tv House Judiciary Committee Hearing on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance... CSPAN September 20, 2019 2:00am-4:18am EDT
tv on c-span 3. working with our cable affiliate as we explore the american story. >> next, a house hearing on renewing parts of the foreign intelligence surveillance act. then virginia senator mark warner and former homeland security secretary discuss the dangers to democracy regarding digital disinformation campaigns. after that a senate hearing on the banking challenges cannabis store owners and sellers face in states where marijuana has been legalized. the house judiciary committee held its oversight hearing on the foreign intelligence surveillance act known as fisa. the committee was considering whether to renew several fisa
>> committee on the judiciary will come to order. we welcome everyone to this morning's hearing on oversight of the foreign intelligence surveillance act. i will now recognize myself for an opening statement. the judiciary committee is holding today's hearing to carry out one of its most important tasks. to ensure that the tools used by our government to keep us safe are consistent with our values and with the freedoms guaranteed by the constitution. this committee has long exercised it's responsibility to shape the legal framework under which intelligence and law enforcement agencies investigate threats and collect evidence of crimes. although we conduct day-to-day oversight of intelligence agencies, hearings like this to conduct a broad review of how our government exercises its legal authorities and whether that conduct accords with our
values as american. at the out set, i want to acknowledge two things. first, the men and women in our nation's law enforcement and intelligence communities including our witnesses today work tirelessly to keep us safe from attacks and other threats by hostile adversaries. those efforts include working rigorously to comply with our laws. second, there are countless americans in the privacy and civil liberties communities who are dedicated to keeping us safe from other kinds of threats. threats to privacy, freedom of speech and due process to take hold in the government surveillance authority extend too far. those who criticize and question the laws we'll be discussing today are part of this nation's proud and robust tradition of holding our government to account, and safeguarding the freedoms guaranteed to us by the constitution. it is in that spirit i hope to have a serious and substantive discussion today about the
foreign intelligence surveillance act of fisa and the provisions set to expire at the end of this year. in response to substantial concerns that the intelligence community had exceeded its authority under fisa, congress in 2015 enacted the usa freedom act. notably we put an end to the nsa's program under which it collected the phone records of millions of law-abiding americans using a highly strained interpretation of a provision in a 2001 usa patriot act. we reformed that provision known as section 215 to prohibit bulk collection phone records and other types of records. instead to collect certain kinds of phone records we required the nsa to apply to the fisa court for an order based on individualized fact and under specific selection term. we've also created an important mechanism to ensure the fisa court hears both sides of the legal arguments in case it's presenting novel and important
issues. and we enacted several measures to enhance transparency in the fisa court and other types of reporting. at the end of this year, section 215 and two other fisa authorities known as the roe v wiretap provision and lone wolf provision are set to expire unless they're reauthorized by congress. because these three provisions give the government powerful and intelligence authorities congress attached them to sun setting provisions when they were first enacted and has reauthorized them for limited periods of time ever since. these authorizations provide an important opportunity to view how these laws are used and to conduct the kind of oversight we're doing here today. he sent a letter asking we reauthorize all three provisions permanently.
at the same time has dismantled the core records program as they've been conducting under section 215 as amended by the usa freedom act. simply put, the nsa dismantled the program because it was a serious failure. the nsa used it to collect hundreds of millions of phone records. in 2018 it discovered it has no authority to collect some of the records it was receiving. worse, we had no way of separating out which records were wrongly acquired from the ones that were collected lawfully. so it started deleting them all. this has all been publically reported by the intelligence community. to be clear, it's not a bad thing that the nsa identified a problem, told us about it and tried to fix it. as former director put it, the decision to end the program was made after balancing its, quote, relative intelligence value, unquote which was evidently minimal against, quote,
compliance and data integrity concerns. close quote. the nsa decided the costs outweighed the benefits and pulled the plug. that kind of candor should be applauded. it's baffling to me that the administration announced that they shuttered the program then in the very same breath asked congress to extend it permanently. the administration has offered almost no reason except the vague suggestion that we might need the program sometime in the future as technology changes and as our adversary's capabilities evolve and adapt. when congress enacted the usa freedom act we made good effort to give the intelligence community the capability it said it needed. that experiment has run its course. the administration really wants to keep this provision on the books, it's going to have to justify it with more than a vague promise that it might come in handy one day in the future somehow. i look forward to discussing the
other authorities including aspects of section 215 and fisa's roving wiretap. i also look forward to discussing as well the important reforms we enacted and whether any of those should be strengthened. this committee has a long running and important responsibility to have these candid and rigorous discussions as we consider how best to ensure that our laws are in line with our values. i thank today's witnesses for being here today and for their service to our nation. i now recognize the ranking member of the judiciary committee, the gentleman from georgia, mr. collins, for his opening statement. >> last week we commemorated the lives of all the innocent victims lost on 9/11. the 9/11 anniversary reminds us each year of the shock, sadness, and anger we all felt that morning. our unity and strength following
the attacks were palpable and encouraging. as part of our resolve, it's critical the tools to defeat terrorism remain available to the men and women of our national security and intelligence community who work tirelessly to protect our country and secure the freedoms we cherish. these tools are set to expire. it is our duty to reauthorize these tools. otherwise it reverts to our national security posture before 911. i don't think anyone wants that. i'm actually kind of glad we're having this hearing. we could have been working on this a long time. i guess we've been busy with other things. the foreign surveillance act was originally passed to protect americans from surveillance abuses. our national security apparatus offers us access we need. but we must ensure there's a balance in protecting our security and civil liberty. fisa was created to do that.
in 2016 this balance appears to have broken down. while democrats accuse republicans of simply trying to divert attention for political purposes, it's clear those at the pinnacle lost the objectivity they're required by law to exercise and that's coming out now as we see a fisa report coming out. a necessary component is the perception of fairness, particularly when implementing surveillance against americans. like many americans, i await the inspector general's report on potential fisa abuse. however it is a fact that multiple individuals at the top of the fbi have either been fired, terminated, or referred for and reported to be under criminal investigation. although that has seemed to escape the notice of the majority on this committee. that said, today we face the reauthorization of authorities passed in 2015 as part of the usa freedom act focused on
battling terrorism. three provisions. it may be difficult to separate our concerns facing us but we need to combat violent extremists and their evil goals. two are fairly straightforward. the lone wolf provision seeking to harm us even if there's no proof of terrorists being directly connected. we know this has been a trajectory of inspired by their ideologies. it allows the community to follow terrorists who attempt to evade by dumping and switching phones. if we can do this for drug dealers we should be able to do it for suspected terrorists. regarding section 215, i look forward to hearing more from the
fbi. authority we can afford to let expire. however section 215 is used for collecting call data records has been significant and seemingly insurmountable technical problems in its implementation. i'd like to thank each of the agencies here this morning. i wish more had been able to come this morning. i wished we could do this. in the spirit of 9/11 and the countless other terrorist attacks need our nation to always be on guard. we've gotten to it now thankfully despite the apparent misuse and abuse are not the ones we should be removing from our counterterrorism tool belt. i look forward to the testimony and i yield back. >> i will now introduce today's witnesses. brad wigman is the deputy assistant attorney general at the department of justice national security division. previously he served in legal positions at the department of
defense and state and the national security council. he also served as law clerk for judge patrick higginbotham. he received his jd from harvard law school. michael orlando is the deputy assistant director at the federal bureau of investigation's counterterrorism division. he's since worked on counterintelligence matters at the honolulu, baltimore offices. prior to working for the fbi, mr. orlando served in the u.s. army. he received his b.a. from the state university of new york college at courtland and received masters in leadership. susan morgan has worked in nsa operations for 18 years. we welcome all of our
distinguished witnesses and thank them for participating in today's hearing. if you'll please rise, i'll begin by swearing you in. raise your right hand unless you're a lefty. do you swear or affirm under penalty of passenger that the testimony you're about to give is true and correct to the best of your knowledge, information, and beliefs, so help you god? thank you. let the record show the witness has answered in the affirmative. thank you. and please be seated. please note that each of your written statements will be entered into the record in its entirety. i ask that you summarize our testimony in five minutes. there's a timing light on your table. when the light switches from green to yellow. when the light turns red, it signals your five minutes have expired. mr. wigman, you may begin. >> chairman nadler, ranking number collins, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today about four important provisions
of fisa. these are authorities that will expire at the end of this year unless reauthorized by congress. the administration strongly supports permanent reauthorization of these provisions. three of the authorities, the roving wiretap, business records and lone wolf provisions have been part of fisa for well over a decade. they've been renewed by congress multiple times most recently in the usa freedom act of 2015. before that the same authorities were reauthorized multiple times between 2005 and 2011 and each renewal gained bipartisan support. today i will give you a brief overview of these three legal authorities and then turn it over to my colleague from fbi to address how they've been used in practice and their value to national security. then my colleague from nsa will address the fourth authority, the call detail records or cdr authority under which nsa can engage in meta data in counterterrorism investigations. first the roving wiretap authority. this enables the government to continue
surveilling a target when the target is taking affirmative threats to thwart the surveillance. these are individuals that rapidly change communication service providers in order to evade government monitoring. the roving provision allows us to continue surveillance without having to go back to the fisa court where a new order each time the target switches his phone. the government has used its authority in a relatively small number of cases each year. the cases tend to involve highly trained officers operating within the united states or other important investigative targets including terrorism targets. the wiretap act has for decades provided. second the business records authority. this allows the government to apply to the fisa court for an order to collect records, papers, and other tangible things that are relevant to a national security investigation. it allows the government to obtain many of the same types of records that can can obtain
through a grand jury subpoena. in most cases, these are records the government can obtain in an ordinary criminal or civil investigation without any court order. a fisa business records order is typically sought because national security interests preclude the use of the less secure criminal authorities or because there may be no criminal investigation underway in the intelligence context. this authority has been used several dozen times a year on average over the last several years. the business records provision is also the mechanism for the targeted collection of cdrs from u.s. telecommunications service providers. as my colleague from nsa will discuss in a few minutes, this provision provides a way for the government to identify telephone contacts of suspected terrorists who may be within the united states. finally, the lone wolf
provision. this enables the government to inform a surveillance and applies to foreign persons engaged in weapons of mass destruction. all though the government has not used it to date, it fills an important potential gap where soitd actors are concerned. it allows for the surveillance of a foreign terrorist who might be inspired by a foreign terrorist group but who's not technically an agent of the group. for example, it would allow of surveillance of a foreign person who has self-radicalized reviewing propaganda like isis or al qaeda on the internet or a known international terrorist who severs his connection with a foreign terrorist group. use of any of these three authorities requires approval from the fisa court under standards prescribed in law. each also requires strict rules governing how the government must handle any information that's obtained concerning u.s. persons.
