6.7%, but where do -- i'm just curious. where should it be? if not 6.7%, should it be 3%? 2%? is that the goal? are we making progress or is it -- have we plateaued at 6.7%? or has it risen to 6.7%? i don't know the trend. i'm curious about what can you share with us about the level of abuse. >> sure. if you look year on year there's availability in the number. i think there's two things i think really have greatest impact on the number. one is, what are the requirements we are implementing that might be new requirements so we're working to enforce more closely. what we find from a program integ standpoint when there are new requirements, inherently the error rate tends to rise. even legitimate providers are not able to keep up with those changes. so, it takes a period of education to actually get

everybody into compliance that then allows the trend to come back down. >> is the trend going down? >> i don't have figures in front of me. there's year-on-year change but we can get that to -- >> let's say over the last 15 years, is the trend, is it increase organize decreasing? >> we can go back as far as the error rate has been measured but we can get that to you. >> i yield back my time. >> we all have members who have spoken for. i want to wrap up -- >> oh, mr. bilirakis. >> i'm sorry. i would ask unanimous consent to enter statement from the national community pharmacy statement. >> without objection. >> to mr. mckinley's question real quick, and i understand that maybe maryland, d.c., virginia, you can check that but there are some real difficulties.

if you count the common wealth of virginia, if you work it out really well, you could hit five states in a single dwat. i think we should be looking in some way doctors can check because you get down there in that little corner and you're touching west virginia, kentucky, north carolina, all within a matter of 45 minutes to an hour. you would have to be at the door steps of everybody but you could hit five states in a single day. my question also is about the methodology used in oig questionable billing practices. we all to want stop these thi things. as the five factors seemed cut and dry without much additional consideration, the broad generalization about pharmacies which may not paint the whole

picture. i represent a fairly rural area. that area has a higher percentage of senior citizens than whole. simply because there are not as many pharmacies around and perhaps other pharmacies have a younger population they serve. also it would not be -- for them to have a higher dispensary. there are also pharmacies who are contract providers for long-term care facilities and hospice. so, how does cms plan to address the results to truly target the bad actors we want to get to without hitting guys who are just trying to serve their customers? this came up earlier as part of

a complaint because one of my rural pharmacies has a supplier for medicines and one point got cut off and they have to tell their customers, i can't fill it today, come back at the end of the week when we change months. that's hard when-f you're a senior citizen. you need that pain medication. in fact, a friend of mine's wife was told that, who had just gone through surgery. she had to wait three days. they managed. that's that's really not the way it ought to work. whether you're in the rural areas or -- how do we fix it? >> you make a good point. this kind of data analysis is a starting point. as to the specific methodology, i'll defer to the oig, but data analysis is the beginning point of our investigations. now, i had shared earlier on a month -- on a quarterly basis we send lists of concerning or high-risk pharmacies to part "d" plan spon source. our methodology takes 16

variables into account and in order for a pharmacy to make it onto a list, they have to be a statistical outlier in four areas. the purpose there, what you're trying to do there, bring more specificity to the methodology. after that follows the investigation. i think it's challenging, unless the data is extremely cut and dry, which occurs in rare situations, to take administrative action without ensuing investigation. that's where we try to get to the bottom of, is something really bad happening or or is this just a an outlier or explained by geographic reasons. >> we have pipeline issues and i was in the other hearing. mr. chairman, i appreciate your time and i yield back. >> now recognize mr. bilirakis from the full committee for five minutes. >> thanks for allowing me to participate today.

>> something congress should be proud of. however, i've been concerned about the growing prescription drug problem within the u.s. and the medicare program. that's why in 2013 myself and our colleague first introduced medicare part "d" patient safety and abuse prevention act which would prevent physician shopping and pharmacy shopping within the medicare program. it's important to medicare program to bring common sense provision that's been used in medicare, tricare and insurance. in keeping with some of the oig

recommendations such as 21st century cures bills. makes those reforms. the first question is for miss maxwell. in your testimony you talk about the need for a lock in program in medicare part "d" to deal with prescription abuse and problem with diversion. do have you any estimate on the size of the problem, how many people and how much money are being lost to prescription drug abuse? >> i don't have the specific figures but i do have the figure in our date brief that the growth in prescribing opioids, 150% increase, which outpaces the growth in the general program, so it's a continuing concern. we've seen a tremendous increase in complaints against part "d" so we have significant concerns about this. we do as a result recommend the lock-in. we've been talking about different ways to deal with

dr. shopping which can result in patient harm or diversion of opioids into the street, one way is the pdmp to provide access to the data around this issue and state lines. specifically directed at that issue. >> very good, thank you. >> dr. agrawal, sorry if i mispronounce. i just got here. >> can you give me an update on this? how many abusive prescribers have been identified in the medicare program and how many have been removed from the medicare program? >> this is part of our overall approach to extending our requirements in part "d." we've been working on getting prescribers enrolled. i mentioned there are 400,000 prescribers we're working to

enroll. i'm not sure we have conducted a specific revocation action. usually we try to do those in combination. but i can look into whether there's a case we uniquely utilize that authority. >> thank you. one more question, mr. chairman? ms. maxwell and dr. agrawal, when they finished their investigation, i assume it's automatically referred to doj, is that case? >> i do believe they make requirements. >> if doj chooses not to pursue the case maybe because of the view of the fraud is too small to be worth their time, does the information get automatically referred to state and local agencies or state licensing authorities? can you answer that question?

>> i'm not aware of that specific mechanism. i know we're concerned when. >> again, i'm not familiar with the specifics. perhaps dr. agrawal. >> i think this was in the testimony. the medic provided 2300 referrals to law enforcement over the last five years. obviously, we try to refer as much over to law enforcement as we can we think kind of meets the threshold for activity and investigation. where law enforcement doesn't accept the case, we have a few options. >> we are going to take you live to a discussion on the technical and political aspects of the iran nuclear deal, which the senate will start debate on in about an hour.

>> good afternoon. i'm glad you're able to make it. it gives me good pleasure as director of washington office of international crisis group to introduce our president, john reganao, the undersecretary for peace-keeping under kofi annan and a distinguished french diplomat who has also worked on issues of conflict over his entire career. we are quite proud and please we had have him as president over the last year. with that, let me introduce john marie. >> i'm particularly pleased to be here this afternoon to

co-host this event, with president who is here with us and we'll take part in the pa l panel. this is the issues we're going to discuss today are among the most important that have come in the last 20 or 30 years. when i think of the complexity of this agreement, i think it compares only to those arms control agreements that were negotiated in the '70s, in the '80s, and the reason why it compares to those is because it's not an agreement which is just, let's say -- a statement of generalities, diplomatic niceties. it is a complex contract, not based on trust but on

verification, on detailed arrangements. and that's what makes it comparative to what we saw in the s.a.l.t. and the major arms control agreement decades ago. i think the comparison stops there. i would want to share with you before i introduce our speakers, i would want to share two thoughts with you that makes that agreement very different from the arms control treaties of the '70s and '80s. major difference is those agreements were essentially bilateral -- were bilateral agreements between the united states and the soviet union. no trust between the united states and the soviet union, no trust between the signatories of this agreement and iran.

the difference today is signatories. i don't say signatory. this is an international agreement. and this is the final result innocent a way of four years of negotiation but more accurately of some 12 years of engagement. it all started in 2003 the date is interesting because that was the iraq war, deep worries saddam hussein could have weapons of mass destruction, that is the year when north korea withdrew from the npt, so there was a sense the whole nonproliferation regime could unravel and that the only possible response was war. hence, the initiative at the time of the uk, france and

germany to engage iran diplomatically, an initiative that then became an eu initiative with solano becoming a big part of the engagement and leading the engagement with the iranians. that came to nothing. ahmadinejad becoming president in 2005 and then you have a second stage in the issue with the security council being brought in, by means of legal coercion that did not exist before. so, what we see today is the product of a very intense diplomatic engagement of the united states with iran. it's also in a way the productive intense diplomatic

engagement of a range of actors. the europeans, the permanent members of the european council, nonmembers of the u.n. security council, united states, china and russia. that is what is behind this agreement. today when we think of the international community, words that most come to one's mind are unraveli unraveling. it's not a time when we see the international community together. it's a time when we see the international community actually in terrible shape, not being able to agree on most issues. the fact this agreement is the one with with exception to that fragmenting sxun raveling of the international community. so, that's, i think, an important point for when one considers this agreement.

