about his book "ike's gamble." after that, prime minister's questions with prime minister theresa may. ♪ announcer: this week on "q&a," michael durand discusses his book "ike's gamble, america's rise to dominance in the middle east." michael durand, what is ike's gamble? michael: first of all, it is the title of my book. the gamble was a decision by eisenhower in the 1950's in dealing with the middle east to tilt away from his traditional allies, britain and france and

israel, and towards the rising nationalist in the region, particularly egypt. brian: how old was he at this point? michael: nasser was only in his 40's at this point. brian: you talk a lot about winston churchill. how was he at this time? michael: churchill was approaching 80, and britain was still the dominant power in the middle east. it was everywhere in decline. nationalists were rising up. the big strategic question the u.s. faced was, should it support written against -- support britain against the rising nationalists, or try to create a new order? brian: i want to put up on the screen a map of that area back in 1956. when you look at that, and are going to explain the person that hasn't been thinking about this for years, what would you want them to know? michael: when eisenhower came

into office, there were 80,000 british troops in the suez canal zone. the zone was euphemistically wased the suez base, but it really a whole string of bases for the british, and the nerve center of their military position in the middle east and east africa. those troops were surrounded by egyptians who were carrying out a low-level guerrilla war against them. the minutens, eisenhower came to power, they escalated that war in order to force the americans to make a decision between egypt and the british. at the same time, there is a conflict going on simmering between israel and all of the surrounding area of states led by egypt. issuesflict of those two , the israel question and the british question, increased that feeling that eisenhower had of being caught in the middle between rising nationalism. he's not nationalism was going to be the wave of the future.

to his traditional allies, the british and the israelis. brian: what led you to write this book? michael: that is an interesting question. i started thinking about it when i was working in the white house. i worked in the george w. bush white house. at thehe senior director national security council, responsible for the middle east. i noticed certain ideas were welling up in the administration about the place of the arab-israeli conflict and our overall strategy in the middle east. that the palestine question, the israel question is the central issue. this is a recurring theme in our , that arabs policy and muslims are reacting to the united states according to what we do toward the arab-israeli convict -- arab-israeli

conflict. this was welling up in the george w. bush white house. there were significant personalities who believed to this, and i had the exact opposite view. i started wondering, this keeps recurring. i knew something of the history. i've been a professor before. i thought, i'm going to go back to the beginning and look at it. i started doing some deep research after i got out of the white house on the eisenhower period, and i got fascinated with eisenhower and the way his views on this issue changed. brian: how did you go about it? michael: i researched in the british archives, the u.s. archives, and a little bit in the israeli archives. brian: so you started the book, what year would it be when you were doing the research? michael: i hate to tell you this, because it was a long time in making. i started in 2009. brian: let's get a feel for what

it was like in 1956 and the suez crisis. here's some video from the new service back then, it is only a minute. ♪ , center of canal controversy for reads, now comes a cause of war and a lighting sequence of diplomatic and military moves. since its seizure and nationalization by president nasser of egypt, it has precipitated a new crisis in the already tense middle east. french units are embarked at versailles -- at marseille. they are prepared for seizure of the canal by force. simultaneously, britain reinforces its garrison on the island for the same eventuality. a naval concentration in the eastern mediterranean strengthens them it is very -- strengthens the military buildup. france and britain issue a 12

hour ultimatum that all fighting must cease. expiration, of its britain it works its way to egypt with bombers. brian: at this time, we talked about the british and the french and israelis and egyptians, what side was america on? michael: let me say, i love these old clips. fantastic. so i've got to take you back a little bit, if i could. , from 1953 totes 1956, eisenhower tilts in favor of nasser thinking he is going to help him organize all the arabs in the cold war. isenhower's fear, what he trying to prevent, is the soviet union coming in, line with the nationalists, undermining the british, and taking control of the oil in the middle east. we cared about the oil because it was 100% of european oil came

from the middle east. it was the number one strategic issue in the cold war at that time for the united states. we want to make sure we had that wouldab regimes come is not aligned with the united states, at least keep the soviet union out. that is the goal. eisenhower believes the association with israel and britain is deriving -- is driving the arabs into the arms of the soviet union. he tilts toward nasser, thinking he is going to help him organize all of the arabs. he helped nasser oust the british troops from egypt. the theory was, i will help nasser gain complete independence from britain, and he will help me in the cold war. he what nasser did is, once got rid of the british, he started aligning with the soviet union and undermining the british in carrying out a low level guerrilla war against the israelis.