each also is subject to extensive executive branch oversight as well as congressional reporting requirements. each has been renewed by congress multiple times in the past. with that, i'll stop and turn it over to my colleagues. >> good morning. thank you for the opportunity to testify today about important provisions of the usa freedom act that will expire later this year unless reauthorized by congress. these provisions have been integral to the fbi's success in many national security investigations. while i might not be able to get into specific examples, i'll do my best to provide you with thorough hypothetical use situations. i've seen a necessity of these provisions throughout my time as both a counterintelligence agent and counterterrorism agent. i'm looking forward to answering your questions today. national security threats have einvolved significantly in the last 20 years. from the proliferation of mobile
smart phones, expanded use to end to end encryption, new technology has allowed actors to work increasingly in the shadows. today we have nearly universal access to the internet and anyone with a cell phone can view and become radicalized by extremist content. our subjects are no longer forced to travel to other countries to communicate with other extremists who threaten the security of the united states. instead they can do this from their home. because of this, we're also witnessing a shift toward individuals acting alone with multiple ideologists and without clear ties to any one foreign adversary. our window for identification and disruption is getting smaller. our subjects are quickly moving from radicalization to mobilization. congress has helped us ensure we are prepared with the appropriate tools to continue to protect the u.s. and its interests. i'm here today to talk about the expiring provisions which the fbi uses with fisa court approval and oversight. as my colleague from the department of justice explained, we used a business records
provision to obtain records for other tangible things for use in a national security investigation. we often describe the business records provision as a building block authority. that means we use it during the early stages of an investigation to build our case against national security threats. it is important to note the responses to the business records order do not contain content. but if we see that the suspect is communicating with a known bomb maker in another country, for example, that's incredibly important information. as in this case, the information we get from business record orders often help us establish the legal threshold we need to reach in order to get from the fisa court for more advanced investigative techniques such as a wiretap. for example, once we received the business record returns, if the suspects terrorist is communicating with a known bomb maker, we'd have relevant information to help establish probable cause for a wiretap. similarly if we receive business record returns showing the
suspect is buying bomb making materials like nitrogen-based fertilizer and large amounts of ball bearings, that information can help us establish probable cause. the authority detailed in the usa freedom act is also important provision that counteracts efforts by various national security threats including terrorists and intelligence officers to avoid court authorized surveillance. these individuals often employ tactics such as using multiple burner phones or regularly creating new e-mail accounts. without this roving authority we'd struggle to keep awareness of our targets as they purposely take action. we use this authority regularly in our national security investigations as a tool to avoid missing critical intelligence that would be lost if our ability to initiate surveillance was delayed. it's worth noting that the fbi only seeks roving authority when the requirements of the statute are met. that means we must provide information to show the target's actions can have the effect of
thwarting surveillance. the lone wolf provision. while it's not been used since authorization, we believe it's important to have available. homegrown violent extremists are among the fbi's top threats to the homeland. these individuals are by definition not in direct collaboration. homegrown extremists are self-radicalized online through terrorist propaganda and are motivated to attack with no direction from individuals associated with a foreign terrorist organization. the lone wolf provision is narrowly tailored to only allow use against non u.s. persons without impacting the rights of any u.s. person. these are critically important in our fight to keep safe. they will continue to play an important role in the fbi's national security investigations as our adversaries continue to advance. i'm happy to answer any questions related to these authorities. >> thank you very much.
>> good morning, chairman, ranking member, distinguished members of the committee. thank you for the opportunity to testify about the national security agencies detail records program. the authority for the call detail records or cdr program is among the important provisions of the foreign intelligence surveillance act that will expire at the end of the year unless reauthorized by congress. congress added this authority to the foreign intelligence surveillance act four years ago in the usa freedom act as one of several significant reforms designed to enhance privacy and civil liberties. it replaced nsa's bulk meta data collection program with a new legal authority where by the bulk meta data would remain with the telecommunications service providers. as this committee 2015 report
described, the cdr authority provides a, quote, narrowly tailored mechanism for the targeted collection of telephone meta data for possible connections between foreign powers or agents of foreign powers and others as part of an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism, end quote. critically, the provision authorizes the collection of certain meta data associated with telephone calls such as the originating or terminating telephone number and date and time of a call but does not authorize collecting the content of any communication, the name, address, or financial information on the subscriber or customer or locational information. as committee is aware, the nsa recently discontinued the cdr program and deleted the record under the cdr authority after balancing the program's
intelligence value and compliance and data integrity concern. nsa's decision to suspend the cdr program does not mean that congress should allow the cdr authority to expire. rather that decision shows that the executive branch is a responsible steward of the authority congress affords it. as technology changes, our adversary's trade craft and communication habits continue to evolve and adapt. in light of this dynamic environment, nsa supports reauthorization of the cdr provision so that the government will retain this potentially valuable tool should it prove useful in the future. thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. i look forward to your questions. >> thank you very much for your testimony.
we'll now proceed under the 5-minute rule with questions. i'll begin by recognizing myself for five minutes. ms. morgan, i want to ask you about the call record detail program. the privacy of civil liberties oversight board reviewed the section 215 to collect, quote, detailed records. the board concluded and i quote, we've not identified a single instance involving a threat to the united states in which the telephone records program made a concrete difference in the outcome of a counterterrorism investigation. moreover, we are aware of no instance in which the program directly contributed to the discovery of a previously unknown terrorist plot for the disruption of a terrorist attack. the board continued. even in those instances where telephone records collected under section 215 offered additional information about the context of a known terrorism suspect in nearly all cases the benefits provided have been
minimal. generally limited to corroborating information that was obtained independently by the fbi, close quote. in short, the board found this very complicated program to be of very limited use to the intelligence community. is there any reason to doubt the accuracy of the board's conclusions in 2014? >> sir, thank you for your question. so i just want to start out by saying that i think a metric in terms of determining the value of a particular intelligence program, the number of attacks it prevented is but one metric. the number of attacks is contributed to identifying is but one metric that you could consider but certainly not the only metric. i was with the agency in 2001 as an intelligence analyst. you're typically dealing with
disparate pieces of information and you're trying to understand what your adversary might be doing. when we looked at the cdr program as it existed up until we suspended it, we did look and evaluate the foreign intelligence value that the program did provide. certainly provides value. however, you have to weigh that in the context of everything else we're doing and weigh it against not only the data and integrity compliance concerns but you have to weigh it against the resources and costs we're spending. so i'd say it's very difficult, it's not ever a black and white answer when you're trying to analyze the value of a particular activity. there's a lot of factors that go into that. i could get a piece of information today that 10 or 11 steps down the line later might actually prove to be really
valuable. >> the cdr program was reconstituted after its passage in 2015. please help me update the board's findings. sitting here today, can the nsa cite any instance in which the cdr program made a concrete difference in the outcome of a counter terrorist investigation? >> as i alluded to earlier, the measure of value isn't necessarily -- >> i agree with that. you'll have to repeat it. the time is limited. the answer is no or yes. >> in an open setting, i'm really leery to get into specific examples of the value that the program -- >> did i ask you a specific question? >> yes, sir. >> can the nsa cite any instance involving a threat to the u.s. in which the cdr program made a concrete difference in the outcome of a counterterrorist investigation? >> sir, respectfully, i'd say
that's a complicated question, that to effectively answer it, i'd need to go into classified information. >> are you aware of any instance in which the program directly contributed to the discovery of a terrorist plot or disruption of a terrorist attack? same answer? >> again, sir, but i would like to, if i may, i would like to say that i don't think a metric of a program in terms of its value should be necessarily focused on whether or not it prevented or stopped a terrorist attack. >> after the cdr program was reconstituted, the nsa realized it had two problems on its hands. first it was pulling in phone records it should not have received and second it had no way of untangling the good data from the bad. is that a fair assessment to the problem? on june 28th last year, the nsa decided to purchase an entire database. nearly three years of records. is that correct? >> yes, sir. >> the nsa stated that it had contacted the appropriate congressional committees of its intent to do so.