the second thought i want to share before introducing the panelists, when you consider the arms control agreements, they were achieved in a context of relative strategic stability. well, there was some implicit agreement on a status quo. this agreement -- the geopolitical context of this agreement is profoundly different because it's -- it comes in a region that is the most volatile in the region. certainly no agreement on what the status quo should be. if you talk to riyadh, if you talk to tehran, you want the same answer. actually, that context is one of the reasons why the europeans stand so strongly behind this agreement.

because they believe if you added a nuclear iran to a very unsettled region, you would just compound the immense dangers we see in the middle east region. and so this agreement is all the more remarkable because it is achieved in that context of instability and lack of agreement on the status quo. i would conclude that point by saying that in a way, the discussion, and it's understandable because at the moment the agreement is before the congress and so it's normal to focus on the technicality of the agreement, which is what we're going to do in a minute. the focus for tomorrow should be on the context of the agreement, because as you will -- as you know, and as it will be explained to you, this agreement has a whole set of time frames. from five years, eight years

to -- that's for the sanctions, ten years, 15 years, 20 years, 25 years, so there's a whole period of time that is opening before us. and the political challenges, how are we going to use that time? how are we going to use that time so that once those years have gone through, do we have the stability of the region or did we just open a period of calm -- i mean, of nonproliferation but didn't resolve the fundamental issue of the region? that is the political work before us which is a decade long effort that needs to be made. and i think there is going to be quite important really to focus on the politics of the region so that the implementation of the agreement on the one hand is all

the technicalities of it, on the other hand is all the political context to make sure that this agreement is a foundation for a different middle east and not just nonproliferation agreement, which is already a huge achievement. now, to discuss we have an extraordinary panel. tom pickering, unfortunately, missed the plane and is not with us this morning. regrets it very much. we have sandy berger. you have the biographies of all the participants. i don't think i need to go into the biography of sandy, former national security adviser of president clinton who will speak to the national security interests of the united states. but i would add one point on sandy's biography. he's one of our distinguished trustees at the international crisis group and very pleased to

have him on our board. the president of the fund co-hosting this event, who is world known experts on nonproliferation and will speak to the implications of this agreement for the broader context of nonproliferation. and then our own international crisis group analyst, who has been engaged in the negotiation relentlessly, i would say, as relentliless as the diplomats negotiating in the last four years and playing a very important role behind the scenes and talking to all the actors because he has this rare quality of understanding both the technicalities of the issues and there are numerous, at the same time, the politics of them. without further ado, i'll ask sandy to get us started.

>> i'm pleased to be here under the auspices of the international crisis group, dh in am ways with eyes and ears of conflicts around the world, and plachours at the heart of the groups -- i'm pleased to be part of this. abraham lincoln used to tell the story of man was lost in a forest on a very dark night in a vicious storm. every minute there would be a thunderous roar of thunder and

flash of lightning. finally he looked up and said, god, i would appreciate a lot more light and a lot less noise. i think that's an admonition we would bring to this debate so far on iran. a lot more light and a little more noise in the debate. if all you were doing is listening to the congressional discussion of this, you would think the agreement is somewhere between horrible and just good enough. and i think that's misleading because those who are against it think it's horrible, but if you are a democratic senator and you made a very courageous judgment to be for this, you also have to deal with all those folks who are against it.

. it's a lot easier to say, i heard your arguments, there are good arguments. this was a close call. i'm forethis. but i realm recognize all the things you said. so, you have a discussion -- who want to stand up. we'll see how the debate unfolds. bear that in mind. i'm not sure this is an accurate reflection of how congress really feels. i would say this is a very strong agreement for arms control perspective, from national security perspective. it's very strong. i will let my colleagues to the left, who are real experts on

this describe the pieces of this. i will just give my top lines here are, i believe it will prevent iran from getting a nuclear weapon for at least 15 years, maybe more. i think it prevents a key threat to the stability of the middle east. and i think its verification provision, our ability to know what is going on, i think are very strong. stronger than any arms control adwreement ever, i think. so, on the positive side, i think there's a strong, strong case. litd me fo let me focus on three issues the opponents -- critics are talking about and address those. one is, we should defeat this

and get a better deal. but more pressure on iran and get a better deal. everyone would like a better deal. but it won't happen. it can't happen. it can't happen for a number of reasons. number one, our partners in this enterprise have no room for negotiation. they think this is a pretty darn good deal. as does most of the world. they're not interested in more sanctions. the out imrim of the sanctions regime which has been china, india, south korea, japan, which is what has made these sanctions work, with great credit to president obama and secretary clinton, who put this regime together, they have no interest in more sanctions.

so, there won't be pressure on iran. in fact, i think existing sanctions will quickly erode. but sanctions worked. sanctions did exactly what they were designed to do. i can't think of another case, except south africa, where sanctions have worked as well as this. the iranians came to the table. probably helped change the government. and negotiated a serious agreement. some people think that's wrong. some people think this is wrong but it's a serious agreement. no one is interested in new sanctions. from the iranian point of view, if you want to get to a better deal, you have to imagine the following conversations, which i have a hard time imagining,

because presumably during these negotiations for a better deal, things freeze. you have to imagine president rouhani saying i told mr. khomeini, mr. leader, supreme leader, i'm not sure what he calls him, i think we should stay at this. i think we should continue to comply. notwithstanding the united states has no obligation. notwithstanding that horrible, ugly debate you just heard for the last three weeks, which they said every bad thing about iran you can imagine. but we'll take the high ground. we'll stay with this. if he's still in the office, he then has to say, oh, by the way, i think we should make some more concessions. i can't see that conversation. so, i can't see how the a

iranians will do any better. i don't think there is a better deal. i think this is a good deal. it's an illusion. it's self-delusion. and we better get it off the table as quickly as possible. the second proposition here is that iran, with all of this new money that it gets, will increase its sponsorship for radical groups in the region, hezbollah, hamas, and others, and that will cause turmoil in the region. i happen to be an iran hawk. i do believe iran is a threat in the region and i do believe iran -- iran's intention, at least at presence, is to gain

influence over the region. one reason i'm for this agreement is because i would rather be dealing with an iran who doesn't have a nuclear weapon rather than iran who does have a nuclear weapon and can use that to intimidate its neighbors, can use that to try to keep outside powers from moving in to help its neighbors. that's a reason for the agreement, not against the agreement. iran will have more money. first off, it's not $100 billion. it's $56 billion. . there are claims against it. some will come back against iran. and presumably if the iranian economy is healthier, it will generate more revenue and more revenue will be available to spend on external matters.

this is just the context i would put that in. number one, those kids were demonstrating on the streets. not because they were happy to get rid of centrifuges. they were demonstrating on the streets because they see an opportunity to have a better life. they see an opportunity to get what they're watching on television. suddenly the iranians ship all that money to assad, i think they're going to have a heavy, heavy price. it's a very repressive government, but, you know, this is a very connect the generation in terms of the internet. very young, connected. there are estimated to be half a trillion dollars of unmet domestic needs in iran as a result of these actions. if a lot of that money doesn't go, to dealing with those needs,

i think they'll be in trouble. i think we have to have a regional strategy. i think president obama is moving that direction to help our friends and allies, better deter and defend themselves against iranian pressure, whether it's not only through arms but through other ways. the gulf countries now spend eight times what iran spends. it's not really money that is giving iran an advantage here. it's capabilities and other asymmetric advantages. the third thing swirling around

here is that verification provisions are not really effective. joe probably knows who said that. i don't remember who said that. it was unfortunate because no country anywhere would permit any time, anywhere inspection. only time i know, joe's the expert, that that's happened has been in iraq. >> yeah. >> after the invasion. we were occupying iraq. we just defeated iraq in the war. it was kind of a false expectation. but i want to put it in a bigger context. think of it as a big puzzle, 1,000 pieces. we'll have 24/7, full scope monitoring of all of iran's nuclear program. stuff coming in.

