notice for access comes from. p5+1, israel, countries in the region, we have an incredible amount of sourcing. they have to respond to that. if they don't respond to that, convene,he ability to to vote, or to take other actions if we deem that appropriate. after 15 years. let me just fill out for you -- we also have a 20 year component that allows us to track centrifuge production of the rotors and bellows. sight, which year in is an access and monitoring of

their life, of the iranian cycle. from the mining, the mills, the yellowcake production, the gasification, the centrifuge, out into waste. we will have an ability, iaea, what have the ability to appropriately monitor that every step of the way. if we have x amount of roger radium coming out -- raw urate -- x amount of raw uranium humming out, we don't see it going into the place, we are going to have extraordinary insight into this. in addition to that, under the additional protocol for civil nuclear programs, all of the facilities are declared. it is a civil nuclear program. as such, there is literally before seven visitation -- literally 24/7 visitation in

those sites. it's only for the undeclared facility about which you have a suspicion that you have to go through the other process. we are going to have amazing insight, because they are living by the npd, or allegedly they will. that is what we have to make sure they are doing. we have day-to-day insight into that. i might add, our colleagues, under the interim agreement, which by the way a number of people called an historic mistake, a tragedy, you heard all the same rhetoric you are hearing now -- those same people asked for us to keep that in place to years later because it has worked. -- 2 years later because it has worked. iran has lived up to every component of that over the course of the last year. they produced 20% uranium, they undid iraq, so on and so forth. we will have this level of insight, which i think is not being examined enough or understood enough.

nothing ends at 15 years. simply the size of the stockpile, the limitation, and enrichment, they can enrich further, but we have insight into that enrichment. requiresuclear program enrichment at 5% or so, that is the high end of it. if you start to enrich higher, around 20%, you are talking about the tehran research reactor. no pressure for research about that. we would have insight into that program and instantly know if they are beginning to go somewhere else. red flags go off everywhere and we would be all over with it. we would have months to respond, to be honest. the breakout team never goes down to level below which we have the ability to respond. mr. chairman, may i ask one

note, it could be a collateral benefit. uranium supply chain, i want to add this is something that the iaea wants to have much more broadly. this would be a first in moving towards cradle-to-grave safeguards. >> i would say to mr. secretary, theypeople have said that would keep it in place then moved to something worse. that doesn't mean people to delete -- people particularly like the program to begin with. i want to clarify that. >> congressman elijah cummings of maryland, the ranking member of oversight and government

reform has come out in support of the deal. he released a statement tuesday saying in part, "i believe that the rejection of the iran nuclear agreement would likely cause more harm to the united states, american interests, and our allies by allowing for continued progress for an iranian nuclear weapon." we have the debate here on c-span when members return. secretary of state john kerry speaks about the iran nuclear agreement wednesday at the philadelphia constitution center. you can see it live at 11:00 a.m. eastern here on c-span. >> on the next washington journal, the chief legal officer of the financial revelatory bob colby talking about his role as a nongovernmental regulator of the securities industry. a look at the so-called cadillac tax, a 40% excise tax on

expensive insurance plans. that goes into effect in 2018. we will talk about it with julie appleby. peter grier of the christian science monitor talks about his recent article on how americans decide who to vote for in presidential elections. washington journal is live with your phone calls and tweets every morning on c-span at 7:00 a.m. eastern. kerry,retary of state energy secretary moniz, and treasury secretary lew testify about the iran nuclear deal. siz democrats -- six democrats and all republicans have come against the deal. this is about one hour.

