to the nigerian government. mainly because he was opposed to the war. the nigerian government imprison him for 24 months. he was in prison during the biafran war,ar -- trying to persuade the government not to sell weapons. because he was opposed to the war. he was imprisoned for 24 months. brian: where does he live now? okey: the joke he shares, he's 82 now, he travels constantly.

so the odds are that as we speak, he somewhere in the air, going to australia or china for israel or france. he is constantly on the road. we are out of time. this is a memoir called never look an american in the eye. >> thank you very much. ♪ [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2016] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> for free transcripts or to give us your comments about this q&a.org. visit us at

also available as podcasts. >> we are live now at the brookings institution here in washington dc for a discussion about the politics of the arab world. we will be hearing from former secretary of state madeleine albright and former national security advisor stephen hadley. at 6:30 eastern, we will be live from the council on foreign relations for a conversation about presidential transitions. we're just waiting for the former secretary of state madeleine albright and former national security adviser, stephen hadley, for this discussion about the politics of the arab world.

>> good afternoon, and welcome, on behalf of the brookings institution foreign policy program and on behalf of the atlantic council. i'm deputy director of foreign policy at brookings. i would like to extend a special welcome to my counterparts from the atlantic council rejoined us here today including the deputy

director and ambassador richard lebaron. i would like to extend a special welcome to our distinguished guests on the diplomatic community. report -- written by my colleague, who over the pastor has convened the task force is working group on politics, governors, and state society relations. this is one of five such groups organized by the middle east strategy task force, a bipartisan initiative launched in february 2015. brookings foreign policy has been proud to contribute to the through theroject security and public order working group whose report was offered last year by our brookings colleague kenneth pollack. the report you have before you today is informed by tomorrow's many discussions of the working group and reflects your own analysis. it helps explain the collapse of

the middle east states system, take stock of where we are now, and offers recommendations for tackling the crisis of governance in the middle east in the post arab spring environment. with years of deterioration state society relations. tomorrow argues that for the region to develop societies that are resilient to terrorism and institutions that are effective and responsive for the long-term, there must be a concerted effort to repair trust between governments and their citizens. dialogue is needed, as his patients and to stand up for some of the regional actors including the united states. these are words of wisdom that echo broadly in washington here today. as the title of this event andests, real security stability in the arab world will be determined by the quality of governance that takes hold there. i encourage you all to read the report and to share your thoughts on the report and on today's discussion the at

the #governance. former secretary of state madeleine albright and former national security adviser stephen hadley, to individuals who need no introductions, individuals who know a little more about individual security. we are delighted to have them on our program. with tomorrow about the report. secretary albright will present some introductory remarks and then we will turn it over to the panel. the, we will invite audience to contribute and ask your questions and engage in the discussion. thank you so much, and welcome, secretary albright. [applause] thank you very much, suzanne. it's a pleasure to be here to

have the opportunity to share this with brookings, thank you very much for hosting this. i think, as you pointed out, one of the things that really distinguished the atlantic council plus italy strategy task --ce is the way in which atlantic council's middle east strategy task force. it truly is a collaborative effort and i think that as we talk about it today, i think that will become even clearer. really was terrific in terms of just working together. i enjoyed it very much. engagedalso, just as we a multitude of institutions in the project, we also tackled a multitude of issues in the working groups that we established. the working groups did produce today we areo releasing the fifth and final one on governance.

lest you think this completes our work, i want to announce that after we all take a break for turkey eating, and cooking in my case, steve hadley and i will be publishing our final cochairs report next wednesday. that report is going to attempt to knit together the topics tackled by each of the working and enter a new long-term approach for the region based largely on ideas from the region is dealt. our sense has been that we have all spent a lot of time looking at the region, but a lot of it has been kind of fire drills and band-aids and that basis of what were doing is taking a much deeper and longer look. tole we have time next week address our broader strategy, today's discussion really involved one of its most important components. we will be talking specifically about how, in order to find a way out of the crisis in the middle east, the states in the

region will need to address failures of governance. and of course the problems ofught about by the lack accountable, responsive, and effective state institutions in the middle east as is so well known to people in this audience. the role has been downplayed and what you will hear is that governance is in fact a central cause of the turmoil in the middle east, something with which i heartily agree. as she puts it, the amending of the region doesn't come from outside intervention, nor does it come from the top. ,t really did come from below for millions of frustrated people whose expectations far exceeded the opportunities that were available to them. as we have seen over the past far easier to's identify the cause of turmoil than to find a solution, and not for lack of trying, but i really do think we have to keep that in mind.

