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tv   The U.S. Middle East Oil Since 1945  CSPAN  November 23, 2019 6:54pm-8:00pm EST

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c-span, your unfiltered view of government. announcer: sunday night on book tv at 9:00 eastern, a discussion on a warning looking behind the sins of the trump presidency from from an anonymous source. >> he is the ultimate decider. of course, that is the job of any president. that he really follows his own instincts on everything from foreign policy, which we have seen so recently with the syria decisions, to the marketing, that joe was just talking about. he is his own press secretary, his own communications director, his own national security advisor. >> people in congress have given away their powers and authority to the other pennsylvania avenue fairly steady over the decades.
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the one way to do something about it is to do something about it. announcer: watch book tv every weekend on c-span two. this congressional briefing, we hear about the role of middle east oil in american foreign policy since the end of world war ii, especially about the importance of saudi arabian oil. >> i want to welcome you here this morning. thank you all for coming. my name is dane kennedy. i am the director of the national history center. which is sponsoring this briefing. it is on the geopolitics on middle east oil, historical perspectives on the current crisis. i want to just briefly explain what we are doing here and why we are doing it. this is part of an ongoing series sponsored by the center that brings historical perspectives to current issues. is strictlytself nonpartisan, and the purpose of
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the program is not to advocate for any particular policies, but in fact to provide historical context to help inform policymakers and the public as they deal with difficult issues. thank or acknowledge the financial support of the mellon foundation, which makes this briefing possible. i also want to thank regional weekly in the back of the room, which is the assistant director that helped organize this. i want to thank the office of gerry connolly, and also alert you to the fact that you all have index cards on your chairs. this is for questions. speaking,senters are feel free to jot down questions. we will collect them. the second half will be devoted to q&a. we will collect the questions and go from there. thank you all for coming.
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david? david: good morning. thank you for coming. i have been teaching international history at georgetown university for 30 years. the rest of it is in the flyer. i workedmention briefly with the congressional research service, the little longer for the department of energy, the conservation of solar, and seven years at the state department and historian's office. flyer notes, my research and publications focus on the political economy and geopolitics of oil. i want to say a few words about the importance of studying history. there are many ways of understanding the world. why study history? i would say first, in addition to being intrinsically interesting, it expands a range of experience. learning from other people in
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other times and places forces us to think outside our own experiences in time and place. studying history helps us understand who we are. as individuals, nations, and human beings. to popularcontrast usage, history is not just about the past, but also key to understanding the present and preparing to face the future. studying history helps to understand how the world got to be the way it is today and then helps us understand the forces that govern its ongoing evolution. as my late teacher michael hunt and his co-author wrote in the 2012 book, arc of empire, without historical perspectives" , we flounder in mid-oceans, the shore with which we came already out of sight, the land we seek will be on the horizon."
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as a historian pointed out many years ago, history is also a way of learning. the methods historians use to understand the past are the same methods we can and should use to understand the present and to think about the future. i will give you some examples. historians stressed the importance of context, as dr. kennedy pointed out. it matters a lot when and where events and decisions are made. although historians study change over time, they are also sensitive to continuities of change and continuity are very important. research the interconnectedness of human experience. they try to see the world rather than focus only on some factors. place great emphasis
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on close engagement with facts and primary sources. you have to read a lot. studying history helps studying history helps us develop the ability to identify relevant sources and it helps us distinguish between types of sources and how to support conclusions with evidence. it helps us learn how to evaluate different interpretations and how to distinguish between evidence-based conclusions and unfounded statements. on speakers will draw knowledge based on years of research. context. emphasize they will examine continuity as well as change. they will analyze interconnection between the many factors that influence the geopolitics of oil. they will strive to provide you with a historical perspective on
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the current crisis. are anakers today associate professor of strategy at the u.s. naval war college citino of rice university. he has written many articles and books on the middle east. the bookt book one of prize from the city of -- society of historians. it is a great honor. i will turn this over. so, there is no need to go over my background.
