monday night, president of audi of america talks about autonomous cars and his prediction of when they will be on the market. >> when you see what uber is doing, you see a lot of proclamations executives are making, the automotive business where you are used to a lot of hype and when it comes to everyday matters, a little bit of hype is ok. when it comes to matters such as this, it is disingenuous. when someone says autonomous or autopilot or self driving, the consumer thinks, i hit a button and that car will take me anywhere in america under any condition. that is not the case. atwatch the communicators

8:00 on c-span 2. u.s. air force academy professor chuck steele talks about the state of the british grand fleet and the activity of german submarines prior to the u.s. entering the war. he argues that the actions of admiral william sims helps to keep the forces united. his class is just over 50 minutes. out the lesson today by talking about william sims, one of the more neglected figures in military history as per the article i sent you, kind of comes off, you know, a distant

second to pers hchling if that and so today this is a sea power class, we'll talk about the significance of sims and, you know, possibly get in to arguments as to who really made the more relevant contribution. that is sims, as you guys know, from being looking at the article. the painting is return of the mayflower. that shows the first group of american destroyers after we had entered the war arriving in ireland to begin operations against the german submarines. so it's sort of the most important figure for us in terms of getting those ships in to place. of course, unlike the other figures that we've discussed, sims isn't going to actually operate operational control. he's going to hand that off to

admiral bailey, the royal navy, which is, again, something that's at odds with the way that the army would be operated for the most part in the war. but he had a good deal of confidence in the british and their abilities to serve as effective commanders. so anyway, let's move on and talk about what we're going to go through. we're going to talk a little bit why the contributions of the naval forces are central to the allied victory in the war and we'll do review talking, once again, about what do the oceans mean to the various combatants. and then what are the limitations of british sea power because it seems rather impressive, all the things that the british were able to do. and then we'll talk about sims and what his contributions are specifically and then if we have some time, we'll talk about the significance of the american experience in world war i and what that means going forward as we set up the next few lessons. all right. so just as a matter of review,

unlike the war on land, not so many engagements, right? most of the readings that you had dealt with jutland because it's the most significant of the engagements but you had the grand fleet involved and smaller vessels from both fleets and engagement in august of '14. coronado in the pacific cost about 1500 plus casualties for the british, a disaster for the british. but then that same fleet, the asiatic squadron makes its way into the atlantic and they come in to contact with the british force of battle cruises or built around heavy cruisers and the germans get mauled and lose close to 2,000 people. so after that, dogger bank in 1915 and then jutland in 1916. that's pretty much it.

and if we look at jutland, what do we think of jutland? is it -- the germans like to hail it as a tactical success. you're laughing, mr. ryan. >> yes. >> why are you laughing? >> tactical success doesn't matter so much in the bigger picture as outcome. >> if you're the germans, what makes you think that you succeeded in this fight? >> didn't get destroyed by the royal navy? >> you weren't completely destroyed? >> you scored victories on a few british ships. >> the death toll stands in favor of the germans. the destruction and damage to ships stands in favor of the

ships but did they achieve the operational results that they were looking for? where do they end up at the end of the battle? so it's a strategic change that changed? >> not at all. no. >> all right. and that kind of brings us to in terms of reviews, we think about the dimensions and traditionally -- traditionally, throughout this course at this point, where does war at sea occur? >> in world war i they haven't really moved in to air assets as much because we haven't started developing carriers or anything like that but germany obviously uses heavy emphasis on u-boats when they are trying to choke out the british commerce and so

that's really their alternative to having to go out and engage the grand fleet. >> yeah. what's the purpose of the grand fleet? what are they trying to achieve? what kind of operations are they engaged in? >> basically, trying to limit what the germans are capable of. it's a reactionary mindset. >> all right. but essentially the british are doing what with the grand fleet? >> deterrent to contain germany to the north sea. >> a term specifically designed for this, blockade. so if you're the germans, yeah, you're vulnerable to the british because they have a bigger fleet, a much bigger fleet. is britain vulnerable? as per the questions that we went over before, does the ocean offer any possibilities to the germans as far as dealing with

the british or do they have to play the same game that the british are playing? >> the best option for et going out of war. >> why is that? what is the ocean to britain? >> it brings an island. [ inaudible ]. that's what they've invested most of their military spending in is their sea power. so if you're the germans, you essentially take britain out of the war with a decisive battle if that ever happened. >> i think the other aspect, adding on to that, is sea is really britain's lifeline. we know it has been for a long time because they don't sustain themselves just based on the resources of the island themselves. so if you constrain their shipping through boat warfare, you're going to hurt them pretty badly. >> it's a source of strength. you have the grand fleet and definitely superior to the high seas fleet.

