introduce our speakers and we'll get right into it. going to start off with vice admiral yoshida who joined the japan maritime self-defense forces in 1979 as a graduate of the national defense academy where he served mainly on surface ships as an operations officer. he has over 35 years of professional and managerial experience in the maritime defense and security area and his offshore duties included serving at the programming generation center which developed antisubmarine warfare systems as part of the aegis program and serving six times at the maritime staff ofsz at the ministry of defense where he was in charge of welfare, education, operations and intelligence. he also served as defense attache in japan's u.s. embassy and his final government assignment was commander of the sesebo regional command. he joins the corporation of america washington, d.c.'s office in july of 2015 as vice-president international security affairs. my colleague, dr. michael j. green is senior vice-president for asia and japan chair here at

csi s and director of asian studies at the edmond a. walsh school of foreign service at georgetown. he served on the staff of the national security council from 2001 through 2005 first as director for asia fares with responsibility for japan, korea, australia, and new zealand. and then as special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for asia with responsible for both east asia and south asia. before joining the nsc staff he was senior fellow for east asian council of foreign relations, direct of the center and foreign policy institute and assistant professor at the school of advanced international studies at johns hopkins university. research staff member at the institute for defense analyses and senior advisor on asia in the office of the secretary of defense. he also worked in japan on the staff of a member of the national diet. and finally, we have michael fontain. mike is the washington liaison for the democratic progressive party of taiwan.

as information liaison between tpp policy makers in washington, formerly he was the senior policy analyst for the formost a and association for public affairs from 1999 to 2002 where he was responsible for tracking u.s. policy toward taiwan. taiwan security issues, and developments in taiwanese political affairs and producing opinion pieces, journal articles and a member newsletter on these questions. and so obviously we've got a lot of expertise here in the room today and so we're going to get right to it. thank you. michael green, we're going to start with you. you obviously thought a lot about the asia security issue in preparation for your fantastic book by more than providence which i highly recommend to anyone who wants to understand u.s. foreign policy in this area. and a key observation from your book was the sort of tension in u.s. foreign policy toward the region between approaching asia from a maritime point of view

and a continental point of view. today obviously we are very much in the maritime space with what we're looking at. so, could you sort of through that strategic lens give us your sense of setting the stage here how we should be thinking about this, what strategic imperatives these three countries face from your point of view, and how we should be thinking about that just as a general frame of reference? >> sure. thank you, thank you all for coming. the book is coming out in japanese and chinese at the end of the year. korea next month, if you want, you can read it in all four languages. hopefully it will be the same. so, japan/taiwan relations today are in quite good shape actually for a variety of political and strategic and economic reasons. in the book i wrote a history of u.s. strategic thinking about asia since the american revolution and there was

strategic thinking even in the federalist papers. and one of the themes that came out when i did my research and wrote the book was that while there are many different views about asia, within the u.s. there's often been a debate about whether our strategic interests are better served by aligning with maritime powers, particularly japan, but also australia or india and taiwan. or whether our interests are better served by aligning with or forming a condominium with china. and there's logic historically to both china as the center of asian order historically, a weak china for the united states was bad in the 19th and 20th centuries because it would draw in other powers. but the contrary view was, no, we're a maritime power in the pacific, critical to our security. and the logical alignment for us is with the other maritime powers. and this is not a new debate. this goes back to the 1850s in

the american case. with perry who opened japan, his counterpart in china, the commissioner of china was a guy named humphrey marshall who was from a landlocked state, kentucky, army, navy. he argued in the 1850s the u.s. should help the chinese stop russian and british imperialism and deal with the thai ping. so, these two visions were evident in their letters back and in speeches. mahan came back in 1853 and in the 55-56 speeches saying in the future the u.s. will secure its position in the pacific by aligning with japan and britain. so, it's kind of the free and endough pacific 100 years early. you've seen that kind of division for sometime, even at the beginning of the trump administration, people were wondering whether taiwan would be a pawn, whether president

trump would try to strike a grand bargain with china. i think that's probably behind us nand the u.s. position appeas to be capture the free and open position. japan also has this historic division. sorry to get a little historical. but also in the -- in this case 1860s and '70s, around the same time mahan was making these arguments and perry in japan had his own debate where the satsuma who created the navy said we are a maritime power and the choshu said let's follow china. yomitomo had this famous line about advantage about where japan had to be in korea or china to defend itself and not let other powers dominate china. and the navy historically -- historically has been more aligned to britain america,

