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tv   Sen. Duckworth Discussion on U.S. Alliances in Indo- Pacific  CSPAN  December 6, 2020 3:57am-5:10am EST

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fundamental threat to the american way of life so he devoted himself to preventing roosevelt from being able to enact it. >> contentious transitions, tonight at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span's q&a. >> now, illinois senator tammy duckworth takes part in a discussion on u.s. alliances in the indo pacific region and future relations under the biden administration. a panel looked at china's impact on the region and steps the u.s. should take to strengthen relations. held by the brooking institution, this runs one hour, 10 minutes. ford and is lindsay want to welcome you to today's conversation on the indo pacific and the future of u.s. alliances in the region. u.s. alliance in the region. i'm a fellow here i am a fellow at the foreign policy department and brookings
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and we are pleased to have with us senator tammy duckworth. needs nouckworth introduction. she is an iraq war veteran, former assistant secretary at the department of veterans affairs and now u.s. senator for the state of illinois. illinois. and i think for those of us working and national security, certainly for those of us who are women and national security. we think about people are breaking down barriers, et cetera duckworth is at the top of the list. one of the first handful of women in the army to fly combat missions during operation iraqi freedom. first u.s. energy given birth while in office. and particularly in today's event the first member of congress he was born in thailand in the first asian-american he was elected to congress and the state of illinois. so in addition to the work she's done on defense and veterans affairs, et cetera duckworth's spent a lot of
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time thinking about the military challenges we face in the pacific. she has really been an advocate for the alliances and partnerships we have in the region. and especially in a part of the world she does very well. in times spending time in southeast asia growing up. from the time she spent surfing the u.s. military she understands firsthand why it is so important to have our friends and partners working and fighting alongside us. morgan had this conversation, et cetera duckworth is going up a few words at the top. never going to talk about 30 minutes. when upset about afloat under and turn the floor over to a moderate of an excellent panel talking perspective on the pacific. were thrilled to have you and i want to turn the floor over to you. thank you lindsey first all went apologizes full thing is late because of me. we had a call at 2:00 o'clock i had to go vote. i do apologize for everyone. thank you for waiting on me to
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it cast my vote to go start this event. lexie thank you for that kind introduction. i'm looking forward to our discussion. miss if you were to kick things offered edges that i am american but as born in southeast asia to an american dad and a thai mother. i think my heritage makes me a living example of the friendship between the two nations. for centuries now united states and thailand have learned from and leaned on each other most fairly diplomatically, economically, culturally. whether it's law enforcement national security for our respective economies at two nations helped one another grow and evolve adapting to a world that's ever more connected. in adapting to an error in technology that allows allies half a world to a way to be there for us. that kind of bond with other in the united states doesn't just hold true between u.s.
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and tylan. it's the same with many other countries were fortunate to call our allies throughout the indo pacific region. they work together over the years and even decades even centuries in the name of common sense and for the sake of common good. and now after four years avenue with the administration the use of term alliance is a dirty word here at home for the strength of these bonds is more important than ever. you know as well as i though the indo pacific place houses and the greatest security challenges of our time. nos tensions with iran and to the north russia is determined to find its way back to dominance it ignoring international norms and moving forward no matter what the cost is per into the northeast , north korea remains dangerously erratic.
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send that amongst the chaos. between us and our friends. from the economy to cyber warfare to maritime security the united states council nations big and small throughout the indo pacific reason to be our partners, our friends working together to ensure the safety and prosperity. to ensure all charges are free to trade and travel on the high seas and make sure all parties adhere to the rule of international law. most shangri-la dialogue i'm going to quote perhaps the greatest long-term threat regio region's to seek to undermine rather than undermine the rules -based order. trend exploit militarily. they destabilize the region towards exclusive advantage. we, the united states must stay vigilant against the request within the erosion of
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sites. anything but resolute economies falter. prosperity are threatened and it rains there's no easy fix. no simple way to backtrack. those are just some of the reasons i'm so grateful to be speaking with everyone here today. i'm so grateful that you have all taken interest not only what's exclusively america's interest but in the allies interest as well. they're often one and the same. with that i'm going to turn over and look forward to the discussion. thank you so much for those remarks senator. take us off. had a couple of administrations now i think this will be consistent with the incoming biden have tried to emphasize focusing on our interest in the pacific region. i think a common complaint
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name you heard their partners in the region over the last couple of years as we in the united states is not always put our money where our mouth is. at times we talk a really big game about the pacific but looks like resources like the middle east. congress i think has really been out in front on this issue in the last few years. more recently the pacific dothan budgetary resources for the pacific. from your view diplomatically as well as on the defense side what are some of the key investments of the u.s. needs to be focusing on over the next several years to really demonstrate their walking the walk.