the mines where they mine uranium, mills where they mill, places where they make centrifuges, places where they assemble the centrifuges. step by step by step. n inspectors, by cameras, by s.e.a.l.s, totally, totally transparent. so, 99%, 98% of this thing is an open book. what this whole debate and discussion of 24 days being too long is about a couple pieces of this pudzle up here in the corner. we don't know if they're there or not, but there may be -- what if there's some sites, we see something going on at a military base. first of all, the simple fact of that is, we've seen it through our intelligence. and we want to go in and see it.

iaea asks to go in and see it and iran says, no, you can't go in. so, we're talking about that subset of issues. in that case there is -- we could just go blast our way in. we could land a fleet. i don't think anyone is in favor of doing that. so, there's a process. the process does have -- it's a 24-day process and it's various phases of it. i think that's a good time period because hopefully pressure will build on iran during that period to open it up. it involves the countries that negotiate with iran and iran, but ultimately if iran does not open the site, any country -- any country, any of the p5+1 countries, they can go to the u.n. and push a button and have the sanctions reimbowsed. can't be stopped.

can't be stopped by russia. can't be stopped by china. can't be stopped by iran. so, we have the ability. you know, that's the ultimate enforcement tool. the last thing i'll say and i'll stop is some of the critics say, it's too big a tool. it's like having a nuclear bomb, you know, to do traffic control. you'll never use it. that's a pretty good argument, actually. but there are alternatives. we have our own sanctions, our own unilateral sanctions, which we can impose if we can't get our allies to go along or if we think bringing the whole thing down is too much. so, we have a range of options to go after iran under those circumstances. i'll stop there. there are a thousa1,000 questio 1,001 answers.

>> thank you very much. i'm the president of plow shares fund. it's our pleasure to join with international yisz group in this session. thank you very much for this opportunity to partner with you. this is why we got involved in the iran issue. we don't do the middle east. we do nuclear. and we saw iran as one of the greatest nuclear threats facing the world and we tried to muster our resources to focus on this threat, to provide grants to groups working on this threat. to find a way diplomatically to stop iran from getting a bomb and stop a new war in the middle east. we are very close to achieving that goal. today, as many of you know, we got 41 senators to say they were

in support of the iran agreement painstakingly negotiated over these last few years. this brings us very close to the possibility of being able to defeat, even without a veto, any threat by the u.s. congress to kill this deal. we'll see how this plays out in the next few days. i'm delighted spann is covering this panel. i want to thank spann for this opportunity. c-span is one of the many pleasurable addictions many of us have in washington that's still legal. and it's been a source of great information for and against this deal as this drama has unfolded. there's lots of things to be said about this. they're all being said, it seems, today. if you're involved in iran, this is like new year's day. there are so many games to watch, you're not sure which one to tune into.

this one you'll see where we dig a little deeper into the agreement, into what this agreement actually is, because, to be fair, as my previous speakers have mentioned, so much of the debate has been dominated by criticism, what's wrong with it, picking at this piece, that part, stretching it out, magnifying the flaws in agreement as they seem to be somewhere between a terrible agreement and barely good enough. the fact is, as a nonproliferation expert, this is by far the strongest nonproliferation agreement i have ever seen. this does more to stop a country from getting nuclear weapons, to stop a region from getting nuclear weapons and preventing the rest of the world from pursuing nuclear weapons programs than any treaty i have ever seen. and i include in that the nonproliferation treaty, the mother of all nonproliferation agreements. the core of the nonproliferation

regime. this deal is actually stronger than the nonproliferation treaty. it's certainly longer. at 159 pages, it is much, much longer than the original nonproliferation treaty. the original npt had a very weak verification regime. this has the strongest verification regime ever negotiated. the u.s. would have to physically occupy iran to get -- to get a better verification deal than this. let me explain a little bit about why i say that and why in the nuclear policy world this agreement is noncontroversial. there is an overwhelming consensus of nuclear policy -- in favorite of this agreement. i was pleased to sign a statement by 75 of the world's leading nonproliferation experts just a couple of weeks ago, praising this agreement and urging congress to pass it. you have to search pretty far

and wide to find a nonproliferation expert who is against this agreement. some who have criticisms, wish i could have said this, wish i could have said that, want to work on the nonproliferation aregime. to oppose it? hard to find a nuclear weapons expert actually against this adpreement. here's why. when the u.s. entered into this with our european partners and russia and china, we had three objectives. one, block iran's pathway to a bomb. two, put in place a verification regime that could catch iran should it try to cheat and, three, keep together the international coalition that had allowed the strongest sanctions regime ever placed on a country outside of war to be put into effect. and allow if iran should cheat, we can snap back those sanctions nearly instantaneously. we achieved every one of those

goals. this agreement shrinkwraps iran's nuclear program. it shrinks it to a fraction of its current state. it wraps it in the toughest inspection regime i've ever seen and it then freezes it for 15 years. almost all the restrictions you'll see in this charts, almost all these restrictions last at least 15 years. some start to come off then. we set up a special procurement channel so everything iran buys has to go to this special procurement channel. what country does that? this agreement mandates iran has to do that. some start to come off in 20 years, 25 years, but some of these are like diamonds. they last forever. iran is never allowed to built a

nuclear bomb. the inspection regime is never allowed to end. even as some of these restrictions are relaxed 15, 20, 25 years from now, eternity in national security terms, those barriers remain. no nuclear weapons ever, forever an inspection regime. this for me has implications far beyond iran. this deal tackles the most difficult nonproliferation threat we faced. north korea is difficult but this one threatened to unleash a nuclear arms deal in the mideast. if iran got the bomb, there was a very high probability other countries would at least in the region, at least try to get a nuclear bomb. so you were looking at the possibility of a middle east nuclear arms race and looking at the possibility the ente nonproliferation regime, the

entire interlocking network unraveling. for me, this would have been a disaster. this would have been a catastrophic fail you're of our effort to try to contain the bomb. but with this agreement, we bottle up iran's nuclear program. you have to understand what we're talking about here. know you've heard a lot about, oh, it's going to take us 24 days to inspect some sites. or that iran's going to self-inspect or other tiny parts of the argument that have been picked out and rayed. you have to look at what actually happens to iran. they have to rip out two-thirds of their centrifuges and put them in lock and seal and warehouses under the monitoring of the atomic international energy agency. they have to take 98% of their

uranium stockpile. remember the cartoon bomb benjamin netanyahu brought to the podium where he warned iran was at that red line, this deal drains that bomb. there is no uranium left in that bomb after that deal. they go from -- they have to eliminate 98% of the uranium. not even by diluting it. they have to ship it out of the country. they're left with about 300 kilograms of low enriched uranium. you know what you can do with that? squat. can't built a bomb. can't make fuel. it's a token element that is left. some of the real news has gone uncommented on for most of this debate. that's that this deal completely eliminates the pru tolutonium p way to a bomb. iran was building a research

reactor at the araq site. this was a research reactor for peaceful purposes. the problem was that the fuel it was using would, during the lifetime of that reactor, three, four years, generate enough plutonium to make a bomb. as that reactor -- if that reactor were to go into place, it would be producing approximately enough plutonium for two to three bombs every year. if you remember a few years ago when there was talk about going to war with iran, that was the reason. israel saw that reactor and they said, that's a threat to us. we cannot allow that reactor to go operational. how do they know that? because that's how israel made their bombs. most countries in the world use plutonium, not uranium to build their bombs. israel built a reserve reactor many years ago and said it was for peaceful purposes. secretly used plutonium.