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i am an associate professor at the u.s. naval war college. i need to add a disclaimer. while i am here on an official capacity, none of the opinions i express should be construed as expressing the official opinion of the united states government or its agencies. a talk i give to my students, regarding the oil industry. i will try to keep it to 10 minutes. the aim of this talk is to give you an overview of how the industry operates as informed by the study of history and the second point, do x plane how oil influence u.s. policy and strategy since 1945. the first point, oil is different from other commodities. for most commodities -- i will give you a brief discussion of
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macro economics. not even an economic historian -- but you need to know, for let'sommodities -- imagine shoes. the supply of shoes is shaped by the demand for shoes. if there is high demand, you will produce shoes until the supply exceeds the demand, at which point you cut back on supply. that is straightforward. oil does not operate under those conditions. inelastic.oil is if oil is two dollars a gallon for three dollars a gallon, you are still driving to work. it does not do a whole lot to affect demand over the short term. the more important factor shaping supply is not the demand, but rather the price of oil. the price determines whether
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certain supplies are economical to produce or uneconomical. if you have a high price for oil, it makes sense to produce oil in canada. at a low price, that makes no sense. factor behindtant shaping the supply of oil is not demand, but the price. point, lots of economists, including nobel prize winners, to tell you that oil is fungible. it is whether or not something can be substituted for another. theoretically, coke is fungible for pepsi. -- a lot of economists like to talk about oil is fungible. they use the analogy of a bathtub. oil taken from one part of the bathtub is replaceable by oil
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from the rest of the bathtub. the problem is this is wrong. anyone who works in the industry can tell you. oil is not fungible because all types of crude oil are not the same. oil is usually dominated in two ways. -- that hasor sour to do with sulfur content. or it is heavy or light. u.s. shale oil tends to be light, sweet crude. whereas oil from the middle east , but also sourht . a high sulfur content. why does this matter? oil of different compositions cannot be refined in the same facility. if you have a refinery there to
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produce light, sweet crude, it cannot handle heavy, sour crude. the process of converting refineries can take several months to several years. never think of crude oil as being fungible. if refineries are designed to process oil from the middle east , that is all they can handle. they cannot substitute it for oil from the united states or africa, which has different compositions. an important fact to bear in mind. oil is expensive to produce, but not scarce. scarce.ot how much do you pay for a gallon of gasoline? back home, $2.50. think a little bit higher. let's say it is three dollars a gallon.
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how many liquids in the world can you buy for three dollars a gallon? go to the supermarket. how much does a gallon of milk cost? pepsich would a gallon of cost? relativelys inexpensive considering how much we use. bear inrtant thing to mind, there are high barriers to entry in terms of finding oil and producing it and the economy -- the marginal cost of oil goes down the more you produce. but it is tricky to find and produce oil in the first place. the other point, how much oil is there? if i knew the answer, i would not -- generally to answers. geologist how much oil there is, they will tell you, based on the existing state
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of technology and how much they thisabout the world at point in time, able to view an answer. that answer is only good for that window of time. it is based on their knowledge at that point in time. that is why geologists every 20 or 30 years will tell you, we only have 30 or 40 years of oil given these rates of consumption. every 30 or 40 years, it turns out we have more oil. that is not because geologists are idiots. geology is not a predictive science. it studies the earth's past, not its future. economists are probably the people you need to ask when it comes to how much oil is there. they will ask, if you want to know, tell me what the price of oil is. if the price is high, odds are
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there will be large quantities of oil. if the price is low, that will shrink the amount of oil available because it is not economical to produce. what is the position of the u.s. government regarding prices? we want high or low prices? high prices carry severe economic costs for consuming nations. gnomic growth and promote inflation. as we have seen, low prices can cause problems. they discourage efficiency or conservation and will tend to undermine the political stability of oil-producing nations. sorry i have to barrel through this. i want to sketch out, why is soil significant? why is it significant u.s.
