology side also on the -- you might say the mix of capabilities. heard about that zerl times today.
to address this, we have two gentlemen. working with osd and secondly retired admiral archer macey. mr. matlock, why don't we get started with you? >> good afternoon. >> i'm rich matlock i'm the program executive for advance technologies. i've got the best job in the agency. and so i want to spend just about ten minutes or so talking you through some of the challenges we're facing over there. i came to the missile defense mission just a few years after president reagan challenged the
nation to look at ways that we might solve the problem of defending our nation against ballistic missiles as opposed to avenging our nation. so i came back as a young rocket propulsion engineer from the air force with about 10 of my compatriots. i see several of them here in the audience today, with the goal of sponsoring research, and really capitalizing on the creativity in our industry and our academia and our national laboratories to go after that challenge. so we made a bet in those days. i think it was on the order of about $2 billion or so a year in research. research in a broad spectrum of technologies and areas that would hopefully pay off down the road and get us that sort of capability. so there was a great focus broadly -- that's an interesting
term, great focus broadly on towing those technologies that might pay off in the future for us. some of those didn't pan out. some of those did much better than others. we were looking at a lot of thing. as you might recall, we were looking at, you know, at nuclear pumped lasers. we were looking at micro -- high powered microwaves. we were looking at rockets. of course in my case, we were looking at electromagnetic rail guns, giant 100-ton satellites that would launch small projectiles at 20 kilometers per second at a reign of 10,000 or so entry vehicles coming in. so as i mentioned, the $2 billion or so we spent those first six or seven years eventually paid off in some areas. and we got more focused after desert storm and looking at how
we might apply these technologies to defend our -- against missile in the theater as well as against our nation. and i want to take one of those examples, one that i worked on in particular, to walk you through how we built that foundation and where we're going to head to, i think, here in the next few years. in the early to mid-'80s, the army's ballistic missile defense command, now i think it's strategic missile defense command -- was looking at ways to apply hit-to-kill technology to destroy an incoming rv. and so they built an experimental set called the homing overlay experiment in which we launched using essentially icbm rocket motors, a very large, about the size of a refrigerator kill vehicle and
an -- at an incoming rv and they had success. but we recognized that that would be a challenge for us in the future. so for thing like the electromagnetic rail gun, we were talking about launching project tiles of about a kilogram that were the size of a bread box. so we needed to significantly miniaturize that capability if we were going to get to that -- to realize that sort of capability in the future. over time, i didn't get to a kilogram or the size of a breadback box, but we did reduce the size of those project tiles down to about six kilograms or so, and a little bit larger than a bread box. the electromagnetic rail gun technology didn't come along very well in that same time frame but we recognized by applying these project tile technologies to some of our existing systems like for example, the standard missile system in the navy, we could change answer aircraft missiles into ballistic missile defenders.
so the standard missile 3 that we have in the field today is essentially the grandson of that technology that we invented in the '80s and the early '90s. and the foundation for the systems that we have today are primarily based on that investment that we made in that time frame. so as we look at the system that general totorof described earlier today and look at what do we need to do in the future to make our ballistic defense systems more capable, i think there is two key areas we want to focus our attention on. one is to reduce the number of shots that we take at each credible object. i'm not going to discuss in any depth here the sort of shot doctrine that our war fighter employs today in order to assure ourselves that we are going to reliably defend our nation, but needless to say that if he is
going to have to shoot interceptor, since we use hit to kill technology against credible objects then it would be important for to us reduce the number of credible objects. as well as the shots that we take against each credible object. and so that's where we're focusing our technology now in those particular areas. we want to find a way to reduce the number of shots that we take at each credible object and we do that by several ways. one is we look at ways that we can improve the reliability of the interceptors we have today. that's one of the bets we are making in this year's budget is looking at ways that we can do that for our ground base and mid-course defense system. we also look at the possibility of bringing more capability to each interceptor by adding more kill vehicles to each one of those interceptors. in other words, instead of
taking several shots, being able to take one shot with several kill vehicles against that particular object and then if you think about the probabilities of reliability, there our effect goes up in that way. our system today, as you probably know, is beyond the missile warning message that we get from our overhead sensor systems in space, a primarily a terrestrial radar based system. all the sensing that we do, the tracking of the missiles that come are base on the ship bay sensor the sea based radar and our other terrestrial radar including early warning radar and what we call our continuey two, our or x band radar that does discrimination. and so all of that is what we base our decisions on in terms of how we launch our interceptors and on what path we launch our interceptors. for very long-range systems like the homeland defense system
where we expect an icbm to travel a very long distance, you can imagine how challenging it would be to get a terrestrial radar all along the path of that icbm, especially if you might envision the rate of icbms that would take different paths. so the challenge of the earth's curvature and these radar systems then brings us to the issue of how do we fine a way to more reliably track from birth to death these incoming ballistic missiles? so our vision is to do a couple of thing. one is to bring new phenomenonology, in other words, gain more knowledge about what this system looks like, what the ballistic missile raid looks like, by bringing additional sensors into this architecture. and not only radar systems, but
systems that use electrooptical phenomenonology in order to determine more about that system. so you can imagine the power of having much greater knowledge, especially knowledge that is relevant to the same sort of sensors that are on our interceptor kill vehicles. we want to get more knowledge about that system, and we want to understand it from birth to death so that we can discriminate and determine which are the two objects that we o ought to be shooting at. and so getting a more capable discrimination system here now would be a way to improve the number of shots that we have to take or reduce the number of shots that we have to take by reducing the number of thing that we might consider to be a