tv Politics Public Policy Today CSPAN April 1, 2013 10:00am-12:00pm EDT
. lot.dds up to all la the shredded she has been to try to shift taxpayer questions to automated systems. they have had help doing this but the tax code has been more complex. there is a growing identity theft problem. .he irs is running to keep up we have made recommendations that they make improvements to their website. their website is not as sophisticated their web site is not as sophisticated as many banks that you can gain access to your account. recommended that the
irs develop a strategy in that direction. host: what about people being able to get the irs refund deposited into their bank account? do you see an opportunity there to address the identity theft problems? guest: increasing the amount of happened, filings has coupled with electronic deposits, or you can have your refund directly deposited to your bank account has increased the expediency of getting your refund. electronically and use direct deposit, and has several advantages. people cannot steal a check from your mailbox. if you file electronically in the first place, the irs does not have to manually transcribe the information on your tax return into their computer system. that manual transaction process
inevitably introduces mistakes that and then the taxpayers have to try to correct. host: one last call. richard is an independent in pennsylvania. whyer: i would like to know when the news people talk about it and everybody hears it on the radio that we have people with $100,000 in errors and yet get appointed to high office? nobody says anything about it. before they get appointed. how can they allow these people to be in high office? it is ridiculous. you raised the issue is an issue for congress in the confirmation process. thates show the complexity
the irs is trying to deal with in enforcing the tax laws. that complexity, especially for people with complex financial situations, means that sometimes you are making mistakes, some on purpose and some inadvertently. host: thank you so much. that's all for this segment looking at the irs. that's all for washington journal today. we will be back deck 7:00 a.m. and eastern time. now to the brookings institution, a panel on negotiating with iran. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2013]
>> good morning. i'm a senior fellow here at the brookings center, 21st century security and intelligence. it's my pleasure to moderate today's panel discussion on dealing with iran and the iranians. western concerns about iran's nuclear ambitions go about two decades back. although iran claims the right under nonproliferation treaty to civil nuclear activities and nuclear technologies, including
enrichment for non-weapons purposes, there are concerns about the where it is going. ts continued actions in enrichment contravene un security council resolutions, which have called for iran to suspend these activities. iran's actions over the last 15 years promote questions on how far it wants to go in the nuclear field. this includes it did not disclose its investment centers until they were revealed by others. it has an indictment program that appears to be inconsistent with a nuclear reactor, particularly when iran has a contract with russia. 'sere are questions about iran continued efforts to develop ballistic missiles, which is the preferred method for the delivery of a nuclear weapon. and there are questions about iranian work in a position of nuclear materials and its failure to work with the international atomic energy agency to explain these activities. the assessment of the u.s.
intelligence community has been that iran has not made a decision to acquire a nuclear weapon but that it seeks to be in position so that it could move quickly to do so if and when it did make that decision. 3, to includenion germany, france, britain, began a dialogue with iran in 2004 to try to dissuade iran from some of the nuclear activities. that process evolved. russia, you had china, and the u.s. involved. it's referred to as the eu' plus 3.the eu 3 is been a dialogue in fits and starts. you've seen growing sanctions on iran. in 2010 the un security council approved a resolution which
applies an arms embargo. since then, the west and other countries have applied additional financial and economic sanctions on tehran. the last round of negotiations took place in february. the reports afterwards seemed to suggest some degree of cautious optimism by both sides. last month, experts met in turkey. the negotiations will resume on when thed saturday group will come together with iranian negotiators. as we look towards that, we are delighted here in this panel today to talk about how best to negotiate with iran and what does not work. we are delighted to have javier solana and carry sa - -gary samon. javier solana is a distinguished fellow at the brookings institute. he enjoyed a distinguished
diplomatic career including spanish foreign minister, nato secretary general, and your opinion's representative for security policy. it was in that capacity that from 2004 until 2009 he led the european union effort in negotiating with iran. gary samon is executive director for research and harvard. from 2009 until early this year he was a special assistant to the president and white house coordinator for weapons of mass destruction, which meant he was at the central american policy on iran and have opportunities across the table from iranian negotiators. we will have opening comments from our two palace and then we look forward to questions. >> thank you very much for inviting me to participate in this debate. as has been said, i was in charge of the negotiations for a long period of time until 2009,
from 2003, when i was the first tehran. to ar have 010 until today, i maintained some lines of , but ication with tehran don't have any responsibility. let me tell you how this started. it is important to get the perspective on how the whole process has gone. in my mind has been the most important moments and movements iran has taken. last moment i will say how i think the next steps could be taken in order to [indiscernible], with all the difficulties we have had in terms of [indiscernible].
by 2003, that was the first time the foreign minister and i went to iran. signed an important agreement at the time. it was important that we t thathe tehran agreement that it had two points. would not start their capabilities and we would give it facilities for whatever they wanted a peaceful use of nuclear energy -- and .conomic kelhelp that went for a year and then everything went ok. elections, there
was a change. agreement.nced that they did not sign the additional protocol aned the holding did not succeed. then ahmadinejad came to power. it was a year-and-a-half and then we met with the supreme leader. he appointed someone with home we did most of the negotiations. laranjani, he is somebody you can talk to and engage with. the difficult part of negotiation for me but irrational part of the negotiations to a certain
extent. startedtell you that it from you will have to suspend and we will offer you something. we ended up with that being impossible. they did not suspend. non-proliferation treaty would be maintained and they would regain their dignity. the most important thing was dignity. and self interest. you have to find an agreement between dignity and self interest. you listen to those two words over and over again. notquestions is we have been able to find an equilibrium. whenever they ask for dignity, we could not give it to them. they are accepting
sanctions. [indiscernible] keep that in mind, because we will talk about that. the two most important moments when we offer a new proposal, which is freeze. you stop your centrifuge at the level you have the day of the agreement and we will not take sanctions out , but we would maintain the level of sanctions at the same level. that was an interesting proposal, but it was misunderstood at the beginning by laranjani. it failed, because they did not want to take a position to stop assembling the centrifuge. there were not ready to give up
any rights. so then we continued with that and presented in iran a more program andreeze the visited with people from energy and other corporations. the most important thing is that proposal that i took with me was signed by everybody. by condoleezza rice for the first time. ministers from european union always signs, but this one was signed by condoleezza rice. thatwas a shock for them the americans stepped into the picture in this manner with a signature from the secretary of state. we thought that would give oxygen to the process, but that was a failure. president putin went to see the supreme leader supporting my
proposal. the result was a failure, not only a failure of the proposal but a failure of the negotiator laranjani. picture that moment with all the effort we had done. then we appoint a negotiator. he did not have the capacity to negotiate. he was just somebody who would tell you what you received the morning before the meeting but not having the flexibility to go into a real negotiation. until geneva 2009 which was a very important meeting for in thest time negotiations. meeting.a very good
i provided for a bilateral meeting. it was in that we thought we had uranium enriched to 20% and to enrich it outside the country. andhe end of the day -- there's much more informational that, but i do think at that time it was a moment that saw the possibility of agreement. if you analyze that period of that there was a sentiment it was possibly to get an agreement. we agreed formally on a referendum for 48 hours, but the whole thing was broken in those
48 hours. but we were close at the moment. let me tell you the results i see. what i see is several problems. tehran. elections in it would be difficult to get something going before the presidential elections. at the same time we have pressure from israel. i don't know exactly how had been a good agreement between benjamin netanyahu and president obama. whatever time is left will be short. the second big problem we have is syria. i don't think it will be iran without with solving syria. syria has a deeper relationship with iran. even between two
members of nato. they really have a very intense relationship. we thought solving that problem would be very difficult to get to the negotiations. for tehran, syria is a very important factor. russiat we need to have . we have two problems. the link between iran and syria. and we. and we have the p5. so we have a pretty bad situation. ist we have in front of us that. the other thing i like to mention is sanctions. sanctions to be reviewed before the end of this summer. today we have been able to put
tough sanctions on iran that are but theyheir economy, are still maintaining the price of oil at a level that is supportable. production is the there. imagine for a moment the economy goes a little better, there are more needs of oil. china atelling gas to a very low cost. grows globally, it will be very difficult to stop the most important thing we that iran would not able to export any oil. if china agrees not to keep buying oil and gas from iran.