do you happen to know if the nsa contacted the house judiciary committee in advance of that press release? >> sir, i apologize. i have to take that back. i don't have the specifics. >> on august 16th, 2019, the nsa decommissioned the cdr program all together. the intelligence community weighed the cost against the benefits, saw the benefits were minimal and decided to discontinue the program. is that correct? >> yes, sir. >> from the moment it was brought under fisa in 2006, to the moment it was discontinued in 2019, it did not once make a material difference to a single counterterrorism investigation. at least that you can tell us about. one last question, ms. morgan. why is the trump administration -- i'm sorry. in light of this record, why has the administration asked us to
reauthorize this program? >> sir, as an intelligence professional, i'll tell you that i want to have every tool available in my toolbox. i am not able to, although i wish i could, predict what the future situation is going to hold. and should i confront the situation where this tool would be valuable to protect international security, protect us against terrorist activities, i'd like the tools to remain available. >> let me just say that very good effort but i think the administration will have to do a little better than that to say we have a perhaps useless program but we want to reauthorize it because maybe some day it will do some good. have to give us some more basis to believe that in fact it has a future utility. my time has expired. the gentleman from georgia, mr. collins. >> thank you. one of the things i want to point out, normally we've had a
classified briefing after this. we don't have that today. i don't know why we didn't but we're choosing not to do that today. we've done this in the past and it would be good to have. what session identifying information under the caller detail records program. if we terminate that and allow the program to expire, a terrorist decides to communicate over an encrypted app, is identifying information lost with respect to encrypted communication? >> sir, i apologize, but in open hearing, i can't get into capabilities. >> thus the reason it would have been nice to have had a classified hearing after this as well, which we could have gotten into this. >> and sir, i'm absolutely willing to make my -- arrange for a time that's convenient for you and the rest of the committee to tell us about -- >> that's fine.
we've had all year and we're here now. i guess we just have to deal with it so that's fine. mr. wigman, does the criminal requirement imposed on prosecutors also apply to practicing before a fisa court? in other words even though the proceedings are ex parte, is there any requirement from the department to inform the court of evidence favorable to the target of the fisa surveillance that could act probable cause that the person is an agent of a foreign power? >> i believe we do provide the full picture, in terms of what the information is available, you're saying regular title 1 fisa. for example, we provide the full picture and that would include -- it's not really brady as a principle. we do disclose i think as an ordinary course to the court the information that would suggest the person is an agent and any information that suggests the contrary. i believe that's our practice. >> so if you didn't disclose, you chose to keep it as
beginning to be more -- this is a very real concern because that is lying to the court, correct? >> you'd have to know the facts of the particular case. >> if you had provided a full picture to the court, if you don't provide a full picture, would that not be a problem? >> i think the effort is to provide a full picture to the court. >> not the effort. if that happened, is that a problem? is that something you would not say should happen? >> in general, i think we would want to provide all the relevant information to the court. absolutely, sir. >> so in general you say it's okay. but in cases where you don't want to disclose it, you say it's okay. >> no, sir. maybe i misspoke saying in general. i do believe we should disclose all relevant information to the court. >> if not, that's an abuse of the court process? >> i don't know if i'd use those exact terms -- >> whether or what would you call it? >> it's something we work hard at doj to provide all relevant information to the court. >> but if it did not happen to
any court, even this court as well, if it did not happen, that's a failure, correct? >> it's something we don't want to happen. >> a failure. the elephant in the room is the corner page fisa. have you conducted a review of the page 5 to determine whether each and every fact was verified by some underlying evidence? has anyone ever been held accountable for unlawful disclosure of the fisa application to the media? >> i really can't comment on that in any way. among other reasons, i don't know anything about that particular case, so i can't comment on it. >> my question prior to this also hits at this very issue as well. this is an issue that's now not a secret court issue. this is something that's been put into the realm of the public and the media. if you're not using the information completely. >> i'm not sure what your question is. >> i understand you're not going to answer it either way. the problem is though i think the chairman and i do both agree
on some things and this is one of the areas we agree, there's a problem at the fisa court. we've just not talked about it this year because it's not the political narrative we're talking about. but there's a problem here that needs to be addressed. not just in general as you said. i appreciate your concern of misspeaking but the issue here is that we've got to make sure this is a process in which is open for everybody because there's not a person listening to this hearing today. this is not something we need to have the culpability at the highest level to have a political agenda or leave out stuff when they go to a court in which there is ex parte proceedings and not anything available to correct that or correct the record and then to actually have it leaked later in a sense in which no accountability has taken place so far. i will go back. hopefully at some point we'll get a classified briefing but my time is expired. i yield. >> let me just say that the
minority staff worked setting up this hearing and the minority staff has been working with the majority staff setting up a classified briefing which will be scheduled. >> i appreciate that but a certain time has always been scheduled together where we can have all our stuff together. i was pointing out a fact. so lacking yesterday. >> well, i'll also comment that i'm not aware of any terrible problem with the fisa court, specifically not with the carter page application. >> those were not talked about until today. i move on. >> yeah. >> thank you, mr. chairman. being in this room reminds me of after 9/11 and we actually came in on the weekend and we sat around the table, the witness
table. it was a bipartisan group trying to figure out what are we going to put together? i participated in that. and we came up with a bill, we didn't know how it would work at the time but we know we needed to do some things and we did as a bipartisan group. it's entirely an important balance. we need to keep our country safe. everyone agrees with that. but we also have strong incentive to make sure that the rights of americans are fully protected and respected. i know that all of you would agree with that. one of the questions that i have on these proceedings is how the court rulings having to do with
privacy are integrated if at all into your proceedings. for example, the recent supreme court decision in carpenter really challenged and overturned the pre-digital age notions of the kinds of information that americans have a 4th amendment right to privacy in. prior to carpenter they considered geolocation data to be a business record and stored under the communications act. it didn't require a probable cause warrant. carpenter, you need a probable cause warrant. has that been translated into the same kind of records that 215 would allow? do you need probable cause to get geolocation records as we do in the criminal matter? who can answer that? >> i can take that. so you're absolutely right. the carpenter decision is an important decision in the
context of a criminal case that you needed a warrant in order to obtain historic cell site location information. so information concerning a cell tower and so forth. so specifically in that supreme court case distinguish the national security context and said the ruling was only applicable in a criminal case. but we've given thought to how does the carpenter case apply. to really go into the detail as to how we're applying it. so i'm happy to do that for you. >> so what you're saying is, you're looking at it. it's not the belief of the department that carpenter actually applies to what you're doing but you're considering the
4th amendment implications for how you were proceeding. would that be accurate? >> i think it's a fair summary to say it's not controlling but something we've given serious thought to in terms of how we apply it to our national security authorities even though it's not controlling. >> one of the things that i have had concern about is the collection of content under various provisions of our fisa efforts. i do think it's important to note if you get enough information, even if it's not called content, it provides tremendous insight into the details of privacy rights of americans. can you, ms. morgan, talk about how much content that you obtain through this program? >> thank you for the question, ma'am. so i just want to emphasize that under nsa's program, the call
detail records program, we don't receive any content at all. we receive things like telephone number a, telephone number b at this date and time for this duration. we're not receiving any content or any locational information either. >> let me ask in terms of -- maybe you can't answer this in a public session, but in terms of text messages, pictures, e-mails and the like, what's the universe of what you're collecting? >> under the cdr program, we're not collecting any content. i'm happy in a closed session to give you more insight -- >> under 215, none of that would be collected? >> i'll speak to nsa cdr provision. we're not collecting any content. >> it's a little bit trickier in the context of the
traditional uses of 215 because whether you call something content like so is a driver's license record content or not, it's certainly substantive information. it's a third party business record. it has the information about the individual or a terrorist or suspected terrorist data, particular hotel on a particular night. >> so under business records you'd get all of that. >> that's right. we'd get that information. but it's not communications content if that's what you mean. >> i understand. >> we can't get substantive telephone calls or anything like that. >> my time is expired. thank you. hopefully, as we will when we originally crafted these measures, we all care about civil liberties. we'll craft together amendments. i yield back. >> gentleman from ohio. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for holding this oversight hearing so we can get a better understanding of fisa provisions and procedures. some of which expire in a few months on december 15th. for nearly a year since the start of this congress, the