>> this hearing will come to order. today we continue our review of the nuclear agreement of the obama administration reaching with iran. this is a critical hearing on one of the most sweeping dramatic initiatives of years, some would say decades. demanding the committee's thorough review. the global threat from iran has been a focus of this committee for as long as i can remember. last congress, we passed country has of sentience -- comprehensive sanctions 20.islation by a vote of 400- it would give iran a choice between its nuclear program and collapse. but the administration was

successful in blocking that legislation. so instead of us considering a verifiable, enforceable, and accountable agreement, we are being asked to consider an agreement that gives iran permanent sanctions relief for temporary nuclear restrictions. should iran be given this special deal? in september, committee members will face the important decision of approving or disapproving this agreement. we will have that vote only because of the iran nuclear agreement review act, passed in may, which the administration did not want/. to be frank, the administration's preference has been to sideline america's representatives. so i was not entirely surprised when the administration went against bipartisan calls and gave russia and china and others at the un security council a vote on this agreement before

the american public. that's backwards and wrong. we have heard serious concerns from experts about the substance of this agreement. first, iran is not required to dismantle key bomb making technology. does that make the world safer? second, it is permitted, reversing decades of bipartisan nonproliferation policy. does that make the region more stable? and third, iran is allowed to continue its research and development to gain in industrial scale nuclear program once this agreement begins to expire in as little as 10 years. 10 year. that is a flash in time. then iranian obligations start unwinding. does this make the world more secure? we appreciate president obama's effort to secure the most

intrusive inspections in history. but it came up short. instead, there is managed access with iran, russia, and china having a say in where international inspectors can and can't go. the deal's 24 day process is a far cry from anywhere, anytime. and this provision expires, too. while the administration has professed absolute knowledge about iran's program, it is a fact that we have been surprised by most every major nuclear develop in iran's history. iran has cheated on every agreement they signed. so i ask, mr. secretary, has iran earned the right to be trusted? this deal guts the sanctions web that is putting intense pressure on iran. economic,all financial, and energy sanctions disappear.

and where does all of that money go? to the largest terror network on earth. gone are the sentience on iran's nuclear program, but also on the bad banks that has supported iran's terrorism and ballistic missiles of element. and to our dismay, iran won a late concession to remove international restrictions on its blissett missile program -- on its ballistic missile program and arms, imperiling the security of the region and our homeland. if this agreement goes through, iran gets a cash bonanza, a boost to its international standing, and a lighted path towards nuclear weapons. with sweeping sanctions relief, we have lessened our ability to challenge iran's conduct across the board. as iran grows stronger, we will be weaker to respond. yes, the u.s. would royal that

the muddy waters if congress rejects this deal, but the u.s. wields the most powerful economic sanctions in the world. sanctions iran desperately needs relief from. sentience that would continue to deter countries and companies from investing in iran. i understand the effort that the ministration has put into this agreement. these are about as high-stakes as it gets. the committee must ask, if we made the most of our pretty strong hand, or are we willing to bet, as the administration has, that this is the beginning of a changed iran? these are, what issues, and i look forward to what should be an extreme informative hearing. -- these are complex issue. i now turn to the ranking member. >> mr. chairman, thank you for convening this meeting, secretary kerry, lew, moniz, welcome to the foreign affairs committee. thank you all for your dedicated

service, no matter what side of the issue anybody is on. i don't think anybody here it doubts her commitment to the u.s. and your good intentions on this deal. thank you for the time you have taken over the last week to engage with members of congress on the proposed deal, and thank you for your testimony today. congress gave itself 60 days to renew this deal. i sincerely hope my colleagues take full advantage of this time to study this agreement, ask questions, and to make an informed decision when the time comes. we've had many months and many hearings to discuss different aspects of the nuclear agreement with iran. at this point, we are no longer dealing with hypotheticals. we have a specific deal on the table, and we have to decide if that deal is in the national security interest of the u.s. and our allies. to answer that question, to be fair, we also need to ask ourselves what are the alternatives?

if this deal fails, how would we get the iranians back to the table? would new sentience have to be coupled with military action? as i continue to reveal -- to review the deal, there are a number of issues that i find troublesome. i hope the three of you will address them. first, i have concerns that international inspectors were not have immediate access to underclass sites. iran has 14 days to grant access. if iran eases access after that time, then members of the joint commission could take another week to resolve the iaea's concerns. after that, iran has three more days to provide access. we're already nearly a month after inspector's first access. if iran continues to say no, another month could go by while this gets resolved.

that potential amount of time gives me pause. i would like to know how we can be sure that iran cannot use these delays to sanitize sites in a way of breaking the rules. already, we are seeing iran's leadership to that military sites will be off-limits to inspectors.