1955, after of eisenhower's has ousted the egypt, nasser signs and arms deal with the soviet union. he gets a quantity and quality of weapons that totally opens the balance in the region -- up ends the balance in the region. army willan constitute an existential threat to the israelis. the british and french are upset because nasser is supporting north african liberation and movements all across the fertile crescent trying to oust the british. happens is the british, french, and israelis start to recognize they have a common interest against asser -- against nasser. eisenhower still tilts toward nasser. march ofr decided in

1956 that nasser has been doubledealing, promising he is going to help the united states and the cold war, but never delivers. eisenhower comes to the conclusion that nasser is a blackmailer. he will pocket any concession we get him and demand more. we still have this image in his head that support for britain and israel is going to alienate the arabs writ large and push them into the arms of the soviet union. in july, nasser nationalizes the suez canal company, and anglo-french asset. is extremely exciting to everyone in the arab world. the suez canal company is seen as a legacy of european imperialism. every egyptian is thrilled by this, and the british and french, they feel that if the trends continue, nasser is going to ask them from the region. it turned to eisenhower and say, help us.

we need some landing craft to attack. eisenhower says no way, and starts this long diplomacy. he tells the british and french it is designed to force nasser to give up the canal, but really is just to string them along and causesem away from the that out they had with the nationalization of the canal. as eisenhower is stringing them along throughout the summer and into the fall of 1956, the british, french, and israelis start to collude with each other. what you saw there was the beginning of the conflict. the israelis attacked egypt, and the british and the french issue an ultimatum. they tell the egyptians and israelis to pull back 10 miles from the canal in each direction. if the israelis pull back 10 miles from the canal, they are inside the sinai in egyptian territory. if egyptians pull back, they are handing egyptian territory to

the israelis and deep inside thereof territory. the egyptians rejected, but that was the plan all along. the british and french were just trying to create a pretext to attack with the israelis. of course, eisenhower sees it immediately, understands that british, french, israelis are all in. -- in cahoots. he takes the side of nasser. he is hostile to nasser the man believes he is working with the soviet union and is a blackmail her, but his allies against him because he deals it will drive the whole arab world into the arms of the soviet union. brian: let's look at 30 seconds. what was nasser's title at this point? michael: he is the president of egypt. today has about 90 million people, bigger than any of those countries you named in population. was it like that way back when?

michael: you're really taxing me at this point. i should know the population of egypt at that point. the exact -- i'm scared to give you an exact number because i don't have it all the top of my head. it is the most populous arab country at that point, by far. and still is. i would guess at that point, 15 or 20 million. i'm just pulling that out of nowhere. brian: let's watch this feat can see what nasser looked and sounded like. >> when we want to stop the communist activity, we have to take out the british occupation and imperialists. states will try to help the nationalists, and the willnalists in this area

lose face in the united states and in the free world. michael: that of a great clip. i've never seen that clip. the message is right there, there's little short messages. those are the key messages he sent to the americans when eisenhower came in, which convinced him he was a guy who could work with area -- work with. rid ofaying, help me get the british, help you with my standard of living, and i will help you keep communists out. bought. the pitch we brian: as you know, president wasp -- president truman for the israeli country in 1948 when the u.n. made decision, but george marshall was not. was eisenhower for it in the beginning? michael: eisenhower is a very politic character. at the time, he didn't express

himself. he later made it abundantly clear he was totally in agreement with marshall, as was the entire u.s. foreign-policy elite. truman'srded recognition of israel and support for israel is one of the greatest strategic blunders in american history. brian: somebody listening to happened backact then has had on our relationship today with the middle east? michael: on many different levels, this is the moment when the united states takes over the region. we ousted the british and french and health nasser -- and helped nasser. this was the moment when we take over the region and become the dominant power in the region.

