tv Pacific Commander To Early to Tell If U.S. Can Rely on China to Deal... CSPAN April 27, 2017 9:30am-11:55am EDT
that's your opinion. thank y'all for coming. [ applause ] and we are live now on capitol hill as they are holding to hearing on u.s. military forces in south korea. a naval aircraft group is currently heading towards waters off of the u.s. peninsula. he will be testifying about u.s. military readiness. arizona senator john mccain is the chairman of the armed services committee. it should start in just a moment.
good morning. senate arms services committee meets to receive information on u.s. forces in korea. admiral harris, i appreciate your appearance and your area of responsibility. i want to express the appreciation for the services of men and women you lead who defend our nation every day. america's interest are deep and enduring. that's why for the past 70 years
we have worked to uphold a rules based order based on the principals of free markets, open seas and open skies and peaceful resolution of disputes. these ideas have produced unprecedented peace and prosperi prosperity. now the challenge threatens the united states as well. the most immediate threat is a situation on the korean peninsula, kim jong un's regime has thrown its full weight to deliver nuclear weapons. a nuclear payload capable of striking a city but an eminent danger, one that poses a real and rising risk of conflict. indeed as admiral harris said
yesterday, north korea already has the ability to strike u.s. territory. i look forward to hearing your assessment of missile programs, the military options they offer to our commander in chief and readiness to call them out if called upon. i welcome the news will soon be completed. it is shameful that china retaliated against south korea with economic and cyber means in response to its deployment. this committee understands that deploying this is a decision that is necessary to defend our ally, south korea. we welcome your views on whether further enhancements or our conventional military posture are required to counter the threat from north korea. for years the united states has
looked to china, north korea's patron and ally to bring the regime and achieve progress towards a korean peninsula. we have done so for the simple reason that china is the only company that may have the influence to curb destabilizing behavior. china we repeatedly. i welcome the outreach on the issue of north korea. but as these discussions continue the united states should be clear that while we earnestly seek china's cooperation on north korea we do not seek such cooperation at other vital interests. we must not and will not bargain over our allowances or principals of the rules-based order. as the behavior towards south
korea china acted less and less of the rules based order and more like a bully. it is economically coerced its neighbors, increased provocations and militarized the south china sea. with a rebalance policy two heavy on rhetoric and too light on action and now a withdraw from transpacific partnership they have failed to the rules based order. that failure has caused him to question the credibility of america's security commitments in the region. this committee has grown increasingly concerned about the mill their overmatch as states like china and north korea develop advanced capabilities to project military power.
america's military remains the most powerful on earth. we must adapt to the new realities we face. we must think about logistics and take steps to reshape the capabilities of our force for great power computation. specifically on the issue, this committee has heard testimony each year about the shortfall we have but we have seen little action from services to finally turn the corner and address this issue with the seriousness it requires. i'm interested in your views and what it will take to meet them. new administration has an important opportunity to be charted and better course. earlier this week our panel of experts witnesses agreed there was a strong merit for an asian
pacific stability initiative. it would enhance through targeted funding to realign in the region, improve relevantly infrastructure, fund additional exercise and with our allies and partners. admiral harris i'm interested to hear your thoughts. i think there is some symbolism in the information that the chinese are building their own aircraft carrier. i'm sure that as an old navy aviator it has some for you. >> thank you very much. i want to thank you for being here today. we understand how difficult this time must be for you and for general brooks and all of the men and women you lead.
we want you to understand our great appreciation for their efforts. it is clear to me especially after a thought ful discussion there is none that lead to a certain strategy. i believe we should pursue and exhaust every diplomatic those options are some what limited. china provides the lifeline for north korea and china for its own national security interest that seems unwilling to exert that the needed that demi denuclearization. it seems he is willing to risk starting his own population to achieve his dream of becoming a nuclear capable state. there are mill their options but they are risky.
it may not and runs the risk of kim jong un. it is the stockpile of chemical and biological peps and missile launches spread across the country side. north korea's nuclear missile is of national security threat. they ask that you tell us how you are preparing for every contingency. while north korea poses an immediate security threat we must not lose the long term threat i believe it is critical
we empower countries in south asia to protect and provide them with economic alternatives to maintain regional stability. >> thank you. it is an honor for me to appear before this committee. there are many things to talk about. i regret that i'm not here with my testimony battle buddy, but i think you'll all agree he is where he is needed most on the korean peninsula. mr. chairman, i request my statement be submitted for the record. as a commander i have the extraordinary privilege of leading about 375,000 airmen, marines and civilians serving
our nation over half the globe. it's important because i believe economic prosperity are linked to the pacific, a region that the poised where opportunity meets the four considerable challenges of north korea, china, and isis. it is clear to me isis must be destroyed now. as we eliminate isis in the middle east and north africa some of the surviving fighters will likely repatriot into north pacific. then there's north korea that remains a threat to the united states. north korea has vigorously purr
sused nuclear testst and ballistic missile launches which it claims are intended to target the united states, south korea, ja man and earl lir this week, australia. make no mistake. kim jong un is making progress and plan to deliver them intercontinentally. all countries need to take this seriously because the missiles point in all directions. it is not yet an exessential threat but it may to hostile rhetoric. i know there is some question about the advancements made by yang and i won't add the speculation. my job is to provide military options to the president. i must assume claims are true.
general brooks and i are going everything possible to defend american homeland and allies and republic of korea and japan. they decided last july to determine area defense system, which would be operational nm coming days and able to better defend against a growing north korean threat. that's why it is back on patrol in northeast asia. we must continue today debut. that's why we want to continue to emphasize cooperation between the united states, south korea and japan. a partnership with a purpose, if there ever was one. we continue to call on china to stop the unprecedented weapons
testing. the fact that remains china is as respoblabnsible as north kor is. it is clear they were diplomatically and militarily. as president trump and secretary mattis have made clear, all o s options are on the table. we want to bring kim jong un to his senses, not to his knees. china continues a strategy to control this t south china sea. i testified that china was militarized in this international waterway by building bases on seven chinese manmade islands. despite subsequent chinese assurances at the highest levels that they would not militarize
that support long-range weapons. dmien's militarization is real. i'm also not taking my eyes off of russia. it is on success it days for the first time since 2014. russia continues to modernize and exercises conventional and nuclear forces in the pacific. despite the reasons for cig inform cant chal lens, since my last wort to you we strengthened alliances and partnerships chls working on shared security threats like north korea and isis is a key component of our regional strategy. our treaty alliances, japan, the republic of korea are joint force efforts. we have also advanced important
partnerships they are viewed that has helped underwrite peace. there is more work to do. we must be ready to confront all challenges from a tradition of strength and with credible come back power. speed and range. restricting ourselves with funding and certainties reduces war fighting readiness and to approve the department budget. finally i would like to thank him for proposing and supporting those stability initiative. this will reassure regional partners and send a strong
signal to adversaries of our persistent thank you very much. >> thank you for outstanding job and your outstanding leadership that you are exhibiting in these very difficult and challenging times. would you say it's an accurate statement that it is reminiscent? it reminds one of a gradual cuban missile crisis?
what i know of is it seems we are faced with a threat and a leader who is intent on achieving his goal of nuclear capability against the united states. >> and that leader does not always behave in a rational fash sho fsh sh fashion, is that correct? >> that's correct. describe rational or ir rational to kim jong un. we have to deal with him. i believe he does have some kind of calculus that ends up in decisions. he takes information and makes a decision. those decisions are often brutal. it is to keep his family in power in north korea.
>> it is clear his goal is a nuclear weapon and the means to deliver it to the united states of america. is there any doubt in your mind? >> there is no doubt in my mind, mr. chairman. >> and there is some question given the difficulty of getting reliable intelligence as to how close he is to reaching that goal. >> there is some doubt. whether he has the capability today or whether he will soon have the capability. he has. we have to assume his capables are real. >> so it's not a matter of whether, it's a matter of when. >> it is truly a matter of lig.
kju is going to continue to work until he gets his icbm's to work. >> what does thaad do for us and south korea? >> i think the point that kju's rhetoric and he's threatened the united states and cities by name. this week he threatened australia by name. i think his rhetoric, if you were to project it on a graph, it's going in one direction and his capability is approaching the line of his rhetoric. where those lines cross, i believe we are then at an inflection point and we wake up to a new world. >> what does thaad do for us? >> thaad enables us and our south korean allies to defend south korea or a big portion of
south korea against the threat from north korea. it's aimed at north korea, the systems, and it posed no threat to -- >> isn't it incredibly difficult to counter the 4,000 artillery pieces the north koreans have on the dmz which could attack a city of 26 million people? >> it is, sir. and thaad is not designed to counter those kinds of basic weapons. >> what is designed to do that, anything? >> we do not have those kinds of weapons that can counter those rockets once they're launched. >> and they can launch -- they have the capability of a launch of those rockets? >> at this very moment, they have that capability, sir. >> what do you make of china's
reaction to our placement of thaad, a purely defensive system? does that give you an idea of china's real intentions about north korea? >> i've said before, chairman, i believe it's preposterous that china would criticize south korea or the united states for placing a purely defensive missile system against the north korean threat when the north korean threat owes its survival, if you will, to china. and i believe that china, rather than criticize the united states over south korea for defending ourselves, should rather put that energy toward convincing kim jong-un to stop his nuclear ambitions. >> so we should be a bit skeptical about our ability to persuade the chinese to break
kim jong-un's quest for nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them? >> i have been skeptical up to the recent discussions between the president trump and president xi. so i think that we're seeing more activity proactive, positive activity from china in this case than we've seen in a long time. i remain cautiously optimistic, but certainly hopeful. >> you wouldn't rely on it? >> it's too early to tell, sir. it's only been a month or so. >> but i mean you wouldn't rely it at this time. >> i wouldn't bet my farm on it. >> thank you, admiral, senator, reed. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and thank you admiral harris. i had seen yesterday that you, in response to the house questions, took responsibility for the miscommunication regarding the carl vinson carrier group. first of all, i commend you for
standing up and being responsible. that's what naval officers do. but i think we've got to take significant steps to avoid such confusion in the future. it was quite detrimental not only here, but as you know in south korea particularly where there was a great deal of concern and some reporters felt they had been misled. i urge you to insure that such a miscoordination or miscommunication doesn't happen in the future. >> as i said yesterday, i'm accountable and responsible for the communications that came out of the evolution. i'm sorry it happened. and all i can say i will do better in the future. >> yes, sir. let me raise an issue that is linked to our diplomacy. we're asking china to take a much more assertive role in
urging north korea to cease and desist. your view in terms of what concessions we should make, if any, to the chinese to get them to cooperate, as both the chairman and i pointed out and you pointed out, they are posing significant challenges to the rule of law in the pacific. and we can't ignore that. your comments on this issue. >> senator, i believe that great powers can walk and chew gum at the same time. by that i mean that i think we can complement and be grateful for china's efforts in north korea, even as we criticize them, rightfully so, and hold them accountable for actions that run counter to the international rules and norms else where. in this case, the south china sea. i think we can do both and we should do both.