the maritime powers with one important exception in world war ii. you know, just as the u.s. has shifted very much towards -- back to really this maritime view, so has japan. in the cold war in what's called the 19 55 system, liberal democratic party, the mainstream was especially after japan normalized relations with china in 1972, the mainstream was all about china. keep a good alliance with the u.s. and maintain a balance by close ties to china. always be closer to china than the u.s. is. when the ldp collapsed, that mainstream view flipped. and from prime minister to today, every japanese prime minister has been what once was called the anti-mainstream which was more pro-taiwan, more maritime. and so you've had this flip. in taiwan, which mike will know much better, before democracy,

the view of japan was pretty positive. but with the dpp, with democracy, the dpp has aligned quite a bit with this maritime view. when i was in the nsc i could not go to the shrine for obvious reasons so i was curious to go in 2006 when i left the nsc and was a private citizen. i walked to the shrine and usually see the old imperial japanese rising sun flag. to my surprise when i walked in, there was a dpp flag flying. which proves the old adage the enemy of the enemy is my friend. the dpp on most issues is aligned with japan's opposition power, nuclear, power. on this one strategic questions, the dpp kind of aligns pretty well with abe. so, you have the u.s., japan, taiwan all kind of aligning, but -- then i'll end -- i mean, there are some obstacles.

i think for japan there's frustration with taiwan over the fact that taiwan will not import food from fukushima where the nuclear crisis happened which hurts the feelings i think of a lot of japanese. taiwan's position on other territorial issues aligns with beijings. that's frustrating. i think for taiwan's side, there's some frustration. i think the current -- former self-defense officers are quite active. the current government of japan is very careful. i think there's more intel sharing, more cooperation, but still despite the alignment rather cautious. and then both sides, both taiwan and both taipei and tokyo are wondering what's happening in washington, and i'll leave it at that. >> even though you have this free and endo open strategy which i think is consistent and

has consist tense throughout the cabinet, mattis and tillerson, their aspects don't conform with free and open pacific with the dpp. that's how i describe the dynamics. >> thank you. we'll come back to the endo pacific in a moment. let's fast forward a little bit to the current picture, admiral yoshida. obviously prime minister abe is in the strongest political position of any japanese prime minister in a long time. how do you think that shapes, if it does at all, tokyo's relationship with taiwan? how do you think it impacts our discussions between the u.s. and japan? and to mike's point about sort of prime minister abe's maritime focus, maybe you can comment on that given your own background. >> yeah. thank you very much for giving opportunity today. so, already you introduced my background, military. so, a little bit -- but my

segment of japan maritime was combat commander in southwestern region of japan. the western end of my area of responsibility was located about 100 kilometers from taiwan. due to the political and diplomatic relationship with china, i was never able to visit taiwan during active duty. that's a very symbolic for many conflicts. the relationship with taiwan was dependent on china. however, the taiwan now had -- has changed dramatically over the past decade. it is essential for taiwan to

maintain a political and security autonomy for the peace and stability of the region. taiwan must not overly depend economically and socially on -- it is also extremely important that taiwan acts locally as a defender of the existing region and order based on the freedom and democracy. to that end, taiwan must constantly expand ask deepen the relationship with partners that share its values and benefit, including japan and the united states. the abe administration clearly recognizes the value. and he emphasizes the relationship with taiwan. shinzo abe is a strong position as a prime minister is a great advantage for japan to advance

such effort. taiwan's efforts in coordination with the united states is also indispensable in my view. >> thank you. mike, continuing on the historical theme, perhaps you can sort of give us a lens from the taiwan domestic political point of view. obviously we've had several democratic elections now and changes in government between the kmt position and the dpp position. but it's been interesting to see that in all taiwan governments it's been a fairly warm feeling toward japan and in general toward the relationship. so, how do you see that from not only the taiwan perspective, but then how do you kind of nest that, if you will, in your sense of the strategic environment from taiwan's point of view? >> thanks very much for the opportunity. i think the first thing to say is taiwan sees itself as an island nation. so, i think that is an important element of the maritime strategy. it's also true, very big

difference between the ma administration and classic kmt position which is some day china is going to et with its act together and we're going to be there. the dpp, thai administration says, hello, we've developed ourselves as a significant sovereign independent country. we want to stay that way. so, that's the tension. and i think what the difference is, president ma looked basically west to china as part of a continental, shall we say, whereas sy looks north to japan, east to the united states and south to that whole arc in the whole southbound policy from india all the way through. it is a very different kind of feeling to it. i guess i would want to put this anecdote in there. i went to taiwan in 1967, long time ago. i had two teachers -- i studied taiwanese. i had two teachers, bolt p of whom graduated from lawson university. they were in their 50s. they had lived through the end of the japanese colonial period into the period of kmt rule.

