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tv   U.S. Institute of Peace on Afghanistan Resettlement  CSPAN  September 26, 2019 10:37pm-12:10am EDT

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>> this event hosted by the
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fifth determine of peace is an hour and a half. >> good morning. i'm alexander while other things at the institution of peace and i'd like to welcome you all today to this important discussion with the inspector general john sob go and the lessons learned and the integration that affects combatants. i'd like to welcome you for joining us online and the webcast and you can also follow the conversation on twitter at usip with today's hashtag. that's at usip at cpi cpg i are. what check out the dew podcast and
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back slash podcasts. which will conclude this event featuring leading voices and national security. usip was founded five years ago as an independent and a nonpartisan to be charged with resolving violence the conflict. since 2002, or rule has worked closely with the civil society and a violent conflict to support the process. and it goes without saying with uncertainty on the impeachment process and how that remains true. what is certain is that the outlook of today's conversation with those combatants will remain if we
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get a peace process sooner rather than later. the report we are launching today is a lessons learned program. in some of the earlier versions and the first and only study to examine all 2001 integration programs and their effectiveness. we have an excellent panel lined up today and distinguish panel which should be moderated by scott worden our director of our program. first i've the pleasure of introducing to john sopko provide the keynote address. john sopko was sworn in as the effective general for the construction of president obama in 2012 and 30 years of experience the investigations as a prosecutor and senior
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federal government adviser and in addition to working for working on capitol hill where they held key positions in the senate please join me now and welcoming john sopko to the stage. view (applause) >> thank you very much for that kind introduction and good morning to all of you. a special thanks to the institute of peace and we have worked with them in the years that i have been in hoping the relationship continues. i stand here today at an interesting time and the current chapter of our nation's longest war which in a few weeks will be marking
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the 18th anniversary and in my seven years i have learned that there is one thing that you never underestimate the unpredictable nature of the matters regarding afghanistan and i think you will agree with me in the past few weeks we have underscored that point. the subject today is the reintegration of the effects of again afghanistan. that will and is relevant to the future and the national security interests of more no matter happens in afghanistan and in the united states with that time to come. if there is ever to be a true sustainable peace in afghanistan, reintegration of the taliban effort who will be necessary component. again,
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whatever that incurs or years from now. that is why today's report by sigar is so important. it is the first independent, public, official u.s. government report of integrating the over can batten's into the afghan society. it is the seventh lesson that we have advisement that we handed out which links you to all seven reports and we began this lesson in this program and scott worden let it for a while until he went back to the institute of peace. we began that program with then general john allen and the u.s. ambassador as well as other senior government officials. who reminded us that our agency
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was the only government agency with the mandate to look at the whole government and the whole of government efforts in afghanistan. like our prior reports, today's report is available in traditional and interactive format on our website's. www.sigar.mill and the united states government we are the only one that will determine what's in a the track did for. sigar took the specific investigation as they would say in part because in the spring of 2018, i was traveling and senior u.s. military and diplomatic leaders in kabul expressing interest in
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more about what didn't work in creating combatants. the body of literature with practitioners called the er and the re-integration that you notice that they are reintegration. we also viewed reintegration as a topic because a large scale combatants is genuinely not seen as foreseeable in the future. the goal of today's report as to help u.s. and other coalition agencies as they prepare for that task of assisting with the reintegration of the 60,000 taliban fighters. as well as the numerous other non taliban combatants. in the event that the afghan taliban agreed
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negotiations reach a deal. the report which ironically actually started 14 months ago today. relies on 51 interviews of u.s. an afghan other officials in a review of thousands of pages of documents and academic material as well as the rigorous period in that regard i am grateful to form a u.s. special representative for afghanistan and james jawbone as well as day data ericsson and as well as others who appear in this report. we really do appreciate their work. we also appreciate the department of defense and the state treasury which also provided valuable insight and feedback. while this report is
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a cigar product it is really a collaborative effort for all of us. in that report, we have outlined four teed five bigs, ted le cid's and 50 recommendations a policy makers. in an effort, to keep our remarks a little shorter these negotiations. i am going to just highlight a few takeaways from that report. first of all, as we all know, u.s. goal in afghanistan is sustainable and a political settlement between the government and the taliban that brings us peace and stability. there has been hope that a u.s. taliban for tomorrow will have again peace process which could lead to a piece of it. while
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there is no u.s. taliban deal at this time, we have the afghan political settled it and the ongoing fighting as donors from supposing the efforts overtime. our teams close examination of those efforts led to our first recommendation. that is not as long as the taliban continues, the u.s. should not i, repeat not support a comprehensive program with former fighters. because of the difficulty of protecting and tracking former fighters. this report as i mentioned and examines the five name 2001 efforts in afghanistan. it assesses their effectiveness or lack thereof. further, examples of