,s a result of that dynamic eisenhower changes his understanding completely of what is happening in the region. the theory of his actions, both in the earlier when he first came in and ousted the british ,- health ousted the british and helped nasser in the suez crisis, the theory was he was where the arabs and united states could cooperate together. the arabs would see the united states as a benevolent power interested in helping them realize their nationalist aspirations. that they wanted stability, didn't even want to dominate, but wanted to keep the soviets out. and on that basis we could come a modus operandi.

it had the opposite result of the one intended. by helping oust the british and french, he gave a huge opportunity to nasser and the soviets. , the --e suez crisis sorry, i never told you what happened after eisenhower opposes the british and french. he brings the british to the brink of economic destruction. when they attack, nasser fills boats with concrete and syncs them and the canal, thus blocking all of the tankers coming through the persian gulf into the can now -- into the canal. suddenly the british have no supplies of oil. when the markets get wind of this fact, the bottom drops out evene pound, and anthony nown any -- anthony eden,

churchill,ter after says, can you help me stabilize the market? eisenhower says, not less -- not unless you get out of the area. military andhuge political victory over the british, french, and israelis. that turns him into a figure 20 feet tall and arab politics. brian: do talk about the importance of the british empire and this whole war on them. tell us where they are at this point and why eisenhower was so against the british empire. michael: there is a traditional anti--- a traditional american anti-imperialism that you see , but it waslt stronger among the republicans that the democrats.

deep,publicans had a visceral distaste for the idea of the british empire. but for eisenhower, it was really just a simple calculation thati mentioned earlier, on its face, seems absolutely reasonable. that the arabs are in a conflict with the british and israelis, and we have taken the side of the british, who are in a terrible decline. we can't reconstitute the british empire. is just not possible. they are in a terrible decline. the wave of the future is nationalism. we have to find a basis for cooperation with the nationalists. that is totally reasonable. but what happens is, in trying to do that, this vacuum was created and the soviet union came in with nasser and exploited it. cleverly, union, very once they realize the united

states was serious about stopping his allies and taking the british to the brink of economic destruction, they issued public nuclear threats against the british, french, and israelis. basically said it would be a shame if your country was destroyed by nuclear tipped missiles. that gave the impression in the arab world that it was nasser and the soviets who had ousted the british and french, when the american role was carried out behind-the-scenes. publicly in the arab world, we not -- we got no credit. the soviets got all the credit. you have a wave of revolutions after the suez crisis throughout the error world, kind of like the revolutions in 2011, that all benefited nasser and the soviet union. that's when eisenhower started to rethink. brian: when did you find something in your research that you said, this is really interesting? michael: i found a number of

things that really surprised me. was the evidence of this rethinking by eisenhower. for theer is remembered position in regards to middle east policy, our member for the position he took in the suez crisis. people were member it, people who think egypt is a liability in the united states, people people who think israel is a liability in the united states, remember eisenhower stood up to israel. people who like the united took in the stance he public was that he was supporting the united nations against the aggressors, the british, french, and israelis. people who like international institutions like the position he took.

historians who like eisenhower's, he's a very likable guy, they see it as his finest hour. that is the way it is rumored. when i came across -- that is the way is rumored. -- that is the way it is renumbered. when i came across the evidence that he actually regretted what , people didn't pay attention to it, partly because stephen ambrose, just after nixon died, wrote that nixon made this up. now we know it was actually stephen ambrose who made stuff up about what eisenhower thought, not so much in it and -- not so much nick said -- not so much nixon. in thes a great passage minutes of the national security council meetings in 1938 where

dallas is being told -- where dulles is being told by the state department that nasser is the wave of the future, this is a guy we have to cut a deal with after the suez, and he loses it and says basically, nasser is frankenstein's monster. we created a guy. , hey major success he got got because we handed it to him, and he is taking it, pocketing it, and undermining us. dulles was not a friend of israel. strongly had some very anti-zionist feelings. i would go so far as to say they were anti-semitic attitudes. brian: this is a sidebar? . -- this is a sidebar question.

dulles, former secretary of state, has dulles national airport. monument forno eisenhower. why they honor john foster dulles so early, but nothing for eisenhower? michael: i really don't know. when was dulles airport? brian: i think it was 1962. michael: i really don't know. he died in office. and he was a great man. the signs of anti-semitism notwithstanding, he was an incredibly impressive figure. brian: britain, israel, and france attacked egypt? michael: yes. brian: was that our aircraft carrier or did it belong to britain or france? michael: i don't know. i wasn't watching close enough.

