even if the policies are set at the national level, they're going to be implemented in many cases at the city. and that's where you're -- whether you're dealing with crime, you know, preventing terrorism, whether you're dealing with education, which is just almost -- you know, education. so i just see this as being huge and, again, come back cities needing to create models. >> i think this question about should cities be free to develop

a foreign policy really it's kind of subjects the order, which that there are certain functions that a national government has to discharge. and i think that the -- you know, i'm sure london, you can certainly argue the case and describe london's foreign policy, which is by and large outward looking, pro-immigration and in favor of utilizing the links with countries like india, like parts of south america, china, the city having a large diaspera apart from anything else. but it's very important not to forget that the electorate and mayors are elected, the electorate will judge the success of a mayor by his or her ability to do what they need for their city. so you can have very grandiose

foreign policy and lose an election if you haven't built the homes people need and improve the quality of the infrastructure. so again, you come back to this -- you campaign in poetry and you govern in prose. and there has to be the underpinning of practical and very clearly managed change. >> on that note, do you think -- was the mayor of london correct to come out and say we should stay in the european union. is that the role of the mayor of london? >> absolutely. it's in london's interest to remain as part of the european union. and look at the businesses in london who speak with virtually one voice on the importance of european investment in london. and he was absolutely right to

share a platform with the prime minister in doing that. because this is an issue which is a matter of national concern, not one of narrow party politics. >> would you go out and be an ambassador to thailand, not just bangkok. >> while they remain city ceos, there is very little time to engage in international diplomacy. most mayors of government find it difficult to travel. as i'm sitting here in chicago, if there's a heavy downpour in bangkok, people will start asking where is the governor? why isn't he trying to drain the water from some streets? >> so we're watching the weather forecast very closely in bangkok.

>> it doesn't mean we don't engage in diplomacy at all, but we have built good relationships with different cities. but it's a totally different thing to engage on purpose international diplomacy on a sustained basis. >> right. >> last word on this, if i may. i fully agree with everything

that has just been said. but i would say that cities do, mayors do it -- i know jacque chirac went to japan quite a few times. so i think they try to get investments and so on. as an ambassador in washington, they imposed sanctions on myanmar, and i think boston, as well -- >> cities like boston were posting more sanctions in myanmar than the federal government. i'm not sure -- [ overlapping speakers ] >> i thought, how can this be? >> i'll tell you one thing you see, it's becoming much, much more intense with globalization and capital being as mobile as

it is. it's amazing how competitive where businesses are looking that they're going to build. mayors and governors, that's a big part of their job. and it's becoming, you know, i think more intense and more difficult. you'll find mayors finding and promoting, or being big protectionists, trying to protect dying industries. >> on that note, i've got to quickly ask you, before i turn to the audience for questions, if london -- if the uk does vote for brexit, does london lose its global perch? >> well, let's hope that doesn't happen, gillian. i think brexit would be damaging to london's economy. yes. >> what probability do you give

to brexit right now? >> i think we'll vote to remain, but the important thing is that we vote to remain conclusively, so the issue is settled, certainly for the next generation. >> i think -- i couldn't agree more, because business, one of the things -- london is a center for global business. it's a global financial center. so that to me a no vote won't be devastating and i don't think it will happen. >> i hope you're right. but many political predictions have been up-ended this year. >> you're right. and mine is worth nothing. i'm just an optimist. >> well, let's have some questions from the audience. it will be courteous but not compulsory to identify yourself and to keep your question very,

very short. i believe we have some microphones roving in the audience. and if you wish to direct it to an individual person, do let me know. if not, i will direct it myself. so any questions for our panel? we have a question back there. >> i'm from the international institute of logistical studies. i've heard interesting things about global north. where do global cities from developing countries, especially those cities that are facing profound violence and dysfunction, such as rio day jannero. so how can they be global cities even though they're facing high level violence, criminal

violence and several deep problems that don't affect cities like chicago and new york? >> you don't see violence in chicago? [ laughter ] >> i think tragically what's happened so far this year. would you like to comment on how to combat the violence and can you be a true global city if you are? >> i think my comment aside, i think people -- the violence in chicago, which is, you know, very sad. it's not in the areas where business is operating, and it hasn't really affected the competitiveness here. but it's a huge problem. now, do i think global -- in a developing world, that there will be true global cities there? and the answer is, you betcha.

when you look -- step back a minute and those of us who have been raised in the developing world, the world is changing in the sense when you look at where the economic growth is coming from and you look at the oecd countries a and the percentage of the global economy they had 10 or 20 years ago and what they've got now and what they'll have in the future, the economic weight is going to be shifting to asia and to other parts of the developing world. and so the idea that people think that shanghai or that region aren't going to be, you know, right along with hong kong, outstanding global cities, i think are -- don't understand what's happening.

so i think if they get it right, they will be important economic drivers. but for them to get it right, china is going to need a new economic model. >> right. >> and they are going to need -- they're not dealing with crime there. they're dealing with, you know, terrible pollution issues. and they're dealing with other really serious issues in terms of dealing with their own form of immigration in terms of the immigration from people from the countryside without having access to education and health care. but yes, i think that what -- and i think your question, though, when you look at latin

america, and you look at different places in africa, and you look at what's going to happen throughout the developing world, and cities springing up and becoming 3 million, 4 million, 5 million population cities overnight, this is something we have to be very cognizant of. because if they don't deal with these issues, it's going to impact all of us in terms of what it does to our global ecosystem and our global economy. >> right. >> i think this is -- i think this is such a good and important question. i think my reaction is on three levels. first of all, cities don't become global cities simply by asserting that they are global cities. i think the second is that the fear of crime, neighborhoods where crime is a factor of evidence life, and i've

represented in my years as a member of parliament some such neighborhoods, makes this sort of self-confidence, outward looking self-confidence that comes with being a global city almost impossible, which is why mayors that make tackling crime, bringing down crime, their number one priority, are likely to be successful in transforming their cities. i think the third thing i would say with the rio olympics, what, 35 days away, is that, you know, i greatly respected the ambition of the international olympic committee, and i know we're going to be talking about big events over the -- mega events of the course of the conference and the part that they have to play. and i'm sure that the rio olympics will be a huge success.

but obviously they haven't come without a price in disruption, unrest, and so forth, by the local community who are living with this, you know, uncertainly, crime, disruption to their lives day by day. so i think that you've absolutely -- if you like, sort of registered a question at the heart of what we mean by global cities. and what we have to do, what leadership is required in order to create a global city. >> yes? >> we have a very different question from the electronic condition, so we'll turn to a tweet. what role does naturalization of immigrants play in singapore? that's a question which has implications for immigrant policy in many cities around the

world. ambassador chan, would you like to comment on what role the naturalization of immigrants plays in singapore? >> singapore is a very open society. in fact, we were so open about increasing our population through immigration. and our immigration is not -- it's not mural migration from the rural country to the city. we give visas so you can control your immigration, and we've been very good about opening our doors, because singapore residents are not reproducing themselves, one or two, that's the birthrate. in singapore today, one out of every four that we meet on the street is not a singaporean. he's a foreigner. it could be 1.3 something. now, you can be naturalized to be a citizen.

but like most cities elsewhere, we are also receiving some political backlash from too many immigrants. so while we remain open, we are staggering that openness. in other words, you're controlling it. but it's hugely important. immigrants play a very productive role in our society and help singapore prosper. >> it helps maintain the population, as you say, in a world where many singaporeans are not having babies. problem of much of western europe. any more questions from the audience? we have a question down there in front. just got a few more minutes. >> steve clemens of the atlantic. thank you very much. my question is, none of you have the various cities that you represent are talking about the transformational power that we're seeing in things like

data, sensors. rahm emanuel is one of the most famous data mayors in the world. while i know there's a panel that comes up in this later, it just seems to me so core to talking about and framing the power and limits of future cities that i'm interested in how you think about data and how that is changing what's possible in the cities. >> everyone on this panel will say that data plays a very major role and how we use data in city management is going to be crucial in actually managing the problems in the city. clearly not every city is at that level. but at the very least, in fact, when i think of connectivity and global cities, global cities thrive on connectivity, because

of the connectivity, a city is a global city. that connectivity must now move to sort of a digital connectivity. the digital foot print of influence is extremely important. >> how do you use data in bangkok? do you have an opportunity to do that or is that something that -- >> well, we are developing our database, which will assist us in tax collection and also assist us in other areas like provisional public health services and looking after the elderly. but it is very much still a work in progress. but the importance of data is recognized.