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psychopaths in they provide the real reintegration. they also examines the opportunity and constraints for efforts for now and the future to do quesadillas of reintegration and come up as well as review the rear reiterate you're on reintegration. i review all of these efforts that any reintegration effort it's very likely to fail in the absence of an agreement between the taliban in terms of how we reintegrate this kind of interference. why is that? it's quite obvious, our review points out that the reintegration effort is more likely to have a greater chance of success to formally hostile parties to demonstrate a high level commitment and a mutual trust and will allow the fires
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to peacefully participate in a program. without this, the fighters joined the program the and their families face enormous risk of retribution and during the war if not impossible in times to provide protection and that risk of retribution and security generally is a key reason that programs did not succeed. other factors with a very weak economy and livelihood opportunities with former fighters and afghan government to implement those programs. additionally early efforts to de mobilize the militias failed in part because those forces or at the same time partnered with those militias for securities
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and other sources. u.s. forces dependence then the commanders and groups are supposed to expand. based upon our review of the documents program evaluations in the independent studies have found mass programs did not lead to any significant number of reintegration's into society and does not leave the reduced sin of violence. we would not be reading a lot about what's going on in afghanistan. our report also highlights that from 2009 onward, the u.s. viewed reintegration primarily as a tool to fracture the taliban. that approach we understand that approach and
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unintended and damaging consequences and basically undermines the reintegration efforts the reconciliation there is no evidence in splinter the result in the current environment suggest that the program would have any greater chance of success then those efforts. moreover, given the legacy of prior programs, and renewed program we fear could in fact i have to trust needed to establish a truly lasting peace process. because the past is often prolonged, one goal of evaluating previous reintegration efforts was to thrive lessons and recommendations a future efforts. should the conducive
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environment present itself. i've we've seen in recent weeks of galveston moved quite rapidly and quite unexpectedly. the whole dramatic engagement by the united states and the government in recent months suggest that it would be prudent for all of us and particularly u.s. policy makers to consider now what reintegration would look like following a peace agreement to the afghan government in taliban. rather than waiting a day after the report we recommended that the u.s. only considers supporting that reintegration effort that first the afghan government and taliban sign a peace agreement. and a peace agreement that provides a framework and there is a significant reduction of
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overall violence and if there is a strong monitoring and system in place and i think we need to highlight the department of states today of raising serious concerns about corruption in afghanistan and there's a reason why. we need strong monitoring with the program on really integration. our report is very clear that any reintegration program, even under the auspices of the settlement is still facing significant challenges. one of the biggest problem we highlight is the poor state of the afghan economy. job listen us for example will present a major hurdle for successful reintegration. unemployment now stands at 23% and a 30%
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unemployment rate for the one fifth of 20% of the afghan population between the ages of 15 and 24. an estimated 400,000 afghan youth enter the job market and four fires to come in from the cold and join society. they will need access to a stable job or they then may return to entering they more profitable but illicit economic sectors such as organized crime, kidnapping and narcotics traffic. additionally we have the peace agreement with some portion with seven of gang refugees which expected to return. they are now and he ran and afghanistan. the world bank
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the afghan return from pakistan and iran of 700 trying to displaced the driver or conflict. these vulnerable groups in the already anemic economy as well as the capacity of the afghan government to provide social services and great jobs and humanitary aid. adding tens of thousands of armed of gain and taliban soldiers and their families will support and only exacerbate this challenge. it will also be critical of efforts to be directed not only the taliban but also members of state aligned militia and other
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armed groups that are fighting. attacks failing to do so would give the taliban a rationale for not participating as they will likely seek to protect themselves against their former rivals. accordingly, successful reintegration will continue economic for galveston and the rest of the community. we know approvingly that a number of voters right now including the united states are working with the bank on plans for a financial and technical support of unison with the goal of improving afghans economy and the services of the peace agreement. in a post settlement scenario this was for reintegration and the population. nevertheless, and lend me emphasize this. this is secretary pompeo's organizing
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today that pervasive corruption in the afghan government institution paired with limited capacity could undermine tangible benefits and resources to as you sigar prior work that i have led that has shown that without adequate oversight and additionally by the community resources tended for soldiers and at the risk of being stolen by corrupt government officials and senior commanders. if benefits are provided but do not also reach the communities they live in. the resentment that follows may also undermine the information efforts. in addition, we have to face the reality of the feature of the security forces. the afghan
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national security forces and the military of over 300,000. that will provide them the further complication. the taliban has shown interest to integrate of the afghan security force i don't have a seat on a desire he is one of the most contentious issues in the afghan government and the taliban with the u.s. government. failure to add to really result will threaten again the implementation of any successful peace between both sides. again, since u.s. funds will continue to support afghan security forces. robust an oversight would be paramount to ensure the successful integration of our adversaries
