tv Cold War Intelligence Gathering and Training CSPAN April 15, 2017 1:00pm-2:31pm EDT
very important collection the university of virginia. it is a great importance to us because thomas jefferson was the founder of our university. on his tombstone, hugh mentioned three great achievement you wanted to be known for. university of virginia was one of them. the declaration of independence was another. so, here we are able to present another side of jefferson here at the university that he founded. >> are cities tour staff recently traveled to charlottesville, virginia to learn about its rich history. when more about charlottesville and other stops on our tour at c-span.org/cities tour. americanatching history tv come all we can, every weekend come on c-span3. >> american history tv, we hear a
panel of scholars discuss how the united states and the united kingdom cooperated to train intelligence officers in the developing world. the panel also explores the different ways the americans and the soviets understood and cultivated espionage and intelligence during the cold war. this hour and 30 minute event is part of a larger conference -- led " welcome, everyone. history and public policy program at the woodrow wilson center for scholars. i am thrilled and delighted and privileged to welcome all of you to the wilson center, and to this annual meeting of the association of international intelligence history.
that is cosponsored by the association, the wilson center, and the german historical institute. which will be hosting a fun saturday morning. delighted to see so many familiar and new faces. delighted to have so many leading experts on intelligence history and intelligence matters from both sides of the atlantic here with us today. we are also throw that this event will be taped by c-span and american history tv, so that is a larger audience out there that may also benefit from some of the discussions and presentations here today. for those of you who are here for the first time and are unfamiliar with the woodrow wilson center, it is charted by congress-- by the u.s. and is the first key nonpartisan issues forckling
open dialogue. policy and public foundation seeks to provide historical context the public policy issues and seeks to foster open, informed, nonpartisan dialogue on historically relevant issues. , one of the center's larges program, coordinates advance research on diplomatic come international history for product of the cultural -- cultural project. including through our north korean project. as well as a number of other key issues. we havet months,
focused increasingly on intelligence history, including a recent workshop with the german historical institute here last december in a number of other events. this event very much fits into developing interests, and we are absolutely thrilled to have the association host its annual meeting here in washington at the center. knowweet spot, some of you , it is been a collection, translation, publication, and discussion of new evidence from international archives. china, working on the asia-pacific and increasingly the middle east. our mission here is to get relevant, but hard to access archives for our global network and archive enthusiasts.
the heart of the operation is our growing digital archive, which provides free access to thousands of documents from 150 archives around the world. very easy to access. digitalarchive,.org -- it is digitalarchive.org. it will take you straight to our collection. particularly are relevant and sensitive to intelligence history, so we are looking for to the presentations and discussions at this conference, particularly on this issue of access to archives and sensitive documents in this area. we do not promote historical research here at the center for its own safety -- for its own sake. with a viewesearch
of providing context, insight, and lessons for the public policy arena. the theme of this conference is creating and challenging the transatlantic community, intelligence community. the panel will deal in depth with a history going back to world war ii and to the cold war to look at the origins and roots of today's trend atlantic transatlantic -- today's transatlantic partnerships. this meeting really could not of been more relevant and more timely. briefly -- let me advertise briefly our new launched lastave month called "sources and
methods." you can google it. ,t centers on issues of access new evidence, documents, new insights from relevant documents . we would welcome contributions from all of you. if you are interested, talk to me or my colleagues on the team about it. i want to thank the foundation supporting this event. i want to a knowledge the contribution of a couple of people who really made the key difference here. avallassor va who is the driving force of the meeting here. lockhart, who had the idea of connecting us in getting us to washington. plus, the director of the german historical institute who will be hosting us on saturday.
secretary --ive and the executive secretary of the association, really the person who got us all organized. and i also want to thank peter and kayla and my team here for all their hard work in organizing this event. -- theylti-day event run smoothly and nobody notices, but a huge amount of work and planning went into this. i really appreciate everyone's contribution to this. goodthat, i wish us all a conference, productive conference. remeetingorward to some of you getting to know others. let us know what we can do to make your time at the woodrow wilson center to be more productive and more comfortable. thank you. thomas?
thomas: thank you, christian. let me extend an unofficial welcome from where i work as a senior historian. it is an unofficial welcome because we are a government organization. you cannot officially cosponsor this event, but it was a very rewarding and gratifying experience for me personally to be involved in setting up this conference. let me just reiterate that i am thankful to christian and his staff from the wilson center. and for all the hard work that went into this. want to say a few words in addition when michael and i had the idea in spring of 2016 about possibly bringing this conference here, it doesn't seem very long ago, but now looking back, it feels very far away. to me, at least.
