tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN August 21, 2014 5:30am-7:01am EDT
russia can do if and when it starts breaking good again. we the international community really need russia as the world's largest territorial state. a country that is made up of an extraordinarily talented and productive population. a country that has been on its way to being part of the solution to the world's problems . to once again be part of the solution and not be a problem itself. it is not just a way of slapping putin around to shut down the g-8. we needed the g-8 and the g 20. it is in the g 20. thatve russia in a mood almost looks for chances to
compete and be the antipode to sets itself up to be an abbot surrey too much of the world, that is not good for anybody, including the russian people ash and adversary -- an adversary too much of the much of the world. guest: what does putin think of the international order? think of it very much in institutional terms and reaching out and transnational challenges and incorporating new powers. you must have a very different view. -- he must have a very different view. >> thank all of you for coming. he does.
it appears putin is trying to overthrow the current world order. in fact, i don't think that is his goal. it assumes something about food tin that we have never seen. we have been studying him intensively for many years. i have written this book and we are now revising that an expanding it to include the whole idea of how putin looks at the world. where those views come from and what he knows about the world. what does he want. he does not want and has never shown an inclination to have his leadership in global affairs for himself or russia.
that seems contradictory to what conventional wisdom is. putin is about russia first. it is all about russia. everything else is tactics. that is the ultimate goal. book, fiona and i have a simplified framework, a version in'she evolution of put views about the west and the united states, bringing us to where we are now. it is divided into three phases. number one, leave us alone. he showed no evidence of being anti-american at all.
there is plenty of anti-american sentiment, conspiracy theories that the u.s. was trying to bring down russia. putin did not seem to subscribe to that at all. you guys tried to help us and it did not work. you don't understand russia. you may have been trying to do something good for us. frankly, these are our problems. we caused these problems. we will solve them ourselves. leave us alone and let us try to do it. happen.n't make,forts he tried to which where programs in the beginning of the government of , was notwas a part recognized as positive outside,
but criticized heavily on human rights issues. rethinkingto cause a of attitudes toward the west. changing wastarted what after -- what happened after 9/11. there was a sense on putin's part that it's not enough for you to leave us alone, you're also doing things out there in the rest of the world that affect us and you're not thinking about us. you are trying to solve your problems at our expense. will you please rethink that. that was the second phase. stop causing this collateral damage to russia with your
behavior globally. , stop thishase was direct assault on russia. when that attitude really crystallized is not entirely clear. of decembere events 2011 after his announcement of coming back as president with protests, this was the last straw. there were preliminaries to that. 2008.orgia war in in 2012, andhat the election is held and he is back in office by the middle of 2012. devoted toto have quite preparations for what transpired in crimea in 2014.
this gives us insights into what he really wants. with the post-cold war order. it it is to reverse these three phases. the most urgent thing is stop this encroachment. stop the nato enlargement. stop the missile the ploy meant on our borders. -- deployment on our borders. stay out of russia and sees this war on russia. this war on russia. you have to realize it is not what you think you are doing and what you say you are doing and what your intentions are that the fine for us our security interests. only we can define them. you say nato enlargement is not a threat. you say deployment of anti-middle school -- antimissile systems on our
is not a problem for us. thirdly, the international order. was perfectlyin happy that the united states would be the leader of the international order. let them make the rules. you can definitely enforce the rules. you are welcome to be the policeman. there are only two criteria or two qualifications to that. we have no problem as long as there is no blowback to russia. we will have the right to veto actions that would be regarded as threatening to us. order.rs a rules-based everybody should go away the rules -- obey the rules except when he decides it's in his
interest to not obey the rules heard he says, that is what the u.s. does. that is making it very simple and making it very crude. diplomats would never portray it in those terms. course, aon, of serious question is whether there is any diplomatic form of that that could be acceptable to the west. actions that boudin chose -- that putin chose to send this message have undermined completely any attempt for russia to determine international order in which russia would be respected as having not an equal voice with voice alongs, but a
the lines of the un security council. there are certain areas where we have to be -- this would be .ossible in a good russia world in which russia was trusted and behaved as correspondingly. these actions in russia by putin may well have completely ruled this out. >> thank you. president obama spoke a couple of weeks ago on the sanctions and said the sanctions are working because they are having an impact, but they were not changing putin's behavior. we seemed to be in a pattern where the united states and europe is responding to the matter and russia is doubling down on its own aggression. where is this headed?