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and successful and safe views of those funds. some reintegration any taliban fighters who fight seasonally already part of the social fabric that may occur naturally and will continue just added into thousand one. and many taliban's struggle beyond the resurgence e to obtain that military power. tens of thousands rule reintegrate with a weak economy and the security and the tribal disputes and unresolved grievances. i ask a could have disgruntled fault with the terms of at peace. so in a piece of the settlement scenarios u.s. policy makers
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must consider the conditions in which they support these funds with reintegration efforts. including the weather of which they should be targeted programs or weather development programs are appropriate to address the issues up front. in addition, the u.s. sanctions have limited assistance and certain members of the taliban and in control they need to have those individuals and areas excluded from the economic development. if a peace settlement opens the door for a system to reach previously accessible population. the community will also face hard questions about how and where they will direct that assistance. the logic justifies reintegration program will assume that ex combatants
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pose greater security risks then all other born herbal populations such as jobless youth. it's reasonable to observe that afghans will have recruitment groups such as isis and reintegration therefore should be a appropriately balanced of under other priorities. finally, as quickly sigar as pointed out before in our high risk congress and issued earlier here, an afghan political settlement will not be into play of insecurity, corruption or weak government capacity. something that u.s. agencies need to take into account of the successful disagreement. and conclusion, it is often been said that it's far easier to start a war then
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two and one. a sentiment that i view as an afghan government that we would all agree with. even the political settlement is reached, of grandstands problems will not magically disappear. the moment the ink dries on an agreement. we have to be realistic. that's what this report is saying and let's be realistic. a failure to reintegrate combatants of all stripes and to afghan society will only lead to the continuation of the years cycle that has led to generations of afghans growing up, knowing only of death and destruction. likewise, which has led to many of the afghan supporters around the world continuing to sacrifice treasure in this
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recent land. should a sustainable and political settlement be reached, some of which the success of that agreement in large part on the successful reintegration of the taliban and other combatants. as are reports of view an efforts in columbia this is not an easy process. should the united states support such endeavors. we must learn from past mistakes. we must set the reasonable expectations and must identify and employment practices in all of this i hope is insisted by the report that will be released today. let me end by just saying this. i'm saying this as a sigar and the
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great team that has given you this support. this is an outstanding team. first of all, i'm going to ask them to rise if that's allowed. he kate bateman led the team with this report and her colleagues were maryam and i always mispronounce your last name but please forgive me for my ignorance. matthew reuben, or is matthew. jordan sure you. along with nick ally, tracey and of course last but not least joe who is in charge of our program. these people will be here today and some will be at the panel discussion and if
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you have any questions let me just say that i've worked in the government for 40 years. i worked on the hill and the department of justice law any department of comedy as well as sam none. even it's people like that team that makes me proud and puts the special in special general construction. thank you very much. (applause) i do not want to take and i'm just a big mouth for the
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agency. i don't want you to take the time away from the great panel and i think that they are the miracles of modern science. i'm sorry gotta speak i gotta take a few questions. >> i closely follow sigar a new report for a lot of research. where are you taking all the lessons and what's next? well there will be impossible action policy? we'll see the past 18 years the great work that she sigar is doing. what should be done? >> that's a very good question. all of our work and the lessons learned is that we try in congress to issue the
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administration and the lessons learned goes out and many of you are here today and our members are trying to incorporate these lessons into practice. ironically, but not really lessons learned until they're actually adopted and as over trying to do. i actually try many agencies with many people and modest might reports were briefing for almost two hours. we tried to get it incorporated into the best practices in the future so that's what we're doing. >> the gentleman right in front of you. >> thank you john. i'm with you afghanistan peas campaign. the peace process and el salvador which un implemented and it's a little bit differently with columbia and that's not the case in afghanistan. do you see
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a role for the un outside of the agents who talk about the need to monitor? house is going to work since they probably think they're winning right now. what role -- who does the monitoring that you mentioned? you >> for u.s. government funding i met an agency that can do the monitoring and i evaluate it if it's u.s. funds should beat the usa. but by the time we come in we are like that war about the police and detectives and it's a chalk outline that has been stolen. but i think there is a role for every government agency and a role for every international agency for strong monitoring and evaluation and we talk about that in the past and have concerns about how well do you and does the job of monitoring the value of a lot
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of program in afghanistan. we have concerns are going to starting another audit for the bank on how they monitor the archie f.. i should say i highly recommend you read secretary colombo's concern about corruption with something that we raise and is put back money with the idea going to the public utility in afghanistan and we have highlighted problems with that utility and we talk about the problems there and the problems that are going to a archie f. so there is a role for everything as not just sigar and their jobs it's also afghans job so we have concerns about the committee and there needs to be an enrollment i need to do something and maybe that's not it but it's in a