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back one of the things we can do is renegotiate a trade agreement, multilateral trade agreement in the region. i did not vote for the ppp. that imparts the time as a congresswoman i have specific issues with country of origin rules as well as rules that had to do the environmental damage. the languages should not shall in that agreement. i end up voting against it. i think when you ppp type of agreement. left the united states out. we don't have it we cannot shall commit to the region. multilateral trade agreement is critically important on the agenda of things to follow through on. the nbs, the dod's national defense strategy that came out a couple of years ago specifically talked about national security and the indo pacific region as critical to
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our national security. we need to go back to that and really reengage with friends and partners and basically restore u.s. presence in the region. that does not mean we have to be there in a purely defensive posture. we can be in a humanitarian posture. we don't need giant basis we don't teacher re-create a base for example. but certainly having a presence when it comes to cybersecurity based out of singapore is important. the initiative right now that's in the current that would establish cybersecurity partnership between united states and indonesia were that looks like it's going to stay in. hopefully that will sign into law create a new initiative. first and foremost is going to be the economic reengage my has to happen a really real way.
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in addition to what's happening. thank you so much senator. cybersecurity is an important one. but another issue talked a lot about, think president obama did too. i would imagine this conversation will probably continue may be in a different form under president-elect biden. this issue of burden sharing. president trump is probably taken with the very narrow slice of this conversation and has focused mainly on the support costs in places like japan and korea. there's a broader conversation to be had when you talk about burden sharing. how we modernize and partner relationships. where the areas are what may be partners have more to contribute. and where partners to what more so they work alongside us. what are some of the opportunities that we can think about burden sharing in
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our respective goals and missions in our life it's may be it a little more strategic way in the coming years? >> i think we should have this discussion wears a burden sharing not purely on monetary terms. i mean you can have that discussion more with nato where alliances and allies are wealthier. them greater financial capabilities. in the indo pacific region in particular you talk about burden sharing you have to recognize some of the burdens that can only be shouldered by some of the allies are those who are not our allies. those were in the region per you have to recognize a portion of burden sharing that is just as important. and encourage other nations to step up. what they've been doing in terms of resisting the chinese expansion into the region. and then into territorial
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waters on the oceans or even indonesia you see the same thing. really give a standing up to their waters. that is not necessary on monetary base but a commitment -based type of burden sharing. it will continue to grow partnership with the same share priorities. that is with navigation in the region and adherence to the international law regimes. it was a role space as opposed to strict dollar space. >> host: excellent points. on the treaty, what would you say in terms of the united states is diagnosed in the near term?
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switch it you know i don't know. [laughter] i'm very interested in moving in that direction. but again we do not even have a named nominee to be defense secretary yet. it is certainly something i will be having in my conversations with whoever the nominee is as we move forward. sue had let me follow-up as of the points you made about vietnam, indonesia, on the last several years the united states is obviously focus a lot on our partnerships in southeast asia. it's economically important countries with young vibrant economies. there's a lot of shared interest have their own sovereignty while
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president-elect biden has talked a lot about the importance of strengthening our alliances and partnerships, that also affects tony's refrain importance of democratic values and human rights back into u.s. foreign policy. there's some difficult conversations to be had there with partners. i'm wanting from your perspective how we balance those two foals in the alliance conversations that we have especially with southeast asia. >> guest: first and foremost we have to be consistent in our approach. we have to consistently stand up for democratic values and for those who are championing true democracy, representative democracy. and be approved authoritarianis authoritarianism. that is who we are at the
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nation those are the values we are founded on. knows what we have must adhere to. whenever we strayed away from those values and has never worked out well for us. another might be an instant to do that that is not the way to go. and frankly it's a different world now than the 50s or 60s. and we have to recognize the move for these democracy movements. they're only going to grow. we need to oppose those whether it's insurgents terrorist groups, just as much as we need to talk to those who may be empower who are trying to oppress demonstrations. and people are just asking for with their own political proces process.