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policy and strategy? east or gulfddle oil is at the center of u.s. strategy since 1945, but not for the reasons you might expect. both would say it is significant because we need to for ourselves. strangely, it is not because we needed for ourselves. in thert middle east oil 1970's, and even then in the 1980's, once western hemispheric production came online, importance of the middle east to u.s. supplies tended to decline. what is more significant, this oil was vital for european and asian consumption. the oil is not important for the united states, it was important for u.s. allies. that is a factor probably still continues. asia-pacific, basically
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all you as partners and allies oil.-- rely on middle east secure supplies in europe and japan after the second world war , discourage them from lying to economic nationalism by developing synthetic fuel sources domestically or grab resources from neighboring countries. we did not want to have a replay of pearl harbor because japan or germany man short on gasoline. development of the gulf center of oil production for the most part tended to promote price and supply stability. which promoted american prosperity after the united
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states became a net importer of oil after 1948. the middle east significant? it is not the amount of oil it produces. lots of places of the world produce a significant quantities of oil. significant about the middle east is, it will in level export markets. there is a small consumption within the region relative to how much it can export. the slight capacity within the middle east. how much they can wrap up production or turn it down depending on under supply or oversupply. this prosperity, which is fueled by middle east oil, facilitated the containment of the soviet , and helpeds allies
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win the cold war. i think i have one more minute. what are u.s. aims regarding the oil industry past and future? i would argue there is not a whole lot of difference from what they were in 1945 and today. the most important factor, control over the global oil trade. not control over foreign oil fields. the oil is only useful if you have a market. as long as we control access to -- the developed world who tend to be more oil intensive -- as long as you control access, you don't need to control the oil fields themselves in the producing which makes relations with oil producers more amicable if you owned their sources.
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we want to secure oil for the u.s. and allies at a reasonable cost, which we do by commanding the comments -- we tend to be towards continental power, which prefer pipelines. controversy over the russia topeline from germany, it is not new. the united states traditionally viewed russian oil and gas exports to europe as a threat to u.s. national security because that is a supply that could not be controlled or intermediated by u.s. companies and the u.s. navy. we want to make sure oil revenues go to our partners and not to hostile oil producers.
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that should be self-explanatory. we want to enhance the economic position in the gulf, if oil producers are selling to u.s. partners and allies and doing so through u.s. companies, even if we are sending dollars to that part of the world, they will need to recycle those dollars using companies that tend to be american or allies. dollars. those , we want tontly prevent the domination of the gulf by external powers. this means, we wanted to have a monroeue doctrine -- doctrine for the dove. f. for the gul
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, which wasdoctrine designed to stop a potential soviet a bid to dominated the region and expended by president reagan the following year to include domination by any internal regime -- specifically iran. i will leave question in your mind. bearing all i have said, doesn't make sense for the united states to wind up its commitments in the gulf when the overall context that surrounds u.s. engagement is not so different as it was at the end of the second world war? u.s. and allies continue to rely on the gulf and control access to that by mediating supplies that travel overseas and controlling access to markets. thank you.
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>> thank you. nathan citino from rice university. i would like to thank the national history center for inviting me. i would like to thank all of you for coming to hear this discussion. ago, on october 11, the defense secretary, mark esper, announced a deployment of forces to saudi arabia. at the time, he said, saudi arabia is a security partner in the middle east and asked for additional support to supplement their own defenses and defend the international rules-based order. this statement and the deployment itself gives us an entry point in our discussion for talking about the history of the u.s.-saudi relationship and american foreign policy in the
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gulf generally. those phrases, like security , or a bargain of security for oil, are frequently used to describe the u.s.-saudi relationship. these descriptions serve to portray that relationship as natural, inevitable, and apolitical. historical research by me and other people in the field -- some great work being done -- shows there was nothing inevitable about the relationship, which developed over time and in a contingent manner. conflict, asof well as cooperation, and in a way that generated political controversy in both countries. in my remarks, i will give you a sense of the literature by
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talking about three major themes or topics in talking about the u.s.-saudi relationship. thefirst has to do with postwar petroleum order. the idea is the u.s.-saudi relationship emerged not on a bilateral basis, but is part of the system that developed middle westernoil for fueling europe and japan after world war ii. we talk about u.s.-saudi relations, we are not just talking a bilateral relationship, but to the place of the relationship within the larger system, that included major oil companies as well as --tes, oil transit states countries whose territory was crossed by oil on its way to market and oil-producing states -- that included governments in the region and great powers,
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like the united states and great britain. u.s. corporations formed the arabian american oil company to develop saudi oil and gold the acrossrabian pipeline four countries to transport oil from the gulf to the mediterranean. aramco-saudi relations were based on a deal in 1954 a 50/50 sharing arrangement. those relations were also based overpayment and ownership of the company, over the housing promotion and of saudi workers, and aramco's commitment to economic development in the kingdom. u.s. recognition and support for israel complicated this relationship and isolated saudi arabia within the arab world.