in anyst challenge journey is to have a destination in mind. for the people of the region, i've convinced that this destination is governance built on the foundation brought in stable enough to last, and that by definition, governments that have the trust of their citizens respect their rights and respond to their needs. as is and mention, tammy's paper offers a framework or how the region can begin building toward such a model of sustainable governance and argues that this work has to begin now, no matter what else is going on. ande are many in the region in the united states who have a different view, and they argue that these questions of political development can only be addressed after nations achieve security and prosperity. i happen to believe that political development and economic development need to go together. in very as all of us

forms of graduate school would argue which came first and which came second. the reason i say that is because evil want to vote and eat. -- people want to vote and eat, so the governments have to deliver. and they also want to live in peace. one of tammy's main arguments is that the reason secure -- security depends on responsive and accountable governance, and this raises some tough questions about u.s. policy, including whether we still have the ability and responsibility to exert leverage on these issues. with the transition underway in washington, the answers are more uncertain than they have been in the past, and it are pointing out that for more than a century, stability in the middle east has been understood to be the responsibility of an external power, where there was the british empire or the united states of america. yet according to the president of the united states, until

stable governments are set up and supported locally, the middle east will never call down. that pronouncement came from the white house, not barack obama, but of dwight eisenhower in 1956. over the decades, we've learned not to expect miracles, even though that is where they are supposed to come from in the middle east. we have also learned not to give up. while the united states remains, in my mind, the indispensable nation to the security of the region, i'm always quick to point out that there's nothing in the word indispensable that means alone. so after a time in which the u.s. has been accused of doing too much and into little, we need an honest discussion about our role and relationships and responsibilities, and that's why i'm so pleased to be part of this middle east strategy task friend,th my very good steve hadley. it's been an extraordinary

learning experience for both of us an opportunity to work with some truly wonderful people. one of them is tammy, and it's now my pleasure to invite her and the rest of her and the rest of our panel to come up on stage. [applause]

>> thank you for being here. let me begin by thanking my fantastic cochairs, steve hadley and madeleine albright. when we started this project, steve and madeleine told each of us working group chairs not to be afraid to ask the questions and to challenge our assumptions . i think recognizing that in the middle east, this is a moment of truly historic transition, and i think the questions of for the region and for those of us outside who care about the region and have a stake in the region, that questioning of assumptions is even more important today than it was when we started the project, so i really want to thank you both for a fantastic process.

i want to thank my fellow working group members in the region and all over the u.s. and europe, we managed to meet virtually and in person and i learned a great deal from all of them. they are listed in the report, so i hope you will take a look and share my appreciation. it may seem as though today's focusis an odd choice for , maybe it's not a propitious time to talk about governance in the middle east, after all, we are dealing with the region in bylent turmoil, beset vicious civil war. in new. is invested military conflicts in iraq and syria, fighting isis. i just came back from an international security or him up in halifax, where the only discussion of the middle east there was framed around terrorism, isis, civil war, and refugees.

these are the urgent problems seen by many governments around the world as a threat to international security, deservedly so, and that are drawing attention to the region. but it's precisely because of those urgent challenges that i think it is valuable to focus in this report on governance in the region, because to my mind, isis and the civil wars are symptoms of something bigger. they are symptoms of a broader breakdown in the region. they are not the disease. seen beginning in late 2010 was the breakdown both of individual states and the state system in the middle east that had lasted since the eisenhower administration. the state system that had advantaged american interests and those of our regional partners, the system that the united states sought to defend. it's that breakdown of the middle east order that has led to the civil wars in libya and yemen and syria and the rise of

isis. so understanding why and how this regional order broke down i think is necessary to understand how we effectively deal not just with the symptoms of that breakdown, but with the challenge of restoring lasting stability to this region, and that is the premise and the driving question of the report that we are releasing today. just threeocus on things about that breakdown that i think it is important for us to understand, and what they about the task ahead. the first thing to understand is the regional order broke down because of things that happened inside states, inside societies, because of the pressures that built up over many years. is first part of that story the story i told in the book that i published in 2008. it's the story of how the bureaucratic authoritarian model in the arab world began to

ideology that the states relied on to survive were becoming less and less effective in a globalized world. ofy rested on a certain kind social contract, a patronage-based contract. over time, these systems became thenand more efficient and they were challenged both from within and without from a thegraphic old of young on cusp of adulthood, from the effects of the globalized and from a radically new information environment prompted first by satellite television and then by the world wide web 1.0 and 2.0. and so the effect on citizens in these countries was that the expectations created under the

old social contracts could not be fulfilled in these changed conditions. just to give you a couple of indicators of this, the egyptian thatnment had promised university graduates would be able to get a civil service job. by the early to thousands, the weight time for those university graduates to get those civil service job was on average, eight years. that's eight years of pushing a food cart or driving a taxi or twiddling your thumbs, waiting for your life to begin. meantime, you can't afford an apartment, you can afford to get married, you can't afford to become a full adult participant in society. the second thing to understand about the why and how of the breakdown in the middle east is that no one in the run-up to the arab uprising was unaware of these challenges. that is a very important thing governmentsd, how

dealt with these challenges actually ended up in many cases exacerbating the problem, rather than resolving them. had a lot of talk and many efforts in the 1990's and to thousands to promote reform of governments and reform of economies in the middle east. governmentsy arab sought to adjust that social contract, they ended up, instead of developing a more inclusive social contract, negotiating adjustments for political and economic elites, whether within their own country or external institutions like the world bank and the imf. they reduced government hiring without really liberating the private sector to create growth. they brought new business cronies into the ruling parties instead of opening up politics more broadly, and result of these kind of adjustments exacerbated inequality, further