>> i think the use of data also allows an open conversation between the leadership of the city and the people of the city, which is why it is important that the data is trusted. the second thing is that transformational change doesn't come without inconvenience and asking people to behave differently, you know, to work more, all these kinds of things. i think data can be a very powerful mediator in providing the evidence base on which that behavior change is carried. >> i tell you what's been a huge eye opener for me. the paulson institute sponsors a

u.s.-china ceo council on sustainable urbanization. so there we have really big companies like tim cook from apple, walmart, ibm, general motors, and the project's big data, like for instance it's just blown me away in terms of locking at what ibm is doing in china, helping them with pollution and what can be done in terms of transportation management. or the -- and all of these companies, it's -- the technology they bring. and the technology i see in china, and just in terms of managing the power on the grid. so this is bringing all kinds of

capabilities. and so i think that is a huge tool for mayors. but still, i do think no matter how much of a tool that is, so much of the constraints come down to political constraints, getting support from the voters to do the things and to do really difficult things. but you're right on. i think probably the reason we didn't address it is i can look at it with awe, but in terms of getting me to -- i'm not a big data expert. >> well, as secretary paulson says, there's always a problem of those pesky politics. or these pesky politicians. it's been a terrific debate. thank you very much indeed. as steve just said, over the next couple of days, we'll be picking up many of these themes and discussing them in a lot more detail, whether it's to do with data management, whether it's to do with the issue of the

olympics and other big events. we have a session on violence, which is a i have big issue, tragically even in chicago. we have an issue on income inequality, urban design, and we also got events looking at questions of culture. so a whole range of these themselves will be discussed. but to me perhaps one of the most potent comments of the session, was from secretary paulson saying, it's harder to screw up national government than to screw up a city. to which i would add, it's probably easier to make your mark quickly and do something really dynamic for the future in a city than government, too. >> amen. >> and that is what we're all here to discuss. so thank you very much indeed. [ applause ] >> and next up, we're all going to have a drink.

on tuesday, the federal court of appeals for the district of columbia upheld the fcc roles for treating the internet like a utility, require progress individuv -- tonight, our panel discusses this decision and talk about their views. joined by washington post technology reporter brian fung. >> now that the fcc has, for the first time got further than that and said this scheme that once governed the monopoly telephone network applies to isps, that opens up the door for additional regulation that was never part of the debate. >> treating it like a

communications service, and infrastructure and a transmission system, and making a distinction between the carriage and the content on the internet. >> watch the communicators tonight at 8:00 eastern, on c-span2. next, arms control specialists talk about the nuclear security challenges facing the next president of the united states. the arms control association hosted the conference earlier this month. >> thank you everyone, for coming back. i want to thank you for those moving and importanting words that remind us all of why we're

here, why we do the work we do to eliminate weapons threats and to prevent the further spread and use of nuclear weapons. it's also a reminder that we've all been at this for a long, long time. for more than seven decades, the united states, under republican and democratic administrations alike, have very actively discouraged allies and foes from seeking the means to produce nuclear weapons. for the most part, this effort has been successful. and that's why today, according to chicago council on foreign relations poll, some 78% of republicans, some 73% of democrats, 68% of independents rank preventing the spread of nuclear weapons as a top u.s. foreign policy poll. that's something i hope the presidential candidates keep in the forefront of their minds,

that this is something that all americans generally agree about. today, there are nine states armed with nuclear weapons. five recognized under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. four others armed with nuclear weapons outside the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. that's far too many. but with the conclusion of the 2015 joint conference of plan of action, otherwise none as the iran nuclear deal, which blocks iran's pathways to the bomb for well over a decade, i would say that there's a very low probability -- [ inaudible ] future. but the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons buildups are still very much with us. there's a lot of work yet to be done. and to discuss some of the challenges that we face today, that will test the leadership of the next occupant of the white house, we have four excellent

speakers. we're going to share their perspectives. first, we'll hear from toby dalton, co-director of the nuclear policy program here. he's going to talk about the issues involving indian and pakistan, which continue to expand their own nuclear arsenals. we need to keep in mind another cross border attack involving these two states could trig ear nuclear conflict. next, we'll hear from the director of global security at princeton university and co-deputy chair of the international panel on fissile materials, which is a very important commission that looks at the challenges posed by weapons usable fissile materiel. he's also a member of the board

of directors at the armed controls association. he's going to address the dangers posed and the security of those stockpiles, which is a challenge that continues even after the very important series of nuclear series summits that just concluded earlier this year. and north korea continues to pose a tremendous challenge. joel whit, former seen your u.s. negotiator on north korea, now with the u.s.-korea institute and the founder of the very useful importance and lively 38 north websites is going to provide us with his perspectives on what can and must be done with respect to curbing the north korean nuclear and missile threat. last but not least, we have with us the former ambassador susan

burke, who will share her perspectives on what must be done in making the health and credibility the corner stone of all nonnuclear proliferation, and we just heard in the previous session, a little discussion about one of the more dynamic debates going on surrounding the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, the open-ended working group on further measures to -- [ inaudible ] you can read more about those developments in the latest news section of -- [ inaudible ] susan has decades of government experience on nonproliferation. she was the special representation of the president from 2009 to 2012, leading a successful effort at the 2010 nonproliferation treaty review conference that produced a consensus action plan on nonproliferation.

so with those introductions, i'm going to turn it over to toby dalton. each will speak for several minutes and we'll take your questions for the panelists. so toby, the floor is yours. >> thank you very much, darrell. it's a real pleasure for me to be here. i didn't have to travel very far, about one floor down. but as a long-time admirer of the arms control association, it's great to have a chance to be with you today. i should also say that i feel like what i'm going to say after the remarks that we heard a few minutes ago, seems like a real distraction. it's interesting and important to think about these things in the abstract, but we can't divorce them from the reality that there are incredibly dangerous places and we need to continue to think about and work on these issues so that nuclear

weapons are not used. again, i'll focus my remarks on what's happening in south asia and what has happened in south asia over the last 20 years and what that means for the next administration. and it's remarkable that we've just past now the 18th anniversary of the 1998 nuclear tests by indian, pakistan, and i feel like it's gone incredibly quickly. yet a lot has changed as you look at this issue sitting in washington. you think about the priorities since those tests. first, it was trying to make sure that the period immediately following the tests, you had a conflict and crisis and concerns about a war that could lead to nuclear escalation. then we had the serial proliferation, and more recently, we've had issues of nuclear security and concerns about nuclear terrorism. in the meantime, the successive governments here have been -- successive administrations have

been trying to main stream india into the nonproliferation regime. still, we have these crises between the two states. it seems like that issue is the one that can always bring us back to real concern. so i would argue that, as we look at the arms competition that is shaping up in that regi region, it argues for focusing our priorities more narrowly. i would say as we look at the region, there are periodic observables, but there are some major assumptions we have to make and significant data limitations as we try to assess what is happening there. often times, there are press releases that seem to be how new capabilities are announced. those don't necessarily constitute facts.

