president trump wants to establish space force as a sixth separate from an equal to five other branches. outlining the first station -- stages of the plan to implement the president's's guidance vision into a reality. spaceeport reviews activities within the department of defense and identifies to lay theeps foundation for a new department of the space force. space force will not be billed from school -- from scratch. since the dawn of the space age, america has remained the best in space.

[applause] >> the state department's top official talks about the trump administration's arm control policy. after that come policy experts review the approach and some of the changes. this is hosted by the center for strategic and international studies. >> good morning and thank you for joining us for today's event on the u.s. arms transfer policy. have thecited to ambassador with us to give us remarks on that at a stellar panel after that. doill begin as we always with our obligatory security announcement because we have thought about what to do in case of an emergency. we want to let you know we have plans and if something were to

happen, i will be your security guide and let you know where to go, either out the way you came in or in the back, depending on what kind of emergency might arise. what we do not expect that today. i also want to thank sponsors who make these events possible, including general member support, which has a big role to do with today's event, and our sponsor who helped us make it possible to do today's then -- event. to thank our friends at the state department very much for supporting us. and being able to talk about this topic. i think it is timely. you are seeing dramatic growth in the level of the dollar value in the u.s. arms exports, and also changes in the world market. the focus of where exports are going and shifting with demand around the world changing.

we are seeing our arms exports and security cooperation more focus of are a major strategy, the national security strategy, national defense strategy, and no doubt related to that, there is a huge leadership focus on it. it is something we see the president of the united states engaging in an addressing on a regular basis. it has been a regular focus for the secretary of defense. it has a leadership focus that is pretty unparalleled in the last year and a half. there has been a major new policy announced at the start of the year. updating the previous conventional arms transfer policy. are just now on the tail end of the implementation review for how to make that policy practical in a way that the arms transfer process actually operates. i hope we will hear about that. without any further do, i will turn it over to the ambassador is done, wer she

will bring up the panel and have the discussion. the floor is yours. [applause] >> thanks. you very much, andrew, for the kind introduction. thanks to all of you this morning. it is a very good crowd for august. my god. i love being introduced by an emergency announcement. theomise i will not cause emergency. privilege and a privilege to talk about some of the issues we are talking about. this is front and center in terms of the -- in terms of our work in the state department and more broadly throughout the u.s. government. i is timely and something think is worthy of longer discussion p just to you because after these remarks, i am called out to a meeting at the white house but my colleagues sitting right in front of me, she will

be part of the panel so the state department will be represented together with some other folks you have got, both from the government as well as from industry. no further do, let me just say i think again, as andrew mentioned and most of you are aware, in april of last year, the president issued a national security policy memorandum -- like wea revised call it, a cap policy. a framework under which the u.s. government and all of its agencies will review and evaluate opposed arms transfers. reflects they national security strategy, namely to prefer peace's through strength, to facilitate the exports of military equipment, strengthen partners and allies, facilitate u.s. economic

security and innovation, and we will talk a little bit about that, and up respect for human rights and non-peripheral -- proliferation perspective. in short, -- to create an art -- american jobs and maintain national security, for each arms transfer thoroughly, in order that it is the united states. the release of the new policy was only the first step in a series of what we will believe is practical initiatives to transfer the way the u.s. government works to support and grow our industrial base. in coordination with the secretary of defense, commerce, during the 60 days following the release of the

policy, my colleagues from across the executive branch and i met with stakeholders from industry, civil society, as well as congressional staffers, to collect all of their input and closely align our implementation plan with real-world challenges. i met with a group of scholars with the think tank to discuss the new policy. we are grateful for everybody who contributed feedback to that important process. as directed by the president's national security memorandum, we indeed submitted a national implementation plan on july 13. the plan represents an innovative strategy, one that aligns our conventional arms transfers with national security , built onic interests three lines. the plan calls for prioritizing strategic and economic petition to a paradigm shift in the

--rent reaction for the partnerships and capabilities reflective of strategic economic objectives. we will ensure that u.s. products can win in a competitive marketplace. second, the plan envisions organizing our efforts for success, ensuring that the executive branch's position, staff, and resource best supports efficient execution of arms policy and that its prophecies are also similarly constructed. third, the plan calls for creating environments through engagement with congress, industry, international partners, and other stakeholders to foster trade. what all of this ultimately means and what the initiative makes clear is under this administration, there will be no more active advocate for u.s. sales and u.s. government health.

top priority of my bureau of political military affairs at the state department, is maintaining the united states as security partner of choice for our many friends and allies overseas. that is just one example of the effort. really, i month ago attended the air show in the u.k. where i met with the defense industry representative from u.s. companies of all set -- all sizes to discuss the implementation plan and receive feedback in real time. those companies were both small and medium as well as large. we try to hit on the array of companies represented, all of which were present. i also met with counterparts from strategic partners and allies, europe, other parts of the world, to brief them on the president's new policy and advocate strongly for ongoing and prospective sales. in years, u.s. embassies consulates have been committed

to reporting u.s. companies efforts to grow their global exports. our diplomats have long worked to ensure that roddick's and services have the best possible chance to compete abroad. through participation in key forms like farm -- the administration's defense trade focus administrative bills the policylds upon and directs the u.s. government by strengthening advocacy for strength sales that are so critical to our national interests. the state department, through my bureau, has played a central role in the development of the policy and its implementation plan because arms transfers are and must be tools of our overall foreign-policy objective. through the responsible oversight of arms transfers, we are supporting existing allies and transfers or in some cases establishing and expanding new security partnerships that we hope will last for generations. the complexities of our operating environment are

clearly manifest. the issues we tackle every day the confluence of policy, regulatory, economic, and congressional appearance. as we endeavor to faithfully implement policy, we are anchoring our transfers and our larger foreign-policy framework and, simultaneously, protecting security and integrity of the technological advantage and our industrial base. about speak for a moment two important issues we take into account on every arms sale. human rights, and proliferation or nonproliferation. in terms of human rights, the policy requires that every sale be assessed for the risk it may contribute to a gross violation -- gross violation of human rights. it reflects an immutable

american value so let me repeat myself. we will not provide arms where we believe they will be used to conduct gross violations of human rights. for sure, there can be complexities in any sale. of ourtance, not all partners are discriminating as we ourselves are when it comes to the conduct of their military operations. for that reason, the new policy requires us to work proactively with the partners to reduce casualties in operations. we regularly use sales as an opportunity to engage in partners to address human rights conduct of their military. these are often, in perfect touations, we always work reduce the chance of the misuse of u.s. arms, and the same simply cannot be said for most other -- proliferation, we too were to strike a balance

ensure regional stability, while eliminating the proliferation of military technologies and trading regional imbalances that can lead to an arms race. so, we work with multilateral regimes in which -- that does not mean that some of these regimes to not meet -- need sometimes updating. the missile technology control theme, designed to prevent proliferation of missiles, never took into account the role that unmanned aerial systems now play in both the military and commercial realm. in reviewing each sale on a case-by-case basis, we must ensure that we are not selling the spread of advanced weaponry and creating opportunities for to ourtors and economic military economic benefit.

