tv FAA Administrator Whistleblowers Testify on Boeing 737 MAX Part 1 CSPAN December 14, 2019 1:57pm-4:57pm EST
i want to hear more about what the candidates plan to do sis ourained -- to sustain colleges in these financially challenging times. >> voices from the road on c-span. on the safetymony of the 737 max airplane before the house transportation and infrastructure committee. the administrator of the faa discussed the agency's role in investigating the two crashes which killed nearly 350 people, and the dealings since then with boeing. >> thank you mr. chairman. mr. dixon, the u.s. aviation industry has to be commended for the safety record we have had over the past decade up until max. my deepest condolences to the families and thank you for being here. , checks have found systems about complacency in the commitment to safety, because
they have had such a stellar record for so long and complacency can be a dangerous thing. particularly in industries that produce -- that are truly safety critical. despite this, we are not aware of any key efforts or initiatives in the faa to emphasize and re-energize the safety culture that once existed. we do understand that you spoken to your staff about not rushing grounding the an maxes and providing safety first, but has the faa fire -- hired safety experts from outside the -- the industry to look at the process? and have you hired more experts as some reviews have suggested. have you sat down with managers and technical staff in the seattle office to hear the themmendations to improve faa and concerns about following and oversight. i would like to know what you
have done to address safety and oversight issues. >> thank you. it's a great question i welcome the opportunity to respond. on my first day at the agency, at my first town hall, i talked culture, importance of we need to have a systematic way for employees to bring their , and we will word have better thought through solutions. we cannot have groupthink. we have to have honest debate as we make these decisions. my experience in the airline industry is that that kind of construct is extremely powerful in raising the safety bar. along with that, in my first three weeks, i made a visit out to see for myself and talk to the team out there. i had a conversation with one of
our test pilots. a phd in human factors. asked her whether we had adequate human factors expertise and whether it was embedded in our process as effectively and needs to be. i learned a lot from that conversation. there is an opportunity to continue to update and improve those skills in our workforce. that is a big area of focus for me. >> we are interested in the system dealing with the human factor. certification and operation. professor, mine, a what do you think at aa at boeing can do to incorporate human factors into the certification process to prevent future accidents? mr. dickson: i am also interested in hearing comments in the second panel and i have
had a chance to read the testimony and i could not agree more with the principles that are articulated there. become more automated over the decades, the job of flying an airplane does not get easier. what it does is changes the nature of where the threat is that needs to be mitigated. there is an issue sometimes with manual flying skills if we are operating in an all -- automated fashion to all -- too often. there is also situational awareness. it is impossible to engineer out human error. as we build modern airplanes, it is important to do so in a way that keeps the pilot engaged with the flightpath path of the aircraft. ultimately, flightpath management, putting it where it needs to be at any point in time, whether it is on the
ground or flying in the air, in a mouse to three things. that is understanding where the plane is supposed to be, understanding clearance, putting the airplane there to comport with the clearance, and making sure it stays there. humans are not very good passive monitors. this is where the forms of tactile feedback that are presented to the pilot as they are flying the aircraft are this isimportant, even as they a more automated in the future. representative davis. >> thank you, mr. chair. thank you to our witnesses. there are 700 boeing employees in my congressional district. , we have theer boeing ceo sitting where you are
. i explained to him that anytime we have tragedies, it breaks my constituents, workers that are there, it breaks their hearts. they want to make sure the planes they are manufacturing my going to be able to fly safely and we do not have tragic accidents that affect so many families that are in this room today. echo my colleagues. our hearts go out to you. but thank you for your presence. enjoy testimony come on you mentioned you are working to ensure the faa learn from its mistakes surrounding these tragedies. i know you mentioned in your testimony, you have answered questions, but what specifically had you not addressed yet is the faa doing to ensure oversight programs work to protect passengers flying by plane and to preserve the dignity of the workers who built the?
mr. dickson: thank you for the question. we are in this together. the situation with the 737 max is unprecedented. being, we have pulled that work inside of the faa, we are not delegating anything to boeing because the expectation is, the faa is going to use its resources and the resources of others we talked sure b. every i and cross every t. -- we. every i and cross every t. that is not to be bureaucratic, but to make sure the public has confidence in the airplane. i am confident i would put my own family on the airplane once
we are finished with this process. we have a number of milestones yet to complete. we have gone through the workload management engineering simulator modules most recently. that data is being analyzed. we are looking at how the software has been developed along with our partners and running all of the audit trees that needed to be run when you are talking about software. there will be a certification flight. i will be flying the airplane myself before i sign off on it. separately, we are involving not only u.s. trained pilots, but pilots from around the world in ensuring that the training requirements that we require for getting the airplane flying again are where they need to be. i do not know if you have anything else you want to ask.
>> any other witnesses want to add? ok, thank you. i will file the same thing that i related to the wing ceo. we expect results. no family should go through the tragedy that these families have gone through. we know there are things we can do better. we want to assist you to make that happen. but results matter. i appreciate your presence today. appreciate your leadership. look forward to working with you. i yield back. i want to start off so no one house -- no one out there faints. i do not believe we should get rid of oda. i am not suggesting that. i want to preface what i was going to say with that. said the system is not
broken. rubens -- but improvements can be made. we saw 456 people died. it was a second crash. renew more after the first crash --ore that second crash good before that second crash pure and something went wrong. first thing i want to raise, risk assessment document. after the first crash, are you -- who saw this document? i was not involved -- i am not sure -- i cannot speak for who saw it.
will --decision to decision tool. >> who makes the decision? mr. dickson: the boy who comes together on airworthiness uses it to make its decisions. you through how that process works. andhenever we get reports, we get reports on a regular basis, we are constantly plugging those reports into truce and evaluating what action needs to be taken. obviously, this was a large action. we did not be deformed to tell us this was a tragedy. us in howto educate to respond. >> was it an acceptable risk? >> it is not an except about risk. that is why we issued an emergency add before we completed the first set of evaluations and followed up with
several other evaluations. >> let me ask a question on that. i wanted to ask, why was there no mention of and cast in that emergency add? >> the continuing airworthiness review board is made up of pilots from our evaluation group, maintenance, engineers. they valuate all the information and they made a determination not to use those words because those words were not included in the boeing manual to start with. there was a discussion, would that create too much confusion? the system that need to be addressed was the trimming system. aty did not use those words that time because the action that needed to be taken by the pilots -- st notstarted with mca
being made in the manual to begin with good one other thing i wanted to mention, kevin lawson had been talking about. i have a degree in mechanical engineering. i know a little bit about airplanes, not as much as the pilots do. i also have a degree in systems engineering. i do not understand how it is possible that part of the procedure is not to look at the entire system. me that yousense to would've looked at each piece of the system and not tell the entire system works together. that theat says to me process is broken. want to be very clear, i
think that needs to be changed. i wanted to get your response on that. of dickson: i think the use integrated system safety assessments is absolutely an area that we have incorporated in the max process up to this point. process,ates into the at which this occurs more frequently, is definitely something that we need to be looking at. remember, those safety , that is one of the process up rubens i am talking about putting in place in a short term, even with ongoing certification activity. >> thank you. i yelled back. back.yield i would like to know
specifically if he continued airworthiness panel received this document and considered it at that time. recognize theould representative. >> i want to thank you witnesses from the faa. thank the families and friends of those who were lost in the tragedies. before i get to my question, i want to make a quick comment. ares amendable we discussing the 737 mat scratches and not one faa official in charge from the time of the check occasions were made has been asked to testify. havew the ranking members requested the chairman hold a hearing with these individuals and i look forward to that in the future.
administrator dickson, could you discuss how other countries certifying their planes and mr. lawrence can chime in as well? similarhave something to the process that we use here? it is my opinion, and that of others, we should not throw the navy out with the bathwater because the system and processes are not broken. but what improvements can be made to our current framework to ensure proper certification oversight? mr. dickson: it is a great question. lawrence. mr. processes around the world and we are talking about the four primary states of design that we are working with, although there that buildntities and assign airplanes, it is really the europeans, canadians, and brazilians.
, because are similar of different legal formulations europeansct that the is a multinational regulator that sits on top of the regulatory toys, there are differences in how far there process goes and how it is managed. the concepts are the same in terms of delegation. rather than delegating individual items, if you contrast our system with the europeans, we have a bout of flexibility and delegating and it is a privilege to be able to delegate certain items. usually, they are routine items therein the faa -- they are routine items. europe, they have a design certificate for the manufacturing entity.
process is delegated in many respects. there is not the ability to delegate individual items. can, iriefly after you have another question or two. >> that is a good description. the key difference is, the legal system that the european union is working under, it is a certificate that a manufacturer design achieves. it is a different system. there is not a constant review of things. in our system, we can pick and choose what we want to review, what we feel we need to have you. there is more upfront work in the european system, there is more of review and understanding ahead of time. those are some of the things we are looking to do. >> thank you. we have heard about how
assumptions may have been made about pilot capabilities and may not have been accurate. can you shed light on how those assumptions were made? the assumptions are of long-standing in terms of the technical requirements that were developed over a period of years with test pilots and engineers. i do not know if there are other details on that. these are some of the things, as a result of the reviews we are doing, that are being revisited. adding to it, and are up in the, is there anything to be in the united states can do to standardize the qualifications of eyelets globally? we have done that domestically very well. what about internationally and what role could the faa play in encouraging that? >> i think the faa can play an
influential role. we introduced a paper at the and i waso assembly part of the team that went up , lifting mobile pilot training standards. that is something we have taken on as an agency already. people have similar discussions with regional regulatory entities and associations as well as some of the bilateral relationships we have around the world. >> my time has expired. >> representative cohen. >> thank you, chairman. thanks to be witnesses for being here today and the families, i express my condolences. today's hearing is a significant step in our oversight of the 737 max accidents. these tragedies claimed the
individuals have a slew of problems under the faa's ability to oversee those it regulate. one issue that has raised concerns relates to the angle of attack, disagree alerts. and aoa disagree alert was angle when the aircraft of alert sensors do not match. disagree alerts were only functional on the planes where customers also purchased an optional aoa indicator. context, 20% of 737 max customers purchased those optional indicators. aoa alert were not functioning then on about 80% of the 737 max worldft's around the during southwest airlines, which does operate in my hometown, secondly statement, it learned
this statement was optional after the tragedy. we learned at our previous hearings that boeing initially decided to write to fix two defects for three years after discovering this flaw. confirmed it kept producing planes with this known defect and did not inform the that aa or its customers until to thise crash in 2018 was over a year after going learned about the defect. indonesian aviation authority filed a report on the with an aoa disagree alert on the atlantic and treated to the crew being denied valid information about abnormal conditions. this is on acceptable. someone needs to be held accountable. someone needs to be held accountable at boeing. the faa shares in this.
