government, the people. guest: the greatest asset i see we have as a country is a strong economy. again i believe it is essential to get back to 3% economic growth. we have looked at alternative ways to manage the economy in recent years and they have not produced that growth. once again that is why i'm excited about fundamental tax reform and i am very excited about regulatory relief as i do believe we will get back to 3% growth at the end of the european -- end of the european host year. host: one approach is a public-private partnership. how does that work? guest: hypothetically how it would be is that you bring that concept of skin in the game. there is money available. let's say that bridge cost $100 million. if you bring $20 million down today, the infrastructure bank would make sure that $100 million goes out. banking the infrastructure

hypothetically, you're actually putting projects that have an economically viable return. i was reading this engineer study when they were siding all these bridges in ohio and pennsylvania that are dilapidated. in the back of my mind, i wonder , do we even need all those bridges? should we focus on those resources on the parts of if the search absolute critical? maybe the bridge built in the 1920's is not necessary. i think my hometown of cleveland -- it does not have a nice airport, but it's functional and works. every time i go home for thanksgiving, the airport works fine. i would rather we not build a new airport in cleveland but focus on a bridge collapsing someplace. if that bridge closed, it would have a nasty effect on the local economy. host: mr. trump does get his of fundingrms infrastructure. would you advocate the highway funding bill? guest: it typically comes at a

places here in d.c.. find that there is a public ceremony will train that goes through little rock, arkansas. i never see people on the train. wherebypass in places they are great and they might not be the highest and important use of our infrastructure needs. host: adam brandon joining us on a discussion of economic policy and the incoming trump administration. roxy, you're next. you are from tennessee on the republican line. roxy, go ahead. let's try maria. maria is in westfield, new jersey, independent line. thanks for calling. caller: thank you, pedro. i three areas that i wish her guest would address. if mr. trump is

in favor of auditing the fed and the defense department with the black budget were a lot of foreign projects for infrastructure or hidden. the second area -- i wanted to know whether he is going to insist with the trade agreements with infrastructure that we use american steel, merrick products, and american workers. -- american products, and a mac and workers. -- american workers. the third and most important one ct preventinga congress people from profiting from inside information. my understanding is that eric thatr put in something families could still benefit from this. if you could cover all these areas, i would be grateful. guest: i will go through these as quickly as possible.

again, i have a lot of concerns way the pentagon does spend an account for money. hen i talk to military folks, they say there is waste, fraud and abuse in prot curement necessarily not systemic across the entire agency can take a look in their books and find ways to better use their resources. when it comes to trade and the comment about american steel for projects, i re believe mr. trump is very serious about renegotiating a deals, however,e we have to remember we want to sell our goods to foreign it is ents, make sure equal trading field so that if buy, the american government is going to be able to buy foreign goods for use, we

to make sure foreign countries buy our goods, as well. to inside es information, it is stunning to me the problems you have here in dc with the inside information and that is why, hey, i'm in for the swamp, you simplify things and make clear rules and away tions and take incentive for the profit. if there are so many decisions in washington, d.c. that drive business, that is a problem, you'd rather the are made on sions business decision not political calculation. when it comes to trade, a story talks about surviving an appointment. they say that mr. trump appears rolf ve included hundrededberg, jr., to head up team for the transition and talks about how chamber of commerce is a lobby group in the represents american business interest and around the globe. guest: sure. we've had quarrels with the

chamber on different spending and priorities, but my big trade ead of one dozen ou will see a different trade deals, with india, singapore, that is how it will move forward. you can find a specific issue, their sticking point, you are enough car parts and blocking our milk exports in for opening up some other sector of the economy. host: what do you think about administration renegotiating nafta? do you think that is possible? is t: certainly anything possible. host: do you think it is probably? guest: four thing the trump needs to do, four promises they need to do. border security, that was the his that launched campaign, there has to be some border.on the regulatory reform, obamacare and has to e taxes. he deliver on the four issues. nafta renegotiation, i see is

part, but i think the four main things you will see in the next -- first quarter of next year. >> moderator: next up maryland, atlanta, good good, go ahead, the guest.with caller: good morning, how are you this morning? it is wonderful, i listen to you the time. i have a question. out, dent obama is president trump is in, congratulations. i want to find out what he's do for homeowners? obama didn't do anything. would ingle female, they not allow me to -- but yet our did.ident that doesn't make sense. is he going to try to help and concentrate to make america great again and bring back jobs? call delta airlines, somebody the phone, nswers

and people in atlanta can't get the job. ing to do that? guest: i think it comes back to magic of hitting the number of three or four percent growth, you start seeing jobs appear. it is a little deceiving when employment numbers. unemploy cemetery low, labor articipation, lowest labor participation rates in the last 50 years. that means people are not job.ng for a once you start getting growth back, you will see jobs reemerge talking about, bringing the call center job back to the united states. y question, i don't specifically if the call center job would come back, once you get higher growth rate, there demand for goods and services and start seeing people market.in the job host: here is dean from hot springs, arkansas, republican

line. and r: yes, statement question. basically getting on the last caller, outsourcing is a problem west of the united states. big companies and everything start outsourcing like crazy, is there any way or do you think it would the government if the would force companies to pay the same wages or more for people working for the company on the outside to bring here?bs back because they're sending jobs out is merica because it basically like slave labor, it is cheaper. say,if you make the company okay, you're going to outsource, for example, that lady talked line system, e okay, if you make that company say, okay, you've got to pay wages or more than you will pay in america, maybe they'll send the jobs back here, what do you think about that? guest: i don't understand the