it is also about u.s. prosperity. the state department authorized license and provide oversight for $49.1 billion worth of government sales. in directllion commercial sale spirit is help the -- over 2.4 million people who work in the defense industry we are spending every effort to maintain america's status as the preeminent global exporter of defense goods. thepecifically recognizing link between economic and national security, among other changes, the new policy provides us tools to continue this important work. while some assets of the transfer process will change under the new policy, the state department will continue to export. each potential

in addition to considerations and the human rights concerns i discussed earlier, we will continue a number of other important factors. each transfer in responding to security needs. the respect of capabilities or advantage. strategic, foreign policy, through increased access and influence, allied sharing, and interoperability. lead another key part of the arms transfer process, the engagement with members of congress, courtney did by the state department. we are communicating with senateues with the foreign -- foreign relations committees, as part of the committee to process, which is required by law for arms

transfers that meet a certain threshold. i want to emphasize that we take our role exceptionally seriously. this is why we worked closely with the white house to help drive the policy forward, understanding we must always involve policies and processes to meet the challenges of the day and prepare ourselves for what is over the horizon. these steps are among the first in what we hope will be a series of efforts to streamline the transfer process. i ensure you that my colleagues and i at the state department and more broadly, will continue to explore ways to cut red tape and give the industry every advantage in an increasingly competitive global marketplace, while ensuring the responsible export of arms. i do want to underline the fact that each delivery of defense articles sends a message to friends and foes, it is an act of support for and trust in our

partners and allies. it provides the necessary capabilities to defend the region,support i think we all can attest here that american companies produce the most technologically sophisticated and best defense systems anywhere in the world. and its national implementation plans are final first depth in a series of governmentwide initiatives to strengthen our allies, to support our national defense industrial race, and drive american job creation and innovation. the state department will continue to be a leader in these efforts into the future of that, i can assure you. that, i know today's panel discussion will constitute a very fruitful dialogue. and i think a timely one. and i want to thank you again for the great attendance here today.

i think that is very encouraging, and we will do everything, as i said, from the state department to drive this agenda forward, which is obviously an important one from the administration's perspective. thank you very much. [applause] >> thank you so much, ambassador. now i have to apologize, because it completely slipped my mind to introduce you before your remarks. so i apologize, but thank you for those comments. i think that will set a great foundation for our panel discussion. having neglected to do it earlier, i do not know if it that makes -- it makes that much

sense to introduce her now, but she is the department head for those who have tuned in and are not familiar with ambassador kay's now's position, she is be ambassador for acting military affairs at the u.s. department of state, and has a readership role on this conventional arms transfer policy rolled out in the spring. and she has left with us her colleague, who can speak to this. and i understand played a prime role in that process as well. so i am going to introduce the panelists before our discussion. takehen we will kind of our discussion in two parts. we have the luxury of about a 90 minute time frame to do our panel discussions. so we will divvy it up into two main sections. , primarily ons the policy changes that are underway and how they will be implemented and their likely maybes, and second, then

broadening out and looking at the strategic context for the policy changes and how it is going to play in that strategic context. so let me begin introducing the panel. to my left is laura cressy, the deputy director in the office of regional security and arms transfers in the bureau of political and military affairs. she works for ambassador kaidnow . she is responsible for seeing worldwide military sales and hasd parties transfers, and had a distinguished career in the state department and the private sector. -- i shouldf those not say rare, but one of those wonderful people who has brought primary -- private sector experience in government experience together. , who iseft is alex grey special assistant to the president for the defense industrial base and deputy director of the white house office of trade and manufacturing policy.

he previously served on the presidential transition team for the u.s. department of state and as a senior advisor to the u.s. representative randy forbes of virginia, who was a senior member of the armed services committee and someone i worked with and for when he was on the -- when i was on the house armed services committee staff. alex, it is great to see you again and great to have you with us. we appreciate the white house saw fit to bring its voice to this session today. left is keith webster, president of the u.s. chamber of commerce's aerospace and export council. he is responsible for guiding the defense of aerospace and export council in their defense and our aerospace experts. on behalf of councilmembers, and their work, putting their positions in front of government , congress, the broader business community. before joining the chamber, keith was the director of

international cooperation at the u.s. department of defense, where we were actually colleagues, and once upon a time in the office of acquisition technology and logistics, and his office has survived the transition, which is good news, as part of that sustainment in the new organization. prior to that, he was the deputy assistant secretary of the army for these kinds of export issues. so deeply knowledgeable about service,his government and now also in his private sector capacity. to his left is melissa dalton, a ofior fellow and director csis'international program and defense projects. her research focuses on in orcing the integral --

and u.s. have policy in the middle east. in 2014,joining csis she served in the department of defense in the office of the under secretary of defense for policy, and was a senior advisor in planning the 2014 defense review. to her left is jeff abramson, rejoinedout a year ago the arms control association as a nonresident senior fellow or arms control, conventional arms trans. -- transfers. he also manages the mining and and prior tonitor, doing these duties served as a policy advisor and director to the secretary of the control w -- and alsothe is the w terry associate director of the arms control commission. to his left, dac hardwick, assistant vice president of international affairs at the aerospace industries association.

his primary responsibilities include international defense,'s a straight, and export control issues. -- space trade, and export control issues. he also works with trade advocacy initiatives and cooperation programs. he was at the harris corporation before now, where he was as possible for working with the u.s. government and national official to ensure timely export for alliesproducts and partners nations. thank you for joining us, everyone. we will divide our discussion a little bit so we have some opening comment and interactive another set of opening comment and interactive discussion, and then we will have interactive discussions with the audience. we want to make this as interactive as we can. so i would like to start with a focus on the policy health, the implementation review, how we

think it will operate, and i will kick it off with laura. nk you forat, tha your kind introduction and for you and melissa for hosting us. it is great to see so many familiar faces. i am looking forward to a lively discussion. i am also very excited to be on the panel, which -- with such distinguished colleagues. so looking forward to our talks today. today is actually the latest in our continuing efforts to engage stakeholders in the arms transfer policy discussions. we value these discussions as mentioned inidnow her comments, and we value the input we have received from the industry and association think tanks, and we will continue to solicit feedback as we move forward in our implementation plan and trying to look at the

processes and policies we have in place in the arms transfer realm. outlined howidanow our new cad policy -- cat policy and the national implication reflect the national security strategies and defense strategies. she also discussed how the cat policy is designed to expand opportunities for american industry, the eight american jobs, and maintain u.s. national security. and what i would like to do in these couple of minutes is delve a little bit people are -- deeper into the plan and what it contains, and try to explain those a little further. to remind you, those three lines of efforts are prioritizing strategic competition, organizing for success, and creating conducive environments. the implementation plan we were

tasked with putting together in effort bylicy is an us to really carry out the president's vision. it is an effort to better align our conventional arms transfers with our national security and national economic interests. line of effort, prioritizing strategic competition, we are trying to take a more proactive approach to arms transfers. specifically, we are trying to improve our ability to compete with our adversaries by providing our partners with viable alternatives to foreign products in order to maintain influence in key regions throughout the world. we are going to be working with our partners and allies to identify critical capability requirements they have, and try to expedite transfers to support these essential foreign policy and national security objectives. the second line is the organizing for success line,

taking a close look at how we are organized within the executive branch and how we are doing our day-to-day work, and what we need to do, to focus on to make sure we are best decisions to facilitate -- positions to facilitate transfers to meet our national security objectives. for example, we will continue to update the policies and regulations that provide us the framework for our arms transfer decisions, specifically looking at streamlining the international traffic and arms r, andtions, or ita continuing to revise the u.s. munitions list and the commerce control list. we will also be looking at the day-to-day processes to ensure that we are as efficient and streamlined, as effective as possible. some of the things we are looking at and that folks in the industry and folks have asked us to look at is establishing milestones and timelines for the

foreign military sales process, improving and speeding up our contracting processes within the defense department, trying to increase the competitiveness of u.s. defense items and systems by building in export ability to ity design and -- exportabil for the design and develop it, and expanding support of non-program record systems. we are looking at a potential financing options that could make our systems more attainable for some of our foreign partners, and examining existing sure they doake not unnecessarily detract from our ability to compete in international, in the international marketplace. finally, some thing else we are looking very closely at is our advocacy process, to make sure we are the most effective advocates for u.s. industry. the third line of effort, creating conducive environment, thingsd at addressing

that are outside the executive branch, outside our peer-reviewed -- outside our purview and control. so that, for example, is working with the state department communities of jurisdiction to address any legislative fixes that could increase efficiencies in the system. also working with the other committees too, with the dod committees to see if there are mightcess -- fixes that help as well. working with our partners, our international partners to help better defined their requirements and their needs so that could help speed up the overlyes, addressing burdensome policies that create barriers for u.s. entry, such as overly restrictive offset policies of our foreign partners. and also, working with industry to try to increase production capacity in order to decrease the leadtimes for u.s. defense items. sum, what we are trying to do