majority has had this committee in the american public endure their issuance of subpoena after subpoena. passing resolution after resolution. yesterday coryey lewandowski appeared before our committee for several hours. he's already testified before congress a number of times but the result remains the same. the president neither conspired or colluded would the russia to impact or influence the 2016 presidential election. the russians did try to interfere. that was under the obama administration's watch, not trump's. it was obama's fault, not trump's. today the american people might finally get some insight on how the original fisa application
that then-fbi director jim comey and other officials obtained, how that began. mr. orlando, let me begin with you. could you please tell us under what circumstances the fbi might seek a fisa warrant to investigate an american citizen? >> we first need a case opened on that individual where we need specific facts of that person poses a threat to national security which he has to have some sort of tie to a foreign power, generally as an agent of a foreign power or tied to a foreign terrorist organization. >> thank you. in order to initiate it, senior fbi officials must apply for and obtain a fisa warrant to collect information related to these allegations? is that correct? >> there's an internal process of how we do that and it ilivates to the department of justice. >> would it be proper for fbi
agents to obtain fisa warrants to investigate senior trump campaign advisors simply because they hated donald trump? >> that would not be appropriate as i've stated earlier for us to open a case, there needs to be specific and articulable facts that this person poses a threat to national security. >> would it be proper for fbi agents to open a counterintelligence investigation based upon hyperpartisan memos that were written by individuals linked to the opponent's campaign? >> same answer. we'd have to show you're an agent of a foreign power. >> thank you. as far as you're aware, do the fbi and other intelligence officials verify the truthfulness of the allegations in the steele dossier about then-candidate donald trump? >> sir, this is outside my purview. >> okay. even though the information was never verified and most of it has been proven to be false, the intel community relied on it to get a fisa application to spy on the trump campaign. is that basically what happened? >> again, that's outside my
purview. >> what sort of information should an agent use to open a counterintelligence investigation? investigation? >> really a wide variety of information that we can use. there just simply needs to be some sort of allegation that has specific and articulatable facts to open an investigation. when an agent does that, there is a supervisor that reviews that. in sensitive matters it elevates the ap in sensitive matters it elevates the proval.approval. >> thank you i have a lot more questions. it appears to me, that it was used to investigate the trump campaign officials bipartisan agents. i think it is strange, just a few weeks ago. inspector general horwitz issued a scathing report about the mishandling of misinformation. it appears that nothing will happen and he will not be brought to this committee
responsible for his allegations with no further opportunity as to what was really happening at the fbi when officials decided to open the investigation. that is a shame. the american people should learn the truth. the truth about how it was that the democratic national committee and the clinton campaign were able to pedal a fake dossier to obtain a warrant and turn it into an unnecessary expense of, time- consuming investigation in order to undermine an american presidency. the american people deserve better. presidency. the american people deserve better. i yield to the gentleman. >> mr. chairman, can i >> mr. chairman, may i ask you a question? i know the gentleman's time has expired. >> is time has expired. >> may i ask him a question on something the gentleman just mentioned? a question for the chairman of
the committee. mr. chairman, ranking members and the chairman of the oversight and judiciary committee received a letter from his tour with last week indicating he has now turned the report over to the justice department. have you had any contact with mr. horwitz about when he may be in front of this committee to answer questions about the very subject we are learning about today? >> we >> we will review any such letter. the gentleman -- the gentle lady from texas. >> thank you very much. let me just ask a general question first. having been here on the day of 9/11, 2001 commemorating the or of that day a week ago is the
process an important process for national security in your opinion? >> yes ma'am. >> mr. orlando? >> yes ma'am. it is a critical process for us. >> yes ma'am. >> let me start with on the opinion the usa freedom act directed the opinion to make all foreign intelligence and surveillance court opinions available to the greatest extent practicable. it is clear from the text and members from the floor debate it was to include opinions. only a handful opinions have been published. how does the doj opinion
determine what opinions are able to be published? >> here is how we decide. the way i think about it is there are plenty of opinions that will only be applying ordinary legal principles to the fact. deciding whether a particular individual qualifies. there is nothing particularly novel about that exercise that is very fact intensive. not much would be released. if we were to release the opinion because it would only be an application of facts, there is not much benefit to the public. that is the type of case we would not consider it significant or novel. if it was, instead an interpretation of the act or something about how the law applies more broadly we would consider that to be significant and novel and those are the opinions we provide to this committee and we have a obligation under the freedom act to review for declassification. >> do you know how many opinions have remained secret because of the definitions you
are using? >> there are certainly opinions that we would not consider nd >> there are certainly opinions we would not consider significant and novel and those would not have been declassified, that's right. >> with their be awake of securing that inasmuch as they are not significant and novel for the information of the american people? would there be a way of releasing those even those they are not significant or novel for the american people? >> if they are neither significant or novel i think the judgment of conference was they will not be provided to the committee with no obligation to review and limited public interest. >> we could access them is classified necessary if classified? >> i would imagine we could have a discussion about that. >> in addition the government should disclose all legal counsel opinions in interpreting the u.s. freedom
act? >> government has done what? >> disclosed legal counsel opinions in interpreting legal section 215, is that important? >> if it should be disclosed? again, some of them are made public and others are not it depends on the facts of the case and policy if it is privileged advice or something that can be made public >> thank you. nsa announced in 2018 it received large numbers of cdr's that should not have these irregularities began in 2015. deleting every single record it had collected. solving the problem but providing any evidence. record it had collected since 2015 and in 2019 in 2019 a major story was published saying the nsa
started using this authority. what were the technical irregularities and has the nsa actually stopped the program. this time if you can answer both of those and finally to mr. orlando, i know where we are with respect to foreign operatives. explain the value in your work but also the necessity of your interpretation to that with domestic terrorism. >> thank you ma'am. the cdr programs has been stopped. last month all of the equipment was decommissioned. we are not leveraging the cdr authority and have currently no plans to leverage it. in terms of the technical library already is that we have experienced we have some information and it would fill all metadata, phone number, date and time for this duration but some of that information was inaccurate.
as such we have determine the best course of action was to delete the records we received from the communication providers. >> mr. orlando? >> ma'am, if i understood your question correctly -- you want to understand how it can be used on domestic terrorism subjects? >> or recharacterization? >> we can only use it when there is proof. if the subject is not tied to an agent or foreign power we could not use it. >> i understand that. a similar bone -- similar or possible situation? >> often times the domestic terrorism case, we look for the active violence or violation of federal law. social. >> thank you. at that time has expired. the gentleman from texas. >> thank you all for being here
and thank you for your work trying to keep america safe. did the doj, fbi or nsa, during the obama administration consider the russian ambassador to be a terrorist or agent of a terrorist organization? terrort >> i cannot comment on that. i don't know. >> i can't comment on anything outside the scope. >> sir, i don't have that information. >> wow. wow that is amazing because it puts us in the position of having heard that jeff sessions was being surveillance to when we met as a senator within ambassador. there are reports that we have had the israeli ambassador under surveillance, people he met with. i don't know any of these things firsthand, just what i read here. it gives me great concern because in my freshman term
when we debated section 206, 215, when we debated the court and recently have seen massive abuses through the court we kept being assured that especially in the court things like 215 we weren't abusing anybody. allowing surveillance i was just wondering if that included nations of israel or other folks like that. your silence speaks volumes. looking at this provision to get access to certain business records for foreign intelligence or international terrorism investigations, i still am concerned as i was originally with some of the language. it allows the pursuit and this will normally be in front of a fisa court, apparently, you can go after a foreign
intelligence information not concerning a u.s. person but we know that is not true because u.s. persons are constantly caught up. as we saw in the obama administration, unmasked for no good reason or masked. to protect against international terrorism. okay, that is subject. clandestine intelligence activities. i asked years ago, what does that mean? clandestine intelligence agencies is that if my neighbor stands behind the curtains and watches what's going on in my yard, is that can lead contestant -- clandestine? i was never really assured by the part of the law that said that these would be done under the guidelines approved by the attorney general, g, we may have the acting attorney general indicted soon. i would rather have those done
under the law instead of some guidelines we had nothing to do with. let me also mention with regards to fisa, i understand you have abandoned the gathering of metadata as long as there is a fisa court there could be another application or affidavit that violates the amendment requirement of probable cause and supported, particularly describing things to be seized. when i looked at what was disclosed, of the order, everyone got one and everyone complied against qwest but let this says give us everything you got, daily basis, details. there was no probable cause of anything. there was no particular rarity.