are we headed into a new cold war? chance of a renormalization in which russia will be part of -- is the rightat starting point because it tells us something about russia's political system right now. what we make of russia's political system where putin has been and where he is headed. unfortunately, it is a system that is very much dependent on one person. that, itays, watching .s worthwhile for us to go back
suggests thatutin we are headed not for a russia scenario of breaking good, but that we might not be in the worst case scenario. even the past is unpredictable in russia. we have to go back and rework our narrative. the basic question of, did putin start out as fundamentally anti-western or has he gotten there? did he have a goal of restoring the soviet union were has his -- or has his appetite grown since a decade ago? to me, that has been one of the interesting things of watching this drama from the beginning.
i read a terrific piece this morning. , hehe immediate aftermath putinism was. a national project he has been engaged in to restore a state that he found to be under attack -- it does matter what is happening inside russia. the question of russian democracy or lack thereof and what putin's ultimate goal is. anher than restoring
ideological competition with wants to focuse on the question of russia what's going on inside russia. restoring what he saw as -- that is what his advisors told us to him to work on. it has been much more about what is happening inside russia. we tend to see things in our own terms. to me, that is a lot of the reason why you have this long, interesting parallel history of misreading. where there were some russian people from the beginning who had known about boudin and said
he is a kgb guy through and through, there were many alternate points of view. when i arrived in moscow to begin covering putin's first term in office, the narrative here in washington was not that this is a bad guy from the kgb. we can do business with them. he has western reformers and his cabinet and is an economic project. we want stability in russia. that was the dominant narrative. theeally was not until arrest of russia's richest man that that narrative began to change. what i would say is that the danger is -- there were always
people who understood that democracy was part of project putin. there were people who understood that he was going to ride a wave of nationalism. i would argue that if you had just paid close attention to putin's words at this time, it was hard to think -- to mistake the meaning. withery first time he met american reporters, 1.5 years after his tenure at the kremlin, right after his famous meeting with george w. bush. i was there. it was quite a performance. it went on for hours. almost until the middle of the night. what was striking was that, even then, beyond this, it was a combative person who felt misunderstood already by the
west. i had the great honor of asking him that question about chechnya. it was like a totally different person speaking. about power inside russia. keeping hold of russian fundamentals. the other thing he specifically -- he could stick to the talking points. it was a smooth, polished performance. when you start to get down to the basics of something that actually matters to whether he kept power or not, there was an absolute change. that was there from the beginning. not only was he being
outrageously lied to in the middle of this conversation, but it was on that trip that you had a high level informant tell you, "forget what he says to you. drinking with was old communists and was toasting ." stalin that is the only thing you need to know about the leader. that does not mean that the picture was always clear cut from the beginning. it is important to recognize we can create narratives for ourselves that don't match up with real priorities are. when it comes to ukraine, vladimir putin does not see that in the context of foreign policy. he sees that about maintaining itselfp inside russia
and the context of internal policies. he is not equally foreign-policy president in american terms. that is where we can sometimes be accused of focusing too much on the elimination of democratic institutions inside of russia. that is why it really matters. i am eager to get on with the conversation. i was thinking about carnegie today. at 10th anniversary of the carnegie moscow center. eraof the early yeltsin democrats successfully marginalized by putin in his first term.
it was pretty clear what direction russia was going. somebody asked him what the 10th anniversary meant, what the prospects are for russian democracy and he said, well, let me put it this way, there is an old soviet anecdote about an ambulance driver who picks up a patient. back ands lying in the he sees that the ambulance driver has driven past the hospital. he sits up and says, where are you taking me? the guy says, well, we are going to the morgue. what do you mean? i am not dead. the ambulance driver says, we are not there yet. that was his response to the question of whether russian democracy --
-- many terrific things jew susan just said. the relationship between putin and the truth. complexioned -- she has a professional enthusiasm for turning truth on its head. to a fault, a master of lying. he is beingnk dissed jen u.s. -- disingenuous --n he perpetrates perpetuates conspiracy theories. if you were to put him on a couch and inject truth serum into him and asked him, do you thely believe that
demonstrations were part of a washington orn berlin or london to bring about a coup d'état against the on echo regime? he would say yes. the lighted hector would show him to be telling the truth. -- lie detector. he believes in untruths. since we are reminiscing about his biography -- you might have a nuance or two that i would miss in this. in which case, you will add them. this is in no way disrespectful -- heutenant colonels rose to and stopped at the level of lieutenant colonel in the kgb.
he was in the second chief directorate of the kgb. catching the enemy spies among your own. which is essentially institutionalized paranoia. the reason he did not get higher than the level, according to him, is that he had a psychological fitness exam every to have ae was found lowered sense of danger. the opposite of risk-averse, which is to say reckless. you put that together with his lies and weto use have a problem. is a strikes me that this rare occurrence.