why does the faa not taking any actions against boeing, including a civil penalty, for knowing -- knowingly delivering an aircraft with nonfunctioning parts that pilots believed were functioning? mr. dickson: thank you for the question. i have not made a decision on this and other matters. myave expressed disappointment for boeing , they read now and previously to be transparent in the sharing of information with my team at the agency, so i reserve the right to take further action and we well may do that. i will not say today what that may consist of. presentedthat you will go into that decision. >> thank you. do you think it is borders on
criminal, they had knowledge of a defect and they do not give notice and they invite the flying public onto those planes? mr. dickson: i do not have an opinion on that. as i said in my remarks for an answer earlier, i am not at this point interested in casting blame. i want to run all of these issues to ground. i want to fix the problem. rest will be time for the as we move forward. has -- grounding the airplane, not delegating anything during the return to service process, not delegating the airworthiness certificates on each individual aircraft. we talked about the enforcement
action. i have not ruled out other actions as necessary and as you point out, and i will take those actions. >> there are serious concerns about boeing's transparency about the alert system. today, i choose the safety is not for sale act. this bill would require air carriers to adopt additional safety equipment and provided to all areas without additional charge. aviation safety should not be a bug tree, bought or sold for an extra fee. you should not charge for seatbelts and you should not. the flying brick deserves more. i'll forward to working with my committee members to ensure airworthiness. >> that we gentlemen. i turned to the member of the subcommittee. >> thank you.
i want to say the comments from of aer about the safety domestic aviation industry, the faa, i was reading an article this morning and it cited how, prior to these disasters, i believe it was the boeing planes had an accident one out of every 10 million flights, comparatively, if you look at the other manufacturers that are largely governed by their civil aviation auto toys, there was an accident one for every 3 million flights. one in every 10 million flights, one in every 3 million. we do need to get back to that level of safety or even better. of theaftermath , there was aash
directive put in place, which is better. rare.ch is and a corrective action review board. data the board, where their recommendations they made that faa did not follow? mr. dickson: the faa followed the recommendations from the experts. and it developed the software. >> these are technical experts? mr. dickson: yes. >> did they recommend the grounding? mr. dickson: they did not. plane was ultimately grounded in the aftermath of ethiopia -- by the way, and thell be in air desk in ethiopia air disaster, did they comply with the adn that case?
the accident report is not out yet. it remains to be seen. the agency, iy at did have a chance to see the data recorder information from both accidents and compare the two. estimation, for whatever the procedures that the faa expected to be followed were not followed. >> i want to make sure we highlight this. in the future, if something is issued, wed ad need to add sure there is a better process that those lessons learned are applied and complied with. that is one of the lessons learned. i want to express caution with my own statements. we need to wait for the ethiopian reported to see what
their takeaways are. a question was asked earlier, i want to give you an opportunity to clarify. you were asked if you were responsible for decisions of your predecessors. for thetely ran congress because i was frustrated by what was here and i was not happy with the performance. that motivated my decision to run. we are where we are as a nation today, as a congress, as an faa. are you responsible for the decisions that got us to where we are, or are you responsible with where we are now and where we go back out -- where we go? mr. dickson: i appreciate your comments. i feel responsible regardless. that is who i am. -- the it is important career professionals at the faa.
i need to advocate for them and support them. i need to make sure they have ,ools and direction and support whether it is the safety aviation organization, flight standards, my job as a servant leader is to make sure they have what they need to be effective in their jobs. i feel responsible for that and i want to take those lessons and apply them to improvements so we continue to raise the bar. >> i share the objective of raising the bar and ensuring we have maximum safety. let me get to the last point. carb did not recommend a grounding, but the plane was grounded. was that a decision by the technical folks or by someone else to ground the plane? mr. dickson: that was a
decision, i believe, that was , or driven byrami the availability of additional data. the acting administrator. note, this waske not a decision of the technical folks, this was the decision of the leadership to ground the plane. >> thank you gentlemen. thank you for holding this yearly. thank you for being here. my heart goes out to family members that are zero. -- that are here. later, we will hear from ed pearson, who oversaw a portion atthe 737 max final assembly the plant in washington state. rode through and met
with general managers of the fleet months prior to the tragedy. to express his concern that the safety and quality work income for my -- were being compromised due to production pressures. according to mr. pearson, in early 2018, bowman's job behind the schedule spiked to 10 times the normal amount. percentage on time dropped to below 10%. also, boeing experienced substantial out of sequence work . this means work was performed outside its planned location or time. which increases the risk of mistakes.
--ing's tracking system i understand that mr. pearson's attorney has omitted you three times. that has written to you three times. i received a letter in september. >> three times to other two to mr. pearson's concerns. chaotic, deteriorating conditions that he witnessed. at the boeing but achieve facility. believedrote that he the flying public will remain at risk on less this unstable environment is investigated and remedied. faa grants certificate to boeing, right? mr. dickson: yes.
has the faa investigated the production concerns that mr. pearson has raised? we have engaged mr. pearson and we are looking into these issues. behrendt may have more details on this. theyke concerns wherever come from seriously and we have a process for dealing with interviewing and investigating concerns that are raised by individuals and things we observed during our own oversight. >> i do not mean to be difficult but to look into it does not seem enough. a commitment from view that we will investigate these concerns. mr. dickson: we are doing that. you have my commitment. we are doing that. >> thank you. i do not have any further,
scared -- any further comments. want to express my condolences to the members of the families that are here today. prayers are with you. peace and comfort as a dealing with this tragedy under lives. i had the opportunity several months ago to have a meeting with a colleague of mine, a friend who is a pilot and blown a 737 max. at the time, -- i am not a pilot , i just write in airplanes. is therexpressed to me was a periodic briefing that pilots are provided, which potentially provides -- essentially, a binder that includes memos, directives, information and pilots should be aware of as it relates to safety
on the planes that they are piloting. he told me that this particular st system wase mca included in the binder of things to be aware of. but that it was buried in the bottom of a stack of such memos. from his perspective, and from my perspective as a layperson, if you are going to have a memo relating to an issue of such importance buried in a stack this big, are you really providing any meaningful direction to pilots? then that scenario, is that case? can you comment on that? mr. dickson: thank you for the question.
as the deputy administrator had said, it is my belief, and he shares it, that pilots should have known about the system on the airplane. it should have been part of the initial training. particularly at the design was changed so it would operate in the heart of the flight. with respect to information about on schedule as is -- ,nscheduled stabilizing trim that is an extraordinary action. the last one the faa had done was two years earlier in 2016. it is something that should be stamped on top of everyone's forehead. if that is not reaching the level of prominence that it needs to, that is something we need to look at. >> i would encourage you to do
that. if you take away i got from my conversation is, he was aware of the issue, but the fact you would have such an important memo with regard to an issue of safety is buried -- that cannot happen. those should be issues that are number one in terms of prominence. thereher question i had, was a question earlier -- are au aware of allegations by former safety engineer that the faa's management safety culture is broken and demoralizing to dedicated safety professionals, and if you are, how do you respond to that allegation? day atkson: on my first the agency, i emphasized, this has to come from the top that we needed to have a healthy safety reporting culture. it is what we demand of those that we regulate.
businessom the airline and the ability to systematically intake or update safety concerns is important to the safe operation of an airline. it is equally important if not more so within the agency. issues through their chain of command, through their boss, or as whistleblowers, there needs to be this middle ground where we are able to take in safety concerns. one of the things we need to do a better job of is going back after decisions are made and communicated to the workforce what the considerations word and by decisions are made. sometimes there may be a perception that you sided with this person or that person or this company or chose to pertain lensat is not the white that we need to be looking in.
we need to have a system where we encourage healthy debate as we make decisions. whether they are pilots or engineers, subject matter experts, that healthy debate, but somebody has to make the decision. in these cases you are referring to, the decision-makers themselves are experienced technical experts as well. >> thank you. >> thank the gentleman. representative johnson. would ask the report you displayed director questioning be placed back on the screen. mr. dickson, i would like to direct your attention to it. in december 20 18, 1 month after the airflight 610 crashed, the faa performed this risk assessment that calculated the likelihood of future 737 max
crashes caused by the erroneous mcast activation. is that correct? mr. dickson: yes. >> this is the report that issued from that analysis. mr. dickson: my previous answer, this is elaborate, looking at all the factors that went into the accident. not only mcast. resultsould admit, the show an unacceptable risk? mr. dickson: that is why the actions were taken. drastic, on acceptable risk. mr. dickson: what is indicating a 45 is essentially, over year period, we would have an on acceptable level of risk so we
need to take action to reduce that risk to the level we want. >> this is an important document that exits within the bowels of the faa. mr. dickson: it is a decision support to appear in -- decision support to will. document exits and bowels of the faa. mr. dickson: we are pretty aware of it at the highest levels. >> when did the highest levels of the faa -- let me put it like this. who was it that took action on this report? when was the first action taken? mr. dickson: the first action was taken about immediately. >> what was the date? and what was the action? mr. dickson: how would you describe that greco --?
>> the first action was the emergency ad before this form was completed. >> after this was completed, what was done? you said it was a drastically on acceptable -- unacceptable risk. this study was performed prior to the yield -- prior to the ethiopian crashed my was my friends on the others' line want an africanhat it was airline and their personnel was somehow responsible for both of these crashes, this healing is about the faa certification process and i resent that. point, what to my was done about this report when it was first received by the faa? >> this is a tool used by a
board. this report was completed, it was recognized to be to do additional work. >> what i am getting into, what was done after this report was generated? >> before the report was generated the action was -- >> after the report was generated is what i am getting at. >> there was not an additional action after this was to be design the system. guided theeport border to look at was how much time would we allow boeing to redesign the system? >> let me ask this question. can either one of you admitted to yourselves that the faa did a mistake in not taking action on this report when it was first
issued? mr. dickson: i would say this is something we need to look at closely. >> was a mistake made? mr. dickson: the result is not satisfactory. yourself tot bring say we made a mistake and you were not there at the time. mr. dickson: this is part of the process, whether it is the data that goes into the decision, the decision did not achieve the result it needed to achieve. >> is the fact that the faa overseeing boeing with 45 personnel to 1502 boeing, does that indicate that there is a problem with staffing in the faa certification process so that we do not allow the fox to guard the henhouse to the extent that it happened with the 737 max? >> we are over time. mr. dickson: that is something
we need to look at. it is not numbers as much as it is the skill set within the workforce. that group that is overseeing the boeing has the ability to drop resources from without the agency, similar to the way a certificate management office oversees an airline. >> representative miller. >> thank you, chairman. and to all of you who lost loved ones, my heart goes out to you. i hope you have been able to be surrounded by family and friends and your faith and love in the light that it will bring you. my heart does go out to you. i think this discussion and the questions we have had today from how we wantdicate to not ever have this happen again.