so we have a really complicated picture in front of us. i think the iranians are really concerned. they know they are going against self-interest as far as the economy is concerned. it seems they have not found the money, would you give them the capacity to come out of the negotiations with their dignity they keep saying always the same pink, "we don't want to be a nuclear power, we want to be recognized as a regional power this is open. "we don't want to be a nuclear power. we want to be recognized as a regional power." there are many more things, but i will stop here. >> thank you.
javier has done a very good job of describing the ups and downs and frustrations and difficulties of trying to negotiate a nuclear deal with iran of the past decade. my expectation was that those ups and downs and difficulties and frustrations will continue for the foreseeable future. why? first, there's a fundamental difference among the parties on what the objectives of these negotiations are. from the standpoint of the united states, working through + one, we are trying to limit iran pose the capacity to produce nuclear weapons, by physically limiting their ability to produce the materials and by increasing means of monitoring their nuclear program so that we can detect future efforts to build a secret facilities. that's our objective. from iran poses standpoint, the objective is the opposite. they want to create the capacity
to produce nuclear weapons, which means having an unrestricted program to produce enriched uranium with as little monitoring as possible, whatever is required. so both sides have a very different view and national interest in terms of what we are trying to achieve. second, there's a fundamental disconnect in terms of what i would call the legal framework that they approached the negotiations, from the +andpoint negotiationsthe p5 1 comic-con onus is on iran to demonstrate its program is peaceful, by complying with various u.n. security council resolutionsand iaea that call on iran to suspend some parts of their nuclear program, cooperate, and so on. these un's standpoint, security council and iaea acts are not considered legitimate.
they are not required to comply with any of these resolutions. they should be treated like any enjoyingrty in terms of an extensive civil nuclear program under iaea and safeguards. given these fundamental differences and interests and perspectives, the theory of the p5-plus-1 has been to try to at least get agreement on some modest measures that would limit somes nuclear program in ways in exchange for limiting sanctions, in the hope that would create confidence and create a context that would make it possible to try to negotiate a more cooperative agreement and at the same time slow down the nuclear program. even in this very modest area,
but two sides are very far apart in terms of the quid pro quo. both sides accept the basic concept we are talking about limits on the nuclear program in exchange for limits on sanctions, but when you get down to the details, they are very far apart. forp5-plus-1 are asking action on the part of iran in terms of limiting their nuclear program, shutting down one, , inping production of 20% exchange for modest but concrete sanctions relief. in exchange, the iranians are demanding total lifting of all sanctions in exchange for stopping production of 20%, something that they could reverse overnight. even in terms of a quid pro quo for a sort of modest step, there's a long way to go before the two sides could come to an agreement.
i don't expect there to be in agreement certainly before the presidential elections in june in iran. nonetheless, both sides have an interest in keeping this process alive, so i expect talks to continue. there may be some incremental progress in terms of a slight narrowing of these big differences among the parties, but i don't think it will come to an agreement. at the same time, even if there is not a formal deal, i do think the iranians are exercising some the program for political reasons, mainly because in my view the supreme leader is focusing now on managing the presidential election and does not want to have to deal with a foreign- policy crisis. for example, the iranians are deliberately converting enough of their 20% in rich uranium to oxide form in order to stay below the red line that by mr. netanyahu identified last year
at the un. it appears as though the iranians are deliberately slowing down those parts of the program that they fear could orgger even more sanctions even a military strike, for the time being. that may change after the presidential election. but for now there seems to be some limits on the program. for the future, the most important question is whether or not it's possible to increase the current level of sanctions theutting even further market that iran enjoys in terms of oil exports. that is a real question. up to now, the sanctions have been remarkably successful in terms of limiting iran's oil exports, because there have been alternative sources of oil. china,main customers of india, japan, korea have been willing to cut back. and has had a substantial
impact. whether that can continue in the future depends on the global balance of supply and demand for oil. it will depend on economic activity, whether there's an economic recovery and what impact that has on oil. the question of oil exports is the greatest concern. is it possible for the additional cuts to be made, it makes it much more likely that there could at least be an interim agreement that would limit further sanctions in exchange for some limits on the nuclear program and potentially create a basis for trying to negotiate a comprehensive agreement, even if that negotiation fails, it still creates some breathing room in terms of limiting the program and slowing down the nuclear o'clock and making a military attack less necessary. i will stop there. >> thank you, gary.
youquestion to both of prepare have been times that you referred to 2009, the iranians did agree to basically transfer enriched toockpile 20% in exchange for them getting fuel for their research reactor. but the iranians walked back from that deal with in a couple days. it appears that within tehran there are differences on how to engage the question. how does that show up at the negotiating table? 2009 was important for many reasons. it wasber 2009 discovered another facility for enriched uranium which they had not declared to the agency. the the 5 plus the europeans
wer -- found out the intelligence that it was going on. we had information before september, but it was made public. hat was a big shock for iran to have to forthis -- to have to admit this. it was made public that they had another facility that had not been declared. with some of its friends frustrated with that discovery. thesecond thing is that for first time obama was already in power and for the first time the united states allowed an american to be at the table. burns at first.
we arranged to have bilateral talks in geneva. the climate was very good. we agreed on something very importanti veryran at that time fuel to put out of into the reactor that would create isotopes for medicine. argentina had been the country historically that was putting he enriched uranium into the reactor to produce isotopes. that was a difficult moment. to get out the same amount we put in. put theched and then other.