ofowered some at the expense others and really increased the grievances rather than resolving them. increased,ent government moves to manage politics were weaker, and the protests row cap it would this brings me to the third thing we have to understand about how this all happen. the consequences of how certain states broke down. when the protests came, many governments responded poorly, in ways that exacerbated divisions, collapsed state institutions, and some governments responded with violence, in ways that generated demand for more violence. so syria and libya are the places in the region that are most violent and most disorder. these are the places where leaders ruled in the most personalized manner, where the

destruction of civil society and community institutions were the and wherethose same the state was most complete. so having failed to act in a manner that could've prevented these uprisings, the leaders -- when basic governments in order broke down, those who impose their will gain power. when the state's power against its citizens, it created a market for others with guns to defend them against the state, and that allowed the emergence of identity-based sectarian militias, extremist groups with horrific agendas. the time these governments had broken down, the social andract had broken down social trust, the basic trust between people and communities

had eroded. tore is very little left manage peaceful politics. this is the challenge we confront today in the middle east. beyond the political competition between iran and saudi arabia, beyond the threat by extremist terrorism or met weapons of mass destruction, this is the biggest challenge in rebuilding a stable order in the region, it's the breakdown of trust within society. the a consequence both of way they were governed and the way they broke down. the paper goes into detail on and offersubjects specific priorities and approaches on a way forward to tackled a problem. fewme just give you a highlights here. first, the future of the region will be determined not by the mere existence of government, although that's what many are the qualitybut on of that governance, because if we don't have more accountable,

responsive, transparent and effective governance, it will not be sustainable governance. it will face more challenge and breakdown again. conflicts that are suppressed will reemerge. so we have to think about the quality of governance, not just the fact of governance. it's probably no surprise to any of you that i think democracy is far more likely than it -- any other regime type to generate the effective governorates, but where the region is today and is neitherocracy swift nor linear. the ambassador can testify to that. the paper lays out a few practical ways to begin rebuilding the basis for that kind of sustainable governance. two teaust mention

insights. first, i don't think the question regarding how to build this new order is about territory or state borders or where lines are drawn on a map. it's about what happens within those lines. is about social trust. there is no line you can draw between shia and sunni in iraq that will not be fought over. the creation of south suzanne did not -- set south suzanne did not magically resolve the conflict inside sudan. also not about institution building. after our military victories in iraq and afghanistan, our allies spent a lot of time setting up new institutions, central banks, the ideas you build a machine of government and populated and you start the gears turning and it should go, but i think we learned from the last 15 years

that building institutions is not enough. it matters how those institutions are populated and by whom. are they inclusive of everyone with a stake in the process? do they have a process that people think is fair and transparent? that brings me to the other insight that i want to leave you with before we have a broader conversation, which is that what is most important to effective, sustainable governance and institutions in the middle east today is dialogue and conflict resolution. like an obvious thing that war isold line a continuation of politics by other means, but it is true. it's a basic beginning aspiration of the middle east to ship conflicts

underway in a violent channel into a nonviolent channel, and also to assumptions to those places where political conflict is being suppressed, where dialogue is being suppressed, for fear that both places may become violent if there is no room or no capacity or institution and forums for 's dialogue and peaceful politics. finally, it suggests to me that sustainable governance in the middle east in the future will be much more decentralized than it has been in the past. because you don't rebuild social trust from the top down, you rebuild it from the bottom up. there is a broader need to build governance in a way that citizens can see and feel and buy into. i think we already see a number of experiments across the region in more decentralized

thernance, whether it's empowerment of elected councils theorocco or the way lebanese have managed in the absence of a president until very recently, or where the government in baghdad is struggling with conditions for locally effective government in the areas that are about to be liberated from isis. so i think local governance is what we need to focus on if we want to replace violence and mistrust with something more sustainable. and ihat, let me stop look forward to our conversation. you, tammy, very much. it's a great paper and i really do urge you to read it. here's what we're going to do for the rest of the time. we will have a conversation up ,ere with some broad questions

and we will go probably until 4:00 orve minutes of 4:00, then we will throw it open for questions and comments from the audience, and we will end probably at 4:30. that's how we plan to use the time available to us. much, steve.very it's a pleasure to be here. thank you very much, tammy, for having me on the panel. it's a pleasure to join the panel today. would like paper, i to congratulate you and the working group on a spot on analysis and great insight in how to look at middle east politics and political dynamics as they are today. going to follow steve's recommendations and recommend everyone to take a look at the paper. analysis.a detailed

it gives us a great overview of what is been happening since the 1960's all the way to 2011 and beyond 2011. i'm going to underline three relevantich i feel are and building on the insights and recommendations. one, and with regard to trust between state institutions , and it covers a very wide spectrum. all the from republics to monarchies. some may have been suffering from poverty, unemployment,

corruption and so forth. we had not been having a lot of popular trust in state institutions and that had been happening in middle eastern society. rather than alternative institutions, we did see [indiscernible] religious-based visions and secular visions. based on social and economic which you offer a great analysis of an conflict between the halves and have-nots. but this did not add up to an alternative vision for state

society relations. an alternative vision for a new social contract. what we were looking at were old social con -- contracts which are collapsing in new social contracts which have led to be -- yet to be fleshed out. believe the picture is not changed in the last five years. were looking at autocracies are limited liberal experiments as we've seen in morocco and elsewhere. we do not have genuine social contracts to attest to that. is how to bridge the gap between state institutions

and citizens, segments of the lost that.that have the first key point we need to look at is the question of social capital. society generates social capital. this is not top-down, it always has to be bottom-up. i'm really focused on arab society, i'm not an expert on iran. when you look at arab society, the only way to imagine social capital is redefining the relationship between state , isitutions and populations the focus on civil society. if we're looking at state instant -- in syria and libya

where the legitimacy is we must offer visions first date society. we do not have a viable lyrical movement in most arab countries -- a viable political movement in most countries. one of the leading forces in pushing the country forward toward a true experiment of democratic government. we question is, how can empower citizens to form these organizations? what are the conditions available in this environment that can help civil society prosper? are are the conditions that available?

