tv Senators Seek Answers on Monitored Calls with Foreign Leaders at FISA... CSPAN July 5, 2017 12:02pm-12:50pm EDT
matthew olson -- first of all, welcome, to all four of you. matthew olson is co-founder of cyber security. previously serving as the director of national counterterrorism center where he briefed the national security council and reported to president obama on counterterrorism actibeing aaci. mr. olsen also served general counsel, nsa, focusing on surveillance, law and cyber security. under the bush administration, mr. olsen served as acting assistant attorney general, national security division, doj, mr. olsen also served as executive director of guantanamo
task force, special counsel director of the fbi, and served as federal prosecutor for more than a decade. he's a graduate of the university of virginia and harvard law school. adam klein is robert m. gates senior fellow center for new american security, widely published in areas of national security, surveillance, counterterrorism law and policy. he was previously an attorney at international law firm and also worked on national security policy at rand corporation in the 9/11 public discourse project, the nonprofit successor to the 9/11 commission. mr. klein served as the law clerk for justice scalia and is and graduate of northwestern university and columbus -- columbia law school.
elizabeth goiteen is of the liberty and national security program, the new york school of law, previously miss goitein served as council to russell finecoal, chairwoman of the senate judiciary committee. miss goitein also served as a trial attorney in the federal programs range as a civil division of the department of justice and she graduated from yale law school. elisabeth collins is serving her second term as board member of the privacy and civil liberties oversight board. previously, she was an attorney in private sector at two international law firms and served as the republican chief counsel for supreme court nominations for senator judiciary committee.
miss collins was also an assistant attorney general and legal policy, the doj, where she provided advice and counsel relating to national security and other issues. miss collins is a graduate of the university of chicago and harvard law school. we'll proceed to my left and my right. so mr. olsen, proceed, please. >> thank you very much, chairman grassley. it's an honor to be here this morning. let me put the bottom line up front. as the former national security adviser, i can attest to the fact that section 702 has significantly contributed to our ability to prevent terrorist attacks in the united states and around the world. this is consistent with the testimony that you have heard from the panelists, the witnesses in the other panel. similarly, the former general counsel of the nsa and a former department of justice official, i worked to ensure that we implemented 702 in a manner that protected the
privacy and civil liberties of americans. i will make a few brief remarks and i will focus those remarks on three points all addressing how section 702 has worked in practice. first, the operational value of 702. as this committee is well aware, we face a persistent and adaptive threat from al qaeda and isis and other groups. just since september 14, isis claimed credit for 40 terrorist attacks outside the caliphate in syria and iraq. the online environment where potential extremists communicate with isis handlers and recruiters plays a critical role in providing the direction to the individuals and mobilizing extremists toward violence. so to combat this dynamic threat, our ability to conduct surveillance under 702 has proven vital. the key point is this, our best opportunity to identify and stop these attacks before they occur is through good intelligence. that's often derived from the surveillance authorities such as 702. as the director of nct, i rely on a daily basis to information
collected under 702. in the morning briefings, the analysts often reported critical information came from section 702. in its landmark report, the privacy of the oversight board identified approximately 30 cases where 702 was the initial catalyst that uncovered previously unknown terrorist operatives and plots and more than 100 cases where 702 helped to lead to the arrest of individuals on terrorism-related charges. this is a truly extraordinary record in just the past few years. my second point is oversight. when congress amended fisa in 2008, i was at the department of justice. congress established the unprecedented oversight regime for 702. and under this regime, as you have heard now, all three branches of government exercise authority to ensure that the deposit is properly using this authority. the oversight has been strengthened over the past several years to both congressional and executive branch action. this rigorous oversight regime
reflects the careful balance that congress struck in 2008. to ensure the effectiveness of this authority. in my experience, the statute has been effective in doing both. the third point i would like to make is to suggest that calls from major reforms are not warranted. one issue that the committee has heard about this morning is the so-called incidental collection issue. a person targeted for surveillance under 702 who speaks on the phone or sends an e-mail. and will communicate with someone in the united states. this is incidental collection. some raised concerns about the such collection. i can tell you from my experience from the ability to obtain and use the communications is provening vital to disruption of plots to those in the united states. the azazi case is an example of this. i believe congress should estrict the government's ability to acquire and use such information concerning u.s.