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completely different role. maybe one more question because i could talk for hours and i don't get paid by the word. right behind you. all answer one more question i hear. i appreciate it. >> do you think i'm just wondering if you have the opportunity the other factors that the taliban are self driven movement and they do have other original players the reintegration in afghanistan without losing those players and the issue of iran the saudi arabia and i'm just wondering what are your views on that. >> i'm going to defer to the panel with kate bateman who are
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team lead is going to be but we did not have a peace agreement or a peace process so i think you're hitting in that area. this will have programs that will try to draw lessons on that so i think will be able to answer questions. there's one last question at the back of the room. maybe they don't have any questions. i'm forcing you to reach you >> alec bates from iowa him in the absence of reintegration that's not supported by the u.s. and has the impact that seem to effect? >> we talk about that and we expect there to be one season to seize and are saying is don't develop major programs in the peace agreement and people
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will and i think kate can talk about that when we identify examples that are turning in their gun and they're trying to get back into the community with a full long program with a peace agreement and without that security is not going to win. thank you very much for those questions and i'll be around afterwards and my staff will be around and if you have any others but thank you very much for allowing us to release this report here and to come back and see our friends, thank you. law (applause)
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>> good morning my name is scott worden i'm at the institute of peace so i like to introduce you to the panel with a discussion between now and 12:30 to talk about some more specific financing reports. i would like to say two points of observation on my own. one is the value as was said earlier, this is the only u.s. government a port of this area and afghanistan of integration and the value of documents that is over an 18 year engagement and the program is to talk about people utter at 15 years old and the first and afghanistan in 2005 any policy makers have not experienced any than having the full chronicle of this engagement in one spot is an issue we've had with the resource. the other thing which
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i hope we will talk about today and in the way that we structure these panels. it's illustrates some of the contrast between the policy objectives that at the top level drive some of these reintegration programs, for better or for worse. and the ground realities of what are the calculations that afghans make on the ground both combatants but also community members to see whether reintegration is worth taking a risk for, whether it is worth supporting. and there has blended between the policy objective in the ground realities. our panel, which i will now introduce has extensive ground experience as well as policy experience and i think through the remarks you can get some of those issues. so first on my left is kate bateman. as she was introduced she is the director of this report. she is the supervisor of the lessons learned program. and she has also done reports on anti corruption and she
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worked previously on the council of state relations and how. coming up soon will be timor sharan he is with the interdependent directorate of local governments. good evening to you timor glad you could join us from cable. he previously was a senior problem for the crisis group she's worked for the asian -- civil society background he's also academic having done research and his ph.d. on local governance and development. eric aghast and is second on my left she is on the global public policy institute. her research that she has published widely on militias in iraq, afghanistan and syria. previously here leading the
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afghanistan and yemen rule of law programs for the institute of peace. this is johnny walsh. he has spent ten years focusing on afghanistan the middle east. he is spent time at the un for afghanistan new york. he has focusing on the afghanistan peace process for a. so without further ado let's first hear from kate. >> thank you scott. we are so grateful to to more, america, and johnny for bringing their expertise to this. i would like to pick up on a few points that were raised and also say a bit more about our other key recommendations from the report. the report answers two main questions, first, how should u.s. policy makers think of the reintegration of ex combatants in afghanistan in the current
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and firemen of an ongoing insurgency. and second, how should they think about reintegration in a future, hypothetical scenario where there may be hopefully a peace agreement between the afghan government in the taliban. so to answer the first question of the current environment of insurgency, we can look at the track record of those reintegration programs that were implemented from 2003 to 2016 as scott mentioned during that time there are some program in place two of those programs were targeting state aligned militias and illegal armed groups. and that was somewhat of a different context because those are implemented in the wake of the -- agreement in 2001. the second two programs were ptsd and a pr easy. they were undertaken in the insurgency our report found that none of these programs
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worked to successfully and reintegrate any significant number of former fighters sir surely there are and to and stories of people returning after fighter life but we have no evidence that those programs successfully reintegrated large numbers are fighters or had any role in those anecdotal stories. there were three main problems. one is vetting how do you determine that someone is an actual fighter in this complex environment, how do you determine that they are genuine in their desire to stop fighting, and to as mr. south co--related the problem of protecting your participants. if you are an actual fighter, the basic thing that you will need is a security guarantee for you and your family. and taliban fighters were facing threats from if you did want to
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reintegrate, you are still facing threats from the taliban, your former comrades. afghan forces who might not know or care that you have reintegrated. and other members of the community who may be seeking revenge against you for abuse committed by you or your unit. so with all of these threats coalition an afghan forces did try, they did take steps to try and protect those members of the taliban who are trying to reintegrate. over 200 were killed in the program. it was very difficult to sink targeting less among many different actors. afghan forces, u.s., military and afghan intelligence. a third problem was tracking and monitoring resurgence. it is very hard to know if they have stayed out of the fight or indeed if they ever left the fight. there were