[indiscernible] we had a good meeting. we had a press conference. that wen agreement would not contradict one another. at least i or thought we celebrated. gary knows what happened to the two days after. big battles. leader at the end did not accept the deal. that was the end. for me that was the end. i was frustrated. i had maintained talks with la ranjani. president.unning for he is an important figure. electede if he is
president. at the end of the day, the supreme leader is the one who makes the deals. one of the big problems which has made things difficult is who is the interlocal tour. we have a system of naming an interlocal tour. but on the other side they may not match with the interlo cutor on the other side. >> i agree. the decision making process in tehran is very obscure. it much moreakes complicated in terms of trying to reach an agreement, politicaly because the competition among the various figures in iran becomes intertwined with the nuclear negotiations. and so, for the 2009 episode,
that was a good example where president ahmadinejad was clearly in favor the deal and to some extent the opponents were motivated, aside from the merits of the agreement, there were motivated by a desire to prevent him from taking credit for making progress. the collapse of the 2009 deal was a critical turning point at least in terms of what the administration's receptions were. it demonstrated how difficult it would be to get even a very shifted thement and president's policy to one that emphasized increasing pressure as a way to gain leverage and privilege. then we embarked on a very difficult six-month negotiation for and other u.n. security council resolution. at the very last moment, as most of you remember, brazil and turkey and iran announced an
agreement which was used -- seen in the white house as a transparent effort to try to delay sanctions. so we went ahead with sanctions. since then, we and the iranians have been locked in this spiral where we keep increasing sanctions as the negotiations make no progress. they keep going ahead with their nuclear program. both sides are trying to build up bargaining leverage. we have not reached a point yet where some kind of an agreement that would relax the sanctions and nuclear activities is possible. open the floor to questions. please wait for a microphone to a rise endecott's state your name and affiliation. right here. >> i am a washington
correspondent for a south korea news agency. good to see you here. i have a question. today the washington post speculation on nuclear ties between iran and north korea. what is your assessment of the problem? also, let me ask about north korea's nuclear test last month. plutonium ors uranium-based nuclear test. what's your opinion? thank you. >> as to what kind of material was used in the test, i don't think we know. there was no way to measure whether it was plutonium or highly enriched uranium. it could been either. in terms of nuclear ties between iran and north korea, i am not aware of any, but it is
something we have to be concerned about, because we know there is an extensive cooperation in the missile area and one could imagine that north korea could provide substantial assistance to iran in terms of enrichment. i expect the north koreans are considerably more advanced than the iranians are in terms of mastering centrifuge technology. so i think it is something we have to keep a close eye on. we know north korea in the past has been willing to sell nuclear technology and materials, such as the reactor they were building in syria. >> right here. howard morgan, a private citizen. what's our rationale for threatening war against iran in order to perpetuate the israeli monopoly on nuclear weapons in the middle east? why is a nuclear weapon-free middle east not part of the discussion?
>> it is cool. it ha-- it is. it was made clear about the facility. it was the first time [indiscernible]. of thathe agreements summit was to try to work card -- hard in two years to get the possibility of beginning a discussion about free-trade zone in the middle east. had to be appointed to prepare that summit. it has not taken place. it was in 2009, the moment in which motion in that direction was started. continues.at sort
the second phase did not take place for lack of agreement among the multi-billion players. wass something which already on the table for the first time. president obama put it on the table in the general assembly. for the first time, there was a meeting at the highest level of the ninth revelation -- nonproliferation treaty. >> president obama has explained in speeches and interviews why he thinks a nuclear-armed iran is not acceptable from the standpoint of u.s. national interest. the risk that it would lead to further proliferation in the region, the risk that a nuclear-arms to iran would threaten our allies such as israel and the saudis and others, the risk that it might
on purpose or inadvertently provide weapons to terrorists. has a very clear basis on which to say that he will use any means necessary including military force to stop iran from having nuclear weapons. the fact that israel has nuclear weapons is really a separate issue. has said, there's a process to try to achieve progress toward a nuclear weapons-free zone in the middle east. that will not bear fruit anytime soon, especially given the current circumstances in the region. all countries in theory support such a nuclear weapons-free zone including israel. the question is what kind of conditions would be necessary before you could put that in place. the conditions in the middle east are not rights for that now, clearly. -- ripe for that now.
>> barbara from the atlantic council. good to see both of you gentlemen. two questions. first, you think as long as we're talking to the iranians we will not be bombing them? computer virus that the obama administration inherited from the bush administration, was it a legitimate use of force against iran? very difficult questions. that therus, i think most important mistake was to recognize who had done that. was thereg time, it and nobody knew who was the father or mother of the virus. suddenly, for the sake of
prestige, somebody decided to who had put itny it. that goes to the heart of your question. if you are first person who put the virus in cyberspace, you are completely lost. i think it's a mistake. anyway. the second thing i would like to thisand i am convinced of and maybe everybody is not convinced, i think that the level of consistency and coherence on the p five is diminishing. it's diminishing first because of syria. syria, china, and russia are not in the same place that the americans and europeans are. that is an important issue.
it's not a minor issue. syria isd before, iran, an important relationship. will be difficult to solve. i am very concerned that as time getting lessp5 are concerted action on many issues, not only syria. i was surprised the other day in south africa, the level of statement that they made, for i saw they wanted to move in international affairs, it was very clear. [indiscernible] the question of the level of energy and price of energy in the markets is important.
opening inwe have an order to have sufficient production to be maintained at 4% of total production. as the global economy grows a to, the level of the canucks maintain the level of iran down, it will be very difficult without a spike in price. and gas company has been working hard to maintain it. , thee economy grows equilibrium, that is something the chinese don't want to, for prices to go up. stophinese will have to
the volumes of imports they are getting from iran. >> the primary factor that determines whether or not military force is used is not what is happening around the diplomatic table. it's what happening on the ground. you can imagine a situation where the diplomacy continues without making any progress, but the iranians are cautious and careful to avoid taking actions that might trigger a military strike. that is the situation we are in now. the question is whether or not the supreme leader continues to orercise caution and whether not he accurately anticipate what kind of actions might trigger a strike. stuxnet?bout >> i will not comment on that, but it's a game where high national statistics are at play and both sides are using all the leverage of power they have to achieve their interests.
>> the first question about negotiation and military action, one of the concerns has been expressed in the west is that iran engage in negotiations. as they do, they get closer to the capability where they could very quickly deploy nuclear ability. is there some sort of thing you would want to see coming out of these negotiations this weekend that might be a signal that there is at a decision on the part of tehran to actually try to find a solution? what would be your minimum take away from the discussions that would say maybe there's an indication iran does want to sign this -- find a solution? but it's a mistake to try to set the bar. if they agree to another round of meetings, that will be the
process continuing. but i think that it's not realistic to expect that there would be some kind of breakthrough in these talks. diplomacy are using for own purposes. the iranians use diplomacy in an effort to try and show there's progress and therefore no further sanctions aren't justified. to the extent it looks like there's progress, it helps maintain the value of the currency. the u.s. tries to use diplomacy to demonstrate iran is being unreasonable and therefore more sanctions are required. that process will continue. if the next round of talks does not produce results, at some point the u.s. and european union will be looking for additional sanctions in order to increase pressure. michael gordon, "new york times. you mentioned the restraint that
iran is pursuing. can you address the new centrifuges that there also pursuing and what the strategic for break outforare scenario and what policy talented they pose in the sense of whether iran can get to a place where they can take action faster than the international community could respond? >> very good question. lots of depth and ways of looking at these scenarios. basically, there are twa's iran could produce -- - two ways. one is to use a facility under iaea inspection. that's the breakout scenario where they would either deny the inspectors access or they would kick out the inspectors and as quickly as possible they would produce enough highly enriched uranium for nuclear device. right now there are -- they are probably at least a couple months away from being able to
do that. as they increase capacity, as they put in more centrifuges, more efficient and more parcel centrifuges, like this new generation, they might be able to squeeze down that break out time to a couple weeks or even less. it would be, theoretically possible that they could produce enough highly enriched uranium for a bomb before the international community could act. i think there are still -- they are still probably a couple years away from having that capacity, because they would need to put in a lot more these more advanced centrifuges in order to do that. that theyscenario is would build a secret facility and then produce weapons-grade uranium, taking their time, and then once they have enough, there would be in a position to confront the world. we know that second approach is the one iran favors. twice now they try to build secret enrichment plants.