you can see now growth in the numbers of nuclear weapons, certainly in the fissile material stockpiles. you see a diversification of delivery vehicles leading to changes in posture, perhaps even alert level. and then results command and control challenges that come with those. we see that certainly in pakistan, with development now of short-range so-called battlefield nuclear weapons and shifts in strategy to associate with those capabilities. you see it in india with longer range missiles and now potentially the development of putting nuclear weapons on submarines at sea. china is a part of this region, too, in so far as there is some relationship between china and india. and then, of course, the u.s. is somehow part of china's thinking, when the capabilities that we have been developing over the last few years, are

part of this picture. how much of this is really a competition versus a series of parallel developments or technology inertia. i think it's difficult to draw firm conclusions about that. i think in india and pakistan you see some action and reaction happening. you have continued embrace or at least tolerance of groups in pakistan that attack india periodically, which could be the flashpoint for a crisis. the most recent of these was an attack in january on an indian military base. in that instance, there was cooperation to try to untangle there. that now is a pattern that's been established over the last 15 years if not longer. india has started to develop more rapid, agile, conventional military capabilities to try to punish pakistan. that is allowed or provided some

justification for pakistan to develop battlefield nuclear weapons to try to deter india from doing those things. similarly, you periodically hear from pakistan about the nuclear deal and how that's a driver of instability in the region, and china, you have some spillover effects with india developing a triad. these are long-standing and they don't seem to have an impact on china as yet. but it remains unclear. in the meantime, you have active chinese assistance to pakistan's nuclear energy program. but a history also of assistance to pakistan's nuclear weapons program. so what are the implications of this? first, i think the security competition exacerbates the existing problems, primarily in the pakistan relationship.

india has a debate that is sometimes active, sometimes less so about how it should evolve its nuclear thinking to address this changing environment. focus perhaps on shifting from massive retaliation to punitive retaliation. these are semantics but have important implications. pakistan seems to be moving towards a riskier posture. certainly from a security and surety point of view that putting weapons out in the field, devolving them down the chain of command raises concerns about security. the next administration will inherit this set of problems that previous administrations have not been able to dampen. i think the primary challenges will continue to be nuclear

security. i would argue for a focus on crisis escalation, given that is where there is a significant chance of nuclear weapons being used. certainly, the obama administration did a lot on nuclear security. on several occasions, praised the steps that pakistan has taken. if you look at how the security competition might affect nuclear security, more weapons, greater numbers of fissile material, more transportation of these things, those exacerbate the weak links in the security architecture. crisis escalation is a very difficult problem to get in front of. most of the u.s. effort over the years has been reactive. again, technology added materials, capabilities, will make future crises likely to speed up, make it harder to

intervene. so i think that is part of the reason why this issue deserves higher priority. there's a tension between these two challenges, nuclear security and focusing on crisis escalation. the kind of cooperation and trust necessary for cooperation on nuclear security is significant. if you're constantly criticizing another country for their failings or you're trying to coerce them into taking certain steps, they're less likely to give you the kind of cooperation or open the facilities or build the kinds of relationships that would facilitate better nuclear security practices. it's hard to do that in a cooperative way. so figuring out how to resolve the tension between those priorities is significant.

that said, i have to say that our policy structure has not really allowed the government, the bush administration, the obama administration certainly, to address the security competition, to resolve the prioritization problems that come between our bilateral ambitions and regional requirements that follow these problems. this is a long standing problem. so as i think about recommendations for the next administration, the first one i would say it's not sexy but necessary as you have to fix the policy structure in a way that allows for thinking about this problem in a coherent way. it currently does not exist. you have a disaggregation of the functional responsibilities. there's no process that allows for coherents to come to this issue. secondly, i think as the strategic and economic dialogue

is happening with china this week, it's important to think about how china's interest in this region are involving, as well. what role does china see for itself now? $40 billion plus of investment, that exposes china to risks in ways that it has not been exposed to previously in south asia. and with some interesting implications. it may be able to assert a more active role in the future than trying to dampen some of the crisis tendencies, or it may weigh more heavily on the pakistani side should there be another crisis. so i think it's important to press that issue of broad understanding with china. third, i think it's important that there is a willingness to be able to speak more openly about the areas that our interests are different and to back that up with cooperative

measures, and that includes our nuclear security. i think it's -- india has had a free pass on nuclear security for quote a long time. i think it's time that ends. fourth, specifically on crisis escalation, there needs to be more of a focus on firebreaks. i think with the sequence of events that have unfolded after the january attack by pakistani base militants in india, you've seen some sort of tentative steps to share intelligence to cooperate in the investigation, to try to build confidence. that is something that should be encouraged and to the extent possible, facilitated and institutionalized in ways that would allow that to at least arrest the momentum. lastly, an issue near and dear to my heart, there's been an assumption over the last 20 years that has taken place, that

somehow what's happening in india's nuclear program is more benign than what is happening in pakistan. it is manifest in the amount of news coverage given to every nuclear test pakistan makes. i think this is a little bit of a dangerous tendency. it allows evolution to take place in ways that don't force us to think about the consequences. so we need to find ways to encourage restraint in the region. not just by india but by pakistan. one of the few points of leverage that we have left is the interest of these states in signing up to the nuclear suppliers. and that's an issue that the obama administration has pushed in terms of indian membership, pushing this week with phone calls.

but i think it would be better to try to build a consensus based process on what the criteria should be for membership and we can use the interest of india and pakistan becoming members to encourage restraint in their nuclear practices. so with those five suggestions, polite i hope, i'll pass it over. >> great. thank you very much, toby. we'll turn now to our next guest. >> thank you, darrell. i was asked to talk about the fissile material problem as part of the nonproliferation challenges for the next president. but as i'm sure all of you know, at least one of the candidates for president doesn't think that nonproliferation is actually a problem. and so it's hard to think about how to phrase the remarks in a

way that captures a meaningful set of propositions for whatever takes charge next. but let me start by making an observation about one lesson we can learn from the last eight years and perhaps the last 16 years of nonproliferation policy in the united states, and that is that if the next president, whoever it is, is going to be serious about at least the fissile material part, the nuclear weapons material challenge in terms of nonproliferation, we have to get past what has been nonproliferation theater. and by this, i mean these somewhat grandiose statements that have characterized both the bush administration and the obama administration when they come to talk about fissile materials. and the most obvious element of

this was the suggestion that goes back to the bush administration of what they said was the goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear material within four years. and many, many years have past, and an enormous amount of political attention gone into this, especially under the obama administration with the nuclear summits that we've seen, the most recent being in washington. and one has to be candid in terms of the actual fissile material problem in the world, we are talking not even about the tip of the iceberg. we are talking about the snowflake that sits on top of the tip of the iceberg. and you know, to think that starting in 2010 we have 50 plus world leaders gathering every two years to talk about this with great important fanfare and lots of pr, and all that has

come out of it in actual material terms, not the promises to do better, but in actual material terms, president obama told us what has been achieved. he said that in the six years, between 2010 and 2016, he said, we have now removed or secured all the highly enriched uranium and plutonium from more than 30 countries. more than 3.8 tons. which is more than enough to create 150 nuclear weapons. wow. by the best estimate, including the one that the president mentioned in his speech, this is 0.2% fissile material in the world. six years, four summits, 50 presidents and prime ministers, and we have addressed 0.2% of the problem.

and that's only if you look at what's been, as i said, secured or eliminated. the countries that were still producing fissile material for nuclear weapons in 2010 are still doing it. that's israel, pakistan, india, and north korea. all the other nuclear weapon states had stopped long before this process. oh, we've secured 0.2%. but we haven't stopped anybody from making them and they continue to do it. second thing that comes from that is that overwhelming policy choices that have been made, especially by the united states, have actually pushed things in exactly the opposite direction. it's been about securing mostly material in civilian facilities, in non-weapons states, which was already under safeguards.