it is definitely a bipartisan issue because we are all human beings and we all want to be safe and i assume we all take airplanes somewhere at some time in our life. there are moments when you fly, if you are not a pilot, you go, what was that? meing forward, it appears to that renewed more transparency and communication when it comes to creating an international aviation safety standard that does work for everyone. it also appears that there are many areas that we need to work on. the only way for us to come together to tackle safety is to understand that we need to take a multifaceted approach to the issue. i believe that is what you are trying to do. mr. dickson, can you elaborate on the joint authorities technical review and what is included? you.ickson: thank
appreciate question. 100% that these issues need to be looked at from an aviation system perspective. we are seeing a lot of growth in the system internationally and the u.s. is a growing system, but it is pretty much her -- pretty much her, stable system. what we do here, we are selling airplanes around the world that need to work everywhere. at issues we need to look may vary somewhat. isterms of the report, it important to understand the commission, that group itself. it is one piece of the pie. it does not offer the complete perspective, perspective from the tap is another perspective
that will inform our future efforts. we have a secretary special investigative activities of this committee as well as the senate commerce committee. also think ig report. all of these things, including our own internal analysis, will help us get to the right answer and that is what we look forward to look it with you on. he report comes down to, if you take the 12 recommendations, it comes down to three things. is, a holistic approach rather than, i will father this ,nd work down the checklist more transactional is the word i .se in aircraft design a more effective integration of human factor considerations throughout the design of the aircraft and not just building the machine and figuring out how to operate it on the end.
is simplistic. that is not how they process works today, but that is an end of the spectrum we need to move more closely to what i described with a more integrated human factors approach. then there are shortcomings that have been identified that i have seen in how various offices within the manufacturer communicate with each other and the entities within the faa, i think we need to bolster our systems engineering expertise. we do not build the airplane, we oversee the process by which the manufacturer builds the airplane. , expertise is important to understand how these systems interact. also, project management discipline. these projects take place over multiple years. if you look at the continuing operational safety of a fleet, you are talking about a product
that will out of their -- be out there for 50 years. >> i want to interrupt. i want to ask, knowing that our products building use across the world, often in places we are not able to regulate, how can we continue to improve safety standards across aviation as a whole? mr. dickson: that's a great question. it is of great interest to me. work are ways we can through i can and ways we can work bilaterally and regionally. he also need to take a look at, what are the responsibilities when you are developing and selling a product, not just for u.s. manufacturers, but all the certification authorities we talked about? how do you take those issues into our account? does manufacturing need to be looking at customer is in terms of what you support is? >> thank the gentleman for his
answer. minute, i think this is a critical issue. who said of the result was not satisfactory. track how thaty was utilized in the decision-making process. you issued an airworthiness direction, but that was a month before. even those 15 of these plans, , butou said up to 50 years it was within five months. white less than satisfactory, it was catastrophic. thank you, mr. chairman. do you know who ed pearson is? himdickson: i have not met personally, but i know of him. >> you understand he was a senior manager of boeing 737 plant?
auntie oversaw production for the 737 final assembly? a moment ago, when he went responding to my college questions, you could not bring herself to say the faa mistakes. do you to different language. i think we would feel better if you showed more passion for this. i want to give you another opportunity. you once knew wrote to you go toer, but through three times cured gold in september, october, and november. i know who just got on the job, but he did not just write letters, he sent extensive information on production problems that he identified at the facility. is, have you interviewed mr. pearson? mr. dickson: we reached out -- like >> that is not my question.
have you interviewed him? mr. dickson: we have contacted him. >> he is sitting right there. will you commit that he will interview mr. pearson? mr. dickson: absolutely. >> will you investigate the problems at the facility? mr. dickson: yes cured -- yes. >> having done so? of people overh here that most loved what have you to date investigated problems at the facility? mr. dickson: i believe we had. i'm not aware of the details. >> you have information, mr. lorentz? have you interviewed workers? how many? >> we have open investigations bureau -- open investigations? >> more than five? >> i would not quit a number without going back to my investigators.
>> you do not have specific information about whether you interviewed workers. you said you think you have, who will look into it. >>if you have been on the job fr a wife. i to get this is the most important thing on your plate. are we going to interview the production workers at the facility? will it be a real thing? can you come to us and give us answers to what you will take into because we know this was not just a software problem, it was a hardware problem. you had a guy who wrote you detailed information who served whatsenior manager, knows he is talking about. could not get an answer to three detailed letters sent you. never interviewed. it would be great of you had specifics on what you had done to look at the production problems can you shed light on that? mr. dickson: we are looking into those problems. >> you do not know how many
workers you interviewed? mr. dickson: not today, no. workers.e interviewed >> haven't reviewed quality and production records? >> we have. >> would you tell us about that? >> there are ongoing investigations. >> you cannot tell us anything about whether you learned anything as we sit here about , ander production problems the letters he sent to you, now are you aware who brought these fellows to boeing's attention four months ago -- four months before? mr. dickson: i know concerns for vaped. >> after the air crash, he went up and down the chain.
he went to the ceo, general counsel, he went to the board. he sent them letters two. saying the same things. you know what they did? they sat on it until a second crash. that is what happened. a bunch more people lost their lives cured some of those pictures are right over there. later sitting here a year and neither of you can tell me whether you got anything specific on the production problems he identified four months before the first crash? i will give you another chance. has the faa made any mistakes here? mr. dickson: i think that is evident that we had issues that i need to address and that our team needs to address and that we had processes that need to be improved. i would agree with you. >> you cannot say the word mistake? mr. dickson: i do not to blame
-- >> it is not about blame, it is accountability. mr. dickson: i am accountable. i hold myself accountable. >> can you say the faa made a mistake in not taking seriously the concerns echo -- concerns? mr. dickson: we are taking concerns raised, we will take seriously and one of them to ground in a systematic way so we can make the right decisions. quickly, given the investigation, what you tell us is ongoing of the production issues, will that be completed and instruct you in terms of whether or not the plane is allowed to fly in what conditions of inspection will be mandated on these planes before it is allowed to fly? >> one thing i can add, we have
retained the airworthiness certificate, at 88 will be doing will not be part of the boeing system. we will do that ourselves to ensure they are in an airworthiness condition. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to follow up on something mr. maloney just shared. i think it is important we get to the bottom of this. that reasonable to suspect in the next 60 days, you can interview an additional 10 line workers at the facility? wherever investigation -- >> i will make it harder. that was a softball. interview at least 10 people at report back to this committee. do i have your commitment? >> you do. >> all right.
mr. dickson, i will come to you. you have been advised by counsel or somebody to not admit that the faa made a mistake. i am giving -- your counsel is giving you bad advice. some point int this process, make a mistake? mr. dickson: yes. >> thank you. mr. dickson: i choose to not want to leave it at that. -- i do not to the lit at that. >> there is enough blame to go around. i get that. but i can sign, it is frustrating when it is obvious that mistakes were made, you do not say mistakes were made. i understandable lawyer say, do not admit anything because of this. i am telling you, and the real world, we have to look at it that a mistake was made.
not one, but multiple mistakes. we have to get to the bottom of it. here is my question. suggestion, the committee had the suggestion that there is a perverted incentive on the certification process where you had faa employees, whether it be bonuses or anything else, they do not engage in the proper way of putting safety first. would you agree with that? i do not agree with that and i have made it clear to my workforce and my team that i support them in keeping safety as their highest priority. >> what we have to do to make sure when things come in -- let me tell you, you have two people behind you that are part of doorstep that i have the highest regard for. one worked on committee staff with me, the other worked on my
personal staff. there is no one who will work harder on this issue and get involved in it. i know you have people that are capable of working with you. is, how willo you we put in the process of making sure what we have is it does not go into -- i cannot going to use a blackhole narrative. how does it not get swept up in the bureaucracy where there is a concern, legitimate concern, and it does not reach the right person until we have fatality? how do we change that process? mr. dickson: there are several different ways. you cannot get into analysis
paralysis or bureaucracy in these things. real-time datae on which -- visible across the organization. >> i'm glad you said that. there is one of the things. not the chairman's first rodeo nor mine. when we talk about certification, i want to streamline certification. what i am concerned about his the faa looks at the process -- we are recertifying screws and things that are taking a lot of ,ime and on the critical areas they get the same bandwidth in terms of the certification process, whether we are working with boeing or anyone else. is there a way for us to highlight those areas that are coming to the market, part of an aviation product, and perhaps deemphasize the other things in the certification process to speed it up, whether it be i think there is a
way to make it less bureaucratic. >> in the 20 seconds i have left, obviously can we have a system that has not been repaired and still has flaws in it. will you commit to the american now that you will a hotline for our pilots a hotline for our pilots to cvall in that they are seeing initiative the users, the people that have to use the apartment, they can get something to you right now where that comes to attention, will you you willing to set that up in the next two days?-- 60 days? mr. dickson: we have a hotline now. >> that comes to you? we have hotlines all around the federal government and their worthless because it takes two years to return a phone call. mr. dickson: we will set that up. >> thank you, sir. i yelled back. >> representative brownley. >> i wanted to add my
condolences to the families who are here today. season surrounds us, families gather together, our hearts and my heart breaks for all of you. but i also want to thank you very, very much for your stop yourere today presence is helping us to get to truth, and it is only the truth that is going to save future lives. i want to thank all of you for being here today. and i wanted to ask one more time with regard to this risk moresment predicting 15 accidents, and i wanted to ask the question may be in a different way. mr. dickson, you have said several times that the buck stops with you and you are the men ultimately accountable for the faa. we have talked a lot about the past and we understand that the past has to be fixed.