so, while professor masuda we were talking about last time it's a nostalgic feeling for japan, it's partially nostalgic, but it's also a visceral response to the kmt rule in taiwan and a kind of comparison. my teachers would say, you know, the japanese were strict, but they were fair. here's the rules. you go by the rules and things will be okay. it wasn't all copacetic during that period. there was a lot of opportunity for taiwanese. they went to school in japan some of them. there was the home rule movement. they looked at that and when the kmt came, all hell had broken loose. there were no rules, everything was up for grabs. between taiwan and japan, comes from very different -- for the older generation, a different view. the younger generation has another set of feelings. pop cultural links. there is the visiting back and forth. there is a lot of sense that

japan is really our friend when the earthquake took place recently. japan offered a lot of assistance, emergency crews. there is a famous picture, and you've probably seen prime minister abe spent some time getting his characters right, go to taiwan. this is feeling stuff which makes a big difference. so, i think that's the way i think you can see how taiwan wants to fit itself into the regional order, be part of this maritime consortium, shall we say, and be a regional player as has been mentioned, as really adding something to the game. there are hiccoughs that mike already issued. i think on the thai issue, dpp certainly feels like they are part of thethe geological links but responsibility is first and foremost to the good

relations, i think that what you see is a drive to have very good relations with japan and with the rest of the area. >> to follow-up, i remember on the island, there was a sense, he had done some academic work on the issue and to your point, he stuck with that position. >> he did. you know, if you see people saying, he moved china's way on some issues but he was supportive of others, the point is, i think that there is a big different, one of the problems that they have is a lot of issues, the taiwanese, came from taiwan, they went in and

they were chased out and they came back the next day and they were purposely pushing the envelope. there are a lot of people that want to push on the japanese, i am never quite sure how to read that. everything is not 100% right but i think that the fundamental push is for them to be part of the regional order. >> talking about the regional order, we talked about the indo pacific strategy, i have two questions, one is your gem assessment of it as a strategy, sounds like you are gemmy supportive -- general yu supportive. how should the united states be thug about integrating japan and taiwan, also how do we

exercise the strategy especially when we are talking about partnerships like japan and taiwan where trade is precarious. >> it was taken from a jop niece document, intellectual yu, lets go back to american thinkers, it's kind of a common dna in japanese and united states and taiwanese thinking about strategy in the pacific and cheun, the national security strategy that came out from the white house was rough, declaring china a power and

equating it with russia. they assumed a great power condominium around terrorism and climate change but this was honest and said we were in an era of trade but i think that its too simple in some ways, it was very good that they framed it that way. but, china is not a power like russia and to the extent that is a revisionist power, it's like the 19th century, so the rules should be stricter because is the 21st century. the problem is it puts everyone in a certain light. that lack ever nuance was a problem, i think that the tpp was an important part of the

solution because it created a rule making body with a group of countries that put pressure on china to open is own market. within china, economic experts were going to use tpp to push changes within china, without tpp it makes this a bigger problem. if the free and open trade is based on rules that we all abide by, you have to make sure that you do not lose korea and vietnam. japan and taiwan and australia and india are talking to the administration about that and that will be good, letting them think about this die mention. >> -- dimension.

>> and your sense of direct on that? >> in the positive instance, we have the president saying that we may rejoin tpp but he also said a bunch of stuff about gun control. but the secretary of the treasury said something, 25 republican senators sent a letter to the president saying we need to do tpp, agriculture, all of the governors september 1 are keen to get back in. is not like we can just wait, united states agricultural exporters are going to start to really hurt. the pressure will grow for us to really do something, not before the midterms but maybe before the end of the administration, the letters tpp are toxic, it's a marketing

problem. >> admiral, you spent several years looking at maritime issues, how should we think about the indo pacific strat yu in that context and how japan fits into this, noble from a maritime defense perspective but from a maritime trade perspective and what japan at thises about this? >> yes, so, i can see it's easier with the economic cooperation with taiwan and specifically relations. but security is important for