in other words, it's the stuff that was the most accounted for and the most regulated already. the stuff that should have been the focus of any effort to actually address the fissile material problem is the large share of fissile material that is actually held by nuclear weapons states. and is unaccounted for and undeclared. we have legacy stockpiles of the cold war. so the first thing for the next president, if they're serious about fissile materials, is to actually decide not chasing small amounts of fissile materials, but to actually deal

with the ton quantity in the hundreds of tons of quantities that are actually under u.s. control or under the direct control. then we can worry about other people's materials. let me give you two things that follow from this. the first is that the united states now has enough fissile material set aside for weapons, that is twice as large as the total amount needed for all the operational warheads the united states actually has, 4,000 plus operational warheads. the united states has fissile material set aside for 10,000 weapons. that's not including the stuff that's already declared excess and everything else. so why is there such an overhang of fissile material that cannot going to be used in weapons

unless somebody has a plan somewhere to double the size? in the past, the united states has declared fissile material excess to its weapons in the last time the united states declared highly enriched uranium excess, 2005. at that time, the united states had 8,000 operational warheads. now we have 4,000, give or take. yet it still has all of that that it had in 2005. so the first thing is, why not reduce the stockpile for weapons, reflect the reduction, at least in the operational nuclear stockpile? associated with that is the fact that when the united states did declare fissile material, the highly enriched uranium, they said we're going to dilute it, turn it into fuel for nuclear power plants.

it's been downblending at a rate of a couple tons a year. that's 40 tons less. according to the department of energy, until 2030 to finish downblending this stuff. the russians were downblending at a rate ten times that of the soviet union, of the united states when they were downblending their highly enriched uranium. so why can't the united states just hurry up and finish downblending the stuff that is already there rather than deciding it's going to take another 15 years to downblend it's remaining quantity? it's a matter of priority. the priority of 1 kilo gram of highly enrich ed uranium in jamaica, not the 40 on thes that could be downblended inside the u.s. so in material terms when you follow the material and account

for the material and take responsibility for the material, the focus really has been in the wrong place. and perhaps nowhere more so than with plutonium. everybody in this room is familiar with if it wasn't so tragic, it would be -- the multibillion dollar plant that now is never going to be built, but has consumed enormous amount of political effort and energy, has been the subject of countless studies to dispose of 34 tons of plutonium that was declared excess for weapons purposes in 2007. we're supposed to have really got to grips with the plutonium problem. yet now it looks like it will most likely never go anywhere, and the russians are about to begin getting rid of their share of their 34 tons. so the immediate process to begin with the united states dealing with 34 tons of plutonium.

if we're going to deal with this 34 tons of plutonium that was declared excess, the question is either we wait for this interminal process to continue or must plan toward the new strategy to dilute and dispose, but what can we do concretely now to show good faith in moving the process forward? there have been concrete suggestions how to deal with this. it would be good to see the next administration actually prioritize urgency. there is not enough to say we're going to do this some day, one day, but to say you have the highest priority in dealing with fissile materials is dispose of them as quickly as possible and see how that changes. and the easiest thing that can be done for those of you interested in the red team report on plutonium disposition that came out in 2015, look, we

can either make the plutonium into fuel, it's going to be too expensive and tack too long, so let's stop. what we can do is this strategy of diluting and disposing of it in a depository, but the red team had a interesting solution. there's a faster way of dealing with the problem, that is to sterilize them, to render them unusable in a weapon. this could be done in situ, and then prepare them for disposal. what you have done is irreversibly made them, and one could quickly and cheaply begin to show that this plutonium will never go back into weapons in a very quick and speedy way. so you should think about it, those kinds of steps, if the united states was willing to show that it took dealing with its own fissile material legacies more seriously, there might be greater prospects of

making progress at geneva, at the talks in the treaty, and of dealing with the fissile material stockpiles held by other countries, because the largest problem in terms of fissile materials is not the small stockpiles held by pakistan and india and north korea and israel, or even china. the real stockpile problems we face in the world are, as i mention, the giant stockpiles from the cold war held by the united states and russia, and then the stockpiled civilian plutonium by britain and france and japan. japan has ten tons of plutonium in japan. that's much more held in britain and in france. ten tons of plutonium is larger than the plutonium stockpile held by some weapons bases. if you decide we're going to go

after the largest stockpile regardless of where they are, then one begins to have a different geography of what the problem is and where attention needs to go, and the question is how do we then work with britain and france and japan, who are all very close allies, to given we have several hundred tons of plutonium, what are we go to do to get rid of this and make sure it's disposed of as quickly as possible. the proliferation scenario looks very -- so i think that the next administration is going to take a fissile materials perspective to thinking about this rather than the old school nonproliferation perspective where it's countries that we don't like that are a problem, right? regardless of the fact that they may have materials that are so small as to be insignificant in terms of what we actually have

to deal with. just to give you one perspective and then i'll stop. when the united states declared its stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, this is how much we made and this is how much we have left, there was material they couldn't account for. it's not lost. they just don't know exactly where it went. or if they made it in the first place. because nobody was responsible for keeping accurate accounts from the beginning. so there's about three tons of plutonium that the united states is unclear, and in terms of nuclear weapons tests, also, there are several tons of nuclear weapons that is not accounted for. now, these multiple-ton quantities that the united states can't account for pales in comparison to what the russians can't account for. and yet no one has taken seriously this question of going to the russians and saying, why don't we try to account for our

materials together? right? you help us figure out where our stuff went, and we'll help you figure out where your stuff went. at the end of it, it doesn't necessarily expose any national security secrets. but at least we'll start to get a better understanding of the mess we made of the world for the last 70 years in terms of polluting it with highly enrich ed uranium and plutonium. but these amounts that are unclear, material that is unaccounted for, is larger than the stockpiles held by iceland and india and north korea and significantly in most cases. you have to ask the question, if you move away from worrying about countries you don't like to actually dealing with the materials which are the real problem, especially if you worry about material falling into the wrong hands, then follow the material and the politics will follow. >> thank you, zia. there's a course that he teaches

at princeton university about these issues and more. next, we're going to have joel wit talk to us about one country that has gotten the attention of our two leading presidential candidates, north korea. joel, thanks for being with us. >> thanks for inviting me here today. i have a long association with the arms control association. i came to washington, i guess it was in 1980, bill kinkade and pete were very helpful to me. so it's a great honor to be here to talk to you today. given the limited amount of time i have, i'm going to make three points. first, north korea's nuclear and missile programs aren't safe. you're all looking at me like, duh, but in fact, up until recently, there had been a number of experts, number of other people who think that the

danger has been grossly exaggerated, and there have been some people who claim it's just an elaborate ruse by the north koreans to get our attention. i think that idea is not true. it wasn't true before. it's not true now. and in fact, also it was part of u.s. and south korean policy to downplay the threat. that was part of the policy of strategic patience and was based on the idea we didn't want to feed the north koreans craving for attention. therefore, we wouldn't make much of what they were doing. the last problem, of course, has been the media. i read the media every day, and i'm sure most of you don't on north korea. a lot of it focuses on air style and whether he's really overweight or all of these

really important issues, but in fact, how many of you know that as we are sitting here today, north korea's probably is starting another campaign to get plutonium at its nuclear site. it's obvious. all you need to do is look at the commercial satellites. of course, i'm not saying that we should jump to the other extreme. we need to work case analysis, but given what's been going on, particularly in the last six months when things are visible, at least we put to rest the idea that this is just -- last year, our institute did a year-long study on north korea's nuclear future. we came up with three different projections going to 2020. i should mention that like david albright and a number of missile

experts, findings basically were that from north korea's current stockpile of about 10 to 16 weapons, it may grow by 2020. 20 weapons, which is of course -- or 100 weapons, which is the worst for us. on the current trajectory, may be about 50 weapons. there will also be qualitative improvements in that defense. fissile front, you see the same sort of forward movement, although as we all know, it's much more difficult to build speculative long-range missiles. we have three scenarios there. in the worst case for us, they're moving down the road, which we have seen tests of this. but just putting that aside, i

think the one thing we all need to keep in mind, that even if north korea never conducted another nuclear test or never conducted another missile test, it can continue to produce nuclear weapons. that's not a problem. it has the facilities to do so. and it already has hundreds of missiles. so this is a problem for the region. these missiles can't reach the united states. but it is certainly a problem for south korea. and even china. the bottom line here, this is a serious program. it's been steadily advancing for the past eight years. the issue for all of us is how far will it advance, and quite frankly, it seems to me that the north koreans don't have much incentive to stop. second, what are the implications if these current developments continue unabated?