persons. a second issue involves the ability to search 702 with the u.s. person identifiers such as names and e-mail addresses. i believe these queries are oo essential means to identify critical intelligence that would otherwise be inaccessible. from an operational perspective, when intelligence analysts seek to identify operatives in connection to suspected terrorists, would be one of their very first steps. so if the fbi suspects a person here is moving toward violence, the ability to query 702 information enables the fbi to move quickly to identify communications that the government has already lawfully collected to find vital clues. i believe this approach reflects an enduring lesson from the 9/11 attacks. that is the impairment for the government to effectively and use relevant information it holds in its databases in order to connect the dots. some are now urging congress to impose probable cause requirements on the intelligence abiliticies before they can search section 702 data with the
u.s. person identifiers. in my view, this would i understand mine the ability of the agents to move quickly to identify terrorist information. at the early stage of the investigation, it may be impossible to establish probable cause and therefore such data would be beyond their reach. and so, mr. chairman, the authority of congress established under section 702, has played an indispensable role in protecting this nation and allows them to collect private information and protects the civil liberties of americans. thank you. >> thank you, mr. klein. >> senator feinstein and members of the committee, thank you for allowing me to testify today. in a recent report, two co-awe tho co-authors and i. we concluded that section 702 is a valuable intelligence tool that should be reauthorized with existing statutory authorities and impact. but we also proposed enhancements to oversight, transparency and privacy. the public should know that section 702 is already subject
for rigorous multilateral oversight from all three branches of government. few government programs receive such close scrutiny. that said, it's always worth considering what more to do to protect privacy and strengthen public trust and programs. this is not just a privacy issue, it is important for national security. programs that lack public support will not be politically sustainable in the long-term. the challenge is to do this without diminishing section 702's effectiveness as an intelligence tool. broadly speaking, there are three areas of opportunity. the first is institutions that oversee 702, including the fisa court and the oversight board. the second is greater transparency, so about how 702 affects americans, how agencies query the 702 information and how the government uses the 702 information in the criminal justice system. the third area is to strengthen accountability for those who receive signals intelligence reporting to ensure that classified material is handled
responsibly and never used for inappropriate purposes. including political purposes. i would also like to mention one thing i hope this process will avoid. one of the 9/11 commissions key messages was the intelligence agencies need to be able to connect the dots between various pieces of information they have collected. i worked for tom cane and lee hamilton in 2004 during the process that led to the creation of the dni and the nct. i know that congress and the intelligence community has moved heaven and earth to break down information of the stove pipes in the ioc. with the grave terrorist threat still confronting us and the allies, it would be hard to reverse course on that progress now. we should not create these agencies from stopping the terrorist attacks. i'm happy to provide more detail on any of these points during the q & a. thank you and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you very much. >> chairman grassley, chairman feinstein and thank you for this opportunity to testify. on behalf of the brennan center for justice.
congress goal when it passed the fisa amendment act in 2008 was to give our government more powerful tools against government threats. the government used this authority to monitor suspected terrorists overseas, to trace their network and interrupt their plots. that's exactly as it should be. we are here today because of the other things that section 702 has been interpreted to allow. the government is not simply monitoring foreign terrorists or powers. instead, it is scanning the content of almost all of the international communications that flow into and out of the united states and acquiring hundreds of communications each year, including a large, though still unknown, number of americans communications. in addition, despite being required to minimize the retention and use of americans data, the government keeps the data for years and routinely searches it for information to use against americans in ordinary criminal cases.