because the recent political changes we have had here on the side of the atlantic. in 2016, most of us, certainly myself, we took the transatlantic intelligence community for granted. i did. i saw it as something that would probably be with us in some form or another for a long time. greatere is no much degree of uncertainty about the future of the transatlantic intelligence community. we just don't know what is going to happen. when future historians look back on the present in 10, 20, 30 years, it is yet unclear on what they will see. merely at see this as deviation from the organic evolutionary path of the transatlantic intelligence community. a blip on the radar.
or they may see it as an inflection point, or the beginning of something completely know -- of something completely new. we are historians, obviously. as historians, we are really humble enough to understand that we don't make history. we don't make politics. that is not our job. -- but we have an important role to play. we are observers and interpreters of the past. it falls upon us to look at the past and see if it holds any leverage for the future. i think this is particularly irrelevant for issue such -- i think this is particularly relevant for issues in the transatlantic intelligence community. let me conclude with a quote from secretary of defense , whoal james mattis happens to be my boss seven degrees removed, but my boss nevertheless.
mattis went his confirmation hearing in the senate a few weeks ago, he was asked about his take on the american relationship with russia and the applications of this relationship for nato. and he gave a very thoughtful answer, and he prefaced it with the sentence and i quote -- history is not a straitjacket, but i never found a better guide for the way ahead in studying the history of a given subject. end quote. i cannot think of a more appropriate model for conference and deals with not only the creation of, but with the challenges to the transatlantic intelligence community. so, in this spirit of looking at the past as a guide for the future, i look forward to a number of informative papers, stimulate in discussions, vigorous intellectual exchange,
and i wish all of us a very great and successful conference. thank you for coming. [applause] welcome, everyone. i'm professor of history at -- h american being the last of the three -- r organizers theome on behalf of national intelligence association, which is the major sponsor of this event. let me tell you that i am exceedingly happy that christian, thomas, and i have been able to draw so many of the leading experts in this field of transatlantic intelligence to this conference. what is interesting though is
three formally german guys, nationality-wise, but maybe an indication that people who are in between of national identity have something of a transnational identity. all three of buzz -- all three of us feel at home in both nations and in between. that makes it very valuable for us to study the field that we are doing in all of our different ways in different fields. i think, it is very dear to our heart what we are doing here and having this conference here. that we have so many leading experts here. convinced for a thriving field of scholarly inquiry. and that we have so many young scholars here. so many young people here. it is very great and makes it even more evident what this field is doing and where the field is going.
forward to aoking and engaging presentation discussion. i would also like to thank the woodrow wilson center for hosting us here, and the german which wel society, will meet on saturday for the last conference. thank you so much. and things to kyla and peter who did the brunt of the organizational work -- and thanks to kyla and peter who did the brunt of the organizational work. this is actually fun. again, welcome. let's have a great conference,
>> good afternoon. member of the iiha, and i have the honor to chat first to the panel today. this is called from world war ii cold war and beyond. that cold warests intelligence and choose that form broader perspectives trying essentials inore general features of the cold war intelligence. we are having two papers here. small, but mighty. thomasst speaker is dr. mcguire.
are in london college? research fellow at cambridge. >> cambridge and london. ok. and you are a political scientists, if i got it right. and in 2015, he received his phd thesis, and won a prize for thesis of this year. his contribution is about the most important intelligence relationship, and on the western side of the cold war, the relationship between the british and the americans, and his work by-- and his work is guided very relevant questions by how
they partnered and coordinated their work. he once to find out about -- he wants to find out about the relationship. the second speaker on the panel is mr. michael herman. most of you know him. she is on one of the most famous and distinguished members of our association. he'd was 35 years that she worked 35 years for the british intelligent communities -- he worked 35 years for the british intelligent communities. he saw the cold war from inside. after retirement, he became one of the most important intelligence -- in oxford. -- yeah, his book
"intelligence in peace and war" is a milestone in the revolution of intelligence of theory. um, his contribution today is titled "what difference did it make?" it is nothing less than an overall assessment of the contribution of intelligence of the cold war. ok. thomas, you're the first speaker. thomas: thank you. i should caveat what i am about to say by mentioning kindly, michael got a touch of couple of days ago to as me if i would speak. my colleague had to pull off her personal reasons. i was actually skiing in france and michael emailed me. [laughter]
i hardly put together this presentation. it is based on an ongoing whicht that i am doing, the title probably summarizes. i will be looking at the anglo american liaison dimension to this question. it's preliminary in terms of the findings i developed so far. so, hopefully it may stimulate interesting questions, but interesting feedback, which i can build into my ongoing work, but michael, thank you very much for having me speak anyway. it is much appreciated. so, what i am very much interested in with this project that i just explained briefly is essentially, the role that the british in particular, but also the american, but i will hopefully expanded, have played in providing overseas security
assistance, training, aid, equipment, etc., to police and intelligence services around the world over the past 60 years. ,t started essentially when number one, in connection to the same penetrating assistance going on in iraq and afghanistan for the last 15 years has come under a lot of criticism. least, theain at idea of training local security services is often put forward as a kind of magic wand to improve stability and local states and presented as if it is a very new approach to dealing with stabilization, improving capacity, all the buzz words like that. through my work that focused on cold war in southeast asia, i had seen time and time again,