even though we may have abandoned those programs as long as there is a fisa court and we don't have proper save guards for people's civil rights in the united states, you could go back and get into a constitutional discussion on metadata. as long as we don't have reforms in the court or do away with it and go back to the old way of protecting national security then we are going to have these kinds of things come up and we will find out about them later and the program can be abandoned but it just sounds like we will keep reauthorizing. i have significant concerns and also i am amazed if you get an order that allows that metadata between u.s. and abroad and within the united states with
local telephone calls but nothing to do with all of those foreign countries. in other words the affidavit and application must have said we are not after anything where people are protected by the u.s. constitution we are only after the stuff that is protected by the fourth amendment of our constitution so that causes me concern i was delighted to hear my friend from california state she was going to work with both sides we definitely need reforms so we don't have to be back here squirming because of the abuses that have occurred in the system. i really do hope we can work together to have some reforms. >> the gentleman from tennessee. thank you mr. chairman. i appreciate the work that you all are doing in your agencies. it protects our country and it is sad they have been attacked
on a regular basis over the last 2 years and people have had to question the people that are doing such outstanding work on our behalf. i think most americans appreciate what you are doing and i certainly do. i am concerned about first amendment rights. i just would like some assurances. the law makes it clear that when you take business records for investigations involving american citizens, questions cannot be conducted solely on what is protected by the first amendment. how does the department look at this is there any kind of rebuke to make sure non-first amendment factors supporting the investigation are not contextual? >> thank you for that question. that is a core provision. various provisions of fisa we cannot engage in investigative activity solely on the basis of
first amendment protected activity. let me give you an idea of what that means it is a first amendment right if you want to say i support terrorism or i support isis or i like beer, whatever. if you would like to say or think those things that is your right. we could not open or get a fisa warrant or get a business records application when we have the basis of that type of speech but if we have more than that if a person is saying those things and they are also in touch with people in isis or in syria or in touch with people in afghanistan and they're having communications, we can still consider the fact that they have made these other statements and gives it context to evaluate if this person is an agent or foreign power. speech, in and of itself that is protected can be combined with other speech or conduct and paint an entire picture in which you come up with a conclusion where someone is aided by a foreign power or a
target. does that answer your question? >> sufficiently. a lot of people have issues or concerns about minority communities being targeted. have you or any of your colleagues analyzed if section 215 has been disproportionately used on certain minority groups. hispanics and could you go about assessing that and is there a way to assess that. >> the fbi and i will let mike address this also, they cannot initiate any investigative activity under fisa on the basis of someone's race, religion or gender. if, let's say we had information that someone of german nationality went to the united states to engage in a terrorist attack and that may be a bit of information we consider together with other pieces of information to see if someone was properly targetable. >> thank you sir. if you could commit one of your
groups that you will do a disproportionate impact audit for us? disproportionate impact audit? >> i can >> i could certainly take that back. i could take that back to the fbi as well and backup some of these comments. we can't open a case on anyone based on first amendment protected activity, race, ethnicity or religious groups. we look at the activity of the individual and that is how we make a decision about opening cases. >> thank you. could you tell us when fisa was first passed i guess that was right after 9/11, is that correct? >> there were changes it was enacted in 1978. >> the changes were pretty strong. >> the patriot act. >> a lot of people reacted adversely to it. can you assure me and some of my liberal friends that have those concerns that there have been amendments to take care of
some of the concerns that originally arose? >> congressional oversight, the executive branch, ct. we have a very robust system for making sure these authorities are used properly. >> think you. just let me close. it appears that some on the other side have got a prompt on what is going on in long and law enforcement. i read over some of them and saw nothing wrong with any of them. all the information was given to the court concerning the fact that the dossier that was there was not the russian government it was a british official. it wasn't russia it was started by the republicans. regardless of that that was just a small factor. lots of information to protect our country from russian interference. i think the justice department and the of the eye for the work and security, too much has been
put on you. the biggest threat to you is that the president who doesn't tell the truth has accessed the good work you are doing. keep doing the good work you are doing. >> the gentleman from texas. >> as a former u.s. attorney it was and still is my opinion that fisa is an important tool in the fight against international terrorism. it is estimated 25% of our actionable intelligence on foreign terrorists comes from fisa authorities section 702 . my point is that properly used, reauthorization of certain fisa authorities should be noncontroversial and bipartisan. the problem is that many of us as it has been pointed out, including those of us with access to classified information have seen what appears to be egregious abuses and misuse of fisa authorities
and corresponding misrepresentations before the foreign intelligence surveillance court itself. specifically, as it pertains to the obama administration, doj and fbi officials, a fisa order back in october 2016, many of us do believe that the obama justice department verified and unverifiable dossier and was funded by the democratic party to secure an order allowing for the surveillance of that former trump campaign associate, mr. page. many of us also believed the obama justice department had exculpatory evidence on the issue of probable cause that was not provided to the fisa court . at least, not provided to the court during the tendency of the fisa order itself . earlier this morning the chairman said that he
didn't see any evidence of fisa abuse as it obtains to mr. page. you just heard mr., and say the same thing. democrats generally have expressed that opinion. the former fbi director, he says the idea of fisa abuse is nonsense. i and many of my, colleagues disagree with that. we will see who is right. we will see who is wrong. i'm afraid, unfortunately that the inspector general is going to find that folks on my side of the aisle are right. fisa procedures were abused and they were not followed and we will offer recommendations to correct that. again, we will see. i would like to use my time to focus on process. let me start off by asking to any special rules exist when submitting a fisa application
to survey or spy on a political campaign or one of its associates? anyone? >> as i have stated earlier. articulable facts and agents of foreign powers. i can't comment on anything outside of the freedom act. >> special rules for surveillance of political campaigns? >> i am not familiar with that i can't say one way or the other. >> let's use the existing framework that we know what. when the government is presenting a case with respect to u.s. persons like carter page the fbi is required to verify to the foreign's intelligence surveillance that that evidence is verified, correct? >> with draft application we have a file that contains supporting documents to back up the facts. >> does the department of
justice, are they required to disclose to the foreign's intelligence that they have exculpatory intelligence. the brady requirement? to disclose exculpatory information? >> again, it is not brady because that is the principle on criminal law in the context. yes, my understanding is it leads subject to getting back to you on this question. the answer is yes we do try to provide the full picture to the court when applying for a fisa warrant. that means evidence both indicating that the person has probable cause and information that would suggest to the contrary. >> in the case of carter page, all the court heard were the arguments of the government seeking a warrant, no counter arguments presented questioning
the motivation of funders of the steel dossier, no cross- examination about the veracity of the dossier itself or about the credibility of the dossiers author, christopher steele. what safeguards are there in the fisa process currently to make sure that those obligations are met. what, as a practical matter, would prevent the appointment of an attorney to represent the interest of a target of a fisa application provided you could meet the security clearance requirement by taking someone from the doj civil rights division? rights division. >> so, if i answer >> so, to answer your question, your question -- your question is if we should have something like an amicus to represent the target? is that your question? >> to be able to probe the arguments that the government is making to take the extraordinary measure of surveillance on a u.s. citizen.
>> so, i guess one thing i would say is we have to remember that fisa is in the national security ward, same thing with the title 3 wiretap. it's the same type of thing and we don't have any amicus or other participation in that context i'm not sure why it would be necessary or appropriate to have an additional lawyer in this context. we do have party proceedings as an ordinary course what we are doing wiretaps of a drug dealer or organized crime figure etc. i'm not sure i would see the need of having an amicus in the same situation of a spy or terrorist. >> the time is expired. the gentleman from georgia. >> thank you mr. chairman i am ashamed that in an oversight hearing you all have to be subjected to political fake news that has been trafficked in by members of the republican caucus on this committee. several days before president trump was inaugurated he
compared intelligence officials such as yourselves as . the day after he was inaugurated he paid a visit to cia headquarters out in langley, virginia and he stood in front of the hollowed ground with the names of cia operatives. men and women, american citizens have given and commemorated those that have given their lives. the untold numbers. we don't know how many. that is what that wall commemorates and it is hollowed ground out there. instead of, while he was there speaking about the sacrifice of those brave men and women who have given their lives to protect us, the president talked about his crowd size at the inauguration and he bragged
about winning the election. since then, he has continued to do everything he can to destabilize public opinion about our intelligence professionals and the work that you do. you have had to work through that. i appreciate you coming here today and i appreciate you continuing to do your work without political bent of mind. single-mindedly for the protection of the american people, i thank you for that. this hearing is about oversight and should not be about politics. as a member of the legislative branch i am sorry i would like to apologize to all of you all, all of you professionals who are here today for having to sit through this tirade that comes from the other side. now, ms. morgan, you mentioned that the cdr program has been
suspended? nsa is tasked with execution of the cdr program, correct? >> nsa operated the cdr program. >> has the cdr program or that authority under the program been used in any way, the metadata collected under the program hasn't been accessed for any purpose since the program was suspended? >> sir, we deleted the records associated that we got from the telecommunications providers. those records are no longer there to be accessed. >> all right. thank you. while it was being collected was that information subject to being shared with immigration
enforcement authorities? >> sir, the information that we collected under the cdr provisions was accessible to analysts who were trained in how to handle that particular data and the rules associated with that data. analysts would look at the data and if they had foreign intelligence insights to share they would report it through authorized channel to authorized personnel. >> that would've been officials involved in immigration enforcement? >> sir i am not sir about that. they would report it to and authorized channel receiving that information. >> mr. orlando. the detail record provision says that these records cannot include gps or cell site
information. other records don't have that express prohibition. what i would like to know is does the government collect geolocation information under section 215? >> i would like to do for that question over to my colleague at doj he is better to answer those questions. >> as i mentioned earlier there can be some fourth amendment issues in that area. to really answer your question i think i would like to answer that unclassified session. >> with that, i will yield back. >> the gentleman yields back. the gentleman from arizona. >> i know this has been discussed this morning to some extent. i would like to approach this from a slightly different angle. do you believe you have the authority under 215 to obtain
cell site location information from providers? >> i prefer to get into that, i am happy to give you that information but i would like to give that in an outside briefing. >> so, this may elicit the same response but has nsa or doj issued any guidance on 215 in light of carpenter? >> no. >> no guidance? nsa? >> not to my knowledge. >> okay. has doj ever notified a criminal defendant that information was obtained by a 215 order? >> know. it is not provided required by law there is no provision for that. >> why is the number of accounts impacted so substantial given the number of targets? in 2018 the government collected on unique accounts but had 60 surveillance targets. tar >> sir, just to clarify what you are referring to, those are the numbers that were reported
on the nsa cdr? >> yes. >> i think it is two things. when you think about those numbers, one is putting those numbers into context and every day in the united states there are billions of telephone calls that can multiple records. we had about 500 million over the course of a year. i would like to highlight that when we get data and when we were getting data under the program that is now suspended we were authorized to get historical data that the telecommunication provider tells. ongoing data for the period of the fourth quarter. additionally, i would like to highlight that under the cdr program that, again we are no longer using, we are authorized to get -- as you can imagine that would expand your numbers
exponentially. >> does nsa believe they have the authority to restart the program? >> sir, we believe that already exists. >> okay. the collection authority that is replicated under authorization or indian authority? or any other authority? is there some other legal authority that allows you to get the same information? >> we don't have another legal authority that would receive the existing program as it existed. following that. salami get the straight. if i understand, to answer the first question you believe you do have the authority to re- start the program you don't you knew authority. >> yes sir. >> to garner the same
information? >> there is no other legal authority whereby where we could establish the program that we recently shut down. >> thank you. a fisa order, it was divulged to the washington post, carter page and i think you answered this earlier has anyone been held accountable for this illegal disclosure? you don't know if there has are not? >> i can't comment on that i don't know the answer. >> i want to make sure i understand something. mr. orlando i thought you said, i am not going to quote you because i'm sure i will mess it up i am just asking for clarification. i thought you may have said something to the effect that you used fisa authority to cultivate obtaining probable cause? is that a fair characterization? did you say anything like that at all? >> we used some of the business records and other authority to
develop probable cause. >> so you are using business record authority? okay. >> okay. >> so we have you don't know if the review -- you don't know if each alleged fact was substantiated can a regular news article serve as evidence in a fisa application? >> if i understand your collection question. if information is pulled from that it would have to be included in the file. >> the answer is yes? >> yes. there are also a lot of other facts that are put into that letter probable cause. >> with that, my time has expired. >> gentleman yields back in the
gentleman from rhode island. >> thank you mr. chairman and thank you to our witnesses for your testimony and service to our country. i think the important constitutional values and your important response is to keep america safe and i would like to focus my questions on an adversarial process. i will begin with you. a significant reform in the usa freedom act was a requirement that the fisa to argue the other side of the cases presenting novel presentations of law. issued by the administrative office of u.s. courts states that on nine occasions it was appointed, is that right? >> i don't know that exact number but it sounds like the right ballpark. >> there is something kind of odd, on three occasions the
fisa court told the government it was considering appointing understanding this is an unclassified setting can you explain as best you can what happened in those incidents? >> i don't know but i can tell you that there is a process that is unusual and you wouldn't see it in a regular criminal matter where we provide copies to the court in advance. this is essentially a draft application and there is a give and take between the judges and the staff and attorneys. in light of the exchanges that occur in that process, sometimes applications are withdrawn altogether and other times they can be modified in ways that may mean the case is less significant or novel. >> can you share in writing
what the particular circumstances of those 3 were? i also think in 2018 something similar happened. giving us more context of the circumstances? >> i can take that back and see if we can give you that information. >> the law also requires the fisa court in those who file access to all material that seems relevant to their duties. as far as you are aware have any ever been denied access they thought was a relevant to their duties? >> not that i am aware. >> have they ever been denied in consulting with other individuals to prepare their cases? >> if they believe the fisa court has made a decision to they have the ability to appeal or review? >> that is a good question. i'd have to look back at the law on that there is an
appellate mechanism. i'm not sure if the amicus, the way we have constructed the law has standing to bring the appeal or if it is done in a different fashion. i could get you the information. i just would have to get into that issue. they certainly can participate in appeals when it is brought. i have to get back to you as to how it works. it is a slightly different mechanism but there is a mechanism. >> it is my understanding that only a handful of opinions from the court have been published out as the nsa or doj determine which are significant or novel enough to be published. >> as i mentioned earlier it is a case-by-case evaluations. the mass bulk are routine. you are applying the law to the facts and determining if there is probable cause to to determine and target a particular individual. there is a smaller number that are significant issues where a type of data can be collected.