>> human with tough international sanctions, there are militias and the assad regime. if this deal goes through, how do you propose to keep it out of the hands of terrorists entirely? i am glad that iran will be limited in the development of advanced centrifuges for eight years. i worry about what will happen down the road. iran could quickly move toward the next stage of its enrichment activities. i would like to know the other

provisions that will mitigate the risk, if any. finally, i have a fundamental concerns that 15 years from now iran will be off the hook. if they choose, their leaders could produce weapons highly rich and uranium without limitations. they could use advanced centrifuges to speed the progress even further. this amounts to iran being a legitimized nuclear threshold state in the year 2030. my big question is this. what happens then? we back to square one? is this deal pushing the pause button for 15 years? i have trepidation barely a week after the iranian site the deal with us. the ayatollah was chanting, death to america, death to israel. you think after a deal was signed, there would be a modicum of good will.

they went back to business as usual. how can we trust iran when this type of thing happens. it is disconcerting. i am looking forward to hearing from our distinguished guests on these issues. i yield back to the chairman. chairman: this morning we are pleased to be joined by john kerry, moniz, and secretary of the treasury. before being appointed secretary of energy dr.moniz was the professor of engineering at m.i.t.. from the director of the office of management and budget, secretary lou now serves as the 76 secretary of the treasury. welcome and without objection, the full statements will be made

part of the record. members will have five days to submit statements and questions and materials for the record. the four turning to the testimony, we have the members here. i know we all recognize the gravity of this issue. we want everyone to have a chance to question the secretaries. to accomplish that, i would ask everyone, members and witnesses to respect the time limit. leave them in appropriate amount of time to answer. we will begin with a summary of secretary kerry's testimony. secretary kerry: chairman, and all of the members of the committee, thank you very much. we appreciate the opportunity to be here. to frankly, clear up a lot of misinterpretations. some element of public distortion that exists out there.

there is one at i have seen on tv that has three or four major incorrect facts on which it bases the advertisement. with respect to the chairman and the ranking member, there are conclusions that have been drawn that do not, in fact match with the reality that this deal sets forth. we happily look forward to clarifying that in the course of this hearing. we welcome the opportunity. we are convinced that the plan we have developed with five other nations accomplishes the task that president obama set out. that is to close out the pathways to a bomb. i think as you listen to armie moneys -- ernest moniz, i

think it is a conclusion everyone will come to. i am joined by two cabinet secretaries, both ernie and jack are critical of our ability to do this. the treasury department's knowledge of the sanctions and application of the sanctions has been exemplary. i have helped us understand the implications of the sanctions. as jack will let you know, we are not talking about 100 and $50 billion, -- we are not talking $150 billion. from the day the negotiations began, we were crystal clear that we would not except anything less than a good deal. one that would shut off the pathways toward fissile material for a nuclear weapon.

after 18 months of intensive talks, the facts are pretty clear. the plan was announced this month by six nations. it encompasses that. all of the nations have nuclear power or nuclear weapons. all are extremely knowledgeable in this challenge of perforation. -- proliferation. iran has agreed to remove 98% of its stockpile of enriched uranium. they will dismantle two thirds of its installed centrifuges. they will destroy, by filling it with concrete, the existing core of its heavy water plutonium reactor. iran has agreed to refrain from producing, or acquiring highly enriched uranium or plutonium forever. how do we enforce or verify?

particularly, to speak to the ranking member's question, what happens after 15 years? this deal applies to forever. we have an extremely rigorous inspection regime. iran has agreed to accept, and full ratify, prior to the conclusion of the agreement. if they do not, it is a material breach of the agreement to ratify the additional protocol. that requires extensive access, as well as significant additional transparency measures. this includes cradle to grave accountability for the country's uranium from mining to milling through the centrifuge production to the waste for 25 years. the bottom line? if they fail to comply with the terms of the terms of the agreement, our