there.nt when you ask employers why they end people or jobs overseas, labor as percentage, and not factor.ily the driving we have the highest corporate tax rate in the world, the tax rate.rp rat when you look at regulations we aggressive e a very regulatory system. f you hold the regulatory bureaucracy back, you lower the rate so that our corporations face similar rate in the united as they do elsewhere, you take away most incentive to move overseas. host: new york is where alberto calling on our independent line. us. are on with good morning. caller: good morning. yeah, how come this country for the any money people, for the americans? they have money for other people want, for they example, they give 2 billion

dollars, i understand israel gets 4 billion for year and will billion for next 10 years, what do they do with that money? education, , free free health insurance, we can't obamacare over here, can't get no kind of insurance. thousands of ds of dollars in education. american people and that is what is never talked about. caller, i don't want to keep going back to my same point tis true, we need to to 3 or 4% economic growth and people will feel increase. since 1999, america has not seen significant pay increase. to the question you brought up about foreign aid, i know it is hard for peep when he infrastructureat problems or the healthcare problem or other issues and is sending billions f dollars around the world, i

think that is why trump's main points is he is pulling money back from different projects nations and one reason he won election, people are looking, we need to take problems at home. if you go around to our inner cities and neighborhoods, they bad shape and why fix and in cessary nigeria, sia, we need to fix ohio and michigan. host: "wall street journal" this morning, pictures and listings trump's key economic advisors, steven moore, who will on thursday, david wilbur navarro. peter of that list, who do you like and who gives you pause? guest: that is like a dream team ist when you lay it out, work with stephen moore at freedomworks. the other gentlemen you mention, these are pro-growth folks, folks i know, they look at the

what it takes w to break out of this economic stagnation we have. that is one thing that gets me excited about what is going to happen in the country. an opportunity to get growth back. host: with that in mind who, is your mind to n head treasure and he commerce? wilbur ross, look invested sinesses he's in, talk about american manufacturing, the steel mill in ltv steel closed, the factory closed. as good as dead and he put a consortium together and labor, creditors and back up and mill running. fire is shooting out of the moke stack and wilbur ross did that. if he could do that, in what i saw in cleveland with he do that g, could elsewhere? he did the impossible.

david kudlow. if you hear his mantra, about getting growth back to the there is also nd i've heard larry kudlow and moore, they make morale cause for growth. what it does for people, what it oes for the economy, the choices it gives you, economic growth isn't just about raising numbers, it's about giving a choice on what you can do with you kids for school, what can do where you buy a house, what you do for vacation. come hing necessary life from economic growth. host: stephen moore will be here this program.on from pennsylvania, democrats line, go ahead, thank you for calling. caller: good morning. i watch c-span everyday. fracking in t pennsylvania and taxes on the never got a penny out of that got ly people benefit from the fracking was $8 ernor corbet, who got

million toward his campaign. oil, who are making profit. texas,ackers went back to the people that leased out land are getting billed for roads put on their property taxes, governor 5%, he supposed to get pledged when running for office, i don't hear anything about axes coming out of the oil wells or pipelines. like a ines are sort of one-way street, right to the top. and it is like 1% mentality. well, the energy industry is historically a risky industry. you can become wealth nethe oil industry and you can lose your easily.ery with oil prices now low, once you start seeing oil prices

will see more economic activity being reengaged. mentioned a,ter, i how high does price of gas and american o be for companies to start producing again? guest: closer to 60 or 70 dollars again. if you grow the economy, demand will rise. you said growing the when we o many times, left the recession, following trends, gdp would have been here. 2 trillion dollar gap between histore cal average and what we ended up doing. that is where i believe hidden is.wth what caused that growth to not happen, i look at reth latory

that, we y, you change will start to close that gap. columbia, maryland, tom, go you are on with our guest calling on the republican line. good morning. good morning. re regulatory, does that mean poisoning the air and water?ng the 'll tell you something, how cousins t.v., they my of all their too.ement and their jobs, host: got you, tom. steel specifically, the company went bankrupt, the problem is pensions were tied with the company and the company went bankrupt. i was referring to ross coming in and taking the company and into something profitable. i guarantee you, the few thousand steel workers working

former ltv plant producing steel in cleveland, ohio today, are happy to have plant. and i continuing is clear, no one wants to have air like china rivers, but when ou look at how the regulatory state has been used, make some competitive. anyone thinks we will return to era of early has trial age, but balance tipped too far to the regulatory camp. more call from stacy in silver spring, maryland. caller: hi. morning. i was just thinking maybe trump his business back and maybe ignite other ompanies to bring their business back. thank you. guest: well, we were talking earlier about trump's economic coming together. what you will see as break from the past, where you see a lot of people coming from the public sector, government folks going

into government, you will see a private sector folks going into government and if ou -- people, i think you look at who voted for trump, people are voting because they want to see economic growth. is history books we'll take a look back on donald he p and see like, hey, did get the economy growing at 3%? if he does, he will be he doesn't, he didn't get the economy growing, that is what it is based on. is freedomworks, the website freedomworks.org, to things ut policies and they advocate. he guest is adam brandon and is the president and c.e.o. sure to watch it c-span's

washington journal live on c-span on tuesday. join the discussion. here are some of our featured programs thursday, thanksgiving day on c-span. eastern,r 11:00 a.m. nebraska senator ben sasse on american values, the founding fathers, and the purpose of government. >> there is a huge civic mindedness but it is not compelled by the government. by allowed at noon discussion of healthy food and the issue of child obesity in the u.s. 12 -- 12-15 teaspoons of