isthe diagnosis of putin correct and the problem is , this is autinism novel development in the world. prior to 1989, there are lots of examples, but very few examples sense. what does it mean to have somebody with that psychology and that capability and that results -- result in today's resolve in today's world? what happens if we are stuck with that? what if we are to have 19th-century actors in a 21st century environment? -- i dointeresting think obama uses that phrase to
himself them -- putin and his foreign explicitly modeled themselves on their own -- who they saw as responsible for putting russia back on the road to great power after the indignities of the crimean war. russia came back and how did they do it? not by being necessarily breaking good, but by assertively insisting upon a right to great power status. boudin is often telling the is oftenin -- putin telling the truth. he has been fairly transparent
around what their goals are. their goals for restoring a strong state. he has never hidden his disdain for democracy. early on in his presidency, he another western report about democracy and he said, if by democracy mean dissolution of the state, we don't want any of that. he has find things on his own terms. and been quite transparent about the goals. it was 1.5 years ago when i lavrov.wed sergey i he was very explicit in saying, in the last 15 years, we have project able to russia's power internationally in the way we would like to. what you are going to see in the coming years is a russia that no
longer is content to hunker down at home. you will see a showing up in latin america and africa and asia. , that looks like a very interesting and very coherent laying out of where they hope to go with a much more assertive policy that they felt had earned them the space to do it. 19th-century as planned to their advantage, they are not interested in becoming facebook politicians. they would be happy to stay with great power politicians. >> there is a huge difference between the type of power projection of the post-soviet russia that you are describing accurately and what was happening during the soviet union. this is why we are not in the cold war.
as a citizen of the united states, it doesn't bother me if russians start showing up in latin america and southeast asia and so forth. good luck to them . they are not going to be competing much with the chinese. they don't have an ideological vision of the kind that the when they were coaching castro on how to, nice cuba. to communize what ever they had to sell, which is mostly resources. is inthey are showing up danetsk and crimea. along their periphery where they
have putin doctrine saying that russia has the right to use military force outside of its itsborders to protect fellow ethnic russians. is entirely doing counterproductive. that is a word we use in washington to mean stupid. russia's neighbors are increasingly going to be afraid and look for help from others. you know the old line about paranoid enemies. russia is a paranoid state right now. they are making its own enemies on its own periphery. >> i totally agree with that. is aquestion of ideology really important one.
it's not a cold war in the sense they are protecting this is a global company mission between the united states and russia going forth. the reason they have a different putin doctrine for the places on the periphery is because they have not really excepted that it's not a part of russia. that's where this notion of we are still fighting comes into play. they have a different policy for ukraine and the changing of borders and things like that then they have for -- >> i don't want to be breaking bad myself. one thing there. conveyingn official of this view has at least the implication and sometimes more than the implication that we come at the outside world, particularly the other superpower, came in and broke up the soviet union. we did not do that. stated that. .- they did that
the people of the soviet union did that because of the internal rot of that system. came apart. in -- boris yeltsin. bush,esident, george h.w. flew to kiev in july of 1991 to try to persuade ukrainian people to settle down and give this reformer in moscow, gorbachev, a chance. he's trying to make the soviet union a modern, normal, civilized state. they said, thanks, president bush. we are out of here. that is what happened. this was a self-inflicted dismemberment of the soviet state. ism goes away, it
will and in the dismemberment of the russian state. there were a lot people who were citizens of the russian federation who were not russians and technically. -- who were not russians, ethnically. they will not associate themselves with the chest beating. > at that point, i go to cliff. 'sama has said that putin strategy is counterproductive. he's running rush into a ditch tot he won't be able to get strategic goals. they will continue with that behavior -- what is his reaction to that likely to be? what is his long-term game plan
or narrative of success? how does this end up working for russia? i think we have to think through the way he looks at the world. after the global financial crisis in 2008, the oil price rose from under $10 to a barrel to the famous $147 a barrel in one day. an enormous windfall came into russia. russian growth rates were the highest in the world. igher then china in those years. he got carried away with this notion that this is the russia that he is ruling.