and you can impose an effective blockade but your command to the seas is, in a sense, limited to the surface and really to the area of the north sea because we talked about this before, i mean, you have to go with the distant blockade. there's too many risks, threats. so you don't control the baltic. there are some limitations on british sea power. but the other thing is that there's now another dimension to be considered and that is submarines. it's operating beneath the surface. and so talk about it being the consequences of british dominance. you have the germans who are recognizing early on this is indeed a problem, that they are

the second most powerful navy in the world or have the second most powerful navy in the world and that's by some distance. but you do have submarines and it's a stealthy weapon. there aren't so many countermeasures out there. the germans are going to launch three large submarines campaigns. i believe i sent them out to you. but there's some consequences that are associated with this as well. i mean, the germans meet with some success in setting up their own blockade. i mean, it's not the same sort of blockade but you're trying to accomplish the same objectives. cut the british off from commerce on the seas. but there are consequences. what's the big deal about the lusatania? it killed 120 americans. >> you follow through this, i mean, why are the germans doing

this? it seems so evil. why does this become an issue? >> it's similar to the war of the weaker. you have to go asymmetric if you're the underdog when it comes to warfare. >> but what do we find particularly distasteful or displeasing about this? you're killing civilians. you're killing american civilians. >> submarine warfare flies in the face of naval tradition, being grave and aggressive and meeting the enemy in open battle and you have a boat full of guy who can sink civilians, military members, whatever, without facing the danger in the same way. that sense of honor, i guess. >> perhaps.

and part of the issue is, you know, again, as per what i sent you folks, you know, there were expectations, right? i mean, what was supposed to happen? >> the u-boats were supposed to confirm the target, one of the officer was looking at the manifest and then decide whether they were going to sink it after ward and the british ended up just arming their merchant minutes to gun at the u-boats when it surfaced. >> if you're going to use these things as we come to sea, i think probably everybody is a bit more familiar with what happens in world war ii, but certainly a pattern is set. if you're going to try and do damage, you need to minimize the risks to your own people, right? so this causes some problems. because, again, you issue warnings but it's still going to be -- for the united states, what does this look like to us?

>> it just looks like germans are gunning down civilians. >> also value the seas so that's a direct threat on being able to be neutral and belligerent in this war. >> britain is definitely restricting our freedom of the seas but this is restriction and doing material harm. and so what was the result of this submarine campaign? the germans continue? are there pauses between these campaigns? >> they are afraid of larger action at sea by the allies. >> you have the potential to bring the united states in this war. the united states protests, right? and so this is something that the consequences -- as this thing is becoming a war of attrition, you've lost your chance for annihilation, is it becoming a war of attrition? the last thing you think you'd

want to do is involve an asian with the industrial capacity of the united states, although nothing like what it would be in world war ii but you still don't need any more enemies. campaign of 1916, the united states is going to get upset again and so he's supposed to play by the rules as per discussion and so this isn't really going to go anywhere either. all right. so what are the consequences for -- and why dot germans, if you can remember back to history 100, why are the germans going to change their minds in 1917? what's the big deal? what's going on by the time you get to 1917? >> there's starvation in germany. it's breaking the supply lines that need to be reopened to some degree, they need to regain access to this sea. >> if you're the germans, you're

probably suffering more than anybody else, right? you're fighting a two-front war, britain when we start this war without a doubt the greatest expression of british power is the grand fleet. but over time, i mean, you've got the population of the british empire to draw from. again, being in a war of attrition, you know, that's not really a good thing. on top of which -- you know, france is still burying the biggest brunt -- or bearing the brunt of all of this on the western front. and france is a formidable power. and so these things, in combination, if you're the germans, it's a very tough situation. and you are running out of resources. and so this has become a war of attrition. and, you know, the charts, if you look at resources and manpower, they don't favor you in a war of attrition. and in the standard 100 class,

the standard history 100 class, the core class, they talk about the big changes that the germans are making at the end of 1917, right? move to an emphasis on destruction of the russians. kind of a combination of military action and political action, getting lennonback in to russia so he would advocate for revolution. but going along the defense on the western front, the elastic defense, they also, in a sense, go on the offensive again. ok? they go back to waging unrestricted warfare. so what's the calculus here? what do you have to consider? what are the consequences of a third submarine campaign?