indeed, current rules allow the fbi to read americans e-mails and listen to their phone calls without any factual predicate to suggest wrongdoing, let alone a warrant. i don't believe this is what congress had in mind when it passed section 702. but in writing the law, congress entrusted the executive branch and the fisa court with significant discretion. for instance, congress allowed the targeting of any foreigner overseas, trusting the government to focus its efforts on those who pose a threat to our interests. congress also left it to the executive branch and the fisa court to fashion specific minimization rules. i don't mean to imply that this trust was misplaced. in fact, we've seen essentially no evidence of intentional misuse. but what we have seen is mission creep. so allow designed to protect against foreign threats has become a major source of warrantless access to american's data and a tool for ordinary domestic law enforcement. this outcome is contrary not only to fisa's original intent,
but to american's expectations and their trust congress will protect their privacy and freedoms. there are several reforms congress could enact that would shore up proexits for americans while preserving the core of section 702, the government's ability to collect the communications of suspected terrorists and others who wish us harm without a warrant. event when the communication transit through or are stored inside the united states. i'll touch on three of the key reforms here. first, congress should narrow the scope of surveillance by requiring the government to have a reasonable belief that the target is someone worth targeting, such as a foreign power or suspected terrorist. this would be an internal determination that would show no probable cause with fisa court approval. this reform would offer critical protection, not just to law-abized foreigners but to americans. when the government can target any foreigner overseas, that
enables a massive amount of collection of innocent conversations between americans and their friends, relatives and associates abroad. those communications then sit in huge databases where they are vulnerable to data theft, hacking, negligent mishandling and potentially abuse. this reform is also vital for the united states's tech industry. the government's ability to target any foreigner overseas is one reason courts have validated agreements between u.s. and european companies. that's why 30 major u.s. tech companies including google, microsoft and facebook, signed a letter urging congress to limit the scope of section 702 surveillance along with other reforms. second, congress should require the government to obtain a warrant before searching section 702 data for american's communications. contrary to what mr. evans said earlier, restrictions on searches of lawfully acquired digital information are the constitutional norm. even when the government has a warrant to seize and search digital data in a criminal case,
it cannot run a different search of that data for other reasons without obtaining a warrant. it certainly should not have that freedom when it obtained a warrant based on a premise that its only target is foreigners. third, congress should end the data collection. this practice has no basis in the statute or legislative history. it's a small part of upstream collection which is itself a smart part of 702 surveillance. the privacy concerns it raises are significant. this is clearly a case where the risks outweigh the benefits. these basic changes would better align the statute with the goals it is meant to serve. i'll stop there and look forward to taking your questions. >> miss collins. >> chairman grassley, ranking member feinstein and members of the committee. thank you for the opportunity
to testify today. i provide this testimony in my capacity as an individual board member of the privacy and civil liberties oversight board, an independent executive branch agency commd with providing advice and oversight with respect to federal counterterrorism actions. from 2013 to 2014, our five-member bipartisan board conducted an extensive examination of the 702 program. in july '14 we concluded a report to show the 702 program is valuable, statutorily authorized and at its core constitutional. we set forth the legislative foundation for the program. the implementing procedures that govern the operation of the program, and the extensive oversight structure that accompanies the program. we also unanimously voted out ten policy-based recommendations. each of which has been
implemented or is in the process of being implemented and none of which required legislation. my oral and written testimony draw heavily from the board's report, which continues to be a valuable resource for understanding and assessing the program. the board conducted both a legal and policy analysis of the section 702 program. we unanimously concluded that the program has a limited scope. it does not authorize or result in bulk collection. instead, it authorizes the government only to engage in targeted collection of telephone and internet communications of non-u.s. persons located abroad who are likely to communicate information about court-approved foreign intelligence topics with the compelled assistance of providers. although u.s. persons may not be and are not targeted, u.s. person information may be incidentally collected. in that aspect of the program
was a core focus of our attention leading to key recommendations on minimization procedures. we also weighed the privacy implications of using u.s. person identifiers to query 702 data. the queries are consistent with years of direction to the intelligence community to connect the dots but also through raising significant privacy implications. we made recommendations designed to address those implications. the board also focused on the judicially approved minimization procedures governing the program. we noted the special protections afforded to u.s. persons and made recommendations designed to tighten certain aspects of the procedures. finally, we considered the labored oversight that accompanies the 702 program. oversight occurs in all three branches of government and can only be described as rigorous. although we identified no
instances of deliberate abuse, there is always the possibility of human or technological error, as would any complex program and robust oversight is essential. we concluded that the program is statutorily authorized and the program is constitutional. although certain features of the program push it close to the limits of fourth amendment reasonableness. specifically, we raised and addressed concerns about incidentalcollection and the use of u.s. identifiers as board terms. the board also expect significant time understanding the value of section 702. it has helped the united states learn more about the membership, leadership structure, priorities, tactics and plans of international terrorist organizations.