that both the british and the americans, not to mention the french, etc. had been doing this for the last six years. in some states, moving out of asia to africa and kenya for example, the british have been training local police and security services basically continuously for the last six years. now, are still doing it arguably something is not going quite right if the sole purpose is to improve the local capacity to conduct operations by themselves. that was my starting point. moreover, if you look at the literature that is been written in this area, a lot of it focuses on the american experience. where the agenda a summit title is -- a lot of been
oftten on cia training security services in latin america and the last 40 to 50 years, but very little has been written on the british experience. this project is designed to build a comparative between a comparative between the british experience and the american ask if the british footprint has been as large as the american's? these are questions i have been asking of the broader project. how significant was this to british foreign policy and strategy during the second half of the 20th century? how effective and how was it measured? how can we measure that now? what factors influenced it? has it been possible to balance the building up of local security services with the promotion of fundamental western values in the same countries? alluded to, this
doesn't just have a historical dimension to it, albeit, that is important in its own right, but it also has implications for piu fourng contemporary -- ongoing contemporary strategy as well -- for ongoing contemporary strategy. the british state has been conducting various forms of security and certain conflict zones. there has been a number of criticisms leveled at this kind of work. firstly, in terms of the actual capabilities of those services that have been trained, they've come under scrutiny. certainly in iraq and afghanistan. has it led to conflict reduction? impinged on human rights? underitish state has come
criticism for police training in bahrain. for me, another criticism that has not been touched on at all, and should be, and i at least looked at, to what extent have the british efforts have been coordinated. ? you look at this list of countries. the u.s. and in providing security systems and all of the states. for me, but enough questions have been asked, is this -- has his been coordinated? jumping off points -- are they jumping off points? and so, for me, a number of studies that have looked at this question often look at individual external actors in isolation. there is american studies at
just look at the american experience without looking at concurrent efforts by other states and their same host nations. the same goes for the small number of british studies as well. what i am trying to do with this work is to build in a more holistic assessment of those different security actors that to lookviding security at the liaison, lack thereof, between those states. i think this provides a better appreciation of decision-making politics involved in that kind of the system and the impact it may have had. just a briefly provide an example from another small article i am working on in tanzania. if you just looked at to what is obviously a former british protectorates in 1961, if you just look at the british experience there by way of security assistance, training upward the colonial police, you would conclude that in 1961, the
government in tanzania cut size -- cut high does -- cut ties and marched off in an independent fashion. it's built-in -- it builds into the wilson center's broader agenda. archives, youli will see quite quickly that it was in fact the israelis who came in as the new providers of security to train of the tanzanian security intelligence services, completely overhauling the architecture of the british and handed over independence. 1967, due tohrough the six day war, it would appear, and i'm still looking at to gain a managed foothold out of the principal trainer of choice in tanzania.
similarly, in 1964 following the east african mutinies in tanzania, can you, and uganda, the president in tanzania rather than offering the training and overhaul of his military to one particular state to ask the british to train his navy, the west germans to train his air force, and the chinese, russians, and canadians to train his army, which as you can imagine, led to quite a number lines, but he'd was doing this because you did not want to become too depended on one particular state. he did not want to become too dependent on one particular state. it is the liaison between those states that i want to draw on today. in particular, the anglo american liaison. by examining these concurrent american british efforts and a
number of countries i am about to talk about, it provides insights into cooperation in certain cases between them. or a lack thereof, which is very the reason for the impact on the effectiveness of their respective programs, given they were operating in the same space, that leads to a greater ability to achieve their objectives in building up the local security service or not. and wider affects on the political landscape in several countries, which i will come back to in a moment. just briefly, all this draws to an extent an established or growing body of literature. comparative intelligence studies is a new area but starting to grow, building up certain theoretical precepts. to long it has been dominated
by the studies of the anglosphere in this changing in the last few years for the better. this draws on an established body of literature that looks at colonial policing and intelligence from philip murphy, martin thomas and my former supervisor, christopher andrew. code walton, who will be here, and a number of individual case studies. i have alluded to the american studies. i'm trying to bring these together. there is also the implication for more contemporary work in this area in the sense i will be looking at cold war counter subversion, counterintelligence, counter training. this is ongoing applications for counterterrorism training, organized crime type training. literature on nation building and the security development nexus. all this was done under the
to,t of, as i alluded stabilizing countries from the security and development perspective. the bodymuch draws on of literature on intelligence liaison. more broadly on why states do and do not cooperate. highlight, i'm just going to be focus on intelligence and law enforcement. the kind of training that was done under these orbits very much fits in a broader spectrum on development aid on one hand through to a more traditional defense aid. coms which is short for communications,. there was a lot of them by the british and americans to improve local or change local information services, id propaganda services.
