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tv   World War II Battle of Guadalcanal Strategy  CSPAN  September 10, 2017 2:00pm-3:06pm EDT

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the entire program sunday at 6:30 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. eastern. this is american history tv, only on c-span3. >> the battle of guadalcanal began in august of 1942, it was the first major world war ii allied defensive in the pacific. up next, retired u.s. naval reserve captain rick james marks the 75th anniversary, by talking about the strategy and significance. the national world war ii museum in new orleans hosted this one-hour program. : all right, welcome to the national world war ii museum here in new orleans. we are glad to have c-span joining us today and also all of the live audience from me facebook live on our facebook. , or next time we meet,
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september 6, we will welcome dr. josh goodman, the curriculum coordinator here at the museum. he will be talking about victory on the menu, dining out in world war ii and how rationing change the way that norland and -- new orleans eight. november 20 is james lynn, he will be talking about the new special exhibit, pelican state goes to war. it is currently on view upstairs if you have not seen it yet, i highly recommend it. marks the 75th anniversary of the start of the battle of guadalcanal. today we are happy to welcome captain rick jacobs. he was in the navy reserve for 26 years. he is a graduate of the naval war college. we know him but i'll -- know him well, he has given over 30 talks at the museum. he is our local mable war
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expert, we like to call him. please welcome captain rick jacobs. [applause] captain: thank you. cruiser ussheavy quincy in the searchlights of a japanese cruiser up guadalcanal early in the mid watch on august 9, 1942. quincy was in the far pacific guarding the invasion of guadalcanal. the invited states in great britain agreeing that germany first was the strategy to fight the war, how did it come about the first american defensive of world war ii was in the park -- far pacific? , the gibraltar of the east fell to japan in february, 1942, the strategic and racial invocations were felt across the british empire. for two centuries europeans had dominated asia, now in asian nation was driving them out.
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congress party would join the japanese, a rebellion that could in -- unhinge the british position throughout the east. australia and new zealand demanded the return of the soldiers from north africa to defend the homeland, just as they were driving towards egypt. meanwhile the germans opened a new offensive in southern russia. the nightmare scenario is that the germans and japanese with linked up, somewhere in asia. -- would link up somewhere in asia. wrote -- it is only by living through such times of ghastly doubts, when loaded with responsibility that one can realize how they eke into one's soul. he goes on with the prime minister who he often disagreed with, that he does -- the disaster magnificently. churchill was always at his best
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and withstood all of the heavy shots without flinching. on march 5 churchill wrote to roosevelt, "we have suffered the greatest disaster in our history at singapore. the greatest disaster in our history. keep in mind churchill was a historian. about thery well disaster at yorktown, yet singapore was the greatest in the history. other misfortunes would calm sick and fast upon us. churchill wanted action and growing strength from america. "action."ord this was a sharp call to roosevelt to do something. fdr replied, america would assume responsibility for the defense of australia and new zealand. even though it necessarily reduced the american commitment to the germany first strategy. the conflicting demands of the european and pacific theaters were a theme that continued throughout world war ii.