sugar. feeding an epidemic of childhood obesity. wille wikipedia founder talk about the challenge of providing global access to information. >> there is a small community there. 5-10 really active users, another 20-30 that no a little bit. they start to think of themselves as community. >> an inside look at the year-long effort to repair and restore the capitol dome. kagan reflectse on her life and career. >> and then i did my senior thesis. it taught me what it was like to be a serious historian and to andin our case all day --

to sit in archives all day every day and i realized it was not for me. >> followed by justice clarence thomas at 9:00. $20t is about putting a idea in a two dollar setting without any loss of meaning. 10:00, at an exclusive ceremony at white house, president obama will to billthe senior award and melinda gates among others. watch on c-span in c-span.org or listen on the free c-span radio app. former secretary of state madeleine albright and stephen handley who served as national security advisor were part of a discussion about middle east politics and security. is hostednute event by the brookings institution.

>> good afternoon, and welcome, on behalf of the brookings institution foreign policy program and on behalf of the atlantic council. i'm deputy director of foreign policy at brookings. i would like to extend a special welcome to my counterparts from the atlantic council rejoined us here today including the deputy director and ambassador richard lebaron. i would like to extend a special welcome to our distinguished guests on the diplomatic community. we are here to discuss a report written by my colleague, who over the past year has convened the task force is working group on politics, governors, and state society relations. this is one of five such groups organized by the middle east strategy task force, a bipartisan initiative launched

in february 2015. brookings foreign policy has been proud to contribute to the task force project through the security and public order working group whose report was offered last year by our -- authored last year by our brookings colleague kenneth pollack. the report you have before you today is informed by tomorrow's many discussions of the working group and reflects your own analysis. it helps explain the collapse of the middle east states system, take stock of where we are now, and offers recommendations for tackling the crisis of governance in the middle east in the post arab spring environment. with years of deterioration state society relations. tomorrow argues that for the region to develop societies that are resilient to terrorism and institutions that are effective and responsive for the long-term, there must be a concerted effort to repair trust between governments and their

citizens. dialogue is needed, as his patients and to stand up for some of the regional actors including the united states. these are words of wisdom that echo broadly in washington here today. as the title of this event suggests, real security and stability in the arab world will be determined by the quality of governance that takes hold there. i encourage you all to read the report and to share your thoughts on the report and on today's discussion the at twitter, using the #governance. the report was cochaired by two of our panelists, former secretary of state madeleine albright and former national security adviser stephen hadley, two individuals who need no introductions, individuals who know a little more about individual security. we are delighted to have them on our program.

we will speak with tamara about the report. secretary albright will present some introductory remarks and then we will turn it over to the panel. finally, we will invite the audience to contribute and ask your questions and engage in the discussion. thank you so much, and welcome, secretary albright. [applause] ms. albright: thank you very much, suzanne. it's a pleasure to be here to have the opportunity to share this with brookings, thank you very much for hosting this. i think, as you pointed out, one of the things that really distinguished the atlantic council's middle east strategy task force. it truly is a collaborative effort and i think that as we talk about it today, i think that will become even clearer. but it really was terrific in

terms of just working together. i enjoyed it very much. i think also, just as we engaged a multitude of institutions in the project, we also tackled a multitude of issues in the working groups that we established. the working groups did produce the papers, so today we are releasing the fifth and final one on governance. lest you think this completes our work, i want to announce that after we all take a break for turkey eating, and cooking in my case, steve hadley and i will be publishing our final cochairs report next wednesday. that report is going to attempt to knit together the topics tackled by each of the working groups and enter a new long-term approach for the region based largely on ideas from the region itself.

our sense has been that we have all spent a lot of time looking at the region, but a lot of it has been kind of fire drills and band-aids and that basis of what were doing is taking a much deeper and longer look. while we have time next week to address our broader strategy, today's discussion really involved one of its most important components. we will be talking specifically about how, in order to find a way out of the crisis in the middle east, the states in the region will need to address failures of governance. and of course the problems brought about by the lack of accountable, responsive, and effective state institutions in the middle east as is so well known to people in this audience. the role has been downplayed and what you will hear is that governance is in fact a central cause of the turmoil in the middle east, something with which i heartily agree. as she puts it, the amending of

-- the upending of the region doesn't come from outside intervention, nor does it come from the top. it really did come from below, for millions of frustrated people whose expectations far exceeded the opportunities that were available to them. as we have seen over the past five years, it's far easier to identify the cause of turmoil than to find a solution, and not for lack of trying, but i really do think we have to keep that in mind. the first challenge in any journey is to have a destination in mind. for the people of the region, i've convinced that this destination is governance built on the foundation brought in stable enough to last, and that by definition, governments that have the trust of their citizens respect their rights and respond

to their needs. as suzanne mentioned, tammy's paper offers a framework or how the region can begin building toward such a model of sustainable governance and argues that this work has to begin now, no matter what else is going on. there are many in the region and in the united states who have a different view, and they argue that these questions of political development can only be addressed after nations achieve security and prosperity. i happen to believe that political development and economic development need to go together. i know that all of us in very as forms of graduate school would argue which came first and which came second. the reason i say that is because people want to vote and eat, so the governments have to deliver. and they also want to live in peace. one of tammy's main arguments is that the security depends on responsive and accountable governance, and this raises some tough questions about u.s. policy, including whether we still have the ability and responsibility to