>> at this point in time, they are getting desperate. so the benefits of this are possibly driving someone out of the war, whether that be the united states or britain. >> well, we're not in yet, right? >> uh-huh. but possibly keeping the united states out but more likely forcing britain out of the war at this point but then the opposite side of that is we could definitely encourage the united states. they could encourage the united states to come in to the war. >> well, isn't that -- >> if you could sink enough british goods coming across the channel in to europe with your u-boats or moving around europe, you could cause economic problems for them. and then that pulls britain out of the war and would open up the seas to your fleet. >> but don't you kind of know that if you go this route, you're going to pull the united states in? i mean, the warnings have been made.

the oceans are important to us. right? so, you know, any return to unrestricted submarine warfare is going to have consequences. the germans pretty much know, it's going to pull us in. but are you that afraid of the americans? if you're running out of resources, what kind of timetable do you give yourself? >> it took us a while and i think the germans are aware of that. >> mobilization goes -- it happens quickly. i think what they are aware of, more than anything else, is how small the united states army is. if you look before world war i, what's the last major military expedition mounted by the united states army? yeah. and how did that go? >> terribly. >> you can't track down and bring a villain to justice and you're going to go over and fight in the biggest war against -- you know, the biggest war that anybody has seen against

soldiers who were battle-hardened and this isn't poncho vee that you're talking about. >> i would say for the germans, i would say it's definitely a risk worth taking because if you can get britain out of the war, you remove the biggest, best fleet in the world and now all of a sudden you're the biggest, best fleet in the world. >> the thing about that, though, the u-boats aren't going to be used to strike against british sea power and naval assets. not in a restrictive sense. they are not going after the grand fleet. they are going after the merchant ships. but -- if you get britain as a nation to surrender, the fleet -- >> the fleet doesn't matter anymore.

>> and the fleet is a strength and it's a liability. and -- you know what i'm talking about? why is the grand fleet a liability as well? >> because they have to put resources towards it. >> specifically what? beyond steel. >> people. >> people. >> what' the most effective means for the navy? in terms of technology, what's the most effective technology for combatting these u-boats? >> destroyers. >> if you pull destroyers to protect the fleet, you can't protect with the same destroyers. >> the fleet is -- i mean, this is the instrument of -- this is what's getting the job done in the north sea. this keeps the clamps on them. but if you remove the destroyers, now your fleet is vulnerable. and so it's a tough situation.

yeah, they've invested more. they have the world's greatest navy. but you still don't have all of the assets that you need to do everything that you want. and so that's one of the reasons why the u.s. entry into this war, why it's going to be so important, one of the reasons i want to bring sims into this picture. orthodox, big ship, good. the traditional path. if you're a naval officer, the first couple of guys that we read about in world war i are fleet commanders and that's what really excites us. you know, sims isn't going to be the guy who, you know, spent his time and energy commanding ships to destroy u-boats. he passes out. but at least he has a pretty solid side picture when it comes to what the strategic situation calls for. and so with the u.s. entry into the war, it's a pretty big deal,

right? we have destroyers. we are going to send battleships, we're going to send a squadron of battleships to the grand fleet but the grand fleet, you know, there's not going to be a second battle of jutland. the germans are going to threaten but nothing ever really materializes. you don't have a 1916 or 1917 version of the battle of -- they have accomplished their objective. but you still have this threat. sims is an interesting character and as long as we're emphasizing leadership throughout this course, a little bit different, the level of war that he's dealing with is different than what we've seen with these other fellows, maybe with the exception of jelico, he certainly has -- one would assume from previous discussions, i think we're in agreement that jelico was a sound, strategic thinker. sims, interesting character. born in canada, graduated from the american naval academy in 1880. sort of during that