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strategy,nt this roosevelt turned to this man, admiral ernest king, commander in chief u.s. navy. he was particular about that title, commander in chief u.s. navy prior to his taking office the title was commander in chief as. fleet, known as think it was not a good title. after pearl harbor he wanted it. tall and lean, king was brilliant and ambitious with a prodigious drive to reach the top. he was also hard as nails. fdr posted that he shaved -- menflaws were's other wives, alcohol, and intolerance. his daughter said he was the most even-tempered man in the navy, always in a rage. eisenhower, who was serving at that time as chief planner for
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the u.s. army in washington thought him stubborn, arbitrary bully. he wrote in his diary the war effort would be advanced if someone shot king. he came to respect him as a fighter and annexed biographer praised him as a true warrior. --n brooke brought him thought him the english strategist amongst chiefs of staff. that might have been damning with fake praise. the british senior officers invariably held american senior officers in a certain amount of content. -- contempt. i will be speaking on the battle of the bulge of the bulge in december and i will go into that further. i hope you can enjoy it -- can join me. slide into put up this particular. this photo of king laughing because it seems so a typical. that stern expression he has on the left, i believe was much
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more his public face. operation. area of in may 1942 the japanese landed in the solomon islands. which are here. this is the chain of the solomon islands with guadalcanal at the southern end. they began building an airfield on guadalcanal. when it was complete, it would make the island that much harder to retake, also strategically allow the japanese to interdict most of the sea routes to australia through the coral see. -- sea. that would add 1500 miles to the round-trip to australia, or 10 days sailing. otherould eat up, in words a great deal of shipping, which was always of vital importance during the war. in effect just going back and
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forth. intensely supportive of defending australia. he thought it was vital. the only thing in the pacific more important than defending australia was the defense of hawaii itself. that gives you an idea of what the priorities were in king's mind. king was an aggressive strategist. he was determined to exploit the victory that we achieved at midway injured. -- in june. it was too soon to launch the campaign in the central pacific. planneds the navy had that in a war with japan, we would sail through the central pacific. these eye lens, which in some of you recognize -- the marshals and the marianas, that was our
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main strategy. it was plan orange. it was too soon for that. the fleet was nowhere near powerful enough to go right into the teeth of japanese defense, if you will. peripheralnt a strategy, which would have the advantage of defending us really a. he referred to it as the defensive offensive. he wanted to take guadalcanal and move up the chain of the solomon islands and the bismarck's. the army was opposed to the invasion of guadalcanal from the beginning. feeling it was way too risky and operation. --an operation. common military thought at that time, as expressed by little heart, a tremendous military strategist and writer held that with the example of dardanelles,
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amphibious landing far from your base was just not possible. --there,et their faced against this. king made it clear if necessary he would proceed with navy assets alone. his ships, marines, and orders. marshall then said, well, if that is the case, i am with you. he signed off. again, i am a great admirer of ernest king. the german philosopher writes about the courage of the commander. one of the things he means by that is the courage to make these great decisions. big forces. the future of the nation is at stake based on your decision. that is a lot of pressure. courage enough is not alone. courage alone is not enough.
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the greatest commanders had what he called the stroke of the eye. what he meant by that was the great commanders see an opportunity that is a fleeting opportunity and he will take it. he will jump at it. i thinking had both. it was a coup to send 40,000 men to the far side of the world to launch the first offensive, american defense of the war. one month after he got the ok or endorsement from marshall, he launched the expedition in two months after midway, the marines landed in the solomon. mrs. the fourth -- this is the formidable and infamous richmond turner. he is the man king picked to lead. known to some as terrible turner. i will talk more about that in a moment.
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turner was big and smart, and nor mostly self-confident and determined to have his way -- and nor mostly self-confident and determined to have his way. not necessarily a bad trait in a commander. hecourse that meant that rode roughshod over a great many. the navally in intelligence establishment, just before world war ii. at the time of the raid on world -- pearl harbor, turner was officer for the navy in washington. that is a powerful position. disagreement in intelligence over who sees raw intelligence, and who distributes the product. in other words, what conclusions do you draw, and who will distribute these things. there is always the distribute -- the dispute between the operators and intelligence over who does what. turner fought and won to get control of both.
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the raw intelligence and dissemination of that intelligence. the bureaucratic battle was typical of his strength. his will and his competitiveness -- combativeness. to this day, some hold him responsible for the failure of readiness on december 7. commander edwin layton, whose intelligence office from the pacific fleet at the time of pearl harbor and remained in that position isoughout the world -- war scathing in his opinions of turner. if you are interested, his book is "and i was there." you might take a look. turner wrote the operation order for guadalcanal. king then appointed him to leave the expedition. a little bit too turner's
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surprise, king felt that was because turner thought he was the irrepressible -- the replaceable man, king showed him he was not. i think king thought he was only be irreplaceable man. turner complained he did not know anything about amphibious operations, which was true. king said, you will learn. on june 12, 1942, just a week after midway, turner left washington to become confident for -- commander amphibious forces southern pacific. washingtonn he left in june, he knew that he was going to the pacific. he was going there to fight, but he did not know where he would fight or when. alexanderjor general archer vandergriff.