there have 100 to 200 nuclear weapons made out of plutonium. when they saw iran doing the same thing, they understood what that meant. this is a proliferation path. this is what north korea did. israel was justifiably concerned about this. this deal, as "the new york times" reports today, completely eliminates that possibility. iran has to take out the core, what's called the cauldron, of its research reactor, take it out, drill it full of holes, fill it full of cement. they have to completely reconfigure the react sorry they can operate it and the new configuration will produce less than a kilogram of plutonium every year. that's a quarter of what you need for one bomb. and even that has to be shipped out of the country once it's taken out of the reactor. iran promises it won't build any reprocessing facilities to do what israel or north korea have done to take that plutonium out of the spent fuel and build a

bomb with it. so, as a nonproliferation expert, i'm excited by these provisions. these provisions set a new standard for countries. maybe you've heard that this deal might set off a nuclear arms race in the middle east. there was a former saudi official who said, we want every capability iran has. and that led to fears if you let iran keep even a token amount of uranium enrichment, which this deal allows, that saudi arabia would say, well, we want some, too. has as a nonproliferation expert i would say, okay. if you want to accept this package, you want to accept this deal and go enrich uranium, go at it. because this is the new gold standard for nonproliferation. the new gold standard for how you contain and monitor a program. how you can build in the maximum

tools for assuring a peaceful program stays peaceful. it's not an absolute guarantee. a country could still break out. iran could still break out. but what this package gives you is years of warning, years of warning. under this deal for at least 15 years, if iran were to break out, you would know it and you would have a year of warning before they were able to make one material for one bomb. but that's just make the material for one bomb. that's not build a bomb. it would take another year or two afterwards to actually manufacture a weapon. no country has ever broken out with one bomb. you have to test it. after you test, it you got no bombs. so when you look at this package in its whole, you see the incredible security it gives you, not just for iran's program, but for the potential of becoming a standard for the nonproliferation regime. here's the kicker and here's where i'll close.

you often hear the phrase, countries like iran and north korea. well, there are no countries like iran and north korea. there is only iran and north korea. these are the last iran and nor korea. these are the last two countries with programs of this type, so ambitious that they could get nuclear weapons like north korea has done in the last couple of years, or on the flesh hold, which is what you feared with iran's program. there's nobody else with a program this large. if you can stop iran's program like this, if you can apply some of the terms to north korea and you can end these last two, you could be looking at the end of proliferation. the wave that began after hiroshima, where one country after another decided they had to get nuclear weapons. that wave crested, crested about 25 years ago. and the last 25 years, more countries have given up nuclear weapons and have tried to acquire them. more countries have given up

nuclear weapons programs and tried to acquire them. we're down to these last two. and you've just taken one off the list. better be careful how i use my fingers there. you've taken one off the list. for nuclear policy experts, this is a deal that's an historic breakthrough, a diplomatic triumph. something that can make not just the united states safer, no the just israel safer, but make the world safer. thank you very much. >> good afternoon, everyone. thank you for coming. as joe said, you've heard a lot about this agreement in the past few weeks. and you're going to hear a lot about it today. so i thought i would do something a bit different to make it more interesting for you. i will first visualize some of the things that you've heard about this agreement in the

past, and then i will tell you something you have not heard about it in the past few weeks. so hopefully that would make it a bit more interesting. so let's start with the visualization. as you heard from joe and sandy, this deal goes a long way in rolling back iran's nuclear capabilities. but what is difficult maybe for some people to realize or to visualize is that what happens if there is no deal? what happens if we go to the path that we were on before we got to the negotiations? so i want to show you a few graphs starting from that side. the number of centrifuges that iran had. and i would like you, i would like you to focus on three time periods. first, from the beginning of the time frame to 2013. that's what i call the period of escalation. and then, from 2013 to 2015, which was the period of

negotiation, and then from 2015 onwards, that's the post deal scenario, depending on if this deal survives or if it is, it can no longer be killed at this point, but it is undermined in some way or another and doesn't come into force. if you look at the number of centrifuges, iran went pretty quickly from 2006 to 2009 when president obama came to office to around 7,000 centrifuges, 7,000, 8,000 centrifuges. and from that point until 2013 when the geneva agreement, the joint plan of action, jpoa froze the program, iran went up to 19,000 centrifuges. so then the graph plateaus between 2013 and 2015. if this deal comes into force, we know exactly what's going to happen to that trend. it is going to come down to

5,060 centrifuges, and it will stay that way for ten years. and i would actually say for 12 years. because the total number, or the total enrichment capacity of iran stays constant until year 12. end of year 12. now, if there is no deal, it's harder to predict exactly what's going to happen. but let's take the critics at their word and believe that if there is no deal, the best alternative is to start ratcheting up sanctions and hope that we would put enough pressure on iran to make more concessions. well, that will take us probably to the previous pattern which was escalation for escalation, right? and in that scenario, iran, given the fact it can produce 50 ir-1 centrifuges a day, you see how the graph and the no deal scenario just goes up and up and up. and by the end of this ten-year period, we will get to about

60,000, 50,000, 60,000 ir-1 centrifuges. well, the same thing will happen in the facility that is under a mountain and has the capacity of 3,000 centrifuges. iran installed 3,000 centrifuges there by 2010. it didn't turn on all the machines, but it installed 3,000. it was operating around 800 of those. if there is an agreement, this number comes down to 1,000 ir-1 centrifuge machines installed, but only 350 will operate. and they will not even enrich uranium, they will only enrich stable isotopes, which are not dangerous at all. and it will stay that way, again, for ten years. if there is no agreement, iran can overnight turn on all the 3,000 centrifuges that it has installed. now, these are the old primitive

machines we're talking about. also has more sophisticated centrifuges, the more advance centrifuges, several models of them. and currently, it has about 1,000 second generation machines that are installed, ready to go. they just have to turn them on. ir-4, ir-6, ir-8. now if the agreement comes into fours, that number goes down to one per machine. so one ir-2, one ir-6, ir-5, ir-8. for 8 1/2 years. and from that point on, iran can operate 30 machines. so a huge reduction compared to where we are. whereas if there is no deal, as i said, they can turn at least thousand ir-2 machines they have installed, turn them on overnight. now, let's come here to this side of the room and look at the stockpiles of enriched material.

the stockpile of 5% enriched material grew pretty quickly from 2007. and it went up to around 10,000 kilograms before the jpoa came into force. if there is a deal as joe mentioned, this will be significantly reduced to 300 kilograms if there is no deal, this stockpile is there and if you project based on the previous patterns, it can grow pretty quickly. it can go up to 30,000 by 2030. same pattern with 20% enriched uranium. it went up to around 190 kilograms from 2010 to 2013. and by the way, prime minister netanyahu's red line was drawn

at 250 kilograms. iran was pretty close to it. actually, the jpoa already got rid of this stockpile, or drains that cartoon bomb that netanyahu held up in the u.n. it's already gone, but iran has the capacity of, again, producing it. and based on the previous pattern, if there is no deal, by 2030, iran will be able to have, not 250 kilograms that prime minister netanyahu is worried about, but 900 kilograms of 20% enriched material. and all of this, of course, contributes to the breakout time, which is the amount of time needed to enrich enough material for one nuclear weapon. iran's breakdown time came down pretty quickly from 2007 to 2013. it came down from 18 months all the way down to around 2 months. by the -- since the obama

administration came to office, it has always been below 6 months. and the joint plan of action already increased that to around 3 1/2, 4 months. if the agreement comes into force, breakout time will go up to 12 months and will remain there for 15, between 10 and 15 years. and if there is no deal, breakout time can actually shrink significantly almost overnight depending on which of these steps iran actually decides to implement to match the escalation that comes from ratcheting up the sanctions. and by the end of 2015, we can go down to about 1 month. or by the end of 2016, to zero. almost zero breakout time. now, i'm not using this just as a scare tactic to say if there is no deal, it would be a

doomsday scenario. but it's important to understand iran's logic behind this mutual pattern of escalation. the iranians believed that if as a weaker country dealing with six world powers, they change or they're seen as changing their nuclear policy as a result of sanctions. then, the west can put pressure on them to change everything else, all the other strategic decisions that they have to make, as well. they wanted to make sure that the west doesn't get the signal that sanctions actually will change iran's policy. and that's why they try to match the leverage that the united states was trying to build with sanctions with their own, ratcheting up their own nuclear capabilities. i believe they will escalate if there is no agreement. we don't know exactly how, and would they remain below the red lines, or not.