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other implementation challenges as well including dispersing and spending money and developing the afghan government kit pasadena that was needed to manage the program. ultimately wanted these to be afghan led programs. this is just more reasoning behind that key recommendation we make. that the u.s. should not support a renewed program during the current insurgency. >> on the other hand we do recommend that if and when the afghan government and the taliban enter negotiations, the state department should encourage both sides to negotiate and to figure out how former fighters will be integrated into society. it is afghans, including the taliban, the u.s. is going to have to be okay with the fact that the taliban will have a very big boat in this most likely, they will ultimately decide the framework for reintegration. and at the details are not worked out during negotiations. then implementation, which is
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already externally hard. it will be even more difficult. our report also makes a broader recommendation to the u.s. government that state usa id should designate an existing office to lead and advice on these issues, on reintegration issues. there is a real lack of expertise and leadership in the u.s. government on this issue. and we think it is time that we built some in-house expertise. so shifting gears to a hypothetical inter afghan political settlement as andrew and mr. sopko highlighted it might be difficult to imagine such a settlement in place that could open a door for real reintegration. but it is -- does not make it any less urgent with the number of people dying. the chances of a viable process are still better today than they have been in 18 years. and last but not least,
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i think no one would argue that the u.s. government does not have plans and prepares too much for how to sustain a peace agreement. our military friends would agree with that as well. admittedly, there is a lot that we do not know about a potential future peace agreement. we don't know what the power structure will be. we don't know the degree to which the taliban and afghans forces will remain secure not fracture. we don't know if all afghan ethnic groups and political elites will back in agreement. we do not know the scale of international presence that may persist. and all of those factors and more shape the prospects for reintegration. but despite those uncertainties. our report offers parameters for how the u.s. and afghan governments can approach reintegration well planning for the very big risks and challenges that they will face. we point out that brought
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development programs can help ex combatants because the process of reintegration will not entirely depend on whether there is a target reintegration program in place. it is important to distinguish between the actual process, some of which can happen naturally versus a program which is designed to facilitate that process. we need to ensure that development assistant reaches these people and their communities and hence, our recommendation on u.s. sanctions. to be assured that u.s. assistant can reach these people in the area is the taliban now controls. mr. sopko also described a recommendation that the u.s. should consider supporting a integration program only if three minimum conditions are in place. i just want to highlight this one. first, those conditions, a peace agreement set a framework for integration. second, a large reduction in violence occurs to enable assistance to
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reach former fighters in these communities. and three, a strong monitoring and evaluation system is in place so that we know if the program is working or not and can make adjustments. finally, a report highlights several actions but the afghan governments could consider for future reintegration efforts. for instance, the need to include not only taliban -- we are not only talking about taliban fighters, because there is a proliferation of armed groups and afghan society, which i'm hoping he erica gaston can speak for. but they must not be the only one included in a reintegration effort but there must be other coalitions included as well. and not doing, this we do not want to give the taliban irrational to not participate. any future effort as the ig also underscored. must ensure that communities are ensuring that the former fighters are part of the
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reintegration process. they cannot be angry and resentful about advantages given to former combatants that are perceived to be unfair. we also suggested international duty are experts advise afghan experts on reintegration they can come from both sides of reintegration from. columbia northern ireland to give the afghan negotiators some sense of what is happening in their countries as well. i will stop there, i look forward to my fellow panelist and reactions on this issue. thank you so much. >> great, thank you so much. timor sharan we will turn you over to you. thank you so much for joining us from kabul. and we welcome your reactions to this report. >> greetings to you all from cable. thank you to the team
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working on this and providing this report on reintegration of taliban fighters. regarding you're reports key findings, there solid. but we emphasize a number of points from our perspective. first of all, given the local dynamics of politics in afghanistan local elites are powerful. and control participate. they're attempting to promote an expensive political network. it is important to ensure that reintegration does not become as it did in 2002 through ddr a
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process of resourced distribution for powerful commanders and leaders to expand their power. secondly, it is important to get local elites and powerbrokers early on. as early as possible, possibly as early as peace negotiations begin. to ensure that they do not splinter. therefore we must pursue a process based mechanism that allows consensus building at the local level and shows inclusive subtlety. and it clearly points out that it is important to have a shared political vision at all levels of the state. second leave the report also rightly points the important of economic and social aspects of reintegration. and i want to emphasize the letter to. which
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seems to be often given less attention in previous reintegration programs. we cannot simply quantify reintegration through short term economic benefits. and should not simply limit it by numbers. for social integration it is important to understand afghanistan society norms are based on a sense of honor, dignity, and having a voice. which is crucial for any successful reintegration program. and let me give you an example, a year and a half ago i was speaking to a captured taliban fighter. i had a brief conversation with him and we had it he was a former fighter and he had joined the taliban.