my guess is that some point in the future they will try to build another secret enrichment plant, because that approached from their standpoint poses much fewer threats. if they try to break out using a facility that is under safeguards, they run the risk it would be detected and the u.s. or israel or others would act against them, would destroy that facility before it could achieve -- produce enough weapons-grade uranium. the question that michael is raising was the right one, that if we continue for a couple more years in this current pattern, the iranians can be closer and closer to having a credible breakout capacity, and they will use that as a threat. they will say that unless a certain sanction is lifted, they would be forced to take action. i don't think they are there now. i think they are too far away
from that being able to move quickly. >> it's not a simple thing to do. one thing is to have enriched 80% or 90%. can continue working on weapon is asian and the very advanced in a position even if you don't have 90% achieved. it may be a crossing point where it is shorter than we expect the actual use of a bomb. provide repair the only thing i would add is we probably have greater capacity to detect and prevent the production of weapons-grade material, as opposed to detecting and preventing ionization. it's not to say it's impossible to detect, but it's much more difficult, because it can be done with a fewer number of people and at facilities that are easier to hide.
the iranians want to go for a very basic nuclear weapon -- the weapon was used on hiroshima was never tested -- but if they want a more advanced weapon that could be put on a ballistic missile, and it's a much more sophisticated question and they probably would want to usedbefore they actually to the capability. >> my sense is yes, they after test. tests may be done through the computer. i don't think they have the capacity. a country that already has the capacity can test the next level of bombs without doing a real test. example we have is north korea and pakistan. they had to do the test. today with the level of the intermission rehab and the capacity of intelligence we this is almost
impossible not to be detected. the capacity of intelligence we have, a number of satellites looking, it would be very for the test not to be detected. >> this is another good example where the iranians have imposed political constraints on the program. they have a very extensive -- comprehensible organization program which was detected -- which was revealed. they stopped it in 2003. at some point in the future i could easily imagine them starting that program again in hopes they would be able to achieve a lot of the preparation work necessary for nuclear test. i agree that ultimately it's likely they would conduct a nuclear test in order to demonstrate that they have a credible nuclear capacity. >> a question in back. brian, washington
politics.dent for euro with the heating up of rhetoric in north korea and the military maneuvers, what impact will that have on the iran nuclear talks? will it take out the momentum because north korea looks to be more of an urgent threat at the moment? or could it have a positive effect? parts i don't think it has any impact. all the p5-plus-1 countries are capable of dealing with several different problems at the same time. so i don't think it's likely to have a big impact. to some extent, korea is a good example where there is pretty good cooperation, certainly among the u.s. and china and russia. all of us want to avoid a military conflict on the peninsula. i don't think that necessarily translates into greater cooperation on iran. >> ok.
edward levine, former senate staff member. if the supreme leader is the key to getting iran to agree to, a negotiations, and if he has a particular concern for a rimbaud's the dignity -- iran's dignity, what part has been given to enlisting help from some third party whose mere presence would of course some of that dignity to iran and also create a channel to the supreme leader? withd has been tried turkey. turkey has been a country that has been tried with the p5-plus-
1. i have been talking to the turks a lot. as you know, the last time with brazil, all that was supposed to we considered it to be a ploy. bit tod af a turkey then separated very much from the negotiations. maybe now with the position they maybeaken with israel, there's another moment turkey can be used. the supreme leader does not talk meteaders that he has not with. whenet with putin in 1997 he went to the supreme leader,
he was received by the supreme leader. was there. putin could not convince the supreme leader. i cannot imagine other leaders that could have a good relationship with the supreme leader with the exception of muslim countries. turkey continues to been the most and hand. turkey is against the regime in syria. it is difficult to find the utor.ct interlocal t
it's. been a long it's difficult to negotiate without bilateral talks. reallyannot psychoanalyze the supreme leader. dignity is less important in my view than he wants to have a nuclear weapons capacity. second, here and looks at the nuclear issue as part of a much broader struggle with the united states. he believes the united states is trying to destroy the islamic republic. we are using the nuclear issue in order to try to achieve that the political and economic pressure, he thinks. the supreme leader has obstructed the negotiations. created a self- fulfillment processing, in my view. we are seeking economic sanctions which could potentially pose a threat to the survival of the regime, if
there's enough public unhappiness with the economic damage that he has brought on his own country and through their mismanagement as well. hi, lara jake's with associated press. yuka spoken a lot this morning about the house syria and the p five negotiations are intertwined. i wonder what effect u.s. military intervention in syria might have on some of the negotiations, not only recognizing this would likely be seen as hostile by tehran but also the effect that it would amount to a proxy war with russia and the chinese would likely follow the russian lead. if you could talk about that? >> i cannot speak with knowledge. i'm not in office. the only information i have is
information that i have through friends which are engaged in this. i think that the united states has not taken a more active role in syria from the beginning because they did not want to disturb the possibility -- to give them the space to negotiate with tehran. they probably knew that getting even militarily could hurt potential negotiations with tehran. nowadays the situation is a little different, because the situation within syria is much worse than what it was at the beginning. byappened to meet yesterday coincidence on the train coming person coming a
sanctions on libya. they said there were topics to be discussed with the united states. one was missile defense. was being phase thrown forward a many years. i do not know. that not has been played sufficiently with russia. engagedto be much more in order to resolve the syrian question. that i have.cern i was in moscow two weeks before this one, and i met with putin, medvedev, an icn sentiment that is not -- and i see a sentiment
that is not better, the relationship with syria, etc.. my fear is it may get cooler tehran.lation to plus 1 has been a miracle. passed a moment together, which was very difficult, but i level ofe the constructive work together. i think it is diminishing. >> i would say you can argue it either way, but the collapse of deal mores a nuclear likely, because that makes the supreme leader more likely to make tactical some concessions in order to relieve further
isolation. that will not change his fundamental interest and acquiring and nuclear weapons capability. it will confirm for him that the best way to defend himself against the united states is to have that capacity. in terms of near term tactical decisions, the more he feels isolated and threatened, the more likely it is he will make modest concessions did have some interim agreement. >> how serious do you take the hk i-missile fatwa by khamenei? >> i do not know much about shia theology, but it would
provide a useful basis on which it the supreme leader and the iranian government could justify some limits on the program. i think we would -- we, we would welcome, if the iranians want to construct a theory for why they are accepting limits on the program because it is supreme -- -- my impression is it can be changed pretty easily. >> thank you very much. question tose a , and dr.ambassador samore, and the question in 16th observations were
made. the first is that the interests of the supreme leader is not dignity, but that he believes iran should have the bomb. the second is pcs the bomb question as only one piece of the frame and relationship with the united states, which is that what we are really after is a regime change. given those two factors, if one accepts them, and for what it is possibledo, what there? lie out of the ambassador said that the road to tehran may run through damascus. there is the presidential
election, there is the prospect hamenei does not live forever. what keeps us in the game, and why is it that president obama continues to make statements that appeared to be indefensible do whatever it takes to prevent iran from having a bomb? , let me take a crack at that. what you said is exactly right. i think it is true the supreme leader wants to avoid going to work with the united states, because he knows he will lose and that could lead to the end of the islamic republic. he has demonstrated caution in terms of limiting the nuclear program in order to avoid believes is a red line that could trigger a military attack.