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i think we can do both spray think we can have blunt upfront conversations especially with her allies and friends. but listen, we stand for democracy. we want to work with you but cannot come at the expense of our democratic expense. >> host: you talked a lot about norms and values. one of the more notable things about the past year has been we have seen a lot of our partners in asia speaking up on issues like they problems in hong kong, taiwan, and pushing back against chinese actions in some of those areas. and in return, have paid a pretty steep price. in particular i'd point most recently into a trade agreement between australia and china over china's rest
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take a jump frustration on covid or hong kong or in the south china sea. that step impacting something like $20 billion of straight exports. they would to see in this situation because i'm sure it's on the first partners this is happened to, it will not be the last. the u.s. has their back. what would you like to see the u.s. taking to be more proactive about backing up partners like australia when they get into these kinds of situations where they are suffering really direct economic force in beijing? me too i think this was back to the first economic engagement. we sort of dealt with this part of the world as an afterthought almost. and when president trump begot the ppp that negatively affected economic engagement in the region.
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lingua should certainly looking at increasing her engagement to the indo pacific region. especially working to it in advance a multilateral agreement. but having a stronger bilateral agreement with specific partners like austria for example. in order to support and show them we do have their back. for the last four years you had a president who is not wanted to engage internationally. whether it's national security wiser economically. i think you see the biden administration, especially when you look nominees he is already announced, they are going to be much more engaged. we commit both economically and security wise. but he certainly would support, i support our armed services and commerce committee. i'm uniquely positioned to talk to both sides of this with economic and security wise. i think more trade agreements are necessary. and looking at what we can do
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perhaps in a bilateral basis. negative pushback from the chinese. >> thank you. you know when we look at what happens in places like hong kong over the last year or two, i think something that has been a concern for a lot of people is that perhaps taiwan could be next. and as they wrap up some of the military, political and economic pressure that has been deployed against taipei over the past few years. how concerned are you about that problem? and what steps do you think? in addition to the other issue of arms sales, can be other like-minded partners as well preserves international states for taiwan. >> guest: this goes back to one thing i been pleasantly surprised by the administration. they have been engaging significantly with taiwan both
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economically and on measures related to covid-19. the administration has taken a number of steps that signals investment in the relationship including something senior officials visited the island earlier this year. hhs secretary is there the under secretary for growth environment was there. these are the highest ranking members of the u.s. government to visit taiwan and literally decades. i think that while it has been an unprecedented, those visits are in line with the established u.s. policy. i think we need to continue this type of visits. and to raise up the level of engagement with more secretary or cabinet level business as well. think the administration has continued to build on this agreement, these engagements. last month the state department did host a delegation from taiwan for the inaugural taiwan u.s.
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prosperity dialogue pretty think we can push that a little bit more. it's basically continued to engage even more frequently and at a higher level that we can bring to our friends and allies from around the world to participate in those that's even better. >> host: i'm glad to hear say that. i think this is an area we think about the taiwan policy were bipartisanship is very importan important. i think it's an important message of continuity that you are making. that question i had for you you mentioned partners from elsewhere in the world. and something that is been really interesting over the last few years is the european allies and partners have become more interested in engaging with us as well. i am curious rethink their particular opportunities to think about ways that our european partners could be more engaged in the pacific. and having more support for
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asian allies? speech i think the indo pacific region is a region that is a growing middle class. that's a whole big marketplace for everyone. the allies and the united states. i think that economic engagement is just as critical to our national security. and really having a much more presence in the region and having much more in terms of formal economic agreements is critically important. and i think it is actually beneficial to our european allies. because this is a whole new market. i see over the last ten years the growth of disposable income in the middle class that isn't growing in places like indonesia and malaysia for example. we long thought about singapore as being a developed nation. we look at places like indonesia and malaysia you see
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this exponential growth in the middle class. and thailand to in a marketplace that is hungry for goods and services coming out of the united states and out of europe. if we don't fill that void, the prc, they are moving in and providing some of the goods and services. we just need to engage in. that is the way to pool our allies into the security discussion to the economic discussions first. >> host: that is an excellent point. everything you've said today emphasizes how much we talk about the indo pacific not just about the military challenges we may face in the region. but we really have to think about the region from a whole of government context that is so true.