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when we asked him the reason. he said for 23 years he was a jihadi any had a purpose. but he felt powerless in the complexity of the local dynamics. leading to this a conversation about honor injustice in afghanistan which cannot be understood in a western sense, individually. it honor and dignity as felt collectively. it includes extended family and the community as a whole. >> i was in kandahar in a district that the taliban had full control of. i was seeing the governor's office and they
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father the deputy governor at the governments compound and someone had written the tech guy sitting there was losing to members of his family but he was reintegrated and i asked him a few questions and realized that he had the village support and was stigmatize and was a key part of that success. on the plane back i talked to a former taliban who used to work in the office and wanted the he people to campaign for food the province and the reason he was successfully included in this mechanism was because he had the tribal support. which
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brings me and clearly highlights the importance of our dignity and giving us voices fighters that we must take a community based approach. >> technology works in and it doesn't. you cut out for a seconder please continue. >> maybe i make the fourth point then. was that we must employee committee based integration. to do this, we must have district structure. as part of the program structure can be very useful with the councils and it combines 48 villages and the
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subcommittees can be a very important entry point and the ex combatants and deplatform privilege and the social dialog and will help us with the vetting process in something that my colleagues have already mentioned. fifth on the political representation it's important to give them a voice with the agency and show that there politically presented. what's included in any peace agreement with afghans that there is some sort of election at the district level and it hasn't happened with ex combatants for office. and at the village level, they started
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a program for vice and 50% of women are represented through the council and huge for a 9% of them are in leadership positions and that's the missing link for us. columbia is a good example of my expertise were were in the sunset closet at the district level and adopted for the district counsel. my six point is that i cannot emphasize my work experience with the government with the resolution mechanism. right now, unfortunately, there is a mismatch in the alignment for responsibilities and the mechanism involved. and
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adopting town halls which is something that we're trying to do him in which we will have a resolution. finally, physically the justice and governments go together and we have the justice sector of the worldwide courts and have shown that if they are fully engaged in the sector. colleagues have pointed out in the week afghan economy let me emphasize that we must monitor the board meeting and the afghan government proposed an initiative for reintegration. which had two components. in short term, it's going to deliver a short term
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jobs through the citizen chart program and we allocate the districts for construction development for the bridges. and the district governments is to establish the and ppp. and he finisher by saying that over the last 18 years our economic strategy has encouraged one of the productions and it's a shift of economic growth and a number of steps of which i'll be happy to discuss with those that are part of the comprehensive post. thank you >> thank you very much timor sharan. let me turn to erica. >> great thanks. i want to talk
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about what timor sharan talked about in some of the positions of power dynamics and he reintegration my do in terms of fall i lined with pro government forces and under the peace process. i think what this report really lays out in this detail his some of the many pitfalls that happens past the ddr processes. dry down the sources of conflict became just another source of those that were appointed into the positions and overseeing the initiatives that were patronage and a lot of the funds were diverted which would pop up existing networks as timor pointed out and provided loopholes of the leadership upon through the government forces. on the taliban side you have the few fighters coming in or there were farmers or even a light with some of the pro
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government fashions to get economic packages. you could join the disgruntled economic things our offered and the loss of status. many of them were subsequently attacked and had lack of protection which you talked about in your report. it addresses the fight when they exactly went back in. we had problems with the past ddr interactions. i think it draws hard to find it when it has good things to say about the successful rapid reintegration in vienna stand. a put out one quote from the report which is a really good summary that you get their own assessment of the program that is overly ambitious and producing no satisfactory results and the world bank has declined to earmark those next economic programs and found evidence and
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experience that is setting aside the economic extensive for fighters and opportunities for corruption and further violence. so i think it's for the shadow and why get so many recommendations from warning signs about the reintegration. there is a narrative that they should be pursued now because the issues of changed. if you have peace happening on the table and u.s. is more supportive of reintegration in the past, there are prospects for it to exist. the support also highlights that the same conditions that scuttle of a lot of the past mobilization process is still very much in play. assuming that the peace process comes back that nobody thinks that the estimated 40,000 60,000 will take part in a process and will still continue to fight on. in addition, there are many number of armed groups are not part of that peace deal so you're looking at is an officer which
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everyone hopes for and will result in a smoother process and really mobilization that happened before and the same security pressure. more importantly, and this is what i really want to talk about is stretching back to the negotiations of a major blockage to both taliban reintegration that's coming off these other armed groups and four groups that were aligned with the afghan government. the question that you here is what do the taliban want to get out of peace process or out of negotiations with the taliban fighters looking for any reintegration package. what jobs they want, what economic package with except. i think in equally important question is not but the taliban fires would want what some of these pro government fighters would want. most in the past ddr processes and billets in security forces