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a virginia gentleman with steel in his soul who would lead the marines ashore on guadalcanal. i would asked you to look at these two photographs. this is vandergriff in 1942. look at that chen. --chin. this is a man of tremendous determination. he has that look in his eyes. this is vandergriff in 1945. his eyes now, to me, have seen a lot of things. this is a man who has borne great burdens and successfully. by the way you might notice that right there is the medal of honor. he ritually -- he richly deserved and was awarded for his action on guadalcanal. vandergriff would command the first marine division. it was literally the first marine division. before this time the marines had never had a division sized formation.
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offices --19,000 officers and men gathered together. it is not, i'm sorry. general -- his name escapes me, i marine general commanded a division in world war i. it was a composite division with marines and army troops and it. -- in it. this was the first all marine division. at any rate, he took the lead marines for the first division, landed in wilmington, new zealand on june 14. he assured they would not see combat for six months. 12 days later on june 26, vandergriff got orders to innovate the solomons on august 1, five weeks away. weeks aftere three
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the second echelon of the first ring division landed in new zealand. vanishingly small. none of the transports were combat loaded. week toiff got a postpone from king to make a landings at the beginning of the second week of august, that was it. king said, there is no more time. you are going then. turner only got to new zealand on july 18. he embarked the marines and failed on the 22nd as commander task force 62. rendezvoused in the fiji islands chain with task force 61. enterprise, and hornets, three quarters of the entire u.s. carrier force commanded by vice admiral frank jack fletcher. is. another thing -- this
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another thing we love in the military, wiring diagram. part of the problem is that fletcher and turner report to vice admiral gourlay, commander of the southern pacific, theater command. king anticipated that he would actually lead the invasion, he would go to sea. stay in histed to headquarters, far from the point of the sphere. what that meant was that fletcher, because he was a vice admiral, and turner was a rear admiral, would be in command. he would be sopa. take a moment to reflect on the different perspectives and pressures on these two commands. fletcher versus turner. turner, for them, seizing guadalcanal was the
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objective. they had come halfway across the earth, moved heaven and earth to get in that position, and that is what they were going to do. there was nothing more important in their minds than taking guadalcanal. that is what you want. you are your command is focused on the objective. that was the objective for them. plus it says if there is more than one objective, you have to determine what the objective is and subjugate everything else to the objective. fletcher, on the other hand, the commander of the carriers, thought his carriers were the critical strategic asset in the pacific. he was probably right about that. there were no replacements due until june 1942, i'm sorry june, 1943, 11 months away. -- seizing guadalcanal meant
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sailing in dangerous waters, near the enemy bases. the essence of naval force is to concentrate at a place in time of our choosing, of the navy's choosing. if they stay too long, if they get tied down, the enemy will concentrate his forces and overwhelm the naval forces. inherently the naval forces are lighter. an extended version of this is okinawa, where the fleet was tied to the island for months suffered terribly. similar events in the reconquest of the philippines. the issue at the conference, at the coral conference was how long the carriers would remain in direct support of amphibious operations. turner said the marines would be a sure by the end of d+ one. unloading supplies would take
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3-5 days and he wanted air cargo the whole time. the high passions and furious arguments followed. this is one of the legendary blowups of the war, if you will. laternant colonel, lieutenant general merrill describedrine general turner in such moments as loud, straighten, arrogant. byenjoyed settling manners simply raising his voice and roaring like able captain in the old navy. peerss on to say, his understood and accepted this because they valued him for a good and determine leader with a fine mind. top that in mind as balance what admiral leighton had to say about turner. if you read his book. fletcher's biographer john lundstrom, he wrote an excellent book. everything he does is good.