brian: here is dwight eisenhower reacting to this very issue of the attacks in this country. --mr. eisenhower: there will be no involvement in these hostilities. i have no plan to call the congress and special session. of course, we shall continue to keep in contact with congressional leaders of both parties. it is our hope and intent that this matter will be before the united nations general assembly. vetoare, with no operating, the opinion of the world can be brought to bear in our quest for a just and to this tormenting problem. how much do republicans today look back and hear him talking so positive about the union -- about the u.n.? michael: not at all. i don't think they were member

it. the u.n., when it was created, had a kind of religious glow around it. we thought this was going to be the institution that was going to end wars. a lot of that authority lasted well into the 1950's, but as you know, i don't think anyone looks at it today and thinks it is going to do much for us in that regard. brian: we do a survey every so often on presidents and who is the most popular. dwight eisenhower has moved up in every survey, and in the most recent one moved up to fifth have beenll 43 that president. why do you think that is happening? michael: it is really interesting, when you go back when he at where he was was in office and just after. arthur schlesinger, the famous historian at harvard, did a historians inican

the early 1960's, and had them rank all of the presidents. eisenhower barely made it into the mediocre. they had poor, mediocre, excellent, great. he was at the very bottom of the mediocre. intellectuals, most reporters, educated people in the 1950's regarded eisenhower as a don't -- as a dolt. it is interesting to compare with what we have today with president trump. intellectuals were absolutely convinced that eisenhower was a stuffed shirt. there is a book written called "the captive hero." the notion was he had been a hero of world war ii, and however successful he was on the battlefield, he was out of his depth as the president. he was surrounded by all of these very sharp politicians

du was aard nixon, and and dullesguylles -- was a very sharp guy, these were the guys who were actually running the country. that he was a puppet, just a figure. the people never agreed with that. the people always saw a man of great substance and intellect. somehow they read that differently, and over time, once the documents came available, the historians started to see that the people were right and the intellectuals were wrong. there's a political scientist at princeton who wrote a fantastic book in the 1980's called "the hidden hand presidency," and said that eisenhower knew something about how to run a large organization. he had a concept of the

presidency where, because it is a book mixing head of state and head of government, there is this great symbolic importance of the presidency, and eisenhower understood that. cabinet be the face of policy, and he put great emphasis on the symbolic position of the presidency. but behind the scenes, he was actually very much in charge of what was going on. inon't know if your member the 1980's under reagan, there is a saturday night bearish -- there was a "saturday night he was mumbling and out of his desk, and behind doors he would start barking orders in different languages and telling people what to do. that is closer to reality of what the eisenhower presidency was. greenstein explained it very clearly for everybody and since then, when you go to the documents come it is extremely impressive.

brian: let's take a moment and go into some of your history. where did you grow up? michael: i grew up in indiana, born in kokomo and lived in carmel and indianapolis. i went to high school in southern california. in orange county, sunny hills high school. brian: from their you went to where? michael: two stanford, and then grad school at princeton. from princeton i got a degree in middle eastern studies. a phd. brian: what did you do after that quest mark -- after that? michael: after that i taught for a bit at princeton. house called after 9/11 and said, how would you like to work in the white house? i said no, can't do that. i have to get tenure. that had been my focus until that moment.

then i went for a long drive with my wife and demonstrated to her how i can go to the white house. finally i did. i haven't really looked back since. brian: how long were you in the white house? michael: for two years, and then i worked in the department of defense for two years. i was the deputy assistant secretary of defense for support to public diplomacy. the united states doesn't do propaganda, and to the extent it explains itself to the public, it does public diplomacy. but the entity that is responsible in the government for doing the public diplomacy is the state department, not the thense department, so defense department doesn't do propaganda and public diplomacy. follow can do is support -- all it can do is support. in a different system, with the deputy assistant secretary of

defense for counter propaganda. brian: you are on the national security council staff in the george w. bush years. the trumpatch administration put together the national, what were you saying to yourself? michael: fantastic. when i see rex tillerson and jim think and mike pompeo, i these are absolutely very first rate people. brian: i was talking about michael flynn in the early days of the national security council. what were you saying having been there? michael: i think it's unfortunate what happened to general's land. best to general flynn. we don't know -- happened to general flynn. we don't know what happened. trumpcusations of donald

being a manchurian candidate of vladimir putin i think is all nonsense. i don't think they handled it very well. told mikeneral flynn pence and said things publicly that were incorrect. that was a very bad way to handle it. it is unfortunate. being on the national security council, how big is a? -- how big is it? obama expanded it into almost a separate arm of government, over 400. but the trump's people have contracted it considerably to 120, 130, something like that. brian: how big was it when you were there? michael: about like that. brian: having been there, does the national security council, is it necessary?