here i would like to highlight two key points. in most air countries where still looking at constitutional frameworks which do not safeguard the economy of civil society acts. there is a great deal of state and secondly, you can that constituency building is not well regarded in most arab countries. come -- not a comparable outreach with any democracy, either western or non-western democracy.

we will not get to real security if we do not fix government .ssues the two key issues we have to look at our how to put in place the right conditions for civil toiety organization represent people's interests, different segments of the population, and a new social contract which is needed in most air countries. freedoms,eguard key in spite of the fact that this is one of the regions that's suffers most. the second point i would like to underline is, once again going to a great insight that tammy offered in the paper with the

working group, one of the tammyendations that articulates toward the end of the paper, the way i understand formingrt, it's security sectors, judicial theitutions as well as of low importance. great in -- political impact, it's about citizens and have a look at state institutions, state security institutions, police officers, atice

the military security institution governing the country. and to build on the analysis in , and here number one ,he internal actors can help those outside the middle east can offer some help. number one is to look at arab institutions and those in place governing, security sectors, military establishments, and getting them to reflect the key values of what democracy is all about. if you follow egyptian events, for example, we've been hearing

-- this is not a new phenomenon. it keeps happening. there are two cases in the last 48 hours or 72 hours. as look -- as long as were going to lack accountability and , citizens will continue to have no trust in government, even if they are democratically elected. to push lawmaking in the direction of accountability. once again, civil society actors need help.

we sometimes see a complete collapse. it's not only a domestic set of it's the actors and europe and elsewhere. it can be a nongovernmental organization. evacuations facing , i believe itoint will stay fashionable in the u.s. for some time. civilian and non-civilian politics. when looking at questions of governance in the region, white is important to differentiate

and spend some time comparing or morocco, egypt comparing different countries where we have civilian elitesians and civilian with all the different political arenas. pushing forward consensus advances,ideological where citizens can hold the government accountable. one key distinction when you 2016at arab countries in is a difference between countries where the military security establishment is the

politics ande in those with civilian political dynamics. we have a track record of civilian groups accepting more , so this has to be a focus when you look at governance and how to push forward democratic government and your paper says that. thank you very much, i want to ask one technical question because i think i was misled by that. you use the phrase privatizing justice. i have the notion of the private sector taking over the police, but i think what you mean is a transparency and accountability that allows citizens to hold those institutions to account.

>> exactly. we've talked about --, and i amr to pick up on something said come you talked about the failures of states to govern effectively led to the collapse or civil war in iraq, syria, and libya. our other states in the region at risk? have we seen the last of the there other are dominoes that potentially could fall, and if so, what will bring that about? crucialhat is a question, because for all that are international attention is that have the eggs already fallen off the wall, others are up there wobbling, and there have been another of analytical attempts to sketch out what those broken neck have in common you seen some

republics being more vulnerable than monarchies, for example. that isee in the places would say today are still vulnerable, it's those places where, as we saw in egypt, you have an aging leader with no andr secession plan, certainly no transparent, accountable, responsive mechanism for determining succession. those are potential crisis , ands for any government we've just been undergoing our regular exercise in the peaceful transition of power here. moment,ways a delicate even for the most established democracies, but in those places that don't have established tradition, it can be a very

dangerous moment. so i would look for example at algeria, where you have an aging leader who has been in place for a long time, and no evident success or and no evident process for a way forward. you could say the same about the palestinian authority today. so you have a looming succession crisis and no connection between citizens and government, where they don't feel like there is any channel to weigh in. that is a boiling pot. >> tammy is right in pointing out the historical precedent. egypt was in a succession crisis with salt of the country being who's going to succeed former president mubarak?

steve, when you look at that, what is missing is not only who the establishment is putting forward as a succession plan of sort, but what's missing as well is how to tackled the loss confidence between government and citizens. in tunisia, confidences undermined because they managed to put institutions in place. constitutione a framework that makes sense. onceis missing in egypt democracy was back in, this was attempted after 2011 and was blown away. between 2011 and going back to many dark moments in election history. like algeria, no one

knows what will happen. mr. hadley: it's interesting because the places you picked were algeria and the palestinian authority. those are not traditional monarchy goal societies. one of the things you may remember when we started this project, we said this is about a crisis of legitimacy in the middle east and we said legitimacy comes from consent of the governed. this is not sophisticated enough. there are other forms of legitimacy in the region based on religious affiliations, revolutionary ideology. a range of forms of legitimacy. how do you square that? as we look at the middle east going forward, past 2011, what do we say about legitimacy, and what do we say to these regimes that may be petering out --