i want to look to the future and an employee had brought this risk assessment to an employee had brought this risk assessment to you and put it on your desk, you are the faa administrator, you are given that information. are given that information.ion would you have made a decision, risk assessment -- i understand 45 years, but 15 more accidents could occur, would you have grounded airplane? mr. dickson: it is hard to monday morning quarterback these things, as you know. i believe that the individuals who were involved in making the decision were acting on the best information they had at the time -- >> i'm talking about you and the future -- mr. dickson: with what i know now, yes. what i know now. >> that came to you and you saw that report, you would ground the airplane? mr. dickson: i would have to --
not what happened in the past, but today. mr. dickson: with what i know today? yes. with what i know today. mr. dickson: with what i know today? yes. with what i know today. but again, it is hard for me to go back and determine in those days when information -- >> just tried to set a similar story but something that would happen in the future -- just tried to set a similar story but something that would happen in the future -- mr. dickson: remember, this document that we have been only a decision support tool. the decision. the decision. they come together with subject matter experts, and certainly i would want to confer with them. >> you would go you would go beh
alert, though? you would ultimately ground the airplane, if i understood you correctly? correctly?n: well, mr. dickson: well, again, knowing what i know now -- it is impossible for me to go back to i know a lot more than i knew back then. >> thank you. the other thing i wanted to ask is there was a "washington post" story last night that revealed faa's plans to establish the aircraft certification safety program management branch, and apparently this is a new safety address gaps in faa's oversight following accidents "help improve understanding of systemic areas of risks and facilitate identification of emerging safety issues fo." i have to say, i'm disappointed reading about it in the media
instead of hearing about it from the faa. disappointed reading about it in the media instead of hearing about it from the faa. can you tell me why the committee was not made aware of it, and secondarily from how will the new office ensure that the same mistakes are not made in the future? mr. dickson: this actually is for the purpose of this office. it is actually a reorganization that mr. lawrence had been looking at for -- i think the organization had been looking at it for about two years, and he can give you the details. lawrence: thank you for the opportunity to clarify that one. there is no new office. there is an office of accident investigation. that still exists, and we will continue, and there is not a change there. it is how i was organizing my folks. as repeated several times here, opportunities to do a better job on communication and the flow within any organization. there was an email announcing that we were assigning someone to look at how fast that set up communicationfety information within the organization. yes, it is not a new office, and certainly was not an approved organization of any kind. are evaluating the
reorganization? mr. lawrence: it is part of a reorganization that was started two years ago, and making the tweaks and fixes as we go through that to make sure we are covering all the issues we should be in an appropriate way. >> mr. chairman, i yield. carbajal.ntative >> i'm a little under the weather so i will try to get to these questions. i want to offer my condolences to the families. i can't imagine your pain in muscles of -- pain and loss. it is clear that boeing did not want to disclose the mcas and aircraft training manual for pilots. the true power of the mcas system, convincing the faa delete mention of it, and therefore hiding its existence in the flight standardization board. what do you plan to do within the faa to ensure and change this dynamic?
faa how will you ensure the and not boeing or some other manufacturer is determining what is an is not appropriate for pilots to know what is on airplanes thank you for the question. issueets back to the identified to the issues and emails you spoke about and by the joint authorities technical review. issue identified to the issues and emails you spoke about and by the joint authorities technical review. this design change was not communicated to the faa, the folks who needed to make the communicated to the faa, the folks who needed to make the decision on the evaluation group. i believe that there were some communications perhaps to our group or within the
engineering circles, but they didn't make it -- so we had issues within the agency -- >> mr. dickson, we can spend all day talking about what kinds the we can spend all day talking about what kinds the transpired, but what you plan to do to change the dynamic so it doesn't happen again? we cankson: spend all day talking about what kinds the transpired, but what you plan to do to change the dynamic so it doesn't happen again? mr. dickson: improve project management to make sure that the team is staying together as a cohesive team and they are all hearing things at the same time, phase of thet project we are income and understands what the of design changes may be. of design changes may be. also putting gates into the process to make sure that we have checkpoints -- you have a bunch of parallel processes time.on at the same
from time to time we need to time. from time to time we need to loop back and make sure that these systems interact correctly. increased use of system safety assessments, as we talked about earlier. and finally, would like to work with the congress on implementing safety management systems for manufacturers, which facilitate even better information flow between the applicant and the agency. does that address the issue of having the faa being in the driver seat and making the does that address the issue of having the faa being in the driver seat and making the determinations, not the manufacturers? mr. dickson: yes, we make those determinations now, and we will continue to do so. >> thank you. administrator dickson, i would like to get your thoughts on the recent testimony from the national transportation safety board chairman, robert sumwalt, where he highlights the safety benefits of safety management systems. given your where he highlights the safety benefits of safety management
systems. given your experience in the aviation sector to you appreciate the chairman's perspective that safety management systems improve safety? mr. dickson: i've spoken with chairman sumwalt about this and we have had dialogue on the recommendations and on sms, and sm --huge promoting of proponent of sms. i believe it has been beneficial the aviation industry and it the aviation industry and it should be applied in this environment as well. >> do you have personal experience with the sms system delta?her time at mr. dickson: yes, sir, i do. >> do you think adoption of the sms system would provide similar benefits? yes.ickson:
yes.ltiple ways, in multiple ways, it provides the ability for in a systematic getfor the regulator to data, more iny real time, from the manufacturing process. it also creates more fluid communication both within the agencyit also creates more fluid communication both within the agency for folks to raise concerns and for them to be processed and for us to go back to the workforce. it also creates more fluid communication both within the agency for folks to raise concerns and for them to be processed and for us to go back to the workforce. but it requires the participation of labor, and also the agency and also the manufacturer to be able to make it work effectively. >> thank you. i've heard a lot of issues and by mytions raised colleagues today. the hotline that was suggested. a by my
colleagues today. the hotline that was suggested. a number of other things. as a second-term member of member ofi always congress, i always wonder, when do we find out when all those items were implemented? when you report back to us after this hearing to go over that list of issues that were discussed hearing to go over tht list of issues that were discussed today, to share with us when they have been implement it or will be implemented in terms of a time frame? mr. dickson: i will work with the chairman and the ranking member i will work with the chairman and the ranking member to put a timeline on those things. some of what we have talked about we are already doing, and we have incorporated some of the lessons learned from the returned to service process. we will apply those immediately going forward. we are looking as an example at some of the lessons we have learned from the process and bringing them into our certification activities going forward. it sort of depends on the topic you are talking about, but i'm happy to work with -- >> i am out of time. i would appreciate getting that information. mr. chair, i yield back. colleague,cond-term because after two terms you start to understand this is the land of promise but not necessarily delivery, so that is why i put a 60-day timeframe on those requests, and either we
will get that back in 60 days or we will get an explanation of .hy i will be glad to work with you in a bipartisan manner to make sure we get it done. >> i thank the gentleman for his clarification. representative stanton. >> thank you very much from mr. chairman. administrator dickson, at our last hearing in october, boeing admitted that mcas did not meet its own design requirements for the i think we have a slide that is going to come up now. this was taken from boeing's coordination should come which outlined the company's requirements for mcas as you can see, boeing's criteria stated "mcas shall not interfere with dive recovery." "mcas will not have any objectionable interaction with the pilot of the airplane." when i showed this to boeing at the last hearing, their chief
engineer admitted the obvious, divemcas interfered with recovery on a lion air flight 610 and ethiopian air flight 302. administrator dickson, do you agree with that assessment? mr. dickson: based on what i know about how the system was designed and how the design was changed, i think that is correct. >> unfortunately, when asked another obvious question on whether mcas had an objectionable interaction with the piloting of the flights, boeing an objectionable interaction with the piloting of the flights, boeing did not give a straight answer. in plain and simple terms, boeing failed to admit that mcas impacted the ability of the pentateuch control the plane. that is -- ability of the pilot to control the plane. that is shared. -- that is shameful. this coordination sheet that you have on the screen today is dated junethis coordination sheu have on the screen today is dated june 11, 2018, which is after the max was certified.
but we have seen earlier versions of the same document from march 2016 before the max was certified, and it contains same mcas design requirements. administrator dickson, did the faa received a copy of this coordination sheet before the max was certified? not aware wei'm i believe come and that is around the time to design was modified, but i have to check. >> should the faa have received this document? mr. dickson: i would say so. earl, you have any opinion on that? mr. lawrence: this is outlining what our requirements are on boeing. the requirements would be to obtain certification.
>> thank you. obtain certification. >> thank you. administrator dickson, did mcas interfere with dive recovery on ethiopian air flight 302? yes, it did. i would just point out again that there is the pilot as part of that system, and the design pilot to beon the the mitigating factor, and that proved to be incorrect. >> boeing failed to meet its own design requirements for system certified by the faa. boeing failed to meet its own design requirements for system certified by the faa. despite this shocking reality, has the faa issued any fines or boeing's failure? mr. dickson: not at this time, right, as ie the said earlier, to take action in the future. >> beyond the design
not at this point. >> not at this point. >> and my final question, since these tragic accidents, has the requirements, or the manufacturer aircraft components, or any part of the certification process? requirements, or the manufacturer aircraft components, or any part of the certification process? mr. dickson: yes, as i mentioned, we have not delegated anything throughout this resours throughout the agency. we have brought in the advisory to run in parallel with us with experts from nasa and the air force and others, and we are no specific very closely changes? mr. dickson: well, yes, those changes are being implemented for the max project, absolutely.