the system is going to take advantage of that and russia is going to be this high growth economy. that will make russia. the definition of a competitive russia in a global economy and the global economy where it's at. it was a huge shock to russia. the rebounded quite well. up.ebounded back what became very serious was the eurozone crisis and the threat of a renewed recession. think at that point, putin started to rethink things and pull back. the winners are not going to be the ones that get these super high growth rates when everyone
is growing, it's going to be the ones that best resist and survive in adverse shocks to the global economy. this is well before sanctions or .ven hints of sanctions he began policies that were designed to make the russian economy more robust. when putin looks at -- he has a project with a capital p. or mission with a capital m. mentioned his determination in chechnya from the very beginning. he even writes in this 2000 -- from 2000, the single best source of how he thinks and where he comes from, he said, "dealing with the
chechnya problem, preventing the collapse of russia, that is my mission." you may think that sounds pretentious. i really believe it. missionit's a historic and he will sacrifice his career. that is interesting. the whole thing for him is a big project. it is strategic and long-term. i'm not saying whether he is right or wrong. people say he's leading russia y wrong,ompletel dead-end path that is weakening russia. we won't be around to make the judgment. on the shorter-term, contrary to what you might think, he has been quite successful and he
continues to amaze me. he surprised me with these sanctions against food imports from the united states and the eu. as -- portrayed as calculated. --s was an x one opportunity excellent opportunity to introduce protective measures for the russian food industry which has been devastated imports. food imports into russia had risen by eight times since 2000. meanwhile, its own domestic production had barely increased at all. the whole russian food industry was being wiped out by imports. russia is a member of the wpa. now he has a great handle on it and this is what he is doing now
. people are talking about how russians are going to suffer as consumers because they will have to find russian substitutes. they love that stuff. all russians can now show their sacrifice by eating buckwheat. i think that putin is often more resilient than we give him credit for. it seems like he is blundering from one to the next. he is a strategic thinker. with anntage he has economy that is 1/10 the size of the adversaries he has lined up against him, he is able to take
advantage of the fact that he is an autocrat. he doesn't have to answer to a party or a parliament or his people. power struggle. the ability to make decisions with his huge popularity ratings right now -- they will never last. they never do. but, they aren't there right now. -- they are there right now. i'm not saying he is going to continue. it is better to think about giving him the benefit of the doubt that he knows what he is himg than to underestimate and think the country is fragile and is falling apart. we can make a but of wrong
decisions. our confrontation with putin through sanctions are already very dangerous. if we continue, there will be further ones. not just ultimately down the line for the unity of the western alliance. wait until it really starts to bite and various countries realize how little the u.s. has at stake economically with this whole thing and how much trade withn europe russia. by someone from a european country that pointed overlook, when this is all , we are still neighbors with russia. we have to think about what happens then. these factors enter. what happens to russia domestically.
do we have any sort of game plan? what are we doing to the liberal opposition in russia with our sanctions? what are we doing to the new sector of the russian economy? they are only hitting the new, progressive, modern sector. the old soviet legacy section of the economy is virtually untouched. ,here are a number of questions not just about global affairs, of about future evolution russia. a plan abouthave futureppens if russia's -- we can all think that somehow the russians will rise up and be angry at putin and not at the west. that is not realistic. they are very angry at the west and americans.
these are the things we will be living with after this conflict is resolved. war thatonflict is a russia has waged against a neighbor. europe sure what part of the person you talked to was from. if he is in the north, that is a ways from the south. thinking, stop including intermedia -- including in our media and our government statements, we have thinking about what we're going to do if russia has invaded ukraine. russia has invaded ukraine. through it piecemeal little green men. it could be described as a covert invasion.
it is not covert any longer and putin is losing. the russians are losing. , is he going issue to accept defeat or declare victory and go home? there are face-saving ways of ending this conflict. in ways that will preserve the territorial integrity and sovereignty of ukraine and allow putin to say he got something out of it. or he can double down. my guess is, he is at a crunch point. in the next week, the guns are already firing -- it could go one of two ways. either an all-out, really serious war in ukraine which could be devastating to ukraine and russia, or he can back down.
tohave not wasted our time talk about his biography and his political personality. he does not strike me as somebody who backs down. >> i don't think he's going to invade ukraine. >> he identified with a cornered rat. he said he understood how it felt to be a cornered rat. >> i think his point is really important. to say that what is happening in convenient been fiction in washington. to pretend that it hasn't really
been an invasion. that has bought space and time does not look like super successful diplomatic efforts. there is always more wishful inking than reality. he is not one to say, thank you, barack obama. calling it an invasion and not treating it in a way tomorrowou woke up morning to a gigantic headline in the new york times saying " youia invades ukraine would have a different response than what has happened here with this monthlong escalation. i agree with the analysis there. question is around the
sanctions. doinguck me that we are this as something one can do as opposed to even having a particular sense that this is going to produce or have a reasonable chance of producing different outcomes. looking at our analysis of putin's personality, it is hard to say -- it strikes me that most of the people who study putin, looking at sanctions will tell you that he is not a man that if you slap on the wrist he .oes not care that much i may be missing something. sanctions are a double-edged sword. there is not much enthusiasm for american -- the american private sector.