exert leverage on these issues. with the transition underway in washington, the answers are more uncertain than they have been in the past, and it are pointing out that for more than a century, stability in the middle east has been understood to be the responsibility of an external power, where there was the british empire or the united states of america. yet according to the president of the united states, until stable governments are set up and supported locally, the middle east will never call down. that pronouncement came from the white house, not barack obama, but of dwight eisenhower in 1956. over the decades, we've learned not to expect miracles, even though that is where they are supposed to come from in the middle east. we have also learned not to give up. while the united states remains, in my mind, the indispensable nation to the security of the

region, i'm always quick to point out that there's nothing in the word indispensable that means alone. so after a time in which the u.s. has been accused of doing too much and into little, we need an honest discussion about our role and relationships and responsibilities, and that's why i'm so pleased to be part of this middle east strategy task force with my very good friend, steve hadley. it's been an extraordinary learning experience for both of us an opportunity to work with some truly wonderful people. one of them is tammy, and it's now my pleasure to invite her and the rest of her and the rest of our panel to come up on stage. [applause]

>> thank you for being here. let me begin by thanking my fantastic cochairs, steve hadley and madeleine albright. when we started this project, steve and madeleine told each of us working group chairs not to be afraid to ask the questions and to challenge our

assumptions. i think recognizing that in the middle east, this is a moment of truly historic transition, and i think the questions of for the region and for those of us outside who care about the region and have a stake in the region, that questioning of assumptions is even more important today than it was when we started the project, so i really want to thank you both for a fantastic process. i want to thank my fellow working group members in the region and all over the u.s. and europe, we managed to meet virtually and in person and i learned a great deal from all of them. they are listed in the report, so i hope you will take a look and share my appreciation. it may seem as though today's topic is an odd choice for focus, maybe it's not a propitious time to talk about governance in the middle east, after all, we are dealing with the region in

violent turmoil, beset by vicious civil war. the u.s. and its allies is invested in new military conflicts in iraq and syria, fighting isis. i just came back from an international security mission up in halifax, where the only discussion of the middle east there was framed around terrorism, isis, civil war, and refugees. these are the urgent problems seen by many governments around the world as a threat to international security, deservedly so, and that are drawing attention to the region. but it's precisely because of those urgent challenges that i think it is valuable to focus in this report on governance in the region, because to my mind, isis and the civil wars are symptoms of something bigger. they are symptoms of a broader breakdown in the region. they are not the disease. what we have seen beginning in

late 2010 was the breakdown both of individual states and the state system in the middle east that had lasted since the eisenhower administration. the state system that had advantaged american interests and those of our regional partners, the system that the united states sought to defend. it's that breakdown of the middle east order that has led to the civil wars in libya and yemen and syria and the rise of isis. so understanding why and how this regional order broke down i think is necessary to understand how we effectively deal not just with the symptoms of that breakdown, but with the challenge of restoring lasting stability to this region, and that is the premise and the driving question of the report that we are releasing today. so let me focus on just three things about that breakdown that i think it is important for us to understand, and what they suggest about the task ahead.

the first thing to understand is the regional order broke down because of things that happened inside states, inside societies, because of the pressures that built up over many years. the first part of that story is the story i told in the book that i published in 2008. it's the story of how the bureaucratic authoritarian model in the arab world began to weaken, the ideology that the states relied on to survive were becoming less and less effective in a globalized world. they rested on a certain kind of social contract, a patronage-based contract. over time, these systems became more and more efficient and then they were challenged both from within and without from a demographic bulge of young

people on the cusp of adulthood, from the effects of the globalized economy, and from a radically new information environment prompted first by satellite television and then by the world wide web 1.0 and 2.0. and so the effect on citizens in these countries was that the expectations created under the old social contracts could not be fulfilled in these changed conditions. just to give you a couple of indicators of this, the egyptian government had promised that university graduates would be able to get a civil service job. by the early to thousands, the weight time for those university graduates to get those civil service job was on average, eight years. that's eight years of pushing a food cart or driving a taxi or twiddling your thumbs, waiting

for your life to begin. and in the meantime, you can't afford an apartment, you can not afford to get married, you can't afford to become a full adult participant in society. the second thing to understand about the why and how of the breakdown in the middle east is that no one in the run-up to the arab uprising was unaware of these challenges. that is a very important thing to understand, how governments dealt with these challenges actually ended up in many cases exacerbating the problem, rather than resolving them. we had a lot of talk and many

efforts in the 1990's and 2000's to promote reform of governments and reform of economies in the middle east. but when many arab governments sought to adjust that social contract, they ended up, instead of developing a more inclusive social contract, negotiating adjustments for political and economic elites, whether within their own country or external institutions like the world bank and the imf. they reduced government hiring without really liberating the private sector to create growth. they brought new business cronies into the ruling parties instead of opening up politics more broadly, and result of these kind of adjustments exacerbated inequality, further empowered some at the expense of others and really increased the grievances rather than resolving them. and so dissent increased, government moves to manage politics were weaker, and the

protests row cap it would this brings me to the third thing we have to understand about how this all happen. the consequences of how certain states broke down. when the protests came, many governments responded poorly, in ways that exacerbated divisions, collapsed state institutions, and some governments responded with violence, in ways that generated demand for more violence. so syria and libya are the places in the region that are most violent and most disorder. these are the places where leaders ruled in the most personalized manner, where the destruction of civil society and community institutions were the making of those same and where the state was most complete. so having failed to act in a manner that could've prevented these uprisings, the leaders sought to impose their will to gain power. when the state's power against its citizens, it created a market for others with guns to

defend them against the state, and that allowed the emergence of identity-based sectarian militias, extremist groups with horrific agendas. by the time these governments had broken down, the social contract had broken down and social trust, the basic trust between people in communities had eroded. there is very little left to manage peaceful politics. this is the challenge we confront today in the middle east. beyond the political competition between iran and saudi arabia, beyond the threat by extremist terrorism or weapons of mass destruction, this is the biggest challenge in rebuilding a stable order in the region, it's the breakdown of trust within society. it's a consequence both of the way they were governed and the way they broke down.