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he wrote turner was tough but brilliant. arrogant, abrasive, domineering, grasping for power. only strong-willed commanders kept him in check. fletcher had been the cruiser squadron commander, as a rear admiral where turner commanded thee astoria, and his cruiser quadrant. he knew turner. he praises him. he said in his 1940 fitness report that turner was one of the most intelligent and forceful men in the service. he never dominated fletcher. turner and van de graaff were new to the war. fletcher had been at sea for 150 days. he commanded at the battle of the coral see and the battle of midway. he saw the great carrier lexington sunk at the coral sea and yorktown shot out from under
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him at midway. he knew how vulnerable aircraft carriers could be. also at his battles we destroyed five enemy carriers and damaged two more. that is turner, i am sorry that it's fletcher boarding, i think it is the astoria. from yorktown. the process of thinking and he shifted his flag to a story of. storia. stor you can understand his perspective and how different it would be from van de graaff and turner. at the coral see and midway be japanese were tied down, supporting amphibious operation. just the mission that fletcher
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was being given for guadalcanal. he had limited fighter strength. it had to be divided over two separate areas. he had to continue to protect his carriers, but he had to for thefighter support amphibious operations, about 60 miles away. planes.8 fighter i'm sorry, 99. in half and say, i guess you can allocate 50 for each. hour, at that an time, an hour and a half to fly back and forth from the carriers to guadalcanal. that amount of time is not really defending anything. for every plane you put in the air, there is at least two and back. one comes back in your refitting it, the other you get ready to go. you can see how these numbers dwindled quickly. 99 fighter planes is not all of
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the fighter planes in the world. despite heavy losses, the japanese fleet in the pacific was still larger than the u.s. fleet. the great enemy base truck and airfields were nearby. the japanese not wait long to counter attack and fletcher knew it. he knew there was going to be a carrier battle fought for guadalcanal in the near future. he wanted his ships ready to fight. sunk, if we were lost the carriers, the marines were doomed. they would be cut off. it would be wake island, except instead of losing a battalion, we would lose a division of troops, disaster. fletcher's logic went like this -- turner said the marines would be a suhore by the end of d+ one, so the carriers were being
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risked to preserve five cargo ships. fletcher, who held the medal of honor, was one of those who was not intimidated by turner. -- remain would mean on station for 48 hours, and a discussion. -- into of discussion. -- end of discussion. that it's fletcher. -- is fletcher. that is his medal of honor. . on august 7, the marines made a largely unopposed landing on what'll canal --guadalcanal. only 247 were infantry, the rest were mostly korean construction workers. all of them fled into the jungle as the first wave came ashore. the marines advanced deliver it lay, the next day took the nearly complete airfield naming it henderson field, in honor of
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the major killed at midway. the going was much tougher across the sound at the nearby islands. the garrison was 900 very tough japanese marines occupying strong, prepared position. there was two days of fighting by the first marine parachute battalion and part of the division reserved to secure the objective during which they suffered 248 casualties in the process. this is some of the amphibious ships offloading at guadalcanal. turner, commanded all of the major landings. i think that is correct in the pacific. which was anti army operation. he commanded them all.
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he learned a lot, as did everyone. in other words, by 1944, the amphibious forces were a finely tuned machine. we know what we were doing. this was the beginning. as happens in the beginning of everything there is a lot of mess up. this is one of them. look at all of the boats clustered around this transport. , look here, here is, look at the boats. here is one high in the water, here is another high in the water, and i believe that is another one high in the water. here is one just sitting there waiting -- i shouldn't say waiting, they are offloading that tank onto the boat. everyone is kind of standing around. something you hate to see. here is another -- this is the
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beach at guadalcanal. look at what is going on, here are landing craft just circling. there is no wake on them. they're just sitting there, waiting to get a sure --shore. you can kind of see the supplies building up along the shore and a couple of boats sitting there. no wake's. they are idling. this is part of the reason why. look at those supplies built up on the beach. they have to get them inland. who is responsibility -- who's responsible? the marines said hey we are marines who came to fight. the navy said, we have the stuff to the beach, that is it. that is what we do. a lot of it just sat there. no one had brought things like a few bulldozers and trucks to
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move this inland quickly and get it -- get the supplies off of the beach. because of all of this, at the end of d+ one, only 30% of the supplies had been unloaded. there were 3000 marines still afloat. during theseime two days, d-day and d+ one, the landing supplies and men was further delayed by enemy air attacks. these are torpedo bombs. i think this shows you how good the japanese pilots were. looking back at. -- look at that guy, look how close he is to the water. these were very, very good pilot. so is this guy. what is that? a few dozen feet. they are good.
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they are making air attacks. shipshey do the cargo have to stop, pull in their boats, up anchor and get underway because you cannot just sit there or they will put every torpedo in your ship. that is another delay. hit thenese did transport elliott and the jarvis . , the destroyer. rate,k that is -- at any the japanese lost 14 bombers and 2 fighters on the seventh d-day alone to the heavy firepower of the american ships and fletcher's fighter planes. there we go. this is the elliott a fire off of guadalcanal. force wass air supposed to knock out the japanese air base.