and i don't want to make that prediction. if you compare the deal to no deal scenario, we will, of course, be in a much more difficult situation. now, this gets me to the second point that i wanted to make. now, imagine that we come to the conclusion that we don't like these downward trends, and the certainty we get with the deal. we want to take the risk of escalation and see if we can get a better deal with iran. now, i would argue from the perspective of iranian politics, a better deal is actually more dangerous. let me give you a few examples. imagine that this famous provision or infamous provision of 24 days, you know, with some miracle, iran comes back to the table and accepts to go down to two-hour notice for inspection of suspect sites. not 24 days as a challenge inspection. now, let's imagine how that's

going to work in practice. so as soon as the ia/ea has some kind of intelligence about suspect activity in a site, they have to show up there. they have to get access almost immediately. without the iranians having an opportunity to study the evidence to discuss ways and means of making sure that it is safeguarded. we're mostly talking about military sites under the control of the revolutionary guards. and by the way, the guards are not a big fan of this agreement. during the past few years. and they're concerned about infiltration by western intelligence as a result of doubling the number of inspectors on the ground at any day and any time in iran.

so this will make the revolutionary guards, which is already resentful about this agreement very sensitive, ve very -- even more opposed than it is today. and that, of course, does not make for a sustainable agreement in the long run. if you have every day a witch hunt, somewhere in the country because now, let's get you have to remember, there are around a few hundred people, if not a w few -- thousand people actually working in the research and

development area of iran's nuclear program. if the program is totally shut down, these people will be out of work and probably pushed undergrounds. and these are the kind of people that you don't want to be unemployed and pushed underground. it will also have another effect, which is important, i think, to say in the city and for people to remember that we're talking about a very proud nation, which wrongly or, you know, for right reasons believes in this nuclear program as a symbol of national pride. so an agreement that actually provides for unfettered access, the same way that you heard from our distinguished panel was implemented in a country that was vanquished in war. of course, it will humiliate the iranian nation.

and not only president rouhani will have a hard time keeping up a deal like that, but the next president who might come to office in iran in 2017 will be in a very difficult position. so the bottom line that i want to emphasize here is it's just not enough to get a good deal, a good deal is a sustainable deal. and it's only sustainable if it is sustainable for both sides. let me stop here, i look forward to discussion. >> yep, i would be happy to get questions after the excellent presentations. you introduce yourself. who wants to ask the first question or comment?

>> mentioned that the iran nuclear program was at the top of their -- his group's concern. where does israel rank in your scale of concern? >> there are three major threats you face if you're worried about a nuclear bomb going off some place in the world. you're worried about the new countries that are trying to get them. that's iran and north korea. you're worried about a terrorist group that could get their hands on a bomb or a material. and you're worried about the nine countries that currently have nuclear weapons. there are about 16,000 nuclear weapons in the world and you're worried that one of those could be used in anger or by miscalculation or by accident. israel is certainly one of those countries, it has an undeclared nuclear weapons program. people estimate it somewhere between 100 and 200 nuclear weapons. i personally think it's at the low end of that scale. so, israel would be one of those countries where you're worried

that something could go terribly wrong. that a bomb could go off whether they intended to, or not, or that a conflict could arise where they might feel forced to use that weapon. i must say it's not at the top of my list of countries with nuclear weapons. if i was to think about the country i worry about the most, that would be pakistan. which for my money is the most dangerous country in the world. it has already enough nuclear weapons, almost as many as israel, is racing past that, building nuclear weapons faster than any other country on earth and, of course, in a very unstable situation both internally and regionally. >> yes? >> yes. norm from aei. sandy, let me direct this the first at you. the ranking democrat on the foreign relations committee agonized a long time and finally announced he would not support

the deal. but has said he's going to introduce a legislative package that will include more resources for israel in the event of additional terrorist activities on the part of iran or supporting them. a path wway -- you think this ia good idea as a follow-up? and two, is there any prospect that this could actually provide a different kind of coalition of support? in the aftermath of acceptance of the deal that would move us away from what's become a very sharply partisan issue. >> i think there'll likely be some other addition. as long as it's consistent with the treaty and doesn't initiate any part or trigger any

provision of the treaty, i personally have no problem with it. a number of those things are things that the president has said or has committed to. and probably won't be terribly happy -- constructive to have members have something that could vote four. when it gets to sanctions, like if that's the tricky zone, you know, i noted in my remarks, i don't think further sanctions are going to be effective. i don't think any other country in the world will enforce our sanctions. can you imagine angela merkel calling in the ceo of sae and saying, thank you very much for staying in the iran market for the last several years. iran came to the table, negotiated an agreement.

which we think is terrific. we like to stay out of iran for another three years. i can't imagine that conversation. many folks are talking about this, what they call secondary sanctions, which is we would say to companies, you choose. you have access to iran or you have access to the united states. if you sell in iran, you can't sell in the united states. it's pretty powerful. i think that also is not sustainable. i cannot imagine the united states hauling before it german, chinese, indian companies. and punishing them for violating sanctions that most of the world

thinks are not legitimate. and are inconsistent with, you know, the general global norm. can i see congress doing some sanctions? as long as it's not inconsistent with the agreement. >> yes? >> anthony garrett. thank you for your excellent presentation. my question has to do with assuming the deal goes through, what are the implications in terms of the terrible tragedy right in the region with syria and iraq? let me start while you're thinking of the answer. >> well, the easy answer is

none. the administration's position has been that we're negotiating a nuclear deal, and we're not going to mix in other issues. and i think that was the right position for the negotiation. we don't want either reality or perception that we dumbed down the nuclear agreement because we thought syria might help us in syria. that's been the right position. i think it depends a bit on iran. you know, as i said before, i'm deeply suspicious of iran. iran could do things in both iraq and in syria. which would be very helpful to the problem. i don't see any evidence that iran is prepared to throw us under the bus.

if they want to do be a productive player, it'd be enormously helpful. in iraq, you know, we have this strange little cat and mouse game in which we're fighting the same guys as the iraqi militia. but we don't go to the same restaurants. this would be very interesting drama to watch over the next year, five years. what is the evolution of syria's approach to the world? the hard liners would say, syria is a revolutionary country, it's basically still embodies the view that it should dominate the region. don't count on it. i think the president believes

that's possible that iran will evolve. and that this agreement to the extent it opens up, iran will contribute to that evolution. big question mark. and i think that's very important question. >> may i add to that? >> this is not an agreement that solves all of our problems with iran. it doesn't cure cancer, it's not going to help you shed those unwanted pounds. it does one thing and one thing only. it stops iran from getting a bomb. but it does that very well. and that is the position that the u.s. and european partners took at the beginning of these negotiations, russia and china agree to this. we were going to discuss the nuclear issue. this is what israel wanted. what saudi arabia wanted. you have to understand, if we're going to have a negotiation about regional issues, some of our partners want to be in that discussion. they were not in this discussion. but, okay, real quick.

what it does do is it's a gateway to those discussions. solving this, the biggest difference you had with iran opens the way to conversations about these other issues. areas where you have overlapping strategic objectives where iran and the united states both have an interest in defeating isis. both have an interest in stabilizing iraq, in stabilizing afghanistan. both have an interest in stopping the war in syria. can you get to those conversations? will those conversations be fruitful? we don't know. if you didn't solve this issue, there's no possibility of entering those rooms. >> can i add one thing? we should move on.