teetering on the shelf but have not fallen off. what in the post-2011 world, what would you recommend to leaders as to how to enhance the legitimacy of their regimes before they go through what these other countries have gone through? i think we have to remember what it is. people think of it as a western concept, but basically people gave up individual rights in order to get protection and security in some form. obviously that is different with a monarchy. but still, there is that same responsibility of what is it that the leader owes his people? when you were asking about different countries, i think those are interesting ones that were picked, but i would say that this is almost like a virus , and one of the things we have not talked about enough is the

influence of technology. one of the things that really with a man ints tunisia who immolate's himself, and the news gets out and all of a sudden it's spread. clearly what happened in tar river square was social media. tahrir i hate to finger any country, but when you look a it country that is monarchy, frontline state in one of the most difficult refugee ,ituations, not a rich place and it king who is trying to figure out the various coalitions and kind of a transit point, and it goes to the very point of whether the state is providing a livelihood to the people. things,that one of the

and you write about this a lot, tammy, in terms of what is it that the state owes the people? initially, in all of these countries, they were the employer of first resort. where that is not possible anymore, then it becomes a trust issue. so legitimacy, to a great extent, in this day and age depends on whether the old leader, the new leader, the king , the deputy crown prince or whatever, actually is delivering , because technology has made it possible for people to know what people in other places have. and especially what you said about the younger generation, they are technologically adept. i have been talking about, this is been a peculiar 10 days, but basically in addition to the thing you think i'm talking , i just spent time with a

group of former foreign ministers in silicon valley, talking about technology and governance. and what it has done in terms of providing people information as the weather they have a legitimate government. disaggregated voices in a way that makes some of the organizational things you are talking about hard. ,ome of you heard me say this and i always admit that i stole this line, but the thing that is interesting is people are talking to their governments on 21st century technology. the government listens to them , or0th century technology hears them but may not be listening, actually. and provides 19th century responses. so that disconnect is what we're dealing with. it's very evident in egypt, and i think anyplace could be

subject to this, despite the our that the ones you chose very specifically so. legitimacy is what is the government supposed to be doing, whether it is a king or a dictator. tammydley: just one more, , clearly, what is a government supposed to be doing and what is it delivering for the citizens? encouraging states to move in those directions, in fact, is it complementary to or supplementary to other traditional forms of legitimacy, that for example the monarchical states are dependent on? or does it undermine those other sources of legitimacy? it seems you have to be able to answer those questions if you go to a monarch and say you need to move in the direction of legitimate, transparent, responsive government.

then you have some understanding that that they can be supplemental and doesn't undermine the traditional sources of legitimacy to which regime is dependent. there is an important language i would recommend to answer this question. it's not about what government owes its citizens. it's really about what citizens expect from their government. not what they need, but what they expect. that is part of what is changed and that's part of the impact of technology that madeleine was describing. one of our other cochairs put his finger on this in his paper, which is that part of what's happened in the arab world and around the world among this younger generation is what he calls a participation revolution, that citizens, because of technology, and because this generation of arabs

, more highly educated, healthier, more engaged than any generation before, and you must remember that parts of the region two or three generations ago didn't even have secondary schools. so the developmental leaks here are tremendous. and this rising generation has a different set of expectations. it's not just about making sure they have a job. they expect to be able to participate, to set their own path in life and not just have it directed for them by their monarch or their father or their uncle or anybody else. expect is, what they the thing that liberal societies are best structured to provide, which is the opportunity for every opportunity to find their own path to human flourishing. governments cannot get away with just offering enough jobs or enough health care or enough

free education. check the box and they are legitimate. they have to meet that set of expectations. they have to give people forrtunities to find themselves a pathway. that means a have to be more open and responsive. to the point of congruence or veryon, if you are a traditional leader who believes you can help way besidesiety grow ,irecting it from the top down that's not the only form even for a monarch. the traditional pathway may be i am the source of social good, i distribute them, but it can also be the source of opportunity. you can be the source of dynamism.

is an interesting mentality, but it is entirely possible. ms. albright: one other thing that has to be put in the mixture, and egypt is a perfect example, the way it stands is the freedom of this aggregated r square, theri young people were all having an incredibly interesting time, having been gotten there by social media. the older man who cannot get to his stall in the marketplace as i cannot stand this anymore, i need some order. so i think one could actually be there was really a movement to have that happen, because people are fed up with the chaos. i think the hard part is how gettingity and

participation, whether people are tolerant enough to go through the chaos time until they get to the proper time. amr,adley: i want to go to and then we will go to the audience. lawrence of arabia said i am a river to my people. a legitimacyg based on satisfying what the people expect from their government and increasingly that includes participation in a role in fashioning their own future. i get that. spent three three-hour sessions in the last 14 months and i tried to make this argument that this is a source of legitimacy. do if overt he must the long-term he's going to bring stability and prosperity. and i have not yet made the sale.

what you hear is what you would expect, given the trauma that egypt has been through, i understand what you are saying, but you need to understand this is a get -- this is difficult time, there is extremism at the door, and the middle east cannot stand a breakdown in order of a country of 90 million people. if you think refugee flows are bad now, you just wait until egypt breaks down. so what is the argument you make sincerely believes, and which he is risking his life, how do you make the argument to him that actually this is where he's got to go, and he's got to bring long sturm last long-term stability to the country?