i think china, as a great power can handle that criticism on the one hand while they're dealing with this important critical international security issue on the other. >> thank you. obviously, we're trying to approach the north korean issue with a comprehensive strategy, diplomacy, military action, military preparedness certainly. one aspect is information warfare. my sense, and i'm not the expert, you are, but kim jong-un is paranoid about his own people and what information they're getting. do you think we're making a sufficient effort to get information into north korea through various means so that we can begin to by-pass the dear leader and go to the people and that could create pressures on
him to forestall his nuclear ambition. >> i believe we're making an effort. i'm not with the totality of that effort. but i do believe that people in north korea revere kim jong-un. and i believe that the idea that somehow we could -- or that somehow they could rise up against kim jong-un, if the situation in north korea became so dire, i think that might be a hollow hope. i believe they consider him a god king and they truly revere him as their leader. that's just based on what i've read in the press and reports of reporters who see the north korean people start to cry, all of this, all emotional when he comes out on stage. they seem to be real tears.
i think that he has a hold on his people that they're not going to rise up from beneath and topple him. >> you know, again, i think your perception is much closer to the situation on the ground. but anything we can do to either raise questions, i don't think they'll prompt an uprising immediately. not only questions among the population, but questions among the dear leader, kim jong-un, that his people are being sort of influenced or there might be elements within the country that are thinking and embracing other ideas. could be some leverage, and i think we have to pursue aggressively this operations -- >> i must agree with you there. >> just one other issue. you know, we have been -- china has refused arbitration to acknowledge the decision of the arbitration clause and the law of the sea with the philippines,
et cetera. we do have a successful example of working together with respect, and that might be a model, maybe just rhetorically, we could use with the chinese and see if we could move them towards a more cooperative aspect with the philippines. >> i agree with you there. >> thank you. >> there are several good examples just in the endo asia pacific where arbitration has worked. both parties have given a little and gotten a lot. and the overall picture in the region has been one of increased stability, rather than decreased stability. >> thank you, very much, admiral. >> admiral, i think these -- what's happened in the last few days has served as a wake up call to the american people. of course we had our hearing on tuesday with some four pretty smart people, came to the same
conclusion. we have you today and we have what happened yesterday at the white house, as well as other places in the house. we actually talked about this, and it's been obvious to those of us at this table, that over a period of time north korea is going all the way arguably back to the scud times of the middle 70s progressing up and ultimately coming up to the statement that he makes that declares that north korea, this is kim jong-un, declares that it's his quote, final stages in preparations to test an intercontinental ballistic missile. i think people now realize it's an imminent threat. i know that you deal with it in military circles and you're dealing with people who know what threat is.
those of us around this table are deal ing with the general public, many of whom do not understand that. we had the hearing on tuesday, they agreed that north korea currently represents the single most imminent, they used imminent threat. victor cha testified, he said the pace of north korea's development shows that it wants to be able to not just field one missile that could reach the united states, but a whole slue of them. the panel all agreed on that. we're talking about serious things here. you just now in response to a question or comment by the chairman said it's not a matter of if but a matter of when. we know -- i think it's our job and incumbent upon the military as well as us to let the american people know the nature of the threat that's out there. last year, i led a group to your area. we talked about some of the
things that were taking place at that time. and we came back, we had that hearing that you've referred to. in the hearing you are asked the question as to what are your needs there in terms of resourcing yourself adequately to meet the threat. let's keep in mind that was a year ago. and with the threats, it's been enhanced since that time. what would those needs be today as opposed to what we thought they were a year ago? >> sir, last year i commented that i had the forces to fight tonight, to respond tonight, to any threat from north korea or anywhere else for that matter. i still believe that today. i have the forces in place to fight tonight, if necessary. what i'm concerned about are those follow on forces and how -- the forces themselves and also how the follow on forces would get to the region, in
terms of air lift and sea lift. so i'm worried about that. i'm also worried about things like small diameter bombs and other kinds of munitions. anti-air warfare weapons for our fighter aircraft. adequate numbers of aim 9 d and aim 920 missiles. i worry about the shortage of the anti-ship missiles. whether it's a long-range anti-surface missiles, more tomahawk, whatever. but a long range anti-service missile. i would like to see a fifth ssn in guam. more than the fifth ssn in guam, our nation is facing a significant shortage in terms of submarine numbers. so as a combatant commander, i only get 50% of the submarines i think i need.
but that's based on a 52 submarine force. by the end of the 2020s, the navy projects that submarine force, attack submarine force, will go down to 42. my requirements won't go down but the pool from what they'll be sourced is going to drop dramatically. i worry about that significantly as i look at the threat from north korea, potential threat from china and from russia. >> we're going to be depending on you to advise us in not generalities buta priorities. we'll get into that. i am also encouraged that our allies are more dependable than what they have been in the past. is it your impression they see this as the threat that's out there as we do? does this open the door for maybe even more allies coming in our direction? >> i believe it does.
if we define allies, you know, as partners like you're talking -- now, we only have five treaty, defense treaty allies in the world and they're all in the endo asia pacific. we have other countries that are close to us that are partners with us, singapore comes to mind, for example. you know, malaysia, indonesia, india, vietnam, these are countries that i think are -- seek the united states as a security partner of choice. >> i appreciate that very much. my time is expired but i would like to ask one more question. you made the statement we should cease to be cautious about the language we use to describe these activities. can you define that a little bit for us? >> i'm not sure in what context -- >> okay that was a quote. i'll do that for the record and give you the context. it's something a lot of us didn't understand, thank you very much. >> yes, sir. >> admiral, thank you for your service and you are certainly in
the center of the action. let me just reiterate here what you've said. you said that the korean leader is intent on accomplishing his goals as a nuclearized nation. his goal is a nuclear warhead, these are my words, but i think it's what you meant, married to an icbm that would have the capability of getting to the u.s. and you said it's not, in your opinion, not a matter of if, it's a matter of when. is that aaaaa interpretation of what you've said? >> it is correct, sir. >> okay. and you also offered your opinion that you would not bet that china can basically deter
the dprk? is that correct? >> to be clear, i felt in the past that china, though it has the capability to influence and affect north korea in behavior for a number of reasons, it had chosen not to exert the full range of its influence. and i think we're in a different place now. i think the jury is out, it's early days. we'll have to see if china has changed its view of its willingness to influence kju. >> based on their previous activity, there's no indication that you think that that's going to occur, although you're hopeful? >> right, sir. past performance is no indicator of future productivity.
up to a month or two ago i would agree with that statement, completely. after all, i made the statement. from a month ago forward, i mean, we're seeing some positive behavior from china. and i'm encouraged by that. so i think we should let this thing play out a little bit and see where it goes. part of that, though, kim jong-un and the north korean regime, you know, they can't do something precipative in the intervening period to test us. so we have to be careful and sensitive to that as well. >> precisely. so up to this point, has china done anything that would give you an indication that they are going to be helpful to the u.s. in getting the leader to back off of his intent to nuclearize
an icbm? >> sir, i don't know for a fact what china has done in the last month or so. i know that they are active in working the problems. but i don't know the specifics of what they've done. all i see are the activities that kim jong-un has done, you know, in the last month or so. >> and that is still on his march to a nuclearized icbm? >> i think it is. though in the last month he has not tested a nuclear weapon, so he's tested five this century and he hasn't tested a sixth. he has not launched an icbm in the last month. or ever. so i don't know if that is -- if there's a cause and effect, or whether it just didn't fit his schedule.