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because we have economic interest there that you do not also think about the conversation about norms and values as being connected to this economic and security interests. you are not looking at the full puzzle. so senator duckworth i want to thank you so much for taking the time to join us today. it has been an absolute pressure to have you. and with that rest i'm going to turn it over to you and our panelists for the rest of the conversation. and i thank you. >> thank you everyone. thank you so much older members of the audience for joining us today. my name is rush i am the director of the initiative i'm a fellow at the institution. i'm glad to be joined by three stellar colleagues of the institution is going to help us think of the future of the u.s. elides the indo pacific. in many ways these individuals represent precise of the people he went on the stage for allies and partners and southeast asia and northeast asia and europe. let me tell you a little bit
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about our panelists we have with us. senior fellow the brookings institute of our products. i'm also joined by jonathan who is the chair in southeast asian studies. at brookings a senior fellow bird also joined by senior fellow here at the center on u.s. and europe. so, to get us started i like to turn first to how u.s. ally partners are thinking at the indo pacific and the incoming biden administration. either way, for all for audience members were going to be continuing with the special it's about 3:30 p.m. the stick with this right until then. so maybe biggest begin with you. how is india thinking about the u.s. role in the region. if you couldn't answer that question, maybe you could address the question he got from her audience from the national war college. he is wondering what changes you perceive under a biden administration?
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i think you might be muted. thanks much. >> thanks rush. i'm going to try to address that in a sustained way. take a quick terms of the indo pacific i think the idea that was really a japanese idea with the australians for it and then and india could have adopted. over the last few years you've seen india, mostly because it changes due to the realities on the ground. including some things that the u.s. is also concerned about which is china's increase into the indian ocean. i think the recognition that happens in the pacific does not stay in the pacific. or is it said you cannot deal the indian ocean and the pacific ocean a separate watertight theaters. the region itself is crucial for india.
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in some ways it sees the challenges in the region, particularly to the rule in that region is fairly similar there's a lot of overlap between the challenges of the u.s. in the india c. and prime amongst them in some way is the rising china behavio behavior. including the actual changes to the status quo. whether that is on the south china sea in 2017 of the ongoing crisis between china and india this year. for india, the u.s. as part of the response it sees is necessary in the region. india's response is said to be up its own game in the region including adjusted approach to its neighbors as its extended neighborhood so out include southeast asia as well. there is a real recognition
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largely because capacity constraints, capability constraints they cannot deal the challenge alone. so what has done is made india more willing to deepen cooperation with the u.s. including in ways that would have been hesitant to do otherwise. so for example india has had sort of been informal doctrine in the region about the south asian neighborhood be simply welcome the u.s. defense agreement. you've not seen the action from india in the past. providing an up dating and the u.s. finding a range of agreements, enabling agreements to make the u.s. and indian military more able to operate together in the future. nuc indium probably welcomes the free and open indo pacific that comes out of the trump administration and has assigned india to like the
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competitive view of china even though it has some problems with some parts of the approach including the heated rhetoric. i think they look at the biden administration, the u.s. for india it remains the most crucial partner of its various partners in the region. it's not just the u.s. that deepens times with japan, good thing for the u.s. is these are all american allies as well. but even amongst these, i think the u.s., they've called the u.s. and indispensable partner. they've been looking for opportunities to move the ball forward and number of areas including security, regional connectivity, building resilience the community fairly broadly. and then cooperation and national and suggestion i think they will watch the biden approach to the region very carefully. it will particular watch the biden administration approach to china. the question will be will the
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u.s. continue with strategic competition? will it limit competition with china because of domestic priorities or a desire to get china's cooperation? i think these questions will shape, with the u.s. and india might be willing to do together. i think broadly and briefly will be quite pleased with a set of people that it is quite familiar with. we'll probably for some rebalancing and the relationship it is not a relationship that needs repair like some others. and on the china approach they will be pleased with a biden administration emphasis on working with allies and partners of not imposing unilateral tariffs on ally partners. biden administration's pledge to reengage national institutions they've been very concerned about growing chinese influence. so i think to round that up i
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think but we would like to see with the biden administration is the continuation of the trends that we have seen between the bush, obama, trump administration. that the u.s. is seen as an important goal in the region the obama administration with the linchpin of the rebound to trump administration scalded eight key democratic anger. i think the u.s. essentially seen maybe not explicitly. but as a strategic counter balance and economic alternative and democratic contrast to chin china. in other basis has supported india's rise and has invested india's rides. you can expect some adjustments that will help the administration will continue that. and also will not throw the baby out with the bathwater in terms of some of the things he trump administration is done that they've actually liked. spect thank you so much. i want to turn onto jonathan. you've written all southeast asia of the front lines does
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not want to choose between washington and beijing. so we see the india side basically tied close between u.s. and india. what we see in southeast asia? what is the picture there? >> it is a complex and diverse picture. the first things i say about southeast asia is it is very diverse. eleven countries tend to make up the association of southeast asian nation. but broadly speaking if you are kind of asking about the indo pacific for instance in that strategy coming out of washington. and also japan, australia and so on. they are genuinely uncomfortable with it. and i would say they have some specific issues with the trump administration's approach to that concept in particular. on general terms, they are concerned that it is kind of an anti- china coalition that dismisses.