changes are being implemented for the max project, absolutely. >> administrator dickson, for me and for so manychanges are beind for the max project, absolutely. >> administrator dickson, for me and for so many americans, these tragic accidents have shaken our confidence in the faa. we owe it to the families who lost loved ones to do better, and we must get this right. anything else would be a disservice to do better, and we must get this right. anything else would be a disservice to them and all those who put their faith in the safety of our air system. i yield back. >> thank the gentleman. representative davids. vice chair of the subcommittee. >> thank you, chairman. thank you all again for continuing to be here. administrator dickson, i want to follow-up about the rudder cable on the 737, i want to follow-up about the rudder cable on the 737 max. as you know, at least half a dozen of the faa's own technical specialists as well, i want to follow-up about the rudder cable on the 737 max. as you know, at least half a dozen of the faa's own technical specialists as well as an expert panel established a cd review process and raised serious concerns that the weather people on the 737 max could be severed if the engine the 737 max couldd if the engine failed causing codes to lose control of the aircraft. this concern is not just a theoretical concern. guidance is rooted in -10 crash in9 dc sioux city, iowa. 112 people died in that crash. in your response to chairman defazio in the aviation chair larson's
letter on this issue, you said we followed the faa procedures, except that doesn't seem to be the case, we will get to in a second. cornerstoneind of of the faa procedures, which is that the components will become safer over time. it is like a good kind of rule of thumb to follow. so when the faa reviewed and ng model, they7 found it had a lower risk of a separate table than the 737 classic model. -- severed cable than the 737 classic model. the reason of this was lower was the engine was more powerful. they on the determination that there was a lower risk in the ng, it was approved. so there is a 1997 issue paper for the 737 ng that once the
engines in the future on 737 models, if they got bigger, it would increase the risk of suffering a cable -- severing the table, and additional steps to protect the cable would be needed. which brings us to the 737 max, which has a potentially greater risk of suffering -- severing the cable. the agency ignore the 1997 wanted. my question is, why didn't the faa follow the guidance from the 1997 issue paper and require additional protections for the rudder cable? mr. dickson: well, thank you for the opportunity to respond. i think it is important to understand that these debates and discussions among subject matter experts are part of what gets us to a safer system. there are a couple of different approaches could be taken in these instances. >> do those approaches include ignoring an issue paper? mr. dickson: well, no, i'm just saying that there are approaches on -- prescriptive rules that can be followed, and there is also sometimes data that can be applied based on the performance of a proven system. in this case the team looked at, eventually when the decision was made, looked at the mitigations
that had been put in place in terms of for structure and also casing around the cfm leap cfm leap engines and the reliability of those engines and the fact that they are already certified essentially from their initial as capable of extended twin engine operations, which is an extremely high level reliability. taking all of that into account, there is actually a risk a riskn adding complexity to an improved system that was put in place in the 1990's to deal with the held-over rudder issues we talked about earlier. when you introduce a fleet that has additional complexity into an operation that has only got therends of airplanes out
that have different maintenance itself creates a risk. that is how the decision was made. and remember that the manager who's making that decision -- made. and remember that the manager who's making that decision -- >> at faa? mr. dickson: yes. faa. >> ok. so the concern here is that, first of all, you are talking about increased complexity and a not following the guidance that had been previously been stated, and not doing a new type certificate. i think there are a lot of instances these in the way you are describing this process, and the overarching concern that the process for safety reviews is becoming either inconsistent or more lax, and that control is being increasingly delegated to the manufacturers. i think that -- i obviously have run out of time, but i do think that there needs to be serious around that you
around that you have set yourself that you have set yourself this is a whole system, and across the system we have inherent inconsistencies in places where it seems as though the faa has been more lax. i think that is something that we can address and it need to address. mr. dickson: i can assure you we actually, ilax, and believe that the decisions we are making are going to be more rigorous because of the reliance actually, i believe that the decisions we are making are going to be more rigorous because of the reliance on data and performance. >> i think the gentlelady and the gentleman. gentlelady and the gentleman. representative lamb. >> mr. chairman, could you put
the slide back up with the 15,000 over we were looking at up with the 15,000 over we were looking at earlier? thanks. administrator, based on everything that you know now, and i understand you were not in office at this time, but based now,erything that you know if you saw a report like this now,the if you saw a report like this with the 15373 number on it, that day, or the next day, would you have been comfortable with the member of your own family max?g on the 737 yes, i would have, but that is because i understand how the airplane operates, and i withstand how to deal
flight control issues. but on the other hand, there is -- immediate aggressive action was being -- immediate aggressive action was being taken. this was just one aspect of trying to put some rigor around what would otherwise be a very subjective around what would otherwise be a very subjective decision. >> do you think it is reasonable a expect that i, who am not pilot, or a pilot, or one of my constituents who don't know the inner workings of aircraft and how pilots are trained and how they receive messages like this -- do you think it would have been reasonable for them to feel safe a 737 max the day after this information was known to the faa? again, at this point, dealing with what were the driving factors in the the lion air accident,
and, again, based on the information that was available time, the emphasis was on the procedural aspect of accomplishing the runaway stabilizer trim. trim. that was again, that was the mitigation that was put in place immediately, and then a very aggressive timeframe in terms of the software modification. what i'm saying is that people are relying on you to protect them in an area they don't know a whole lot about, trust is required for them to participate and feel safe about our airline industry. provides a just said
reason why a person should i provides a reason why a person should i felt safe stepping onto a 737 the faa was in possession of this information. let me ask you a slightly different way. there are echoes in this incident of a situation that , captain cox, who will say that that incident was a recurrence of the fall that brought down 580 53 years ear 580 53 years ear -- 585 three years earlier. he goes on to say that we do not aircraft,--lion air crash, his
family and friends are with us today, but the second wave of peopleaircraft,--lion air crashs family and friends are with us today, but the second wave of people in if you. --ethiopia. all these years later after the two crashes for us to fix the problem? two crashes for us to fix the problem? what is changing? mr. dickson: it doesn't. that is why we need to make the processes more rigorous and have better analytical tools so that we can drive the risk down, and know that the actions we are taking will have that effect. taking will have that effect. >> who's being held accountable for the fact that the pilots were not and that in fact the references to mcas were removed from the manual? wh is being held accountable for thato?
thato? >mr. dickson: certainly that is part of the process we are all going through. mr. chairman, i yield back. >> thank the gentleman. representative malinowski. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. malinowski. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. dickson, earlier in the here and said that one of your priorities is to make sure that there is appropriate separation at the the faa between business issues and safety issues. i was struck by that. is actually referring to the manufacturer, i actuallyring to boeing,
referring to the manufacturer, i was referring to boeing, the indications of pressure on the seems to be happening, that willufacturer like boeing begin production of an aircraft, it will complete all the steps of two finalizing production, including ordering materials, before getting faa permissions, and they will materials, before getting faa permissions, and they will say, oh my gosh, if the materials, before getting faa permissions, and they will say, oh my gosh, if the faa raises a concern, they will say that we are almost there, we will lose a tremendous amount of money if we don't get this claim into the marketplace. and then the faa sometimes seems to take that into account. sometimes seems to take that into account. isn't that potentially would when theor example, when
faa initially said that flights and later training would it not -- would be required for the 737 max, and when the faa initially said that flights and later training would it not -- would be required for the 737 max, and then boeing said we have this agreement with southwest airlines, we when the faa initially said that flights and later training would it not -- would be required for the 737 max, and then boeing said we have this agreement with southwest airlines, we were promised a million dollar rebate per plane if it didn't require flight simulator training, and the faa says, ok, you don't have that requirement? do you think it may have bled concerns, business may have bled into the faa's decision there? mr. dickson: i know having spoken with our eg pilots in seattle, and having read some of concerns have been that have been expressed to the committee investigative staff, that concerns have been that have been expressed to the committee investigative staff, that this was an item of concern they had from very early were the project, so they very engaged from the very early days, and went through a process of over a year of making sure that pilots from airlines were brought in, those who were the 737ng on ag
regular basis were able to have proficiency even without additional simulator training on the 737 max. so that is something that was of concern, and was resolved through the process, but it is something we need to watch for, absolutely. rep. malinowski: and what about the decision to exempt boeing from the requirement that new airlines be equipped system, that would allow the aircrew to prioritize cautions andrent alerts they received? that system was required on the 400, 757, 767 to 777, 787,
-- 737 max was the only aircraf required, that was exempted from that rule i think since 1982. was there cost considerations that factored into that position? mr. dickson: it's a great question. in my view it was not so much a cost consideration, but how do you integrate in a play like that into an existing fleet? i will let mr. lawrence tell you consideration, but how do you integrate in a play like that into an existing fleet? i will let mr. lawrence tell you how that process works. mr. lawrence: the question on that particular one is we have a very large fleet, and operators of the existing aircraft come and if you change the procedures, the positioning of the switches and the procedures, the positioning of the switches and the information, do you introduce another safety hazard. that was the debate on that particular system. it was not as much of cost, per se. -- you haveng at southwest airlines as an with a whole existing
737 fleet. you have all the pilots trained and all the maintenance folks trained and the system built on that. what is the risk of introducing a new system that dramatically changes that? it is a debate. that there areng not good arguments on both sides of that discussion. just saying that it was a discussion, and making those determinations of whether you are going to allowing aircraft of whether youthat are going to allowing aircraft to continue in that fleet in its existing configuration, those are part of the discussions. and safety is the driver in all of those discussions. rep. malinowski: thank you. i yield back. i thank the gentleman. thank you, mr. chairman.
lamb's. the 737 max was certified with the disagree other, a standard feature on the aircraft. in august 2017, boeing learned that the disagree learn was not functioning on an estimated 80% learn was not functioning on an estimated 80% of the entire 737 max fleet. boeing conceal this flaw from alert.a and more. more troubling, pilots expected to the disagree alert to be operational, and it wasn't. july of this year, your this is what you wrote.
design or approved design. these features are mandatory. each airplane reduced that type of design thereafter. although the disagree message although the disagree message was not necessarily meeting faa safety regulations, once it was made part of the approved design, it was required to be installed and functional on all 737 max airplanes boeing max airplanes boeing produced. it is a real it was required to be installed and functional on all 77 max airplanes boeing produced. alert is a safety issue, but i strongly believe that boeing's open defiance of faa requirements into knowingly delivering airplanes without it is both illegal and an ethical
issue. my understanding is that the faa has not penalized boeing in any way for this conduct or taken any other actions to reprimand of the company for its behavior. months, but the word here "accountability" has been used a few times. when i have the ceo of boeing i hope you and i don't share a different definition as well. why hasn't thei hope you and i a different definition as well. why hasn't the faa done anything to hold bowling accountable, your agency, and most importantly the public for this egregious behavior? thank you for the question. we have already taken action. as you know, the airplane is grounded. we are not delegating anything to boeing during the next return to service. to boeing during the next return to service. we are not delegating the airworthiness certificates for each aircraft. we have takento boeing during tn to service. we are not delegating the airworthiness certificates for each aircraft. we have taken action, recent enforcement action, and we have additional actions under theideration, both with existing settlement agreement that we discussed earlier here, and the existing settlement agreement that we discussed earlier here, and there may be additional actions as required, and i reserve the right -- i will take
them as appropriate, and you point out a good example here. and youred: point out a good example here. rep. allred: thank you. i think where we have regulations in place, where we there is no consequence for that evasion, then the regulation doesn't matter. i hope that we will see enforcement of this, and a plot of my colleagues, -- a lot of my colleagues, we are trying to determine the balance we should strike here. is the process fatally flawed? what changes need to bewhat cha? this, in my opinion, is just a decision that needs to be made by the faa on how regulations, a violation occurred. mr. dickson: congressman, but couldn't agree with you more. safety is our most important core value and what supports that is accountability. rep. allred: absolutely. i yield back. >> representative garcia.
rep. garcia: thank you, mr. chairman. mr.rep. garcia: thank you, mr. chairman. mr. dickson, i would like to ask about the faa associate provided with ar copy of the transcript. i have to say, i'm shocked at some of the things he didn't know. crew operations manual and following the lion air crash. document before," and replied "no, i have not." but it is a flight operations medal. don't then asked, you
watched some of it," he replied. the document was made public. he interrupted, "no, i was not aware of that." the member then asked, "you didn't watch it, so you are not aware." he replied, "no, i didn't. he interrupted, "no, i was not aware of that." the member then asked, "you didn't watch it, so you are not aware." he replied, "no, i didn't. like i said, i was in montréal at the assembly, and i just watched portions of the hearing, and i do not know about this document." administrator dickson, this was the response of the faa chief officer. he seemed completely unaware of he interrupted, "no, i was not
aware of that." the member then asked, "you didn't watch it, so you are not aware." he replied, "no, i didn't. like i said, i was in montréal at the assembly, and i just watched portions of the hearing, and i do not know about this document." administrator dickson, this was the response of the faa chief officer. he seemed completely unaware of the fact that boeing believe that pilots reacted to unanticipated mcas activation in 10 seconds or more, it could lead to the complete loss of the aircraft.