new issues and expanses of authority. we are evaluating that on a case-by-case basis. >> how many opinions fit that definition of significant or novel that are not published? >> we have to provide all of those to the committee under the freedom act. they will all be provided and we all have to undertake a declassification review to determine if we can read:and release any of those significant or novel opinions. that has been in the law since 2015. >> all the declassification reviews are current? >> there may be some that are a work in progress. there may be some ongoing that haven't been done yet and they would be under review. >> my final question. the department of justice, have they notified all criminal defendants that are being prosecuted based on evidence derived in the use of section 215. you are required to do it for prosecution of 702 and i would like to know if you do it in respect to 215 if you do not, why not and if you will commit
to such notification. finally, would there be a problem if congress went to amend section 215 to require notice to a criminal defendant same way we do under section 702. >> we do not provide notice under 215. other divisions of fisa , congress has built-in a mechanism whereby we would get notice if we have information that is obtained or derived. there is no such provision currently in the law for section 215. the reason for that, again is 215 is like a grand jury subpoena. it is authority to allow us to collect third-party business records which there is no fourth amendment protected interest. generally we associate suppression mechanisms with the ability to challenge the invasion of protected privacy interest. that is generally not done in
respect to third-party business records. there was no ability to challenge information derived from a grand jury subpoena either. that is a model that is incorporated into fisa. >> ink you i yield back. >> the gentleman yields back, the gentleman from louisiana. thank you for each of you just a few questions regarding the constitutional implications. the fourth amendment's protection against reasonable search and seizure apply to business records that could be attained by section 215? >> no. >> a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in third-party business records is that right? >> yes. >> is it true that in 215 order provides greater privacy protection than a grand jury or administrative subpoena that can be used to obtain the same type of business records in a criminal investigation without prior court approval. >> correct. most grand jury subpoenas can
be issued by an attorney. here we have to go through the court and make a specific showing and so forth which we would not have to do in a criminal case. it is more protection not less. >> if the fourth amendment applies to foreign countries to other american protections under the bill of right applies? the second amendment or due process clause? >> not sure if i understand your question. >> strike that. let me give you some foundation. in a domestic title iii wiretap an individual who is not under suspicion may be monitored because they receive a phone call from someone that is the target of the wire tap. minimization features, is the same true under fisa. >> yes it operates differently under title iii, criminal context it is turning on and off the wiretap during the conversation depending on if they are collecting information
that is relevant to the investigation. in fisa, it is done after the fact. if you receive that information if it is a foreign target then the minimization process, the procedures it is in place to minimize the collection retention. that process is done post talk when you are doing the information you have. that is the stage at which they are doing the minimization in the fisa . that is the big difference between title iii and fisa. >> in that process the on off procedure, obviously is there an inevitable amount of subjective subjectivity that goes into that and that is the type of thing that makes people nervous. at the end of the day we need to have some trust. those that have the authority will switch it at the right time but i know that is an impossible thing. >> just to be clear that is an ordinary criminal wired trap.
is legally obtained information eligible and other intelligence activities. intelligence collection can be used and under what circumstance. >> yes it can be. assuming they get approval from the attorney general. it can be used as a general matter in a criminal case. >> okay i will yield back. >> the gentleman yields back and. the gentleman from california. >> thank you mr. chair. thank you for your public service. i will start by correcting some misstatements of my republican colleagues related to the fbi's counterterrorism investigation in the carter page warrants. the fbi included, in part the carter page warrants. the entire investigation help lead to the mueller investigation. 34 individuals being indicted
or companies being indicted of which 8 have been guilty of violating american criminal laws. the mueller report shows that russians engage in a sweeping and systematic attack on the elections and the trump campaign knew about the attack, welcomed it and gave internal polling data. the plan to their data around the attack. we should be thinking the fbi not trashing them for getting this information out to their people. those are the facts. now, i have much to say about the call of detail record program. my first question is, unlike fisa warrants, none of this goes through a warrant process is that correct? >> sir if i might explain how the program works. >> this is an example.
a nsa analyst has a phone number and they have a suspicion that the fbi is used by a foreign power or an international power. at the nsa with the doj and the fbi to draft an application in an emergency situation. the fisa court reviews that information we present to see if we have met the standard of the decision. with the fisa port , that application, the telecommunication providers are compelled to provide us with the metadata associated with that phone number. there is a court -- >> before that, before the purge you had all of these records collected without a warrant, correct? >> sir, before the purge the records that we did collect were a result of going through that fisa process. however, some of the records we
received had technical irregularities which resulted in the purge. >> hundreds of thousands of records that went through the fisa process? >> the fisa court approved the specific selection term. the records we get that are associated come from a telecommunication provider. >> one term could result in a lot of records. >> yes sir, as you likely know we are likely to get historical records associated with that homework and perspective records in place we are also authorized to get what we call 2 hops out from that phone. >> and you a plane can you explain what that means? >> the same phone number associated with international terrorism and international foreign power. it is approved, i am authorized to get metadata records of other phone numbers that have been in contact with my phone number.
for example, if i am in contact with miss orlando i am authorized to get that i am also authorized to get the phone numbers that were in contact with mr. orlando's phone number. i am authorized to get those numbers and we call that 2 hops. retrospectively as well as ongoing for the duration of the court order. >> thank you. earlier it was stated that part of that would include drivers license information? >> again to be clear that his traditional use of 215. what was just being described is the cdr program. it has nothing to do with drivers license that is separate. the regular, ordinary use of business records allows you to get drivers license records, hotel records that is more targeted and based on the relevance of those records in a particular investigation. >> with that include images? >> i'm not sure.
we can go back. >> let us know. >> i don't actually know. >> thank you for your answers. my personal view is that this cdr program also known as the metadata program, to me it violates. the government could tell just through metadata what every person called a suicide prevention hotline, if that call was anonymous or a bankruptcy lawyer it is too much information for a government to have i think it captures too many people. without a greater showing of why the system is efficient or resulting in an actual concrete, i am unlikely to supported through authorization. >> gentleman.
the gentleman from north dakota. >> thank you mr. chairman i would just like to say i have never worked with the nsa because i was a lawyer in north dakota but i have worked with doj and fbi in my private career and i appreciate everything you all do. what i have always found is the very best agents, the very best lawyers are very cognizant of where the line is and what they can do and what they can't do. also the best and most aggressive ones, i am assuming this area, they will push the envelope in order to do something because that is their job. i don't discount that. i think that is actually appropriate and i think that is why it is our job and the courts job to set where that law is. you can keep running into brick walls and doing what you are doing to keep our country safe. i do want to go back to something that we were talking about. we were doing the context between this information in criminal cases. one of the things that was stated. this happens a lot in criminal cases. i think one of the fundamental differences is that eventually i get it all.
in a straight forward criminal case i get it all. i get to go to brady, carpenter, all of those things. i think that is what we miss in how we deal with it. i know the difference between carpenter and this is a perfect example of where we get to that. do you know how many fisa derived information's have been used in fisa warrants? >> i'm not sure what you mean by come out of? if you mean how many cases have we used fisa information in a criminal case? title i fisa and title three fisa ? since fisa was first about it adopted.
it's not a magic number but i wouldn't have an exact count. there have been, over the years, many different cases. >> outside of everything i have never wanted a half hour longer to ask questions. how do you transition the intelligence gathering? we talked about brady and it is not the same. i understand all of those things but when you get into a criminal case. we always have a saying hard cases make bad law. carter page, all of that. the problem with a lot of this is we only hear about the hard cases. we don't hear about other things. i am all over the place because i have so many questions i want to ask. how does the woods review work? >> i will let my cancer that.