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and they say that or feel that way because in an ideal world they want to have constructive relations with both united states and china. and given the geography of the region and china's growing economic strength and their integration with china, in some ways they cannot afford to choose. that's three get to the problem with the trump policy over the past three or four years there's very hard rhetoric that basically talks about a choice about free and oppressive divisions of the region economic creditor that has death trap diplomacy for instance. this is in a context where they're desperate for infrastructure if they want to meet their economic needs there is a death problem in laos perhaps cambodia. but broadly speaking's not so
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much about opposing china but managing china's rise. they also recognize it's here to stay to issue their own kind of language last are they issued a document called the outlook on the indo pacific. as more of a centered approach strives to make it be the end and core or the foundation the main emphasis of his inclusiveness or should not be about about excluding china to
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pick up on some of the themes of center duckworth on economic development. it's coming in in january think there is a sense of relief with that experienced diplomat here this is on the op-ed's and so on in the hope it will reengage with doubt these asian mark, rebuild ties. think one of the most important things is they will show up for regional summits at a high leve level. for southeast asia companies that is really important. but just as important as that, they want the biden administration to know the region has changed. i think the incoming diplomats know this. they really want to make the point that china's gotten stronger put in particular
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china's gotten worse stronger in the economic realm. practicing economic statecraft in a way that is really expanded not just its economic power, but its overall power. in helping to achieve its strategic goals along the way. and i think even before the pandemic, there was a regional survey that showed policy elites in southeast asia felt that among, when they were asked what country or institution is their most strong in asia or in southeast asia, china was rated a 79%. the u.s. was only 8%. japan was about 4%. and obviously i think there are strategic gains that flow from these economic realities. and i could tell that senator duckworth was also pointing this out. think it's a very interesting point to consider for the incoming administration. >> thanks jonathan.
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think one of the audience members said germany had a policy document that received a lot of attention uk's thinking about the military presence in asia. so what did all this mean on the indo pacific? would you think the european allies and partners specifically want to see from the biden administration within that region? >> guest: thank you for much first of all for inviting me to it speak with my colleagues and also listening to center duckworth was fascinating. there is a great deal to discuss and work on here. i want to bounce off a really excellent picker that lindsey ford the moderator with senator doctor work wrote in late september called sustaining the future of indo pacific defense strategy. it's essentially a critique of americans indo pacific defense
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strategy. but makes the points that in fact argue that makes a case why there is a role for it allies here. in the key point that she makes is the u.s. and the incoming biden administration needs to find the appropriate balance tween deterring high-end conflict encountering the coercion. in other words, in other words what should be in the hybrid gray zone conflicts. now emphasis obviously was on the allies in the indo pacific theater. and on the role for the american diplomatic and economic agency to play. you can extend that argument to the europeans. but in my view that's not where it ends. so what would be the role for europeans there? i see four things. one, military, second,
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political medic leverage and fourthly in probably key point is economic heft. we europeans have traditionally thought of ourselves as essentially trade partners of china. it's really only the uk and france that has a traditional military presence in the pacific. they think of as essential to their role as nuclear power. and where the germans are extremely reluctant to think of their alliances in the indo pacific region as in any way security-related. that has completely changed, particularly in germany. there is no recognition that the chinese aggressiveness in its region has an impact on our trade. in other words as the defense
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minister said recently freedom of navigation at the indo pacific for the relationship with china. but there is also increasingly in europe the chinese strategy is strategic and global. and is highly active in european. essentially acquiring digital real estate which, not just serves immediate chinese strategic purposes could also has deployed in a secondary way to fit the europeans window that's necessary in case they are developing the agency with the china. : :
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>> strategic rival and a security threat to them, and they are trying to figure out -- they are both traumatized by trump and want to embrace the biden situation, but it would force them to choose. this is what the europeans are having to navigate. there are two papers that came out this week the tell you a little bit about where the europeans are going. nato 2030,oup called that has an extended chapter on china. it does not mention the indo pacific at all. literally zero. it is all about nato and china. by theek's paper
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european commission on a u.s. agenda for global change, interestingly does embed the transatlantic policy in a larger context. as has already been pointed out by people who have read it, it is ambiguous. it recognizes the american china -- we agree on the strategic challenge by china's growing assertiveness, even if we do not always agree on the best way to address it. there you go. they are proposing new u.s. dialogue to address these issues. i will end on this -- a number of these german guidelines that you mention, they focus on the military aspect of this.