hope he would have been aware as to what was made public -- rep. garcia: is that a yes? mr. dickson: against my will have to talk to him about it. rep. garcia: thank you. do you believe you should be aware that if the pilot failed to act to activation within 10 seconds, the result would be catastrophic? mr. dickson: sir, could you restate your quick? rep. garcia: do you believe the associate administrator for aviation safety should be aware that if a pilot failed to react to unanticipated mcas activations within 10 seconds, the result could be catastrophic? representative payne. rep. payne: thank you, mr. chairman.
together myself for a minute. >> i presume five minutes. >> yes. >> [background sounds] in your discussion which was human factors. factors, one of the issues we are looking at is how we change the certification process and what changes are to be made. pressure re-think about analysis into this and forget -- how should we think about incorporating analysis into the certification of airplanes? th ll drop out at >> it is way too easy for even
-- knowledgeable the ability to have the independent set of eyes looking at what is going on and the processes that are being used in the outcomes and the results i think is extraordinarily voluble. we need to make sure that the teams are equipped with well-qualified human factors engineers who understand a lot of the complexities of human behavior that are involved in these sorts of events, particularly with things like automation and situations like we saw here. >> in your opinion -- you may -- have opinion or knowledge maybe if someone else has an answer, we would welcome that. does the faa currently have people in line to conducted human factors analysis of airplane designs, system
designs? >> yes, the faa has very well-qualified human factors professionals in charge of certifications on the human factors side. the issue is one of having enough people and having those processnvolved in that such that they are getting the information they need and are involved all along the way. that is the most valuable way to incorporate human factors. you cannot just put a stamp at the end. you have to be involved early on and continuously. >> anyone else want to answer the question on human factors? skills and capabilities within the faa? nothing? ok. testimony, the agreed tom manager conduct a thorough engineering and quality analysis to determine if the production
environment has caused safety risks. microphone, please? >> not to my knowledge. >> whose role would it have been to follow up on that? >> >> i need a microphone please. not to my knowledge. >> did you do any follow-up on that or whose role would have been to follow up? >> the general manager's responsibility, appropriate leaders of the other organizations like engineering quality. >> ok. in that circumstance, was campbell, mr. campbell within the oda and was your concern for into the oda at boeing
this question, i was this outside of that? >> this is a discussion i had with him one-on-one, not involving anyone else. >> is the point you're making in her testimony that this is a problem with production pressure because of economic factors or a isblem with the way boeing organized to build and to certify airplanes? >> could you rephrase that again, congressman? the point argument or you're making with your testimony is a very good point, is because of economic pressures or a prep problem with how boeing uses the oda? >> i really do not have a comment about the oda. as far as economic factors go, i'm obviously not an economist. my issues were what i saw in the andory, the environment
things that were happening at the time when those planes were being built. and then i was not there when the second plane was built, i had retired prior to that. that was my concerns. i will say, just on the topic, if i may, there has been a lot of discussion about certification and the certification process and a lot of's discussion -- a lot of discussion on the left side if you weld the design and flight training and things like that. the right, on the far right is what is called the production part. and boeing has issued a production certificate that expects to have every plane built with the same double of repeatable quality. so that is really important part of that air plane certification process that we should not forget. >> thank you. yells back. -- i yield back. >> thank you. i will recognize myself. we have heard from some through
these hearings who have said well, if this had happened with u.s. or european pilots, it would not have been a problem because they have superior training. aware oflieve you are u.s. and european pilots who knew this problem was coming in a simulator and were unsuccessful in managing it, is that correct? >> yes sir. i am aware of some anecdotal tests that were done with some european and north american pilots that also let the airplane get to a quite high speed over speed condition. so i don't believe there is evidence that can support a premise that it is exclusively due to their -- to their being developing countries that the accents were caused by this. -- the accidents are caused by this. >> was it you who used the word pandemonium?
and what are you referring to their? -- there. >> the fact that when this situation occurs, when the airplane breaks ground, you get somewhere around seven simultaneous failures, one of which is very, very distracting. the stick, the column in your handshaking and it is very loud. -- in your hand is shaking and it is very loud. so u.s. a pilot, the train comes back to how usa pilot sort through that. where to go back to the commonality and sort through that. and what priority. but with that much noise going on and simultaneous failures, the word pandemonium is appropriate, sir. >> yes i think ntsb said cacophony, similar. >> i have had a stick check or go off in an airplane with passengers and it by itself is enough of a challenge, much less now compounded with six to seven other simultaneous warnings and failures.
it would be a real handful. >> wouldn't that sort of fit into the human factors approach, in terms of solving how quickly a pilot could solve that? >> yes, that was a big factor. the idea that pilots could respond in three seconds is based on a lot of things. but it would have to be a well-recognized queue for a well-trained procedure. and that was not the case here. they had all kind of multiple, competing alerts which were slow down decision-making time. which would really slow down decision-making time. >> you said and i would like to revisit, after your extraordinary persistence, when you finally got into see the general manager of the 737 program, would you please give us a little color on that meeting? a little more than in your testimony? congressman, you are
referring to i believe our july 18, excuse me our july 2018 meeting. as far as, color, if you will, commentary, the meeting started at was a follow-up to the email i had written, requesting a shutdown of the factory. i met with him and i walked in the office and he asked, why are you here? and i said i'm here to follow-up to my earlier commute occasion with you. he asked me how it was going and i explained that it was getting worse, in my opinion, and that i echoed my recommendations. had a bit of a difference of opinion at that point. and then we talked. at the end, he agreed that you know, that he would pull the overtime records and look at how much work we are asking per union employees and i emphasize that not only, that is obviously really important because they're the ones doing the lion's share of the work, but also the managers who are overseeing
them. and then the engineering quality analysis i had requested be done to see if there was any possible issues that may have required us to alert our customers. >> and nothing changed? >> not to my knowledge. i retired in august. >> and we'll ask the ceo and the last hearing after he the recommendation from you, did you close down the line? no. did you slow down the line? no. and apparently none of the engineering reviews you asked for or overtime reviews, if they were reviewed, they were disregarded. and he did, when you posited that from your experience in the navy, this would say no, we have and fixand revisit this it. but he did say to you something about, the navy is not a profit-making, what was that? >> he said, when i explain to him that in the military
operations we have these kinds of indications of unstable safety type things, we would stop. and he said that, the military is not a profit making organization is what he said. >> now, mr. collins, your involvement in the issue regarding the placement of and/or lack of additional protection for the rudder control cable. you know, as i understand it, the end, there were how many people involved in the non-, what you call it a non-concur? >> there was the issue paper not , hisrrence any srp panel rough mentation was rejected. and the board recommendation, so i think it was a total of 13 project pilot and four managers documented that they did not agree with the decision. >> and this was to the best of
aur knowledge, overruled by single manager who is in the boeing, is in the office in washington state? >> yes he is in the consolidated office he was the transport airplane director manager at the time he is the one who signed it and took his possibility. other supported it, other manager supported him. >> and there were questions raised are the minority that they think well, we should bring in former faa administrator required a summary else -- or somebody else. and to your knowledge, the decision-and this is only one decision, there have been others and we will check those down. you think anyone higher up, like in the national office, was involved in the rudder cable issue are even aware of it? srp reporte safety that the boards recommendation, the manager had to come back and explain why he disagreed with that. air two, theed to
deputy director of aircraft certification. in the earlier decision is been my expense in issues like this that they are discussed with the aircraft certification deputy or director. >> and that is someone based in washington? >> yes, and washington, d.c.. >> good, that is a strength to follow for us and we will see where it goes -- -- that is a string to follow for us and we will see where goes from there. thank you. i represent -- i recognize representative norton. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i appreciate your inviting these witnesses as well. they have broadened our understanding i would like to begin with mr. pearson. i understoody, as it, focused primarily on the renton, washington factory. but in past hearings i have raised concerns about the north charleston, south carolina factory, which makes the boeing
787 dreamliner. concernshad reports of by, from employees of defective manufacturing, even pressure not to report violations. office raised concerns with boeing representatives, they have assured me and my staff that the problems found in south carolina were not systemic. your testimony indicates some of the same issues. were present in renton, washington. to your knowledge, how widespread were, or are these issues do you believe, mr. pearson? have nocongresswoman, i experience at the south carolina facility. but what you speak of i did witness at the renton factory and there was certainly an inordinate amount of schedule pressure being placed on
employees. and we have a lot of challenges with parts. normally when the factories running fine and the factory is running well. then we had a cascading problem and it got out of hand. >> i do not know why we would want to trust boeing without making sure that the faa should go farther and do, in fact would you favor that, the faa going farther and doing an investigation of u.s. boeing factories? >> i fully support that. i'm encouraged to hear the faa go in and do a row investigation. i really think that is necessary. again as i mentioned before, not only owe and investigate but identify problems and fix them. but maintain a presence you need to have into the future. >> i'm going to suggest that following this hearing. mr. collins, you say that the culture at faa shifted from supporting faa technical
specialists to favoring industry positions. this is something that concerned me and my questions this morning. i would like to know what immediate steps you think faa leadership can take to return the agency to a culture of safety. you apparently experienced when there?st began their-- >> yes i think the culture has evolved so it take some thing to turn it around. i experience working with flight standards for a bit and they rewarded employees who raised safety issues. i think rewarding employs and managers who address safety issues might be a good help. notan, i have heard, i do have evidence but i've heard in the past, managers bonuses and things were based on in part, applicants schedules. >> applicants what? . >> schedules for projects, to complete a project on time. >> is not what leadership is all
about? you cannot change in any copperheads of way if you do not a,e somebody at the top of located organizations forcing change down. you think that the present issue and faa hast at faa the capacity to bring that kind of change or make sure that kind of change happens at boeing? faa.can speak to the at. the faa, they have the ability to do it. it was a work to change the culture at all different levels. that has evolved over time. now this isently by built into the culture of places like boeing. that is why my question to mr. pearson was about not assuming that what you see at one boeing factory would be the case at another.
it seems to me that given what we have learned, the recalcitrance of boeing, it is going to be on us, if we do not take the steps to systematically look at boeing factories across united states. >> thank you, chairman to fazio. dr. endsley, the faa's looking into incorporating human factors into consideration throughout the design. and certification process. can you tell me about that? was that was one of the recommendations of the jtr and we concur with that. what needs to be done is to increase the staff that is available. we need to increase research to look at these issues they're having challenges with, such as multiple learning situations and even automation of action.