in this whole of government effort, looking at the arms transfer process really from soup to nuts, is trying to ensure that once we have decided of a defenseer capability to a partner is in the national security interests of the united states that we are able to effectively compete and efficiently deliver the equipment to our partner as quickly as possible. will close by underlining the fact that while some of the aspects of arms transfer processes will change under the new cat policy, as ambassador kaidanow said, the state department will continue to evaluate each arms transfer or potential sale on a case-by-case basis. we will also continue to work very closely with our committees of jurisdiction on the hill to help them carry out their oversight responsibilities. the cat policy provides a framework for under which u.s. arms transfers, whether they are commercially licensed sales are

government to government transfers will be reviewed. it does not change existing laws and regulations regarding the export of u.s. defense items. the other thing i wanted to add is while the cat policy is quite important for us, this is the fifth iteration of the cat policy. was signedat policy by president jimmy carter. for as, the exciting thing is this implementation plan, which really musters all of the efforts of the u.s. government to try and harness the forward movement and forward momentum that we do have, to try to make the processes as efficient as effective as possible. with that, i will turn it over to alex. you so much to andrew and his team, and csis for having me here. it has been a ♪ [video clip] ♪ -- it has been a pleasure to be

here with our colleagues. we have had a great iteration on throughout the agency. i particularly want to a knowledge our colleagues at the national security council, who have been tireless and incredibly skilled at pushing this through. i am here on behalf of the white house trade and manufacturing policy office, and our mission is to work with our interagency colleagues and with the national security council, to promote policies that expand balanced trading opportunities abroad, encourage policies that by entire american, and strengthen the u.s. industrial base. policy encapsulates all of those objectives. laura and state have done such a andt job lamenting the state side of this, but i'll talk about how implements the president's broader agenda and some of the connections and connectivity

between different aspects of that agenda. cat was designed in response to a shifting strategic landscape characterized by great power competition. cat prioritizes staying ahead of this competition by responding proactively instead of reactive lead to the defense needs of allies and partners. it also recognizes one of this president's signature themes -- economic security is national security. by removing some of the previous administrations artificial barriers for the transport arms -- for the transfer of arms to critical partners, this administration is both strengthening our hand in the ongoing strategic competition while also stimulating economic growth at home as well as job creation. and should be noted that the u.s. aerospace and defense industries contribute almost $1 trillion annually to the u.s. economy and support about 2.5 million american jobs. at one point, the u.s.

international export market alone is estimated to be worth more than $50 billion a year within the next decade. that is the stakes we are competing for. he objectives of cat -- key objectives of cat going forward, laura i mind -- outlined most of these. allies keep the requirements they have. and one thing our office has been particularly involved in is the advocacy piece of this and ensuring that the competitiveness of our defense exports abroad promotes both economic and security purposes is maintained. i would in vote -- i would note, as ambassador kaidanow did, the administration dispatched one of the highest delegations today to the air show, which shows how supportive the government is at that particular aspect. we are working with partners to see that u.s. barriers to entry are reduced, and policies

do not threaten american jobs technologicalr edge. like laura said, continuing to update the policy and the regulatory frameworks that underlie the arms transfer policy, including outlining outdated policies and updating regulatory frameworks like itar. cat is part of the larger than a straight effort to stress the point economic and national security. another part being the defense and the industrial manufacturing base, which we hope will be released in the near future. an importantts are tool for maintaining a healthy and resilient defense industrial base, including one capable of searching in a crisis. a diversified industrial exports sector promotes a wide variety of critical labor skills required by the u.s. defense industrial base as well as our allies and. i look forward to continuing with this interagency process as implementation of cat

progresses, and we look forward to continuing this dialogue with relevant stakeholders here, and want that dialogue to be frank, honest, and ongoing. i would urge u.s. industry to engage with the energies the -- interagency in this process, with 150 steps that will help withut the goals in -- steps that will help the goals laid out in cat. andrew: keith? q: andrew, thank you, and thank you to csis letting me speak. the defense export council, which was recently launched a few months ago in a couple -- in april is a unique opportunity, capitalizing on the administration's interest on moving forward with have policy -- cap policy changes -- cat

policy changes and working with our industrial sector to advance opportunities for industry globally. it is an honor for me to be part of that initiative and my executive director, ben schwartz, is here in the front row as well. as andrew kindly pointed out, i have had a little bit of experience, roughly 33 years of experience in this very issue of arms transfer and cooperative research and development work with friends and allies globally. what has changed in that 33 years is that the united states , althoughndustry having incredible he capable military equipment, is not the only game in town. we are seeing the emergence of thechinese, and military-industrial complex. we are also seeing russia continue to advance some of its capabilities in the global market, as well as others,

friends and allies, who have created military and industrial complexes. when i started in this business had a veryo, i strong corner on the market for a dance military capability. that is no longer the case today. there is a paradigm shift. t changes, wehe ca in this council are welcoming the economic impact can iteration's as an element of the arms transfer review policy -- process. in my 33 years, this is the first time the department has been expanded to include this consideration, economic impact. it is not an overarching consideration, but it is allowed to be a part of consideration in transfers. we also consideration for an availability as elements of the arms transfer review process as we are witnessing china filling voids the u.s. left with a denial to a friend or ally --

without denial to friend or ally. the consequence is as follows. the u.s. loses market share that and inly not recaptured some cases may never be recaptured. the u.s. loses control of the capability. the u.s. loses the opportunity to train, influence, and maintain a military relationship with foreign forces, who now are introducing into their inventory a chinese, korean, israeli, etc. capability. and finally, with the introduction of a chinese or russian this dumb into the military inventory of that friend or ally, we now have a far more complicated future of arms transfer decision process aat is now compounded by prior u.s. denial, and in some cases, we complicate the potential for expanded diplomatic relations.

i mean here.n what let's take india as an example. i have worked very closely with india in many years for dr. carter. years ago, we denied asa radar for the fighter and the french clinched the deal. i like the french, don't get me wrong, but i like american industry better. now, several years later, and i worked at this initiative with dr. carter -- we are johnny-come-lately to the effort. for additional aircraft capability in india, and now we are all in. allieslies -- we write -- we revitalized our policy, but we are behind now. because the french beat as out. another example with india, we never answered their request for -- prolific this and defense capability, and now

india has been forced to consider and potentially looking --the russia as 400 system system. now we are rushing to put together a proposal for india to counter that situation. why is that a problem for us? we have legislation on the hill in 2017 which penalizes friends and allies who lean towards russian equipment specifically. fortunately, there has been a congressional carvel for india created, but it made a lot of anxiety. india in 2019, the national defense authorization act for fiscal year 2019 is headed to the president and we at the chamber and on this council, the defense and aerospace export council, are concerned with the -- inge and action 1752 section 1752 that enforces economic and iteration in this -- economicss, and

consideration in this review process, and --, a recommendation we published in 30 proposal to the administration -- in the proposal to the administration on june 8. finally, the council you see is working closely with the administration and the congress specific to our 30 recommendations we published on june 8. the administration is being kurds to use the tools it has to affect real change. to issue executive orders, directives, and hold the system accountable to see this opportunity to address issues that we have debated since the defense news article wrapped in red tape that was published in 1997. i remember that. many of you probably do not. a unique opportunity for true change, and i am honored to work with the colleagues represented both state, nsc, and the white

house to advance these changes. thank you. you, keith.k i will take a break on opening remarks and ask some questions as moderator that i would like the whole panel to weigh in on if they would like to. and i would like to start with the question, if i could pose it in the most general form and elaborate a little bit, how you implement a policy and a process that is a case-by-case review process? come up asse cases individual transactions ordeals. they might not be single transactions, they might be multiple transactions, but th ey are viewed as an overa rching case. each system has its own hurdles, bumps, and roadblocks, and might lead to an outcome that might seem inconsistent at first wash with the policy statements being