>> right. >> so, again, it's early days on this. so i think we would be best served to see if this has a positive outcome or not and let the president xi and, you know, work this issue as he and the president had agreed they would. >> sure. but if china doesn't deter him, there's only one deterrence left, and that's the u.s. kinetic action, is that what it looks like? >> i don't know want to say that there's only that option left. i think if china's efforts fails, then we're back to where we were, status quo ante if you will, to try to throw some latin in there. at that point, then as the president has said, all options are on the table. i think he means just that.
all options are on the table. so my job in that framework is to provide military options, but there are other options, i'm sure. and i would leave it to those experts to come up with those options. my options are hard power options. >> your hard power options, you need additional materiel? >> i need additional materiel in the long run but that's not to suggest the hard power options that the u.s. military can provide the president would not be effective tonight, and they would be effective tonight if called upon to execute. >> final question, there was a report in "the washington post," i think it was david ignatius, several weeks ago. in essence, saying that the
failures of the north korean launches are directly attributable to the u.s., is that anything that you want to talk about here? >> no, sir, it's not anything i want to talk about here. >> okay. >> thank you, mr. chairman. admiral harris, thank you for being here, as pacom commander, did you participate in authoring the 2016 force structure assessment? >> i participated in the run up to that. >> okay, the assessment called for 355 ship navy. in that regard i want to follow up on a line of questions and drill down on that. actually, what the fsa said is that in a perfect world unconstrained by the budget, the requirement is 653 ships fleet
wide. but by accepting risk and understanding the financial restrictions that we have, the requirement is 355 ships. i want to help you get the ships you need. i want to help the navy get the ships they need. and so when i'm told 355 ships is a requirement, i believe that. now, you mentioned to senator inhofe that you don't have enough submarines -- you also mentioned ammunition there. let's talk about ships. how many submarines do you have now and how many do you need? >> sir, i prefer to give you those in a different setting. >> okay. >> precise numbers. but i will say i only have half -- i only get half of what i need. >> okay. >> i have a stated requirement
that's based on steady state things we do with our submarines today. then i have a requirement that's based on war fighting. in our war plans, they say these war plans state a requirement for x number of submarines in y number of days. those are two kinds of metrics. you've got a number of submarines that you need to fight the war, if it happens. then you've got a number of submarines i need today to do the day-to-day operations in the region. in today's numbers, i get about half of what my formally stated requirement is. >> you get half of 52? >> no, sir i get half of my requirement. 52 is the total number of submarines that the navy -- attack submarines the navy has. my number of requirements is irrespective of the number of
submarines the navy has. but the number of submarines i get are based on the number of submarines the navy has. it's not just me all these combatant commanders have these. >> if the navy gets its 355 ships and you get your portion of it, what will you be capable of doing that you can't do now? >> the first thing is my steady state requirements in order to do the things that we do today in this -- in the climate that we're in would be much better. my fight tonight forces that i have to have ready to respond to a north korean aggression or chinese coercion or something like that, those forces will be more robust. most importantly, the follow on and search forces will be
available on shorter timelines today those follow on forces are delayed by any number of reasons. and that delay is felt in terms of increased risk, longer timelines, and increased deaths of americans. and if i have the number of ships that the navy is asking for and the number of jets that air force is asking for and on and on, then both my ready to fight tonight forces will be richer, the timelines to get follow on forces will be shortened, and the density of those follow on forces will be thicker. >> let me just say, i think at some point it's going to be helpful to this committee if you're a little more specific about those details. let me just follow up on something that chairman mccain asked about. the threats that we have from north korea now, there's the
intercontinental ballistic missile, there's a better chance than not that we could shoot that down if that happened. there are these 4,000 short range missiles. and your testimony is that there is essentially no defense from the south for those short range missiles? >> those are mostly artillery -- >> artillery, okay and there's no defense -- >> right. i mean, you're trying to shoot down an artillery round. >> okay. and then the chairman asked you -- i don't think i understood the answer. what does thaad get us? >> thaad allows us an intercept capability to shoot down at the high altitude level ballistic missiles that go from north korea to south korea. it's a terminal high altitude aerial defense system aimed at
ballistic missiles from north korea against south korea. you know, that's a short di distance across the earth, but the missiles have to -- the missiles have a high atmospheric altitude. and so that's what thaad gives you. thaad is part of a system, you know, that the south koreans have. thaad, they have patriot, and they have the like. so that's what those systems are designed for, to give an umbrella, if you will, to protect south korea. >> it seems to me the chairman's point is the dramatic point. and that is that there's the short range artillery and we have no defense. >> right. >> should north korea decide to unleash. >> i think we should develop that capability. >> thank you. >> yes, sir. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and admiral harris, thank you very
much for your service to the country and for your leadership at this challenging time. one of the things that we heard from a panel of private sector, but some former officials on north korea on tuesday was that the only impetus to encourage china to engage with north korea in the way that we would like in order to help us get them to back down on their nuclear program would be if we initiated much more extensive sanctions on china with respect to their financial system, or if they believe that there was imminent threat of war on the korean peninsula. do you think that's an accurate analysis based on your experience with china in the region? >> senator, i think it is an accurate analysis. i think there is some room in the sanctions regime, but
there's not a lot left in there. but there are some and we should apply all of those we can before we're left with only the other choice. >> again, to be clear, they were suggesting that the sanctions should be on china on their financial system. >> there are many -- there are some areas in the sanctions regime that we have not yet explored. i think we should explore those before we do the kinetics. >> thank you. and everyone has acknowledged, obviously, that north korea is working towards a nuclear weapon. and that's one of the things that's changed in north korea. have we seen an escalation of rhetoric from kim jong-un, or are we seeing very much the same kinds of rhetoric but we're paying more attention to it today because of the nuclear threat? >> i think we're seeing increased rhetoric. this week he threatened australia. this week, he said he was going to shoot out -- sink the carl vinson with a single shot, which
is, you know, ridiculous but he said it. he's increasing his rhetoric. at the same time, he's continuing his aggressive weapons develop. so i think they both go hand in hand. he had that parade last week that showed off the weapons systems and all that. all that in combination lets me know with and should let us all know that he is intent on his objective. and he's moving toward that objective at pace. >> and how much of a concern is it that at the time when we're trying to get china to work with us on north korea, we're also very concerned about what they're doing in the south china sea. they're increasing effort to expand control of the seas in southeast asia. how much of a difficulty does that present for us as we're
trying to work with them? >> as i said earlier, i don't think it poses too much of a difficulty for a nation like the united states. you know, we should be able to compliment and applaud china's efforts on the one hand and be willing to criticize them for the bad things they do on the other. and i think from china's perspective, they can receive that criticism and continue to do the thing that benefits, not just us but benefits them. a nuclear north korea or the u.s. response to a nuclear north korea, as you said, affects china almost as much as it would affect north korea. i think it's in their best interest to do this and listen to what the international community, not just the united states, but the international community is saying about this. >> so i appreciate that you've taken responsibility for the carl vinson, and i understand as the commander you would do that.
but how concerned -- as we're thinking about the messages that we send to north korea, to china, to both our allies and enemies, how concerned should we be about that kind of a mixed message? yesterday one of the things that, obviously, got a lot of attention was the briefing at the white house of all of the senators, which i rusuassume no korea watched closely, as did most people. how should we think about being consistent about the messages that we're sending to the region? >> i agree with you. i think we should be consistent. the messaging was my fault, not simply because i'm the combatant commander, but it was my fault. i take the responsibility for it. what i said at the time was that
we were going to pull the carl vinson out of singapore, we were going to truncate the follow on exercise it was going to have with australia. cancel the australian port visit, and then send it to northeast asia. i didn't specify time in there. there was a lot of press reporting on that that implied that it was now now now. i could have stepped in and corrected that and i did not. i feel responsible for that. and i'm remiss for not doing that. that's all on me. the messaging on this comes out of pacific command. i regret it happened, i'll try to do better but it is on me. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you mr. chairman, thank you admiral harris for being here. some believe our forces only
exist to protect an attack on our homeland. but i think the recent events the rules that our nuclear forces play in assuring our allies of our resolve as well. can you talk about the value that our allies place on our nuclear umbrella and the importance of modernizing our nuclear forces so we can continue to deter our adversaries and reassure our allies? >> ma'am, i think our allies are as dependent on our nuclear umbrella as we are. and i think the shows of force we provide against our adversaries are important. we have the uss michigan, it's not a ballistic missile deterrent but it's a guided missile submarine is in south korea right now. i think that sends a powerful
signal of solidarity whether our south korean ally, and at the same time it shows the north koreans that we are serious about the our defense commitment to our ally on the peninsula. i think the modernization, modernizing of our nuclear deterrent is absolutely critical to our nation. for our survival. and that means the follow on ohio class submarines, that means the long range strike bomber, and an upgraded ground based icbms. i think the three at the triad is a proven success story. we shouldn't experiment with some other formula. it has worked so far. and i think it will work well into the future. but we must commit as a nation to modernizing that force. >> thank you, sir.
if we're going to have that message of deterrence and assurance, we need to stick to that modernization plan, then, correct? >> yes, ma'am. >> last year general scaperatti stated that the isr was his top readiness challenge and he said, quote, the united states forces korea requires increased multidiscipline persistent isr capabilities to maintain situational awareness and provide adequate decision space for the usfk, pacom, and national senior leaders. can you discuss how the isr enables your operations in pacom region and also in relation to the korean peninsula specifically? >> yes, ma'am. i'll try to stay on the right side of the classification here without getting into too many specifics.