taiwan, it leads to china being there and just now, the us signed an agreement. the difference is that taiwan is the center. we have differences but taiwan is very important, but so another offense is between taiwan and japan, so no change to either party. but for the relations they they

have a chance. >> hi. >> for a visit by the taiwan navy. i invited the chief of the navy at that time, he invited me, to the maritime security company this taiwan, so they were dealing with how to cooperate. we can do that and also i hope that the taiwan navy used the

united states and the taiwan airport. it's fundamental that japan and the united states and taiwan are there, it's very important, sometimes the relations between taiwan and japan and the united states, more hopeful. just now, the relations are not so different for the security relations. tpp, the administration, it's not only the economy but also the security.

>> just a follow-up on that. now we have japan in the drivers seat. from your perspective, does that add an additional component to how japan is thug about the economic infrastructure. >> tpp? >> yes. >> well, there is a lot of economic benefit for the globe and the security also. i think that the international community including the united

states will build an airport in taiwan. they announced a new strategy, also they directed it. imthat the potential cooperation is good. mike, taiwan is in an interesting position when it comes to the asia pacific strategy, they are welcoming of it but they are careful and they think about how to place themselves. they have the policy initiative which is a recognition from her perspective that the previous administration is thinking about taiwan's economic future. it's not an equivalent for the

chinese, how do you think that they are looking at all of this and what ambitions does taiwan have in terms of finding ways to i want great itself. >> the first thing that comes to mind is that they have been at it since 1955. japan is on the outside of taiwan, they have in between so taiwan is asking, are we inside or outside? i think they are inside in most people's mind but there is a question as to what it is going to mean. matsuda talked im the security dilemma of japan, they are asking, are we going to be dragged into a war or are we

going to be abandoned. it's an attempt to make itself and taiwan's economy with the region. right now 20% of taiwan's exports go to china, is also japan's leading partner. so neither can say, forget about it. but how do you develop a supply chain that does not go as much to china, that's the first point. those are the questions that taiwan is grappling with. for now, the policy has been very good with students and business going back and fourth. on the ground economic development. taiwan has now something like 31 stop shopping places where, if you are a business person in taiwan, you can go to this place and they will help you, that's one sign of how serious

they are about integrating their economies, but they have also the problem of looking over their shoulders. with japan, some of the ways in which taiwan is talking about it, they can build railroads, there are ways where, i do not think much has been done on this level but the administration add complicated and detailed programs that are meant to integrate the south bound riej and be part of the regional mix. >> it's also economic properties and muting some -- putting some emphasis on that. how do you see that as part of the strategy, is that part of the puzzle or about securing taiwan's future. >> i think that the heart is a

big part of it. taiwan has depended on the united states for it's military hardware, nobody else wants to sell it or will. so taiwan wants to be able to have a sufficient deterrent capacity, over the last two years, i must say, the united states department of defense and the state department is not feeling the urgency of the short term time frame for the chinese possibility of attack. you have the generals in china saying, today is not the day, i think that the president wears his helmet and takes part in things that they are serious about, but what are we going to buy and make? it deserves attention, we want to make sure that they make as

much with their own capabilities but the short term demands more sales. that is in the pipeline, so as we mentioned, there is a big problem for taiwan's brawn drain, china can offer five times the salary, how do you keep the talent in the mix, you help to develop the weapons systems but at the same time you are doing things available to perhaps corporate entities and the future building of corporate it. they have a foot in the corporate world. it's both those things. >> great, lets talk about the elephant in the room, how do deal. you mentioned the national security document and the

defense strategy, they are honest, there is a huge debate about policy and this sort of thing, what we can say is xi is going to be around for a while. maybe a long wiel. with that -- while, with that, the idea of turning, lets talk about the values being presented as something that they are focused on and think about a lot. one of the things in those documentses, especially with those three countries we are discussing and the democratic values. >> when i was a graduate student in international

relations theory, the realist were mostly antiwillononian. they taught us that there is national interests and real policies and in the mid 1980s, we were taught we not impose western values, asians like authoritarian values, et cetera, then they democratized. historically, democratic values have been very important to security, for a whole bunch of reasons. in my book i talk about thomas jefferson and perry. how do we make sure that other