made. so i guess in terms of how you implement this policy approach, and i take the heart -- i take part the paradigm shift -- to heart the paradigm shift mentioned by several to be proactive, and i resonate with keith's remarks, where we previously had a situation where u.s. products were so much in demand, so much the pinnacle that the world was seeking that reactive probably worked, at least for a while, because you had what everyone wanted and you could afford to be in a reactive mode. i think that has changed. so how do we actually do a proactive process on something where it is case-by-case and we are trying to balance impeding priorities? i welcome anyone on the panel who has thoughts on this. laura: i will take a first shot. review at a case-by-case , to us, what that means is it

provides us with an element of lexical it. it does not mean we are going to .gnore -- flexibility it does not mean we are going to ignore past licenses or arms transfers, turn a blind eye to cedent, but it does give us some flexibility. all of those variations in the cat policy we have to take heed of when we are looking at a potential transfer, what is great about the cat policy is it does not prioritize any of the considerations that are out there, it just lays them out there for us to consider. was saying in a -- chambers of commerce event yesterday, the world changes, from week to week, month to month. so something we may have been willing to provide a partner two months ago, maybe something has

changed. you can imagine right now, some things have changed such that we are not really quite ready to approve that transfer today. so that is the kind of case-by-case review that we are talking about. it does not mean, just to underline, that we will not be considering precedents, we will be looking -- not be looking at past licenses, if a company comes to us and says well, this is the third of 10 transfers that we have planned, we are not going to necessarily take that third transfer and look at it without thinking about the whole picture. so hopefully that bill lays some ys someconcerns -- bela of the concerned, but we do have a balancing act with the case-by-case review and our desire, as alex was talking about, to work proactively -- look proactively of what we want to do with partners and allies.

and that proactive strategic look is a little different than what we are doing on a case-by-case, on the case-by-case basis, and it is trying to take into account, what are the things we want to accomplish as a country? what are the things that have been outlined in the national security strategy and the national defense strategy, and how can we work collectively with our partners and allies and try and realize those goals and objectives? alex: i think this is a great leadoff question for what we are talking about here, and it is illustrated in one of the reform the aerospace industry association submitted to the u.s. government. with a broad abroad policy change act of the best example is you look at some of your existing processes, and specifically, the program licenses. unfamiliarhat are with the program license,

instead of licensing on a case-by-case basis, on individual licenses, you provide a license for the entire program and any of the associate license is that -- licenses responsible for that program can be extradited to the u.s. government. that program has authority been adjudicated by the united dates government. about considerations human rights, humanitarian concerns, technology transfer, that has all been adjudicated. that allows for the licenses to continue through the system, which is burdened to move through more quickly than you do on a case-by-case basis. a program like this is a good these reallyone of thorny issues we run into when you do overall defense trade and defense trade reform. thate hope all -- hopeful the administration will look at the program license and continue that particular structure as something that can be considered going forward. thanks, andrew. to build off that point, there

is the risk of being inundated and overwhelmed from a capacity and workforce perspective in terms of the range of input that will have to be taken into consideration with this policy. there has always been multifaceted argue ability and andrs -- argueability letters -- layers the administration is trying to incorporate, which i think is the right approach. at the same time, a similar but broader effort to what dak and aia recommended is building the kinds of situations that the u.s. national security community will encounter when it rustles with the arms -- wrestles with the arms transfer policy decisions, based on the context in which we are inserting these arms in terms of the foreign policy trade-off, in terms of tech you could develop a range of archetypes that move

along a spectrum of a highly capable ally such as european or eastern asia allies to perhaps a more fractious debate around partners in other parts of the world. that might be an approach to consider, but it would require nodes of therent interagency and a dialogue with industry, chamber of commerce and others who have a voice in this process, along with civil society and humanitarian actors to construct these archetypes. just briefly on this, it is an interesting question. i get where it is coming from, but i want to stress that it isn't -- that it is important that you keep this because of the changing dynamics and situations, and maybe later we can talk about there should be additional insertion point where account theo changing times.

i understand the desire here, but i think it is important from the point of responsibility with these sales that there is this case-by-case review. alex: in one addition to what laura said, i think while maintaining the case-by-case review, i think it is important that we do have these big picture policy statements, not only because they come they -- convey the sentiment of the administration and the president's intent in this policy throughout the whole of government approach, but having these economic security -- being able to compete in a great power competition, having all of that as a signal of intent to our allies and partners as well as our competitors, i think that is really important. the balance between the big picture signaling and the case-by-case nuance that the agency needs to do this effectively i think is really important.

andrew: the discussion brought to mind to me -- when you don't ead of the rapid acquisition so. what i was trying to do with facilitate the provision of equip into afghan national forces so they could exceed in inir missions -- succeed their missions. keith was my son golly -- trying to manage that process. oftentimes, he would bring to me that the answer of the solution that or solution was to take the easier path. alreadyhat were approved in a similar context were easier to a proven an afghan context. not saying and you cannot be done, but it is easier and quicker to do something that is done before. that ties into what alex is theng, if we communicate, government, some of these broader policy ideas and folks

in industry and folks in partner nations have an idea of what is know,ikely to be yes than maybe we can cut out some friction. that seems there is a role for the broader policy statements and communication, but that brings me to the next question, which is how does the panel see it should be, or will be, that we can facilitate on both of those communication mechanisms? that was referenced by several folks, wanting to get feedback from industry, but sometimes the u.s. government is challenged to communicate back to industry in its processes for its variety of reasons. the panel.t out to how do we get this kind of dialogue process with industry, partner nations, working effectively? keith? keith: a couple of thoughts. this issue of transparency we discussed yesterday at the chamber with the undersecretary of some of our other members --

and some of our other members, as the administration works through the details of the , we reallyion plan do see a desire for greater transparency on the details of that implementation plan. i realized some of it is classified, but there is a trust that is not -- one of the things we worked hard in the pentagon for many years and was critical to my various assignments is viewing industry as a partner. times, the bureaucracy will try to keep industry at arms length for a number of reasons. in order to succeed in this, it has to be a very collegial and transparent dialogue with our industry partners and the associations. and our counsel. otherwise, we are not going to

move toward -- forward. it requires an understanding of the technology, so you have to have program management involved as well. part of the discussion we would have in the pentagon is part of the acquisition technology and logistics community, where frank or ashton carter, when he had the position, was the holden to thepresident -- beholden to president and the war fire for not approving a transfer capability that would somehow disadvantage u.s. forces. the conversation we would have is in that industry and capability, within five years, will there be a next generation of something that minimizes the risk of a transfer today? in some instances, the answer was yes. we felt comfortable supporting the administration's desire to cut its capability, which might be risky, and in some cases the answer might be

no. that is a dialogue you need to have to move forward in some of these areas. are critically important. they know where licenses have been approved in the past and where the swing lanes are. however, there are opportunities lanesress against those to create opportunity for new precedents. india is a great example over the past five years. raising the bar on our relationship with india. that came with a great deal of dialogue and discussion, and a great partnership with the industry for f-18s, f-16s, etc. i think we need transparency and a strong and open dialogue to move forward. andrew, let me give an example. i think there is an existing mechanism ongoing right now that aia has been a part of her a number of years, and it is through a series of dialogues at a number of levels in the

government and the industry. we had a ceo level dialogue that we held with the deputy secretary of defense, and an that is held with division tierdents, and a mid dialogue we continue to run with other associations as well. there are multiple conversations wet are ongoing that i think can formalize, we can continue to pursue with the u.s. government in such a way that it achieves the reforms that we all agree needed to move forward. the key for us is to make sure we focus on security cooperation , defense trade, overall trade as the topic that is elected. the challenge that you suddenly start to have is at the senior level and just under that very senior level, you have competing demand for multiple issues across the ranks. so it is not just security cooperation, the secretary of state, secretary of