there's a litany of dangers. i think most of you are familiar with, but i'll just repeat them here. first, there's not only the growing danger to our allies and our troops in north and east asia, but also to the united states itself. if north korea moves forward . and there's every indiction they are. second, there's the danger to our ability to maintain strong alliances. that's the bedrock of the administration's pivot to asia. that bedrock depends on extensive returns and the credibility of our security. likely will be undermined. linked to that, of course, is the danger that south korea and japan will feel they have no choice but to build their own missiles.

so the laundry list of arguments about why that will never happen, but we can't be sure, and particularly, we can't be sure, a, in what it may do in the future, and b, now we have the trump factor. maybe it would be a good thing for south korea and japan to build nuclear weapons. there's the danger of a growing threat to stability in the region, and particularly crisis stability. i guess there's some parallel here between northeast asia, and we all know the korean peninsula is not a very stable place in the best of times. periodic arms clashes and fights possible, they'll continue into the future. on top of that, well, once again, not a lot of attention has been paid to it. there's already an arms race on the peninsula.

we all know about what north korea is doing, but do we all know about what south korea is doing? the missile program and also the focus on preventive quite frankly, as someone who worked on these issues, here's now, i would say our options have narrowed significantly in the past eight years. they've said a number of times they'll be a responsible nuclear weapon state.

the missile program and also the focus on preventive quite frankly, as someone who worked on these issues, here's now, i would say our options have narrowed significantly in the past eight years. it's clear to me from talking to north koreans, i moved them regularly and tracked the meetings. it's clear to me in talking to them, since at least 2012, they've got a bounce in their step. they've been building these weapons, no one has been able to stop them. impose sanctions on them. they have done very well even with the limited sanctions we imposed on them. and so if i was a north korean, i would be feeling pretty confident.

having said all that, let me just weigh out five very quick suggestions for guidelines for the next administration policy. first, make dealing with this challenge a priority. it may sound strange, but it hasn't been a priority. it's not a priority, even though we talked about rebalancing to asia and the importance of our alliances, nuclear security, and i know there are many meetings between u.s. and chinese officials. senior level meetings where north korea barely comes up. if it doesn't come up in those meetings it's not a priority. second point, stop the magical thinking about how to deal with north korea. it's amazing that i still maintain my sanity, quite frankly, because i hear all sorts of ideas about how we should deal with north korea. and there isn't enough time in

the meeting to talk about all of them, so i'm not going to do that but there are a lot of ideas floating around from the administration policy of strategic patience to the idea of korea, a regime change in korean unification. in my mind, they all qualify as magical thinking. they are unrealistic. third, a related recommendation, think strategically, not tactically. we are constantly reacting to what north korea does. and when they don't do anything, we don't do anything. so what we need to do is return to basics. what are our objectives here? how do we achieve them? what tools should we use? this may sound very strange, but we aren't doing this basic thing. fourth, be willing to think out of the box.

everyone is so quick to dismiss any north korean proposal that we're never going to get this process going, if we are indeed interested in trying to have negotiations. once again, i don't have time to relate all of those, but i'll be happy to talk about them. fifth, we need to be willing, whoever the president is, should be willing to take the domestic political risk to secure our national interest. as long as there are no security downsides. once again, that may make -- that may have some resonance, but the fact is that we haven't been willing to take those domestic political risks. so maybe the fact that donald trump has now said he would meet with kim jong-un, i'm not sure if that will give any domestic political coverage, but at least a new wrinkle in that area.

so as far as i'm concerned, domestic political risks are the only downside to an approach that combines diplomacy with -- i'll stop there. thank you. >> thank you, joel. we're glad you maintained your sanity to this point. very sobering presentation. next, former ambassador susan burk is going to talk about the broader set of challenges that face the next u.s. president relating to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty as a whole, where these issues and others are discussed every five years in a cycle, and in between, and so thank you very much for being here, susan. >> thank you very much for inviting me. i wanted to thanked the arms control association for all of the work they're doing to advocate for and advance a responsible arms control nonproliferation agenda. from what we heard so far this

morning, i feel like i should say my name is susan, and i'm a nonproliferator. the quality of a support group, and i appreciate the arms control association for providing those of us who suffer this affliction, having an opportunity to be with other true believers and kind of share our burdens. this morning, i wanted to focus on the disarmament or the divide between the haves and have nots. i was asked to address the impact of these challenges on the health of the treaty, and so i'll talk a bit about the impact of the divide and some options to address this divide. and i really tried not to be political, but i may not be able to help myself. in any case, you know, over the years, the parties to the ntp generally have agreed fairly consistently on the support and central role that the treaty has played in grounding and upholding the global nonproliferation regime. at the same time, frustration

over the pace and process of nuclear disarmament and increasingly disagreement over the role of nuclear weapons and npt's nuclear weapons security state strategies has been a feature. i was involved in the 2010 review conference, and that benefitted tremendously from the good will that had been generated by the nuclear agenda laid out by president obama in prague. and it was also helped by a substantive decision on the middle east which paved the way for agreements on the action plan. there were a number of pieces of that action plan, and two things in particular i mentioned. one was that action plan launched an unprecedented process of p-5 engagement, no laughing, and provided for increased accountability by reporting.

but perhaps expectations were unrealistically high on all sides. we thought that was possible. or this modest progress was seen as an opening for more ambitious opening of the flood gates, because as soon as the npt party reconvened in 2012 to prepare 2015, what has been known as the humanitarian consequences movement began its surge and the first of three international conferences on the subject was rolled out. the nuclear -- the nuclear weapon states declined to participate in the first two meetings. of the u.s. and uk participated in the third, and by doing so, in my view, they forfeited the opportunity to contribute to the developing narrative, and they strengthened the hand of the group who were seeking outside of the npt framework, disarmament. as support for this movement was growing, the prospects of further u.s.-russian arms reduction was fading.

russian nuclear saber rattling was increasing. north korea, as joel mentioned, was continuing to conduct nuclear explosive tests and engage in provocative behavior, and the conference remained -- against this backdrop, the 2015 conference last year again made a run at a consensus final document, but stumbled in the final hours over the middle east. there's no direct evidence that consensus would have been broken over the disarmament report alone, and i did my best to try to get people to tell me if that was the case, but the lack of enthusiasm has been widely reported, and so i have even heard from some that there was relief in some quarters among non-alliance states that there was no document because they were not -- but that draft, which was not finalized did include some initiative that

including the u.n. working group that was mentioned as well as calls again for regular detailed reporting, and the open ended working group which i'll talk about a bit was something that the nuclear weapons state appeared to support in the document. so not withstanding the fact there was no agreement on the document, soon after the conference, the u.s. signaled its willingness to engage in the oewg on the basis of the terms agreed by the npt party. that is the decision -- i represent only myself. i think that the decision to establish the oeg ultimately under different terms than had been agreed upon, that was to go to u.n., which was, made for a missed opportunity.