i would like to think there is offramp -- that the you said he is the most powerful leader since stalin. all of the leaders up until power leader a they had to report to. he does depend on an elite around him. that lead is quite globalized. they have swiss bank accounts to newir kids are going england prep schools. i do think they represent some bolder ability -- bolder ability lity.lnerabi
they see a downside of the full out war. one thing we have not talked about, what's going on in ukraine. one thing that will be going on in ukraine, if russia moves in with regular troops and takes ,ack over those three cities then russia is going to be finding itself fighting in urban insurgency. -- an urban insurgency. >> somebody was talking today ,bout come at once the ukraine they might be running into some trouble. they are facing this decision really turn do we what was a lie or falsehood that this was a grassroots uprising
of ukrainians against their government -- the evidence is that was not the case. do they turn it into a ukrainian insurgency in order to wash their hands of it? or are they going to be stuck doubling down in order to not suffer an embarrassing the feet? -- defeat? >> if i could ask one more question. workinganctions are not in the sense that they are changing putin's behavior, what are the alternatives? people proposed two different alternatives. one is to go back to deterrence and try to deter putin from a formal invasion. not necessarily through committing troops on the ground or anything like that, but by promises of military aid
or intelligence assistance. that is one category that the president really has taken off the table to this point. the second category is to try a grand bargain with russia. oftry to figure out a way reassuring putin. options?f those viable or options that have appeal in european capitals? >> i want to hear what everyone else has to say. on the latter, i would say there is zero chance. barack obama has made it very clear to his advisors and others .hat he is done with putin there won't be anymore resets. he will not be searching for a grand bargain.
to not be a putin reliable partner. >> one of the other options you that would befied --come in moscow should be for the united states or for ukraine or anye other country from being a member of nato sunday. orre are some extremely highly revered figures in this who have floated this idea. -- a member of nato just as we could have people on this panel who would disagree. i think it would be devastating to do that. remember how hard the russians tried to prevent the baltic states from coming into nato.
and so did a whole lot of people in this country. there were times i felt like i was the only member of the country -- council on foreign relations that wasn't in favor .f nato -- in favor of the nato alliance. notatvia and estonia were in nato today, i bet you anything there would be russian troops stomping around in their size 14 boots, at least in estonia, where there is a heavy russian population. we have already come as a result of putting an expanded nato in place, to some degree contained the phenomenon we are talking about. i completely agree with you, susan, a grand bargain is out of the question completely. think a full-fledged russian invasion with official
russian troops into eastern ukraine is minimal likelihood. y echo -- why? because i think couldn't think that is our trap. he's very sensitive to that. or four, the options for the future reply in between those -- for the future lie in between those, which is murky. in the best case, something is carved out of that. we talked about the offramp, the de-escalation. i don't think prudent -- kuchen cares -- i don't think putin cares much about reputation or him being seen as backing down or anything like that. this project has very little to do with ukraine, per se. it is for the future of russia and his repeated statements that historically, russia today would be a great nation, as populous
as the united states, as powerful as the united states, , russia100 years ago had not continually been drawn into wars and revolutions. i find it difficult to believe that a guy can say that as many times as he has said it and be so shortsighted and so stupid as not to think that the whole game plan here is to lure him in to a military invasion of eastern ukraine. thishis nationalism, all ethnic russian stuff, all of this orthodox church, anything -- asutin a spouses spouses is tactics. i don't think he believes anything -- any of that am a necessarily. it would be interesting to put him under the sodium pentathol and see if any of that stuff. as if he believes that if you just leave russia alone and don't undercut russia, it will be great. mystical in that
sense, but it's all about russia. wrong.'m completely maybe he will invade ukraine, but i don't think he will. >> from your lips to god's ears, because if you are right, and i really hope you are, if the offramp. it won't be our way or the highway. it will be the offramp. that could be handled at the medically in a way -- diplomatically in a way that would not embarrass him in the way he deserves. that is the geithner doctrine. that is what we wrote this paper about. seem fair that some people who did all of that in the financial crisis should not be punished, but if that is your concern, you will never solve the problem. if our only concern is to punish vladimir putin -- and i >> i'm
not saying that. >> i know you are not saying that. i'm agreeing with you. >> pour tim geithner. he just got compared to vladimir putin. [laughter] putin should be compared to bernie made off for somebody like that. who do you punish? clicks ok, i think we will go to the audience. clicks the audience will bring us back. a microphone because this is being broadcast. .lease identify yourself we will take three at a time. .et's start at the back maybe here, and maybe here, and then -- yes. >> thank you. i'm from jpmorgan chase. we have several meetings coming before the baltic summit and
the nato summit. all of those could have good conversations on russia. what do you expect out of those meetings? >> ok, good. and maybe here. is, when we had a war, people usually don't believe their own government. elaborate onou can feel about their own values, whether moral values, or values against another country [indiscernible]
where you have to say foreign policy is usually obligatory. >> thank you. >> i'm derek mitchell and i write the mitchell report. i want to push a little bit on something dr. gaddy said at the outset. essentially, that putin has no interest in being a world leader or global leader, that he period.sia firster, is, given the fair amount that we've heard in the last year or so about putin's thatest in a eurasia union would be beyond russia and would stand as something of a counterpoint to the american
, how do we bring those two seemingly opposing thoughts together? that suggest that putin 's ambitions may be larger than at this point we are giving him credit for? >> thank you. we will take those three and then go back in a moment. would anyone like to start? .n the nato meetings access to take this last question quickly -- >> just to take the class question quickly, whether putin is focused first eurasian, and then the union as more of an expansion project. in my own view, there is no contradiction there because he still sees eurasia as russia.