defense are responsible for, they are responsible for a number of things. it is being very specific about what you are trying to achieve, and defense trade is very specific. if we can focus on security cooperation and defense trade at the senior level and have it be baked into the bureaucracy, we will make some real change. right now, we are having those dialogues and they tend to be episodic at best, but if we can have them be in during going forward, you will see the levels of change we think is necessary in order to accomplish the reforms that are part of the natural -- national implantation plan. laura: i wanted to add on to was saying. we have a number of standing meetings with associations, with and and eia -- ndia, others where we try to engage the broad spectrum of industry stakeholders with the

consideration of the new cat policy and the implementation plan. the administration has really tried to make an extra effort to increase that, increase that engagement. we had a series of roundtable meetings with associations bringing in their membership, trying to make sure we are reaching out not just to primes, but small and medium-sized companies as well to make sure we get a range of input. thatso understand too sometimes in these broader dialogues, folks might be somewhat reticent to talk to us. so our doors are always open to folks, whether it is associations or think tanks or companies, to meet in our various offices, whether it is state department at the undersecretary, assistant secretary, or office level. if it is the defense security cooperation agency, under

secretary lord in ans. all across the security cooperation landscape, there has been an extra effort to make sure we engage to understand what the various concerns are. we had said when we started on this process, we were not just going to be looking for input to the limitation plan, write the plan, put it out there and say thank you, we are done, talk to you later. this isto make sure just the beginning of our engagement and we continue to told out to folks that some of our colleagues that last week, we held the first meeting of the inner agency offset working group that was reestablished pursuant to the implementation plan. in our first meeting, we said one of the first things we need to do is reach back out to industry and the associations to

find out what is the perception of offsets? what is the perception out there of what the u.s. government should be doing as part of its offset policy? what our countries out there were offset policies are perceived to be incredibly onerous, such that our companies cannot effectively compete? kind of situation where you will see this ongoing engagement from us on a number of different issues. if i could follow up on the topic -- it was raised by ms. ambassador kaidanow about resourcing the process. i am loath to criticize my former colleagues, but i would say there is some challenge there. i would point to some of the early stages of this year's defense authorization bill, kind of targeting, for example, the defense technology security administration potentially to be folded into other of the -- aspects of the

department and abolished as an independent entity. there is pressure on the system, on the department of defense, the system, to be efficient and reduce billets in certain areas. in particular, the kinds of things that tend to support the arms export policy, like contracting, technology security reviews. how do you strike that balance? how do you effectively make sure the resourcing that is required to be proactive rather than reactive, and i would postulate or argue that might be harder to do, require more staff effort to accomplish than just to be reactive. n environment. some of those defense authorization bills were not in the final conference report, but there were some -- implement it. -- implemented. so resourcing is a concern.

it is a concern, i think, among all of our agencies. i cannot speak to dod, but they have some concerns, contracting especially is one area that all of us collectively point to as a real need for increased department, --y resourcing. in my department, i think -- is quite understaffed at the moment, down considerably. we also have vacancies here and there. it is something that our leadership is very much aware of , and we will be seeking to fill those spots. your,, you mentioned it there are stresses on the system where we are being asked to do more than less, and we have to prioritize our work. luckily for me, this is a top priority, so we have a fair number of folks in my office and

other offices in the department that are working on these tasks in the of limitation plan. -- in the implementation plan. andrew: i will raise this up a , but shift is up to the more strategic perspective of how arms transfers generally and the policy we are discussing fits into the strategic framework. been addressed several times already in terms of the national security strategy and the leadership focus and the need to engage or at least be engaged to prepare in her competition. just give us some opening thoughts on that. . i will start first with melissa. melissa: thank you, andrew. i am delighted to be joining today's panel in partnership with andrew, starting in march

-- andrew. starting in march, we launched an effort to unpack the complexity of the defense trade agenda with an event here at csis that featured lieutenant ral uber and -- from paul state bureau, and looking forward to continuing this project stream with andrew in the months to come. we will be harvesting many insights from today's discussion. some othersto thank for organizing today's event. often, we think about and approach arms sales in terms of the input to the partner and the output for the united states. seen congressionally mandated reforms for security thattion -- cooperation are underway at the state department and department of defense that encourage the whole community to think more and

drive towards more outcomes. indeed, if we want to compete and win in the ways that have been framed by this administration, it hinges on our ability to articulate and achieve those outcomes. ambassador, as kaidanow stated in her remarks, arms sales or a foreign-policy tool that might reap u.s. strategic and economic benefits, but are fundamentally political acts with political outcomes. and in shaping the monopoly of the use of force within the partner country that we are working with, and how that force is used. so as we are thinking about the that we are seeking to achieve politically, we have to take into consideration that broader sweep of considerations. i believe that the intent is there in terms of how the

itsnistration is designing security cooperation reforms, again mandated by congress, and reflected in the framing and but it is of the cat, worth underscoring that arms transfers should be designed to build allied and partner capability and interoperability to mitigate risk in u.s. plans for managing crisis and contingencies, for deterrence and coercion against our countering, for terrorism and other national security objectives. internal to the u.s. government, this will necessitate greater linkage between the planning community and the security cooperation community, and joint planning with our partners beyond which is currently practiced. there are impediments, of course, to this from a , insification perspective terms of tech release consideration and in terms of cultural barriers, not just between the united states and

its partners, but between the different cultures that exist in the u.s. bureaucracy and, in fact, between the planning community and the security collaboration community. in order to break through those barriers and ensure stronger alignment with defense and national security priorities, we need to think about ways to better streamline and provide top-down direction for the of thinking about security cooperation as a way to achieve our planning objectives. armed transfer policy also needs to be reconciled with two other priorities that have been articulated by the trump administration. the first is the return on investment for working with allies and partners, and why context matters in terms of avoiding being embroiled in protective conflicts, including

those that are pursued by our partners and to whom we might be providing arms. to start with return on investment, in the past two ndaa cycles, there has been an emphasis on reform for monitoring planning of security collaboration and the president himself and members of the administration strong in quite encouraging allies to step up and do more, to invest in our collective security. arms transfers are a form of security cooperation, so in thinking ahead in how we frame and reconcile the imperative of seeking return on investment with the need to be streamlining our arms transfer processes and policies to provide those arms to other partners, i think we to -- with the highest

levels of our government. if they are treated as separate policy decision-making processes, we run the risk of the country of parallel and possibly conflicting outputs and outcomes. -- outcomes that we will have to deal with in the years to come. context also matters. further the by, with, and through approach, relying on allies and partners to achieve common security objectives, not only through burden sharing but also burden shifting. we have seen this approach increasingly utilized not just by this administration, but frankly by the obama administration and for good reasons. our partners, oftentimes, have better understanding of the lay of the land or complex operations. they speak the language. they will hold the keys to that

country's future in terms of providing security over the long term and ensuring that our interests are met there. may well achieve common objectives for both the united states and the partner, but we need to think through whether the outcomes are sustainable and supporting of our broader foreign-policy objectives in these country contexts. they must be calibrated not t partner expectations that the united states will not be able to match, whether that is the type and sophistication of the arms we would like to provide them, but the political implications of continuing a military cooperation relationship with them over the long-term. that we are not inadvertently empowering bad actors or enforcing predatory governments, or exacerbating conflicts dynamics that may undermine our collective. or it he in certain regions, or

that we are causing civilian harm -- collective superiority in certain regions, or that we are causing civilian harm. and i do want to address the new human rights measures in the cat policy, and i hope they are well and lamented. i would like to point you to the administration's own remote assistance review elected by the department of state, department of defense, and the u.s. agency ,or national developing usaid which links some of these complex scenarios where we are securityhese with collaboration and the need to be thoughtful about how we are designing our security cooperation programs in this context. so for this administration, context does matter, but it does seem to be in tension -- intentioned with some of the

imperatives driving in the arms transfer policy. so while we need to design a policy that is responsive and adaptive to the competitive landscape of the 21st century, to support our allies and achieving -- in achieving common objectives, decisions are incredibly multifaceted. you can see that csis is challenging the links of csis panels today to bring together the multifaceted dimension of these issues. but given the greater reliance on u.s. allies and partners heightens the importance of approach, as you consider the different policy objectives, providing feedback , sortunities to refine them we are achieving our desired outcomes. thank you. thank you, and thank you so much for inviting me to be on this panel.