the paper goes into detail on all these subjects and offers specific priorities and approaches on a way forward to tackled a problem. let me just give you a few highlights here. first, the future of the region will be determined not by the mere existence of government, although that's what many are focused on, but on the quality of that governance, because if we don't have more accountable, responsive, transparent and effective governance, it will not be sustainable governance. it will face more challenge and breakdown again. conflicts that are suppressed will reemerge. so we have to think about the quality of governance, not just the fact of governance. it's probably no surprise to any of you that i think democracy is far more likely than it -- any other regime type to generate the effective governorates, but where the region is today and

liberal democracy is neither swift nor linear. the ambassador can testify to that. tunisia hashink thatimpressive progress on path. the paper lays out a few practical ways to begin rebuilding the basis for that kind of sustainable governance. let me just mention two key insights. first, i don't think the question regarding how to build this new order is about territory or state borders or where lines are drawn on a map. it's about what happens within those lines. remember, it is about social trust. there is no line you can draw between shia and sunni in iraq that will not be fought over. just as the creation of south sudan did not magically resolve the

conflict inside sudan. it's also not about institution building. after our military victories in iraq and afghanistan, our allies and the u.s. spent a lot of time setting up new institutions, central banks, and the idea is that you build a machine of government and populated and you start the gears turning and it should go. but i think we learned from the last 15 years that building institutions is not enough. it matters how those institutions are populated and by whom. are they inclusive of everyone with a stake in the process? do they have a process that people think is fair and transparent? that brings me to the other

insight that i want to leave you with before we have a broader conversation, which is that what is most important to effective, sustainable governments, to effective, sustainable institutions in the middle east today is dialogue and conflict resolution. it seems like an obvious thing to say, the old line that war is a continuation of politics by other means, but it is true. and i think it's a basic beginning aspiration for the future of the middle east to shift conflicts that are now underway in a violent channel into a nonviolent channel, and also to pay special attention to take back the assumptions to those places where political conflict is being suppressed,

where dialogue is being suppressed, for fear that both places may become violent if there is no room or no capacity or institution and forums for people's dialogue and peaceful politics. finally, it suggests to me that sustainable governance in the middle east in the future will be much more decentralized than it has been in the past. because you don't rebuild social trust from the top down, you rebuild it from the bottom up. there is a broader need to build governance in a way that citizens can see and feel and buy into. i think we already see a number of experiments across the region in more decentralized governance, whether it's the empowerment of elected councils in morocco or the way the lebanese have managed in the absence of a president until very recently. or where the government in baghdad is struggling with conditions for locally effective government in the areas that are about to be liberated from isis. so, i think local governance is what we need to focus on if we want to replace violence and

mistrust with something more sustainable. with that, let me stop and i look forward to our conversation. >> let me just say it a word. thank you, tammy, very much. it's a great paper and i really do urge you to read it. here's what we're going to do for the rest of the time. about going to speak for 10 minutes or so. then we will have a reaction to the paper giving you a little sense of what is in it and then we will have a conversation up here with some broad questions, and we will go probably until about five minutes of 4:00 or 4:00, then we will throw it open for questions and comments from the audience, and we will end promptly at 4:30. that's how we plan to use the time available to us. amr: thank you very much, steve. it's a pleasure to be here.

thank you very much, tammy, for having me on the panel. it's a pleasure to join the panel today. it's a good paper, i would like to congratulate you and the working group on a spot on analysis and great insight in how to look at middle east politics and political dynamics as they are today. i am going to follow steve's recommendations and recommend everyone to take a look at the paper. it offers a detailed analysis. it does not stop where tammy stopped merely because of time and engages you, of course. it gives us a great overview of what is been happening since the 1960's all the way to 2011 and beyond 2011. in that spirit, i'm going to underline three points which i feel are relevant in building on the insights and recommendations.

number one, and with regard to lost trust between state institutions and settlements in the region. it covers a very wide spectrum. all the way from republics to monarchies. some that have been doing better economically and some that have been suffering from poverty, unemployment, corruption and so forth. clearly we had not been having a lot of popular trust in state institutions and that had been happening and unfolding in the background in middle eastern society. rather than alternative institutions, we did see

[indiscernible] between religious-based visions and secular visions. we did see a bit of political confrontation based on political and socioeconomic preferences which you offer a great analysis of an conflict between the haves and have-nots. but this did not add up to an alternative vision for state society relations. an alternative vision for a new social contract. so what we were looking at were old social contracts which were collapsing and social contracts which have yet to be fleshed out.

and i believe the picture is not changed in the last five years. and the very fact that we are still looking at a talker sees, devising autocracies, or limited liberal experiments as we've seen in morocco and elsewhere. the very fact that we're still at the region, the dynamics of the last five years where we do not have genuine social contracts to attest to that. the very fact we are still looking at the region and the dynamics for the last five years, we have a new social contract attached to that.