intel community, our energy department of that is responsible for nuclear weaponry, are absolutely clear that we will quickly know it and we will be able to respond accordingly with every option available to us today. when it comes to verification and monitoring, there is absolutely no sunset in the agreement. not in 10 years, not in 15 years, not in 20 years, not in 25 fears. no sunset, ever. remember, two years ago when we began these negotiations, a luck to people are today. people are saying, oh my gosh this is going to happen in 15 years. iran will have the ability to be a capable nuclear power. when we begin the negotiations, we faced in iran that was

already enriching uranium up to 15%. they already had a facility built underground in secret that was rapidly stockpiling enriched uranium. when i began negotiations they had enough enriched uranium before 10-12 bombs already. already they had installed as many as 19,000 nuclear centrifuges. they had nearly finished building a heavy water reactor that could produce weapons grade plutonium at a rate of one or two involves a year. experts put the breakup time when we began, which remember, is not the old breakout time that we used to refer to in the context of arms control. that is the time to be able to deploy a weapon. breakout time as we have applied it is extremely conservative. it is the time it takes to have enough fissile materials for one bomb. it is not the amount of time to

the bomb. when we say babel have one year to a certain amount of -- when we say they will have one year to a certain amount of material, they still havethey still have e bomb and do a bunch of other things. you will agree, no nation will consider itself nuclear capable with one bomb. if this deal is rejected, folks, by the way the existing, when we started the existing breakout time was about two months. we will take it down to one year and then it goes down slowly. i will point out that provides us with guarantees. if this deal is rejected, we immediately go back to the reality i just described. without any viable alternatives. except that the unified diplomatic support that produce the agreement will disappear overnight. let me underscore.

the alternative to the deal we have reached is not some kind of unicorn fantasy that contemplates iran's complete comfort to a. he will have talked about dismantling their program. that did not happen under president bush when they had a policy of no enrichment and 163 centrifuges. they went up to the 19,000's. our intelligence community confirms. they will tell you that is not going to happen. in the real world we have two options. either we move ahead with the agreement to ensure that the iran nuclear program is limited, rigorously scrutinized, and peaceful. or, we have no agreement at all with no inspections, restraints, no sanctions, no knowledge of what they are doing, and they start to enrich. to be clear, if congress rejects

what was agreed to in the anna, you will not only be rejecting every one of the restrictions we put in place. nobody is counting the two years that iran has already complied with the interim agreement. complied completely and totally. we have already rolled their program back. we reduce their 20% enriched uranium to zero. that has been accomplished already. if this is rejected, we go back down the road. he will not only be giving i ran a free pass to double the pace of its uranium enrichment to build a heavy water reactor, to install new and more efficient centrifuges, but they will do it all without the unprecedented inspections that we have secured. everything we have tried to prevent will now happen. what is worse? if we walk away, we walk away a

loan. -- away alone. our partners will not be with us. we will have squandered the best chance that we have to solve this problem through peaceful means. make no mistake. from the very first day in office president obama has made it clear he will never accept a nuclear armed iran. he is the only president who has asked for and commissioned a design of a weapon that has the ability to take of the facilities and he was actually deployed that weapon. the fact is, iran has already mastered the fuel cycle. they have mastered the ability to produce significant stockpiles of material. you have to have that to make the nuclear weapon. you cannot bomb away that knowledge anymore than you can

section it away. i was chair of the relations committee when a lot of us joined together and put omost of the iran sanctions and plays. the whole point was to bring them to the negotiating table. even the toughest sanctions previously did not stop their program from growing from 163, two 300, two 5000, to more than 19,000 now. it did not stop them from accumulating a stockpile of enriched uranium. sanctions are not an end to themselves. they are a diplomatic tool that has enabled us to do what sanctions could not. that is to rein in the nuclear program that was headed in a very dangerous direction and to put limits on it. to shine a spotlight on it. to watch it like no other

nuclear program has been watched before. we have secured the ability to do things that exist in no other agreement. to those who think of opposing the deal because what might happen in here 15 or year 20, i ask you to focus on this. if you walk away, youyear 15 and 20 starts tomorrow. what is the alternative? what will you do with a start to enrich. they will feel they have a right to if we walk away from the deal. what will you do when the sanctions cannot be reconstituted because we walked away from a deal that our five fellow nations accepted. i have heard people ask if the vienna agreement will legitimize their nuclear program. that is nonsense. under the agreement the iranian