and in fact, as part of that project, really, good and has meant to say, that does not mean thell wholesale reconquer soviet union, but he sees this in a category that is separate from the category of foreign policy. i think he has pretty consistently spoken in terms of the country abroad. also, i think he sees his --ntry at the counter -- as he views his country in terms of expanding common is a around the globe. but he does see "russia first" includes a policy of restoring russia's status as a great power in order to have an equal seat at the table with the united states again to the best of its ability. to me, that is how you square that circle.
>> and not just restoring its status, but also recovering territory occupied by, or populated by, russians. "russia firster" depends on what you mean by russia. if it includes odessa and places like that, then you are back into the reason we are having this panel today. this goes back to the 19th century and i think president obama is right to say that putin is thinking in 19th-century terms. there was this concept in the 19th century, particularly in europe, particularly in italy, which was the use of force to expand territory on ethnic lines. that is the big problem. otherk thought on the
rubble of questions. -- the other couple of questions. in terms of the beating that is coming up, it is important that they do no harm. which is to say, that they do not expose fissures by either transatlantic or between the private sector and the public as much as possible. and as to your question about statements from leaders, i will say something that is in a backhanded way a compliment to of putin from the title cliff and fiona's book. he tells you exactly what he's thinking. he tells you exactly what is going to do. and then he does it. and now we have a problem. on the eurasian union, i think that whole thing has been wildly exaggerated. anybody who would think that this eurasian union of russia, and the goal was ukraine and hkstan stan -- kaza
essentially. everyone else is secondary. any thought that this could be a counter form, you would be an idiot. wooten is not an idiot. -- putin is not an idiot. what russia needs most of all to be robust is markets for these dinosaur enterprises, these companies, these massive, huge dinosaurs that were inherited ofm the soviet union, most which were defense enterprises. and they cannot sell anything to anybody, essentially, outside their own market. they are trying to sell it to the other former soviet countries. they are highly integrated in the defense industry. basically, it was a defensive
move, not even undertaken with a great deal of enthusiasm by putin. but treated as a defensive move, which i think he thought the european union posing the black-and-white alternative, it -- ukraine, either you are now associated with the european union, or you are completely with the eurasian union and there can be no bridge between the two, was regarded by food and -- by putin as an aggressive measure. i'm channeling him. i'm not saying i agree with it. here i am just trying to protect my economy, and you guys are undercutting me. i think it fed into his paranoia about tensions with the west, specifically about the european union, which he increasingly began to regard as the political .rm of nato somewhat different than the u.s., but it plays into that form. the reestablishment of the european union -- of the
eurasian union, i think that is all exaggerated. >> an additional meeting to keep an eye on is the g 20 meeting in brisbane, where the prime minister of australia, tony abbott, suggested after the downing of malaysian air lines 17 that putin may not even need to go to australia for it if he did not respond in adequate fashion. but if he does go, he will be environment in australia where 39 people were killed. and if he doesn't know, will china and india and others not go as well? , will chinasn't go and india and others not go as well? to the middle there, and then the gentleman in the blue shirt as well. >> thank you.
i am a reporter for the russian newspaper. you made quite a systematic analysis of what putin's priorities are and what the messages are that he wants to send to the world. and you mention that what was done in ukraine, the way his message was sent, was too much. is, what do you think are the options for putin to send this message? he expressed his concerns, for , verbally many times. and some commentators have said that the conflict in georgia in 2008 was a sort of wake-up call, and also a strong message about russian concerns for nato enlargement.
and these concerns do not seem to be heard. what are the other options for him? and do you think the west shares at least partly responsibility for this because his messages were not heard? >> thank you. the german right in front of you. -- the gentleman right in front of you. but thank you very much. economist.red i understand that the focus has been on global among local, and economic issues. but one thing i have not heard anything about his demographics in russia. others have written about this quite a bit. in ramp and change tuberculosis, the rampant use of alcohol and tobacco, and the low demographic growth of the russian federation and some of the other republics.