the value with everything we have done in terms of public pressure, sanctions, threats of war, all of that has helped to reinforce his caution and has led to constraints, has led -- and the iranians could be moving moving forward much more quickly, but they have self-imposed constraints in order to avoid those risks. whatever happens at the diplomatic table, we have an interest to make clear that we would not accept iran having nuclear weapons and we are prepared to use military force, if necessary, and we will increase economic and political pressure. that has a positive impact. >> a contradiction which i legitimacy of action is going high.
it is difficult to imagine after syria, etc., and after history how a military action could have legitimacy. how is illegitimacy to find? well, we have to find the to the missing lately by the security council. together,have the p5 it will be quite difficult to do it, and i would say difficult to have international community together. it is not a trivial thing. what we're talking about, after advent of libya, syria, and we found it difficult the security council resolution,
maintaining the international community coming together. i think we have an lot of problems. we have another problem that we have not mentioned. suppose that we get an agreement, and that agreement sanctions,o lift rapidly. you have the congress of the united states that has to do it. that is not an easy task, either. and that is known by the supreme leader, also. so we have some other problems that have to be considered that makes the problem. delicate and difficult. >> hi.
you mentioned earlier both the possibilities on the other side of the ronnie in an election in june -- on the iranian election in june, that they will have greater flexibility for dialogue as well as lifting off the on,es it has been putting 20% and rich uranium as well as other activities. i wonder whether you see an or the of escalation escalation been more likely and what factors you see playing into that most. i would be interested in the ambassador's take as well. thank you. >> either is possible. one could imagine the leader feeling more confident if the shores up his domestic situation, manages the elections, makes sure that ahmadinejad's did it is not elected and he has somebody in who is compliant pit
leader might feel he is in a thenger position to take next. whether it is 20%, higher levels of enrichment for their naval reactor program. one could imagine later this year there would be a confrontation. one could imagine he is in a stronger position, he actually has greater flexibility to make some tactical deal with the p5 plus 1 to relieve pressure. i did not know which way it will go, but as long as it is more likely to get a positive outcome if he believes there's more sanctions to come. if the leader believes the p5 plus 1 is reached the limit, then he will feel he can weather the storm and does not need to make concessions. >> i tend to agree with that.
>> thank you. the national defense university. the two sides claim [indiscernible] is on your their side. what is your assessment? t --e ever reach a differen a deal with iran we have to sell out in washington, and given the relationship with iran for 30 years, it would be hard. i imagine the president will have to ok it by the public and the congress. how do you think we can sell, deal domestically here? thank you? >> you have to sell any agreement on its merits. if that achieves its intended results, then you have a strong basis on which to convince
congress and the public that it is worth supporting. if the deal does not have a dramatic impact, if it is just cosmetic and allows the iranians to continue on their course of expanding the capacity to produce this material, the deal will not be supported. we have to keep in mind any agreement reached will be subject to strict monitoring. iran has demonstrated it is not shy about cheating on its international obligations, and it has a very long record of violating the safeguards agreements it has reached. one could imagine a situation where there was an agreement and some ways down the road it was revealed iran was violating it. >> then we would have to convince all the parties. saudi arabia would have to be convinced and others.
you understand what i mean. can you expand on the nuclear collaboration between iran and russia, and are they legal under the mpt? >> yes, the cooperation between is legal.d iran theaccept it, that enrichment of a rainy meant -- and richmond of the iranian -- enrichment of uranium, for a nuclear reactor, but the product of that is produced in the rack your best in the reactor was taken by russia. russia was conscious of the
movement of the reactor, and that was accepted and encouraged to finish it and encouraged to port fuel in it. in my mind, yes. >> there have been instances where russian scientists have provided on are authorized nuclear assistance to iran, and president bush confronted president putin with the fact that a russian institute was helping with the heavy-water research reactor that was being built in iraq, and the government stopped that. there is a good record of the russian government limiting nuclear cooperation with iran reactor, which is a but we have accepted. >> hi, i'm a law student at american university. i have a question about why the
military strike is even on the table, because haven't we learned our lessons from iraq? we have killed so many people, we have harmed our military, we have harm our economy. why would we consider doing that with iran? as a business owner, what can i buy oil from iran? 99 oil crisis, we were asked cents a gallon in 2001, and now we are $4. if we go to war with iran it will be eight bucks. why are we hurting our a american economic interests to prevent somebody from pursuing their national defense strategies like any other country does? >> i see it as a clash of interests. think having nuclear weapons or the capacity to produce nuclear weapons is
necessary for their defense and to assert their position in the region. the u.s. for reasons that are produced understandable from our standpoint, we want to stop iran from having nuclear weapons because it would be threat to our interests and those of reference of the region. there's a clash of interests. i'm not saying anybody is right or wrong, but in international politics and if you have a clash of interests and you cannot reconcile them, then the ultimate recourse is the use of force. clearly, obama is not looking for opportunities to attack iran. he has made the case that we're not at that point where we have to make that choice, that there is still room for diplomacy, sanctions and pressure, still some possibility that that will achieve results. at the end of the day, he says the matter is so important to the united states that he would be willing to use force if necessary. people may disagree with that
judgment, but that is the judgment that he has made and explained publicly. for carey.ion is do you think the u.s. is prepared to acknowledge iran's right to enrich at some levels, 5%, at some point? thatf you had an agreement satisfied our goal of limiting iran's capacity, ability to produce nuclear weapons, i think partlimited enrichment as of satisfying iran's dignity, some face-saving outcome should be acceptable to us. i do not see any evidence that
iran is prepared to accept the kind of limited enrichment that we would really require and ordered -- in order to achieve the results of physically limiting what they are capable of doing. >> allow me to say, i do not think it is imaginable in an agreement with the recognition of enrichment by iran. that is the trick, how that is worth. i cannot imagine after having spent hours, cannot accept anything that takes the program to be disassembled. >> one of the complications of this negotiation is the iranians are insisting they're right to enrichment be recognized by the notlus 1, if they have
acknowledged that the obligations imposed by the toncil and the iaea demonstrate that their actions are peaceful. it is hard to imagine a deal where we accept their princip le they did not accept ours. if we had a mutual acceptance where we're prepared to of knowledge once confidence is a suit -- a short, they could pursue enrichment, but one would expect in return they would acknowledge that there -- they are obligated by the council to take actions, which includes a suspension of their enrichment program at the confidence is restored. -- until confidence is restored. i am from iraq. my question is about the negotiations and the details.