does it stop on the state and defense department? brian: it is absent -- michael: it is absolutely necessary. you can't run the executive branch without it. it is the core coordinating mechanism that makes sure the state department, defense , treasury area are rolling in the same direction. you have to have that, and you have to have somebody to staff the president on foreign policy. somebody has got to say, here is what is going on and briefed him on it. that job of keeping everybody moving in the same direction is a monumental job. somebody got to do it. the national security council, it's the one thing everyone understands. brian: where are the staff members housed? in the old executive

office building right next to it, the eisenhower building. adviser isl security in the west wing, the deputy national security advisor is also in the west wing. tiny office.s a there is nothing more valuable than west wing real estate. little almost a closet. it is in the west wing. brian: back to your book. who are some of the characters you ran into? michael: the one that fascinated me most was carmen roosevelt. it was hard to write about eisenhower.

very poorly understood by the historians. they skip over those first three years, but they had a huge fight over egypt. in public, they were best friends. behind the scenes, they were absolutely at loggerheads. those were relatively easy chapters to write because churchill documented, and every thoughte, that he ever had. eisenhower is a very different kind of guy. he's a midwesterner, he plays it all very close to his chest. that's one of the problems i had as an author writing the book, my main character isn't as

expressive as i want him to be. also he had health problems that get in the way. roosevelt, who we all know as the architect of the two against .he shah of iran in 1953 brian: he was the grandson of teddy roosevelt? michael: yes. what i didn't know is how important a role he played in arab affairs, and as particular, one of the key with nasser in this. . -- in this period. when i was in the white house, department would never gladly hand over an important account to the cia.

never. the that's what happened in 1953 -- 1954. john foster dulles was secretary of state, and his brother was the head of the cia. they got along well. allen dulles was the junior partner, the younger brother. withfelt that, in dealing nasser, it was best to do things on the quiet. they ran a lot of the relationship through the cia. , in charge oflt the middle east at the caa, became a key figure in working with nasser -- at the cia, became a key figure in working with nasser. it was driving egypt and the arabs into the saarc -- into the

arms of the soviet union. what we had to do with the legitimize the u.s.-israeli relationship and build up the nasa relationship. there is a great relationship with can have between the west and egypt if the west will just do x and y for me, sitting right off camera is common roosevelt telling him what to say. exploited the transistor extent. an incredible he had broadcasting capability unlike anyone else in the middle east, paid for by the cia. we entered into a catholic

marriage with nasser before we gave him. death before we dated him. --ple like roosevelt were so before we dated him. were soike roosevelt enthralled with him that they believe everything he set about wanting a good relationship with us. we were certain that once we got the british out of egypt for him that he was going to help us organize the middle east. we started getting into capabilities to organize the middle east before he had ever really shown us that that was his true intention. we >> how long did the fighting go on in 66 because of the u.s. crisis.- suez -- british and the israelis the british and the french --

they thought that by not being right on the, when the israelis landed to intervene. they gave the ultimatum and they had to send their troops that. the british troops had to come from cyprus so they had to seem across the mediterranean to cyprus. by the time they started bombarding, eisenhower was already against them. have a current map of the middle east area. you can see it on screen. so much has changed. you see some very well-known countries to this country today zhat were not and is at the sue canal open now? >> it is open. it is an incredibly important artery for the transmission of oil?

>> who owns the sinai? >> the israelis. eisenhower ruled the israelis outside of sinai. the prime minister of israel had hoped of holding on part of it but eisenhower ruled him out just like he ruled the british out. within the israelis retook get in 57 and is part of the peace deal with carter they relinquished it. >> this was a man who was responsible for israel is again in ben-gurion. said as farnassis as he was concerned, the conditions for peace with the base on the you and no resolution. resolution.

and as we cannot bring back all , that resolution cannot be brought back. this. did he fit into all important. the heart of the story was the u.s. and the british relationship but the american regard the arab-israeli conflict at the beginning as a central issue in the region. with kermitaid roosevelt it was our support for israel that was driving egypt away. the urgent thing to do was to solve the british egyptian

relationship but the most important thing was to solve the israeli-egyptian relationship. so when i look at it i think we misunderstood this. the real issue wasn't the question of arab nationalism versus british imperialism and then the things that the americans totally missed with all the rivalries among the air. arabs.g the eisenhower came to realize that if you supported one arab leader you've already alienated a bunch of others because they are locked in conflict with each other. there is no such thing as the arabs. there are different networks of arabs and if you go towards one you are opposing the other. that is the essence of middle eastern politics.