amr: this is basically the debate we are having in tunisia. not just since 2011, but even earlier on. cases to pushugh clearly, it cannot provide for long-term stability. 2011, what happened after did not began in 2011. young peopleof protesting and demanding that their voices should be heard, their concerns should be addressed.

people took to the streets. these were not only young people. increasingly, people with grievances. you do a great job in the paper highlighting the socioeconomic impact. unemployment a young -- among young people, 40%. young female citizens, 45% and more. so, the argument is that autocracies promote instability. i take it seriously that there are security challenges. not only terrorism, but different challenges in the reason that need -- region the need to be accounted for. the question is, how to get government. the only way to get them is to listen to civil society actors. we need an organized presentation, all citizens to

get governments to listen. i believe that we offer some solutions. you do not have to undermine trust among citizens by harassing, by imprisoning and killing citizens in police custody and elsewhere without providing socioeconomic solutions to improve those conditions. governments listened to their , that only thes military and business establishments, which benefit and thrive on the patterns that do exist, they will find solutions. the irony of the modern arab state is that it was in fact the era of modern state -- modern that through from the 1950's in 1960 plus. in a way, the modern state

enabled development, enabled leaps in education, health care, and elsewhere. yes, this is the healthiest and most connected generation of young arabs we're looking at. but in a way, these governments have become anachronistic. to listen to what these voices are demanding in this instance. stephen: one last comment, then we will go to the audience. >> i think that it is a false choice between mass mobilization and authoritarian order. it is not that a leader is a river for his people, but the people are a river. like water, they are going to pound -- find outlets. is whether youge can create channels, mechanisms, pathways, for people to have the influence you want to have in the lives of their communities.

however, left with no alternative, they will spill into the streets. the failure to perform in the. period leaving -- leading up to the uprising is what compelled the mobilization. what is destabilizing and dangerous is a leader who believes that by putting a lid he has lowered the boil in the pot. as you all know, when you put a lid on the pot, the boyle increases. that is what i think we have got in egypt right now. we have no civil society channels. no effective political channels, because the parliament and party system are so tightly managed. no free speech channels. boiling very fast, in a way that i think is far more dangerous in many ways than

the situation that egypt was in before the uprising. stephen: i love your phrase. the leader isn't the river to his people. the people of the river that if the leader does not channel will spill into the streets. way to summarize. cc.ra: try it on [laughter] forhen: i will wait madeleine. do we have microphones, or are we just going to ask able -- yes, ma'am? in the front. in the fourth row. please identify yourself. if you will keep the questions short, we will keep the answers short. >> short questions but long answers? i'm from the university of washington. civil militaryn relations in turkey, egypt, israel. listening to you, it's fascinating how you are describing the egyptian and arab

worlds. but a lot of what you are saying applies to other cases on the periphery of this arab world. turkey in particular, i would argue they are going through the regime where they are turning into the making of the mubarak regime. over cycling of civil society. is as if there are ping-pong regions, imitating one another. i guess, i wonder -- because i there aread -- is center for middle east policy for other countries within the region, including turkey and israel, of course? and the crackdown on civil , thety in israel as well law that you have to account to who is founding you internationally?

a lot of what you have been describing seems to me like bits of conversation everywhere in the region at large. is that part of the framework that you would encourage adopting? not just looking at our countries, but other arab countries in our neighborhoods. stephen: do you want to take that one, tammy? tamara: first they would say -- yes, because politics is politics. while every region and every country has a history and culture that shapes the way politics are expressed, there are certain common features. yes, there are demonstration effects. positive and negative. in the paper, i talk about the competing models were the middle east today. the fragile democratic experiments of tunisia. the effort at renewed authoritarianism symbolized by egypt. and the brutal, savage border of isis. which is also a model competing

for adherence in the region today. and that's part of what's at stake. what are people going to embrace in the midst of this turmoil? i do think that it has an effect on the region, but i also think that some of those dynamics -- for example, the global push back against civil side he -- society hasn't stopped in the middle east. we see it in russia. india and elsewhere. stephen: we do, indeed. >> from the german embassy -- congratulations to the task force and working group for completing this. my government, i think, finds a lot to agree with in this report. we think it addresses a key aspect. implementing it will be hard work. i do think that as someone who has worked in the region until recently, a lot of people are afraid of challenging these workers, as there is such a level of chaos and

disintegration around them. i think that that is something that needs to be looked at. but i would go a step back and wonder if you address it, in the report, in a sense to me the most basic point is -- are we ,oing enough as governments taking an interest in the region but not part of the region, to stress the importance of human rights? for example, bringing out arbitrary attention, extrajudicial killings -- these kinds of things come way before, in a sense. we talk about freedom of association, which is very important. we would obviously support that. but the human rights and rule of law part is fundamental and that is where we see such grave this behavior and file nations around the region. -- misbehavior and violations around the region. sec. albright: i would say that i believe we do. or at least, we tried. the problem comes from having