isr is the term we apply to our ability to watch our adversaries. and we want to watch them all the time. but there's not enough isr to go around to meet all of the requirements of all the combatant commanders. so i've stated my requirements, like the submarine discussion, central command who is fighting the fight today in the middle east, africom and so on, they have their requirements for isr also. it comes out of a pool. all services contribute to the pool in different ways. and so i don't have what i need. i don't have the ability to persistently watch my adversaries all over the endo asia pacific, over half the globe, 24/7. and i need it 24/7. i need it whatever 60 times 24 hours is. i need it that minute by minute. i don't have that. and that's what the general was
getting at with persistent isr. i'm convinced today, even though he's the european combatant commander he would like more isr as well >> can you give us an idea what percentage of those requirements you have fulfilled? do you have half? 2/3? >> i probably have a tenth of my requirements. >> thank you sir, thank you mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. chairman and thank you admiral harris for your testimony here today. you referenced in your written testimony that nine out of ten mega cities in the world are in the pacific command's area of responsibility and certainly given our conversation here today, seoul is in the front and center of what we're talking about. it's my understanding of the number of mega cities in the world is expected to expand in the coming years and i expect that growth will continue in the endo asia pacific theater as
well. i'm concerned, as well as i know a number of other folks that our military isn't adequately prepared for operations in mega cities. whether it's to fight or to assist in humanitarian assistance or disaster relief mission pz, so i'd like your poirn, admiral, on how we should conduct training and do you believe that additional training, particularly with the army and marine corp should focus on operations within mega cities. >> just to be clear, that nine of ten, i stole a city, one of those cities is karachi, pakistan, so i believe the army and marine corp are getting after this issue of fighting in heavily urban terrains. and i believe that the they need to continue to do that for the reasons you've outlined. also we're working with our allies and friends in the region
to improve their capability at the same time that we're working to improve our capability to fight in those dense urban environments. >> as you know, china's one belt, one road strategy seeks to secure china's control over its continental maritime interests with the hopes of dominating eurasia and exsploploiting resources. such designs place the country at odds with the united states and nations like japan and india. currently, china's economy budget is four times greater than those of india. i'll talk about india and its importance to us. however,india is an ambitious and growing country. they have competing interests at stake in the continent. india has expressed concerns and perceived goals in the region. given the fact that india is a
democracy, shares many values with us here in the united states. i'd be curious as to how you view india's role in the future in the endo pacific region, and what we should be doing to strengthen that relationship, and if there's anything in particular that you would like to see expanded so that we can work more closely with our friends in india. >> i've madeind india a formal e of effort because i believe it represents a tremendous opportunity for the united states at large and pacom in particular. we share democratic values with india, we're the world's two largest democracies. we share cultural values with indian americans that live and work and lead in our country. i think that in the mill to mill space, we're in a very good
place and getting better. india is purchasing a lot of american equipment. the world's second largest c-17 fleet, for example, is indian. the indians have p-8 poseidon aircraft, u.s. helicopters, hi think there's a lot of opportunity there and we should continue to work that. we're heavily involved -- i say we -- the navy is heavily involved in working with the indians on the development of their aircraft carrier, their indigenous aircraft carrier. that's an exciting program. i think that india's geo strategic interests align perfectly with ours. in terms of being concerned about china and in terms of the interaction or the intersection,
rather, of china and india, including along their long land border, but especially in the indian ocean. especially in the approaches to the indian ocean. so i welcome an improved relationship with india. they've invited me twice in the last years to speak at their dialogue, which i've accepted. i want to continue to improve and grow the relationship between our two countries. >> thank you, admiral. >> admiral, welcome back and thanks to you and all the men and women you lead in pacific command. i want to talk today about relative strength of missile forces in the endo poiacific gin the vast area. how many of china's land based missile forces do you estimate have a arrange of 500 to 5,500
kilometers? >> in an unclassified venue, over 90%. over 90% fall in that range. >> how many missiles do you have that fall into that range? >> i have none, sir. >> you have none? >> right. >> why do you have none? >> because that range, 500 to 5,500 kilometers is defined in the inf treaty, which prohibits nuclear and cruise missiles and icbm -- nuclear and conventional ballistic missiles in that range. and we adhere to the inf treaty religiously, as we should. it's a treaty we signed on for. china is not as signatory to the treaty, they're not ablieoblige
follow that treaty and we can't criticize china for developing weapons that contravene the treaty. >> the only two signers are the united states and russia. >> it's really us and russia are the signatories to the treaty. general selva testified that russia has violated the treaty in the general sense. at the end of the day what you have is you have a treaty that binds theoretically two countries, one of which violates it without being held to account, the other adheres to it rigidly, as we should, as it should. all the other countries in the world are not obliged to follow the treaty and they don't. those countries are of concern, of course, are china and my region and iran. >> since you mentioned general
selva's testimony, i think this is what you're referring to, he spoke to the house armed services committee last month, he said the russians have deployed a land based cruse missile that violates the spirit and intent of the nuclear forces treaty and they do not intend to return to compliance. is that what you were referring to. >> it was. >> you agree with that assessment? >> i do. >> the treaty was originally reached between the united states and the soviet union after the build up of the soviet forces so it was geared primarily towards the european theater, is that correct? >> it was geared toward the soviet union in a bipolar world. this was at the height of the cold war, and now we're in a multipolar world. where we have a lot of countries that are developing these weapons, including china, that i worry about. and i worry about their df 21
and 26 programs, the ballistic missile programs if you will. the inf doesn't address missiles launched from ships or airplanes, but it focuses on land based systems. i think there's goodness in the inf treaty, anything you can do to limit nuclear weapons at large is is general good, probably. but the aspects of the inf treaty that limit our ability to counter chinese and other countries' cruise missiles, land based missiles is problematic. >> as you say, since the united states and russia are the only two parties to the treaty, and you and general selva and other officials have said that russia is violating the treaty, that means the united states is the only country in the world, the only country in the world that unilaterally refuse today build missiles that have a range of
5,000 to 5,500 kilometers. >> yes, sir. >> do you think we should withdraw from the treaty? >> i would never advocate unilateral withdrawing from the treaty because of the nuclear limitation part of it. but i do think we should look at renegotiating the treaty. we should consider that. because as you say, there's only two countries that signed on to it and one of them doesn't follow it. so, you know, that becomes a unilateral limitation on us. >> so one final question, then, there's three scenarios. one is russia comes back into compliance, the united states and russia comply. two is we somehow withdraw from or abrogate or declare russia in material breach so we're no longer unilaterally controlled or continue the status quo where
we are the only country that refuses to develop those missiles. surely whatever you think between one and two we can't accept three going forward, can we? >> right. >> thank you. >> thank you, on behalf of the chairman, senator warren, please. >> thank you, thank you for being here, admiral harris. in your posture statement last year you described the asia pacific rebalance as a strategic hole of government effort that guides and reinforces our military efforts integrating with diplomatic political and economic initiatives. still agree with that statement, admiral? >> i do, ma'am. but, you know, we labelled it the rebalance in the previous administration and in the early days of the prevent administration we labelled it the pivot. >> yes. >> i think the labelling of whatever it is we do is less important than whatever it is we do. >> that's actually the part i wanted to focus on. i agree with you on this.
and yi just have a simaple questions cutting funds to agencies that perform civilian functions would make your job easier or more difficult? >> i believe it would make it more difficult. i'm reminded of what a famous french foreign minister said ahead of the french army, he said when my profession fails, yours must come to the rescue. i think that it's -- we're not in a good place if we're not bifurcated. also, i believe that if the state department fails earlier because of funding, then we'll have to come to the rescue sooner. i'd rather, you know, push that off to the right rather than bring it to the left. >> that's a very powerful point. i want to note for the record that the trump administration in its budget blueprint calls for about a 29% cut to the state
department. and significant cuts to other agencies with international responsibilities. obviously, there is a strong military component to the asia pacific in keeping us safe there. as you say, it takes a lot more in this vital region to keep us safe. i want to shift if i can to north korea. we're dealing with a real threat from a dangerous, unstable nuclear armed state. and despite tough sanctions, north korea continues to be provocative. i'm concerned that this is a brewing crisis that would escalate without warning. we went over to the white house yesterday, the administration said again that the time for strategic patience is over. now, i think it's not clear precisely what their new strategy is. by all accounts, north korea's continuing its efforts to develop a nuclear armed system
that could reach the continental u.s. coast line. and administration officials have talked about shooting down a north korean ballistic missile test. admiral, could you talk a little bit about the strategic considerations that we must take into account before taking such an action? what are the upsides and down sides to shooting down one of their test missiles here? >> well, there's a capability issue, there's a geometry issue of where that missile is going and all of that. so if they're launching a test missile that we think is going to land in korea or japan, i think we're obligated to do what we can -- >> i understand that. but just shooting down a test missile in general. you know, as i understand it, what i've been trying to read about this, experts on north korea's war plans say that kim jong-un would likely respond to
u.s. military action with massive escalation against south korea, japan, perhaps even the united states if we shot down a test missile. so i'm just asking. do you agree with that assessment? if so, how is it that the administration should take this dynamic into account as it formulates its north korea policy? >> a lot of what you're asking, senator, is being deliberated in the administration now. and, you know, i'm in a difficult position when asked to comment on ongoing process deliberations. i'm going to defer on that. i will say that there are -- if we don't maintain credible combat power to confront kim jong-un's testing and his development goals, then we're
going to be in a position to be blackmailed by kju. that's a worse place to be. and i think that we'll all agree that everything that's been done up to this point has not worked in deterring kim jong-un. so all of the military capabilities that we have, all of our alliance and all of that have not deterred kim jong-un's desires to achieve a nuclear weapon that can reach the united states. we must stop that. somehow. >> well -- >> those options are, i think, are on the table. all of those options are on the table. >> the somehow, though, is the question. i see that i'm out of time, so i'm going to quit here and we can continue this conversation later. but that's precisely the question we're trying to ask about and why it is that i'm asking the question about what the up sides and down sides are if we take action directly on one of these testing missiles,
whether or not it escalates. and this gives him provocation to invade south korea, to bomb japan, otherwise so -- >> i think that he has the -- he can manufacture whatever provocation he wants to attack south korea or japan or us. you know, i think that the manufacturer of provocations resides with him. of provocatio resides with him. >> i appreciate that. but i have to say on this one, admiral, i think that we need the administration to be clearer about what they have in mind here. you rightly say this is under discussion. but what that means to me at this point is that no one knows exactly what it is that we plan to do here. if no one knows here in the united states, if the american people don't know, if kim jong-un doesn't have some idea
of what the response will be if he continues this testing, i think it's difficult for it to have any kind of deterrent effect. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. chair. admiral, thank you very much for being here today. i know the region is in a really precarious time and situation. but we do appreciate you taking time out too be with us. in a february speech you warned the audience of the perils of linear thinking saying instead we need to think exponentially in order to develop strategy and technologies that give us an asumemric advantage over regional threats. i absolutely 100% agree with you. as chair of the emerging threats and capabilities subcommittee, i am very, very frustrated with the oftentimes slow and very, very expensive nature of our defense acquisitions. you've even said this, you said that lady gaga was able to use over 300 drones during her super
bowl halftime she and why is it that she has that technological advantage and we can't capitalize on that. how important is it that we're able to rapidly develop things li if we had these technologies today, would we have more and better options in order to manage threats that are posed by north korea and china? >> so i think, senator, that innovation is in general is one of those asymmetric advantages that america enjoys over every adversary. we're in a place now where our adversaries recognize that and they're trying to close the innovation gap. they do it in a number of ways. they send their best and brightest students to american universities and then they get educated here and go back home and carry that knowledge back to
them. they also do it illegally. they steal our secrets, they steal our industrial processes. and they shorten their acquisition timelines drakt dramatically. they can field things at a rate faster than we can. we're often incumbered rightly so by law, regulation and policy, and i think that we should look at trying to figure out how to shorten that process. the law is important, obviously. regulations are important, policy is important. but when the three in combination allow us to be overtaken in technological development by countries that would do us harm, i think we should step back and look at that and ask ourselves is this the right way forward? i'm pleased with things like the diux effort that's been undertaken by the department,
the special capabilities office that resides in osd to try to go flash to bang quicker and things like that. >> thank you, i do agree. i think it's important that we are able to move rapidly and you were absolutely correct about the regulations and the laws. great. they were there for a purpose. but we do have to go back and i think scrutinize some of those regulations to make sure that we are able to move as rapidly as some of our near peer competitors or even those that are not near peer competitors with office shelf technology. you mentioned isis in some of your comments. and in your testimony, of course. active engagement between the united states and our partner countries is very critical to maintaining the stability in that region. not just with those state actors like north korea, but also with partners engaging those partners in the fight against isis.