empires did not colonize places like asia, we thought if these are well governed rep governed -- republics they will be better. if countries in asia are well governed and resistant to crime and have rule of law, they are not going to have bullet trains that crash, they are going to scrutinize. lets shed light and the best way to shed light is by supporting rule of law and transparency and accountability. americans are more likely to fight and die to save a fellow democracy, all of the polls show that. it's very important, i think, and frank lu a missing part,

that the president of the united states and the secretary of state is and others are without values, it shows that they are committed to like minded states. it forms support for their governance and the rule of law, is not about defending china it's about how to help states resist imperialism. if we were worried about asia in the 19th century, an important part of this, i think that there are people in the administration who believe this, like vice president mike pence and others, the president talks differently, his meeting with kim jung un bothers me for that. >> obviously, you got on to the

maritime piece with the islands early and the transparency, we shed a lot of light on that situation, we are talking about couldn't newt yu -- continuity, obviously there is an argument that says, watch out for the south china sea, they are seeing a lot of push back, your sense of looking at that problem? do we move on and try to focus on defense in the east china sea or do we try to roll back china's gains there. >> i think that tactically, if you will, or in that sector, china scored a touch down with the militarization of the island, they pawed no tactical

cost. on the other hand, more broadly, you can argue that the quad, the alignment of india and australia which focuses on these maritime partnerships, that was blow back from what china did in the south china sea, maybe i it's a draw, they scored a touch down but they lost a bit more broadly. the admiral mentioned the first island chain which is what will ultimately force the united states and japan to have more intimate intelligence sharing and relations with the caveat that there will be many political and economic and constitutional issues. with the offensive, the united states was able to send two carrier battle ships with

impunitive yu through the south china sea, to demonstrate will power and to show that we can flank china on the south if they mess with us in taiwan, that's much harder today. now they are operating on the pacific side of taiwan and the pacific sued of japan, we can no longer think of the first island chain as the theater, the pla looks at it as one integrated problem. it's easier for them because there is just one of them. we have the fill 15 land -- fill philipene land. we need to think harder than we have about how to expose that. i think that taiwan will

probably be well positioned to do more smart work. how can we talk to japan and taiwan about demarkation and -- demarcation and doctrine, not one alliance, but in terms of capability, if we had to operate with fewer things in a crisis, we could, the fact that we could is important, right now we can't. >> that's a hard military side. then there is the diplomatic side. it's important to realize that china has a strategy, they focus on this idea of warmer

relationships between them and tokyo, we are hearing strong rumors about an extension, there seems to be interest, maybe for the first time in a decade, that could happen. your thoughts on how that effects this situation. >> we had mentioned that the united states has changed under the trump administration but say the other thing with xi and china have been consistent p not changed. at the same time we are dealing with the response and the main

thing is to improve leadership, also based on the further japan united states alliance, maybe its. >> it's. >> we will balance the chinese expression and behavior, including the president, the free and open example. we will use the chinese expression, china has been consistent but china has

attitudes and i think that there are four reasons why president xi has done that. domestic politics, second, the us alliance and the form of order for china, third, the view of china and the administration, therefore japan will continue to maintain a cooperate position by attempting to change the attitude and improve relations with china, if its in the interest of japan and our allies, is the same for taiwan. >> thank you. speaking of the china

rising theme, there was a lot of speculation in congress last fall that if xi became more powerful, this would have an effect on china's approach, mab an adverse effect -- maybe an adverse effect. there is a lot of in chinese domestic propaganda output as well. you know, the xi era or the new era, at the end of the day, we have not seen it yet. we know he is going to be around for the foreseeable future, do you think that for the idea that whether its 2021 or some point beyond that, that

there is more pressure and how is taiwan thinking about this? my perspective from my recent visit is that they are a little skeptical. they think that maybe action depending on some electoral results, the prc may have to deal with the taiwan government. >> it's a big conundrum for taiwan, i think that what china hopes and xi hopes is that they can use the sweeteners, they have conditions where the chinese get young people from taiwan to come. that's hard to miss. imthat there is always that, i think that is the direction he will try, if they were to

attack forcibly, it would just shake everyone else. i think that they are willing to take the toim to get to the great china rejuvenation mode by doing this kind of economic efforts. >> so the major project programs, is that going to be enough to balance off the kind of inducement. will there be a possibility of allowing taiwan to come in. >> it could be for the united states, a big issue, taiwan is caught in the middle. i do not think that there is an immediate concern about military attacks but that's why they are building up. the thing that most people do not realize, united states and taiwan relations are there. they are trying to get one of

