helpingionate argument, us understand the complicated and very important arguments in this first case we heard this morning. robert, lindsay, thank you very much for joining. great pleasurey to bring in our panelists for the second case that we heard this morning, which was our lady of guadalupe versus morrissey baruch. and i have the pleasure of introducing them now. , joined a group of professors in support of the petitioner. he is the distinguished professor of law at the ucla school of law, where he teaches the first amendment. he is the author of important textbooks on the first amendment and founder and co-author of the bolick conspiracy, a leading legal blog. and it is wonderful to have him.

and a briefs omitted on behalf of the national women's center, and 68 of the organizations in support of the respondent. legal director of the national women's law center, where she oversees the center's litigation efforts. she helped to create the center's legal effort for gender equity, and until august 2017 she served as the pre-director for the civil rights division within the u.s. department of health and human services. thank you both so much for joining. >> thank you so much for having us. >> nice to be here. mr. rosen: we have so much to unpack. what a case this was. eugene, you filed a brief on behalf of the petitioner's, so let's begin with you. and i was it right back up to the first question -- and i will zip right back up to the first question she's -- chief justice

roberts asked. the personnel here is a teacher, and as part of their job they personify church values. is that enough to trigger the ministerial exception, in that case? tell us what chief justice roberts was getting at in that question, and also how he was pressing the petitioner on the central claim that the test should be whether or not an employee of the church organization performs and according to religious functions. >> sure. let's step back a bit. anti-determination law generally applies to a wide range of employers that are more than tiny, let's say. large, medium, even medium small employers. it would normally apply totally to churches, synagogues,

mosques, whoever else. so when a church, a catholic church says we only hire men as priests, the answer would be that is illegal. you have to hire women as priests. if the church says no, either you fork over all your money to the plaintiffs, or you leave the country. so, the courts have long recognized that there has to be toexception antidiscrimination law, and past other kinds of employment laws, employeesn kinds of of a religious institution. certainly ministers were probably other things. i imagine there is institution staffed by nuns. you say ok, it is ok for you to and not monks or something like that. so there has to be a zone of these kinds of exceptions.

it is not limited to people who are labeled ministers. a lot of those groups just do not have a label, or they don't have the sharp division of labor that other institutions too. question here is what happens to school teachers at religious schools, especially teachers of religion. i think what we saw his chief justice roberts and others resisting the notion that any employee that somehow personified the church is exempted from antidiscrimination. that can cover a lot. janitors, secretaries. at the same time i think we saw a lot of jobs thinking look, if someone is really a teacher of not just than they do personify the church, they speak for the church in conveying its religious doctrine. and that is a lot closer to the minister or the priest or the rabbi or the imam than it is to

the janitor or the secretary. that is the line they are trying to draw. i don't think anyone thinks it's an easy line, but the question is where the line is going to be and how it is going to deal with school teachers in religious schools who teach religion. mr. rosen: thank you very much for that. several justices led by justice ginsburg said this would represent a radical exception to antidiscrimination law if we extended the so-called ministerial exemption, which the court recognized in a heard a 2012,out, decided in which said that if a teacher had been called as prime minister, then she wasn't subject to antidiscrimination laws and could be fired. if that were to be extended to any teacher with a religious function, then nearly anyone who

worked in a religious institution might be sent from antidiscrimination laws. so tell us what is the concern you heard from justice ginsburg and the other justices who expressed that concern was, and why it was that they preferred to include test people who performed leadership for actual ministerial functions. >> that's right. justice jay -- justice ginsburg along with justice sotomayor and justice breyer were troubled that what justice ginsburg called the staggering breadth of what is at stake. already we are going from a spiritual leader to someone who was a religious teacher. that was already an expansion. and it is an expansion in an area where there is immunity. so it is not just even employment discrimination at stake but far beyond that.