if you could, can you speak to the importance of engaging some of those partners and how we are moving forward in that fight against isis? >> sure. so in the indough asia pacific, the countries we work close with in the isis fight are the asia, philippines, bangladesh. us, australia and new zealand, to help them fight that threat themselves. and the entity that does that for me is soc-pac, special operations command pacific. and we are actively engaged in providing i think it's god's
work, and pleased where we are in that fight. >> thank you, admiral. thank you, mr. chair. >> senator sullivan has to go to florida. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and my colleague, senator hrono from hawaii, i very much appreciate you letting me jump ahead. in alaska and hawaii, we have a lot invested in this, as you know, admiral, given our citizens are impacted sooner than anyone else with regard to the ballistic missile -- intercontinental ballistic missile threat. i want to begin by thanking you again for your service, admiral. would you agree that we're clearly in a more direct threat phase with regard to the north korean challenge to our citizens? >> i agree, senator. >> and we were all over at the white house describing a strategy, integrated strategy, that the administration is putting together with regard to very focused initially on enhanced diplomacy. but do you also believe that the
threat of military force or at least keeping it on the table actually enhances our diplomatic efforts? >> it does. i believe that the best enhancement to diplomacy is a strong military capability. >> you mentioned the unprecedented weapons testing. i have a chart that i want you to take a look at. and also not if, but when north korea will have a capacity to arrange the continental united states. again, hawaii and alaska would be earlier. the chart shows that kim jong-un has actually conducted more tests than his father and grandfather combined. do you see that abating at all? >> i do not see it abating at all if the trajectory remains as you have depicted on the graphic. >> and he's learning even when he fails. >> right. he is not afraid of failing the
public. >> one thing for my colleagues here. we're going to be working on a bipartisan enhanced missile defense, homeland missile defense bill. and i certainly think that that's in order. and hopefully we'll be able to get a number of members on this committee to be co sponsors of that. admiral, i next want to turn to the south china sea and the issue of freedom navigation operations. earlier you had mentioned that the high-level services that the chinese weren't doing that. standing next to the president in the rose garden, president xi stated, quote, china does not intend to pursue the militarization of these islands. so what do you make of that statement by the president of china? >> i wanted to believe him. but they have -- >> do you believe -- since he made that, i think it was a year-and-a-half ago, what's happened? >> they have militarized the south china sea, sir. >> so despite the fact the president was standing next to
our president, that was not an accurate statement. >> the reality is that china has militarized the south china sea. and i think you have -- maybe it's the other graphic. but if you look at a graphic of fiery cross reef, you'll see a 10,000-foot runway, weapons in placements, fighter aircraft, and troops. clearly, that facility which is 700 acres, a military facility, all of that capability doesn't exist to rescue the odd fish fisherman that gets lost out there. >> this committee is very interested in our policies and execution with regard to freedom of navigation operations in the south china sea. the trump administration is developing its own policies. i was supportive of secretary
carter's pro announcements of flying, sailing and operating anywhere in international law allows. but the execution of that was done rather meekly. can you give us a sense as the new administration is developing these policies what principles they should be looking at, the important role of whether we're doing it under innocent passage or not? and also, when you look at this last graph, this last chart, you see that the scarborough shoal has not been militarized yet, but it's very strategic. and what would happen if that became militarized by china. and what should we do to stop that militarization? should we draw a red line at that important geographic point in the south china sea? just give us a sense on those issues, innocent passage, allies, scarborough shoal. what we should be looking at. what the new trump administration should be looking at in terms of their policy in
the south china sea. >> so, senator, i've made clear to this committee and other testimonies to other committees that i'm a supporter of freedom of navigation operations. i think we should do them not to send a signal about territoriality or sovereignty or anything like that. we should send a signal that we do operate wherever international law allows. and the freedom of navigation operations exists just for that reason. to exercise our freedom of navigation. and the freedom of navigation that's exercised or could be exercised by all countries in the world. so one of the beneficiaries of our freedom of navigation operations in the south china sea would be china, for example, in other waters. and that's the right of all nations to operate in accordance with international law. so i believe we should continue to do those. there's a whole range of them,
whether you challenge what is considered an illegal baseline claim, whether you do innocent passage and don't notify a country who maintains that you must notify them before you do an innocent passage. or you can go within a 12-mile territorial limit of an island or feature or whatever that doesn't deserve one under international law. so there is any number of ways to conduct freedom of navigation operations. and we should not limit ourselves to any of those. with regard to scarborough shoal, i think it's an important part of this region for the reasons depicted on that chart. it would give china a quote, unquote, trifecta of bases in the south china sea with woody allen, the para sails, to the
northwest. the spritelies in their seven bases there to the south. and then scarborough shoal would give them a key base in the northeast. they have not done that yet. i hesitate to draw red lines. i think red lines are problematic for a number of reasons. but we should communicate clearly with china that we do not want them to militarize, to reclaim and then militarize scarborough shoal. >> thank you, admiral. thank you, mr. chairman. >> all right. senator hrono, please. >> thank you, mr. chairman. aloha, admiral harris. and always good to see you. thank you for your service. there's a lot of focus, of course, on the ongoing and heightened threat from north korea, and in light of that, of course, i want to ensure that hawaii is adequately protected. pmrf is a national treasure that
cannot be replicated anywhere else with the under sea and missile testing ranges. there has been discussion about operationalizing asia's shore located at pmrf. is hawaii adequately protected at this time given the assessments of north korea's current capability and the missile defense systems we have in place? and going forward, as north korea's capabilities have advanced, what will be needed to defend the u.s. and in particular hawaii from korean advancements? >> thanks, senator. i agree with you that pacific missile range facility on kauai is a national treasure. i think that -- i've gone on record as supporting the idea that we should develop and acquire a defensive hawaii radar that gives hawaii the ability to see the space, if you will, in
the face of potential ballistic missile attacks. we have the sbx. that's the x-band radar that sits on a self-propelled all platform that has to be sustained. and refurbished and all of that. and i think a land-based permanent facility to do that is necessary. i believe today general robinson will tell you that hawaii is adequately defended. i think in the future, as north korea continues its weapons development program that we need to look at all ways to improve the defense of hawaii, including ground-based interceptors. i'm not smart enough to know if we should or not, but i think we should study it. and i think that would be the complement to a defensive hawaii radar. >> do you have any sense as to
the time frame for moving from the radar capability that we -- you say we need to develop right now and going with the ground-based? >> no, ma'am. i do not have that idea. >> thank you. congress has called for headquarters reductions in recent years. and while i agree with reducing redundancy where it makes sense and eliminating waste, i am not a fan of salami slice percentage cuts across headquarters at enemy entities. so i'm a strong advocate of taking a look at each headquarters operations, the personnel mix, the evolving threats and challenges it faces, as well as previous growth of a particular headquarters before recommending any cuts. so as you mentioned in your testimony, pay com has been in its arr for four of the five challenges, which drive u.s. defense planning and budgeting. and so that's in your arr. can you talk about pay com headquarters in terms of staffing levels over the last 20 years or so, reductions you have
taken or are about to be applied in light of the challenges you face, including a hostile north korea, a rising china, russia and isis in your aor. and how will proposed staffing reductions impact pay com's ability to succeed with all of the challenges you face. >> yes, ma'am. so over the past 40 years, pay com has averaged less than 800 personnel. and that's officers, enlisted personnel and civilians. we have been pretty consistent over 40 years at that level. and pay com is the largest geographic combatant command with one of the smallest staffs. that said, i think that, you know, we all should seek efficiencies where we can. but i'm not supportive of the
idea of salami slicing, either. so across that 40 years of staff manning levels at pay com, the threat has increased. because in that intervening 40 years, now we have -- we don't have a by polar role any more. we have the threats i talked about in my testimony. china, russia, north korea and isis. so i'm -- i will continue to -- and my staff, we continue to work closely with osd, office of secretary of defense, and the joint staff on our manning levels. >> and i would like to -- i would like for us to be very cognizant of the kind of impacts across the board types of cuts will have. and you've already mentioned, if you don't mind, mr. chairman, i would like to get to one more question. you already mentioned the sponsor you have for the app-c.