the carrier groups and the united states planes helped. now i think that there is more and more of that kind of interoperability. i think that the steps are being taken but its not clear where president xi will be pushed to go by his own demands and by internal precious, there is a lot of variations that i do not see clearly. of course there is the main land sued -- side and its very opaque, ohm one voice matters and its difficult to figure out what that voice is thinking. what is the risk on the taiwan side that the president has a moment where she decided, enough of this, i have been

trying, even in this receipt effort with, you know, using simplified characters and showing an extended hand. say there is recognition or something happens, what is the prospect that they go in a different direction to provoke the main land. >> i think that there are several problems. the economy has grown, show has to satisfy domestic constituents, but i think that the question is, she faces something that is nice in an open democracy, the kmt is not

sitting there quietly, they believe that ultimately, there should be it there. some people are willing, there is a real question now about how far they can go, i think that for her, personally, she is weakened right now. one of the things that has happened is that there are a number of laws in place trying to recapture the assets stolen by the kmt. they never saw much distinction between the party and the state. so they appropriate all of those at sets and the territory and they lived off them for a long time. now they have created weakness in their structural ability and in their candidates. they have an old central committee kind of apparatus and not much on the local level, for the next period, the question on the ground is what

is going to happen this year. so bottom line, i think that she will not have the moment. she has been adamant about keeping the status-quo. i think that will be appreciated by the united states and they will be supportive of her in that position, keeping to that line has been hard but i think she will and i do not think she will have a moment that will say i am going to lose this election unless i do something crazy. >> we have learned for a long time. >> we do not want to go back there. >> the lesson has been learned. a lot of people lived through that but also, i think that the

question is not to read washington, dc improperly. i can read washington, dc pretty well. frankly when they figure out the consequences and the relations with washington, dc, that may change, we should be in a much different place. >> i think that we have to give her a lot of credit for doing what she said. >> yes, as you know, she came here as a candidate and the united states was thug of her as a sur -- surrogate. she was able to maintain the current state. when she came in 2016, it was great to see her.

she's a sophisticated professional woman who knows what she is talking about. >> thank you. >> okay, that's enough from us, we are going to turn to the audience, as usual, if you would raise your hand if you have a question and wait to be called on and wait for the microphone to get to you, for our online listeners, please identify yourself and your organization. you are the first up. thank you, thank you for the presentation, i am leo from the research institute of global taiwan, my question is about the chinese influence in universities. this has been an issue in the united states and australia and england. the chinese soft money has geared universities to gear their efforts in one way, has this been an issue in taiwan.

>> it has been an issue in the past. in the united states, people did not realize it until recently. in my view, chinese fellows associations got some extra dollars, i think that the chinese united front activity in american, australian and taiwan and japanese universities are much bigger than they were a few years ago and much bigger than we thought but not as dramatic as what we were saying, in the united states we have to be careful because of civil liberties but we need to be aware. my view is that universities should be aware of it and police themselves. the united states, the

university of gorgetown, there is very little japanese press out there but the same thing is happening in japan, there have been problems with chinese professors in japanese universities had gone home for break and had their families had pressure. there is a lot of pressure on japanese universities. i think that its one of those issues where we should be comparing notes, i do not think that we should overreact. i like to have students from chiern, they are dynamic and interested -- china, they are dynamic and interested. >> taiwan has little issue with

the population shrinking rapidly. they want more students. china wants to come. i do not think that is going to make up for it. a lot of money comes in with those students. that's one question, i think that the other question is that, there is suggest contact and everyone knows is it. i will tell you this, i walked up the steps in taiwan, i turned around and there were 6 prc flags, it's a democracy, so it's their right but how does that work internally, that's another question. >> i do not know any snepts that have provoked an uproar. >> to mike's point about not overreacting, one of the challenges that we increasingly

see, as it become harder and harder to separate the notion of china from the notion of the communist party of china, that makes it harder and harder for the universities, they can say, i do china, not the tpp, that's changing rapid lu -- rapidly. we see a divided congress from a chinese perspective. you know, the communist party is working for us and we need to socialize other people to the fact at that there is stability and that will make these issues more apparent but the key is not overreacting. next question please.