it has enabled the discovery of previously unknown terrorist operatives as well as the locations and movements of suspects already known to the government. it has led to the discovery of previously unknown terrorist plats directed against the united states and foreign countries enabling the disruption of the plots. overall, we came to appreciate the flexibility that section 702 affords the executive branch while still within the framework of judicial approval and oversight. the board's report and recommendations are consistent with what has been called a clean reauthorization of section 702. we made serious recommendations, each of which we thought necessary to enhance privacy and civil liberties protections but none of which required legislation. each of these recommendations has been or is being implemented. i personally view section 702 as a valuable tool in the fight against terrorism and believe
the current framework for section 702 provides the necessary protections to ensure that our american values are not compromised. i look forward to answering your questions. >> let me start with a question for all of you when to some extent, each of you or maybe i shouldn't say each of you, but some of you touched on this. you heard me mention earlier some suggesting that the government should have to get judicial approval or even a warrant before searching lawfully collected 702 information using u.s. person information. y'all come from different perspectives and you also have different backgrounds. i would like each of you to answer the question, is there any legal or constitutional reason why we should require judicial approval of a warrant before section 702 collection can be searched using u.s.
person's information? >> thank you, mr. chairman. first, i think the answer is no. judge of the fisa court addressed this head on. to permit the fbi to conduct such searches without going to a court in the first instance to obtain a warrant or any other judicial approval. i would point as a hypothetical example to the zazy case. an individual in colorado who was in touch with an al qaeda courier in pakistan. if somebody said to the fbi, this person zazy is in the midst
of plotting to carry out an attack on the new york subway. the fbi wore barred from searching its own databases if a connection was between zazy and this courier in pac. it allows the fbi to determine what else they need to do. and i would suggest imposing a judicial requirement would bar that information from the fbi being able to access it. >> mr. klein. >> this is certainly not a trivial privacy question. that said, i agree entirely with mr. olson's analysis of that. one point i would like to add, we now have information in the public domain about the scale of this problem. how much foreign intelligence information is coming through this channel into the criminal justice process. and we know from the most recent
ic statistical transparency report that there was only one case in 2016 where an fbi agent actually pulled up 702 information in a u.s. person query in an ordinary criminal case. given that the scale of this is very limited, i think it would be a significant overcorrection with major consequences for national security potentially if we were to impose a court order requirement. it is not a trivial privacy question. we can have more transparency about why these queries are necessary. we could have more information about precisely how often the bureau does them. and how often they return information. we've proposed a possible slight narrowing of these queries in some cases in my written testimony. but, by and large, i think the current practices need to continue. >> we're talking about this information. as if it somehow landed magically in the government databases. the way the government got this information without requiring a warrant in the first instance, even though it knows it will be pulling in american's communications incidentally, is
by also proing the fisa court, by certifying its only interest is in the foreign targets. it has no intention, no interest in any particular known americans. if it, instead, went to the fisa court and said there are particular known americans whose communications we are hoping to read as a result of this collection, then the government would have to get a warrant. so, to me, warrantless backdoor searches are a violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of the reverse targeting prohibition. i will also say as a constitutional matter this is only quite recently been looked at by any courts outside of the fisa court, but the notion that once data is seized, the fourth amendment is done and the fourth amendment doesn't apply to any leader searches is actually not correct. you can tell by analogies to criminal cases in which data may be seized under a warrant but if the government wants to conduct a separate search later for
different reasons, it actually does have to go get another warrant, even though it's already collected data and it's sitting lawfully in the government databases and i can provide that case law. >> based on the board's analysis, i do not believe prior judicial review for a u.s. person query is constitutionally required or advisable as a policy matter. we spent a tremendous amount of time on the issue of u.s. person queries. and we made a number of recommendations designed to enhance privacy protections. these recommendations, which have been implemented, impacted the nsa, the cia and the fbi. but after extensive discussion and consideration, the majority of the board declined even in the most difficult case which is the instance of a query by an fbi agent in an ordinary case to recommend a warrant requirement. we were concerned that such a requirement would raise the threat of rebuilding the so-called wall between intelligence and criminal
investigations. and that criminal investigators needed to be aware of potentially relevant 702 information. we did, however, recommend additional restrictions on the use and dissemination of any such queried information. >> senator blumenthal, should i call on senator lee while you're getting really or are you ready? >> okay, go ahead. >> first of all, regarding the fisa court and the mitchy missy brief, the role that they play, i have long been concerned about ensuring that the fisa court, which authorizes and oversees government foreign surveillance activities under section 702 as you know and other authorities, has sufficient information about
the civil liberties and privacy implications of the decisions that it makes. in 2013, i proposed legislation to establish a special advocate to assist the court in that task. and i think it's fundamental that the fisa court hear different perspectives and the weighty statute concerns in this area. in 2015, congress, as you know, passed the usa freedom act which created an institutional freedom process for participation of amicus curi to provide the fisa court with information about civil liberties and privacy concerns when the court is presented with novel or significant questions of law. the court has -- i understand appointed five amisi to fill this purpose. so my question is do you think
they have played a helpful role, how could this process be improved, and what do you think are the next steps for fisa court reforms in regard to bringing these different perspectives to bear? and that's for the whole panel. >> thank you, senator. this is something i've written about. i agree with you entirely that the amicus development is a good thing. i work in the space so i read the fisa court opinions. i read the u.s. courts transparency reports. i know rigorous oversight. if you talk to ordinary people, they're skeptical. there are two reasons. because it's in secret and that really can't change by and large, although the declassified opinions are a good thing. the other reason is because in most cases only the government gets to argue. and people are used to a court where both sides get to argue.