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topics has to do with the politics of reform, domestic politics within the saudi kingdom. recognition or argument historians make is, from the beginning of this 1930's, the government and american oil companies were involved in domestic saudi politics. strikes among aramco workers in 19 45, 1953, and 1956 latitude andnds for reform nationalization of aramco by the saudi government. the government suppressed these strikes and arrested or exiled leaders. , such as the national reform front, formed out of these uprisings.
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labor leaders and other dissidents regarded the u.s. airbase and aramco itself as constituting a colonial presence in saudi arabia. this was the era of anticolonial nationalism, decolonization in the arab world of the authority, influence, and popularity of the egyptian president. a movement for a constitutional ,onarchy, supported by workers some government employees, and even some members of the ruling family, was defeated in the 1960's. the u.s. government closed ranks behind the king, who opposed the constitution, and in 1964 deposed his half-brother.
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third -- this is the most scholarship on the relationship -- has to do with the 1970's and the period subsequent. the scholarship that examines , its973 oil embargo consequences, and the way the relationship was reconstituted following that embargo. prior to 9/11, the most serious crisis in the relationship came saudi arabia joint other oil producers in an oil embargo against the united states, imposed for american support of israel in the 1973 war. timeil embargo came at a when tight global oil supplies gave producing governments leverage over major companies.
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the result was a major shift in what historians have called the postwar petroleum order. producing states pursued what is called resource nationalism in the forms of higher prices, demanding a greater share of the wealth produced by the production of oil, and corporate nationalizations. in other words, demanding ownership rights within the companies producing oil within their territories. as a consequence, saudi arabia nationalized aramco in a planned takeover that culminated in the 90's with the creation of the state oil company, saudi aramco. which has a large presence in houston. that phrase i mentioned earlier, security for oil, a bargain
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between the united states where we offer security in exchange for secure oil, that security for oil bargain pertains to the , the period area after the oil embargo. u.s.-saudi relationship was reestablished on the basis of recycling petrodollars, especially through weapons sales produced by u.s. companies to saudi arabia, and saudi arabia's bonds,e of treasury helping to fund the debt of the saudi states, as well as support for anti-communist causes in the cold war, especially the support with the islamist insurgency identity soviet union in afghanistan after 1979. ally ine u.s. lost its the gulf, the shah of iran, to a
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revolution. the iranian revolution placed emphasis on site every as a u.s. ally.hasis on a u.s. the announcement of 1980, the doctrine in u.s. increased its dilatory presence in the gulf. this encompassed in the creation of the joint task force and later the u.s. central command, as well as debasing -- the in theof u.s. forces area. hundreds of thousands of u.s. troops were deployed to the region, including saudi arabia, war.g the floor -- gulf the u.s.ght expect,
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troop presence provoked opposition and resistance and opened a new chapter in the opposition against the ruling family and u.s.-saudi relations. al qaeda included saudi dissidents such as osama bin laden and veterans of the anti-soviet campaign in afghanistan. saudi leaders saw the u.s. as an ally against iran and its regional proxies. iranian writerly has entered a new phase as these across theompete region, a region destabilized by the 2003 u.s. invasion of iraq and its affects in yemen, iraq, .yria, lebanon the rivalry has escalated and
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intensified violence in conflict that are framed in sectarian terms, but are really about regional power. prioritizing the conflict with iran has led saudi arabia to mutate criticism of u.s. policies towards the iranian-palestinian conflict, even as the current administration has adopted israel's position on issues such as the status of jerusalem. it has a split of cooperation council. gulf has split the cooperation canceled -- counsel. oil tankers raise questions about whether the will-iranian governments seek to de-escalate their rivalry and implications of this
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development for the u.s. campaign of maximum pressure on the iranian economy through sanctions. as in the past -- if we are --ng the past as a guide rather than an apolitical partnership, conflicts over regional power, the place of oil in the global economy, and domestic politics in both will shape or determine contours of the u.s.-saudi relationship and u.s. policy going forward. i will conclude my remarks there and look forward to your questions. next very much. -- thanks very much. cards, if youur have questions, we will take the cards rather than the hand raising. to ask a question about
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opec. it seems to dominate a lot of people's minds. they talk about though back embargo in 1973, there was no opec embargo. it was the arab producing countries. that peopleatistics still list opec countries and non-opec producers. anymore?tant is opec course at the graduate and undergraduate level, and we talk about was there an opec era? is it still on? does it only last a short time? how could you engage opec's power? power, it is greatest
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when oil prices, ironically, are low. prices at sustain oil a low level for a long period of time, who controls the largest share of the world's cheap oil prices? who has the lowest cost of production? those tend to be producers in the middle east who dominate opec. have been an opec oil embargo, but there have in price increases to compensate u.s.he decline of the dollar following the shock in 1971, the delinking of dollar to gold. unfair to were producing nations, they were giving a nonrenewable resource
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at such a low price. if you have sustained low middle east will become more important, because it makes no sense to produce anywhere else. tendcally, low oil prices to increase opec's power. high oil prices may benefit opec in the short term. in oiljoys an increase revenue over the 1970's. that created a long-term problem. every boom lays the seeds for the next bust, and vice versa. an oil boom, having high oil newes leads to finding sources of oil, which leads to low oil prices, and the cycle repeats itself.