>> we can't enter into this agreement with iran because they're causing trouble. they're sponsoring hezbollah, and sponsoring assad and causing problems. to me is illogical. you have to flip that argument on its head. because to the extent we can take the nuclear issue and wall it off, put it out of the picture, we're in a better position to deal with those things. if iran is not able to intimidate its neighbors with a nuclear threat. if iran is not able to intimidate other countries with a nuclear threat, i think we're in a better position to stabilize the region. >> the europeans generally, most of them are very supportive of the deal. precisely because they feel they are on the receiving end of what's happening in the middle east at the moment.

that doesn't solve the problems of the middle east. they have their own dynamics. but it opens the possibility, it just opens it and is for us, then, to work on it. it opens the possibility of a more rational conversation between the powers of the middle east and between the powers of the middle east and the outside powers. and, of course, they there will be a balance of power. and one of the questions is whether to balance iran. this is all about more weapons, more fire power for the gcc countries. or whether that has to be accompanied by diplomatic framework of engagement between iran and the gcc countries. at the moment talking about that diplomatic framework seems a bit like a pie in the sky. because when the considering the rhetoric on both sides is very difficult to see that engagement.

i think the answer to your question, the implications of that deal, they will be what we will make of it. i think that's why you're going to see a great flurry of diplomatic activity in the middle east because everybody knows that the deal is not the answer to all of the problems. but everybody knows that this is now the time to work very aggressively to begin to build a diplomatic framework in the middle east that at the moment doesn't really exist. >> just one last point, if i can add. very good question. i just want to add a point about the money issue. this is actually a case where

you have data. if you look at 2011 to 2013, that's when the sanctions regime reached its apex. it was really when it was hurting in iran. 50% loss value of the currency, 50% loss of oil exports. it was the worst years. but during that period of time, iran actually made the majority of its gains, if you can call them gains in the region. it succeeded in popping up asset in the worst period of time and the beginning of the crisis. succeeded in helping iraq, pushing back isis. that's when there were reports of increased iranian presence in yemen. that's 2011-2013. now, from 2013-2015, iran actually received about $15 billion as a result of the interim agreement. but during that same period of time, assad actually started getting weaker and weaker and today is in his weakest

position. iran lost its ally in baghdad, maliki. it saw the islamic state taking over half of iraq and syria. it's not that money, necessarily, will empower iran or lack of money and sanctions and pressure will bring about a more moderate iran.7&[5 >> thank you. i just wondered, particularly what you thought of the possibility, that's the cooperation that has taken place now was in the p-5+ 1 framework. and what does it mean for the relations among these countries that are in that group. it seems to me this is a fairly

important development with some potential just from that standpoint. >> well, i think it's true that this deal would not have happened without quite effective diplomatic cooperation. for instance, between the united states and russia, which at the moment on ukraine on most issues. are fundamentally on the opposite side. and like wise between the europeans and russia. and seen on this deal that the priority given to nonproliferation has meant that the countries have been able to coordinate their positions. i would be cautious in suggesting that that's going to be expanded and can build on it for a broader cooperation. i think when there is a

paramount goal like nonproliferation where the p5 fundamentally agree, then they can come together. but when that goal isn't there, it's much less likely. there is a question, of course, of the fight against violent extremism, against the islamic state. but that is fraught with difficulties. when you read it from a russian perspective, it is just a way to say, look, assad is your best bet against violent extremism. so behind a superficial appearance of agreement as soon as you scratch the surface, the divisions remain deep. when there was the chemicals

weapon issue on syria. the security council for a the first time in a long time was able to agree in the security council. there was hope that that agreement would lead to a more coordinated policy on syria. that did not really happen. and at the moment, we see probably greater russian support to the regime of president assad. so i think one should not overstate the possibility of convergence. but i stand to be contradicted. and i hope i will be wrong. but i think the fact at the moment do not support very optimistic thesis on the convergence in the security council. their experience, diplomats at the table. i don't know, sandy, you must have an opinion on that.

>> just a quick question for dr. ali. you mentioned the pressures and you articulated very well the pressure, the input on iran to put them in the negotiation zone. and i understand, you know, it was a mistake, the spoilers of this negotiations versus you negotiated on behalf of certain group. my question is, why do you think, you know, the group, which is israel and the area, i feel they are the spoiler in my opinion, the way i read about them. and also, why do you think this is the optimal point for negotiation? knowing what we know what iran is doing and syria and iraq and et cetera. why are you releasing the pressure now? why do you think this is the optimal plan of releasing the pressure on them.

although, i understand what is the purpose of this negotiation. but if i take the wholistic approach, the context, and i see you are releasing the pressure on them, giving them a chance to strengthen up, why do you think this is the optimal point of negotiation and making this deal? thank you. >> look, i would make two points. first is the question of, was this pressure. the pressure of sanctions. putting us in a better situation in terms of iran's regional policy. because you will continue a policy, only if it's successful, right? if it's not working, not getting you any closer to your objectives, no point in continuing it. you know, we could have another 50 years of sanctions on cuba. i don't think it would have changed anything. and that's also the question of what happened with iran in the region. and i think there is a fundamental understanding of what iran seeks in the region. and that's why people think the pressure of sanctions actually

helps. i would argue that as long as these fundamentals that shape iran's foreign policy don't change, iran's foreign policy will remain the same thing that it is today. number one, it is encircled by the united states. number two, it is inferior in conventional military capability to almost everybody else around it. you know, the uae, which is the size of a suburb of tehran is a more powerful air force than iran. and number three, it is completely excluded of all the regional security architecture. that's why it needs the so-called forward defense policy of supporting proxies. as long as those factors don't change, with nuclear agreement, with money, without money, will remain the same. those are the three elements that inform its policy. and number two, i think we

should be very careful about moving the goal posts. you know, there are not a lot of tools in the foreign policy tool kit. and one of them is sanctions. if we come to the conclusion that sanctions were useful in bringing iran to the table or, i mean, they were at the table the majority of this tile. but making them to negotiate seriously. if we move the goal posts now and say, well, you also have to change your regional policy or foreign policy or domestic policies, human rights, all of this, the sanctions as a tool of states craft will lose their credibility. it will be very hard next time to go and international support to use sanctions for a narrow, specific objective if people start believing that the last minute we will change the goal posts. >> it's a little hard for me to accept the analysis that says iran is a victim. of the rest of the world.