number one is how to bridge the gap between populations and citizens groups who have lost us. first, a question of social capital. look at how society accumulates social capital. it is never top-down. it has to be bottom up. we look at the fabric of eastern societies -- i'm not an expert on iran, when we look at arab society, the only way to imagine it is leading to new social contracts. it is the focus on society. if we are looking at state institutions where trust has been lost. if we do not have a person who can ask, offer visions, we will not have viable movements in most arab countries. tunisia is unfolding in a different manner. that has been one of the leading

forces pushing the country forward in a true experience of democratic governance. what are the conditions available? here i would like to highlight two key points. in most arab countries, we are still looking at constitutional frameworks which do not safeguard the economy of civil society acts. which undermines the autonomy and independence of citizens. there is a great deal of state

control, and secondly, you can see that constituency building is not well regarded in most arab countries. there is not a comparable outreach with any democracy, either western or non-western democracy. we will not get to real security if we do not fix government issues. the two key issues we have to look at our how to put in place the right conditions for civil society organization to represent people's interests,

different segments of the population, and a new social contract which is needed in most arab countries. secondly, how to safeguard key freedoms, which it is no longer fashionable -- in spite of the fact that this is one of the regions which suffers most from violations of freedom. the second point i would like to underline is, once again going to a great insight that tammy offered in the paper with the working group, one of the recommendations that tammy articulates toward the end of the paper, the way i understand the report, it's forming security sectors, judicial institutions as well as the paradigm of low importance. it's not the great political impact, it's about citizens and have a look at state institutions, state security institutions, police stations, police officers, at the military security institution governing the country. and to build on the analysis in

the paper, number one, and here the internal actors can help, those outside the middle east can offer some help. number one is to look at arab institutions and those in place governing, security sectors, military establishments, and getting them to reflect the key values of what democracy is all about. this means to my mind, number one, and here it can help us nongovernment

organizations operating outside of the middle east can help because we do have expertise on how to do that. number one is to look at arab institutions governing. institutions. military establishments. starting to push them to reflect the key values of what democracy is all about. accountability and transparency. if you follow egyptian events, for example, we've been hearing at least two,, who lost of their lives in police custody. this is not a new phenomenon. in egypt, it keeps happening. there are two cases in the last 48 hours or 72 hours. this once again is a testimony to as long as were going to lack accountability and transparency, citizens will continue to have no trust in government, even if they are democratically elected.

democratically legitimated. theto push lawmaking into direction of greater accountability and transparency. secondly and once again, civil society actors need help. sometimes there facing not only the closure of public space as an egypt and moderate and elsewhere. they are evacuated. egypt civil society up on the actors, it is the great expense, actors that elsewhere.europe and so here we need international cooperation. it can be nongovernmental or governmental organization to help these actors facing

toinction, evacuation, endure. the final point and once again, itelieve it will, it is, and will hopefully stay fashionable in the u.s. at least for some time. the difference between civilian and non-civilian politics. one of the, when looking at questions of the governance in the region, why does important to differentiate and start spending egypt to egypt or indonesia to morocco, comparing different countries where military establishments are dominant in politics and the other countries where we have civilian politicians and civilian political elites and civilian elites managing the effort political arenas. it is a compromise.

pushing forward. ideological alliances. new social contracts where citizens can hold their government accountable it is not easily done if you have military governments in place or if you have government dominated by military establishments in place. so one key distinction when you , look at arab countries in 2016 is a difference between countries where the military security establishment is the dominant force in politics and countries once again, tunisia, morocco, and elsewhere where civilians have a civilian political dynamic and are in charge. we have a track record of civilian groups accepting more compromise, so this has to be a focus when you look at governance and how to push forward democratic government and your paper says that.

let me stop here. >> thank you very much. i want to ask one technical question because i think i was misled by that and i want to make sure the audience is not as well. you use the phrase "privatizing justice." of course, i had the notion of, you know, the private sector taking over the police, but i think what you mean is a transparency and accountability that allows citizens to hold those institutions to account. >> exactly. mr. hadley: have i got it right? >> exactly. mr. hadley: we've talked about --, and i want to pick up on something amr said, you talked about the failures of states to govern effectively led to the collapse or civil war in iraq, syria, and libya. and yemen. so one question is -- are other states in the region at risk?

have we seen the last of the dominoes, or are there other dominoes that potentially could fall, and if so, what will bring that about? tammy: that is a crucial question, because for all that are international attention is focused on the eggs that have already fallen off the wall, others are up there wobbling, and there have been another of analytical attempts to sketch out what did those broken eggs have been common. you have seen some arguments about republics being more vulnerable than monarchies, for example. what i see in the places that i would say today are still vulnerable, it's those places where, as we saw in egypt, you have an aging leader with no clearer succession plan, and

certainly no transparent, accountable, responsive mechanism for determining succession. those are potential crisis points for any government, and we've just been undergoing our regular exercise in the peaceful transition of power here. it is always a delicate moment, even for the most established democracies, but in those places that don't have established tradition, it can be a very dangerous moment. so i would look for example at algeria, where you have an aging leader who has been in place for a long time, and no evident successor and no evident process for a way forward. you could say the same about the palestinian authority today. so you have a looming succession crisis and no connection between citizens and government, where they don't feel like there is any channel to weigh in. that is a boiling pot.