professionalism that starts to develop, the creation of the naval institute and shortly thereafter the creation of the naval war college under the leadership of steven b.luce, our navy in terms of encouraging thinking, you know, in terms of developing agile minds is kind of ahead of the game. and sims is certainly one of these guys who benefits from this or at least fits in to this environment. he would go on at the time that the war begins, he's actually serving as president of the naval war college, sent over to

europe and eventually becomes head of u.s. naval forces in europe. and that brings us back to this whole thing. the destroyers are kind of important but if we think of the united states just in general, in the broadest sense, what's the most important thing we can do for our allies? >> produce. produce stuff. >> we're actually going to be relying on foreign equipment. >> ok. >> foreign tanks, foreign aircraft. but -- and again, this goes back to -- it's in the article that i sent you dealing with sims. but if you go back to history 100, how are the allies doing in 1917? what's that? >> the british and french can't really get any farther on the western front and russia's starting to kind of deteriorate both in their government and

their forces on the eastern front. >> yeah. the russians are going to go through two revolutions in 1917. the october revolution is going to kill it. so the germans are successful. the strategic shift to the eastern front, they are successful. but what's going on -- if we look at the allied forces fighting on the western front, how are they doing? are they taking advantage of the germans and their shift to the east? >> no. at this point, the lines have been established and they are not moving anywhere at this point. >> and when they do try, do you remember the novelle offensive? he's the commander of the french -- big hero and comes up and gets the choice field command and he's going to lead them, you know, in a big offensive in 1917. what does he run in to?

anybody remember from 100? >> gas? >> no. >> artillery? >> do you guys remember the elastic defense? anybody remember the elastic defense? >> it's been a long time. >> basically just kind of an evolution of the defense in depth. >> bingo. defense in depth. you're not going to commit everything to protecting the front lines. you sort of put up the minimum in terms of resistance up front and set up sort of a massive kill zone farther back. and this is what novelle runs in to, or his soldier. i don't think he was leading any charges. but the effects of 1917 on the french, disastrous. the germans are on the offensive and the effects are disastrous.

they use the term "mutiny." it's not as if the soldiers were in charge but sort of mass disobedience to orders. i remember reading an article. that's a great term. mass disobedience to orders. you want an offensive, go ahead, right behind you, 100% of the way. right behind you and not moving anywhere. if you look at it as far as getting to this war, you're looking at the french, i mean, they are suffering, man. they are just about out of this thing. if you're the germans and you're looking at it, maybe things aren't so bad. you still have these problems in

terms of resources but russia's not going to be a problem going forward. the french are demoralized. and the effects of the submarine campaign against the british, you know, they are producing some solid effects. i can reference the numbers in that article that went out there. the germans are having some real success. jelicho says, hey, man, we're about to break. we need more stuff and these submarines are keeping us from getting. but -- and i'm not trying to paint the picture, it's a sea power class. the most important thing that the navy can do, what do you think the most important contribution that the united states can make is? >> open up the seas back up. >> what does that mean? >> destroyers. >> open the seas back up for the british. >> in particular, what's going to be the most precious thing? where does this war have to be decided ultimately. >> on the ground. >> so what do you need? >> people. >> troops. >> troops. >> that's sort of a long way to getting to where you are, peyton march is another unsung hero of

world war i because march is the guy who is going to organize the draft. you're talking about an army of -- the united states army before world war i is less than 2,000 people. by the time -- there are 2 million soldiers, u.s. soldiers in europe with another 2 million getting ready to go. we go from zero to 4 million. that's peyton c. march. he didn't make it into any of the readings. he's somebody we should keep in mind. that's a pretty substantial task. my old boss when teaching at west point wrote a book called "pure victory," a great, great study talking about the french in the first world war. and i think i referenced this in that article that you were looking at. but the fact that -- as long as you can get those troops there,

first a trickle and then a flood of healthy, you know, well-equipped -- they don't look like they are battle-worn, that's for sure. sort of big, american kids coming over who are just full of enthusiasm. they haven't been broken down by three years of fighting. that's huge. that's huge. because it's -- you know, this has become the biggest military mistake that anybody could think of. i mean, if you're the germans, you think that you're done with france in a month and a half. and now you have millions of casualties. >> at the same time, too, while america is coming in, their reliance on usaustralia and hungary and. >> they are doing the heavy lifting.