hi, chris you mentioned xi, i just wondered, the new constitution, and his image, what kind of expwak will that have on the western point of view on china. for the other panelists we found articles saying that the united states has gotten china wrong for the past 20 decades but there are so many bright people here, how did you get that wrong or do you have your own explanation. >> as for the xi question, come again thursday morning, we will be talking about this but in short, i think that, you know, one thing that we have seen about xi since he arrived on the scene, he puts a lot of thought in keeping the other

people in the party off balance. some of it is consistent with that, some of it is consistent for putting an explanation point, there has been a lot of murmuring in party circumstances that they have not solved the succession problem, but xi is saying, i just solved it, there will nobody be a succession any time soon, i am not surprised by it. perhaps i am disappointed by it. do not be surprised if in 2022 he decides to leave, this is his personality, constant turmoil. the other piece that i think is significant is, this puts, to

some degree, an even bigger target on him, which i would argue in the contradiction in dialectical thinking, will rattle him even more. >> i am not sure that we, the united states or japan got china wrong, i do not buy that argument. i interviewed at some length, some of the architects of globalization and the opening, none of them thought in the 70s that we were going to democratize china, the united states was on its back after vietnam and we needed china to not be weak, it's interesting, when you talk to people involved at the time, they thought that china was weak and that weakness created an imbalance and a vacuum in japan, that was the thinking,

they did not have a long strategy to democratize china, i think that what we and certain other think tanks got wrong was xi. that's what people did not anticipate, that he would emerge to be the kind of leader and have an anti-american alliance but frankly, some of the best minds in china in the university leadership got it wrong, that's what we got wrong with xi, a lot of people still do not have him right but we have to be much more on our guards. we cannot do the same things that we were doing, what would we do instead of engagement. we have to be dealing with a dinner kind of leader and a

different system than a few years ago. >> okay. one area where we got it wrong was, it was the bill clinton approach. get them into the system and they are not going to democratize but they are going to get the economy moving and there is going to be a middle class, they are moving in a different direction, they accumulated a lot of money, that's where the push back has o to come now, go by the rules, on the economic front, we have not forced them to go by wto rules. they have a lot of money and then they start to throw it

around. from what i saw in the 2000s was an attempt to get cheun into the game and that it was going to change towards democracy. >> i cannot overemphasize the role of technology and the fact that if you have enough market power and people you can be on the global internet at least for the short term. >> in the mild. >> with all due respect, i still hear often, denouncement for the american engagement with the republic of china, so the question i would like to

ask you, what implications, if any, will the president have on the future policy towards taiwan. >> for 25 years i have been saying the same thing, strennen our alliances strengthen our support for taiwan, network our alliances and stand up for democracy, i think that a lot of people have been saying the same thing for a long time. a lot of the people sawing that engagement failed had a more optimistic view of china, i do not know what other strategies people would propose, if a handful of people want to contain china, what does that mean, if we are worried about

china having a hedge monic -- megemonic hold over -- he ghrks emoni -- hegemonic hold over australia, we do not want to be exclusive because we will lose country that want to maintain a balance of power, and we need to then stand up for, we, the united states and japan, are on the path of self-determination, the vietnam war, a lot of people criticized the united states for being with the europeans, in world war two, we

were criticized for helping the british create empires, now the united states is on the side of small powers determining their own futures, we give them a hard time on human rights or democracy but we are not going to coerce them like china is. that's our trump card shesz so to speak but if we ignore the interests of the small to medium powers, we will find ourselves on the wrong side. i think that in washington, dc, there is a broad recognition on what we need to do in broad terms than there ever has been, within the administration, there are debates about section 301 and can we resort to

sanctions and debates about the tools but i do not see any possibility of a tawnment strategy getting legs with the american public or the congress, the american possible does not know what to do about china. the overwhelming majority of americans said strengthen our alliances and partnerships to counter balance china. >> taiwan is not antichina, the tpp is not appellate china, it's pro taiwan, so how do they effect the strategy, they have to imrab on to the problems and the regulatory issues, there are other -- grab on to the

problems and the regulatory issues, they are other things just in taiwan. all right. i am asking that in the future, maybe the china economy is close, especially the goal of china in international organizations. based oned future -- on the future. inaudible. >> well, the first thing i would say is, when ever our

policy on china and international organizations that china is not currently in, what ever our policy, you have to maximize the international states and organizations. one cannot go without the other, the second thing i would say about china, this is a hard question and a good debate. some people propose letting china into the oecd so there is an incentive for china to share data. the organization for economic cooperation and development and the international energy agent circumstances i am a hard liner, i think that we need to get democratic countries in that organization and i would