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obviously that had not happened. more troubling was that they -- they were zero fighters accompanying the attacking bombers. these were naval fighters. 40 navals beyond range fighters. what were they doing her? the logical conclusion which fletcher and his staff reached was that it meant there must be at least one japanese carrier in the area, otherwise where did these planes come from. a point of fact, something they it hadot have realized, actually flown out of ripoll in a fit of samurai idiocy their orders were to support the attack, and then ditch or try to crash land on bougainville and do the best they could. the powers that be would do the best they could to try to get
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the pilots. they were almost all lost. this is a great picture. these are the three carriers, saratoga and enterprise going away. taking from the deck of the lost -- wasp. zero by the way was a better fighter plane than the wildcat. so we had to have numbers. fletcher continues to thank, keep in mind his combat experience, he is inking, if i don't have numbers on my side, the japanese have a superior plane. their attack will get through. there is a carrier out there somewhere, i cannot stop them in less i have superior numbers of fighter planes to do that because it is a even match, the zeros will beat the wildcats everyday.
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fletcher lost over a fifth of his planes on d-day and d+ one. he was down to 78 fighter planes. that his make sure ships were ready for the coming .attle the battle might or might not occur right then. he had to be ready for that, but there was going to be a carrier battle. the ships had to be ready. turner had not informed him about the delay in landing troops. he thought all of the marines were a sure -- ashore. at 1807 on august 8, fletcher radioed his boss, fighter plane strength reduced from 99-78. a view of a large number of enemy bombers in the area, i recommend immediate recall -- withdrawal of my carriers. request tankers immediately as
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fuel is low. they approved and fletcher departed the coral see the next morning. that was one of the most controversial decisions in the war. i will talk a little bit about that at the end. turner --this is turner's disposition on the night of d+ one. the marines had a hard fight it to lobby -- to lobby. there were forces off of guadalcanal. that is turner's flagship. he is there. northern force, three cruisers, and a couple of destroyers guarding the northern approach, north of the island and south of sample island is seven. 2 cruisers and a couple of
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destroyers. a couple of picket destroyers in front. life cruisers with a couple of destroyers guarding the rear, if you will. messageets fletcher's that he is going to depart the next morning. he calls a conference between himself and vandergrift and rear admiral victor crossley, who is the royal navy admiral who had been flown temporarily to the australian navy because they were short of admirals. this is an australian heavy cruiser, that is what he was doing. he, being the senior man had the force. turner calls a meeting on his
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flagship, mcauley. says, he takes the camera to the meeting. mistake.have been a , he took hisued flagship australian. there are two cruisers left. here is australia. australia is another heavy cruiser, that was his flagship. message thatthe turner is going to have a conference, he takes his flagship. perhaps he should left austria with southern force, that would have strengthened it, obviously, for twole stations days, it is a 30 mile wide -- ride in a boat through the black says, he takes
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his ship. left the ceo of chicago, uss chicago, a heavy cruiser is what we calll otc. no one put a message on that. no one said, ok, you got it. they knew that critchley was ofng, and de facto the co chicago was going to be the otc. if crotch lee, shall we say a certain complacence and all of this. with hindsight, i should add. -- commanderiral of the japanese fleet was anything but complacent. he was a fighting admiral.
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withnt aboard his flagship six cruisers and one destroyer, setting course to attack the invaders. the course he sailed from ripoll down to guadalcanal. elaboratean reconnaissance plan to keep an eye on these waters. it was for the purpose to see if the japanese were sneaking up on the invasion. there were five different commands involved in that reconnaissance. planes from five different commands. naturally coordination flipped and its sales through the fog of war. cited by a few different slot -- planes, but they never figured out where they were going. they didn't really understand the composition of the force.