if anyone would like to address that, i would appreciate it. >> thank you. we can take one more question. yes, this gentleman here. >> i wanted to pose a quick question. >> would you identify yourself? >> john woodward, i'm sorry. into theukraine back picture itself. it tends to get lost in the shuffle sometimes. -- i will promise the question with the thought that i think some of the political divisions in ukraine are, some of them are serious. in the twenty-year year history since independence, they have struggled to reconcile their own internal differences and problems. i suppose you could say that one offramp for putin would be to back away from an insurgency in eastern ukraine and resort to political interference and try to gain as much a possible -- as
much as possible, particularly in southern ukraine, using clinical interference and other forms -- political interference and other forms to gain what it might want. on the new leadership possibilities in ukraine for reconciling the differences that have existed in ukraine, and i think they are real, and what that portends for russia and for putin and what might be a strategic it alternative. that last one first. it is important to bring ukraine into it. often, i do find our conversation here in washington is very reflection is. there is washington. there is moscow. there are european titles. endo, by the way, -- and, o, by the way, there is ukraine, the territory on which this is playing out. i think what you have described is the strategy that russia has
orangepecially since the revolution in 2000 in ukraine of destabilization . the entire revolution was a response to the failed attempt by russia to buy the previous government of ukraine's acquiescence. it was essentially a billion-dollar bribe from the point of view of moscow. any felt they had invested anonymous amount of money and manipulate in a political process in ukraine to suit their and command that this -- to suit their needs and this are presented the failure of that effort. it is pretty clear they are pursuing a strategy of both political, military, and economic destabilization throughout ukraine. they are already trying to do that. they have not written to be super successful in that effort
so far, but i don't see it as , one, in lieu of the other. it is part of the playbook. and the question about nato enlargement and whether this was a rational response on the part of moscow and what else could he have done, that is such a distorted view of history and it's hard to know what he could've done there. ukraine is not joining nato, and that was never a subject of this. secondly, nato enlargement last occurred practically a decade ago. this is not a proximate cause for the de facto russian military invasion of ukraine, and to suggest there is some direct causal linkage is almost absurd as an actual factual matter. ina broader kind of, was this part of the grievance and thateir tip of russia
putin is taking into it, i suppose we could have a conversation around that. but it is very hard in a factual sense to look at this in any way as a direct response to anything having to do with nato. footnotegh, and ironic to what susan has just said, and i grew with every syllable of what she just said, is that depending on how this current crisis plays out, it's very will havehat putin changed the attitude of many ukrainians and the ukrainian government and they will be begging to go into nato. once again, it's creating your own enemies. one thing to keep in mind about ukraine is that ukraine has had 20 years of one lousy government after another. they never went through the genuine, albeit in some ways very flawed, reform timeframe that russia did. and they are paying the price for this. if ukraine can survive this
crisis with its territory and sovereignty intact, it could take a deep rest of relief and realized it has -- a deep breath of relief and realized it has one more chance. nameorwitz, if i got your right, it's a very important point that you raise. if vladimir putin were a real strategist, he will be worried -- would be worried about three things in reverse order. china in the long run. the rise of political islam in the south, number two. and most of all, what i call the pogo factor. we have met the enemy, and it is us. the most dramatic and vivid manifestation of that is the , which you time bomb have very correctly
characterized. russians, slavic citizens of the russian federation, are in deep negative growth rate. for russians,y slobs, particularly males, -- if i, particularly males, were a russian i would be dead 10 years ago. and a number of my russian [indiscernible] of longevity. it is what rush is not doing, in part, and that is that it -- it is part of what russia is not doing, and that is not becoming a state. there is some part of russia that is not being heard because among other things, russia no longer has a free and open media. think the first question was
directed to you. >> i can answer. the second question, that is the topic of eternal focus, the demographic crisis in russia. i read -- i wrote another book with another co-op or last year traps", called, "bear and it's about russia as well. it speaks about the demographics and verse rate and so forth. it kind of debunks some of that, so it would be of interest to read about the alleged crisis. on this question directed specifically to me by the gentleman from the russian newspaper, i'm kind of in the same boat as susan. putin has a distorted view of the world. he has a distorted view of the united states and its tensions -- its intentions.
we do suffer from this thought that everyone should automatically assume everything good about us. you cannot do that. you cannot be the critical. we have a lot of problems in that regard. but what fiona hill and i do in the new edition of the book we are doing, is try to really delve into that, what prudence view -- putin's view of america is, where it comes from. we find it is very distorted. we tried to be as objective as possible in that regard. and therefore, to try to give an answer of, what would an in person-- what would a with an incredibly distorted view of circumstances do in contrast to what he actually did? me, this is so much high political and counterfactual, that it doesn't make sense. -- hypothetical and counterfactual, that it doesn't make sense. and the questions of guilt, i hate those questions.