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because of the sustained high prices, not just in the early 2000's, but in the 1970's and 1980's, a new source of oil markets did not exist before oil, perhaps u.s. shale ofch undermines the price oil through production increases and cuts. >> i apologize to whoever wrote this question, they asked the same question i did. whatever happened to opec as an independent actor and shaping the geopolitics of oil? does it remain a force independent of the u.s. in the west? as a historian, i can give a historical context for opec. opec was established in 1960. established,t was the eisenhower administration viewed opec as a less dangerous
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outcome, or less threatening in ame, placing oil nationalist context. the egyptian leader, this great nationalism,-arab the fear was oil produced in the gulf would be used for political purposes, to pressure the u.s. in its policy toward israel in another context. oilopec emerged as an club, both arab and non-arab, that included iran, venezuela in the western hemisphere. opec, to the great relief of american leaders in 1960, took oil out of the context of arab nationalist politics and needed
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this producers club where the focus was on bargaining over prices and other kinds of technical issues. conceptual --of contextual point to make is 1973,e of the embargo of countries developing whose economies are based on the production of primary materials, raw materials, viewed that embargo as a kind of model for trying to force a reform or restructuring of the global economy in a way that in their view would be more just and more equitable to those kinds of developing countries that produce primary materials. ofs was known in the history the united nations as the new
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international economic order. it was an agenda of developing states. there are many reasons that didn't come to pass, why countries that produced products other than oil couldn't follow and theootsteps of opec arab oil-producing states. it had to do with u.s. foreign policy and opposition to that kind of agenda. thelso had a lot to do with the that the structure of global oil industry, the nature of oil as a global commodity, is different from other kinds of primary commodities like minerals. here.uestion someone asked about -- explain slack capacity, or excess capacity, and how it applies most to middle east oil. and maybe how it refers to saudi arabia in particular.
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>> power in the oil industry not just the ability to produce oil, but the ability to produce oil on demand, that you can increase or decrease production as circumstances may require. time, u.s., the longest that role was played by texas. it could increase or decrease production depending on u.s. or global commissions. that had shifted largely to the middle east. the kingdom of saudi arabia. tell, it hascan pretty much all of the world's slack capacity. it's the difference between what you produce and what you could
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produce. if theoretically tomorrow, if elsewhere inroblem the world, say venezuela descending into anarchy, problems in iraq, nigeria was having a systemic issue, countries in the gulf, specifically saudi arabia, can increase production to compensate for the shortfalls elsewhere in the world. gave through the swing producer. that power of increasing oil production to compensate for shortfalls anywhere else in the world lies not just within opec, but largely within the gulf. statistics for how much slack capacity in the world are really opaque. it's no more than 5 million barrels a day. it used to be about 10 million
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barrels. now it is 4 million to 5 million barrels. not like it's a closely guided seat -- closely guarded secret. i don't have much to add a swingan to say that producer is undeniable. saudi foreign also benefits from the perception that that is the case. small andthe more medium-sized producers coming add toand going to supply and maybe drive down twice to an extent. the other factor is the the 10ous production in
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years or so in north america in developing new technologies, tight oil that is available now in north america that has undermined that role as swing producer. >> that was another question, and the role of u.s. shale oil production. shaleave argued the industry is now the new swing producer, not so much because it has a lot of excess capacity, but it is easy to bring on and off-line. you have small producers, slack demand he lay people off. they can go on and off. what would you say to that argument? shale oil of production in the u.s. on the global balance of power in the oil industry? >> if there is an immediate shortfall --
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shale companies are in incredibly poor investment. they all have negative cash flows, it is not a profitable business to be in. basically keep the money, allow companies to produce oil at will, and make money through volume rather than the price of oil. this meant profitability was very low. what we have seen over time is the small companies are increasingly going out of business for having access to capital restricted. larger companies have taken their place.