was there other topics other than the nuclear program that iran talked about, like iran's destabilizing role in the middle east in supporting terrorist groups in iraq, lebanon? issues internally for a run of, like it's horrible human rights violations and democracy? it was firsttions, and negotiation with iran and then the possibility be get engaged with this negotiation had them. there are many other topics that we would like to talk to them. remember that iran was at the table in the agreements in afghanistan, in those negotiations, that iran was at the table.
at a given moment, the bush administration was thinking about putting on afghanistan negotiant sessions -- negotiations, but nothing having created the climate, appropriate on the nuclear and other potential topics. talks wereplus 1 created to address the nuclear issue. that was the primary focus in terms of what they would like the agenda to focus on. it is true the iranians have said we want at a much broader discussion cannot talk about syria, bahrain, and that has been resisted by the p5 plus 1 because we do not want to create anxiety on the part of other countries in the region that we
are negotiating some kind of regional arrangements with iranians when they are not present at the table to have their interests represented. >> we have five minutes left and we have way more hands. i'm going to take three more questions, and then we will answer those. >> as we approach the end, this has been interesting. i would like to move for a second to the framework of perceptions. the president's statements have led to a perception that this year or next year are critical years, that if we do not solve the nuclear issue in iran that we will be moving toward a conflict, and we seem to be discussing this with the israelis, although in the last
meetings, netanyahu moved back from that. on the other hand, as this discussion brought out, the weaponization has a long ways to go, and true weaponization might not at all occur in the presidency of president obama. are we running a risk here of perhaps being too smart by half and that we are creating the perception of imminent danger and conflict and decisions about that, whereas in fact, weaponization is not progressing as far as we know, and if it did it would take some time. we're talking about something beyond the next three years. >> second row here. >> i was born in tehran.
global bridges for humanity. it seems that for many years america has been engaged in persuading iran to come in line to the line that america thinks is right for iran. and we have up to this point seen that, as they say, it is very hard not to -- runyon's are not that hard to be pushed over, -- iran needs are not hard to be pushed over, but the fine line was to give us that 20%, and we will tell you when you can get it back. that was not acceptable to them. when you are negotiating you have to have some kind of principles to follow.
we have come to a point that to recognize that iran may be a regional power. why don't we get iran and see what our interests are in the area, and see if iran can protect our interests in that area they are capable and they will not cost us anything. they will be more than happy to do and protect our interests without money to give them like we do to other people in those areas. the question, after all these discussions, when it goes beyond a certain point, it shows the impotence of america in solving a problem that is very important to the world. question, over here. gary, and ambassador, is
there any price that you think that p5 plus 1 would be willing to pay that iran would accept the 20% for a small deal, and if not, i'm interested in, gary, what you think about the big idea or offering them a more comprehensive offer. thanks. >> let me take this hit on the timetable, as i tried to explain, the timetable is determined by political decisions and calculations, not by physics. if the leader does things that brings this matter to a head, this year, and there are lots of things he could do that could force president obama's hand, then we may be facing in military conflict in the near future. on the other hand, the leader may avoid actions that would force the united states to act, in which case the diplomacy, the
creeping, alllear this will continue for years. it remains to be seen. whether or not the next year it is critical or whether this problem will continue on its current pattern for the rest of the president's termed it on the question of other issues, the tree is the u.s. and iran are loggerheads on almost every issue, syria, and i agree with mr. solano, that this has cast a shadow with the negotiations, but whether it is a peace process, his ball law, u.s. forces in the persian gulf, almost every issue, u.s. and iran are enemies, and that makes it much more difficult to deal with a new issue in isolation. finally, i think it is possible
that iran could decide after the presidential elections to accept the small deal that is on the table now. i think it is a good deal for iran, if they are looking for a way to create some respite from pressure, what an offer would do pick it might not lead to a the trouble, anything that we would accept in terms of what their program would look like, it is fundamentally unacceptable to the iranians because it would take away their weapons capability, and that is the whole purpose of the program. >> let me comment. the first thing i would like to say is the level of mistrust between the united states and the western world and iran is very difficult to convey. you cannot imagine the level of
mistrust. second, the war in iraq and iran has not been forgotten in iran. we were playing the role of iraq is -- thee, and that was lost hetiation was 14 years of age with keep in mind, this is a a very difficult situation. candidtwo, in the most moment in the negotiations that they have, and the moment when you're walking with no they might ask, what would be your dream? could you tell me what would you
want to obtain? think not a complete answer, but an important direction, of what you want. brazil.d very much to why? brazil is a regional power. it has a nuclear reactor, which is nuclear. but they have not produced anything. they have been allowed a certain capability which they have not used, etc., but they want to be a regional power recognized, and in order to be a regional power recognized, they need to have some level -- you look at the world, you have japan, brazil, stop.ina, and i would not
there are some others with some capabilities. why wouldquestion -- we not allow this to go this far? wasanswer is -- brazil always in the commentary, brazil was a good model. i do not know if that answers you. a regional power, with the recognition that they were class ofthat you have a level nuclear capability. >> [indiscernible] >> i do not have anything else.
it is want to be difficult, but i think it is doable. that is what i really think. -- will yourties please join me in thanking our guests. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2013] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] this afternoon, encore presentations of our series " first ladies."
that starts at 1:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. harrison,ht, anna and julia tyler. madonna of first ladies. she loved publicity. she posed as a model at a time when that was frowned upon. she was known as the rows of long island. by all accounts, was bewitching. ,he bewitched john tyler married her, and she loved
being first lady. she had the job for less than a year, but it was julia tyler who ordered the marine band to play when the the chief" president appeared. she greeted guests sitting on a throne with purple plumes and her hair. it is like she proceeded to that more queenly role that martha washington had deliberately rejected. >> we will include your questions and comments by phone, facebook, and twitter, the night live at 9:00 eastern on cnn c- span3, also on c-span radio and c-span.org. will reducedter our grants by about 5%, which equates to $22 million, which will be distributed among the various licensees and stations
that i have described. 13% cut inen about a our overall federal funding of the last two years, and if the entire federal government had sustained the cuts that we have sustained, the budget would be $500 billion smaller than it is now. we have made is significant contribution to deficit reduction and retirement of federal debt within our own context. >> the impact of spending cuts on public television tonight at 8:00 eastern on c-span2. >> discussion on campaign fund- raising with the finance shares of the obama and romney 2012 campaigns. they talked about the record amounts of money that was raised, and the influence of super pacs. they also looked ahead to how funding may change in 2016. this was hosted by the institute
of politics at the university of chicago. >> thank you. and thanks >> thank you. and thanks everybody for coming. this is an exciting deal to have student of politics at the university of chicago as a chicago native, i'm just thrilled by this and thrilled to be able to take part of in it. and i wanted to start out tonight with a quote from a man named. mark hannah who lived and was more than more than 100 years ago. and he was william mckinley's campaign manager in the election of 1896. which had a lot in common with 2012, as i'm going to mention in my book. and hannah said there are three essential things in america politics, money and i can't
remember what the other two are. and hannah went around to all of the heads of the largest corporations in america in 1896 and he got them all to make major donations to the mckinley campaign including cyrus mccormick whose corporation is based in chicago, mccormick reaper. and he just blew out william jennings bryant, the boy orator from platte, nebraska, who is the populist, and that year the economic party candidate. this time around, 2012, the money raised was a lot more even.