the usa freedom act adding amicus is a good thing. as we know, it's in the court's discretion. so given the significance of the annual 702 resort ification resort resort ification proceeding, one thing i have proposed i think would help strengthen the public confidence, that that is rigorous oversight. to require the court to appoint an amicus. which is problematic oversight. this is a way to build trust in 702 that people know it's getting rigorous scrutiny. it wouldn't affect the government's implication of the program, which is what we're all concerned about, one bit. >> thank you. >> senator blumenthal, i want to thank you for your leadership on that specifically. i think it was an extremely important contribution of the usa freedom act. i think it's clear from the act that congress intended for the fisa court to make use of amici, really any case in which there was a novel or significant legal issue unless there was some extraordinary circumstances. for the most part, the court has done that. there were a couple of occasions
in which the court has found participation inappropriate based on the rationale the court didn't need help. i don't think that's consistent with what was intended. but that's been rare. that's something i think this committee should keep an eye on. i do think it makes sense to have participation in the annual certification process. be mandatory. and the one other thing i would suggest is there's currently no provision for amici to appeal rulings of the fisa court if the amici arguments were rejected. and sometimes that's important. i think we saw in the fisa court's decision on backdoor searches, there were a number of, to say the least, very novel legal issues there that would have benefited from review. i think congress would usefully provide a provision requiring automatic supervision to fisa court of review in significant cases where the amici's arguments are rejected. >> thank you. the privacy and civil liberty's
oversight board spent a significant amount of time looking at the workings of the fisk and we addressed the surveillance court both in our 702 report, which is the subject of today's hearing, and our section 215 report. we made a series of recommendations which were designed primarily to enhance public confidence in the workings of the fisk and the oversight that body provides. we supported the concept of a special advocate. it was one of our recommendations. we did ultimately leave it to the discretion of the article 3 judges who sit on that court. but to miss goitein's point, we did also recommend consideration of a mechanism for appeal, although not as of right. >> as you know, my initial proposal was for a special advocate and that it be, in
fact, at the advocate's discretion whether to be engaged not at the court's discretion. so i would welcome thoughts as to how to improve the present process. did you have any comments, mr. olson? >> no, that's all right. i would simply add, somebody who has appeared many times before the fisa court on behalf of the government, that the characterization of the court as a rubber stamp or insufficiently cognizant of the array of issues before it i think has been unfair. that said, i agree with the benefits from a public legitimacy standpoint of including the opportunity for these judges to appoint amici in appropriate cases. i largely agree with my colleagues here, how that's worked out over the past couple of years. >> we all know the best judges who are not rubber stamps welcome the advocacy strong and vigorous advocacy on both sides of an issue. enables them to make better decisions.
their worst nightmare, in fact, is a defendant who is unrepresented, or is representing himself in many respects. >> i agree. >> that's the way the system works. that's the spirit that led me to make this proposal. thank you all, very, very much. thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator lee. >> thank you very much. >> when senator lee's done, i'll just have one question and then i think we'll be done. >> miss goitein, i'd like to start with you. why is it concerning if agents decide not to use information that they obtained when doing a backdoor search? >> in other words -- >> i'm sorry? >> what kinds of concerns does it raise when you've got somebody doing a backdoor search, whether they use it or not? why is that a problem? >> i see your point. the point is the search itself is a violation of american's privacy. that's the heart of the fourth amendment, is that the government has to have a warrant before entreating on an american's reasonable