in your written testimony, you state you have kernts about some of the changes made in the 27 nda. and i just wanted to give you an opportunity to tell us how these changes could impact the dod counter transnational programs in the pay com oar. >> yes, it could, potentially, depending on how the cuts are affected. it could dramatically affect the joint interagencies task force west. which goes after narcotics programs. i'm concerned about the international military education and training, which i think is the best -- one of the best foreign assistance programs out there. that's where we bring foreign bright light -- bright up and coming mid grade officers to the united states for senior military education for a year at a time with their families. and they get immersed in american culture ideas and living in an environment where
we practice daily civilian control of the military. so i think it's important that we fund these programs. and i'm concerned if those programs were to be cut. >> thank you for that. thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator reynolds, please. >> thank you, sir. admiral, first of all, thank you for your service to our country. i think the first time that we met was in hawaii. i was on senator inhofe codel with him, and your briefing that day was alarming, to say the least. and eye-opening with regard to the breadth, the scope, the size of the area in which your team was responsible for the security, not just of our forces, but in conjunction with our allies, as well. one item that caught our attention at that time was simply the time frame in which to respond to an adversarial activity. i would like to talk about some
of the newer technologies that are being employed or may be well-employed in the future. in particular, i mean -- when we talk about the unique problem set that you've got there, the trifecta of fuel land-based areas in which to operate extreme distances, some of the most challenging and contested environments to operate and i believe the deterrence value of long-range strike to hold targets at risk, targets that are quickly becoming harder and harder to access, what are your thoughts on the possibility of a conventional warhead variant of the proposed long-range standoff weapon? >> so senator, i think that we're going to have to look at that in terms of inf. because currently, you know, that's the law, that's the treaty we follow. if if you're talking the land-based capability. we're not limited in air and --
i think we -- >> thinking about an air launch. >> i think we should explore all of that. because more capability against the threats we face is what is needed in the pacific command. >> what about with regard to hypersonics? right now i think in open source documents, there's some pretty clear evidence that both russia and china have been looking at hypersonics. the ability to deliver weapons at mock 5.0. >> so i have to be careful when i talk hypersonics in an open hearing. but i am concerned about chinese and russian hypersonic weapons development. and i've expressed those concerns in the right places. >> is this an area where perhaps our own technology development needs to be reviewed in terms of our ability to respond to those possible threats? >> i think we must improve our
ability to defend against and conduct hypersonic -- defend against hypersonic weapons and develop our own hypersonic weapons. again, in the development of hypersonic weapons, offensive hypersonic weapons, we're going to run up against treaty restrictions. >> we've been talking now about some unique types of new weapon developments, both ours and theirs. and at the same time, we talk about readiness. it seems that we sometimes get caught up and we assume we're simply being able to maintain the readiness that's necessary. i would like to give you an opportunity to talk a little bit about perhaps our lack of readiness in some areas. and in particular, i'm thinking right now as an example, every time we get together with a team of experts, such as yourself, we hear some perhaps horror stories about the inability to even take care of some of our existing assets. in particular, i'm going draw attention to the fact that we've got the "u.s.s. boise" sitting at port.
not in depot, but at port. here is a nuclear-powered submarine, which is not operational at this time. and i understand that there are two other boats in the same category. could you perhaps give -- can you give us any anecdotal or additional information in which you have seen or frustrated by our ability to maintain the readiness necessary for you to do your mission? >> so that's one of the issues that fall into the service chief's bailiwicks, if you will. their responsibility is to maintain and equip the force for use by the combatant commanders in meeting the national command authority's responsibilities. so i too share your concerns when i look across the enterprise. not just across the navy, but across the enterprise in shortfalls in search force readiness. >> prepared to give us any examples? >> no, sir, not in this hearing. >> all right.
thank you, sir. >> thank you, sir. >> once again, thank you for your service. >> thank you. on behalf of the chairman, let me recognize senator donnelly. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and admiral, thank you so much for your service to the country. when we were home here in the senate, working in our states, was when this developed with the aircraft carrier. and so based on the words of the president and secretary mattis, i spent that time in meeting after meeting with people in indiana telling them how serious we take this north korea situation and telling them we take it so serious that we have our aircraft carrier, "the carl vincent," heading to north korea right now. it turned out that was wrong. i felt misled, and i think my constituents were misled, as well. and what i don't understand is that when those comments were made, how they -- how nobody
said anything that, hey, this is wrong. this is not correct. and so my question is, how do we make sure this doesn't happen again? and i know other members asked about this, as well. but i don't want to be in a position of having the people in my state think one thing and the reality is something else when we all take a pledge that we'll speak truth to power. that if we see something that's not correct, we'll tell people. we'll let them know. and, you know, have great concern about that. >> sir, i can't say i'm sorry enough. but i'll -- >> i'm not asking you to say you're sorry. >> i'm accountable and responsible for the messaging that came out of that "carl vincent" issue. at the end of the day, what weigh said was, "the carl vincent" was leaving singapore, truncating its exercise and heading to northeast asia. that's where it is today. it's within striking range of
north korea if the president were to call on it. now, that messaging was not done well. and that messaging is on me. >> well -- actually, it was -- we heard the president and secretary mattis say exercises are being cancelled, it's heading to north korea right now. i mean, to say -- you know, some day i'm going to the cemetery. i hope it's not next week. i hope it's not next year. but at some point i'm going to the cemetery. so to say i'm going to the cemetery is technically correct. >> right. >> i just want to make sure the information i give to the people in my state is accurate. and if you can make sure, if you see something that you look at and you go, look, this really seems sideways, that it be communicated right away so that the people of this country actually know what's going on n and our allies know what's going on. have you seen any sanctions against north korea that have worked or that have slowed down kim jong-un's efforts to --
>> none. >> none. >> none. >> have you seen in the -- in the last month or the last couple of months kim jong-un slow down his efforts to achieve his goals of meeting up the nuclear warhead with missiles? >> i haven't seen anything in the last -- since i've been at pacific command. in the last month, though, since president trump and president xi got together, and president xi and china seemed to be more willing to exercise their influence on north korea. north korea hasn't done any of the testing that senator sullivan showed on his graph. the bad testing. the nuclear test or icbm testing. and i think it's early days yet to draw direct correlation. i think we're going to have to wait and see and give president
xi and china a chance, assuming that in that interim period, kim jong-un doesn't do a nuclear test or something like that. >> what is your understanding? and by that i mean pay com's understanding, of china's biggest influence point pushing back against north korea, where north korea will pay attention? >> where china's -- >> where china's biggest strength to slow down north korea and their efforts is. >> i think their biggest strength in doing that is economic. 80% of north korea's economy is china-based. 80%. so i think china has a powerful lever to apply on north korea. and from china's perspective, you know, they're concerned about two things. they're concerned about a unified korean peninsula that's aligned with the united states and they're worried about refugees, should the northern --
should north korea collapse precipitously. >> but the time went by so fast, i have a million more questions for you. but i'll only ask one more. and that is, the rules of engagement for our ships. are any of our ships sailing solo right now, and near korean waters, north korean waters. and if so, do we have a plan that if they are intercepted or engaged that we have air cover for them immediately, that we have fellowships coming by immediately so that they are protect and had we don't have another pueblo type situation. >> that's a great question. and all of our ships that are operating in the sea of japan, east sea area, operate under -- standing rules of engagement. and they have what they need, in my opinion, and belief, to defend themselves. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> on behalf of chairman mccain, senator purdue, please. >> thank you. thank you for all of the men and women in your theater. you know, since the barberry
pirates in our first five frig at, the united states has dealt from a position of strength. i'm very concerned as we sit here today we're in the middle of a paradigm shift relative the other super powers. in your mind, since 2000, china has spent -- or is spending today approximately six times more on their military. and these are constant dollars. 2016 dollars. is that directionally correct, in your mind? about six times compared to just 15 years ago? >> probably, sir. but i don't have the data. but i've seen, you know, the curve. >> yes, sir. >> and the curve is dramatic. in the amount of defense spending they are doing. based on just what they tell us. and they're probably spending higher. >> that's what i want to get to. the stockholm international peace research institute, their numbers -- and i believe that china is spending more than even these numbers reveal. that's an 11% compound annual
growth rate just since 2000. here's the real problem. in 2017, they're going to spend about $240 billion in -- but adjusted, in real terms, apples to apples to the united states, that's $826 billion compared to our $630 billion. directionally, would you think that's reasonable to look at it that way? >> i think it would be. we have looked at purchasing power parity in a general sense with regards to china. and they reached that purchasing power parity point already in -- with regard, in comparison to the united states. >> i lived over there, and i've manufactured over there, i've sold over there. and when you adjust the currency and the ability they have to buy their weapons and their systems cheaper than we are, and i look at the developments just this year of, you know, you educated me a year or so ago about their df-26, the carrier killer, the
first aircraft was coming online this year. the fact that 95% of their missiles violate the inf treaty and that they far outrange our capabilities today. would you say today, sir, that china is on parity with the united states' military capability in the pacific region? >> i would not. in terms of our asymmetric advantages and the quality of our equipment and our people. that said, quantity has a quality all its own. and they are swiftly moving to exceed the united states in terms of numbers of ships and submarines and aircraft and the like. so we have to continue to work and resource that -- those asymmetric advantages we have. and certainly china is trying to close that gap. and in every regime. >> so within next five years, if you continue that trajectory, there is every reason to believe when a purchasing power parity basis, they will actually double the amount of investment we have
in the military. what i'm concerned about is this. independent of the money, i believe we have a supply chain war. you talked about it today. it takes us much longer, much more expensive, many more relations to go through. tell us what we can do to help you as a combatant commander compete in the supply shaupply chain war. you said i don't have what i need today against the current threats. we know their threats are only going to increase gee metcally over the next five to ten years. i believe they have a 2025 strategy. and i'm very concerned. you have talked about that as well. tell us what we can do to help you, sir. >> senator, i think that the -- the best thing that the congress can do to help me today is in sequestration and give us a budget. >> when you look at the china strategy in the southeast asia region, particularly in the south china sea, it's pretty easy. you said they militarized it. i agree with that. what are their intentions for
that outer ring of islands? it looks like the next level of national interest. i'm talking about guam to pa allow, in that area. have you seen any indications now they have sights on those, as well? >> not indications like what we're seeing in the south china sea where they're doing activities and that kind of stuff. island building. but they are working to influence countries in that region. small island nations. economically to bring them in line with their world view. >> two last questions real quick. are you concerned about the recent reorganization. and also the russia/china cooperation? it's at a higher level now than it's been in 30 years. are you concerned about those two developments with regard to pla? >> i am concerned about the former, which is the pl a's reorganization and a joint theater command. so we went through a period of joint -- integration, if you
will, as a result of the go water nickles act in the late '80s, mid '80s. and since then, i think we have become a much more effective joint fighting force across our military. and i think china is learning from that. they watch and they study. and they're going to this theater joint combined -- command structure. and i think that will make them better. it certainly made us better. and i worry about that. and then your second -- >> the russia/china cooperation. the military cooperation. >> i think that's more temporary. more -- -- because they need each other right now more than anything else. and i would be concerned about -- i would not be concerned about a long-term alliance with russia and china if history is a guide. so -- >> thank you, sir.