there are number of those kinds of steps that can be done to enable the certification, to consider human factors. it is important that they get the kind of data that is needed through the process from the analysis to looking at the designs to reviewing tests of procedures and test results. that is a really important thing to corporate although through. >> that was my second question as well. your talk about mobile factors, multiple human factors in the beginning of your statement? >> yes. >> human factors is really looking at every aspect of how humans perceive, think, how they move, really all human characteristics and human capabilities and limitations. and designing systems to be compatible with how we work and should guard against some of where are known failure points are.
so it is a systematic way of designing systems based on research on how people work and that is the way to really improve human performance. it works to not improve the efficiency of the system but also guard against errors that lead to accidents. in people the adrenaline starts to flow. that will be difficult unless they are trained consistently how to react to specific problems, j think? >> training is extreme important and it is part of what we doing here in factors. the first and you want to do is design the system appropriately. it is hard to train for bad design. train people to and training people on what to do in an emergency situation is extremely important. thingsery important and like automation, automation failures and getting into the sorts of edges of the envelope where the automation does not behave properly.
and you have to expose people to that so they know what qs look like, how to prioritize information, how to prioritize information and respond and communicate. so those can be communicated more speedily when the real thing happens. >> how do we tackle that automation surprise? >> we try to avoid it. the way we have to address it is one, training. you get good training on the automation which did not occur in these accidents but is extremely important for automation because this complex. even experienced pilots do not know how the system is going to operate in a variety of circumstances. the other thing is really the displays we provide. even well-trained pilots are not going to do the right thing if they do knock get the right information. for example here they did not have information on what the impacts were doing. they did not have information they needed to understand the angle of attack sensors or had a problem with it so they did not have the inflation they needed.
>> so they can override it so to speak? traininging all the will not work unless you have the right decision. it is good to know there are people like yourself out there that when you see something wrong or willing to speak up and let people know what is going on and how you feel. as someone who travels on planes this is comforting to know that you would try to do the right thing. you want to the management, they ignored you. and this morning, i cannot believe that after all we have gone through, this morning, we finally got a commitment from mr. dixon that they going to emails and all your the reasons it happened. amazing to me after all this time, it took this hearing for them just even look and investigate what your comments were so i thank you.
>> you're welcome, congressman, it was the right thing to do. >> was this pressure on boeing unique dust because of the 737 max, or was this something that was all the time at boeing? just the culture, pressuring in place to push, push, push. >> and mike spence at boeing, the other positions i was in at boeing, i did -- in my experience at boeing, the other positions i was in at boeing, i did not see that. it was in the factory, in the production facility, that is where it was the pressure and the scheduling. 30 years in the military, i never saw that level of schedule pressure being put on people. when you put people in that kind of pressure and they are tired, mistakes are made. and i think the doctor would agree with that. >> can you give me other
examples of what was going on because i'm not well-versed in the factory of some of the issues you talked about? well? >> what you saw. >> in the factory, everything is planned. and it is supposed be done in accordance with our faa approved reduction certificate. when things -- faa approved production certificate. when things are being done properly, the plane moves down the line and eventually it is flight tested. whate end of 2017 and 2018 i started observing, and again, i was not alone and this is why was adamant about talking with other employees at the site, we started having problems with our parts being delivered. it was not just big parts like the engine, which was a chronic problem. we had other things that were really important, every part in the plane is important, but
wiring, wire bundles, these are really important things. and this starts to lead to a lot of out of sequence work. so resources are stretched. people used to working in one position or two are now being asked to work on the way down to the factory and maybe even outside. of course that means their managers are also stretched. and the equipment is stretched. there's a lot of stuff going on and it is very challenging to really, in my opinion, maintain a level of quality that we are expected to maintain. >> do stand touch with some of your former workers, coworkers? >> i'm sorry, sagan? -- say again? >> do stand touch with your coworkers? >> i have a lot of friends at boeing and i have not with the exception of two employees, i have been in contact with i decided it was not the right thing to do, to talk to them about what i was trained to do and get the investigators to go look. so i've not really talked to them. >> i was wondering if that same practice continues today, what
you observed while you were there, has any thing changed? >> is a great question. again, i am encouraged the fa's going to go in and do a thorough investigation, talk to employees and start with the employees actually building the plane, the mechanics and the electricians and the quality inspectors. those are the people who are going to give the best perspective overall of how things are going. and looking at all the data and production reports, there is a lot to look at. i am encouraged by that that they are committed to doing them. >> you are encouraged by what mr. dixon said this morning, that he is going to follow up on this. >> i'm a healthy skeptic right now, i am encouraged. >> i hope our committee follows up and that mr. dickson does what he committed to this morning. >> i can assure the gentleman this will be followed up on closely. i appreciate mr. pearson's persistence in this matter.
that, i would recognize represent a brownlee. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i also want to note to the committee that it is concerning to me that mr. pearson also reached out to ntsb and to the department of transportation in his effort to get someone's attention and in both cases with ntsb and the department of transportation, they did not take any action from your notification. is that correct? >> it is correct, congresswoman, that it was an effort to try to get to the investigators. i was trying to get to them and share investigate -- share information. and it took three month before they would meet with me. they do not want to receive the documents. eventually they did meet with me and they offered to give me 15 minutes. and my attorneys and myself said that is not nearly enough time so, they only gave an hour and a
half. and at the end of it all, they said, they referred us to the department of transportation ig. and said that it was outside their scope, that we asked them again, to pass the information to the indonesian and the open investigators. and their take on the matter was that it was beyond their scope of response abilities in those investigations -- beyond their scope of response ability and those investigations. >> i heard a podcast on boeing six right month ago and it was another boeing whistleblower who was talking about production of the airplane the intensity that boy was putting on the employees to produce and produce in a timely way in this top podcast they reference the fact that they were directed at one time, that there were engines that were not allegedly fully functioning engines that they
were marked and painted in a way that said there was some malfunction going on with the engine. and in this push to move the assembly line, that they actually were instructed to go use an engine off of that, i do not know if you ever observed anything like that? the podcast went on to say, too, that there were tools and so forth left in the belly of the plane or in the tail of the sloppy worksort of -- sloppy work that was not being inspected. i do not know if you witnessed anything like that? again, i didman, not work in south carolina. about the asking renton facility, i do not ever recall anybody ever saying go get a part that was not approved. i never saw that. >> ok, very good.
mr. collins, in terms of talking itut the faa culture and how really needs to change, when you were, was there a crash that occurred when you were employed by faa? >> yes. i actually investigated two accidents, one was in air france in tahiti that ran off the runway and nobody was hurt. the other was a teedo view 800 accident -- the other was the whereveraccident buddy died. i was the lead fa engineer on it when he can clear with the fuel tech explosion. >> when you were at the faa -- a fuel tank explosion. >> when you were at the faa did you see changes in the way that fa operated, did you see changes in the culture of the organization? >> it was kind of under the
initial culture. we did a lot of work. we did to rulemakings to improve the safety. there were hundreds of directives as we learned about different failures that could create a mission sources. it was really after -- could create a mission sources-- ig nition sources. safetyafter the 2001 role where i saw industry resistance starting to creep in. >> would you say that was the beginning of a cultural change starting to happen? >> yes that was on east first started seeing engineers non-concurring on issue papers. i do not ever that before then. -- 2002, 2003-ish. it is across-the-board with
manufacturers, not just boeing. >> if i could add, the example of the rudder was the most dramatic because it is unprecedented to have that many people document their disagreements like that. >> thank you. follow-up, you mentioned the name of one individual who we are going to seek to discuss this with. you mentioned there were others. to happened recall their names? -- do you happen to recall their names, when they overruled? >> on the rudder control issues? wasne of the managers victor wicklund, the trans-port staff manager. to pursue moreg interviews with faa. >> the other was jeff do even -- manager.n, a >> the rationale i saw was the
engine was slightly smaller than previous versions. and therefore, and it had not had an uncontained failure. therefore even though the maxygen was much larger, they thought it would be very dependable and never had an uncontained failure. but it was a new engine, how do you know that? >> i grape or as a propulsion engineer, i did not see validity in that argument. and you have to come on the airplane side, assume you get the uncontained failure and then protect against it. when the engine is being approved, they have to, their job is to show is not going to eject parts. on the airplane side come on the installation, you have to assume is going to have those failures and then protect the airplane from the failure. >> thank you. you would say that during your lengthy tenure with faa, and you just mentioned it in
response to representative brow nley, that you saw change after , that it was unusual to see non-concurrence before we went to the -- before we went through that fuel tank issue? >> correct. it crept in after that. >> and you never saw one in your 30 years not as one where as many people nonconcurring and it got overruled? >> right. and the voluntary safety reporting process brought in specialists who are not working on the project and reviewed and came to the same conclusion as those that do not agree with the issue paper. and then that was overruled. it was disappointed for it to go through the process and not to see any change. >> what you think is, we had someone say it would be impossible without oda and i agree. if you're going into minor aspects of the plane, things that are what i consider anything that could take a plane down, faa should be directly,
fully informed of and directly involved in. but, i mean, how would you, what you think about the current process and how might we change it? >> well, i agree. when i first started i was taught that the faa regulations defines the minimum level of safety for the airplane. and this is where the means to compliance, lessons learned from accidents should be incorporated in showing compliance with that. there are a lot of exceptions under 2101, where new rules are not incorporated in amended type design and exemptions also, where too often to me it seemed, the interests of the applicant was again, over the interests of the traveling public. one example in my testimony is fort an exemption granted fuel quantity indicating wires, ignition prevention in the fuel tank. a for your time-limited
exemption was granted on the 737 m g and five years is all it takes for a new type design approval. at the end of four years no change had been made and it was a permanent exemption was granted instead of making the manufacturer fix it. >> ok. ilot of years in the air and think you flew earlier versions of the 737. in one of the hearings i showed, an image of a flight deck from the 100. and then the image of the flight deck from the max. it really did not look like the same plane. should do you think we consider how many times you can know, a certificate, versus actually going through certification? >> it is an anchor mental step process so that pilots -- it is an incremental step process so
that pilots, and i flew the 200 and 300. thehe point where we split fleet so that only 200 pilots would fly the seven 300, we treated it like a separate airplane. some air blinds have been willing to do this and others for economic reasons have elected not to -- some airlines haven't really to do this and so others for economic reason have elected not to. there is a lot of difference between a max and the first-generation 737. i think ob unreasonable to ask a pilot to fly a one or 200 and on tuesday thursday go fly a max. but as we, the income rental steps that were taken, i can -- but the incremental steps that were taken, i can understand how the faa approved it. i think the 737 is unique because i do not take we have another airplane in the fleet that has as many derivative type certificates or has been in service as long and i do not think there will be another
version of the 737. i think the max is the last one. so i think the problems to some degree is going to cure itself. >> yes and i do not know if any but he can answer this but they are trying to amend that type certificate for the 777 withholding wings, and say this wings,t -- with folding and say this does not require recertification. but i'm not aware of any commercial transport that has folding wings, it seems like a radical departure. >> it is but the airbus and i through the 319 and 321, there were subtle differences between the three airplanes but for the most part they flew virtually identical. close. 300 and 400 were the 737 700 and 800 are very close. there are cases where these different types are, the differences are minor. and there are somewhere the differences are significant.