and military policing. this fits a broader spectrum. i will be fitting -- focusing on the intelligence aspects. most of my work thus far has focused on asia. that's what i will be drawing on in the time i have left. americansand the basically had training operations during the cold war in every east asian state, barring a couple. from a colonial standpoint, most of this from the british perspective was done to indigenous local security services before handing over and improving their capacity to withdraw krish ex-pats -- british ex-pats. this training took three different forms. some of it was u.k. and u.s. based through the central police
college in britain, the international police academy in the u.s. which was set up in the early 1960's, and the intelligence services have their own training sections as well were senior officers were brought over for training. had a head start on the americans in they had a number of regional training facilities they could offer in southeast asia. intelligence facilities through the mi5, sis base through the training grant special school, that you can see on the left. it was a dilapidated chinese mansion owned by a chinese business family in malaysia at the time. and the essayist jungle warfare training school. the special branch training school that i want to focus on provides a quick overview of the
course that was provided. if you can make some of it out. this is a series of lectures offered to students not only ya in singapore. i will come back to that in a moment. you can see a lot of the training would be quite recognizable to some extent to intelligence officers eating trained today. sis was set up by mi5 and based on training and books used in both services at the time. essentially acted as the main source of training for generations of officers through the 1970's, while after independence in malaya. in country training was conducted with by the u.s. and u.k. mi5 and sis preferred doing in
country training. they felt it was more effective than bringing officers over to britain. that took a variety of forms, services.two local i will move on from that. to provide a quick overview of the kind of numbers that were going through this training in british facilities in the region, around 280 officers were trained over a six-year period in the 1950's. this expanded significantly from the late 1950's with students arranged in countries across the region. in both special branch training mi5-sisand in the joint station in singapore. the brits did not hand over running of this regional training facility until the late
1960's, a good 10 years after malaysian independence. then continued to fund the training well into the 1970's. it continued to act as a british tool of influence in the region through into the 1970's. comparison with what the americans were doing, back home at least, as i said a lot of literature tends to take an american focus and suggested u.s., u.s., from a western perspective was dominating sector. the brits were quite comparable in both the number of territories from which officers were coming in the actual quantity of students themselves as well. just to reinforce the point, the british were a major player in this area. what of the anglo-american liaison dimension to this? there was a certain degree of cooperation.
there was a division of labor between inside southeast asia, which was formalized in 1954-1955 between mi five-sis and the cia. the brits would focus and take the lead in the commonwealth. the americans would take the lead in what used to be french indochina, thailand in the philippines. -- and the philippines. the americans very much focused on big scale training. basic policing, military training, cia training. because of prayers limited resources they focused on much more specialized types of training. security intelligence. activities, the british foreign office propaganda wing that conducted a number of training operations to train local states to run covert propaganda operations essentially.
there were a number of mutated -- u.s.-u.k. projects. they viewed it as a facility which they could offer in the brits could fund it to expand the operations. laosian was set up by the british and french in the 1950's. a degree of cooperation in south vietnam in 19 six east. thompson mission started in 1961. british police training missions group until the early 1970's, which ran concurrently with the larger american police training mission in vietnam. this was done with american agreement. those police trainers on the faced off a that often more -- often face more obstacles and cooperation from trainers on the ground who felt they were stepping on their toes. this is a story which i will
come back to in a moment. just to provide quickly some stats on the british training in vietnam. this continued into the early 1970's. in the column on the left hand side, large numbers of loasianse, thia and officers that received training in these british facilities. the americans are not the only dominant force in this area. however, from what i found so far in my research, they were far more instances where cooperation was lacking between the british intelligence service and the american intelligence service on the other. way back in the early 1950's when the foreign office was pressing mi5 and sis to get involved in this foreign intelligence training, both were quite wary of doing so for fear of crossing wires with the cia.