this is a tough thing. if we look at the american contribution, not only so much people here could argue over this but it's not so much that we're going to produce these key victories as it is we're going to be there to, you know, bolster the morale of our allies but, also, if you're the germans and you've got these hundreds and thousands and millions of americans showing up, it helps to convince you that, you know what, we miscalculated. and that's a big deal. so -- but in order to do that, in order to make that effect felt, you've got to get those guys from the united states over to france. and that's -- initially, it looks like it's a dangerous proposition. sims is going to be important in all of this because he recognizes the value of this --

you know, of this technology, the u-boat and the value of destroyers to combat these things and that's something that the united states has. it's kind of an interesting -- an interesting contrast. we think about per sha and using sims as the measure and sims and his men both write pulitzer price memoirs after the war, or at least their names were attached to it. i don't know if they had any assistance in the writing. but sims in his memoir, "the victory at sea," equates his role of being that with persia. anybody remember anything about the way persianing behaves? >> no. >> no. >> does he have confidence in

him? >> he's a huge believer that his troops are better because of where they come from. >> he does have confidence and, yeah, american troops are going to win -- which of all of the notions that he has, that might be the one that sort of has the strongest foundation because, again, we're not beaten down by three years of war. you've got americans that are fairly enthusiastic. the marines at bellow wood, these guys aren't stopping. they are going to keep going. the first infantry division, the first time that they are -- americans performed pretty well. the third infantry to this day, the rock of the mar, the name, the nickname that they go by is associated with their performance in this war.

and so there's enthusiasm. there's not necessarily that much ability. marines, the first division, third division, sort of picking on the cream of the crop. but is he fan of -- what do the europeans want with these american soldiers? >> integrate them in to the units that already exist. >> it's like, hey, we've got all of these experienced officers. why don't you give us your soldiers. >> right. a lot like our framework today where they are expecting us to educate, train, equip and then send them over to a combat and commander and hand them over. >> yeah. if you're pershing, beyond having all of this confidence, though, it's like, what do you think about the europeans based upon anything that you've seen over the last few years? >> i mean, you're watching french soldiers just get sent to

their deaths in the thousands by what you view as poor decisions made by these commanders so you're not really -- you don't want the same fate to be suffered by your troops you're sending over. >> think about the battle of -- looking at the british. the year before the americans come to the war. we come to war april 6th, 1917. not even a full year. if you go back from june to november of 1916, does that fill you with confidence? by all means, let us give you a few hundred thousand american soldiers. so pershing -- and i'm not a big fan of pershing. he winds up having to stand out of command himself because he's not achieving results he thought he would.

i think it's somewhat founded he doesn't have that much confidence in the military leadership of the allies. so let's flip that over and take a look at sims. we already talked about sims when these destroyers come over and that first slide. is sims uptight or reluctant to hand over these assets to british -- i mean, the ships are commanded by americans. so at the tactical level of war, you know, it's americans. commanding american ships. it's not like we sent ships over there and the british, you know, crewed them out and everything. but bailey is in operational command. bailey's the guy who is more or less directing them from headquarters. so does sims come across reluctant to do this? >> no. >> why not? >> he realizes the importance of maintaining unity of command in this larger war effort. he realizes that by sort of investing in the sea power with the british and going with their

strategy it's going to end up giving him the best results with his force. >> does he have -- go ahead. >> i was just going to say, he also realizes that he doesn't have the experience that the british do. the british have been fighting the germans for a few years now whereas sims, they are just coming over and -- >> sims is a -- he hasn't -- >> i'm not saying he's inexperienced. i'm just saying in that situation he might. >> let me ask you a question. has anybody surpassed britain in terms of setting a model of excellence? >> no. >> not close. >> not close. >> in that second slide that we were looking at where we went through those naval engagements, right, cornell, absolutely a disaster for the british. did they recover from it? heck yes. the british lost, cornell lost about 15 plus, 15, 1600 people.