in a lower court they have seen people pay, and all these employment contract rights, religious institutions are using this to basically avoid a whole host of law protections. humidity is quite broad -- the immunity is quite broad. when you have that blanket immunity you have to carefully cabin gets to be included in that. so that is really the question here. briefs thatf the said don't worry, this will not be all teachers. this is a special teacher because she is a commission minister and a teacher. now we have come all the way down to regular teachers, lay teachers who may teach religion out of a workbook. we also have this very dramatic moment to me where nurses and hospitals would not have the civil rights protection if they are asked to do prayers along

with caring for the sick. and that is where the problem is here. courses -- justice just as gorsuch wants the courts to refer to religious institutions, but how can you -- maybe in a good-faith way because they all personify the faith, or maybe to avoid liability. for any of those reasons you hear how a whole host of workers denied all of their civil rights protection. there's so much at stake here from the health care industry, camp counselors, football coaches. justice kagan gave a whole line of hypotheticals. and there was not a clear through line for the responses. mr. rosen: thank you so much for that. those were amazing hypotheticals. i am just calling them up. she wanted a yes or no answer on that. we deathly covered? probably not -- would that be covered? probably not. you mentioned a math teacher,

takes 20 seconds. would that count? no. she just ran through them all. america'su're one of leading experts on free exercise clause. i take it from the discussions that they are arguing that this expanded ministerial exemption is located in the free exercise clause. response to justice breyer, who said that the ability to fire or do what people who perform ministerial functions is already covered by the religious freedom restoration act, or occupational qualifications, but to allow anyone who performs important religious functions at a religiously affiliated school to have an exemption from laws that prevent them from firing someone who has cancer or chemotherapy, as justice ginsburg pointedly asked in this case.

a radical expansion that would be a dramatic disruption of anti-dissemination loss. -- laws. prof. volokh: there are two things going on here. what is the legal source? it is in the first amendment? or we leave it to statutes. statutes means if you have a state employment law and estate act,ut a religious freedom and about 20 states have no such act, and which does not have an exemption from dissemination law for religious institutions, and most don't, in that state the catholic church could not function because it's rights would be subject only to the state statute. fideight have a bona economic convocation but that is also a definition of state law.

that exception has been read very narrow. i think that is why the court unanimously agrees that this is a constitutional claim. the constitutional right of religious institutions to select based on whatever criteria they see fit. that is a question, who certainly at the very least these ministers, probably synagogues, i think some of them are rabbis in a mosque, or religious music directors and the like. and then to want -- what extent does extend to religious teachers. second question is what about situations where it looks like the religious institution does not have a religious doctrine thing. we must fire the disabled, or you must fire the older something like that. so why should have an exception even there?

that has to do with concerns about entanglement of government and religion. they actually recognized an exception from disability law in part because even though the lutheran church said look, we are not firing her because she is disabled, we are firing her for another reason. that deciding what the true reason is of a religious employer for not hiring or firing or whatever else somebody who would be -- we do it all the time for secular employers. we say is your explanation reasonable? was the person otherwise doing a really good job, so there is no basis for firing them? the supreme court took the view that, well, making that decision about whether it was reasonable for you for other reasons to fire somebody because they were

doing a bad job of the ministry or a bad job of teaching religion, that would be too intrusive. you could imagine a different rule that says a church or a relation -- religion could say we have a religious objection to hiring the disabled, let's say, for to having old people with us. we are the opposite of run by the elders, we are run by the youngers. if they have a sincere religious objection, then they get to use those criteria. but otherwise they don't. you can imagine that being the rule, it may be a sensible rule, but that is not the world the court -- mr. rosen: many thanks for that. several ofgene says, the justices were concerned with entanglement with the court's internal decision deciding who is a minister and who is not. and in the case, the court rooted the ministerial

exemption. tosaid requiring a tree retain an unwanted minister or punishing a church for failing to do so interferes with the governance of the church by imposing an unwanted minister that infringes the state exercise clause and the states power to determine which -- which prohibits government involvement in such decisions. other justices pushed back. you could and void that you could avoid this with a mormon narrow test -- you could avoid this with a more narrow test. i want to understand how dramatic a result it would be if the court extends its decision, which was unanimous, into this very hotly contested area of any schoolus employee in a that has some sort of important religious function, and sunu, do

you agree that that is rooted in the establishment clause, or would it be a dramatic expansion? ms. chandy: i think the question of entanglement is exactly what the justices were struggling with here. justice breyer said what is the test? the way that justices gorsuch and thomas would do without is to have any analysis at all is entangling. what we believe is it was correct. you need to look at the more objective criteria. aboutf the discussion was title and duties. there were also these other really important factors of consideration at least, training that barely came up, and what is the institution saying about this person. how are they holding this person out to the world? how was she holding herself out to the world. they are objective.