you had a proposal that the npt nuclear weapon states engage as long as it was consensus. at least the process calling the discussion in this oewg with the weapons possession. those who pushed for a vote, i think, i question their motives. i have heard from some who attended the oewg. no one in the room, i have to say. who were told that they didn't want the weapon states to participate. that was one of the motivations. if that's the case, i think there's a problem here, and it may not be the usual suspects. engagement is a two-way street. it requires flexibility on both sides. if one side is setting up a situation that they know the other side is not going to be able to live with -- in any case, the fourth humanitarian conference has not been scheduled for various regions.

it has become the focal point for debate on disarmament but without the input of the weapon states. because no states possess nuclear weapons. the oewg is also discussing the so-called legal gap in the npt. this is what some states argue is the lack of a clear definition of the effective measures to be negotiated relating to nuclear disarmament, the effective measures mentioned in article six of the npt. and there is no con sevcensus o whether there is or is not a

legal gap. the oewg has gotten some press because several states -- a handful of states to convene a conference next year to negotiate an agreement to prohibit nuclear weapons, but there are a number of papers that have been tabled to lay out the proposals we have all come to know and understand. building blocks which are step by step. a convention, nuclear weapons convention. a framework agreement. these are all proposals that have been tabled in the npt review context. i would say for many of the participants in these meetings, regional and global insecurity is very real. they believe their concerns are legitimate. and their frustration with the

nuclear weapon states has led them to this venue. this u.s. has aligned themselves with the prague speech with the concerned expressed about the humanitarian -- they believe -- they're real in the sense that frustration over disarmament and fear of nuclear use has contributed to the growth of this humanitarian movement, and it's led some extremely well informed and well placed observers to conclude that the two sides are more polarized than they have ever been. now, this movement provides an opportunity not only for states to show concern about and dissatisfaction with the status quo, but to take matters in their own hands outside of the npt and without the nuclear weapon states if necessary.

this is not going to strengthen that treaty. it will not fill the void that many believe has emerged in the absence of further progress. now, bridging the divide is going to require we make common cause with our partners to address the concerns that fuel the humanitarian movement. i was asked to provide a best case and a worst case, and i won't get into the issue of politics, but you know, who gets elected in november, i think, will very much influence the best whether or not there's the best you can make or the best you imagine case because the conference, the 50th anniversary of entering the force, and shortly after 2015, folks already began to look ahead to that as a dramatic milestone moment and a very symbolic conference. so no matter what happens, i think it's going to be something

to watch. even under the best circumstances, it's going to be a challenge. so how do you mitigate that challenge. how do you make the best of a bad situation? i think the next u.s. president early on has to reaffirm strong and unequivocal support for the nonproliferation regime, including the npt in all aspects, disarmament, nonproliferation, no spread of nuclear weapons to any countries, and removal. i think that has to be clear. a prague-like speech that reflected continuity in the nuclear agenda i think would do a lot to reassure international partners about continued leadership, partnership, and shared objectives. i know there's a lot of criticism about the prague agenda not being fully realized, but i think it's a heck of a good place to start, and something like that that builds

and moves forward. such an agenda could also include commitments to sustain the work of the international partnership of nuclear disarmament verification. i would suggest seeking to expand its membership to include more partners, explore involving other nongovernmental organizations able to make contributions and make the partnership work as transparent as possible. these are a way to use the time available now to prepare for advances later when the process is linked to understanding and education of a wide variety of states on the verification challenges of the nuclear numbers. the next president should announce. and this would be a way to re-engage russia on nonproliferation arms control issues and i do not in any way underestimate the difficulty. they -- he or she should

persevere with the p-5 process and promote p-5 transparency and accountability. last year's annual meeting, lewis dunn outlined several possible p-5 initiatives to be pursued through this process, including p-5 action to minimize the risk of nuclear weapon use by anyone as well as a p-5 code of nuclear conduct, and i would urge people to take another look at those ideas, and if i were advising the next president, i would urge that. i think pressure should be kept on getting the negotiations going into geneva. i understand this may be a fool's errand, but it is important for a number of reasons. and if the u.s. has flexibility on stocks as has been reported, that would be an important development. the next president should uphold the 24 plus year testing

moratorium. continued support for the international monitoring system, and a way to make sure that that system is made a permanent part of the international nonproliferation architecture. the ratification is a tough issue, as we all know, and it depends what happens in other races. i think more effort should be made to make the case to the american people and to congress on why -- and i think this is something both the u.s. government and ngos can do more on. i know aca is doing a tremendous amount of work. don't underestimate the importance of getting out the word to the american public. and then i would say reaffirm the u.s. negative security assurance contained in the 2010 review, and recommit to the ratification and don't forget the other zones once the protocol is completed, and in another step, i would suggest that the next president signal

willingness and an appropriate venue to discuss the conditions under which a global negative security assurance agreement, under what condition. and then finally, we should not shy away from joining the ongoing multilateral discussion on disarmament. if we believe that our mission is a sound one, we should be prepared to partner and defend our mission. maybe they'll learn something. maybe we'll learn something. i think this would signal a clear commitment and to work with and through multilateral institutions, better or for worse. this should be part of the president's agenda. while this would not discourage certain states from pursuing solutions outside of the npt to force disarmament process, this is going to strengthen the hand

of allies closely aligned with ours. you can't fight something with nothing, and this is the way to get a real discussion going. now, even under such a scenario, a successful review in 2020 is a 50/50 proposition. that's probably generous. nuclear disarmament is not the only issue that can derail agreements, but if the goal is to re-enforce the centrality, the indefensibility and the irreplaceability, then strong, responsibility, and creative u.s. leadership and engagement, and a respectful sensitive to a large number of nonnuclear weapon states, now, i'm not even going to talk about -- i'm already stressed about what i have heard so far, but i'll be happy to talk over coffee or answer questions, but in conclusion, a proactive and positive u.s. nonproliferation and arms control agenda is essential for a best case outcome.

and i use best case. but it's not a guarantee of such. as i have noted, bridging the divide is a two-way street, and the nonweapon states and even the ngos must be willing to engage on common ground. i would also note on arms control, it takes two to tango. right now, i would say this government doesn't have a partner. so it should not be held -- to be blamed for not moving forward without a partner. but maybe work can be done to try -- humanitarian consequence movement has provided a vehicle for nonnuclear weapon states to articulate their concern and their fears about nuclear weapons, which are legitimate. i think as we have heard today, and prevent their frustrations with programs and policies they believe rightly or wrongly put them at greater risk. the challenges facing the npt regime will require steady, informed united states leadership to build on the decades of work that has been done.

>> thank you. >> as i said this morning at the outset of the meeting, we have a very substantive and high-level program, and i appreciate all the ideas and the problems with the issues from our four speakers on four important areas. and because we have put forward a presentation on four different areas, when you ask your question, please be specific as to whom you're directing your question, and try to keep it tight. we have about 25 minutes before we're going to take our lunch break, and then move to our keynote speaker at the noon hour. so with that, the floor is open for your questions. i see a number of hands going up. i will try to get to as many of you as possible. why don't you try to head over here to the right side with mr. wolf by the wall.