i may be the most unhappy with the policy on the panel, so that is a role i will happily take on. there is a lot i would like to talk about. i have been taking a lot of notes, because i wanted to tailor what has been said so far. -- it lays out some of the points i will make. of --tioned, it was part i was part of the forum on the arms trade, a network of 70 people around the world who initially responded to the transfer policy when it came out. we have a page on our website on the arms transfer initiative, where you can see some of those reactions and ongoing things have been written on c-span. there is a great deal of concern, actually, about this policy. every conventional arms transfer of a blurb, you can find whatever you want in there. the priorities are not weighted, just listed. i'm concerned that the optics and the reality of how this policy might be implement it are

looking at the wrong problem. i want to frame a few things so i can see how i -- say how i see this differently and talk about how this matters to the world. there are some sessions i am hearing that i reject as a frame. one, if others do it, if others are going to fill the gap, we will have to fill it. i do not think that is a rationale for transferring what is not a trade commodity -- these are weapons, killing machines, and it is easy to talk about them in the abstract, but that is their purpose. in our economy, they are not that huge in our economy, but people care about it. they have an outweighing impact on our country and the world, and we never need to forget that. we cannot talk about the arms trade as a clean system, it is dangerous. i do not think we have figured out exactly how to do it right over time. we can easily go through a litany of past arms transfers that seemed to make sense that no longer do, and i think that

is the problem that every conventional arms transfer policy should take at its root, how do we do it responsibly? and i appreciate ambassador kaidanow's message that we want to continue to do this responsibly, and i believe that is what is in people's hearts. but each delivery sends a message. when we stress the economic side, that is what is seen. when president trump meets with -- in saudi arabia and holds up posters of weapons, the message being perceived as that human rights do not matter, it is a transactional approach. it is about faster and more. faster and more can be a recipe for disaster. these are some of the concerns that need to be taken into account. this idea that the higher technology weapons are the only

ones that matter so there is an export control process on categories one through three, which i find alarming, the prospect that will make it easier for semiautomatic weapons to around the world. these are the weapons used in conflict, the weapons driving human rights abuses. the rationale that these are not high sophisticated weapons and we do not pay as much attention is driven from the idea that our approach needs to be more and faster and we need to protect only the crown jewels, a continuation of the obama administration. all of these parts going on that i think are the wrong message. one of the other parts is we do want to create responsibility. where there might be overlap. there is a lot of discussion about timeline and milestones. i understand industry is one for that. i understand you want to move faster.

i recently met with people working on the policy and the artistic -- they are disappointed that none of our suggestions about transparency would be helpful in we would support that. i think also if we are going to move faster and more, we need to of how weter sense will use restrictions and have better transparency after ward -- afterwards. there is a much greater push to assess whether our security assistance or efforts are achieving the goals. my concern is we will move faster and not improve transparency or process in a way that we can assess later. that alongcritical the process, there are milestones, there are insertion points where you can reevaluate whether the deal that was made in the past so make sense.

as small a piece as it could be, congress gave us the power to get a predelivery notification. standard process and can be public. similarly, direct commercial sales which get notified to congress but do not have the same website as foreign military sales, this could be made public. my thinking here is if we are going to do this, if this is the drive to the administration for faster and more, we need to have at the same time, a more transparent process and one that the public can engage in more freely. in the first two years of the trump administration, congress is paying more attention. there holds on sales that have been concerning that i thought were going through on weapons to saudi arabia and the uae. we have some holds on apartments. congress needs to step up its game.

it can beink inconsistent. a can be worked into the policy. the message of the policy is not one that promotes international responsibility, but promotes transaction and sales, not human rights. that is alarming. >> thank you. i cannot thank you enough for the opportunity to be here today. to my colleagues, i want to thank you for all of your work policy.n the transfer the aerospace industries association has been working on this item for years. andse understand aia defense workers across the country are appreciative for your efforts today. i'd like to call out about she has been a- partner with us for a number of years and her team has been absolutely outstanding. her presence on the panel should not go unnoticed.

they have been at our call, very responsive to issues we bring to them. i want to thank you for that opportunity. i want to go through a couple of things. the strategic linkages andrew spoke about. then i want to talk about and a recommendations for government action. we can talk about country relationships and then wrapping some of this up, where does this lead? conventional arms transfer policy, we thought was the first step in addressing key reforms we need in u.s. defense system. of the u.s.a pillar foreign policy for decades and it will continue to be. aia and its member companies have focused on the issue for years and we are excited to see the progress we're making. the conventional arms transfer policy and reforms associated with its is in support of foreign policy and national security objectives of the u.s., as laid out in the

national security strategy and national defense strategy. in the national security strategy, the reforms we see that coincide are renewing america's competitive edge and reducing the regulatory side. in national defense, we find key objectives like strengthening alliances and attracting new partners, deepening interrupt ability and fostering a competitive mindset to be heading toward the goals of the arms policy. there is a direct linkage between the national security strategy, the national defense strategy, and the transfer policy that has not been identified. we see a strategic linkage from what the direction of the u.s. is and the conventional arms transfer reforms. the linkages are key to reforms going forward. earlier this summer, aia sent in recommended government actions as a result of dialogue with aia member companies.

we went into 11 different areas. -aerospace.orge has recommendations. likes into key areas identifying specific abilities, addressing key reforms in the military system, specifically totracting and reform related transactions. examining the arms transfer technology review release --cess and industrial offsets. those are 11 categories of recommendation that aia recommended. when we saw the sheet that came many themes we saw associated with recommendations were carried forward by the u.s. government. we were excited to see those. the next step is the limitation. we have referred to it as the national emblem mentation plan. one of the things we need --

national implementation plan. so wed a system set up can provide feedback to the government during the implement -- implementation stage. we need to bake in a feedback industry tom government someone. effective coordination mechanisms between industry and government will be key. the objective is to reduce the burden on the system. one of the questions we had was about resourcing. one of the easiest things to handle resourcing is to identify the things in the system you do not need any more. as part of the export control reform initiative. one of the things we do not need to do anymore to reduce persian -- burdens is to look of a situation you have, see what you do not have to do any more because the situation has evolved.

that is a what you get to the resourcing piece. where does all of this lead? has beene things that missing from discussion that i is theike to emphasize role of the ultimate end user of items that we are transferring, foreign partners. how do our foreign partners -- if you were to take off your shoes and put on their shoes, how do you think our foreign for -- partners feel about the u.s. conventional arms system? would submit to you, having talked with a lot of these partners is, they are as frustrated as we are because their objective is to control their own national security to meet their own objectives and to be key partners with the u.s. we think about it one directionally. we want key partners and allies. our partners also want those. that means partner for many is the u.s.

we want to make sure we are meeting their objectives through our system, just like we are meeting our own objectives. where does all of this lead ultimately? day, this is ahe very competitive market. there are four and competitor countries, foreign companies, they are all looking to get a leg up. they are looking to take market share from u.s. companies. it is not necessarily about market share. they are looking to expand global influence. running is are race for global influence. the u.s. set the standard for global influence. the question we have and that we of these reforms that are coming as part of the national implication plan, is who is going to make the rules for global influence over the next 50 years?