stick to that, there are probably ways to have mechanisms for cooperation with china but i would maintain the g 7 and the oecd, especially when we have revisionist powers of various kinds. then we find other ways to expand cooperation. it's a hard question and i have to go case by case on that one. the ones that we know share common democratic values. >> taiwan has a problem with the international organizations. the united states does not recognize taiwan as a sovereign country but it does not recognize control over taiwan, what the united states has done

is be very supportive of taiwan's parption in the who -- participation in the who. even the leadership in china, it's hard to get over the bar, what the united states has done, effect ifl as far as -- effectively, as far as that, the united states and taiwan sponsor a wide range of technical meetings in taiwan and they invite people from the whole region to come, they are on illnesses or women's equality or humanitarian issues. china can make itself a player but it does not have to reach the level that the un demands, i wish more could be done but

there is a barrier. >> japan was one of the few countries that stood with the united states on the aid issues, now they are softening on those. japan, i assume is going towards mike's point of view. >> the system is that way. so, my experience for the last two years for the chinese expansion across the line, to

hear that, i think we have more views of the world. so i think that maybe the chinese goal is improvement of the situation where the united states and japan and china and others cooperate and they have this alliance as much as possible but i entered the navy at the end of the cold war so i

remember the opinions. the chinese are not containing the engagement. so the mcmaster thing, and also the completed means, the united states talk, maybe the military will promote a second run, do this as a training to pick out them. but the alliance and the tip that helps, so that is a deep

issue, so that is the idea. >> i think that we have time for one more question. i am from the export bank, i would like to bring a question back to where michael was just a while ago about the perception of china and xi and you said that you have not really changed anything, you have promoted the same thing viv a vis taiwan and the united states but i now have more time to listen to cnn, for example, and it seems that things are

different. here you have mr. xi, and there you have mr. putin and here you have mr. trump. if i were a japanese person sitting in japan looking at the three leaders and the way that they behaved and how the united states is being tested by the scandals and everything else at the leadership, i would wonder if we should keep the same kind of attitude towards china and towards the united states in the long range. i am wondering what you think about that. because you talk as though nothing has changed a few blocks down. >> i do not think that at all. my argument of what your strategy should be has not changed. a lot of people in that

category, that's what i am saying, i think that the problem is more complicated and xi is more authoritarian and i would use the word expansionist, in more dimensions than people anticipated so the strategy was right but we have to be better at it. so your second question, if i were tokyo, and i was seeing donald trump, well, yes, the indo pacific strategy is very good. president donald trump's relationship with shinzo abe is very good. they probably have talked more than shin ab be talked to obama on the phone -- shinzo abe

talked to obama the whole time. but it was worrying, the decision making on steel and aluminum was worrying, these alliances are based on a web of networks and an understanding the strategy and the people that speak to the president and the prime minister rkz even though the president's relationship with abe is very good and the national security strategies are favorable for japan, the decision making process has people rattled everywhere, public opinion polls in japan, talking about the united states, the numbers are not great. but where are you going to go. someone in japan said if this keeps up, we are going to hedge against the united states. i set what you are going to do?

they said they are going to strengthen their ties with india and australia. maybe xi has a better option. >> i think that we will end it this, please join me and thanking our panel. wish journal, live everyday with news and policy issues that impact you, coming up tuesday morning, freedom works, adam brandon on president donald trump's tar riff announcement and the midterm

elections then mary francees berry and former venture capitalist on his new book and on what school can be, watch washington journal tuesday morning and join the discussion. >> here's a look at our live events for tuesday, interior secretary rye -- rye sin sin testifies in front of the senate budget committee at 10:00 a.m. on cspan-3, then the house comes in and they are working on legislation to improve legislation on experimental treatments, then the commanders of central and africa command testify before the senate armed services committee about the

2019 budget were then bet bets -- betsy devos then former prime minister david cameron testifies about global security. >> sunday on q & a, colorado colorado college professor tom cronin talks about his book, imagining a great republic. >> i think that a reading of major american political classics is ee nobling and empowering in terms of, this country stands for something special and the great writers and all of these people are story tellers saying that our tribe wants to do something special, not just a city on a hill but a city that cares and loves one another and it

willing to work with one another and understand that