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as a's resource of patronage and power and local fighters and they are unwilling to give that up and particularly with the share to the taliban so it's a real prospect going forward and as soon as it reintegration plan is put on the table it as spoilers any ongoing peace process. they're in discussions about power sharing and -- that's one major risk instead of putting this large reintegration package on the table that could affect the prospects for peace negotiations and particularly the incentives within the peace process. he second is that the current ideas is that there is some talk about reintegration proposal would look like. it is not only to put out some certain economic incentives but also that the taliban would
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want the afghan security forces. most people there are considering this question and don't necessarily want them in the army cars though pertain the police because they don't want the taliban to at least publicly at the moment support the constitution and charge law enforcement. so the third left option seems to be maybe we can give them a position within one of the different local force sources. so the afghan police or territorial forces are some other quasi force. this is problematic because these forces while some communities have invested well and respond to the community checks they had really mixed records so the best-case stereo is on the third of the sites and a lot of areas as they have an enabling force for getting on payroll and criminal or other economic groups to take further control
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of power and local area and they tend to the fight with the other groups and resource of the conflict. the idea of pumping the taliban through this is not good that they would want that as opposed to the force to be fully seek then but the central state of power and it's also about what's likely to happen is the scenarios were you would put them into the global forces and exacerbate some of the existing problems with some of the divide communities that will lead to more conflict. in other areas there already de facto under reintegration and are just sitting -- those are the current issues and i want to pull out the conclusions here and not getting a word in. what i took away from this report was the program done poorly in an adverse condition is worse
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than it at all. and this case is something worse and nothing until all of these other conditions will figure out. the rebuttal that you're going to get is what you want to do with all of this. cloud say is focused on all of the other fighters that are currently out there and not under full government control and creating a lot of violence at the local level and would anyway not to be part of the reintegration. so the current afghan security force numbers are about 300,000 and is not sustainable. everybody thinks that those who would have to reduce those by 50 200,000 would be part of those fighters and there's these local force units that have the unsustainable source of funding. they need to find birth for 30,000 afghan local reintegration priority. not to mention all of the section in the report talking about these law mittens who are waiting for that to come through. there's a
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lot that's already on the plate that needs to be sorted out and reintegration. without poisoning the well a future peace talks with this ideas. i will turn it to johnny now. >> thanks, erica johnny your next. >> i will try to be quick so we can get some questions. first my congratulations on what was a cathartic report. identifying some of the problems that frustrated many of us in government over the years. my own journey with reiterations integration in afghanistan started when i served there in 2010 at the height of the troop surge. enormous resources thrown at every problem. there was this guy named -- who came in and said he wanted to reintegrate. he said he was a significant commander. it was very hard to prove or disprove that complain. we thought he was, he probably wasn't one of
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the most important people we are looking for. and the short version of that experience was that we did reintegrate him. he came with about 25 or 30 people in his tail, which was often how it worked. it did start a small movement of imitators. probably more legit than fake. but it was virtually impossible to vet these people, even with the resources, they ended up being housed in the government prop compound or another existing ad hoc facility. and even though there was the story of visible momentum that was so elusive. it died within a few months, because you could not provide for more than that tiny critical mass and really ensure there security. and eventually he was not assassinated. so it was to me representative. i just want to make three quick points. one each on the past, present, and future. i think the point on the past is that,
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as we have all noted today, it was improved basically impossible to split or weekend the taliban through reintegration or a deflection strategy. it was not in the same thing to try but i do think our effort to do so often undercut are larger efforts to reach peace in afghanistan. and that included, for reasons we have discussed, problem for the person who reintegrates seven times and was never in the taliban in the first place. the fact that we could not seriously provide for any large number against a movement that had very substantial capacity to assassinate them. the fact that the taliban is an extremely cohesive movement that has existed for 25 years without ever experiencing a split that meant anything on the battlefield. and the fact that are very plain, not at all hidden efforts to split the group made it, i do not want to
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overstate this point but it made it harder to convince that we wanted a top down piece with them. which is a different discussion, but was much more valuable way to get to peace with afghanistan. the point of the president is that, you may have noticed, we just had a significant setback in the countdown to the peace process. for better or worse i have been working on this peace process since 2010. there have been other such setbacks. they almost always lead to a period of soul searching and out of the box options for how else we could get to a more peaceful outcome. and that conversation almost always includes a reversion to the discussion of, could we spawn mass deflections or could be split the group? it happened after talks broke down in 2012. it happened after the doha office closed abruptly in 2013. it happened in the early period of the south asia strategy when we were optimistic about the battlefield. that was one of the reasons we were asked to
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take on this problem. it was good to have creative thinking. it is not good to hang our hopes on what we have already defined as hopeless, in a more clearheaded moment of thinking as sigar has led for all of us. so we can talk about whether the best way forward is to revive the top down peace process or to try something else. we should not be tempted to revisit the idea that some low level campaign of attrition will just wear itself on down, it truly will not. and then finally the point for the future, if a top down process does get back on track, sigar is saying this is basically the first item in every list of conclusion and recommendation, mid conflict resolution may be helpless as far as the taliban is concerned but postconflict resolution is possible. this --