expectation of privacy. and whether or not they find something as a result of that does not affect the privacy intrusion. it has other effects potentially. but, you know, if the government enters your house without a warrant and doesn't find anything, there's no argument there that somehow your privacy wasn't invaded because the search was fruitless. so i think we have to understand the nature of the privacy intrusion when the government is allowed to search american's communications without a warrant. >> okay. what kinds of things can information be used for? what kinds of investigations could incorporate information obtaineded through a back door search? >> well, we don't know exactly for a couple of reasons. one reason is because the list of crimes unrelated to national security, that the department of justice is authorized to use section 702 data when prosecuting, that list is not public. all we know is it's serious crimes. we don't know which crimes those are. and despite repeated requests,
with the statutory requirement that it notify criminal defendants when using evidence obtained or derived from section 702. the government's interpretation of derived from appears to be quite generous, perhaps creative. but once again the department has refused to make that interpretation public. it's fighting requests for that interpretation tooth and nail. what we do know is there were no notifications given at all until 2013 and then when the government was essentially caught telling the supreme court that it notified defendants when it doesn't, it changed its practices. since then, i think there have been eight cases in which there were notifications. despite the fact the fbi routinely searches section 702 data in certainly national security cases, and there have been hundreds of national security prosecutions during
this time. so we have an information deficit here. >> in fact, we don't really know, we don't have any idea how often this occurs. you know, the organization recently signed a letter to the director of national intelligence expressing dismay as to why he was choosing not to provide an estimate as to the number of americans who were subject to these. >> yes, and if i could, i would like very much to speak to the notion that this is somehow infeasible or at least not without drastically violating american's privacy. there are three kinds of collection under 702. the first is collection of telephone calls. it is a simple matter to assess, to estimate, whether someone on one end of the call is an american and that's by looking at the country code. it's not perfect. but we're not looking for perfection. we're not looking for an exact count. we're looking for an estimate. it is certainly sufficient for
that purpose and involves no privacy intrusion. the second kind of collection is upstream internet collection. when the government conducts this kind of collection, it must first run a filter to try to filter out wholly domestic communications. it doesn't do this by doing a lot of research that invades american's privacy. it does this using ip addresses and some comparable technical means. in doing so, it manages to filter out enough. domestic communications that it can comply with the constitution. so if this method of determining the american versus foreign status of a communant is sufficient for purposes of complying with the constitution, i think it should be sufficient for purposes of giving americans a rough sense of how many of their communications are collected. >> sure. >> the third program is where there are more complicated issues. even for that program, the privacy community is unanimous is saying that conducting a one-time limited sampling under careful conditions would be a net privacy gain.