>> thank you. i would like to ask questions of each. i'll confine myself. i have always thought strategic patience is not the right term. it should have been strategic indifference. but toby made an interesting point for me, and he said that one of the first things he would recommend in dealing with south asia is fix the policy structure. i wonder if you think the problem with the structure, that's the recommendation you would make in the area of dealing with north korea. >> before you take that, joel, why don't we take one more and do a couple at a time, since we have several right behind you. >> i'm from italy. also with a question.

the presentation is rather pessimistic. but i agree with you. but there's one element of hope and it's an evolution. both russia and china are becoming concerned. and you said that their missile capacity could even reach china and i guess also russia. so maybe also they are fed up with the situation, and they can exercise pressure. and also, what is wrong with the suggestion for negotiation, for negotiating a peace treaty?

after all, 60 years have passed from the korean war, and maybe this time at least to establish the border, the most dangerous one is the northern limit line, which is not defined at all. thank you. >> thank you. joel. >> policy structure. this is obviously a very difficult issue to deal with. so the question is, can the regular bureaucracy opt out, so i and norm also have been part of an experience where you had one guy in charge who actually grows to a conclusion, a framework. i think today that's what you need. otherwise, leaving this to the

state department, to other bureaucracies, nothing is ever going to happen. you're just going to have more patients. secondly, on your point, first, yes, every time i give a presentation, people, there's always someone who rightly points out, you're being pessimistic. yes. you're absolutely right. but i would say maybe it's a psychological defense. i'm being realistic. that's what's important here. yes, we would all like to find elements of hope, but i would suggest that relying on russia and china and some sort of change in particularly china's approach, isn't going to work. been doing that for 20 years. how many times have i had a discussion with people where

they're saying it looks like china is changing its approach? it happens over and over and over again. there may be changes, but they're tactical. you probably follow the newspapers. you saw president xi with the former north korean foreign minister who is now a member of the -- a lot of people are interpreting that as china accepting north korea as a nuclear weapon state. so i don't see that as an element of hope. third, on the north korean suggestion, let's negotiate a peace treaty, i agree. i don't see anything wrong with that as long as we get our issues on the table. the problem is that's really very difficult for americans and people in northeast asia to visualize because a peace treaty in theory could lead up to a very different northeast asia.

a very different korean peninsula. i don't know what the impact would be on our alliances in northeast asia, if there were forward progress. so it's very hard for people to make that leap. but i would argue, as i said in my presentation, think out of the box. the only way we're going to deal with this problem is by addressing core security concerns on both sides. and i have been in meetings where people say, the north koreans, they don't have anything to fear from the united states. why do they think we're a security threat? well, you know. i mean, you don't have to meet with north koreans regularly to see what's wrong with that statement. so that's what has to be done. and it's very hard. >> before we move onto some questions for the other panelists and other issues, if

you could quickly remind us no matter how difficult this is, what are the stakes? and your institute has done some careful research on future scenarios in terms of what the north koreans may have in their arsenal down the road. >> you mean the implications? >> i mean by 2020, by the end of this next president's first term. how many nuclear weapons might the north koreans have at their disposal? what might their missile capabilities be based upon? >> the technical part? >> yeah. just to remind people what's at stake here. >> we did three different scenarios. david albright did. the range in weapons was 20 to 100. that doesn't sound like a lot to us in the united states, but it sure sounds like a lot to the

south koreans and the japanese. and of course the qualitative improvements are almost as important. it's unclear. i think and david thinks and now the u.s. government thinks and the south koreans are admitting the north koreans can put a war head on top of at least a regional range missile. they've made qualitative improvements. and depending on the pace of nuclear testing, they could make a lot more, including the possibility of developing a very simple single stage hydrogen bomb by 2020. the big development out there, the elephant sitting in the room

is whether they can build an icbm. we've seen it. we've seen mockups of it in plai parade. we've seen tests of the rocket engine motors. these are all things that shouldn't be taking people by surprise and are coming down the pike. >> we've got some other questions here. marissa, why don't you come here to the front table and take this lady's question? thanks. >> my name is angela beach. my understanding is that pakistan wouldn't participate in negotiations because of its strategic concerns -- [ no audio ] my question was a little bit of a technical one.

i was hoping you could talk about the estimates on the size of stockpiles and at current rates of production how long it would take pakistan to catch up with india under the scenario that that would be the critical juncture at which they could join up in ct negotiations. thank you. >> why don't we take one more question here in the middle? then we can thumb wrestle over your question. >> pierce gordon. i've probably been in the business maybe too long, but there's something called the united nations disarmament commission, which meets annually. its primary objective of -- [ no audio ] by definition all u.n. members are there, which means all of the states both in and out of the npt and the united states

participates but i don't say it gives very much attention to that. what are the prospects that the u.n. could become a more central point of dealing with nuclear disarmament involving all of the possessing states and all of the other states and perhaps the oewg efforts could sort of morph over into that forum which is ready to continue working indefinitely perhaps as a beginning point. bearing in mind that russia has made it clear that they're not prepared to do more bilateral negotiations. >> thank you. >> yeah. thank you for that. our international panel on fissile materials does these estimates on a regular basis. you can find the most recent

global fissile material report. but i think the interesting thing is actually not the current balance of materials. the question is the presumption behind your question and the claim that pakistan makes that it is delaying and blocking the beginning of talks at the conference on disarmament on a fissile material cutoff treaty. it's true, pakistan has made an enormous investment in building up the production capacity for -- especially for plutonium, weapons plutonium in the last 15 years. as of 2000-2001 it had one plutonium production. now it has four that are operating. but the thing you have to understand is that there is actually not that much difference in the stockpiles of

material produced for weapons purposes between the two countries. what pakistan points to is india's live stockpile of unsafeguarded plutonium which is from indian nuclear power reacto reactors. in other words putting on the table indian stockpiles which is outside safeguards but india claims is not for weapon purposes. there is a concern behind this. and that is that india's fast breeder reactor will use plutonium as fuel, but it can produce weapon grade plutonium as a byproduct of its operation. it will take reactor grade plutonium for fuel and produce weapons grade plutonium.

if it operates at any reasonable rate, which is uncertain, because most people who have tried breeder reactors have realized they're very hard and very unsafe and have lots of problems and can't get them to operate well. but that breeder reactor, if it works, could increase india's weapon plutonium production rate almost tenfold. the sad part, of course, is that the united states has had 15 years to deal with the pakistan concerns and the indian breeder reactor program and has refused to take either aspect seriously because of other interests. since 9/11 the united states has been more interested in chasing al qaeda and killing taliban than dealing with pakistan building up its weapons program. and it has been more interested in recruiting india to its side in an emerging cold war with china and having access to the indian market and all these other things. so we won't talk too much about

what indian is doing with its nuclear program. so the real reason, i think, that pakistan is blocking is the fact that it can. and it's using that time to build up its arsenal to whatever size it thinks is appropriate, really regardless of how big india's stockpile is or isn't. and it's largely, you know, our fault. >> all right. why don't we go to the question with the undc. >> pierce, i don't know the answer to that question. i mean, i see randy. he might know better. i'm not aware of the undc producing anything in recent memory. and i remember years ago, probably when i was at the pentagon, you know where it was a more -- doing stuff. but i'm not aware that it's being used by any state tomeani. if it's under u.n. rules where

you can vote things in or out, well, if it's consensus, i just don't know. my impression of it is that it has not been particularly active or you know in the front lines or even in the middle lines, maybe not even the rear lines for a long time. so it would require a retooling, yeah. well, i just don't know the answer to that question. >> before we go to the next question, let me just ask a followup of toby on the fissile material cutoff treaty issue. at the end of your response you said that pakistan was blocking the start of negotiations because they could. because the conference on disarmament operates according to the consensus rules so one country can block. just this january as we reported in arms control today, the u.s. put forward a proposal that would meet one of pakistan's concerns, which is to discuss the stockpiles as part of --

pakistan is still opposed. then when prime minister drew dou trudeau came to washington and met with president obama, there was a small notice that they issued in their statement that perhaps other approaches to pursuing this material cutoff treaty other than the conference on disarmament might need to be explored. quickly, if you could just address this question. i mean, is there another option for the u.s. president -- the next u.s. president to get negotiations going maybe outside of the conference on disarmament where consensus based rules are not necessarily in effect and work with the other nuclear arms states with fissile stockpiles? is there another way, yes or no? >> it's possible to go outside the conference on disarmament. there's no reason why not. the issue, of course s that just in the way that susan mentioned, the nuclear weapon states, when they want to protect their