it's encircled and weakened. killed 250,000 of his people. it supports hezbollah, which is a terrorist organization. flip the logic on his head. no, i don't think it's black and white. i think iran does feel insecure. on the other pseuside that irana reactive country in the region. i think iran would be able to integrate itself more if it dealt with some of these broader issues. and i think there's agreement, i think, is kind of a steppingstone for that kind of integration. >> what makes a situation dangerous in the region is that all countries have a deep sense

of insecurity. and when the narrative in each country is fundamentally different from the narrative in another country, but the situation would be even more dangerous if you add to that sense of insecurity nuclear weapons. but that doesn't mean that without nuclear weapons you have a stable situation. you don't. and that's why you need diplomatic engagement. and certainly, the narrative in tehran will be, i push forward to enhance my security. but that narrative will, indeed, feed in saudi arabia and other gulf countries, a sense they're under attack. and that perception is perfectly legitimate. and that's, by the way, i think a strong reason why the region will not achieve stability without some kind of a diplomatic engagement from outside powers. because left to its own devices, that dynamic of insecurity will

only feed escalation and confrontation. i think there was a question over there. >> from voice of america. the administration and the supporter of the deal insists on this deal was based and focused on the -- iran's nuclear. and it's not based on trust. but many critics say that if it's not based on trust, it's based on hope to achieve certain goals in tackling the crisis in the middle east. but it's very difficult to see that iran's behavior changed and it harmonizes with the goals in the middle east. and if it's not, if it was based on nuclear, why did the negotiation team on the administration agree to giving more and more incentive to iran during a negotiation like on

purchase and missile system and reduce the period so short. >> let me start with an answer to that. i don't think that the u.s. did make a series of concessions here. i think this was a bargaining process. this was a negotiation. we went in with some very strong positions. we would've preferred that iran give up nuclear program entirely. i mean, the safest outcome of this in an ideal world is there's no enrichment facility. there's no nuclear activity of any kind. that was the position of the united states back in 2003 and 2005. we ran that play. it failed. iran built up a nuclear complex that in 2003 had about 164

centrifuges to something that had 20,000 centrifuges. so now you're trying to get them to go all the way down. so the -- it's not a freebie. if iran's going to cut 2/3 of the centrifuges, what are we going to do? started putting sanctions relief on the stable. these are the kinds of things we would do. but i don't see outside the sanctions relief package, i don't see any other sort of concessions that the u.s. made. it didn't lax any nonproliferation standards. it doesn't have a looser verification regime. it has a tougher verification regime. it doesn't legitimatize iran's behavior in any of the other areas. we are not dropping the sanctions on terrorist activity. not dropping sanctions on human rights activities. all those stay in place. the iranians at the last minute, you may remember this. it's hard to remember because it

was two months ago, last minute, they tried to get get us to drop the sanctions on conventional arms transfers. and on the missile program. those sanctions were adopted because of the nuclear program. and it was part of the package. part of the pressure that was put on to try to get iran to the table to negotiate a deal. and said, okay, we came to the table, lift those sanctions. but we didn't want to do that. so in this final agreement, in this comprehensive plan, the conventional, the ban on conventional arms stays for another five years and the ban on missile trades stays for another eight years. and this is a complete ban. and even after those drop, we have other restrictions that we place. it's not like iran gets a free pass to start importing the equipment it would need to build intercontinental ballistic missile even if it could build such a system. i'm sorry, i guess i basically

disagree with the premise of your question that there were a lot of concessions made. this looks like like as colin powell says, a pretty good deal. and you've got to understand this. this is like negotiations. for negotiations to succeed, whether it's labor and management, players and owners, or countries, everybody's got to be able to leave the table and declare victory. and that's what's happening now. and we may not like the sounds of victory coming out of iran and they certainly don't like it coming from us, but that's what makes it a strong agreement. that's what makes it a lasting agreement. all sides feel like they won. >> one quick comment. diplomats never get any credit for anything. it's a remarkable achievement. >> it is. >> secretary kerry. i think if you had put this

agreement for most of the critics a year ago and said, would you take this deal, they would say, it's unachievable. >> yeah. >> never get this deal. so, you know, the negotiating team really did an extraordinary job. >> both of us happen to know the negotiators involved. for example, wendy sherman. i've negotiated with wendy sherman. she cleaned my clock. these were tough, tough people. there was -- you see the smiles on the tv. but behind that is teeth of steel. these people did, i think, a tremendous job. and the only thing that prevents us in the united states from seeing what our european allies see for what the conservative government in the uk and france and germany see. this is a remarkable diplomatic achievement. the only thing that prevents us from seeing that is the politics of it. that we have a bitter partisan

divide in this city in this city where the republican party has decided they're not going to let the democratic president get anything. i'm telling you, if a republican president negotiated this agreement, we would've already named an airport after him. >> yeah, and i would add that, i mean, speaking now as a frenchman, france has had a very difficult relationship with iran over the years. and in that negotiation, france was on the tough side. and when it felt that the verification provision or this or that was not tough enough, it made its voice heard very strongly. creating some worry it could torpedo the negotiations. so you didn't have just one country, the u.s., taking a top position, you had a group of

countries and then that i would single out my own, did take a strong position wanting to have an agreement that would be really based on very strong verification. because there was no trust because there had been the experience of terrorism, originating in iran and against french interest or in french territory. and so, a sense that you had to have a very solid rock solid deal. part of the dynamics of the negotiation. yes? >> american security project. >> we know the success of the deal will rely on the ability of the ia/ea to verify the provisions. what does it need from the united states and the international community in order to ensure it's operating at the full potential given that we know that american inspectors

will not be able to participate in those inspections? what can the united states and the rest of the international community contribute to this? >> money. the ia/ea is chronically short of money. one of the pieces of the draft legislation, that some of us have seen, that i think should be supported by all of congress increased the donation to the international atomic energy agency. they are going to be applying here state of the art technologies. if your idea of inspections is what happened in iraq in 1991 where you were able to shut inspectors out in a parking lot for days. you don't understand what modern inspections are like these days. these are -- this is. we're going to have cameras and sensors and seals everywhere, and not game of thrown on parchment. i'm talking about fiberoptic

seals. so if these things are broken, bang, we're going to know instantly. all the declared nuclear facilities, the entire sprawling complex that's depicted in charts here, that whole thing is covered by the iaea. this agreement doubles the amount of inspectors we have there now and applies it all over. we're setting up a special procurement channel so everything iran buys, they're going to have to buy through this special procurement channel. if you see a company up in northern iran -- and widget "a" is prescribed, there are going to be people that find that out. we'll track it through the processing facility until it's stored as a gas and cylinders. unprecedented. we don't that anywhere else. you've got to back it up with money, back it up with support. and i say one of the sticks you have to carry into this is

making a threat of snapback sanctions real. there's a role here that congress can play in helping to implement this agreement, fund the necessary inspection tools and keep your powder dry on sanctions. show that the united states is willing to snap these in place. keep the unity. it's south korea, india, and china and russia say that matters. >> yep? >> thank you. >> let me pick up on something you said about the next phase and how this is where we really have to engage diplomatically if it's going to be done. was in new york last week and he said several times that, yes, it's possible we can deal after the agreement with the united

states, but it will depend a lot on whether you continue to bully us. and whether you treat us with respect. and i guess i would say it looks to me like after the deal, the combination of the loading on legislation which would restrict the president, the united states effort to provide all that israel and the gulf states want, the dynamics in this country and our own narratives joe was saying, combined with the narratives we'll hear from iran could possibly make it a very long and difficult time before the discussions, the diplomatic discussions are really possible. so, i guess, i wonder how you

think we can manage this next period or help the administration manage it in ways that will minimize the anger that will arise in both countries. certainly both parliaments after this deal is done. >> first of all, turn off the radio and television for the next three weeks. in terms of -- it's going to be very ugly, it's iran, and they're sophisticated enough to understand that. i think you make a really excellent point and as i was listening to you, thank you for all you've done in terms of putting together the support of this.

triggers my mind that we should start thinking about how we deal with this. we were so focused on the agreement, getting the agreement done, supporting the agreement, i think we need to think about the period you're talking about. hopefully the administration is. there are some people in the opposition who believe sort of the affordable health care act strategy, which is introduce various things which will try to undermine the agreement. make sure it'll fail. series of amendments, which put supporting senators in a very difficult position. if you're a democrat and you decided to vote for this, which goes against the grain of a lot of your most serious constituents and, you know, a month from now, you get a piece of legislation, tough

legislation, which mandates sanctions against iran, which would be logical. there could be a strategy here of kind of legislative harassment. that's one piece of this. but i think, you know, you're right. there needs to be a broader thought process in terms of how we don't slide back here. >> i was glad that senator was answering your question. it's a tough one. because i -- i do think that over the long-term, it's really about building a narrative in the middle east that would not be the same in tehran.

that would be naive and unrealistic. we'll allow for a discussion, engagement between the countries. i think as i said earlier that because of the regional dynamics, the regions will not come to that conversation without strong outside engagement. and i think there, and speaking as a european, i think it's going to be very important for the united states. no to think that, okay, we have the deal now. we monitor the technical implementation of the deal. and of course, that's going to be very important. let's not be as little involved in the rest as possible. i think it's essential on the country to be diplomatically engaged with the region so that the measure of reassurance comes from the united states because ultimately, when you look at e the -- iran is a big country.

iran as was said as a much weaker military than saudi arabia, or some. but nevertheless, when you look at the figures of the population, it is the big country in the region. and so it will be very hard to build that sense of self-confidence in the countries of the region if they don't have some kind of external reassurance. the challenge is you don't want that reassurance to build a kind of escalation. you want it to be a path to diplomacy and conversation rather than a path to -- and that's a very fine balance to find.