>> king abdulla jordan is one of our better allies among the arab countries and here is his father king hussein. think a piece can be brought about when israel starts to feel and believe that there are the air at rights -- arab r ights. role does the jordan play then and what role does it play now. >> jordan was at the time, it was the country that was the closest to britain. its army was called the arab legion and it was led by a british officer. the top officer in the entire army were british. they were borrowed from the british military. the arab legion was paid for

entirely by a subsidy that the british handed to the jordanians every year. and when i mentioned before about how we did not realize there were these conflicts , what nasserrabs wanted was to drive the british out of jordan. his conflict with israel, he was using the conflict with israel in order to ferment unrest in jordan. it is a very complicated picture. king hussein knew that. he probably had to say israel was the enemy, king hussein knew very well that nasser was gunning for him and was using the israel question to go after him. douglas and anti-might best -- an anti-semite. >> i did not use that term in

the book. i would say he had anti-somatic i-semetic attitudes? >> eisenhower, it is an interesting question, eisenhower is the only president, he is the only president to have converted religion while in office. 10 days after inauguration he converted to presbyterianism. if you had asked eisenhower, first of all he would not want to talk about it. --just wanted to prepare appear in front of the american people as a presbyterian. mennonite and his family was mennonite. actually his family were jehovah's witnesses and his

mother and father were jehovah's witnesses and he did not go to church. rarely, from the moment he went to west point to the moment he became president. witness, wellah's that's the family he grew up in. book, --ou did this the want to write another book on eisenhower? butot so much on eisenhower the relationship between religion and foreign policy. i started to in cover as they went through this very interesting connections between religious affiliation and attitudes towards the middle east and i think it is an unwritten story of our attitudes towards foreign policy. >> we go back to this one.

>> my kids the needle me about this. iny put enough this started 2009. they said are you going to take another decade, dad? when you left the defense department -- >> my kids are 14 and 15. >> what year did you leave the pentagon? >> january 20, 2009. >> where did you go? >> i would briefly to nyu. i did not get this idea of teaching at a university at of my bloodstream. i moved to the brookings institution and from brookings to hudson. >> an outsider would say those are two entirely different ideological -- one looks like it tilts left and the other looks

like it tilts right. >> and my friends at booktv brookings -- brookings will forgive me and they would say they would not tilt left but they certainly tilt left. and hudson tilts right. >> why did you change. scholarly them have a bent to them. the political affiliation is not as important to me as the freedom that both institutions to give. that is what i like about it. brookingsor fellow at is working on a book and at hudson they don't put emphasis on book in the same degree but they allow you to do it if you want. i don't think book writing is all that i do. i was interested in moving to hudson because i was concerned about -- i am conservative.

i am concerned about the future of conservative internationalism which is what eisenhower represents. and i want to be part of an effort to deserve -- preserve and defined conservative internationalism in this era when we see this retraction of american power. >> what is the most important thing about conservative internationalism? >> that the united states has been asked if the role to play in the world. >> but once you get past that, more military. >> the military is absolutely by vital -- vital. it is the fundamental basis. our economic power and military

power by which we can project our influence around the world. >> when you think of our position in the world militarily? >> i'm glad to see president trump is interested in holding up. i'm interested in the growing alignment between china, iran and russia. i think we need to see them as in an alignment and see our role as pushing back against them. suezing back to the 1956 crisis. book,s are in the iranians are in the book. i want to put out the 1956 map again because it shows a lot of the players we are dealing with the now including saudi arabia. you can see saudi arabia on the map. it is close to jordan, israel, syria is up at the top.