as an industry, country, and the government, the u.s. is poised to set the standard and make the rules for the next 50 years. that is why we are excited about the potential change in the arms policy and reforms coming forward. we have set the stage for good action going forward. we're happy to answer any questions. >> i want to follow up a little bit on what you said. there was a common thread to your comments and melissa's comments, getting out the question of how do we evaluate whether our policy is succeeding or failing at promoting strategic objectives that it is designed to support? there was critique, there was argument for monitoring as one way of assessing what we are achieving. there are a lot of other potential metrics. i would be interested in the

broader panels thoughts on how do you assess, in a years time, if we do a six month in, a year, road, -- farther down the do we say, the policy is working, or he might need to fine-tune some things. i postulate that you always need to fine-tune things. how do you see that assessment process playing out? , it has beenion referenced, the fy 17 national defense authorization bill expressed strong commercial interest in understanding the strategic context of this and assess it and bring visibility to whether we are achieving our objectives in security cooperation efforts. let me turn to the panel and see what thoughts we have. one metric that the president himself has said, is he would like to see more sales

thatare successful, sales meet the requirements that are laid out in the policy, that are evaluated with all criteria the state department and interagency team deem appropriate. he would like to see an increase in defense exports. he has been a vigorous advocate of doing that. set a record for defense sales. the 18 looks like it will continue -- 2018 looks like it will continue in a trajectory. that is an important metric. in strengthening strategic partnerships, i think that will be harder to quantify. we will continue -- you will continue to see more sales are consummated. signis also going to be a of the continuing strengthening of our strategic partnerships. -- theye two metrics have been showing themselves since the start of the

presidency. this policy is implement it and we continue down that road. we will see more of that. metrics are: difficult. difficult in this area, in particular. waytities of sales is one to measure how we are doing. it is definitely not the only one, as alex mentioned. for us in the business, when you talk to those of us in my office and my counterparts in dod, we often say we are not looking to sell items to countries -- what we are looking at is trying to build capabilities in our partners, not just selling them something and walking away. we want to make sure our partners and allies are more capable and able to work with us when we need them to be more able to effectively defend themselves. it is hard to quantify that.

that can be very squishy. it is something we need to do. as we are selling things to african counterparts, what does that mean? how are the implementing the things we are selling? our country is able to better perform with u.s. were fighters and various operations. that needs to be factored in. sales are of the day, important, but making sure that we are building the capabilities of our partners. what lauralding on was saying. you have a national security strategy and from that strategy you have a military strategy and from that you have a -- combat and commanders who have worked globally on getting documentation. likeknow what they would

to see in their partners and allies in the region, they'll are have as capability. time in the pentagon when there were debates about highly technical capability moving to a partner for the first time, we would go back to wartime planning doctrine and look at thethe capability supported combat and commanders objectives in the national security strategy. that can be another way to measure success. that is not something discussed publicly. it is a ways to measure success in the administration. say, i speak on behalf of myself, not on my association. it is a tough question because weapons, as a part of any security solution, are a long term proposition. it is hard to say after six

months, whether it has succeeded. you have to pick your metrics properly. is how are the recipient countries using or changing the practices? this is one of the pieces that sold to them -- my community is concerned about. there is interest on protection of civilians, training was required for transfers to nigeria and saudi arabia will be a critical component. we talked about this in terms of human rights concerns and making sure capacity is there. those are the metrics i am looking at. we have seen countries receiving u.s. weaponry, if we are concerned about changing the behavior, we have the belief that if we are partnered with the country, we will have control over what they do. oftentimes, that is not the case, i would argue that saudi arabia has not been a good actor, no matter how much

influence the have tried to act on them and they are reacting in the situation in yemen. getting.captured sometimes sent up ands we sue, we get embroiled in conflicts that we were not expecting too. if you see progress, it is how you are treating peace and security, one of the hardest things to measure. as i allude to in my opening thoughts, there are robust processes underway and good thinking happening in terms of how to conduct the assessment evaluation. it is a congressionally mandated task. has to create a framework for section 333 title x building partnership capacity activities. over time, there will be an

a desire to encompass title 22 grant be ---based security systems in similar frameworks. stress in trying to my opening remarks was that, regardless of the inputs, grant assistance, or arms sales, or fms, you are still achieving the same effect in the country. you are driving toward interoperability, building partner capacity capability, retaining access, retaining influence in relationships. are we not using the same framework to evaluate our outcomes, objectives with our partner, regardless of the input to the system? my sense as an outsider is the processes are being -- right now. >> i want to open up to audience

questions. you have been a patient audience. [laughter] we officiate that. appreciate that. i wish i had a dod person on the panel. it did not work out. i can only imagine how long we would have kept you if we had. collin: i am a grizzled veteran. as far asalmost keith, the defense security trade initiative, wonderful ideas, they were going to change everything. everything was going to be faster, better, more, wonderful. not to be snide, but a lot of it sounds similar, although there is less focus on process than in the gtsi. -- dts i.

my question would be, laws and regulations have not changed. , aside fromctually pushing people to say yes more often, actually get things done? melissa dalton: you were looking at me, right? laura cressy: [laughter] excellent question. i think i tried to allude to this a little bit when i was making my opening remarks, where we have a situation right now past severalthe years, before this administration, we were hearing from partners that we are slow, cannot compete, we take too long to take decisions, too long to produce our staff. we produce wonderful stuff but it is too expensive. mostly focused on military sales

process. the defense security cooperation see --under atmel wrecks under the other admiral tried to take a look at reforming the process. they ran into some bumps along the way. have direction from the white house that we need to take a better look at how we are doing things and we have that top cover to implement those kinds of changes that will make the fms process smoother and address real contracting issues. we can look at program of record to gethat take forever technical disclosure process for. what has really changed is that the by and from the top level. it is the white house, but not just the white house.

secretary of state or of defense, or deputies, or undersecretaries, everyone is aware of the different things we are doing and behind it. of otherthe absence documents and legislation and the like, you really do have a changed situation with the top down direction. >> the reason why i agreed to head the council of the chambers is i believe there is a unique opportunity by this administration at the highest levels, in a way that is unprecedented. let's look at export control reform, it was tried by the clinton administration. it was tried by the george w. bush administration. it was not until the obama team came on board with secretary

gates and direct intervention that export control happened. that is what it takes. the proposals we put forward to , the threeouse proposals, were detailed. 16 pages based on my experience and experience of others. that does not mean it is the only way to get this done. it has to be a very specific, driven solution, detailed event, rose pinned on someone to see it through that --. see is the only way we will true transformation. contracting -- it takes over 300 days to get a major system on contract under and at ms case. community contracting in the pentagon that is decimated and understaffed. with theoverwhelmed current fight supporting u.s. forces and supporting allied forces in the current fight and

then fms comes along as a third priority for contracting. undefended ties contracting actions. that is an opportunity, potentially, to look at carving out, with congress support, unique federal acquisition procedures for fms contracting to have a rapid process. that will take community support. that is just one little example. if you look at export control reform, how to that actually get done' ? that is a roadmap for how to get this done. i want to quickly say one thing. what has changed? >> the easy answer is your

global security environment has changed. government colleagues see it in their bilateral discussions. industry members see it when they meet with customers. we see it in the daily media about how great powers are emerging, how certain countries are moving to align themselves. the goal of security environment is changing and continues to change in the dynamic. it is not fixed. there has been recognition by the administration, by our friends in our agencies, and by industry that the global security environment is shifting, the dynamic is changing quickly and we need to make key reform in order to ensure we are meeting the challenges of the next 50 years. so your global security environment has changed. ,fter 15 plus years of conflict we should expect that the environment would change. it will continue to change.

that is why we think some of the recommendations we put forward allow the u.s. government or industry to be flexible, nimble, able to react quickly to a world that will change quickly. i'm going to catch this question in a quote from keith webster. consequence of a denial still by china. what is the will at the white or at the state department to change so that this aggregate is filled with a number of policies that seem to need significant changes, like a sovereign decision to treat aircraft like aircraft and missiles like missiles/what is the will to move on those challenging, very hard choices? the will is

demonstrated by the level of engagement that you see on this issue. the fact that you have principal level officials talking about these issues on a regular basis, peter navarro has written to past.-- often adds on you have ambassadors going to numerous places talking about these issues. hish was talking about experience, going back 30 years and not having this level of administration engagement on a topic like this. i think that is true. to your point, what is the level of commitment? it is demonstrated by the personalities involved and their public statements. i direct you to those.