>> thank you. by the way, mr. chairman, i'd like to submit that letter that i referenced a moment ago for the record. as the letter notes, senator widen has been requesting this information since 2011. the house judiciary committee and privacy groups have been requesting that information now for nearly two years. and members of the house of representatives were promised, i believe, by director clapper and director coates that the estimate would be forthcoming. so we have yet to receive that information. sounds like you certainly share my concern with the fact that notwithstanding those assurances and notwithstanding the public interest in this, there's no information yet. >> there's no information. but there was a lot of progress. under the previous administration, there were several meetings that the intelligence community had with
house members, with members of civil society. they discussed methodologies. they were considering there was a tremendous amount of progress on this. and the letters from the members of the house judiciary committee confirmed their understanding that the administration had committed to providing that number in early 2017. hopefully by january, and, in fact, all accounts, public and private, suggest they were on the verge of launching that count towards it is end of last year. we had a change of administration and the government has now backed off of its commitment to provide that information. >> thank you very much. thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator, i just have one question, it will be for miss collins. i believe that transparency and government leads to increased accountability. i suppose all of you believe that too. one of your board's recommendations was to provide additional transparency surrounding how often nsa obtains and uses incidentally collected communication of our citizens.
i also understand that in february 2016, the board described the recommendations as being implemented. so this is the question. the board's last report on this was about a year and a half ago. so can you walk us through the specifics of the five things the board recommended in this area and provide us an update regarding the status of implementation by the executive branch? >> when we did our report on section 702, we spent a lot of time on the issue of incidental u.s. person collection because it has both policy and constitutional implications. and we ultimately did identify five measures designed to provide insight into incidental collection. and these are collectively reflected in recommendation nine of our report. it has been partially implemented.
without getting into too many details, i can address this in further detail tomorrow in the classified briefing. to miss goitiens point, the recommendations that involve telephone data are easier to implement. it's just more feasible. i am sympathetic to the arguments of the dni and the nsa, that there are operational hurdles. there are technological hurdles to providing some of the information that has been requested. i'm sympathetic that there are certain methodologies that have been suggested that would increase privacy concerns. but i would add my voice to those who urge the dni and the nsa to continue to find a way to provide some quaint ification or some estimate of incidental u.s. person collection. >> i want to thank all of you for your participation and thank the audience and all the staff that participated. we'll proceed -- we'll proceed
tomorrow night at 7:00, american history tv. we'll be joined by top museum staff to learn about exhibits. preview. >> so in this gallery then, we kind of unpack the story of the declaration of independence. we have a small theater which explores the actual process of drafting and passing the declaration of independence. we rotate on display printings of the declaration. of course, we're all familiar with the engrossed copy on parchment you can see in washington, d.c. at the national archives. but other than members of congress, very few people ever saw that document.
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