they are also ones that have something to do with what the employee signed up for in taking this role. as compared to bringing a disability claim or an age claim or race claim, then being told actually, you lead a prayer every day and even though you taught our, you are a minister you have lost all your employment rights. if you have the courts dipping into say you lead three plays or fourfour -- you taught lessons that were not from the workbook, and we are going to say you were on one line or the other of a factor. our position is that is just one of the pieces you should look at. and we cannot have a system where there is a wholesale deference to religious institutions to say it is any of their employers -- employees covered by laws. it just throws to the wind all these hard won employment rates.

we also have to think about who is being harmed here. 300,000 lay teachers who are mostly women. we brought up nurses and health care workers. peoplepeople of color, with multiple identities protected under our law, will be bearing the brunt of this. while religious institutions will be able to get a free blank check, even if it is a sincere belief. we thank all of our workers personify our faith, and the messages of our faith. even then, this would not be a practical system. --down thing equities here a respondentgene, argued the schools strip more than 300,000 lay teachers of employment law protections, including teachers who teach secular classes. as a matter of text and original you tellding, what can

our listeners about why you believe the free exercise clause properly understood, compels this result? i understand that for entanglement reasons, you might want to craft a test that doesn't have judges second-guessing administering who isn't. but what can you say about original constitutional intention for why they carved this out? prof. volokh: let me make clear, i am not primarily an originalist. ofple who argue in favor religious institutions here are. i am not. i'm not sure how much original meaning has to say about this in part because the original understanding of employment around the time of the framing was that it was not something that the government would heavily regulate. disputes oddly about church employment, and about specifically as to

ministers, as to whether ministers could be appointed by the king, for bishops and the like. this was a controversy back in the middle ages even. as this was a very hot issue in england, with disputes between anglicans, the church of england, puritans, catholics and such. and i do think the framers pretty clearly understood that churches were entitled to select or theirests, ministers or rabbis. i do not think they had much i way of thinking about other employees because the employee relationship was not regulated back then like it was now. that is my personal view. more regionalists would have a different view, but that is my view. i do think though that there are good functional reasons for saying that when a religious

institution hires people to teach religion, it is important government stay out of the decision about who it is to be hired for that. and it is true, that that leads to certain employees not being covered by employment law, just like if a woman wants to be a catholic priest, i sympathize with her desire. she can't. and she loses what would otherwise be a benefit of modern employment law, but that is the nature of what we offer. we decide who it is who gets to spread the faith. the question of whether it is limited to someone being a spiritual leader, cantor's, or judaism, or who run religious music programs, or who teach religion. that's an important question that the courts do not get to

decide. i will say that looking to the title seems to be a mistake. because different denominations use the titles are quite different. my understanding is that in islam, an imam is just a leader who does not need to have a formal title. he is kind of -- my understanding is quakers also have a very egalitarian view. understand,bbis i they are teachers. many rabbis are ordained, but it is not clear what the constitutional significance of that should be. so that is one reason that i find the functional approach more appealing. we still have to figure out where the functional line is drawn. but looking to the title, in some places it is very clear because those institutions are all about sharp divisions of labor and sharp distinctions

between the lady in the clergy. for other religious groups that is just not so. mr. rosen: many thanks for that. sunu, justice alito said what is the difference between an elementary school who teaches -- schoolteacher who teaches everything including religion, maybe not every day because teachers teach a lot of different subjects, but if it is only a quarter of the time, wouldn't teaching some religion be enough to qualify for the exemption? that too.gan said if that is the land the court adopts, any teacher who teaches some religious values in a adopted, school is would that mean a catholic school could fire any teacher aboutay, complaining child abuse in the church, or for being married in a same-sex marriage? essentially, would all teachers in religious schools lose all

their protections under antidiscrimination laws? ms. chandy: yes, i think that is a very possible outcome here if there is not actual analysis. mean thattle does not the title has to say minister. as the women here were hired, they were hired as lay teachers, they were given lay employment benefits. they had no reason to think they were spiritual leaders. they taught out of a workbook. if those were the kind of teachers we are talking about across our country, they should not be denied their employment protection rights based on that. so i do think the harder questions are if you have someone who teaches religion all day long at a high school. but even so as the discussion show during the argument, the question for me is is that person teaching out of a workbook, coming in on tuesday and we teach chapter five, or is she a spiritual director of the religious program of that school. i think we have to think about some of the questions that came

up. one of the phrases was one of the -- what is the primary job of this person. some of those questions do help to think about function. while it is not a stopped clock issue, it is helpful analysis to see. herempared to the teachers where religion is one small piece of being a secular teacher. i thought the whole title discussion was so fascinating because the issue is are you being held out by this organization, are you holding yourself out to be a spiritual leader, as someone who is providing direction on religion. that a few times a week as part of your job doesn't seemed to be aligned with how this whole doctrine developed, which was to say you get to hire and fire your house of worship leader. that is where it started.