>> good morning. thank you. my name is veronica. i work in the security sector, including nuclear policy. risk.entive is in future that is what i would like to focus on. t policyif the ca could include risk policy. should bety considered, which is primarily focus in the future risk. for example, how could we be so sure after we transferred the weapons, not to be reached transferred somewhere else? secondly, does the u.s. still

have the technology control of the transferred weapons? i think that is primary. we all know we are a changing world. our allies are becoming adversaries and vice versa. thank you. >> how does risk fit into the policy? we have tosomething factor into every decision we make. colleagues are very aware of risk, whether looking at the release of a technology, the sale of a system, the situation within the country, within the region. say, the assessment of risk is baked into the process from beginning to the end,

including monitoring, whether it is a direct commercial sale or a foreign military sale. we also have strict retransfer ,rovisions that are within whether it is a direct or commercial sale, a built-in internal license, or whether it is safe foreign military sale, built into the contract. in order to transfer an item, they have to come to my office to get that kind of approval . if that does not happen, we have other provisions to deal with countries that transfer in contravention of their agreements. we are very much aware of risk. the kinds of things we are dealing with and not talking -- we are talking about

transferring lethal equipment. risk is baked in. -- thes easy to forget u.s. is the world's largest arms dealer and growing each year. if you look at the reports, the u.s. is not suffering, it is growing. it has great influence. for decades, it has argued for responsible arms trade. policy, ifsed the this is setting the standard for the next 50 years, is this the standard we want other countries to follow? if it is, we need to make that case. if we are concerned that countries are acting -- are not acting as responsibly as they shed, had we convinced them to act more responsibly? that is where we stress these monitoring agreements. pieces of our continuing process that we want other countries to follow. unfair criticism, but i do not think this administration or president is proud or fond of

multilateralism. ultimately, the approach you have to take, there is an arms trade treaty assigned in a hundred countries and all of our allies are part of it. how do we figure out ways to build a multilateral system at the same time because of the problem is other countries acting poorly, and we present a model, is that model when they will replicate? if we can do it faster and better, how can we do it taking account of all of these risks? >> i want to say something differently about risk. risk can be mitigated by processes. risk is also mitigated by relationships. i want to emphasize that. the government to government relationship that occurs between the u.s. and other countries is critical in ensuring that whatever risk there is in transferring an item is -- that is mitigated is really important. the other relationship is the

relationship between the industry partner and of the country in question. those relationships are baked in four years. what happens is, as soon as you start working with a country, you also start working with their supply chain, or in country partners. develop,ationships continue, and indoor beyond the government relationship. we do not necessarily talk about those often. what you see is a risk reduction will occur both on the government to government level, industryn -- as the and country level. that is important to make sure you are making the right decisions when it comes to sales and countries around the world. make a couple of quick comments. our defense industry is doing an incredibly good job internationally today. the focus of my work is ensuring they do as well in 15 to 20

years as they do today . part of the change in the dynamic is the evolution and success of competitors like china who are going to make that more challenging for industry 15 to 20 years from today. i also want to point out, our defense industries ensure that medivation continues to progress. -- motivation continues to progress. we cannot sustain our position in the world without security. we must have continued innovation. innovation comes from a -- revenue. we leave in renovation. they do amazing investments with the money dod provides them, money they make from sales. dod announced this week that the 2020 budget for the president will be flat.

no surprise. r&d has not been cut over the years, but remains flat. we need industries to continue to be vibrant and reinvest revenue in research for the next generation capability is for our forces and allied forces to dominate on the battlefield tomorrow. >> we are running short on time. i'm going to recognize a couple of people and ask you to ask of the briefest version of your question. i will come here and then here. whoever gets the mic first. there was not a lot of discussion about exports. i was wondering if you could talk about what is an implementation plan to enable that.

can you give us a status update thaty changes to the mtc the state department is proposing? >> she asked about proposes or changes to mtcr. then let's to the second one. >> you and alex both talked being reinforced under the new policy. when i was a foreign service officer, i advocated for defense sales under a strict set of rules. now as a defense contractor, we are hamstrung compared to our foreign embassies. have you issued new guidelines for embassies and commercial counselors on what they can do? on advocacy, we have not yet issued new guidelines. the question we are looking at, what should our role being?

-- be? that is another point of confusion. we have this purity corporation officers, foreign service officers, and four in commercial service commerce departments. it is definitely something we will be looking at and hopefully issuing something as the process goes on. >> he wanted to tackle the mtcr question? -- who wanted to tackle the mtcr question? we are looking to try to reinvigorate the mtcr and haveect to uav proposed something to our partners that we are working to try to gain acceptance that we market spacen up

for the producers of ua asked in the u.s. and abroad. that is something we are working toward this fall. i hope to have more later. one quick piece on the opposite view -- advocacy point. we talk about strategic positions as a larger and protests. one of the larger tools that has been used as part of that competition is advocacy by our rivals, competitors. i would say not just by competitors, but friends and have had very vigorous advocacy, high-level occupancy efforts going back decades. -- at the -- advocacy efforts going back decades. aggressive been as with high-level advocacy as we could have been.

one of the thoughts you high and the larger cap policy and driven by some of the folks at the highest level of the administrations to personally , is thatwith advocacy is a way for us to be strategically competitive is to have that high-level advocacy. --the state and inter-and inter-agencies continue to work on that, providing guidelines and working on implementation, there is a huge designer at the height of the principal lever to undertake that effort. i know there are a lot of questions left unanswered. it is the end of our time. i do not want to hold you to long. thank you very much to the audience for coming. thank you to the supporters who made this event possible. thank you and please join me and thinking the panel. [applause]

>> tonight at 8 p.m. eastern on c-span, youth activists address the u.s. conference of mayors. >> i cannot explain the feelings you have during a school shooting. one thing i can relate it to is the feeling of anxiety, uselessness, not being able to do absolutely anything. there is only one other place where i have felt that, the united states congress. a funny sound like remark, but it is no joke. i have spoken with legislators from across the board, senators, representatives, mayors. not one single person is confident that one thing can be done about the 17 people who died in my school and the many others who have died since. >> on friday at 8 p.m., portions

of the first annual resurgent gathering. speakers include google executive and texas -- texas governor. >> texas is facing an immigration crisis. we have a thousand people a day moving to the state of texas. people talk about building a the and we are fed up with federal government not doing the job. texas is going to come out of our own pocket and we are going to the wall. instead of building the wall on the border between texas and mexico, we are going to build the wall on the border between texas and new mexico so we can keep all of the californians out from coming in the texas. c-span, c-span.org, and listen on the free c-span radio app. sunday night on q&a --

>> what must that some might? [crying] >> what you are hearing are the cries of children, immigrant children, who had just been separated from their parents in a border patrol detention facility. it is audio that i obtained a month and half ago with the help of a lawyer, a civil rights attorney named jennifer. she obtained this tape and thought it was important and shared it with maine -- me. she asked what i thought about it and i said we should publish it. decision for easy the source of the tape, who felt the tape could put them at risk.

-- for being identified and fired. agreed to ultimately allow me to publish the audio. >> pro-public is senior reporter ginger talks about covering mexico and of the u.s. government's immigration policy. sunday night at eight eastern on c-span's q&a. now, health policy scholars talk about the trump administration's decision to expand short term limited duration health insurance plans. under new rules, insurance plans can last up to 12 months and can be renewed for up to 36 months. the cato institute organize this forum. >>