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these larger companies do not have the same interests in maximum production and choose to make their money not through volume, but through the higher price of oil. they have interests elsewhere in the world and want to see higher priced oil if at all possible. i would argue shale has transformed the global oil industry by creating large new and other countries may play a major role. that's not the same as saying they have global slack capacity. the production you have at any given point in time, it is on production. the question is how much do you tod back production in order compensate for any shortfalls anywhere else? the only country in the world that has the ability through
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simple turning around to increased production is saudi arabia. played,the russians had it is really not opec, it is just saudi arabia. supposedly russia has been trading production cuts in order to stabilize oil prices, but as , itssia oil analyst told me is not clear the russians are trading oil production so much as having a natural decline in the productivity of their oilfield. we're the only country that is decreasing production and raising it as circumstances may require, the kingdom of saudi arabia. u.s. shale is not comparing in that same regard. i would throw one issue that is hanging over the global oil industry, i'm a change.
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of thecription i gave history of aramco and the way a plant naturalization in saudi arabia of what became saudi aramco in the 1980's, many have been reading. saudi aramco is going to be offered as a publicly traded of the, a couple percent company will be offered for public shares. in part, we are reading it is part of a strategy by the saudi kingdom to hedge against the possibility, and perhaps the reality of, decrease and demand for hydrocarbons as people become more concerned about carbon induced climate change. askedouple of people question about the saudi-iranian
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conflict. not only the saudi-arabian conflict, but the relationship of the u.s. and saudi arabia, as well as iran, and how it has changed over time. i would expand a bit on the comments i made. ofthe late 1960's, the sort principal imperial power in the gulf for many years for more than a century had been great britain. britain withdrew from the gulf, this cold war context of a power vacuum that increasingly relied on saudi timea and iran, at that ruled by the shah of iran, as the pillars of american foreign policy in the gulf.
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more powerfuluch regional state at the time. when the iranian revolution occurred in 1979, this posed a tremendous difficulty and challenge to the u.s. and its foreign policy in the gulf, certainly to the extent saudi arabia took that up, a greater responsibility as an american ally in the gulf. the saudis at that moment were experiencing their own difficulties and challenges. there was a seizure of a grand mosque in mecca, islamist militants. an uprising in the eastern province in the eastern part of saudi arabia. also the revolution. some background to that
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relationship among the u.s. and saudi arabia. >> somebody get another card. you seemed to comply earlier the conflict is less over religion and moreover power? >> that is my stance. i think that historians and other analysts look at that relationship much more as one two regional power over kinds of rod coalitions of states and regimes in the middle with one that is aligned the u.s., israel, other pro-u.s. regimes, and those that are aligned with iran, including syria, other states that are
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opposed to the first coalition. the emphasis on secretary and of political kind strategy that i think was seen as beneficial by parties on both sides of that conflict in mobilizing political support, and establishing transnational coalitions of supporters. seeingn, for example, lebanon as a valuable ally in the confrontation against israel and the u.s. also, a political strategy for undercutting the sort of democracy movements that we saw during the arab spring in 2011, and which have a history in the
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region, as i suggested in my remarks about the constitution movement in saudi arabia in the late 1950's and early 1960's. anybody would like to speak about the u.s. role overthrowing the iranian government in 1953 and the long-term implications? do we want to touch that? important topic we can approach from a number of different ways. importance ofl historians uncovering what happened and getting on the public record of what happened. recently, the u.s. state department produced a new volume of the foreign nations of the u.s. series, the documentation
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of u.s. foreign policy. that offered a much more transparent and complete accounting of the u.s. role in himnizing the coup against in august of 1953. professional historians are doing that important work of insisting that documents be released and be made as transparent as possible for historical researchers and students. another interesting point about that era is that even before the overthrowing, iran was under economic sanctions. for theind of precedent moment of maximum pressure on iran through sanctions on its economy. was, to a iran certain extent, embargoed so