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it is particularly interesting that the germans have moved in this direction. minister hasfense been particularly forthright on this. saidas among other things that we suggested a bilateral navy relationship with german naval officers on australian chaps, and next year deploying a german freight to australia to deploy with them in operation. that is a change in german thinking. smile at the thought of german trade and maybe the australians are smiling as well. it is a huge political signal. the question that remains open, though, is whether the europeans and the germans are willing to at their economic heft behind
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strategy. that is the biggest leverage. that raises a huge amount of questions we can discuss. questions. >> thank you. that is an exceptional amount of questions we have for the first round. how to turn to changing perceptions of china. that's clearly one of the key takeaways from this year particularly post covid and assertiveness around the world. i will zoom in on how that perception is affecting each country and also the politics within each country. there's a lot written about the casualties there as well as the diplomacy on social media and mixed degrees of success there. could you talk about how all of that is shaping in public opinion in weather that can lock in shifts ahead?
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>> i just want to say. countries in china, i think we will see a lot more of this interaction between european and pacific countries, not just because of the interest but because everybody spin had some uncertainty, there will always be this at the back of the various ones. what happens if this happens again in four years. i think india, which will see china as a challenge almost since the 50s, i think the one for the china india relationship, which i think is focusing much more on europe, it has been the chinese handling of covid the boundary, that is the one.
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among the public, you even see that border crisis in the 13th month of covid, you see it in the public, in a way that's usually reserved in these other black stands and you think about strategic communities, the particularly former mets china has, it seems that it's not an inflection spot, the already low levels of trust have fallen even further, if they exist at all and almost all have called for china to be reassessed. we've had people, like the former secretary in india say the pma and lateral attempts to change the status quo of the boundaries has left the agreements the countries have
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tried to manage the boundary dispute, those lie in a heap of rubble. that has resulted in the government of foreign ministry and again just this week, they see it very similarly, the agreements between the two countries that have violated the basis for all the corporation and expansion of the broader china and india relationship. essentially he said you cannot expect to violate agreements and have the relationship remain. i think the covid has also weakened arguments of those in government calling for india to do more with china, less with the u.s. or those arguing that as we saw in the u.s. a few years ago, the deeper economic side and broader productivity with china would alleviate political trade. these things might have brought
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to the existing concerns about the lack of transparency, committing to the rules of this order and growing influence in the pacific international institution and it is a particularly of concern, a new concern that china is pointing to democracies and saying look, we do better than this. this idea the ideological competition, we just starting to hear this discussion in india. i'll end with, this would be all very well if there will want specific quality results. i think some concerns, of particular concern with india that has resulted in specific policy actions and i don't mean at the boundary for economic in particular concerns have been but overdependence on china, chinese companies have made certain sensitive areas and in some cases, using them for this
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information so we have seen a slew of indian policy measures not just what got a lot of attention that will restrict or increase chinese activity in a number of economic technology, telecom, public diplomacy, educational exchange and so that has been a big move in an area with there's a lot of focus on resilience. being production home are diversifying suppliers and finally, i would say working where we started, and years decided he needs to work with like-minded partners for more than it has in ways that it was reluctant to in the past. >> thanks. sure you could talk about the relationship with china it's a diverse question so maybe you can go through as many as you
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are able but in particular, what about teaming up in the last year, has it affected the way they look at china? on the other side, was recently signed, what does it tell us about the region thinking about china as well? >> again, the diversity factor in southeast asia, ten states individually trying to balance as china rises in the rivalry, depending on geography, a sense of economic opportunity, history and other factors. this includes our allies in thailand and the philippines and important, emerging partners like vietnam and indonesia. philippines have tried to, under
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the president tried to get more economic developments in the initiative, not to successfully compared to other countries in the region but they have maintained and kept an eye on security partnership and relationship with the united states. vietnam in some ways has been more pushing back against china in the south china sea but also perhaps the most vulnerable so they know there is a line they cannot cross basically have a border and being on china's doorstep. i think the key points we need to remember, broadly speaking, the region remains very distrustful with china. the same survey i mentioned earlier made it very clear that policy throughout southeast asia are distrustful of china's long-term teacher contention.