now it has extended to someone who is a commission manager and a teacher, and now we want to extend it to a full-time religion teacher, part-time religious teacher. would we all personify the faith? this is a very slippery slope that can have really damaging consequences. mr. rosen: thanks for that. eugene, what about that notion of holding yourself out to be a teacher of religion? e respondent in this case did say, i did not even know i was considered a religious teacher, i thought i was just signing up to teach nonreligious subject, then all of a sudden i went to the hospital for cancer and i got fired. if entanglement is our concern, is the important religious function test, the only way to do it, or should -- could you craft another test which would be narrower?

i think we saw a couple of different claims about holding out. question is holding out a person as a teacher of religion, my understanding is both work without question teachers of religion among other things. if you had to ask them what are you, they might have said teacher of religion, because i have other things to do. but they did teach religion. if you asked one of the students, johnny, what did you study today, and he said religion. from home? -- whom? my teacher who teaches me religion. , the other framing was held out as a spiritual leader. that is a different matter. that would be deliberately a lot

narrower, because a lot of teachers are not held out as spiritual leaders. how was this person presented? was this person described as a likecularly holy person, as a rabbi is a teacher of religion, but also spiritual. a very narrow definition. maybe that is the definition some people might prefer. i am not sure the justices are prepared to say you have to act in a spiritual capacity. some religions are not that into extolling leadership. a understanding is quakers, lot of them said i do not want to be a spiritual leader. we are not a leadership-type group. i am just someone who tries to spread my understanding. is thethe question is, person being held out as a teacher of religion, that would cover pretty much anyone who teaches religion.

if they are akin to a minister or priest, that would be a lot narrower. there are a lot of lines the justices could draw. this is an area where a line has to be drawn. consensusaw -- broad that -- ultimately they will have to draw the line. 's position was if someone really is a teacher of religion, then that is something that is close enough to the minister or the priest or the rabbi. so that is i think where she seems to be inclined to not draw the line between those two. but what happens about someone who says something about religion for a minute a day, and not much else. what happens for someone who teaches it for half an hour? -- i amthe distinction not sure that that's ultimately

something the court will be prepared to do. because the court's view is religious institution, i think, are entitled to either micromanage their teachers, or not micromanage their teachers. a a lot has to do with what you think is the most effective for a particular grade level. you might teacher my workbook, but you imbued that with a lot of your emotion and intellectual property. distinction, you do it with real spiritual qualities, where are you just dialing in, i do not think that is something the court is willing to elevate to constitutional distinction. mr. rosen: thank you for all that. thank you for noting justice kagan's interesting suggestion that perhaps being a religious teacher might be the right place to draw the line. the decision was unanimous, and she joined justice alito, which set forth a test that came up a bunch of times, like preaching,

teaching, holding yourself out, combined with the formal role of a minister, deciding who gets extension. justice alito said many interesting things, and one of them was this. i would be more accountable if we jettison the ministerial exception phrase. why is this not a religious autonomy question? a function of teaching religion to a new generation. what did you make of that suggestion? and is justice alito moving toward applying this religious autonomy exemption more broadly in cases outside of schools, like cases involving the hobby lobby case, involving exemptions from antidiscrimination laws for religiously scrupulous businesses? free was not decided on exercise grounds. going see justice alito in that direction, embracing a broad notion of religious autonomy to say religious

scrupulous businesses along with schools and businesses get this exemption? ms. chandy: i think that is a really important point to rate. -- to raise. we are in this moment where more and more religious institutions like hospitals are emerging and affiliating, running nursing homes. the numbers of people working for those organizations is always increasing. when you have the kinds of employers who are bringing their senses, and you have the expansion of the employees who will be impacted by them, that is extraordinarily helpful. case, birth-control justice ginsburg said there is no talk about the harm to women. here there was ongoing discussion about who is being tomed without any attachment

the first amendment. that came up repeatedly because if you just look at this case on first blush and think it involves a religious institution, you think they have to make some link to some intrusion into the first amendment right. but there are already those protections. under the statute you can hire say --e, you can there are many other ways religious institutions can bring up these issues with their faith. is question in this case that they get a complete blank check and immunity. so i think that sort of framing it has been a fight between religious cetaceans and civil rights that is really harmful. because there is a whole number of exemptions and other ways religious institutions can protect themselves. mr. rosen: many thanks for that.