tried it -- i won't say in which country -- that we can help you if you don't do something about your laws and human rights. mind your ownof business. but i do think that we have to do that, even if it is not received well. and it is argued, by those who don't want to do it, that it adds to the chaotic situation. the question is -- and this has come up over and over again -- democracy,ights human rights, participation of people, western rights, or global? i have argued that its global. we are all the same. people want to be of book to make decisions about our own lives and we want an absence of arbitrariness. but it's not an easy message to deliver. frankly, if it's not delivered alongside practical assistance, whether it is to security or aid

programs, but it does have two go together and if we don't do it, your country and hours, then we are not fulfilling our responsibilities. but it is not happily received, steve can testify to that. stephen: if i can say one thing that you touched on, it's a very important point -- those countries that are making steps in the direction of what tammy is talking about -- and you see it in uae, most of all, and are beginning to in saudi arabia. certainly, tunisia. it's hard to do that and to keep your society together in a security and regional environment. think about the environment in the middle east today. and to say to a leader -- we need you to take the risks of moving in this direction in a region that is in many respects, melting down. this is a hard thing that we are

asking of leaders and we have to recognize. one of the things that we say is -- this is the attitude of the international community and it ought to be that if you are willing to make those hard decisions, we, the international community, will support you financially, but diplomatically -- financially, diplomatically. if you don't, we won't. not because we are being punitive, big -- but because in our judgment a would be a bad investment. a good investment would be to the countries who are willing to make these steps on the behalf of the people. because they are the most likely to result in long-term stability. but i think we have to recognize the difficulty of what we are asking and we need to being gauged and being willing to step in and support the countries willing to make the right decisions. yes, ma'am? >> hi, janet smith. inorked at the war college

saudi arabia from 2009 22013. i've got two quick comments on two parts of the report. one, the issue of trust. my observation, obviously based on my experience is one of the issues to think about is trust amongst people themselves. they have the freedom to express to each other how they struggle with these issues. it's not just government affecting that key issue of trust, but how do you provide a comfort level where saudi's, jordanians, it is your chins, can talk to each other -- egyptians, can talk to each other without fear? some of the most moving conversations i had started with the premise of finding the political philosophy foundation within islam, the region, the .ulture, asking two questions especially obviously among muslims. what are the values in islam

that have the deepest meaning to you? that's a conversation. issue.s your dialogue the second part is, how do you want to see them expressed in society? when it becomes grounded within -- culture, as you mentioned things the company the bottom-up, the cultural component and militaristic component are obviously key, but the two issues combined are different is taken within your report. thanks. just a quick reflection on that very thoughtful comment, absolutely. i do, in the paper, talk about within communities. not just between citizens and government. if you're thinking about a case between libya and syria, where the society has collapsed into sectarian or tribal civil war, you have to think about that. are things that can be

done, even now, while these buildcts are ongoing, to forums and platforms for dialogue, trust building, platform resolution. there are some u.s. programs that were done in a rack -- in a before the idp's were brought back into the town, so the idp's did not have to immediately justify or reveal themselves under the threat of return and the communities could feel comfortable. there are examples and programs we can build on. one half sentence on the previous point from our german colleague, i wanted to echo something that my colleague, general john allen has said a number of times -- from his perspective, as someone who spent the last years of his military and civilian career , if weg terrorism

external actors who have invested so much in the military fight, if we do not also invest in the governance piece? we will essentially be playing lacrimal on it -- whack a mole on an extremely global scale. the problem presents itself again and again. stephen: other comments, questions? yes, ma'am. >> hi, i'm with a private firm that works in the middle east. my question is actually expanding on the notion of social trust. it sok that you framed well, talking about the breakdown in the middle east. particularly when we think about the relationship that a government has with its citizens and the expectations to the relationship that the citizens have back with their government. one could certainly argue now, not just, but here in the united states, that we are beginning to some extent and erosion of

social trust with certain groups who may be feeling more marginalized or more uncertain with relation to the government. i would just ask if you could comment about what can a citizen do, in terms of rebuilding social trust? how would that be most effective? to the region, without comment on the u.s., it's ,triking that the two countries with the emergence and explosion of tribal conflict, multiethnic andact -- conflict, libya syria, are the countries where the primary organizations are between government and citizens. but the big difference, as

opposed to libya and syria, is that we were approaching them as having had an established civil society marina with professional organizations. human rights defenders. in egypt, in terms of their autonomy, the dictatorships crashed into intermediary layers in the state. in a way, citizens woke up to dictators who did not feel like departing the scene and it was a way for them to organize through as it wasdeologies, given to them through civil society actors through which there were no channels. my fear is that what's happening not bea and syria should happening elsewhere in the region. is not response to it

the might and power of a general , but to enable governments to take the challenge between citizens and governments seriously. to enable them to exist and thrive. this is the only way to manage multiethnic pensions. full-fledged democracy. it is a multiethnic society. it is because we do have an established arena for civil society fighting with the actions of citizens. there are distances and demands from the government. at least to an extent. stephen: other questions, comments? weigh in the back? and then we will take the two women here. >> thank you, greg from american university.