i hear those from the russian side and from the american side, of who is to blame for all of this. it is fruitless. it is especially for listing going forward if we really are trying to solve this problem. -- it is especially fruitless going forward if we really are trying to solve this problem. it will get a lot worse in the future if we do not solve it. so let's just solve the problem. historians can worry about who is to go to the -- who is guilty and who deserves to be punished. the real problem is, what will we do if the population in ukraine continues? putin has not been successful in undermining ukraine other than by means of military. what they could really do to ukraine economically, not just politically, if they chose to do it, rather than middle -- military force, that is another reason why i tend to think a full-scale military invasion of ukraine would not make any sense. there are many other ways,
unfortunately, that russia could destroy ukraine. and there's no way we could protect ukraine. if russia were to just walk away from ukraine, don't do anything, pretend it never existed, we could in the west never support ukraine. it is so dependent on russia. russia subsidizes that economy to the tune of $5 billion to maybe $10 billion per year. ukraine's future depends on russia. it's just a simple fact. ukraine will never be a free, democratic, and flourishing country until wash a is at least moving in that direction. that is just the fact. and to think that we can somehow develop and protect and make a wonderful society and country movingukraine without russia in the right direction, i think that is utopian. on assistance to
ukraine and whether or not -- i mean, that is often held up as -- there was an article about a week ago where the author said the challenge is to support ukraine. but if what you said is right, then that actually should not be the strategic objective, because it is destined to fail. >> i think cliff is making some really important points with this, and to be clear, my point was that russia had tried not the negative versions, although they had done the negative versions before, but that they felt they had purchased the ukraine government before and had already invested significantly in destroying the ukrainian political system. it did not work to their full satisfaction. so now you're right, it's a very grim scenario. talking about ukrainian dependence on russian energy supplies, ukrainian food, the economic issues, i think it is right to say that anything the united states or even western
europe were to offer, ukraine say that theyy are considering the possibility of anything that could come close. >> i know we're coming to the end. one thing that is in the same spirit of what will cliff and susan had said. i don't think there's a danger that russia is going to completely blockade or walk away from ukraine. and it kind of the flip version, or the other side of one reason , that is,y russians citizens and leaders of the russian federation want to be in ukraine. the bonds between these two countries are beyond those of near neighbors. ukraine is the cradle of russian civilization, as we all know. ukrainians have relatives in russia. so many russians have relatives
in ukraine. we just have to hope that somehow this very dangerous situation plays out in a way so that russia and ukraine regard each other as well it is rather than russia insisting upon treating ukraine as an amputated limb where russia can still feel , and i'm losing my metaphor here, so it back on. it back on. if they can be not just neighbors, but relatives, that would be the kind of political and philosophical space in which they could get vast -- passed what is going on between them right now. let's just hope they survive the next week. >> thank you.
to carnegie for hosting us today. and to all of you for coming. and with that, we are adjourned. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] >> 200 years ago, british soldiers battled american troops outside of washington dc and left the national capital open to forces. they burned down the capitol building.
anthony talks about the burning of washington on american history television. holder and was greeted by diners met with the highway police captain. to meetder is expected with the family of michael brown later in the day. >> thanks for coming. >> thanks for having me. >> hey. >> i have business. >> ok. you see what she says.
she can give you a discount. >> follow me, sir. >> argue doing? how are you doing? cute little kid. what is your name? how are you doing? i'm sorry to interrupt. that looks good. what was that? meatloaf. all right. >> how are you. >> good. >> thank you for coming. there are a lot of municipalities and economic developments going on. a lot of municipalities. and 16 or 17day
people in housing. of standing up and helping them. >> all right. i think we can come together. a lot of treaties of come together to solve problems. >> this is a region. we do not what the world to know us for what is going on here. havent to rectify this and justice for everybody that is involved in this. this area is a good area. we have a lot of development going on. there are a lot of good things .oing on can get you some chicken wings? you said you wanted the meatloaf. words me say a couple of
about the investigation. experiencedght very prosecutors. we have experienced agents who are handling the matter in a fine way. i am going to get briefed on more of the details. there is nothing that can replace coming to the office that is handling the matter and looking in the face of the thise who are handling investigation. ours is different. violationsing for and it is different from the local investigation. we have brought a substantial number of people here and agents here. they have done a great job anvassing and we can do
thorough and fair job to make a .etermination i am confident that we will make a determination about whether or not any federal statutes have been violated. of stressing the importance the way the investigation is going. aey will hopefully have calming influence on the area. people know that a thorough investigation is being done and my hope is that that will get a degree of confidence at the appropriate things are being done. we are doing something different.
i hope that we'll we are doing will have a positive impact. >> here are some of the highlights for this weekend. andrew has soul. on sunday, charlie wrangle. afterwards, a retired narrow search and. lawrence on the competition between the wright brothers and glenn curtiss to be the predominant name in manned flight. american history television. looking at the hollywood portrayal. the 200th anniversary. sunday night, the former white