eugene, what can you tell us about the constitutional sources of this religious autonomy doctrine? it is not located in the original understanding of the first amendment. where does it come from, how broadly does it sweep, and why does it seem to be more categorical in granting immunity than even the religious restoration act? i am wondering where all this is coming from. prof. volokh: right. where it comes from, where most things in the american legal system come from, is a combination of precedent, which is to say the judgment of past justices, and the judgment of present justices. absolutely this is broader than the religious act because it is narrower. let act applied potentially to -- that act applied potentially to all people. that is the way it was designed. obviously we do not have a situation where any employer can

say i refuse to hire women in a leadership role. as long as you conclude the catholic church should be free to refuse to hire women in any leadership role, you have to but alsorrow rule, deeper. it provides more thorough protection than the broader apply to everything. then the question is why would we think that there ought to be some measure of independence for religious institutions from the government telling them you have to accept this person as a leader, you have to accept this person as a teacher of your religion. and if you don't, we will bankrupt you. why would there be that? there is not that for secular institutions. why would that be so for religion? and i think the answer to the courts- the answer the

historically have given is the free exercise of religion, generally speaking, includes the freedom to have your own religious institutions. and one of the most important things a religious institution can do is propagate the faith from generation to generation. and that requires a certain degree of freedom there that is not present in the commercial conscience. that if you cannot have free exercise of religion if the catholic church is told you have to hire women as priests. or if it catholic church -- school is told you have to have monks as well as nuns teaching. if they decide our sense of the ministry -- the way the schools should be -- likewise, synagogues. theyogues -- let's say have a jewish canter. that is a religious this section. judy --

national origin rule. i am not religious, but i am ethnically jewish. i would be counted as jewish. they would not hire me as a canter for any reason, but you can imagine a group saying that my dad is the children of a jewish mother are jewish, whether or not she was raising them jewish. that is a national origin. [indiscernible] the other question is how far does it go. sunu woulde what say, but i assume she would agree that when it comes to the notwithstanding with the state or front of government we want to do -- may want to do, we can protect women

who want to be free from discrimination by the catholic church. the other question is how far that goes. hadorically the courts concerns about the chip ration of church and state, about non-entanglement, has been reluctant to allow the government to supervise hiring and firing decisions as to certain kind of religious institutions. and again, you can imagine that line being drawn for some kind of religious teachers, no kinds of religious teachers, all kinds of religious teachers. but it is part of this process that the court has gone through of trying to figure out what free exercise of religion means, and to the extent that the establishment clause bars undo intrusion into religious institutions. mr. rosen: thank you so much for that. we have time for one question from our great audience for sunu, then closing arguments.

wouldn't you fire a religious teacher who just taught out of the book and was not living what they were teaching? school add onto that, a in ohio has just fired a history teacher for marrying a man, exercising his constitutional rights to marry. he's considering challenging this on the grounds that others who do not follow church teaching, for example, by getting divorced or not following church teachings about abortion or contraception, are not fired. if the teacher were to lose in this case, sunu, might the teacher still bring a claim against the church for selective enforcement of the laws against gay people, for example, and not against other people who violate church teachings? or would there be total immunity and no ability whatsoever to ever challenge any religious school decision about hiring and firing? ms. chandy: yeah, i think a

couple things. one is that the churches do have an ability to hire and fire in terms of using -- those are protections in the statute. the article questions are not at stake here. what is dramatic about this case is that the schools could not and did not provide any nexus between the actions they took and their religious faith or any burden on the first amendment. it is not a sticker saying do you believe in not providing accommodations are not having people with disabilities to work here. they are not saying we never want to have older teachers. they are not tying any other actions to this case to religious faith. so i think we have harder questions about if there is some link. but i think you are absolutely right, that even if there is some link, there is this question of disparate enforcement. are you just applying that rule to people of one race or one

background or one sex? i think you could make some headway there. all that is in the context of making sure that these employees are not a list zone, because then they would be absolute immunity. when you bring their case to you have to say this person under our theory, and if you go the route of deference, that is incredibly damaging. this person is personifying the faith, this person is a camp counselor and sings religious songs in the morning before they take the kids out for a hike. these people are ministers. then they do not even get to press their claim forward. there is no day in court, no ability to have any back-and-forth about if the employment decision was even arguably tied to any first amendment rights. and that is what is so troubling here. mr. rosen: it is time for closing arguments in this completely fascinating case.