how much of what happened then -- i kind of asked this earlier but how much of what happened then is impacting us today with our relationship with the aircraft -- arabs? >> the history has a certain integrity to it and i did not want to yoke it to a contemporary argument. i think there is some direct contemporary relevance and i see the book as a tacit critique of obama foreign-policy because i think the dna of obama foreign-policy is the same dna those in the early eisenhower foreign-policy. if you substitute egypt in the eisenhower era for the ron and if you substitute george w. bush 's muscular for policy for british imperialism, you have

all the same attitude. wanted to distance himself from israel. he wanted to distance of the united states from the george w. bush style of foreign-policy and he wanted to reach out to the number one opponent of american policy in the region and convince it that we can put our relations on a new basis. one of the things you do not see is nasser. nasser telling us in english that he wants to be good friends with us. that is not what he is saying in his propaganda. the obama administration believed that it could turn the page with the ron, it could turn it not into a partner but a country that had shared interest in the united states so we could work with them -- i think --

vacuum into which the iranians and now be russians have moved. >> on the propaganda side, you talk about the voice of egypt. arabsded the force of the and they controlled it. a have the voice of outdoor hourra, trying to pump a voice into the middle east. >> i think it does a good job for what it does. the world has moved on to facebook and twitter and every other actor in the region has a similar tool. our problem, i think is not the particular tool, it is sinking them all up into a coordinated effort. , the holy grail is

this whole government effort. we have our broadcasting saying one thing and action saying another area. >> i asked you about your kid but i did not ask you how you met your wife? and when? >> i met my wife in the british archives actually. you must have known this. >> i did not. when i was doing research for my phd, which was in the early archives,the british my wife used to hand me my document. researchers, in britain they have a 50-year-old and 100-year-old and a , according to their freedom of information act, their public records become

available automatically at 30 years. others that have sensitive information they will withhold from 50 years-- to 100 years. when you hit this little piece of cardboard that says this file is withheld because of the 50 year rule, you feel those are the documents you really needed. all my fellow researchers thought i was dating my wife to get those documents that were withheld. >> she is british? >> yes. melanie i'msay going to the archives to research it does she get a little nervous? >> no. my wife is british by nationality but her mother is italian. she is italian in family, food and everything that matters and i think she knows who is the boss in the family and have to

exercise that control. post: the name of this book is and the author's name is michael durand. thank you. doran.el >> thank you. ♪

announcer: if you liked this q&a program with michael durand, then here are some others you might enjoy. evan,.2 interview with techniquesoks at the president eisenhower used to avoid a "conflict with the soviet union and simon in who talks about an experience from eisenhower's young adult life that led him to propose the interstate highway system as president. you can find this interviews online at c-span.org. announcer: c-span's washington journal live every day with news and policy issues that impact you. olivia golden will discuss at the proposed cuts to social programs and president

trump's 2018 budget. then jessica bond of the center for immigration that he talks about efforts by the trump administration to withhold grants from so-called sanctuary cities for their efforts to keep illegal immigrants from being deported and the senior correspondent for a government executive discusses the current size and scope of the federal workforce and the potential cuts to be forced by the trump administration. be sure to watch c-span's washington journal live at 70 of eastern live on monday morning. join the discussion. the confirmation process for supreme court nominee neil gorsuch continues this week. tomorrow the senate judiciary committee meet to vote on the nomination before it is considered by the full senate. once that live at 10 a.m. eastern on c-span two. monday night on the

communicators, u.s. telecom president and ceo jonathan squats or talks about the internet and telecom landscape as congress take steps to rollback privacy rules adopted by the sec last october. the house voted 250-2052 reversed those rules but never went into effect. what are the protections you see consumers have in the wake of that vote? have a strong privacy protections that ensure the integrity of their sensitive data. our companies are aligned in ,nsuring that sensitive data deeply sensitive aspects of our personal life in the not and should not he actually transacted or shared on our networks. we are all committed to that. it is also good to the current have joinedthe sec

together in a common voice to say as we move forward, we need to try to make it consistent and harmonize, and they will be acting together in partnership to make sure consumers receive the kind of privacy protection they require. announcer: watch the communicators monday night at eight eastern on c-span2. next, primeoming up minister's questions at the british house of commons. and a look at preparations for uk's official exit from the european union. and at 11:00, another chance to see q&a with author michael durand -- doran. announcer: during question time this past week, as prime minister theresa may took questions on formal preparations for the u.k. exit from the european union. she was also asked about recent funding for