they get more than that back on the germans. they haven't relinquished anything there. it's the germans, you know, preceding that. that's the germans running for cover. dogger bank. even if you read german commentators and they talk about the victory at jutland, even if they sink or, you know, do more damage to the grand fleet, the grand fleet's big enough to absorb it. so there's nothing that has happened here that would make you think that the british are somehow incapable of wages war at sea. >> his role as an observer p hir

to the war, he had no delusions of american's capability at sea. >> that goes back to when he was in paris, he was looking at all of the other news and saying, wow, we are so far behind everybody else. but that's years in advance. to be fair and even this out, before the war began, sims is an anglophil. he actually gets in trouble for voicing his support, kind of like everything we do here, you know, the views expressed in this lecture are those of the professor, not the air force academy. he didn't offer a disclaimer. he said that this is -- the united states will stand against britain and when the navy got a hold of this they were saying, what the hem are you doing? you're not a diplomat. so he has a sense of incline to

view the british army favorably. but in fairness to sims, there's a reason that you would admire the british. they've got a fairly, you know, long tradition of doing things the right way. in this class, the biggest hiccup is fighting with the dutch. but that's, you know, way back in the early portion of the age of sail. hasn't followed us into the 20th century. so, you know, sims, like i said, is willing to trust and it works. because if you think about it, what are some of the weaknesses in terms of submarines at this point? we talked about they are stealthy. but even if you don't have sonar, is it going to be that hard to combat submarines? >> they have to come up for air and refuel more frequently than we think of today.

they are not that fast or have that great of range. they are kind of limited in their capability individually. >> yeah. you don't stay submerged, right? you spend more time under or on the surface of the water? >> surface. >> so if you're thinking about this, destroyers, how disruptive could they be? because if you force the submarines to go beneath, they can't stay there very long. and, you know, the response -- and this is the other thing, the response to this is, the british have an idea of what needs to happen. a lot of people credit sims with coming up with the idea of convoys and sims in his own memoir say the british have it in mind what they need to do. they just don't have the resources to get the job done. and sims is like, all right, we can help you with the resources here. and the idea of convoys, they have been around forever.

remember we talked about admiral lansing, going back to the seven years of war and beyond, one of his big victories, which i guess would have been the war -- that would have been the war of the austrian succession. but you still -- if you have something that's precious that's traveling at sea, i mean, the idea of convoys, it's not brand new. it's just new in the sense that the threat, instead of coming from surface radars or whatever on the surface of the water, now it's coming from under the water. the idea was, why don't we do the same things? why don't we put combatants around our merchant ships. offer more protection. and initially, i mean, as per the discussion, if you're a merchant sailor, what scares you about convoys? >> they are larger than you just sailing by yourself so there's this idea that you're somehow easier to find. >> is that true?

>> in a limited sense, but -- >> not really. >> -- it's a big ocean. >> why do you say why not? >> because the ocean is so big and 10, 15 ships is not that much bigger compared to the entire ocean. >> convoys can get pretty big but it is a big ocean. our losses -- the losses that are -- where you still suffer losses, as the convoys get in to proximity with the shoreline when they disperse to send their ships, they come more vulnerable. but the idea that you're going to have great, big losses because you're traveling in convoys, at least in this war and as we move forward to the next war, the germans are going to have a lot of success initially against the convoys. but at this point, not so much. it really does cut down on the

effectiveness of the submarines. the convoys work. destroyers work. cooperation with the british, at least in the war at sea works. this is a success story. sims, for his part, it's kind of stealing or answering the question in advance but, i mean, generally, yeah. it's -- you know, american soldiers, we get a couple million people to aid our allies and, you know, at a time when things look as bleak as they had ever looked, forces the germans to sort of accelerate their war making against us. they come up with some great tactical fixes, it looks like they've solved the problem of trench warfare in 1819. what do they come up with in 1918? >> infiltration tactics.