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this provides real opportunity for the u.s., security concerns will continue and there is an opening as china continues to be more assertive plenty assertive during the pandemic, as you mentioned. china has also been occasionally handed in may's maybe ways we saw a few years ago, not so much recently. there was a music video in the philippines the chinese embassy released called the onesie with a showcase there covid relief on one hand but legitimize their claims to waters as their own territory on the other end. there obviously was quite a social media reaction in the philippines so china is facing this, a trust deficit in the region but what is interesting and given the pandemic, southeast asia, i think leaders
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have been particularly hesitant good to criticize china over the pandemic. we haven't seen but maybe we have seen of australia are coming out of europe for instance. i think it is because they see china as economic recovery, the potential engine for their own way out economically from a real stressful situation they are seeing economically in their own country. here, i think, one thing i am concerned about is the secrecy of economic recovery could have potentially long-lasting effec effects. as china comes out of the gate first, the region is looking obviously at this moment much more into the united states. the vaccine diplomacy will be interesting because they have been much more assertive in the front and get the news i have
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been seeing about china for their vaccine development, at least so far, hasn't been quite as positive as what we have been hearing from pfizer or moderna here. what you mentioned, this is seen as a real triumph and diplomacy in the region, a lot of people see it as a china agreement but they pushed it along. china is a key signatory as is japan. i think what we will see is integration between northeast asia and south east asia. the only more integration between china and southeast asia which will continue these trends that i am discussing. for southeast asia getting back to the core question on perception, while they have a distrust of china long-term, i
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think they are realist and look to the future, they try to estimate china's footprint 20, 30 years from now, figure out potential economic opportunities will be and even though they have concerns, which they will continue to voice, somehow it tempers things going forward and it is a dynamic we will see for years to come. >> something i wanted to ask you about, you mentioned within the diplomacy in india, may have had more in europe and for the audience but the more assertive nationalistic diplomacy engaged in propaganda so have you seen that affect public opinion of all does not shape european strategy at all was driving what you mentioned earlier, your
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perspective is much deeper in these elements. >> thank you. that is an excellent question. it is a very complex one and there are different levels. i would say there is a distinct sense that the chinese diplomacy generated enormous blowback between public opinion. it is amazing. i was just sneaking a peek at twitter and there is a conversation about comments of one of these seen editorials of the global time in response to senator blackburn. a vehicle for spending that kind of stuff. i do think it is essential in shaping public opinion changes. certainly one of the more notable departments in recent
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months was what seemed to be like a goodwill tour on the chinese foreign minister while two european capitals where the german foreign minister need it intentional sit to stand next to him and rebuking him. they made it very clear that they share american concern about taiwan. none of this can make folks in beijing very happy. i don't think this is where i thought it would go. they have only themselves to blame for it. it has been astounding. if this was supposed to put the fear of god and politicians, i would say it has the reverse effect. then there is the business level which in some ways what happened to european russian trade
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relations a decade early, a recognition that the benefits come with high cost and there is a distinct lack of property and the ultimate purpose of what was thought to be a hugely profitable trade relationship is economic in ways that seem to be directed at coordinating europeans purposes including in europe. that has really moved the needle in europe. again, the europeans think mostly that interdependence is the destiny and their openness in the destiny. that seems to what denies them against europe as the russians
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have done, the trump administration has done and the chinese government is also doing. creates huge concerns and they have all been drivers of this debate in europe about how to achieve some measure of autonomy without closing european borders or decoupling. >> thanks. i want to turn to an audience question quickly, this is not as specific. the question from leslie from chat house. her question is about my or should it look like on the engagement particularly whether it's economics, finance, technology, how can we think about this?