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it is not all that easy to determine, is that a cruiser or destroyer? they thought it was a -- there rate they never really got the word, and certainly turner never heard anything about this. during the morning of d+ one, august 8, they sent2 scout planes to spy out the invasion. he gets the american disposition and he makes his plan. island.nese go past the let me see. they will pass south of several island -- savo island. technology problem. ,hey will pass south of savo shoot up the southern force, make a hard left turn, go to the north and shoot up the northern
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and see how matters stand. see where they are. had a 1300 yard interval between ships. attack speed would be 30 knots. he sends out his plan by blinker. 30 knots is fast. it is a simple plan but you have to be real good to execute. at those speeds you cover over half a mile a minute and no brakes on a 10,000 ton cruiser. momentum is going to carry afford. -- you forward. you have to navigate through the black of the night, through squalls, keeping an eye on the single stern of the ship in front of you, which is otherwise all blacked out. that is again, the japanese were very good. as a matter of fact they were the best night fighters, naval
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might fighters in the war. -- night fighters in the war. this is the flagship. , the imperial japanese navy specialized in night fighting. they have the finest optics and pyrotechnics in the world and trained with intensity. it was not unusual for them to suffer death in exercises. they carried the long lance torpedo. it is shown down here. it was the finest ship killing weapon of the war. pounds30 feet long, 6000 and had a half ton warhead. an oxygen fueled edging gave it a range of 20 miles at a maximum speed of 49 knots with virtually no weight. launched with/list powder at night, they were virtually invisible.
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here comes the,. one they0 of d+ launched planes again. the picket destroyer talbot heard them coming in before midnight and broadcast, "warning, warning, plane over savo headed east." although repeated around the force, the message never reached turner or other senior officers. at 2400 battle station sounded aboard the japanese ships. the task force came at 26 knots. a little less than an hour later, they decided to port. the pig destroyer blue, sailing west. west., sailing this way. radar was brand-new at that time. little understood. it was often landlocked when you get around bodies of land.
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, theo mention the american guys with binoculars on the bridge doing this i am afraid, they lookouts were not as well-trained as the japanese. as they point out the tendency is to look ahead. if you are the lookout, the tendency is to look out ahead. the japanese past behind them. it missed the enemy, passing 8000 yards. they slowed the killer's wake and increased speed for the final approach passing through clouds around savo island. a heavy priceless advantage of surprise and overwhelming force at the point of contact. 133, they signaled speed 30 knots and three minutes later cited cruisers at range 12,500 yards. he came to port, ordered
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independent firing and the first torpedoes were sent off two minutes later. the japanese continued undetected, until finally at 1:43, patterson broadcast, "warning, warning, strange ships entering harbor." a lookout reported big ships coming out about two miles ahead. torpedoed -- torpedo tracks were cited as to ships emerged followed by an -- a deluge of eight inch gunfire from japanese cruisers. it was hit 24s times. the captain mortally wounded and the engineering space devastated. it went dead in the water, took on a 30 degree list and lost power. it happened so fast the damage was so extensive, that camber
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did not shot -- shoot. she sank later that day. it was a different world back then. when some of the wounded survivors got back to australia five weeks later, they were met not by grief counselors, but by rear admiral george duell who told them they should feel ashamed that the ship had been sunk by gunfire without firing a shot in return. so much for sympathy. that is her burning. this is chicago. the other cruiser remaining in the southern route. look at this. beautiful ships, these cruisers. it is a narrow waist. they were designed for scouting, cruising, if you will, not to stand in a line of battle. the armor was mostly 1.5 inches
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thick. that is not much against the 275 pound eight inch shell going 2700 feet per second. two minutes after chicago saw firing around -- bear with me. one of. two minutes after chicago saw firing around kamber, they watch cited to ships between madison and camber. oh i see. bear with me. i think i am in the right spot. yes. ok. the lookout on chicago sees2 ships and firing going on. a couple of minutes after the
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firing he sees these ships emerge from the gloom. chicago takes a hard turn to avoid incoming torpedoes. that only enhanced the target angle support. at 1:47 chicago was hit in the bowel by a torpedo just as captain load came on bridge from an exhausted sleep. in the chaos chicago never cited the enemy. she shot her five inch batteries in the same general direction they were firing. the captain said no warning or gave no orders to ships and company but failed west away from the enemy. the battle moved on, leaving the bewildered cruiser alone, slowly steaming in the wrong direction. performance of the night was by the destroyer patterson. commander frank
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walker, was called to the bridge in response to tell the warning of the plane over savo just before midnight. he remained there two hours later a ship was sighted near their. they found it immediately. patterson broadcast "warning, warning strange ships entering harbor." they opened fire and began dodging torpedoes. soon the guns were knocked out and a fire started. a minute later the fires were out in the guns were back in action. one of the shelves to the cruiser and she was heavily , she gothen at 02:10 the order for them to rendezvous and break contact. the admiral later claimed that the orders were meant for the and engage destroyer, but that is not with the order said. it shows you the difficulty and confusion and taste of the of the battle of saying what you want and getting the word out. it was a pretty bad day.