if theyld not predict were approached by local government whether the americans would also be conducting training in the same area, whether the americans would train one agency in the british training and other. they foreshadowed problems that did emerge shortly thereafter. because when local states did request training from both, the u.s. and the u.k. or the u.s. in the u.k. decided between themselves to split the assistance, they often ended up training competing agencies within the same state. as reflected the politicized nature of a number of the security agencies in a number of these states in southeast asia. thailand, the brits managed to get a foothold in training and creating a small intelligence unit with the thai police. the cia came in with a much larger amount of money to offer the police and the brits are
pushed to one side. the scale of support for the thai police said into the 1957 personalized nature of the politics sought assistance to the police being against their influence. in indonesia in the 1950's the brits ended up training a new security service from scratch. the american training competing police force under a competing minister in the country. this led to almost -- a whole host of problems. in south vietnam it was even worse where the security apparatus was more fractured between the civil guard in the security service. just to briefly cover other examples. in latin america, the u.s. was very protective over any kind of
british march into the area. a number of countries in latin america requested british whenrt and essentially british training to begin in a number of countries, bolivia, colombia, the local cia station pushed back strongly. japanese security service requested british training in the 1970's. the cia said absolutely not. in a number of instances cooperation was not there. just to quickly some up in terms of what this suggests, what factors went to explaining cooperation or lack thereof, a problem from the u.k. perspective was there was no central coordination whatsoever. it meant coordinating with the americans was very much difficult because there was no centralized place for that kind of liaison to take place.
that created a number of problems and made liaison a lot more difficult. instances where the u.s. and u.k. could regard working together as being mutually beneficial, this kind of work did take place. as it did in thailand and south vietnam to an extent. the americans in the 1960's in particular one of the brits to play a greater role because the brits were unwilling to provide military support for the campaign in vietnam. the americans were very much supportive of the brits providing other forms of training. however in instances where local services regarded it as the greater national interest to maintain a hegemonic provider role in the security field, liaison and cooperation did not take place. it highlights the kind of training was not just about improving the intrinsic
performance of local services. it was done with a number of secondary benefits in mind. the fact this kind of training increased the liaison between the provider and the recipient of the training and a channel for influencing these services, especially useful in its rinses or diplomatic -- in instances where diplomatic relations were poor and it can provide influence that cannot be achieved through normal diplomatic channels, and where the cia and the sis collection gave abilities were limited. it offered intelligence recruitment possibilities, which i have seen referred to in a number of documents. finally, in the states where the local security service played a , workinglitical role through these services can provide a measure of diplomatic influence on leaders who often turned to the heads of their security services as close confidants.
another point to explain this. the brits and american technologist they had spheres of influence in the area. latin america being an american one, the commonwealth being a british one. both were very much on the lookout for any instances where one or the other was looking to gain a foothold as a provider of this kind of assistance. where they kept their own spheres cooperation very much took place. in instances where it did not take place in quickly highlighted that providing this kind of security assistance was not just about, as i said before, improving the local capability of the services. it was about leveraging influence and power in a number of these states. i will leave it there. i look forward to listening to your questions and think he very much again. -- thank you very much again. [applause]
>> thank you very much for this interesting speech. i think we continue with michael, emily asked questions. -- and then we asked questions. >> thank you. working? my talk is based on this little book we produced about three following a conference on intelligence and the cold war. what difference did it make. [indiscernible]
>> speak into the microphone. >> is that better? right. on a couple of journals i wrote which are really simply scratching the problem whichuge needs to have the cold war historians look at probably. hear of the provisional conclusions i offer. the cold war obviously was essentially an intelligence war. the two sides had very different
starting positions. could intelligence exploit the west's open society, but the regime cannot learn anything that was not learned by covert means. the west was faced by ferocious soviet secrecy and had to depend on intelligence more than ever before. intelligencer gave to wartime style importance. attention forted peace time. it was that that leads to the intelligence, a substantial national institution
that it is now. what difference did it all make? high consider the cold war oftly as a state of mind, enemy in images -- in any images, threats and reassurance. and partly as the actions that made up the cold war's historical services. particularly the armaments race. intelligence had other inferences within the western alliance, but i concentrate on its effects across the east-west divide. i also separate the effects of intelligence's collection activities from the effects of the reports and the assessments which these efforts produced. itselfr intelligence was
questions oftor in internal security and also particularly in covert actions. on these in passing. haveintelligence events their places in the cold war chronology. the shooting down of the u2 over the ussr in may 1960 lead to the breakdown of the paris conference that followed it. the american photographs of soviet missile bases in cuba precipitated the cuban crisis and prevented a soviet fate a complete. basicallypetition was influenced by the boost given to
soviet nuclear development by its wartime espionage successes. detectiony the west's of the first soviet test in 1949. these cold war highlights would ignore the west's constant surveillance of soviet military activities. -- thear depth of this sheer depth of this monitoring, and the same perhaps applies in the east. i prefer to consider intelligence's key relative s, and i will take the psychological effects in the effects of the intelligence's content. first psychological effects. sides whenon both
those of the opponents' covert actions. the west line of soviet espionage from the defector in ottawa in 1945, and the trials of the atomic spies the following year. cases and other spy related diplomatic expulsions that followed at intervals went both ways. they were publicized in the east-west war of words. fear ofest the visceral aried, butwithin v on the whole remains second to the fear of nuclear war. applied more on the soviet side where the regime seems to have had a genuine fear of destabilization by the west.