, would you agree with that? yes, very much. tammy is right in pointing out the historical precedent. egypt was in a succession crisis with salt of the country being who's going to succeed former president mubarak? i guess she is right in pointing it,but when you look at what is missing is not only who the establishment is putting forward as a succession plan of sorts, but what is missing as well as how to tackle the lost confidence in any arrangement between government and citizens. in tunisia, confidence is on the rise because they managed to put

institutions in place. you still have a constitution framework that makes sense. what is missing in egypt once a talker see was back in, this was attempted after 2011 and was blown away. we are in between devising what existed in 2011 and maybe going back to very dark moments in egyptian history. in the same goes for a place like algeria, where no one knows what could happen. mr. hadley: it's interesting because the places you picked were algeria and the palestinian authority. those are not traditional monarchical societies. one of the things you may remember when we started this project, we said this is about a crisis of legitimacy in the

middle east and we said legitimacy comes from consent of the governed. this is not sophisticated enough. there are other forms of legitimacy in the region based on tribal associations, religious affiliations, revolutionary ideology. there are a range of forms of legitimacy. how do you square that? as we look at the middle east going forward, past 2011, what do we say about legitimacy, and what do we say to these regimes that may be teetering on the shelf but have not fallen off. what in the post-2011 world, what would you recommend to leaders as to how to enhance the

legitimacy of their regimes before they go through what these other countries have gone through? ms. albright: i think we have to remember what it is. tammy mentioned social contract a lot. i think people think of it as a western concept, but basically people gave up individual rights in order to get protection and security in some form. obviously that is different with a monarchy. but still, there is that same responsibility of what is it that the leader owes his people? when you were asking about different countries, i think those are interesting ones that were picked, but i would say that this is almost like a virus, and one of the things we have not talked about enough is the influence of technology. one of the things that really did -- it starts with a man in tunisia who immolates himself, and the news gets out and all of a sudden it's spread. clearly what happened in tahrir square was social media. i actually think no place is in you lord to it.

and i kind of -- i actually inured tolace in it. hate to finger any country, but when you look at a country, like jordan, for instance, that is a monarchy, frontline state in one of the most difficult refugee situations, not a rich place, and a king who is trying to figure out the various coalitions and kind of a transit point, and it goes to the very point of whether the state is providing a livelihood to the people. i think that one of the things, and you write about this a lot, tammy, in terms of what is it that the state owes the people? initially, in all of these countries, they were the employer of first resort. where that is not possible anymore, then it becomes a trust issue. so legitimacy, to a great extent, in this day and age depends on whether the old leader, the new leader, the

king, the deputy crown prince or whatever, actually is delivering, because technology has made it possible for people to know what people in other places have. and especially what you said about the younger generation, they are technologically adept. i have been talking about, this is been a peculiar 10 days, but basically in addition to the thing you think i'm talking about, i just spent time with a group of former foreign ministers in silicon valley, talking about technology and governance. and what it has done in terms of providing people information as the weather they have a legitimate government. and it has disaggregated voices in a way that makes some of the organizational things you are talking about hard. some of you heard me say this, and i always admit that i stole this line, but the thing that is

interesting is people are talking to their governments on 21st century technology. the government listens to them on 20th century technology, or hears them but may not be listening, actually. and provides 19th century responses. so that disconnect is what we're dealing with. it's very evident in egypt, and i think anyplace could be subject to this, despite the fact that the ones you chose our very specifically so. legitimacy is what is the government supposed to be doing, whether it is a king or a dictator. mr. hadley: just one more, tammy, clearly, what is a government supposed to be doing and what is it delivering for the citizens? does encouraging states to move in those directions, in fact, is it complementary to or

supplementary to other traditional forms of legitimacy, that for example the monarchical states are dependent on? or does it undermine those other sources of legitimacy? it seems you have to be able to answer those questions if you go to a monarch and say you need to move in the direction of legitimate, transparent, responsive government. then you have some understanding that that they can be supplemental and doesn't undermine the traditional sources of legitimacy to which regime is dependent. tammy: there is an important switch in language i would recommend to answer this question. it's not about what government owes its citizens. it's really about what citizens expect from their government. not what they need, but what they expect. that is part of what is changed

and that's part of the impact of technology that madeleine was describing. one of our other cochairs put his finger on this in his paper, which is that part of what's happened in the arab world and around the world among this younger generation is what he calls a participation revolution, that citizens, because of technology, and because this generation of arabs, more highly educated, healthier, more engaged than any generation before, and you must remember that parts of the region two or three generations ago didn't even have secondary schools. so the developmental leaks here are tremendous. and this rising generation has a different set of expectations. it's not just about making sure they have a job. they expect to be able to participate, to set their own path in life and not just have it directed for them by their

monarch or their father or their uncle or anybody else. in essence, what they expect is the thing that liberal societies are best structured to provide, which is the opportunity for every opportunity to find their own path to human flourishing. ok, if i can put it in philosophical terms. so, governments cannot get away with just offering enough jobs or enough health care or enough free education. check the box and they are legitimate. they have to meet that set of expectations. they have to give people opportunities to find for themselves a pathway. that means a have to be more open and responsive. to the point of congruence or tension, it is a mental shift.

if you are a very traditional leader who believes that the only way you can help your society grow it is by directing it from the top down. that is not the only form of legitimacy, even for a monarch. the traditional pathway may be i am the source of social good, i distribute them, but it can also be the source of opportunity. you can be the source of dynamism. that is a shifting mentality, but it is entirely possible. ms. albright: one other thing that has to be put in the mixture, and egypt is a perfect example, the way it stands is the freedom of this aggregated voices in tahrir square, the young people were all having an incredibly interesting time, having been gotten there by social media.