leaders are permanently barred from pursuing a nuclear weapon. there are permanent restraints and access provisions and inspection provisions to guarantee that. i underscore. if they try to evade the obligation, we will know it. a civil nuclear program requires full access 24/7. it requires full documentation and we will have the ability to track that as no other program before good. the iaea will be monitoring their centrifuge production. they cannot be diverted to a covert facility. for the next 25 years, the iaea will be monitoring uranium from the point it is produced, all the way through production so it cannot be diverted to another facility. for the life of this agreement, however long i ran remains in the npt and is living up to

their obligations, they must live up to the additional protocol. that additional protocol greatly expands the iaea's capacity. this gives us a far stronger detection and capability with more time to respond to any attempt to break out with a bomb and much more international support in stopping it than we would have without.

i had a one should present voting record -- i had a 100% voting record for israel. i understand the fear. i understand the concerns that our friends have. we believe that what we have laid out here is a way of making israel, and the region in fact, safer. i emphasize, we do not lose any option in 15 years, 10 years, five years that we have available to us today. we will push back against iran's other activities. we have laid out a very detailed policy for working with the gulf states. we look forward to working with israel and the effort to do that.

it is why we have a robust military presence in the region and his wife we are working -- and it is why we are working so closely with the gulf states. mr. chairman, we will continue to push back against iran on every front available. the fact is, it is a lot easier to push back against an iran that does not have a nuclear weapon, as compared to one that does. that has been our objective. you with the nuclear weapon, and then you will have an easier time dealing with the other issues. we believe the deal makes our countries and our ally safer. it will guarantee that the iranian program is under intense scrutiny. it will ensure the world community is unified in backing this up. in the end, it will guarantee iran's program has to be peaceful and therefore, is a good deal for the world, a good

deal for america, a good deal for our allies and friends. we believe it deserves your support. chairman: secretary kerry has been very thorough. will recognize you at this point. >> thanks for the opportunity to discuss the iran agreement. the jcpoa prevents iran from getting a nuclear weapon, provide strong but verification measures to give us time to respond if they violate the terms and take our options off the table. i want to stress that i was backed up in the negotiations by this congress. the leading nuclear experts in america at doe labs engaged

throughout the negotiations nine labs and sites in seven states took part in supporting our negotiating position. these experts were a central. as a result of their work, i am confident that the underpinnings of this deal iare solid. the jcp oh it will extend for at least 10 years the time it would take for iran to produce its own material. fissile material will be reduced. will be stringent constraints on the enriched uranium stockpile for 15 years. there will be a strong containment and surveillance measures on all centrifuge manufacturing. the uranium supply chain will also have containment and surveillance for 25 years.

we are forever stronger with the agreement than it would be without. it is not a plutonium factory anymore. it is to tony of bearing radiated fuel sent out of the entire life of the reactor. the parameters are maintained and all paths to a bombs worth of nuclear weapons material are addressed. one important area of that strengthening is that iran will not engage in several activities that could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device. that includes multiple point detonation services. iran will not pursue plutonium or uranium for 15 years. weaponization requirements, a specialty for missile launch added to the breakout timeline.

mr. chairman, i cannot agree that they do not dismantle the iranian technology efforts, relevancy to nuclear weapons. every aspect is bold back -- is rolled back. the iaea will be permitted to use advanced technologies that d oe laboratories have developed. much has been made of a 24 day process to ensure that iaea inspectors get access to undeclared sites. the iaea can request access to any suspicious location under the additional protocol that iran will implement under the deal. the deal does not change the baseline. the jcpoa goes beyond that baseline. it provides a crucial new tool for resolving such disputes within a short.

t period of time. this is the first time there is a cut off in time. environmental sampling provides extreme the sensitive measurements of nuclear materials even after attempts are made to remove the material. the 2003 example found undeclared material even after iran delayed access for six months. combination of the agreements technical measures and the coherence of the vienna deal dramatically increase the risk to iran for any attempts to move to nuclear weapons capability. any attempt to get an rich to uranium will earn a sharp response from necessary means. a steep response must be clear from the start for any violation of the agreement.