>> thank you. >> on behalf of the chairman, senator blumenthal, please. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank you, sir, for being with us again. and thank you to you and the men and women under your command for their extraordinary service to our nation. when you were here last year, you told me that you were concerned about russian and chinese undersea warfare capabilities, specifically their modernized submarines. and you noted, number one, the russians took no break from developing submarine capability following the cold war. and they have ballistic missile submarines now in their force fleet in the pacific. number two, the chinese are building a new class of such submarines that may have the capability to threaten of us. and you also told us that your submarine requirement in patcom
still has not been met. and your testimony this year, you mentioned a second ballistic missile submarine in the pacific, and the russians' plan to build and send six new attack submarines to the pacific by 2021. and you state, i'm quoting, potential adversary submarine activity has tripled from 2018 levels, tripled, requiring a corresponding increase of u.s. activity to maintain undersea superiority, end quote. you, i think, support the navy's 2016 force structure assessment, which calls for an increase from 48 to 66 attack submarines as part of a larger 355 ship navy. in february, acting secretary of the navy, sean stackly, submitted to secretary mattis an
accelerated fleet plan, which supports three additional virginia submarines. one more in fy-'21, fy-'22 and fy-'23 respectively. but you support this accelerated plan, and do you believe that it will give you -- our nation -- the necessary capability to address these looming and increasing threats from both russia and china in the pacific? >> sure, sir. i'm completely supportive of the plan. and i'm completely supportive of the effort to move to the left, construction of these virginia class submarines. they were clearly increase -- our nation's capability, and if assigned a pay com, pay com's capability. but three or four oh inadequate in the grand scheme, based simply on my requirements, which have to be adjudicated, whether requirements of all of the other
combatant commandant commands. >> can you give us an assessment of our adversaries' anti submarine warfare capability? >> yeah. so today the u.s. reins supreme in the realm in anti submarine warfare. but our adversaries, particularly china and russia, are closing that gap. because they understand that the gap exists, and they're working to reduce our asymmetric advantage. i think that we have to continue to keep that advantage. and, you know, i don't want it to be a fair fight if we have to go into a fight with these folks. and that means that we have to continue to resource the development and the continued development of our under sea
capability and submarine warfare capabilities. >> does north korea have significant anti submarine warfare capability? >> they do not. >> and are they developing that capability? >> they're working on it. they're trying. i mean, they have submarines. they have a lot of them, smaller submarines. they're diesels. and they have an ssb, which is a ballistic missile capable diesel submarine. and so they recognize the advantages and what the submarine gives them in terms of war fighting. but they're a long way from developing a submarine force that's comparable to any other country that we were talking about in the region. >> on the f-35 in your testimony, you note, quote, the forward stationing deployment of the fifth generation air frames the region continues to be a priority for your command. do you continue to believe that the f-35 is necessary in that
part of the world for the defense of our allies. japan is going to be acquiring them and others. >> senator, i believe that the f-35 is critical most in pay com than any other region of the world, because of the threat that we face and what the f-35 brings to the fight. and the f-22 is also the -- from hawaii and alaska. and so those fifth-generation fighters will allow us to get inside the a2ad area, the now area defense capabilities of our adversaries, particularly china and the region. we're going to need fifth-generation fighters to get in there. and they provide that. >> thank you very much, admiral. thanks for your great work at pay com and throughout your career. thank you. >> thank you. on behalf of the chairman, senator graham, please.
>> thank you, admiral. i want to echo that, too. thank you for your service and all those that are with you here today in your command. is china's activity in the south china sea in terms of militarizing the region getting better or worse or about the same? >> i'm not sure what better means. but they are militarizing more now than they were last year. >> i would say that it's worse. >> and from our perspective, that is worse. >> did they understand that we're serious about that's a bad thing? >> i believe they are. >> and they apparently don't care. >> to date. >> all right. so how do we make them care? >> i think we have to demonstrate credible combat power on the one hand and powerful diplomacy on the other. >> okay. is it fair to say that unless something changes, north korea's likely to have an icbm with a nuclear warhead that can reach america by 2020? >> i don't want to put a time
line on that, sir, in this hearing. but it is safe to say they will have one soon. they will match rhetoric to capabilities. >> okay, great. >> i beg your pardon? >> what's the purpose of having that missile? >> one, they want to be recognized as a nuclear power. and two, they want to ensure their survival. >> okay. in their mind, it's an insurance policy. >> partly. >> okay. from an american point of view, what kind of threat does that present to us? >> it presents today, even though -- i don't believe they have the full capability today. they threaten the 28,000 american troops in south korea, plus families. 55,000 american troops. plus their families in japan. our south korean and japanese allies. >> what about the homeland? what kind of threat do you see? >> depending on the nuclear weapon, depending on the missile, they could reach the
eastern seaboard. they could reach us right here in this building. >> is it fair to say that's what they want to do in the western part of the united states, california is probably easier target? initially? >> i believe they want to be able to threaten the united states. >> well, what kind of threat would that be to us? that would be a bad thing, right? >> that would be a terrible thing, sir. >> okay. so do you believe it should be the policy of the united states never to let that happen? >> i beg your pardon? >> it should be the policy of the united states to never allow north korea to develop an icbm with a warhead that could hit america? >> i believe that's correct. >> okay. do you believe that the only way they'll change that policy, their desire is if they believe that the regime could be taken down by us if they continue to develop an icbm? without credible military threat in the mind of north koreans, they're going to plow ahead. >> i believe that generally, but i believe that china might be able to exert its influence.
>> do you believe china could change north korea's behavior, absent a belief by north korea that we would use military force to stop their icbm program? >> i do not. >> okay. do you believe that china would act stronger and more bold if they believed credible military force was on the table to stop north korea? >> i do. >> so it seems to me that the policy of the united states, given the admiral's advice, and you are really good at what you do, that we should all agree that it's not good for america for north korea to have an icbm to have a warhead attached and it's really not good for china, is it? >> i believe it's not good for china. >> why don't they believe that? >> because they have their own calculus. their own -- >> do you think they're beginning to reshape their calculus in light of the -- our reaction to north korea? >> i hope so. but it's early days. >> okay. in terms of china leverage on north korea, you said it was substantial. >> their leverage is
potentially -- >> substantial. >> the best way to avoid a military conflict with north korea over their missile program is for china to wake up north korea to the reality of what threat that presents to north korea and china. is that fair to say? >> that is fair to say. >> is it also fair to say that we do not have any intentions of invading north korea at all? i mean, that's not -- nobody has told you, get ready to invade north korea. >> that is not fair to say, sir. i believe the president has said that all options are on the table. >> yeah, but i mean, we're not going to just go in and take north korea down. >> sir, i'm -- i don't want to get into what we could or couldn't do. >> okay. well, north korea thinks we're going to invade at any moment. do you think that's part of our national security strategy? is without provocation, to attack north korea? >> i think north korea has provided provocation already in terms -- >> but without provocation, it's not our policy to attack north korea. >> they have provoked us
already. >> yeah, but i said if they stopped it, they don't have anything to worry about. that's all i'm saying. >> that's a decision -- >> okay. so north korea is listening. none of us want to invade your country. >> they are. >> okay, well, good. so here's the point. all of this military force going that way is to deter them from being able to hit us. and protect our allies, right? >> right. >> we're trying to deter them from hurting us. we're not sending a bunch of people over there to invade their country without provocation. is that fair to say? >> right. >> good. i hope they understand that and i hope china understands that. thank you >> yes, sir. >> on behalf of the chairman, senator mikulski, please. >> thank you. last year, general skap letty testified at this hearing that north korea has one of the largest chemical and biological weapon stockpiles and research programs in the world. do you agree with that investment? >> i do. and do you believe that the facts that we know about the death of the half brother to kim jong-un was likely assassinated
with vx nerve agent? >> yeah. i do, senator. that's just based on open source reporting. >> right. so i'm -- we haven't confirmed that it was used. >> i beg your pardon? >> we have not independently confirmed that it was used. >> i have not seen reporting to reflect that. >> so do we -- do you know enough about the delivery capabilities of chemical and biological weapons at this point to adequately be prepared to defend our allies and our american soldiers and families in the surrounding vicinities? >> i don't know enough about all of their capabilities, and including those that we saw or probably saw in malaysia. so i think that's part of the readiness calculus that we have to go through when we consider the threat from north korea.