not without some justification, it was told of american and british opinions and actions. by book includes a study or of the current writings of the kgb old guard, and about the so-called plan for undermining the regime. a complete myth, a complete myth of a speech which he never gave. a complete myth. apparently an article of faith in the russian government view of the threats from nato.
technical connection on both sides also the psychological effect. but more graduated ones. u.s. propagation meant the cannot intercept soviet targets from the homeland, but needed interception sites overseas and cooperation with the foreign agencies. from this came the chain of western sites around the soviet periphery. in the canadian arctic, scandinavia, the u.k., west germany, italy, greece, turkey,
iran, pakistan, and japan. well with berlin was a special value for close access. amongst all these sites, north norway was an interesting case. window onrch value, a the soviet operations in the by the 1970'shat the americans were supplying the sophisticated equipment there 70% of the salaries of the norwegians who are manning it. close to theget shorter range soviet emissions led to most of the western allies to not interception operations from ships and aircraft. baltic thes for the
soviet defenses would track and react to western aircraft that flew just outside their territorial limits. sometimes would deliberately stimulate the defenses and monitor the results. 1960, some 13 american aroundt were shot down the soviet periphery with a loss of 170 american lives. there were collisions between the u.k.-u.s. and soviet submarines. these are given no publicity. this close technical
access coincided with the west's need for photographic coverage of soviet targets. overflights over soviet territory developed in the first half of the 1950's with some british participation. effort66 onwards, the americanntrated on the u-2 reconnaissance aircraft. again with some british involvement. lancewas some british par of the u-2's. on the first of may 1960, one was shot down deep over soviet territory. shortly afterwards the photographic coverage of american satellites became operational and there for no more plant overflights --
thened overflights, except first reagan administration. ussr and its satellites also mounted maritime and air operations. notably by the fleet of so-called trawlers. these were less intrusive than the west's. were moreactions measured in geography made the blockingck efforts -- efforts more dispersed than the west. these activities, both human and technical, felt to elped toionalize -- h institutionalize hostile relationships. on the other side of the coin,
intelligence capability provided western governments with reassurance against being surprised. achievementican-led was a worldwide, near real-time monitoring of soviet armed forces activities, to revive morning of the attack that never came. -- to provide warning of the attack that never came. presidents never believed there would be pearl harbor overnight. as western intelligence improved, the soviet threat no asger seemed as unknowable it had to some people earlier. side, ite soviet feared a surprise nuclear strike in the early 1980's and
developed its own warning system. we do not know whether the gained any confidence. intelligence reassurance was mutual. intelligence on both sides was u.s.-sovietin the strategic arms control agreements of the 1970's, the so-called national technical means of verification. the two sides recognized in agreed not to impede by concealment or incitement. possible arms control and determined the forms it took. it was a remarkable american initiative to put the secret sauces on the table for treaty
legitimization. these were the psychological influences, but intelligence's more obvious effects were in the government actions that sprang from its reports. soviet political intelligence on nato countries probably gave the playingnd advantage and its tactical diplomatic hand in europe. targeting of opposing intelligence services on each side sometimes lead to political action, as over the ricochet expulsion in the 1970's of 105 soviet intelligence officers operating in london under diplomatic cover. a spinoff of the soviet
leadership's preconceptions with western agencies and the threat they were thought to have posed. was that although it received excellent covert intelligence, it trusted it all as western deception. intelligenceern andmilitary intelligence, most military decisions were intelligence-related. despite soviet secrecy, nato forces were probably as well presented potential opponents as any in history. probably the same is true of the soviet side. i doubt if any battle was wargamed as intensive as a potential soviet blitzkrieg across the north german plane.