eugene, the first one is to you. why is this case important, and why do you believe that the first amendment could -- brought by an employee who carries out important religious functions? prof. volokh: let's start with this example of the camp counselor. justjob is probably not to teach kids how to -- you can imagine two understandings of how our society should function. one is religious institutions are just institutions. like for-profits, like a lot of nonprofits, exactly the same rules. laws, ifscrimination the institution discriminates based on race, origin, in selecting anyone, then that's

their part of life and they are controlled by american law as anyone. another possible understanding is the religion clauses are supposed to make religious institutions special. not completely special. we can still investigate crimes there, let's say. but at the same time when people go to work for a religious institution in a context where they are part of the spreading of the faith, where their job is to spread the faith, whether they are a minister or a canter, or whether they are the principal of a religious school, a teacher, a camp counselor at this religious camp, whose job is to sing religious songs. theyver they are there, have to recognize they are in a different place, a place where

religious institutions get special liberty. why? perhaps because we want to maintain religious institutions as a separate entity that perhaps is a separate alternate place of allegiance and of influence within society, that not everything in society is governed by the generally applicable laws. and in particular, the teaching of religious faith is something that needs to be immune. under the free exercise clause and establishing clause. that is part of the free exercise of religion, the freedom to choose who spread your message to future generations, including the freedom to choose without having your reasoning -- that is more or less what the court says goes at least part of the way. got tocourt unanimously the second model in some measure. the second question is how far that goes. to what extent is there this zone of the government has to

stay out, even when it is trying to protect people against unfairness, the government has to stay out a religious institution's decisions to who will spread the religious faith, and how far it has to go. that is the question, and that is of the justices will be resolving. thank you so much for that. sunu, the last word is to you. please tell our great viewers why this case is important, and why you believe that the first amendment's religious clauses does not vent courts from adjudicating from religious --ims brought by employers ms. chandy: i think we had talked about what is really at stake here. for the millions of health care workers who have been so instrumental in the midst of this pandemic, the last thing we should be saying is because if

you might say a prayer or because you work for a religiously affiliated institution you give up your civil rights. counselor and i was in charge of the morning song, and it was actually a quaker camp. that is my family background. i raised the example to say when andnt to the camp director there is a camp counselor -- i think that is outrageous and cannot be what happens with our hard-fought civil rights laws. if it was someone else who worked at the camp that was director of the camp, that is why i think the question is important. because it is your job, to lead the faith and pass on the faith. i think that should be reflected somehow in your title, in your

training. and these factors that the supreme court not that long ago said were the criteria to look at. so religious duties are but one piece of the puzzle. center,why the national along with -- know theirtions who rights are at stake. [indiscernible] while they may have taught religion as part of the job, they should not be stripped of their civil rights protection. i look forward to seeing what the justices will do. some really interesting questions about where the line will be drawn, how it will be drawn. we look forward to the outcome. mr. rosen: thank you so much, eugene volokh and sunu chandy for a fascinating discussion of

this extremely important case. so muchpan, thank you for taking the time to educate yourself about these important cases. this is an experiment in constitutional education, and we are testing the proposition that citizens are able to listen to these constitution -- complicated arguments with an open mind so you can inform yourself. if after listening this morning you changed your mind about the constitutional issue in the case, in other words if you were initially inclined to rule against the petitioner and then decided that the constitution protected the church, or if you want the other way and were inclined to rule in favor of her, right to me. -- wright to me. tell me how -- faith you are able to engage with these arguments in a rigorous way.

tomorrow's homework is the subpoena cases. the power of congress and the new york district attorney to supreme the -- to subpoena the president. read the briefs. listen closely to all the questions. and together we will learn in the spirit of justice brandeis and reason together so we can enlighten ourselves about the meaning of the constitution. and with that, i will once again say eugene, sunu, thank you so much for joining. thank you everyone for joining. and we will see you tomorrow. bye. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2020] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] announcer: supreme court oral arguments continue tomorrow morning. whether congress and federal prosecutors can subpoena the president's tax returns or other federal documents. president kant -- president trump has claimed a president cannot be investigated while in office. in wednesday, whether state political'-- ]r3e2d '

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