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ok, at 1:44, the flagship came to port to stop the northern force. three ships followed, but due to confusion, spring more turned to soon. you can see, there is the turn. there is the split. northern force centimeter japanese formation, only seven minutes after camber was devastated, they fired torpedoes and came to course at 069. two minutes later japanese searchlights illuminated a story of, quincy, and vincent. before cruisers opened fire, joined by the comrades support.
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u.s. ships at position two with exhausted crew sleeping or they could were suddenly under fire. that is a story of -- a stor storia. the captain came on to bridge with the sound of his own guns, fearing friendly fire, they ceased fire. the japanese closed firing for 90 seconds, but then when they restored firing, it was hit. the ship was without a home for half a minute until a bloody mate named young crawled out of the pile of hotties and took the helm. fires below drove the people from the engineering space. their last with before losing power and steering. she sank at 12:15. this is quincy.
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in response to patterson's warning and the side of players to the south, quincy sounded general quarters. captain moore rushed -- rushed to the bridge as she was lit up by searchlight. fearing to initiate fire on what could be his own ships, moore responded by flashing his recognition light and quickly through fire. quincy's guns were trained, but do not say that way -- stay that way for long. they kept shooting. they destroyed the chart room and killed many. bridge was soon devastated by enemy fire. a plane was hit, spreading gasoline fires along the upper decks, illuminating japanese gunmen, who switched off their searchlight. more fire came in from the port. 2 long lance torpedo struck. picture i had at the
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opening. 02:10, the captain, fired by another torpedo hit. quincy were shattered. a government officer ordered abandon ship. the first of the many that gave the waters the name, iron bottom sound. vincent. with destroyer will sense all the flares and heard echoes this gunfire. caught -- came to the bridge, he decided to remain on station, protecting the landing. they increased speed to 15 knots . when the japanese illuminate the formation, be southern group requested the lights turned off. the shells began to land.
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vincent spotted immediately, hitting with a second, and it was quickly hit by a torpedo portside as to more japanese cruisers scored. at 02:03, a torpedo killed all hands. a catapult plane ignited, giving the enemy light. they were devastated by an avalanche of shelf fire, knocking out all of the guns. an inferno burns within the ships haul. the sale was lucky enough to be alive. ship and vincent went down at zero 2:58. captain cole, corporal patrick, and the chief blast off the sheaf -- ship. he might not have fought so well, but he was brave and he stood by his men. and theyas going down
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ordered a withdrawal, departing iron bottom sound shooting at as he passed. it was a contentious decision. something he should have regrouped and destroy the amphibious shipping. on the other hand, his formation was askew and his flagship damaged. his ships could reload torpedoes at sea, but it was not done quickly. they reckoned it would take two hours that organize another attack. since he was at both pearl harbor and midway, he knew what dive bombers and navy planes could do to ships without air cover. he sailed away. for abandoning the objective, he was privately reprimanded by the admiral. i wonder what he thought of that. probably, that guy was not there, i was. that is what i would've thought. this is pharmacist nate
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bukowski, blown overboard with three and 42 shipmates killed and 257 wounded. a casualty rate of over 50%. allied casualties were almost 1100 dead and 700 wounded with four cruisers sunk. .ing was devastated you can imagine, it is early in the war, he demanded this campaign. he has driven it through the force of his own will. it opens with the biggest disaster in the history of the u.s. navy. or at least the worst disaster, let me put it that way. pearl harbor was bigger, but at least we had the excuse we were not it more when the japanese planes showed up, now we were. king called it the blackest day of the war. didr all, how many generals lincoln fair -- fire, looking for someone to fight? king had only been there a few
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months. king decided to withhold information on the battle from the public and everyone else he could. he did not tell the secretary of the navy or general marshall until the end of october. his biographer writes, "presumably king informed the president once he had confirmation. " presumably, quite a word. despite the defeat and more to follow in the long campaign, king fought through to eventual victory. that is courage. he did not give up or pull back. he said, we can win this thing, and we did. in large part, thanks to ernest king and a lot of other brave men. battle, ag after the little later than planned, turner departed guadalcanal with 1800 marines and 70% of band are griff's supplies onboard.