military procurement and policies also took the rationales in intelligence estimates of the adversary. if they were cherry picked by governments to suit their own preferences. for the first part of the cold war, the west was not in a position of complete ignorance. of potential soviet forces remain rather two-dimensional. --ointed to particular areas to two particular areas. the west accurately estimated the peacetime strength of the soviet army has 170 divisions. -- they weree ro all active and fully manned. they were one third strings, one third partially manned, and one
third skeleton strength. by the time this was realized, the immense soviet conventional superiority had taken firm root in western thinking. of -- wasearly area the u.s. air force's instance on the alleged missile gap between soviet and american icbm forces in the late 1960's. after being part of candidate's elect -- kennedy's election platform in 1960, elect to increase american missile programs after his election. than the larger than expected soviet response from the second the 1960's onwards.
then they accelerated a u.s. program of the late 1970's and early 1980's. intelligence's early exaggerations had some responsibility for this continued nuclear instability. this position changed with the imageryf american satellites in 1960's. russian military equipment could countermeasure and assessments of it became more accurate and more confident. intelligence which show was on the soviet drawing board. although there was never clear evidence where the adversary in war would be a paper tiger or 10 feet tall. but western defense policy nevertheless became western by exaggeration and developed a better tether with reality.
as for the soviet side, we do itsknow whether intelligence estimates of the open western military targets where objective or totally distorted ones. they key question for both sides was not military capability, but the others intention. without hostile intention there is no threat. the east took western hostility for granted. as covertb selected evidence to fortify that conviction. for the west a basic requirement , in the words of a british gic committee in 1948, "what does russia want?"
was a satisfied power or dissatisfied one? here intelligence made less difference than one might have expected. the basic assumptions about the iniet union were not crafted washington -- were crafted in washington after 1985, but not by intelligence. there was no effective american machinery for intelligence estimates until the cia got into its stride in the 1950's. western views of the soviet threat were determined in the earlier years by soviet behavior and became more fixed thereafter. intelligence assessments became more sophisticated, but the american community never spoke of a single voice -- with a single voice. in britain, the policy was
surprisingly limited. was that limitation western intelligence never found covert sources that provided direct access to the soviet center. natoxception was over the exercise able archer in late 1963 when intelligence detected soviet spheres of 8 -- fears of a western strike. intelligence was drawn on to legitimize the preconceptions of the time. to summarize, intelligence's activities deepened the emissary's images -- adversary's images. offset by they mutual reassurance provided in arms control, and the confidence
he gave western governments that the cold war could in various ways the managed. managed.war to be as her intelligence's for direct impact on policy, soviet intelligence was so buttoned up with the regime it seems impossible to assess the kgb in the gru as discrete influences. in the west, intelligence's quality improved, and particularly from the 1960's onward its inputs dissuading governments from being more carried away by political pressure than they might have been. intelligence's collection activities added to both sides' perceptions of
threats. on the other hand, western break on the as a exaggeration. it was lucky the west could draw not only on american -- america's technical intelligence, skills, power, everything else, but also on the intelligence professionalism that britain and america had developed in the second world war. argued what iti achieved in telling truth to power made the cold war less dangerous than it would've been without it. thank you. [applause] thank you very much to both speakers. now coming to the question and answer session.
that with the archival evidence i found in the interviews i've conducted so far, there does not seem to have been particularly strict framework for measuring what impact the training was having. if there wasn't much of a framework at the time, it makes it more difficult now to lay a framework over to assess. of more intuitive assessments i've come across, at least from the british perspective in southeast asia, came to the conclusion the actual capabilities of the services were not improving much period.0 or 15 year when training commenced in the early 1950's a number of assessments were made of the local services in terms of their ability to collect basic intelligence. the degree of penetration they would achieve into local communist parties. 15 years later, the assessment
of the services and the criticisms are being leveled of those services as as they were. basic tradecraft is missing. making copies of passports to check on stamps and passports to determine where targets have been moving. basic tradecraft like that. the same is being leveled 15 years later. i have used indicators to eliminate the fact that a lot of this training did not seem to be achieving much in terms of objectives on one level. one final one to point out. where these officers were placed in their respective services after they finished their training. consistent criticism across the board. the training was being often wasted because the officers were being placed in positions in their host services where they
could use the training they had achieved or gained in the most effective way. i wass why i caveat what saying along the lines of this was not just about -- it was about improving the capacity. things would have changed quite quickly. these criticisms are about more than just improving them. it was about leveraging influence and power. gentleman.his he was first, yeah. then it is your turn afterwards. you. -- yeah. i'm from the university of helsinki. addel almost obliged to some thoughts. you -- thank you for the expose.