>> if i can go back to your original question and answer that. i think an espionage case was a good example. often times we used fisa to build that case and we bring it to a criminal conclusion. as we build that case we make sure that that fisa information, we turn it over and it gets declassified to turn over to the defendant. >> i have a question have you ever found existing criminal activity unrelated to what you were dealing with that has been turned over to law enforcement? >> i don't recall. >> talking to a drug dealer. that specific fact pattern. >> i don't have any specific background. i would have to get back to you and see if that came up. >> that is where i think the conflict comes in for people who are not naove and understand how we want to keep our country safe but really to care about how the due process clause and civil liberties apply once we end up in that situation. >> just to be clear. if we are using fisa, we have an obligation to give notice to
the criminal defendant . they have the ability to challenge the use of that fisa information in court . there is the process that up in statute that has been done in these cases. terrorism, espionage and the like. >> in regards to the woods process. an application. once he is complete he sits down with his supervisor and they review it together. every fact, he has to be able to show the supervisor where he got that information from. all that information goes into a book for review? >> i think this goes back to what we were talking about. we said that attorneys get all relevant, legal information. some of us -- i don't care if they have the top classified clearance that exists in the world. what would be the problem with having somebody in all of these hearings at their onset? >> this is something that was
considered back in 2015. our judgment at that time and i think it remains our judgment today that it would really slow down and bog down the process in the fisa court. if you had them participating in every. having an adversary proceeding in every application it would make the process untenable. >> thank you. i don't necessarily -- i think the oversight part of this that i would be looking at. i don't want them to have relevant information, i want them to have it all and be able to review it and deal with those. i don't think it would have to be adversarial in hearing i would just want them to be able to deal with that. the consequences for withholding information and those types of issues, it really only comes to bear if somebody finds it out which is typically very challenging when there is only one part of this process being presented. i think there is potential ways to do this that doesn't slow it down that also holds people
accountable for making sure it is being done correctly. >> with that i yield back. >> gentleman yields back. the good lady from washington. >> thank you mr. chairman and thank you for being here. i think you have heard on a bipartisan basis that we all have concerns about how mass surveillance and used in the united states. particularly after the patriot act we tried to address some of those things but i think there are still issues that remain on the table is weeks look at reauthorization. i would like to go to the cdr and just so the american people understand this, i think while the program has been suspended, my understanding is that the administration has asked for that to continue to be part of the reauthorization. is that correct? >> yes ma'am. >> just the people understand how much information is being collected, according to the office of the director of
national intelligence, 2019 statistical transparency report the nsa collected call records based on 11 targets in 2018, is that correct? >> i don't have the report in front of me. >> it is page 28 of the report. according to that same report with just 11 targets, just 11 targets the nsa collected 400 -- approximately 434 million call records. i know you don't have the report in front of you that is quoted from the report. >> ma'am, that sounds accurate. >> i think the american people need to understand that when one record is collect it, one target is collected that means you are collecting enormous amounts of call records with just that one target. it is a shocking amount of records. i don't think the vast majority of the american people
understand that. now, going into section 215 as part of the broader surveillance authorizing by section 215, can the nsa obtain people's medical records? records? >> ma'am, if i i i could just clarify. the components that we use that we are talking about today is really the cdr provision from an nsa perspective so i would prefer my colleagues speak -- >> sure, if you want to address that. >> i'm not aware of it being used ever to get medical records. i mean -- >> but it could be? i mean the way the provision is written, the way section 215 is written, could it be used to obtain medical records? can it be used to obtain driver's licenses? >> the circumstances i can think of as to why that would be are very limited. >> but there is nothing that
currently prevents us, you are just saying it hasn't been used before. it could be, correct? >> i think we would have to look at the provision closely. >> okay, how about tax returns? do you collect tax returns from hundreds of millions of americans? >> certainly not from hundreds of millions. you have to show in each case, with the statement of facts, that these individual records are relevant to an authorized investigation of counterterrorism or counterintelligence purposes for a u.s. person. that will limit dramatically. you also have to use a specific selection term that congress put in in 2015, so you can't do bulk collection, so there is no possibility of collecting hundreds of millions of health records. >> for clarification, you could potentially collected though, perhaps not with the scale that i mentioned. >> right. if the law specifically mentions tax records and says
in the case of an application for an order recording book sale records, firearm records, and tax return records, then that application has to go to a high level review. the director of the fbi, the directory and the a/d, the assistant director. it does contemplate the possibility, but recognizing the sensitivity specifically of those types of records, they are elevated for senior review and i am not personally aware of whether we have ever done that, the connection of a medical or tax record to a counterterrorism investigation is, i guess, unlikely, but it is possible. >> so you might be supportive of excluding those types of records. >> you never know, if those records meet the standards and are relevant in an authorized counterterrorism investigation -- >> let me say, i am hearing you, but i am deeply concerned
about the kind of information that we collect. ms. morgan, you mentioned earlier that the chairman's questions were not the right standard to assess whether or not a program was effective and at some point, perhaps, i have another question to get through and i see my time has expired, but maybe at some point you could provide us with what metrics are reasonable, because the problem we are dealing with is trying to strike the right balance of maintaining security, of course, but we have to respect bedrock values of privacy and civil liberties protection. when we authorize this and we see what happens with the cdr, i think that is an indication of the challenges we face. thank you, mister chairman, i yield back. >> the lady yields back. the gentle lady from florida. >> thank you mister chairman and thank you all for what you do every day to help keep us safe. if we could go back a little bit follow-up on my colleagues
questions about whatever the information is, that it would have to be relevant. i believe. could you talk a little bit about the checks and balances of the fisa court application system that would maybe relieve some of the concerns here. >> to begin with, first we have to open a case, which has to have supervisor approval. as you move forward to do a business record and it goes up, goes back to a supervisor for review. all the way up the chain, over the our headquarters, where there are a number of lawyers who look at that application to make sure it is relevant to a national security investigation then it moves over to the department of justice for another series of attorneys to look at before he goes to the court, so there are a number of individuals and supervisors looking at these applications. >> you also have to have a statement of fact. you need the facts showing it is relevant to the investigation and you also have to be able to show it is not
based on personal protected activity and you have to present all of that to the fisa court and the court has to agree, so there is the elaborate process mike just described ended and set with judicial approval. >> moving on to roving wiretaps, when the government conducts electronic surveillance under fisa, it does not always necessarily have to identify the person being targeted. the law requires you to state the identity, if known, or a description of the specific target. at a general or hypothetical level, can you state why you might not know the identity of a target and instead might provide a description of the target? or in most cases do you know -- >> in all my experience we have always known who the individual is. the relevant authority gives us the ability if they are using tradecraft to elude us, so we can go to multiple facilities, but we have to go back to the
court within 10 days to describe what we've done. the only circumstance i can think of is if there was a pending threat. we don't have the name, but we have a number of identifiers that that individual is. we could possibly present the case to the court that we think it is this type of person because it meets all the identifiers. it might be that circumstance. >> if i can add to that without getting into classified detail, the cyber context is one you can imagine where you might have a lot of information to identify an individual, but you may not know that person's name. i can give you more information about that, but if that is what you are referring to, the cyber context is the context in which that would be most applicable. >> so with the roving wiretaps, can you briefly describe why you feel this provision is so needed and why terrorists or national security threats of been detected as a result of this and if it is classified,
just give us a hypothetical. >> sure, i can talk about counterterrorism and counterintelligence hypothetical situations. on the counterterrorism side we have extremists radicalizing very quickly and mobilizing very quickly. we have to disrupt them faster than we've had to disrupt them in the last 20 years. they are evolving with their tradecraft. we have instances where they changed their cell phones, emails and online profiles quickly. the roving authority helps us keep pace with them. if we didn't have that authority we would have to repeatedly go back to the court or seek emergency authority and get the order thereafter, which would cause delay. on the counterintelligence side we have highly trained intelligence officers trained to evade fbi surveillance were able to come into the country, change cell phones, change emails, change vehicles. this gives us the capability to keep pace with them. >> i believe it was said earlier that the provision has never been used. could you give me, i find that surprising, but with the
concern you just expressed, could you give me some examples of how it could be used to help decrease domestic terrorism? >> i don't believe it applies to domestic terrorism, but what i would say, the lone wolf statue with homegrown violent extremists, these are individuals in the united states. they have to be a non-us person. they have a global jihadist ideology. not taking direction from a terrorist organization. to date we have been able to thwart those activities by finding other ways of getting fisa or making connections. but with the evolution i see the possibility of losing that statute possibly coming through with the way the threat is evolving with people using these ideologies. >> thank you. mister chairman, i yield back. >> the gentle lady yields back. the gentleman from california. >> thank you, mister chairman. i would like to express
appreciation for your work protecting our country, our citizens. i also wanted to add my concerns about civil liberties privacy. we are not a police state. our security, to a great extent, relies on the trust of the population in our governmental institutions and our beliefs, so to speak. in my district we probably speak 100 different languages. i think about my district as being the new ellis island of the united states. i have people from all over the world, literally all over the world living in my district and trust in our police agencies is paramount. a few years ago, i didn't, but neighbors arrested a rapist in the act. he was convicted of 20 counts,
and we think there were more victims, but they never presented themselves because of fear, fear of authorities and many of them were undocumented. i wanted to follow-up. some of the questions congressman cohen touched on, which is section 215 on minority communities. specifically, the information that you gather, is it shared with immigration enforcement authority? >> it would have to be some crime that relates to them before we would share any information. >> so let me help you clarify for me. it is not shared with immigration authorities, unless it is relevant to some specific crime, some national interest of specific criminal acts of terrorism or otherwise? is that what i am hearing? >> it would have to be done case-by-case, as well, for us to pass it.