interests, insist on a consensus based approach. like when we talk about nuclear disarmament, the other nuclear weapon states that we would want to be involved in a fissile material cutoff treaty, the russians, the chinese, the others may say, well, look, the u.s. may be fine because it has all these allies who will vote for whatever it wants, but we don't. so therefore we want consensus in any process. you can get a process, but other weapon states to protect their own interests in negotiations will want consensus also. whether it helps the process grow that much faster is unclear given the differences they have in their negotiating positions. i think the real issue is not to go outside the fissile material cutoff treaty negotiation in geneva. we could have them in geneva. the question you have to ask is whether a country as dependent on the international system as

pakistan is able to withstand the entire international community. the only reason it doesn't is because no one cares enough to call them on it. and they're getting away with it precisely for that reason. everyone else has more important interests with pakistan than fissile materials. the day that changes -- the pakist pakist pakistanis said sure we can have negotiations. they saw that the world was really concerned about the nuclear tests and wanted something done. it's going to be that kind of determination that will force pakistan to say we'll let the process go forward. doesn't mean they'll agree to a treaty when it's done. they've got enough fissile material to suit themselves. this really is a question of how badly the international community want this is treaty. >> i wouldn't add much to that

other than to reinforce what he suggested, which is that within the p-5 certainly there is a range of views on the desirability of an fmct, let alone an fmt. so the risk in shifting outside the cd is that we might find the five quickly becomes a much smaller number of states that are actually interested. >> all right. i see a couple more hands. there's one way in the back. i want to respect the people in the rear of the room. if you could get to her, yes. then we'll take one more up front and then we're about at our lunch break. >> from voice of america, persian tv network. i know it's focused on northeast asia. perhaps i can ask the panel about china's investment in pakistan and recent trade cooperation between india and

iran, do you see any possibility of nuclear cooperation between india and iran? and how can the future united states president strike a balance withchina's presence there and india as an ally of united states and pakistan and india, perhaps. >> all right. let's take one more question and as we consider that one. right here, please. >> thank you. retired foreign service officer. israel seems to be opening up a little bit on its nuclear weapons program. how do you see this evolution, if, indeed, it exists moving ahead in the next few years? there was mention, i think susan burke mentioned the nuclear weapons free zones.

thank you. >> all right. thank you. all right. i'm going to ask toby to try the first question that was asked then we'll turn to the second. >> so as i understand it, the question was how should china, india and iran, how does that all look, particularly as nuclear trade concerns go forward and whether there's potential for some stabilizing role there. i think, you know, the questions about iran as daryl highlighted have focused much more on the closing down of the weapons infrastructure. what we see still is interest in nuclear energy there and russia has been the primary recipient of that interest and i would imagine would continue to be the primary recipient of that interest. india has been constructing reactors on its own territory but largely has not participated much in international nuclear trade and i think is still quite a ways away from being able to

do that. but the big question mark is now the extent to which china is becoming more of a supplier and what that means in terms of the international market and the rules and practices associated with that. until now, it's primarily been building reactors in pakistan but has participated in a number of bids to build reactors outside of pakistan. and so it's conceivable that in the future, it could play a much larger role in the nuclear power programs of other states. that kind of then leads to the questions about whether china has the same priorities in terms of safety, security, responsibility, practices. i think that's not something we should take for granted. but there's not a lot of evidence at this point to suggest that they don't. it strikes me as an area for important conversations and cooperation going forward.

>> susan, do you want to try to take the question about israel's interest or its role in reducing nuclear risk especially through the wmd-free zone in the middle east? >> i'll just, you know, i haven't been involved in the middle east discussions. israel is not a party to the npt. the middle east issue, as i mentioned, has been a substantive issue at review conferences ever since the '95. prior to that, some dustup about the middle east, iran, iraq, whatever, would keep people in the conference room until 3:00 in the morning. i'm not going to comment on whether or not they're opening up or not. there were valiant efforts made after the 2010 conference to try to convene a conference of regional states to discuss establishing a weapons of mass destruction freestone. that's the proposal.

not just nuclear, but all weapons of mass destruction. the israelis were participating in these meetings but there was not -- it was the arabs that were -- iran wasn't participating in any of the meetings, so the conditions just don't seem right there, but i -- it's not israel that is the problem as best i can tell in terms of police getting together with regional partners to scope out the parameters of a conference. i think it's safe to say that the obstacle has been the larger group of states and i won't go any further than that. >> i would just add that, you know, as we look at the middle east region, which was not covered too much in this session, you know, we have been talking about, we will continue to discussion ways in which we can build upon the jcpoa, the iran deal, to head off possible future iranian interests in

nuclear weapons beyond the terms of that agreement as well as looking for ways in which other countries in the region including israel can join in some of the multilateral measures like comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty which was signed but not ratified. the ways in which other countries can help reduce nuclear risks and create the conditions toward a wmd-free zonen the region, perhaps beginning with a nuclear weapon test-freestone in the region. that will be a subject of focus for the arms control association at future events, but we are out of scheduled time for this session. i hope this conversation -- it may be unsatisfying, it may be a little difficult to take sometimes. these issues keep coming at us, but that is why we do our work. i want to just note before we thank our panelists that we're now going to be breaking for about 20 minutes for lunch. i would encourage all of you to

step outside with some elacrot where, to get your plate of food. there will be two lines. going to resume the program as close as 12:00 noon as possible for our keynote speaker, ben rhodes. with that, we're going to take a short break. please join me in thanking all of our panelists. [ applause ] more now from the arms control association conference with ben rhodes, deputy national security adviser for strategic communications, discusses president obama's progress with nuclear security. mr. rhodes is also an adviser on

the joint comprehensive plan of action with iran. he says the deal demonstrated that diplomacy can be an effective tool to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. >> all right. good afternoon, everyone. welcome back. if i could ask everyone to take their seats, we're going to get started with our program once again for the 2016 arms control association annual meeting. i'm daryl kimball, still the executive director of the arms control association and i'm happy to see an even larger set of people here. we have, for those of you having

a harm time with seating, we have an overflow room downstairs in the back at the carnegie international peace building. we have the privilege and honor to have with us for our second keynote address someone who has been involved in the articulation and implementation of president barack obama's strategy to address the threats posed by nuclear weapons. the deputy national security adviser for strategic communications, benjamin rhodes. ben is a long time and key member of president obama's national security team. from the period proceeding president obama's april 5th, 2009, speech in prague on his vision regarding the steps toward the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. to president barack obama's historic visit just ten days ago to the hiroshima peace park where he recognized and reflected on the tremendous suffering of that war and the meaning of the a ttomic bombing.

which we also heard about this morning from a survivor. we've asked ben to come here today. about seven years after the prague address to review and reflect on what the president has accomplished over the past several years. a lot has been accomplished. we've asked ben to talk about why that's important for the world, for u.s. security and perhaps what more the president and his team believe needs to be accomplished. you know, as the president said in his eloquent remarks in hiroshima, quote, persistent effort can roll back the possibility of catastrophe. we can chart a course that leads to the destruction of the so stockpi stockpiles. we can stop the spread to new nations and stop the deadly materials from fanatics. as i said, thanks to president obama's leadership efforts, a

great deal has been accomplished but even as he has acknowledged, there's much more to be done and on behalf of all our arms control association members here today, and i know many others out there who've been concerned about these issues, let me just say, ben, we hope the president can and will use the power of his office in the months that remain to take the inspiring message from hiroshima to advance further common sense steps that would move us closer to a world without nuclear weapons. so, we thank you for being with us today taking time out of your busy schedule and we appreciate your personal contributions to these issues and we look forward to your remarks. please come up to the podium. and afterwards, we'll take questions from reporters who are here and then we're going to take questions from the gene