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successfully, was this was a moment in the 1950's were a handful of major oil companies controlled the oil industry. that's really no longer the case. it's march more difficult to impose that kind of successful sanctions regime than it was half a century ago. also buyers like china and other countries who aren't part of the maximum pressure campaign. feel the need to make a point about iran and the coup. i'm simply pilfering and irani and colleague's work on this. there are a couple of things you need to bear in mind about the relevant toare real the subject today, important to history and understanding the challenges. is the coup in
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1953 is trumpeted not by the shah's regime, but the iranian revolution regime after 1979. it was more important to them, as evidence of u.s. perfidy, that anyone before hand -- as far as they are concerned, they are the ones who create the museum of the coup in the former u.s. embassy. may champion the role of the actor in domestic politics, not before hand. a marginal figure with iran, a member was marginal around domestic politics with foreign revolution. it is a revolutionary regime that is appropriating the legacy for political reasons, even though they have absolutely no time for secular democratic
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politicians in any other circumstances other than a u.s. coup. there is a tremendous decline in u.s.,n perception of the it is due to the fact -- the so-called status agreement in 1956. what really turned iranians against the u.s. is the notion beforeericans in iran the revolution, these personnel would be subject to extra territoriality. they would be subject to american laws, not iranian loss, that iran was being colonized by the brass, as evidenced by this agreement. the status of forces agreement that really undermines the perception of the u.s. and americans within iran before the
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revolution, not the coup. it is an important point to bear in mind, considering under what conditions we want u.s. troops to offer in other nations in the told insisting being subject american laws, not domestic laws. president obama's decision to withdraw troops from iraq after 2009, the sticking point was at with they withdraw, it was question of would they be subject to iraqi law or not? realwould have extra tour -- extraterritorial rights. this was unacceptable to the iraqis, hence the decision to withdraw u.s. troops. you can argue amongst yourselves whether it was a good point to make, whether pandemonium could if weeen avoided
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were willing to choose a different path. bear in mind, that was the sticking point, just as it was in the 1960's. >> we have a question that goes to another question of the supply/demand balance. that's what drives oil prices, that's what drives oil politics. what is the supply/demand valance today, and what are the factors that affect it? increase capacity for renewable power in the u.s. how would that change if the u.s. was less dependent on fossil fuels? how would it change u.s. relations with the middle east, especially with the persian gulf? balance --ly/demand isfar as we can tell, there only one place in the world
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seeing an increase over time, that's east asia. the developed parts of the world are seeing demand for oil. they consume a lot, that's not what the demand growth is. if you want growth in the industry, you are looking to sell to east asia and maybe to , considering we are still on oil when africa can modernize. the question is who is looking for access to those markets? that's where the money is made, in terms of future market growth. supply balance, it's the only part seeing any supply growth over the last few years, the u.s. that's because of shale, and 90% of the new oil supplies that have come online over the last 10 years is u.s. production. basically that's it. of course, where are the
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reserves in the world located? what's the cost of production of those results -- reserves? within the gulf, which has the lowest cost of production. supposedly venezuela has larger reserves, but they are heavy crude. nobody really wants to invest a lot in venezuela today for reasons that are related to oil. means that even if you have a lot of supply growth in the u.s., they are largely being consumed within the u.s. or the western hemisphere. the middle east remains important because of its low cost of production, it is the can part of the world that conceivably in the short to midterm satisfy expanding growth within east asia and south asia. to thank the national
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history center for setting this up. thank you for coming today. [applause] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2019] this is american history tv, on c-span3. each weekend, we feature 48 hours of programs featuring our nation's past. for more information, check out this weekend on "the presidency," a look at pat allison's political cartoons focusing on the presidencies of george h w bush, clinton, and george w. bush, including barack obama's election. here's a preview. with this one.
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incredibly timely. february 1999, after bill clinton is acquitted on impeachment. he is dancing on the left, playing bongos, smoking a cigar saying "free at last, break out the broad, i'm free at last." then you have history writing in the book in the upper right. andmoving finger writes having writ moves on. this is the part -- he may be wrong on this one -- if people remember, post impeachment, clinton was a fairly popular. he left office fairly popular. history doesn't just write once. we have seen the way history has continued to reevaluate bill clinton and his perceptions of change over the last couple of years. evenes sort of show impeachment effort fails still leaves a mark in history.


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