>> ok. point i do not thing i have further questions. maybe staff is a further question. my-h one, where my -- where - where am i? kevin cox, as a formers safety consultant how important it is that for a pilot to be trained on new flight control systems particularly something that is novel or unique like, mcas? >> the training is critical. particulate the fact that the assumption was made that the pilot would instantly recognize an appropriate stabilizer trim movement. with the 730 seven starting with the 300 system, the trim moves because of a speed trim system. you have to recognize that movement in and of itself, on commanded movement by the pilot
in and of itself would not necessarily be a trim runaway. and in, when you have multiple failures that are going on, the recognition of an mcas activation would be much more difficult. hence, that needs to be trained as a possibility that if you see a stick shaker that comes on with multiple shaker -- multiple failures, recognize the moment the flaps are retracted, you may get a significant nose-down input. that was not done. lacktraining, i think that , the failure of that training to be widely disseminated, is a contributor here. >> thank you. ensley, again, human at least in the first flight, the first accident , not in the manual. do you think in terms of human factors approaches that pilots
should have been made aware something is running in the background that can radically alter the behavior of the airplane? >> absolutely. it's hard to diagnose and understand what the system is doing if it is something of never heard of. they do not have information about why was acting erratically. as captain cox pointed out they did not even have good cues to run the procedure that boeing assumes they would be able to run rapidly. it was this combination of no information in the flight manual, no training and no adequate displays that were the worst possible, nation. -- worst possible combination. >> i have kept you along time and this be the last question and i would ask everybody or ever but he wants to respond, is the biggestnk concern this committee should
focus on, regarding the faa capability of overseeing boeing and production and novel systems, given everything you've heard here today? i will start with captain cox. >> i think, based on the things i have heard today and what i have learned, over the months of watching this, i would encourage the committee, do not get too focused. the jailer report was very good in taking a holistic -- the jader report was very good in taking a holistic view. there's not a single cause to this accident. you have a rare opportunity if the committee will view it in its entirety of the complexity, you can help really significantly promote aviation safety going forward. i think that was reinforced today here.
there's an awful lot. of focus on the faa and an awful lot of focus on boeing. and they are two of the major contributor to these tragedies. but they are not the only ones. so i would encourage in the strong as possible terms, keep the focus broad. >> right. and i would agree. in terms of the aoa, we did have a company that had repaired the aoa, that was on, was that on lion air? that they had been lost their license. >> yes sir. and if i might, the installation of that, the angle of attack sensor on the lion air airplane. there's a calibration procedure that has to be followed. and the maintenance department signed off that they did it. it is not possible that they did. >> right, because it immediately >> that is what the procedures for his to determine the accuracy for the sensor output.
to come full circle, this is the reason i said, there is a lot of can tripping factors. -- contributing factors. >> i get that. >> there has been considerable discussion here today and previously in the press about concerns about safety culture at both boeing and the faa that underlie a lot of the failures we saw an good process and good design. andfaa minister eight or boeing have mate -- administrator and boeing have made announcements of what they're going to do and we are glad to see that. changing culture is really hard. it is something you have to do every day. it has a lot more to do with actions and words. the importance of really following up on those actions of taking a safety issues very seriously, reprioritizing safety with regard to reduction and cost and schedule, those changes
require a lot of can to new interaction by management. that is going to require bringing in a lot of people who are knowledgeable about these things, to get those changes moved through the organization. the ntsb has been talking about the importance of safety culture for the last 20 years. it is something we really need to emphasize, as well as solving some of these basic process problems. >> and i agree with you on that 100%. my first meeting with mr. dick son, when he was nominated, i talk with him about the prince of polities within faa who seemed resistant to a minister eight or and changes from that level and he assured me he was going to be reaching down in the organization and trying to change the culture. mr. collins? >> i agree with everything she said about tainting the safety culture. -- about changing the safety culture. sonwhat administrator dick
talked about with all hands meetings, i think he needs to get down with the working people more. i was a union rep. the union reps usually feel more free and more protected in discussing issues than employees. talk to them in the seattle , in the offices, in the offices, and the seattle office for sure. you hear conversation about resources. you could use more aerospace engineers and manage resources better. but the lesson i would like to leave is that when you have the resources and they identify safety issues, that really concerns me. the ones that are missed, you can do impairments and better oversight. but when managers are made aware of safety issues, compliance issues, i wish there would be a culture shift so that they give and moreibility thought to compliance versus
production schedules and things. >> thank you. and finally, ms. pearson. -- mr. pearson. >> congressman, first on the expression -- investigation of the detailed production facility is in order. an important thing is to maintain a presence in the factory. i should have mentioned earlier i was there for three years and honestly, i never saw or met in faa employee in my three years. >> ? really? >> yes. and i never member any one saying they met and faa employee. visual and be present prayed my sunset should they wear a jacket or something. so that we are not -- they should be visible and present. my son said they should wear a jacket or vest or something. you can have the most amazing design by the most brilliant engineers and flown by the most
talented pilots, but if you have a tired mechanic or electrician that is over work or technician that is stressed because they have not had a chance to take care of their family because they have been working so many hours, it could all be for not-- naught. so don't lose sight of the fact we have to do the whole thing, from design all the way out to ongoing production into the future. >> thanks and reflecting on your comment about not seeing and faa employee on the floor. a number of years ago i raised concerns as we moved more to an agency which, this was more in terms of maintenance and production, but where they were spending much less time at main its facilities and more time reviewing paperwork they received from maintenance facilities, as opposed, and i think it is vital for them to actually have a presence. and they may not personally observe something while they are there but it may be some employee would want to come up to them and say hey, i have some concerns here. you're from the faa i want you
to hear this. >> absolutely. >> thank you all and thank you for your generous allowance of time it. i appreciate your testimony. and we are going to continue with this investigation. i want to again give my condolences to the families and thank you for your constructive, and i have to do some stuff. second --ng on fry hang on for a second. remain open until such time as our witnesses, answers may be summit in writing. so ordered. i ask unanimous consent. let the record remain open for 50 days for additional comment. for witnesses to be included in today's hearing per without objection so ordered. again i thank you and i've nothing else to add. so the committee sands adjourned. -- stands adjourned. [gavel]
>> we had a system that said if we catch you out of compliance one or two or three times and we are going to be on you like, that is the idea. >> how about going? -- how about boeing? >> a lot of the boeing people are lawyered up so we would have to deal with their lawyers. they tell me after the interviews. i get transcripts or get summaries. i do not know who they currently have on their list. staff may not be able to tell you. >> can you give us a sense of where it goes from here, the timeline in these hearings for a few months now? unprecedented.s .n important investigation i do not have a defined endpoint. we are still pulling threads. some of them on minority have a question of how high up to disco? i have -- how high up did this
go? i have the same question. today we get a few people and one it sounds like comes back to the national office. we want to be talking with those people. granted, that is not the mcas issue but it is a certification issue where i think the agency went awry by allowing boeing to proceed without protecting that rudder cable. >> at this point what are the major gaps for you having listened to all of this? >> we still are not totally sure, certain of how it was ever allowed to put this airplane in the air with a safety critical system and a signal point of failure. that is not done. and then also this report we have. i am not aware and i would hope that there is no other passenger transport airplane in the world flying except maybe aleutians and i do not know if they even
fly those things anymore, i would not get on one, where you're going to predict that we are going to lose a bunch of these overtime. time.r it is supposed to be a one in a billion chance. in this case it turned out to be a one and a million chance. that is a thousand times below the standard. >> were you satisfied with the think the faa offered when you asked about that document and who knew about it and what the decision-making process was? >> no. i did not get a good answer about how it was circulated and who saw it and what role it played in the decision to not ground the airplane. no. i do not get any answers on that he assured me he would follow up on that and we are going to follow up on that. we just him across this document recently. it is one of the 5000 we have gotten. -- of the 500,000 we have gotten. >> to think that should've been a heart stop for the faa? that they should've made the decision in december to ground the plane? >> since that is protecting a
crash with way more, i cannot tell you how many, 35 years, how many planes they produced, hominy hours that can fly but i believe that was way over there one in a billion chance and that is the standard they are supposed to follow. the minus 9th [power] and i'm disturbed that head of safety came in to see me after that report was produced. he did not mention it. he told me it was a one off. and in our transcribed interview with him, he says he never saw that document. there's a big problem there. bywe surprised in general this, not to know? >> yes i do not know what he does on a daily basis and see does not seem to know much of anything. >> thank you. >> great. ok. >> thank you, mr. chairman.
>> oh, look at that. ok. >> there is not supposed to be certified in the united states of america or anywhere, i do not know what the overseas standard is. our standard is one to the 10 minus nine. that there's a system on the plane that is going to cause a crash. this was, even if you think about over 45 years of a flight. this was way more than one to the 10 minus nine. that should have rung alarm bells appeared and apparently it did not. we are going to be getting into that. wethere is statement says
use this to validate our decision to send out the warning to pilots, etc.. . >> know what they said as they sent out the warning to pilots and thought that was sufficient even though they then came up with a document that said 50 of these planes will go down over the life of the fleet. that should have been waita minute, the warning to pilots was not sufficient. >> thank you. >> thank you mr. chairman. [crowd background noise]
>> earlier today, president trump departed the white house to attend the army-navy football game in philadelphia. before the game started, he spoke to both teams in their locker rooms and then took the field during the national anthem joined by defense secretary mark esper. ♪ >> were so gallantly streaming. glare, thekets red bombs bursting in air, gave night, thath the
delivers remarks later tonight at a fundraising event at the trump international hotel. back at theook 1998-1999 impeachment of president bill clinton. we will show you a portion of the u.s. house floor debate on four articles of impeachment. the house voted to approve two of those articles, making bill clinton the second president in u.s. history impeached since andrew johnson in 18 68. on december 18 and 19th, 1998, the house of representatives take you have articles of impeachment against present bill clinton. we will show you highlights coming up in a moment. first i would like to explain how the articles move from the house to to share committed the floor within a week? >> they pass out of the house judiciary committee. there was lots of discussion about what the rules would be.