and the older man who cannot get to his stall in the marketplace as i cannot stand this anymore, i need some order. so i think one could actually be persuaded that there was really a movement to have that happen, because people are fed up with the chaos. i think the hard part is how inclusivity and getting participation, whether people are tolerant enough to go through the chaos time until they get to the proper time. mr. hadley: i want to go toamr, amr on that and then we will rephrase it and go to the audience. "i am a of arabia said,

river to my people." you are saying a legitimacy based on satisfying what the people expect from their government and increasingly that includes participation in a role in fashioning their own future. i get that. i've spent three three-hour sessions in the last 14 months and i tried to make this argument that this is a source of legitimacy. this is what he must do if over the long-term he's going to bring stability and prosperity. and i have not yet made the sale. what you hear is what you would expect, given the trauma that egypt has been through, i understand what you are saying, but you need to understand this is a difficult time, there is extremism at the door, and the

middle east cannot stand a breakdown in order of a country of 90 million people. if you think refugee flows are you just waitia, until egypt breaks down. so what is the argument you make to one who sincerely believes, and which he is risking his life, how do you make the argument to him that actually this is where he's got to go, if he is going to bring long-term stability to his country? amr: this is basically the debate we are having in tunisia. not just since 2011, but even earlier on. we do have enough cases to push forward very clearly, it cannot provide for long-term stability. before 2011, what happened after 2011 did not began in 2011.

activism.rs of young people primarily protesting and demanding that their voices should be heard. their concerns should be addressed. people took to the streets. these were not only young people. maybe in the beginning they were young people. i beg to differ. but increasingly, people with grievances. which, we did a great job in the paper highlighting social, economic grievances. 30% rate of poverty in the country. unemployment among young people, over 40%. young female citizens, over 45%

and more. those grievances, people taking to the street and going to the square and elsewhere. they never managed to provide long-term stability. yes, there are challenges. not only terrorists, but there are security challenges in the region that need to be accounted for. the question is how to get governments, and the only way to get them is to listen to civil society actors. we need an organization of citizens to listen how to do it right. i believe the egyptian civil society actors offer some solutions. not by imprisoning citizens and not providing enough social and economic solutions to improve living conditions. rollers, ifen, if governments listen to their own

constituents, not only the military and security the businesss also elite which benefit and thrive on the popular system that does exist. they will find solutions. finally, the attorney of the our modern state is, in fact if you state,an arab modern first the elites you are referring to. it was created by the modern states. the modern states and away and able to to happen. and at least an education and leaps in education and health care and elsewhere. yes, it is the healthiest and most connected generation of young arabs we are looking at. but in a way, these governments have become an economist at. -- anaconda stick. -- anachronistic.

they no longer are addressing concerns. >> one last comment in them we will go to the audience. >> i think it is a false choice. i would think of the leader not only as a river for his people, but the people are a river. and like water, they are going to find outlets. so, the challenge is whether you can create channels and mechanisms and pathways for people to have the influence they want to have over their own lives and their communities or whether, left with no alternative, they will spilling into the streets. the failure of reforms in the time leading up to the uprising is what compels that mass mobilization. so what we see in egypt today that troubles me very much and i think itself is quite destabilizing and dangerous is a leader who believes that i'm putting a lid on it, he has

the -- the boyle in lowered the boil in the pot. -- you know, when you put a lid gets highter.ing that is what i think we have in egypt. we have no civil society channels. because the parliament and the party system are so tightly managed. we have no free speech channels. that is boiling very fast in a way that i think is far more dangerous than the situation in egypt before the uprising. >> i love your phrase that the leader is not a river to his people. the people are the river. which of the leader does not channel will spell over into the streets. not a bad way to summarize. >> try it. >> i will wait until madeline is with me. do we have microphones? or are we just going to ask people? right here in the front. in the fourth row.

please identify yourself so we can get a lot of questions in, if you will keep the questions short, we will keep the answers short. >> at short questions but longer answers. my research is civil relations between turkey, egypt, and israel. i think, listening to you, it's fascinating how you are describing analytically the arab world and egypt. but a lot of what you're saying applies to other cases on the periphery of the arab world or the periphery of the arab countries and turkey in particular, i argue it is going through a regime turned where it is turning into the making of the mubarak regime.

civil society and places of expression and all that. there is a ping-pong regional order, imitating one another. i guess, i wonder, because we have the report on that, is there a center for middle east policies. is there peripheral vision to other countries within the region, including turkey, including israel, of course, and the crackdown on society and israel as well? the law that, you know you have to account for who is funding you internationally. a lot of what you have been describing seems to me like a conversation everywhere in the region at large. and is a part of the framework you would encourage adopting and not just looking into our countries but looking into our neighborhood, if you will. >> tammy, do you want to take that one? >> sure. yes, i would say politics is politics. every region and every

country has its own country and culture, there are certain common features, right? and, yes, there are demonstration effects both positive and negative and in the paper i talk about models for governance in the middle east today, the fragile democratic experiment of tunisia, the effort at renewed authoritarianism symbolized by egypt and the brutal, savage order of isis, which is also a model competing in the region today. that is part of what is at stake. you know, what are people going to embrace in the midst of this turmoil? i think it does have an effect on those people in the periphery of the region, but i also think that some of these dynamics, for example the global push back against the civil society and freedom did not start in the middle east.

we see it in russia. we see it in india. >> we do indeed. >> congratulations to the task force and the working group for completing this. my government, i think, finds a lot to agree with in this report. we think it addresses a key aspect. implementing it is going to be hard work because i do think that as someone who has worked in the region until recently, a lot of people are afraid of challenging the order because there is such a level of chaos and disintegration around them. in i think that is something that needs to be looked at. but i would go a step back and i wonder if you address this in the report. basicense to me, the most point is, are we doing enough as governments taking an interest in the region but not part of the region to stress human rights? for example, bringing out arbitrary detention