and contrary to a lot of expectations, as we'll get into, but i wanted to just start out with some basic facts before we start our discussion. let's start with you, spencer. how much did you raise altogether, and how much of that was used for division and the other important functions of the campaign? >> thanks, jonathan. let me start by saying thank you to everyone at the institute of politics. david, thank for you hosting me here and allowing me to be here. coming from boston and from the romney campaign, i got an invitation to come to chicago and come to the institute of politics and pause and say
well, gosh, i wonder how i'm going to met at the institute of politics and president barack obama's back yard. and i have to compliment everyone here at the institute of politics for the way you have welcomed not just me but other members of the romney campaign, so thank you for allowing conversations like this to take place where we can look beyond the partisan nature of politics and have a real conversation about political campaigns and what's happening. to answer your question, jonathan, we raised just under $950 million for the romney campaign. now, that includes money that was raised of course in the primary that we raised and spent in the primary, about $100 million. we weren't able to use in the general election. you look at the overall spending of the romney campaign, about 2/3 of it really went into advertising of some kind, whether that was web advertising or tv advertising. and the other sort of largest line item was other than get out the vote political apparatus, whether it was done through the digital team or the
political field operations. but those are the biggest line operations. we raise the money and the political strategists spend the money. there's always a healthy debate as every campaign strategist knows in every budget meeting about trying to forecast how much will be raised and where it's going to be spent. we tried to limit as much as possible the overhead of the campaign. and try to maximize every dollar going to turn out the vote. we're not always successful in doing that, but about 2/3 goes into advertising. >> juliana, you had the first billion dollar campaign, is that right? >> we ultimately raised $1.1 billion and it was exciting. when we hit the billion, we were like oh, my god, we never thought we'd get there. but as far as a the spending goes, you have the same issues on your side, too, the push and pull between the raising and spending but as everyone knows
we had a huge g.t.o. effort and we spent significantly on that and on tv, too. i don't know exactly the breakdown but pretty close. require think it's close or a little less on tv? >> it's probably a little less on tv. >> you probably know the breakdown. theit less, just for record? >> yes, i think it was less. >> less than the 2/3. >> a reason for that. >> maybe in the q&a we can get you to address that a little bit. >> there was a lot of publicity about this billion dollar goal early on in 2011, and people on the campaign were telling me, no, no, no, we'll never raise a billion dollars and that it's too bad it leaked out because it's not really in the cards.
highs a ridiculously number. so why, other than the fact people like the president and -- what was the -- how did you split the atom on online fundraising and the other things that got you up over a billion dollars? >> well, i mean, we started out like we did in the 2007 and 2008 race. we did a lot of major donor fundraising which is usually comprised of events with the president. those tend to be the higher ticket items. and with that people want to come and get their photo taken, you know, with the president or the first lady or you can say with axel rod. we did a number of events like that early on. we did some online fundraising but the online fundraising basically kicked in the last half of 2012. which makes it a little bit difficult to budget but we sort
of knew, we raised $880 million in the 2007-2008 campaign including the d.n.c. we thought ok, maybe we can get close to what we had before we raised then so that's how we sort of budgeted it. >> you didn't have the same allegiance from the donor base, you know, a lot of people on wall street had been with the obama campaign in 2008 kind of peeled off. your early events were a little bit underwhelming in 201 1. you weren't quite behind the eight-ball but you weren't doing as well as you had anticipated. so what changed? >> well, i think we had set goals and we reached our goals. there were no events we didn't reach our goal. so in that case we were very satisfied with the money we were raising. it was harder this time just in we had three million donors in
the 2007-2008 race and ended up with 4.5 on this campaign and 1.9 of them, i think that's right. no, 2.9 of them were new to this campaign. to the current year. so we had a lot of new excitement, new people joining the campaign. i don't think it's a lot of folks weren't excited, it's just different. we didn't have the primaries, or the events, if you will, leading up that were just covered in the press. we had to create our own event. so going to a dinner out in los angeles, that's not going to get the press coverage, nor should it. if there's a debate somewhere, that would get coverage. when we were able to have the excitement with the president and hillary and edwards and chris dodd during that time. >> a lot of it with john edwards. >> yeah. >> so 2.9 million new donors, these are people who they'd gone all the way through 2008 and hadn't given, despite all the excitement. >> right. >> who were those people and
where did you find them? >> we did a lot of online advertising, found a lot of new online contributors. we, you know, talked to a lot of new donors that could give at the higher level and were able to get a the lo of new bundlers and those who followed what the president was doing and wanted to be a part of this campaign and for whatever reason hadn't been involved in the last one. >> what was your breakdown between the percentage that gave over $100, or $250, if you want to mesh occur that way? >> our average contribution by the time it was all said and done was $66 which is pretty amazing. so about 97% was under $250. >> ok. now, this is not really a question that you probably want to answer, spencer, but how about for you guys? >> didn't look quite like that. the obama campaign had more new donors in 2012 than we had
total. so just to put that in perspective. we had about two million donors and about four million contributions. over the course of the campaign. so about half the number of donors. when we started, we recognized that we had a -- had to go through a primary process or there wouldn't be a lot of online excitement. you can't build a big online fundraising in the primary because people aren't paying attention to the race in the primary. we knew that would come later and we were asked in every fundraising money early on, how will you raise money the way the obama fundraising does without getting millions to join team and we were running against newt gingrich and rick santorum trying to convince the voters that will happen at some point, not to the measure of the obama campaign. it did happen later on but we ha
fundraising strategy based on a high dollar approach. individuals that would give in the primary $1,000-plus. so our structure we put together was based on people that could go out and raise in $2,500 or $1,000 increments, $50,000 or $100,000 or $250,000. it was a much smaller group are people writing and raising larger amounts of money than the obama campaign. >> can you give us a little idea how much smaller? what percentage of your donors gave less than $200? ofi'll give you a couple these that i'm sorry to read them to refresh my memory but that list is now looking through the course of the entire campaign. start with the -- our highest level which is individuals who were responsible for $1 million. we had over 100 people on the
campaign who were responsible for $1 million. >> bundlers, basically? >> as bundlers. >> right. >> in terms of giving, we had what we called the founding memberships and founding partnerships with individuals. and we looked at the giving guidelines or giving limits for the republican party. and there are always these strange numbers, $33,322. we've got to get rid of that, let's do $50,000 and $100,000 as a couple. so we marketed $50,000 founding memberships. we raised $100 million from couples that gave $50,000. we raised $80 million from people who gave $100,000 as a couple. so 50 and 100. so you're close to $200 million just from people writing at least a $50,000 check. let's see. our club mitt program, which raised about $50 million for