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things are sure were not as grim as they might seem. 17,000 marines were on guadalcanal and 15 million rounds of small arms and diminish in -- ammunition. thank you. millions of rounds of ammunition. u.s. rations for 17 days at two meals a day. much of their equipment was still on turner's ships. japanese equipment were there for the plundering. fairfield would soon be operational. ensuredeantime, they and trust of their most valuable asset, the marines. these were volunteers who joined in the immediate aftermath of pearl harbor. they wanted to fight, and they were some of the finest citizen soldiers. to quote richard frank, from his monumental book on guadalcanal
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-- they, meaning the volunteers were augmented by the old marine that had fought haiti, banditos in nicaragua, and throughout the tropics of central america. it was the marines that were the jungle fighters, not the japanese. they also fought french, english, italian, and american soldiers and sailors in every bar in shanghai, manila, and taking -- peiking. they were better gamblers and cursed with fluency, smoked rank cigars or chewed tobacco. cigarettes were for women or children. they could live on strong black coffee and hash cooked in a tent hat. -- tin hat. many had auto rifles, and bayonets.
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they knew their weapons, and they knew their tactic. they knew they were tough and good. them in thenough of division and to impart thousands of a younger men -- of younger men a unique spirit which animated them and the skills they possessed. this is a painting of smedley butler. painting, a top marine fighting in haiti. morale was the immediate problem for the marines. that the navyd deserted them. it was another wake island. he dealt with the defeated them head-on. he declared in no uncertain terms that he had come to win the battle, that is what marines do. the six-month campaign called for all the resolve the country could muster, 60,000 marines and soldiers eventually fought to win.
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1769 were killed. nearly every man came down with malaria and many with something worse. fighting in the seas around wattle canal -- around guadalcanal, 25 ships were sunk including two carriers and more were damaged. when we were down to just a two battleships and a single damaged carrier in the pacific, they were sent to support the marines. the navy never deserted the c orps and we have the butcher's bill to prove it. i'm going to stop there. any questions? [indiscernible] >> he was in command of a
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was composed by marines and army troops, so it was not a marine division. [indiscernible] and she was juno, sunk as a result of actions later in the campaign. there were five brothers serving on board the uss juno and they all died. that was the inspiration for "saving private ryan." thank you very much. [applause]
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>> we have a facebook question. he says are there any historical resources on the people who died in ritual it -- and detroit? >> you could be featured in our next live program. conversation on facebook at history or twitter @c-span history. q&a, the founder and ceo of open the books. their check books for the last five years. we found that a thousand six veterans died while waiting to see a doctor and the v.a. spent $20 million on a high end art christmas it was trees priced like cars. it was sculptures carved --
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priced like five-bedroom homes. procuredo sculptures by a v.a. center that serves blind veterans. sculpture all in with landscaping for $1.2 million. this is the type of waste that is in our government. >> tonight at 8:00 on c-span's q&a. a teacher of social studies and civics to middle and high school students, try our classroom resources at the classroom website. there is ready to go resources including current events videos, lesson plans, and handouts, also teaching tools doing engage your students and discussions. many teachers use these resources, so you should try it, too. go to to sign up.
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>> up next, an emory university law professor delivers the keynote address at the society for historians of american foreign relations. talk, she looks at how americans have experienced war country'sduring the history through journalism, soldiers letters, and photography. this is just over 50 minutes. >> good afternoon. i am privileged to serve as your vice president for 2017. and in that capacity i have the distinct honor of introducing mary dudziak on behalf of her lecture. the professor at the emory university school of law, mary was elected as president of schaeffer at the height of a very distinguished academic career. she was educated at two of the nation's finest universities,


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