i really appreciate your ,omments on civil society, amr and the need for organizations outside the region to help those inside the region. as you know, especially in egypt, the government portrays us as a foreign conspiracy and play up the hyper nationalism and prevent that type of assistance. so, how do you get around that , to have civil society, the united states, europe, helping those on the ground and in egypt? thank you. amr: thank you. very briefly, a, we don't have to push back on the counter narrative. we don't have to submit to the populist narrative of what happened was a conspiracy. it was not. it's not. the government should recognize the failures that they have been

sustaining and enduring for a long time. pushing a counter narrative for civil society not only vis-a-vis citizenst, but for amongst different groups in the population. secondly, as there are cases in which they can operate -- like in egypt right now -- tunisia, egypt,, as opposed to and finally once again this is a question involving narratives. what does it take to fix? is about security or autocracy? it is about enabling civil society to exist and present citizens with demands to be at best responded to by accountable governments. stephen: so, we are running shy on time. to take the two that i

wanted to hear in the two from the side and we are just going to go through those questions and try to answer those four questions in the panel, but then we will be out of time, i'm afraid. ma'am, you had one? the two women behind you? and then we will take you, ma'am. >> hi, i'm a jordanian consultant with a focus on government. going back to the gentleman's question regarding civil society , i have a lot of hope in civil society, but in the absence of political will on the part of government, this space is very limited. how would you discuss options beyond foreign government assisting but also nongovernmental organizations? i'm going to throw another group into the next. perhaps this could be another way of looking at it. porac -- ds for a --

these disparate communities. hello?: >> on a concerned citizen from texas. the social contract, what secretary albright was speaking about, seems impossible without dealing with all the corruption. to me that seems like such an underlying problem. if you can't trust your police, judges, if you can just buy them off, how do you even trust anyone? i think this is why there is so much discontent. how do you deal with that? yes, ma'am? right back there? three from the end? good, u.s.son department of energy. in have done a great job terms of addressing political governance issues, but it seems to me there are bigger

macroeconomic issues that cannot be solved by nations themselves alone, such as taking oil and currency crises. how do you all see the u.s. and the rest of your national community -- how can they best serve these countries in helping them to bridge that gap to foster better governance? very good question. one more from the side? yes, sir? >> i'm elliot hurwitz, former state department, world bank intelligence community person. i want to thank the panel for a great presentation. reade not yet had time to the report. on the periphery of the arab world, the only arab country i have been to is yemen, which no one has mentioned. it is particularly pertinent to u.s. policy. i would like anyone on the panel on yemen andment or u.s. policy towards it. stephen: we have got four issues.

any takers? tamara: i think that we should just do -- should we just? stephen: let's do it quickly, one minute answers. spaces whichhe key we still have available, in countries where the public space has been closed off, the question becomes how to do it in a manner that does not undermine the capability and legitimacy of domestic actors. the question becomes how to do do it away from government to government. i thought it was more powerful if done nongovernment to nongovernment activists. finally, once again having to justify the interest from a political perspective, for these

communities to get interested in what's happening. there cannot be exiled opposition. we need a smart narrative to push it forward. yes, it's one of the key spaces. tammy, you want to do corruption? tamara: yes, i would say that sunshine is the best this infection. it is such an important antidote to that kind of behavior. corruption exists, typically, because those in power or what who have power of trying to solve problems they have, grease the wheels of their own lives or of the people above them in the chain. you got to look at how to fix the political dysfunction that creates incentives for dysfunction. whether that is higher salaries for policeman or making sure that there are expectations from

outside, as well as from inside. this goes to the plan for globalization. highlighting this for you, there report onar in the economic globalization and its impact on state sovereignty. it is a problem for every state but there is a reason why arab states were and are particularly ill positioned to deal with the effects. an expertght: i'm not on yemen, but i have to say this . in many ways it is a country that is a victim of all kinds of meddling. one, in terms of north and south yemen being united as a place where they are not very excited about it, but there is pressure coming from the neighbors. then the fact that it was on its way in terms of looking at having some government work when then it became the playground of proxy war between iran and saudi

arabia. so, that is what's going on now. a victim country, is the only way i think it can be described. and very hard for the outside powers that would like to do some good there to actually get any purchase on it. in some ways. it's not big enough and it is, a lot of therbing problems that cannot beat out with somewhere else. stephen: we have come to the end of our time. i want to thank you, cheney, dashcam he, for -- tammy, for a great paper. thank you for coming. please, join me in thanking the panel. [applause] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2016]

[indiscernible room noise] >> yeah, i have a ton. [indiscernible] it's good. [indiscernible] are you headed out immediately? [indiscernible] here and there. [indiscernible] do with decide what to the headstone. [indiscernible]

>> hi, i'm [indiscernible] how are you? >> high. >> oh, ok. >> yeah. [laughter] [indiscernible] >> good, good. [indiscernible] >> in the only reason [indiscernible] today, an event with william daley, joshua bolten, and matt mclarty on presidential transitions.

they will speak at the council on foreign relations, live at 6:30 p.m. eastern here on c-span. >> tonight, on "the communicators," former fcc communicators on how the fcc could change under the trump administration and a look at the tech and telecommunications issues they could be facing. >> if we are smart as a country, we will start to tackle -- what , with artificial intelligence, the jobs and the commercialization? >> the changes with set-top box items, when there wasn't any sort of unanimity from the democrats, for starters, probably not going to get off the ground. >> watch "the communicators," tonight at 8 p.m. eastern on