individuals who gave $2,500. so you can see where i'm going as you look at these numbers overwhelmingly, well over 50% of our money, more like 70% came to a high dollar program. it wasn't until the very last three months of the campaign where we started to see large amounts of money coming in over the internet, average sized contribution towards the end of the campaign would have been over the $1,000 mark. it's very different in 1966. >> was there a time -- you were enormously successful with this, much more successful and spencer was really one of the stars of the campaign for those of us who are following all of this, so you were enormously successful, but was there a point when you realized, you know what, by getting all these small donors, obama is turning them into volunteers and he's
getting buy-in from average people who are giving as little as $3. >> yep. >> with the original ask for the obama people. and that they are turning their small donors into people who can really help with g.o. tv and other parts of the campaign and that's a weapon we don't have. did you guys confront that? >> we did. we thought a lot about it. it wasn't something that we pretended didn't exist. we knew every time the obama campaign got someone to write a check for $2, that individual will follow their investment and turn out to vote. they were going to be there as a volunteer. it wasn't that we didn't want that, it's just that that's not where we can get the money and we were asked why do you rob banks? that's where the money is. my job was to go out and raise money. we originally thought we'd raise -- we set a goal of $500 million and that's what we said we think we can raise $500 million based on what john mccain and george bush did. then we heard this incredible
number from the obama campaign that we were going to raise $1 billion. we had a meeting and got together and asked, how do we raise $1 billion? deliverednough, they $1 billion. we quickly changed the structure how we were going to get $1 billion and we came very close and we ran it like a business. every state, every region had state chairs, city chairs, our finance operations is probably the closest thing to the -- you know, i don't want to compare it to the obama political machine because that's a -- you know, a whole other stratosphere but in terms of what we get on the finance side, holding people accountable, i mean, we fired volunteers, for instance that weren't hitting their goals. but you have to do that.
if you're going to hold people to a standard and say these are the goals, these are the metrics, we measured them every day. and if they weren't working, we tried something differently and i think that's the reason we were able to come as close as we did on the money side. >> did some of them work on commission? >> i'm talking about -- these are volunteer -- >> your professional -- >> no, we -- it's a good question because in previous campaigns, many of these individuals, these consultants in various places work on a commission structure. we changed that and set a very high goal. we said look, we can go out and raise hundreds of millions of dollars and here's what that means for you in illinois. here's what that means for you in los angeles. and in every market, we had a state chair that was ultimately responsible. that state chair is a volunteer individual who is able to hire, fire or promote the staff within that region. the staff were not paid on a commission, they were paid a fee if they were a consultant. if they were an employee, they
were paid as an employee and then given a bonus based on us hitting certain goals. >> let's talk about the subgroups a little bit. wall street. any sense of how much money you raised from wall street altogether? >> a lot. >> i think that's right. >> we were fortunate, i think, to get a lot of people from wall street who had been previous donors to the obama campaign in 2008 or to the clinton campaign in 2008. and so if you look at what we did in new york in the primary of 2008 versus what we did in the primary 2012, comparing primary to primary, our new york number was up by about 85%. so if you're looking at wall street, and i would say overwhelmingly, those individuals gave money or voted for barack obama or hillary clinton in 2008. >> wow. >> we had meetings with folks
in new york who we would do a little survey and without telling us who they voted for in the primary, on the democratic side, it was clear that the overwhelming majority of the room voted for and gave money to one of the democratic candidates and they said we're not doing that this time. >> it's been scary for you. >> it was really scary, it was. you know, we heard all the chatter from our new york folks. we had staff in new york, we had a small office there and they were a little nervous. the great thing is we were able to find new dollars in different communities, the lbgt community, we were able to find new donors. women came out in droves and they gave with their checkbook, too. >> any note, any idea of what percentage of your total money came from wall street? >> if you take new york city,
it's probably the closest we can break that down, more than 15% of the money from the entire country came from new york city. anynd how about you guys, sense of how much came from wall street? >> you know, we tried to do that. it was substantially less than what we did before but it was not -- i don't know the percentage. >> you measured everything, juliana. >> i don't know what you're talking about. >> everything. can you give us ballparks? >> we did really well in new york. if you look at it, it might have been, you know, the couple -- one of them may have worked on wall street but we might have gotten a check from the other. >> sometimes you get one from the wife and maybe the husband would be -- since there was a gender gap -- >> right. >> maybe one would be giving to romney and the wife to obama? >> possibly. >> was there some of that? >> i don't know. we didn't really look at that
too closely but probably. >> we would see that from time to time in places like new york and l.a. and boston. that would definitely be the case. remember, as juliana said, a lot of the fundraising at the high dollar level is event- driven and means the candidate or the president shows up to a market and they have an event and that's what drives a lot of the excitement and money raising. when the sitting president of the united states shows up in any market, i don't care where it is, there's going to be excitement and people will -- who may otherwise not be inclined to write a check without an event get very excited about that. >> and the president was doing as many as six fundraisers a day, right? >> we did a lot of fundraisers. >> you have any idea how many he did altogether? toi don't know the answer that. it's a lot, though. more than has been done in the past. but, you know, the difference
in 2008 and 2012, you know, he's a sitting president. we had, you know, the secret service we had to take into account their restrictions of where we could do events which would limit the space for the number of people we could raise from. even as fundraisers, we wanted to add 20 people who could write the maximum and sometimes space restrictions we weren't allowed to do that. that was a different befall. we had to do more events. >> right. so after the gay marriage announcement, did you see donations from the lbgt community just spike? could you actually see it? >> we had folks that were trying to figure out on their calendars when they could do events, folks that would host fundraisers. we had several calls that day coming in. i think we can do it next month if it works for the president's schedule or vice president biden. so it kind of opened up a lot of events, people were ready to actually make the commitment and
do the event. >> and spencer, how about in the mormon community, how big of a deal was that? any rough idea of what percentage of your money came from that community? >> throughout the campaign, no. it was a much bigger part of our fundraising in 2008 in the primary, to be honest, it became -- we raised records amounts of money in places like salt lake city, utah, in the primary of 2008. we actually raised more in the primary of 2008 in utah than we did in 2012 in the primary. there was definitely an evening out of the support. it wasn't just from, you know, you start a fundraising campaign and you start with people who the candidate tends to know, has a long-standing relationship with. so we started with people that governor romney had known many years from his church, from his business in private equity, from the boston community. but that definitely evens out over time.
IN COLLECTIONSCSPAN Television Archive Television Archive News Search Service
Uploaded by TV Archive on