>> do you have the appropriate cvrn, which is an acronym for the record that is our defense? equipment necessary for chemical and biological attacks? >> i believe that general brooks does have that for the forces that are in korea now. >> okay. what about in japan? >> i can't speak to that. >> okay. i would love a followup on that. >> yes, ma'am. >> i think, you know, we do stuff in fort lauderwood in missouri. it's our biological defense center. and i'm concerned if they are using nerve agents to kill family members, they certainly are not going to hesitate to use nerve agents to kill american soldiers and our south korean allies and innocent citizens. so i would like a followup on that. >> you bet. >> do you think we should deploy thad to japan? >> i believe that's a decision japan has to make. i believe japan should have some kind of system like that. but whether it's that or age
agis assure or something else, they have to make that decision. >> as you know, i had the opportunity to take a exhausting tour of all of our anti ballistic missile systems last year, and you kindly hosted us when we were at pay com. but had a chance to be in south korea, understand that thad was going in, and also obviously in guam to observe the thad. i just want to make sure we know what the needs are in terms of that, in light of what north korea is up to. >> so we work with japan, and described the capability that thad would provide. that would give them also agis assure and potentially other systems. so that will be a japanese decision. it would be -- >> we are indicating to them we would be cooperative in trying to deploy thad to japan. >> right. >> okay. >> we -- to be clear on that, i
have not reached an agreement with japan on deploying thad. >> right. >> but that's a different issue than your initial question, which was should japan buy thad. >> right. >> so you know, if they buy it, then it's theirs, and relieves me the burden of having to deploy it, and the joint force. >> right. >> so i think that whole decision, whether they buy thad or agis assure or assess to support them or whatever, that's a decision yet to be made. >> it seems to me that the discussion that we're trying to have about pressure on china to do the right thing, especially in light of what i learned from you in terms of china's activities and militarization in south china sea that the more talk we have publicly about thad, more places, i think the more it behooves what i think is our policy right now as it relates to north korea. very quickly, i don't think anybody has touched on what i
have been really confused by, and worried by in light of how important the philippines is to the united states' military. could you assess the current situation of the u.s./philippines relations? because i know what strategic importance those islands have to your capability of defending the united states of america. >> so, ma'am, i believe that we're in a reasonably good place in the mill to mill space with our forces of the philippines. afp, if you will. we have a range of activities we continue to do with the afp, including billikitan, an exercise that is next may. the cooperation agreement, the five or -- five philippine bases that we have agreed to -- with the government in the philippines to improve for -- in some cases for us to use. that is preceding a pace.
most importantly, our special operations command folks are active in southern -- in the southern philippines to combat terrorism. in conjunction with and in support of the armed forces of the philippines. so our guys are doing the advising and assisting, but not the direct action. that's the responsibility of their own forces of the fi philippines there and i think that's working. >> so in terrence of not having a negative relationship in the mill to mill. >> yes. >> that's reassuring. he kind of goes in the category of kim jong-un in terms of what the hell, right? >> we are in a good place in the mill to mill space with the philippines. >> right. okay. thank you. >> senator king. >> thank you, mr. chairman. first, sir, apparent letcally, your exchange with senator ernst, silicon valley and those innovative industries located in other parts of the country.
we had testimony here a couple of months ago that silicon valley essentially won't deal with a defense department, because of the -- i was -- i would call it byzantine, but that would be an insult to the byzantine empire. the cumbersome and slow process in our procurement. that is an urgent national priority, in my opinion. and i just wanted to echo that conversation. the second point i think that's important, all the discussion we have had in the last few days about north korea in the last few weeks and months have focused on the icbm and threat to the homeland via a missile. the other problem that i think deserves attention is that north korea is a serial proliferator. of nuclear technology. and i think as serious a threat as an icbm is a nuclear weapon, a nuclear warhead in the hold of a tramp steamer sponsored by isis headed into miami or the
part port of baltimore. so that to me is an imminent threat that is almost as dangerous as the icbm threat. so that's got to be part of this calculation. here's my question. historically, the regimes in north korea have gone through these cycles of provocation and rising tension. and then there's been some negotiation and concessions. if this is part of that pattern, what does kim jong-un want? >> yeah. >> so senator, i don't think it's any longer a part of -- the pattern of his grandfather and his father. so as you correctly correctly s the past, they've gone to this provocation cycle. i've talked about it a lot in hawaii where there's a provocation, there's a negotiation and there's a concession. peace for a while and then the cycle starts again. i think kim jong-un has elevated
that to a cycle of provocation, provocation, provocation. what he is seeking is his own independent nuclear deterrent in order to threaten the united states and to insure the continuance of his regime. >> to follow up on senator graham's questions, we go back to history, this situation ha we're in now has often been analogized recently to the cuban missile crisis. part of the settlement in that case was we had a military force and threat of military force. we had the blockade but ultimately there was an agreement not to invade cuba. and that was part of the agreement that ended up with the missiles coming out. is this a moment, if regime preservation is his goal, is there a moment where we could enter into those kinds of
negotiations and talk about a treaty? >> i don't want to, you know, to limit the president's options as he decides which course of action to take. i'll say that in the cuban missile crisis was credible combat power that allowed diplomacy to act. >> i completely agree. >> i believe that my part of this problem set is to provide that credible combat power in the face of north korean provocation. >> i totally accept that. i understand that the vinson has to be there and all the other cape bes that we have and that's part of this process but i'm talking about how do we eventually get out of this, and that involves some discussion of what is it that is necessary to end this. china's a little puzzing to me because we've always talked about economic pressure, and china, i agree, has total pressure ability with regard to
north korea. there's no law that says that the missiles that he's developing and the nuclear weapons only can go south and east. he's as close to beijing as he is to tokyo. and if i were china, i would not want a nuclear armed guy right on my boarder who could threaten me. and it seems to me ha china really has to start to think about the threat that this, if he achieves this, suddenly, he can threaten anybody within a thousand miles. >> yeah, i agree with you there. >> finally, we talked about the vulnerability of seoul. i think -- as a talk to people in maine, they're surprised to learn that seoul is about 30 miles from the north korean border from the dmz and enormous threat from just artillery. and we talked about that we don't have any defense for that now. do the technologies that have been developed in conjunction with the israelis, david sling
and iron dome, have any relevance in this case? >> i don't know. i'm not smart enough on that. i'll have to get back to you on that. >> i appreciate that. that is a technology that's been effective in defending israel from short range rockets and perhaps it would be something that would change the military calculus. >> yeah, and i'll get back to you, sir. >> thank you, admiral. >> well, thank you, admiral. and i think that what we're talking about that the north koreans have is rockets which are -- would not lend itself to iron dome defenses. these are very difficult and challenging times, and it's very fortuitous that you are here before this committee particularly after the briefing that we had yesterday at the white house. you've been able to give us some
of the details that only a military commander can provide us with, and will help us to make judgments. i don't think any of us are predicting conflict, and i think it would be wrong for us to do that. but i also believe that we should make every preparation and although it would be military activity would be a last resort, it's something that we can't completely rule out. but i emphasize it would be absolutely, i know that this president's last resort. but you're the tip of the spear, admiral. and so the fact that you will have men and women ready if called upon and the testimony you've given today is reassuring to this member, and i believe to the other members of the committee. and i know how much you look
forward to coming back and testifying before this committee. i know it's one of the highlights of your time as commander in the pacific, but this testimony today was extremely important, and i thank you for taking the time and speaking in a very enformative and articulate fashion. senator reid, did you want. >> mr. chairman, i concur and i just once again, admiral, thank you and make sure you thank the men and women under your command. >> thank you.
if you missed any of this hearing you'll be able to see it again at c-span.org. a quick programming note, senate minority leader chuck schumer of new york will be holding a briefing with reporters at 12:15 p.m. eastern time. a little less than a half hour from now. we expect to hear more about funding for the federal government through the end of the fiscal year. tax reform proposals by the president, and other issues. again, senator chuck schumer 12:15 eastern, we'll have it live here on c-span3. later today here on c-span3, white house press secretary sean spicer and a white house briefing scheduled to get under way at 1:00 p.m. eastern time. we'll have it live for you. and this afternoon, president trump heads to the veterans affairs department to sign an executive order dealing with whistleblower protections for va employees. the president will sign that order and make remarks starting at 4:45 eastern time. you can see it live here on
c-span3. this weekend on "american history tv," on c-span3 it, saturday night at 8:00 eastern on lectures in history it, twoson university professor hakeem reinhart on victorian era culture in the u.s. in the last half of the 19th century. >> these are the values that they're promoting. restrain yourself, don't give into your urges and your gluttony and your desires all the time. be modest. don't brag and make yourself the center of attention and do not be lazy. >> at 10:00 on real america, the film "soviet active measures" about the soviet union's efforts to use forgery, bribery and the spreading of fake news to further their cold war agenda slurg. >> time and again in the diplomatic package would arrive and secret packages would be brought in my office. and almost each time there would be some forgery there and you
know, like in spy movies. >> sunday at 6:308 p.m. eastern, historians talk about their roles as expert witnesses for court cases. >> so as i see it it, history is a sort of add-on. it's a source of evidence or context to which most judges and lawyers turn to to the extent that it's useful in a particular case. >> and then at 8:00 on the presidency, presidential historians on the most influential first ladies. >> dolley madison who really shaped informal politics in washington. she really understood that at social gatherings, you could get men to agree to what the president wanted to do or get two warring factions together over ice cream. >> for our complete "american history tv" schedule, go to c-span.org.
>> federal communications commission chairman ajit pai yesterday an announced new plans to reverse net neutrality rules instituted during the obama administration. those old rules prevented internet service providers from blocking or slowing down some websites but not others. the fcc chairman said that getting rid of those rules would help expand high speed internet access. >> good afternoon, everyone. my name is adam brandon. i am the president of freedomworks. and i want to welcome everyone here. a lot of people are talking today about president trump's first 100 days. and i would suggest that yes, the supreme court's a big deal, but the things the chairman pai are working on potentially will have the longest impact of anything coming out of this administration. that is dit