>> so specifically wiretaps, you suspect somebody on one end or the other. there may be questionable immigration status. that information is not automatically turned over to immigration enforcement authorities? >> it would have to be relevant. for instance if we determined there is a terrorist threat possibly coming to the border, we would turn it over to our partners in cdp to assist us in neutralizing that threat. >> and that terrorist threat is not one defined merely as immigration status, but rather they are here to do serious violent acts to our population? >> they would have to meet the definition of an international terrorism case. >> ms. morgan. >> yes sir, we lead the program specifically to mitigate threats from instant national terrorism. we report out to entities authorized to get that information. >> mr. wiegmann.
>> there are procedures under authorities that specify the rules for when you can disseminate information and the general standard is has to be foreign intelligence information necessary to understand foreign intelligence information, or evidence of a crime. >> and that crime would not be immigration status in this country? >> good question. as to whether someone illegally entered, would that be a crime? so if you had evidence bearing on that as a crime point i don't know, maybe that is possible if the actual information was evidence of that crime. >> can you give me more information under what circumstances that may be possible or not? >> sure. >> again, my question is, your information shared with immigration authorities on the fact that maybe somebody here, the immigration status is not correct, so to speak. >> i will get back to you on that.
>> i can envision a situation. you have a very powerful tool at your disposal. information. wiretapping. you could very easily turn that around and say we are going to use this for immigration purposes. i hope you don't get to that. >> that would not be correct, sir. we only use these to counter international terrorists -- >> i would like something in writing from each of you on that specific. i don't want a treatise, just something clear. finally, i would also like to know what tools you need to fight domestic terrorism. you mentioned that the lone wolf provision has not been applied. maybe it only applies to international, not domestic. i want to know what tools you need to keep our population safe
in the u.s. from emerging domestic terrorism threats. with that, mister chair, i yield. >> the gentleman yields. the gentle lady from texas. >> think you mister chairman and thank you for holding this important hearing. i want to start by thanking all of you for the good work that you do in your respective agencies. all the people that work in your agencies, not only in your offices in dc, but obviously in the field, where the real work happens. i, too, have worked with at least doj and the fbi on a number of occasions in my capacity as a judge and a lawyer. never with nsa. so i just want to make sure that you know that there are many of us out there who do support you and do so without shame. but however, when we look at the whole picture, i know it is all about a balance, isn't it? national security, threats, versus the privacy of individuals, versus some of the
other things we've got to balance. i want to start with you, ms. morgan. to clarify for the audience watching at home, perhaps. you know, we get a letter from your agency that says nsa has suspended the call detail records program and has deleted the call details record. this decision was made after balancing the program for intelligence values, such as compliance. you know, it was suspended and you keep saying you need the tool in your toolbox. obviously, in my toolbox if i have a broken hammer, i just throw it out. why is it that you suspended it and now you think that you need it? i know that you said that emphatically as a professional that you thought you needed it, so i want to be clear as to why we really do need it. >> thank you for your question,
ma'am. i really do appreciate it. as we stated in the letter, we made the decision to suspend the program after we balanced the intelligence value that did exist in the program -- >> but you said there were major ones, you only referenced to, the ones the children talked about. >> i'm sorry? >> you talked about the matrices that went into that decision but you only mentioned the two that the chairman mentioned. so what other matrix do you all consider? >> when we evaluate our program we look at the panoply of all the different programs that we have. >> i know, that we talked about too, what others do you look at? >> what others do i look at in terms of making decisions on value, is that what you mean? >> yeah, and why we should reinstate the program. >> so what i would say is that as i sit here is an intelligence professional, and i started my career in 2001 as an intelligence analyst, and i
can tell you you never know what you are going to confront in the future -- >> you've told us all that, i want the specific matrix you all look at to determine whether or not you want the program reauthorized after you've already suspended it. >> ma'am, can you help me understand what you mean by matrix? >> i'm using your own words. >> i think you mean metrics. >> i'm sorry ma'am, i thought you said matrix. i apologize for that. >> it's been a tough week already. >> it's been a long day. but metrics, what i would say is a couple things. one, you are not always necessarily going to have metrics, because the intelligence profession is not always something that can be specifically measured and you can't necessarily measure the information, the lead-in information i got over here, ultimately, weeks, months, years from now, actually led me
to have a significant picture that provides critical insights from a foreign intelligence perspective. so it is not always that you are going to have like a data point, like this amount of this particular thing happened to happen. you're not always going to have a number. in some instances it will be intelligence professionals, discussions with our colleagues to say, hey, we reported this information from this program. has it been of value to you? how has it been of value to you? then you take that information and make a decision based on different factors to consider, but you are not necessarily going to have, this program i rate a 5 and this program a 3 and here is all my means. >> it sounds like you want to keep it just in case you want to use it and i'm not sure i agree with that. i'm going to have to cut you off because i quickly want to ask a question from the fbi folks. a number of companies offer genetic testing services.
to test for genealogical research for status and inherited conditions. is any of that also subject to the pfizer 15 activity? >> this might be one of those where we need to refer back to the book again. i'm not familiar of anytime we've asked for that type of information. >> so again, the 215 authority is like a grand jury subpoena. you can really request any type of tangible thing, any type of record, provided you have established it is relevant to an authorized investigation. you have specific facts that show that. it seems unlikely again as i said with respect to medical records, but it is not ruled out. i don't know what the fact pattern might be, but could there be a fact pattern in which that was relevant to an investigation -- >> what about the videos, you know the new doorbell that you go to the door and there is a video camera or video
surveillance at the front door -- >> that most certainly could be relevant in an investigation. i can easily envision scenarios where that could be relevant to an investigation. >> ma'am on the business record provision mostly what we use it for is a building block. we open a case, identify telephone numbers, email addresses. we go to the court for a business record to identify the transaction records, not the content, to see who he is talking to. to see if we can build a connection to the terrorist organization to identify the network. we have our analyst look at that and fill in the probable cause to move to pfizer court authorized surveillance. >> thank you, my time has run out and i yield back. >> the gentle lady yields back. this concludes today's hearing. i think all of the witnesses for appearing. without objection witnesses have five days to submit additional written materials for the record. so, without objection, the
president trump and first lady melania trump will host the second state dinner of his administration as he welcomes australian prime minister scott morrison and his wife, jenny morrison. watch guest arrivals and dinner toast. our live coverage begins friday on c-span. online at c-span.org or listen on the free c-span radio app. this weekend on american history tv, saturday at 6:00
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it had its own fleet. negotiated what you might call treaties with some of the warring european powers. its leader, hoover, enjoyed informal diplomatic immunity and traveled freely through enemy lines. probably the only u.s. citizen permitted to do so through the entire war. >> explore our nation's past on american history tv, every weekend on c-span3. saturday on book tv, at 11:00 p.m. eastern, in their new book the education of brett kavanaugh, new york times reporters kate kelly explore justice brett kavanaugh's recent confirmation process. >> and at the time of the kavanaugh confirmation hearings, the me too movement had been underway for a while and i think there was a backlash brewing. that it was going too far and this notion of believe all women was oversimplified and
overlooking the investigation part of it we were talking about earlier. then you have a president who does advocate taking tough stances and has talked about allegations of sexual misconduct is something where you need to deny, deny, deny. >> i think it was important for us to put ourselves in kavanaugh's shoes and really imagine someone is being mostly accused and really go there and explore that. then on sunday at 10:00 amy stran, live coverage of the 2019 brooklyn book festival, featuring a discussion on the trump administration with pulitzer prize-winning author and historian annette reed. race and the 2020 election with author and journalist and a look at historical resistance. then, at 8:00 eastern, in his latest book, power grab, former
utah republican congressman jason j fitz argues that liberals are trying to undermined the trump presidency. >> there is this recurring theme that they really do believe on the radical far left side, they throw all these labels, like fascist and all these really negative terms at donald trump but what i see them doing is exactly what they think the president was doing. that in order to protect our freedom, they need to take it away. in order to make sure the first amendment is in place, they need to take away our rights under the first amendment. i mean, it is just a recurring theme. >> and at 9:00, michelle walken offers her thoughts on u.s. immigration policy in her book, open borders inc. she is interviewed by texas republican congressman chip roy. >> can cook and jeff bezos have donated to many of these deep- pocketed, nonprofit organizations that are
crusading for illegal alien rights. you wonder how it is that they have instant representation in court to sue over every last trump initiative to enforce the law. so, big business and the u.s. chamber of commerce are a huge reason for that. >> watch book tv, every weekend on c-span two. now, virginia senator mark warner and former homeland security secretary michael chertoff discuss the challenges and dangers to democracy regarding digital disinformation campaigns. the remarks came during a symposium hosted by the office of the federal election commission chair, ellen weintraub and the global digital policy incubator. this is two hours. >> a few more people are still milling up and down stairs,