so, yeah, wow, that's fantastic. but operationally, they can't support it. but part of that is you're pushing these guys to move as quickly as possible so that they can drive the french and british out of this thing before the united states becomes effective. so march does a great job of filling the ranks and sims does a pretty good job of making sure these people arrive safely. you know, it's a big contrast -- the british love sims. they want to give him a seat on the admirality board where the united states are like, no, you can't do that. he has really bad relations develop or exist between him and daniels, the secretary of the navy and becomes kind of bitter as time goes on but daniels and wilson are not keen to seeing sims take this position. meanwhile, pershing, he emerges

as the great american hero but the allies don't have a lot of great respect for him. he hasn't really showed them that, wow, this guy really knows his business. and the big point is, i guess he didn't -- we can argue this another time but i don't think he really had to show them that. i'm sure we could get into an argument about how much fight was left in the germans but, you know, the germans -- if you look internally, they are pretty much near collapse. i mean, the next period in german history is the vymar republic. what the heck, some little artsy town off in the countryside. but you couldn't form it in berlin. it was risky. the germans are getting ready to fall apart and the united states would play a role in that

because how do you stand up against this new entry into the war. so, again, in order to make that impact felt, you needed somebody like sims who was, you know, willing to listen to the allies and called for the application of -- maybe not the resources that the united states wanted to see participating in this war but the ones that he understood would be the best fit to the problem. all right. so -- and then a last thing -- yeah, i think that was it. a last thing, as far as going forward, as we move out of world war i, if we think about the last few discussions that we've had, how has war at sea changed? if you're a group of planners and this war is coming to an end, what are the things that you want to see in your navy? what are the competencies that you're going to work on developing?

>> becoming more unconventional by traditional naval standards, like submarines are more involved, airplanes are starting to get involved at the end of world war i so they want to start developing those. >> you're becoming -- you're looking at sailors being more proficient with their sailing capabilities and being more technical experts as far as like you have a lot more technology on the seas and a lot more things that work than just sails. not just sails but steam engines. >> but that's been coming for

half a century. >> anything else? >> you can't just rely on the power of a juggernaut. because of the emergence of submarines. >> spread out those really, really strong commanders. because we talked about how, like, back when nelson was there, like if you were the best, that was shown by the type of ship that you commanded which if you command a line, you made it. but now, kind of like what he was saying with all of these different parts are starting to kind of play, like anyone can really affect anyone else. you want to diversify to all of those commanders. >> the logistics at sea have changed because they are shifting to fuel-powered ships. if i'm going across the globe, i have to worry about fuel now and supplying that fleet with fuel from either my country or another country in the area.

>> there was a bigger problem when you had coal-powered ships. and i can see where you guys are developing these ideas but let me throw this back throw this back to you. what are the biggest naval engagements of this war? juggling. does it do anything to change your value system in terms of what are the best assignments? keep in mind we talk about simms and submarines and understanding the technology is changing the face of naval warfare, that we didn't even talk about aircraft. aircraft are going to in a limited sense involve themselves in just about the same sorts of rules that we will see in the next war. but there's not going to be a head long rush to abandon

tradition. so we think about this you get a glimpse of the future but nobody or there aren't so many people. simms is an interesting character because simms is willing to adapt. and he becomes, you know, sort of a supporter, if you will, of naval aviation, maybe naut most popular thing early in its infancy. he is willing to accept that technology will drive a lot of change. there aren't so many people out there that are. >> you are saying that going into world war ii the idea of a decisive battle will give you command of the seas? >> largely. we think about it because we will discuss this the next time out. if we look at like german, you know, german building, ship

building during -- it's a brief period of time. instead of falling back on experience of submarines germans rush to build major surface combatants. there's still this thought that you know sort of pervasive that to amount to something you have to be a captain at sea in the strongest ship that you can find. submarines aren't going to be the biggest threat that the germans offer. it will be a real problem. same thing in the pacific. nothing will sink more tonnage than submarines submarines for the americans. that is not even a threat. at the beginning of the war it is not working so well and the japanese don't really send a lot of resources. we'll take a look.

this is kind of a problem. that's where it it is a good place to leave off, what is at the back of your mind and what is at the foreof your mind in terms of what makes a navy great as we move in. people are going to have to make a lot of hard choices because there is not a lot of hard money to go around. i think that is about it for time. we'll catch you guys on monday. >> join us every saturday evening at 8:00 and midnight eastern as we joint students in college classrooms to your lectures on topics ranging from 9/11.erican revolution to visit our website, c-span.org/history/podcast or download them from itunes. >> a history