the east analyst relations east-west 1970's -- relations during the 1970's, for my own experience confirmed by many other evidences later on. it was a question of the ideological war between communism and capitalism. 1970's -- heade of the soviet section political department in helsinki during the highlight years. 1975 to 1978. themain thing was that focusev regime took into the make of finland to prove
their dogma that communism is a better system of government than capitalism. the communistn words to make the change. not to go into details, there ods, one in the 1960's and an implementation period in the 1970's up to 1977. the ministry was concerned with the status of neutrality. i must add to the neutral in as toosition was the same constitution -- i
was in many negotiations with andians during this times other associate countries in europe. withuestion, how to deal neutrality? this was moving in the east-west line by millimeters. it was very hard job. >> can i ask you to come to your question? -- the high point was the spring of 1977 when the kgb in political services wanted to slow down the finish neutrality. he said now is the end of the finnish neutrality. but after political
consideration, version of nev recognizedz him as the head of the country and the new neutrality. what was important besides our stopped purposes was he .he implementation of doctoring the main focus was in the czechoslovakian intervention of 1968. threaten european countries and focus his armored forces to afghanistan, as you know. the next example was a polish one. >> there are some other questions. >> this is comment i'm adding. point inthe turning the east-west relation in the
ideological. they let your slide from their main focus. >> thank you. the lady behind you. >> i have a quick question. from georgia tech. you said human and technical intelligence helped institutionalize hostile relationships. i'm not sure what you meant by that. if you could expand on that. i might not have heard properly. if you could expand on what you meant that human and technical intelligence helped institutionalize hostile relationships. what did you mean? >> gosh, yes. [laughter] general comment really on the i can't remarks,
comment usefully except this is just the sort of observation and study and approach that is needed for this thing. here is a huge subject of the cold war and the experts on it. intelligence of lightly tond itself simplicity and a set of conclusions. we welcome that. -- yes.nd question it's an interesting question. is a very interesting question. effect did each side's collection activities have on the other?
>> [indiscernible] >> i don't need the microphone. [laughter] >> i assure you i don't. but if it is there, i will use it. thank you for giving me the microphone. on the paper of mr. mcguire, i wonder if you shouldn't in larger focus. you have very legitimate question of saying, you know, if they've done training for 60 years, what good is it? really see any improvement and so on. the training missions obviously have other purposes as well. they give you a legitimate presence in the country. you have a reason to be there and conduct your own spying activities in the country on your own without the help of your partners. the other is very often times
withave a trade-off technical installations. you say i really want to set up a station in such and such a country. i have to do something in return so i will do a little police training for these guys. argument.at to be an and then there are many other benefits, but one of the benefits of the relationship is -- it goes the other way. we have cases of illegal funding of election campaigns in europe that are based on the special reference -- relationship with one of these colonial countries. that is what in france is called -- france still provides support tohatever
these postcolonial dictators. in return these nasty guys help of the election campaign. -- with the election campaign. it doesn't happen too often in the british and american case, but in the french case it is well documented. thatinteresting research, piece you are doing here, but perhaps you might just consider some of the wider context. >> thank you. i will definitely build those points into my future research. whether canada or uganda or malaysia helped dissuade british elections are not too sure, but i'll keep an eye out. thanks. >> yeah. this gentleman. lot.anks a
i work as an assistant professor. thank you both for your interesting presentations. i would like to ask a brief question. michael, i have read your book and listened to your talk that if you know a lot about the capabilities not about the intentions, it is also to worthless. that is one of the conclusions i think. the you think in the post-cold improved?s this the u.s. had a better idea of russian intentions and vice versa? could you reflect on this? >> i'm sorry to confess this i can't really hear your question. it is not your fault at all. would you mind shouting it? [laughter] >> do you understand me now? is this better?
do you think that the american knowledge about russian intentions has improved, improved for the better after the cold war period and vice versa? sorry. i have got to pass. i'm sorry. i haven't quite got your thinking. thank you for the question. i'm sorry. let's talk afterwards. when i can be with an shouting range. >> we are running out of time so that's a good idea. the last question. who was it? no more urgent questions?
i'm closing the panel and enjoy your coffee. [applause] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2017] announcer: american history tv, a panel of experts talk about how intelligence services through america and europe you've all been incorporated for better security and discuss how technological advances revolutionized intelligence gathering and exchange.