>> thank you, diane pearlman for conflict analysis and resolution and also psychologist for social responsibility and i wrote their statement endorsing the deal as an opening for improved relations. so just following up on the last comment. there's a question about whether it can be transformational. a lot of it is up to us in having a dynamic effect understanding of how our relationship with iran and also just to state what we've been talking about that the debate is irrational against the deal. the answers would satisfy them. anyway, parties are more dangerous when they're afraid. and the way to be more secure is to make your enemy more secure. and as someone just mentioned, said that, you know, if we treat

them with respect, then we could cooperate on certain issues and the deal is a test. while a lot of the rhetoric focuses on a view of them chanting death to america, we don't look at how mccain says bomb, bomb, bomb, bomb iran, or conferences people talk about bombing iran or israelis talk about bombing iran. we need to have more reassurance. is there any reason why we can't start something like a mutual nonaggression pact? or reassure each other we won't attack each other or build that into this because if we reduce tension, then in 15 years, we won't have to worry about. >> that's an ambitious way to start. you know, we did pistachios.

>> first of all, i think it's a test on both parties. not just a test of the united states. it's also, you know, iranians are great at casting themselves as the victim here without regard to what they're doing in the region that's causing problems. i agree with the premise. we need to try to find ways to take a different path. but it's not only going to come from things we do. it's going to come from things they do. you may see some things in this administration after the deal. i think you have to start this, actually, very gently.

the country is not ready for, i think, a cuba here. not ready for a big step. if there's a big step right now, it will be the wrong direction. now, it would be the wrong direction. so let's get this agreement done. let's see whether to me the next step is can he engage syria in some fashion -- iran in some fashion, in an effort to stop the massacre in syria. that is to me question number one. because everything we're talking about here, we're focused on iran, but it is in the midst of a region in turmoil and the epicenter of that turmoil is the civil war in syria, which has 11 million syrian refugees sloshing around the region, in lebanon

and joerld and elsewhere -- jordan and elsewhere and a world that has been indifferent to that. so the way to take a step with syria, i think, is if they were prepared to step back from assad, which strikes me at know overly burdensome on anything other than geopolitical service. >> one last question in the back. >> hi. i'm tom downey. i want to congratulate the panel. it was extraordinary in the work joe has done to organize this has been extraordinary. i want to compliment sandy's perception of what will happen politically and raise a concern. because on the 16th when the

republicans debate you can be sure that every single one of them will pledge to do this on day one of their presidency. and i agree this is going to look very much like the affordable care act has been with constant amendments. so i think the real challenge for us going forward, i mean we've done a remarkable job of getting 41 democratic senators and nancy pelosi has done a great job in the house of representatives and without peer as a leader but our vigilance and work has to continue because we can see this undone by a thousand cuts if we're not careful and we need to be mindful of that. >> i think we should end on that note. thanking the panelists, thanking all of you for your questions. thank you senator reed and the armed service committee for allowing us to have this wonderful room for a very interesting discussion. thank you. [ applause ]

[ hearing concluded ] a debate beginning in earnest back on capitol hill today and house of representatives is expected to begin debate tomorrow on the iran nuclear agreement with a vote on disapproving of the agreement by the end of the

week, follow the house on c-span. before it is debated on the house floor, the rules committee is set to meet this afternoon for rules governing the debate to the resolution, formally declaring congress's disapproval of the iran nuclear agreement. that house rules committee meeting tomorrow at 5:00. we'll have that live here on c-span 3. meanwhile, over in the senate, they have gavelled back in. two senators have publicly said how they will vote. suzanne collins, maria cabinetwell. and because 41 senators have announced they will support the agreement, there aren't enough votes to block the formal vote on the iran nuclear agreement. lindsey graham of south carolina saying at the national press club he hopes two democrats will step forward so they can debate the resolution. here is what he had to say. >> before you came here today, you had information about senate reed and a majority and what is

going on up on the hill. >> we have 48 no vits and for republicans, we need 60 to proceed to the bill, a sim pal majority to get the bill to the president's decision. motion needs a simple majority. and then the president can veto and we'll have to override it. we don't think we have the votes to do that. will some republicans step forward to oppose the debate. i hope they will. i can't believe the senate will not debate the foreign policy in my lifetime f. you like the deal, tell us why. give me a chance to tell you why i don't in the american people. to deny discussion on this deal would be one of the low points in the history of the united states senate. what the hell are we here for if not to talk about this? >> he was a nazi. he was a concentration camp

commandant and he was responsible for the murder of thousands of jews. >> this sunday night on q&a, jennifer teaguen on her life altering discovery that her grandfather was the nazi commandant almond gurt, known as the butcher of plassau. >> we would see a tremendously cruel person. a person who, yes, who was -- i mean he was capable of -- he had two dogs. he called them ralph and rolfe and they trained them to tear people apart. he was a concern who -- [ inaudible ]. there was a pleasure that he felt when he killed people. and this is, yes, something what when you are normal, if you don't have this aspect in your personality, it is very, very difficult to grasp. >> sunday night at 8:00 eastern

and pacific on c-span's q&a. next up, a look at the nuclear weapons stockpiles of the united states, russia and other nuclear powers. this discussion from the strategic -- center for strategic and international studies is two hours. good morning, everyone. i'm sharon squasony, i direct the center here for center for strategic and international studies. and it is my pleasure to welcome you this morning. i know this is the friday before labor day so i appreciate your time and attention. just a few administrative remarks. we do have a system of plan of action, whatever you might call it, in case there is an emergency, so ukari in the back, if there is a problem, turn around and she's raising her hand, we'll follow her.

please turn your cell phones off it. creates a problem with our sound system. and it can also be distracting to our speakers. i am going to introduce our panelists first, before we launch into the substance of our discussion today. everybody knows we're not talking about iran, right? it is not iran this morning. it is kind of a throwback to the past, here to talk about nonstrategic nuclear weapons and the u.s.-russia relationship. i am joined today by three experts who all participated in both of the dialogues that we conducted with the russians first in october and then more recently in june. on my immediate right is andy kutchins who is director and

senior fell yo of the russia andure asia program and well-known author. and i don't think we overlapped with the carnegie endowment, i think you were there before me. and in moscow also. next to andy is ambassador steve piver who directed the arms control and nonproliferation and former ambassador to ukraine and so his service have been invaluable to our discussions. and next to steve is guy roberts who is a former deputy assistant general for weapons of mass destruction at nato and guy and i go back a long time in the arms control -- not that long. in the nonproliferation and arms control scene. i am going to try to limit my

remarks. i'm going to set up how we did this dialogue, what were some of the conclusions and then we're going to give each of our panelists a couple of minutes to give their impressions or -- i asked them, tell me what you thought about this dialogue, what was different, how it changed from october to june and also what they thought were some of the most interesting outcomes from it. but i think i need to set up this whole thing for you. so i didn't print out reports. in deference to the environment. but those are the links and they are all on our website. there is a long report from the first workshop in october and then an even longer report from the second workshop in june. this project was sponsored by -- technically by the navy. it was the project on