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weaving the international community need to want more than the parties do and the reason i say that is we have done a fair amount of research out of the different afghan parties including the taliban would like to see in a final agreement. they will often have a sort of minimalist view of what is necessary. i think the government, people on the government side will sometimes look at it more from the lens of how can development programs organically integrate people. and the taliban because they do not believe or want to acknowledge that fighters want a hand up from the government. however this is a country with a huge employment crisis. there is some sobering numbers of people in the taliban ecosystem included in this airport. we estimate as many as 200,000 if you include every category which is fully possible. failing to seriously provide for these people, even if the parties are tentatively willing to go animalistic. that is the formula that isis or its future
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functional equivalent is able to recruit a lot of them. people who get left behind by the peace process. so the efforts for making post conflict resolution is the most important. >> great, thank you all. really a rich discussion and a lot to talk about. we have about ten minutes for questions. so let me just move directly to the audience and wait for the microphone comes. we'll start with a woman in the back. >> thank you very much. i was part of the un deep team that developed. that in addition to all of the things that you said i think there are two other issues the vocational training and the actual jobs that are there. second, the most important thing that -- this is a program that was supported by -- when the donors went up against the president they stopped funding. it is one of the main things was, people who
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have integrated were expecting some money and then they were left out, and then the taliban came to them and said remember we kill you now are you coming fight with us. the number of people who have been taken for -- but anyway this was the past, the question i have for the future is about the communities. i think that we have a big dilemma. do we securities aid in communities that are going to reintegrate? are we going to get them more money? or are we going to assume that communities are behind? these what tim moore said was actually interesting. are we going to look at communities as support systems from the taliban? very quickly are we going to envision a paramilitary organization to fight the islamic state let me ask let's keep it crud look and
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give several panel us the opportunity to respond. >> i saw hand in the back the gentleman on the top. >> thank you so much i would tend to agree with timor there are different categories of fighters some are ideologically motivated. some are motivated by a desire to take revenge for the wrongs committed by them. some were lured by money and others are -- joined insurgencies because of the fear factor. i was wondering if the report suggests the same recipe to integrate all kinds of taliban fighters. or if there are different recipes involved besides justice and corruption? >> maybe hand the microphone
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tear left for one more question. >> i'm the afghan american chamber of commerce. if the taliban were on board for a peace agreement then one of the biggest man power sinks would of course be private security because he is still going to need security protecting any sort of investment in afghanistan. so it is fairly easy to take soldiers in taliban and retrain them, take away the assault rifles and give them shy guns and rifles and put them to work its private security. you still have many other reasons you need security, isis and others. so just seems to me there is a huge opportunity in the case of afghanistan. to essentially reemploy these people, retrain them. and put them to work fairly quickly. >> thank you timor, i hope you are able to hear those comments. maybe let's start with you to address whatever points he would. like and then i will go through the other
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panelist's. >> thank you so much. one of the key lessons that i have learned in the last two and a half years. is how important these are not only as a source of protection. and support but also as a way in which a lot of these conflicts are resolved at a local level. and as one of the audience members pointed out there's a need to different shape between different categories of the fighters. a lot of them have -- this is a country that has historical grievances based on land management and the current state structure. which is currently fundamentally flawed in the sense that it keeps power in kabul and does not
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empower local state administrations we did a basic survey a few months ago, around 75% of our district government time spent on this resolution. they've been very creative among these disputes. but a lot of these disputes are not contained at the local level. which leads to exacerbation at the national level and a tribal dispute between two tribes can lead to almost the collapse of the state and that province. because they have contained conflict at the district level. so i think it's important that we support and empower those in
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terms of authorities and responsibilities at the district level and administrations. and with those sorts of disputes. by empowering those, the reintegration efforts will will be playing a key role in terms of successfully reintegrating what could be part of the different categories of the taliban. the second issue i want to link is the connection between justice and the governance. (technical problem) they need to be successful on the justice front and that means we need to rely on informal justice. i find ways to merge the effectively utilize this fixing mechanism in the local system and others. we can be very creative and
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resolving some of these excuse with representation. i'm personally believing that the afghan model of the representation can be much better and more successful than the election. we have organized district councils and we have set that's going to take a lot of effort. the reality is we can do that indirectly and give voices to people who have a village elders and if the district had 80 to 100 village elders and he can bring them every two years of the district and we can have them for a week or so and can choose that district governor or council. we've been relying on where we
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can do all of this and have the power in the communities and local administrations to be able to effectively overcome some of these challenges and produce grievances. >> thank you very much. i'll give each of the panelist a chance to respond to those questions before we close. >> i can take a shot at something. partly in response to the question of whether there would be a paramilitary force against isis and response to the question about rehab being taliban as these security companies or something like that i, think it's hard to know in advance exactly what role is going to beat the white one in a change of galveston and all reaches hope postconflict at
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the moment. my personal view is that it would be virtually impossible to provide for what i think is the largest insurgency in the world without significant news of the tool that they
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