blocking the covert path, i will emphasize will always rely on the work of the american intelligence community, and those of our friends and allies. the deal is based on science and analysis. the cousin of its deep grounding and exhaustive technical analysis carried out by our scientists and engineers, i am confident it is a good deal for america, our allies, and our global security. this is summarized in the letter to congressional leadership by seven ambassadors to israel and secretaries of state. they are dedicated to strengthening the bonds between israel and the united states. i quote briefly. this agreement remove the threat that a nuclear armed iran. we sedo fatal flaws that full call for the rejection of this agreement and have not heard any

viable alternatives. as has been stated by many analysts, the biggest gamble would come in turning away from the agreement, rather than implementing the agreement. thank you for the opportunity to be here. chairman: we go to the secretary of the treasury. >> this is an important issue. the full discussion we are having will make it clear this will strengthen our national security. the powerful array of u.s. and international sanctions on iran is the most successful regime in history. we cut them off from world markets and crippled their economy. today their economy is about 20% smaller than it would have been had it remained on the 2012 growth path. the united states government stood at the forefront of this

effort across two administrations and with the bipartisan support of congress. we have established a web of far-reaching u.s. and international sanctions that allowed them leadership afte afr rolling back their international program. the world's major powers have been able to remain united in preventing a nuclear armed iran. that produced for tough resolutions and sanctions in many companies. countries. the point of the sanctions is to change their behavior. accordingly, once the iaea confirms that they have completed steps to rollback the nuclear program and extends the breakout time to one year, sanctions relief will come into effect. there is no signing bonus in the

agreement. to be clear, there will be no immediate changes to the u.n., eu, or u.s. actions. only if they fulfill the necessary conditions will the u.s. begin suspending secondary sanctions on a phased in basis. sanctions that target third country party doing business with iran. regard against the possibility that they do not uphold their side of the deal. that is why if they violate their commitments, once we have suspended sanctions, we will be able to snap back both u.s. and you and sanctions. says preventing the u.n. snapback requires an affirmative book from the un security council, the united states have the ability to reinforce the addition of those sanctions. even as we face the sanctions relief, we will maintain sanctions that fall outside the scope of the deal, including the trade embargo and other measures.

with very little exception, iran will continue to be denied access to the world's largest market and we will remain powerful sanctions targeting their support for terrorist groups, its destabilizing role in yemen, it's backing of the assad regime, its missile program, and its human rights abuses at home. just this week, we will not be reg sanctions on the guard corps. some argue the sanctions relief is premature and till bases their activities. the funds iran recovers could be diverted from malign purposes. i understand that concern. their ties to terrorist groups are why we must keep them from obtaining a nuclear weapon. the combination of those threats will raise a nightmare scenario.

a nuclear armed iran will be far more menacing. if we cannot solve both concerns that once, we need to address them in turn. the jcpoa will free us to check the nuclear activities more aggressively. i contrast, walking away from the deal believed the world's leading sponsor of terrorism with a short nuclear breakout time. we must also be measured and realistic and what the sanctions mean to iran. many fear they will be redirected for nefarious purposes. we estimate that after sanctions relief, i ran will only be able to freely access around half of these resources, or just over $50 billion. that is because over $20 billion is committed to projects with china, where it cannot be spent. tens of billions of additional funds are in nonperforming loans to their energy and banking

sector. iran can simply spend the usable resources as they will likely be needed to meet international payment obligations such as financing for imports. moreover, the president was elected on a platform of economic revitalization and faces a political imperative to start meeting those promises. he faces trillions of dollars in investment and obligations. they are in a massive hole that will take years to climb out of. backing away from the deal to escalate economic pressure and try to obtain a broader capitulation from iran will be a mistake.

even if one belief that extending sections pressure was a better course than resolving the threat of their nuclear program, that choice is not available. we agreed to impose costly sanctions on iran to put a stop to the nuclear program. if we apply them to all of the objectionable activities, they would not do it. we would be left with neither a nuclear deal, nor effective sanctions. it is unrealistic to think that additional sanctions pressure put force iran to totally capitulate. it is impractical to believe that we could marshal a global coalition of partners to impose such pressure after turning down a deal our partners believed is a good one. the joint comprehensive land of action is a strong deal with phase relief after iran the phils its commitments to rollback the nuclear program and a powerful snapback built in if they break the deal. the terms achieve the objective

they were meant to achieve, blocking the path to a nuclear bomb. there is an overriding priority and it should not be put at risk when the prospect of an unconstrained nuclear program presents as a threat to america and the world. thank you again and we look forward to answering your questions. chairman: thank you secretary. to get to a point that i read. the 24 day suspect process does expire in 15 years. the iaea additional protocol alone would not stop them alone aced obased on our past experience. in the secretary defense's testimony about the i in icbm stands for intercontinental.

simply countries develop icbm's to develop a nuclear forehead. these would be aimed at us, not at moscow. at the same time that these missile restrictions are coming off, sanctions on the iranian scientists involved in the bomb for our coming off. how is that making us safer? it seems to me the winner here is russia. they demanded and onwon on the lifting of the sanctions. why did we concede on that? secretary kerry: we did not concede on that. we had seven nations negotiating. three of the seven thought the sanctions ought to be lifted immediately -- iran, russia, and china. four of them thought they should not.

what we succeeded in doing was keeping both the arms embargo and the missile component. the missiles for eight years and the arms for five years. not withstanding the fact that iran has a legitimate argument they are making that the u.s. resolution 1929, that created the sanctions and the structure we were negotiating under. it said that if iran comes to the table and negotiates, all the sanctions would be lifted. they did not just come to the table to negotiate. they came to make a deal. a signed an agreement. they felt they were in comply iance with the u.n. resolution. we felt it would be unconscionable, notwithstanding to lift.

we don't feel we lost anything whatsoever in that, mr. chairman. the u.n. resolution of 1929 is a nuclear resolution. susan rice was at the u.n. and put the arms peace in at the last minute. it was a thrill and at the last moment into the nuclear resolution. the nuclear resolution always contemplated that if the iaea came to its broad conclusion that iran was not engaged in any illicit activities in any illicit activities and its declared or undeclared activities, then all the sanctions are lifted. no matter what is going to happen here, we were going to lose both the missiles and the arms under the u.n. component. but here is what we have done in

the meantime that we believe actually takes care of the issue. first of all -- chairman: mr. secretary, i follow the arguments you made about the laws that we have to defend against the iranian missile program. i understand the steps. i am just saying, big picture, when we end up with a bottom line when in eight years they get the missile. it does not look like a victory to me. they may not get the missile at that time, but they can buy the technology at that time. secretary kerry: actually, they cannot. we have several other protocols that prevent that from happening . specifically the missile control technology regime prevents that from taking place. we have an executive order by the president of the united states that in fact, prevents

the transfer -- chairman: there is a reason why russia pushed it. secretary kerry: they did not want the u.n. component of this. they know we have separate capacities. chairman: i would hope we can strengthen our hand in this as we go along. the bottom line is iran is getting a financial windfall. they increase their support for terrorist proxies. they announced that recently. they upgrade their conventional weapons and i think, their ballistic and missile program over the time of this agreement. it has an industrial sized nuclear program in 10 years. that is the timeframe, only if they don't cheat. when i look at this, and i see that their neighbors that know it's the best, trusted the least, i just ask, we are

presuming that they will change their behavior. that behavior did not change last weekend when they were chanting again, death to america. secretary kerry: chairman, with all due respect, we are not presuming any such thing. there is no presumption on what iran will or will not do. there was one objective, make sure they do not get a nuclear weapon. on the backside of that, we have a very robust initiative that will push back against their other activities. let me be very specific -- it authorizes u.s. sections on foreign persons that contribute to the proliferation of missiles, including efforts to develop or transfer them by any person or foreign country or proliferation concerned. that is just one of about four or five. secretary kerry: --