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should be separate in asia and europe? should be combined? should be looked at different arrangements for different issues? we often talk about multilateral's we don't specify what it should look like. help folks look at this a little more creatively. >> that's a great question and one thing i think we will talk about a lot because the biden team has made clear they would like to get back to thinking about multilateralism without only doing it in multilateral positions. i think that is speaking from experience, the obama administration in ways the ppp stems out of frustration with the wto not moving forward i think what you see, i suspect,
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flexible multilateralism i think is different issues, international organizations, better coordination and those organizations, perhaps like-minded partners to ensure his principles and standards are enforced. i think you will see a different issues, different groups of coalitions of democratic countries, but i think on some issues you will see it would make sense to have patient and europeans, i suspect the u.s. will have to find ways to bring in countries that are like-minded but not necessarily democracy so how do you fit into a country like vietnam? it kind of has shared views but
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doesn't quite fit back on those metrics. then you have a set of thinking about multilateralism on issues where even if the biden administration says it will defeat china, for some issues, it cannot be solved without china at the table so how do you then bring them in with them in those formats but i think the way to do that is to ensure that you don't leave the corporation and their interest on those global issues on global health and issues and throwing partners under the bus so i think i think the other word we will hopefully about his solidarity. something brought up so i think you see different formats, i
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think it will be a lot more flexible and i think we are leading into the coalition and institutions sometimes they will be outside. >> you like me to chime in. >> yes, i don't know if you heard me, i would love for you to jump in. what are the approaches in democracies in southeast asia? some sites might be able to speak freely and others might be concerned. >> also responding to the audience question a little bit in a different way but i think it is true, it will be interesting to see how the coalition of democracies approach or democracies in the first years of the administration will be perceived
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in the region because there are political challenges on that front. they already mentioned vietnam. the other country that has a lot of strategic overlap in some ways with the united states. it may be the fastest growing economy this year, in the world, not just the region because it's been successful governance and economic reform. it's managed to respond but obviously not a democracy. other countries are challenged whether it's philippines or thailand at the current time in the clinton administration are other times when the u.s. has a strong democracy approach, at least at the leadership level,
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it has not been well received. i think that can be quite challenging. the perception could be quite different in a civil society. if i could address the other broader question as well and picking up on what senator duckworth mentioned, i was pleased to see her mention something like a tpp, multilateral reinstatement in the region. i think it is so critical. the trump administration has talked for three or four years about reciprocal free bilateral agreements but there has not been a lot of interest. i think one thing that will be very interesting to see, and what the region most wants, is
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whether or not the u.s. can somehow come back twice multilateral engaged trade agreement with the region and how do we get there? congressional hearings, some kind of national discussion about how we can make foreign policy work for the american workers and middle-class reconnect both domestic and foreign policy of this country. i think it will be a real challenge but the region is hoping for the. >> thank you. what is the perspective on the coalition approaches or multilateral approaches? >> obviously europeans think why they are the world champions. they can rope in power and make them behave. i do think, this is slight but i do think in recent years, it's
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been a somewhat sobering recognition of there's only so much. i went to pick up what they said and say the perception in europe is not just what if it's just for years for the perception is wait, what if it went for two years? this administration will be even more constrained than it already is now? so i think the emphasis is very much on doing things not taking the usual european decades long dialogue and then you take the approach very quickly harvesting low hanging fruit and sorry, this is a horrible metaphor but bring in the two by fours that will help, that will salvage
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pragmatic flexible multilateralism for future of additional ones. one focus has to be the w eto. it is absolutely crucial. i think an overall comprehensive trade approach, you're going to look at the sectoral approaches, line two, whatever works as somebody who once studied international law, i am uncomfortable, it is existing customer at the time but in many areas, things have really moved on, particularly exploitation of
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the seabed and also in cables and listening devices. there is real work to be done here that is not covered at all and where it is worth having conversations, was there a new more comprehensive approach? i think that would be much more minded and engaged than they were 30 years ago when it was finally at the un. >> thank you to all of you. i think we are approaching our 3:30 p.m. and here. now to take a moment for thinking our audience. for those of you who submitted questions, i hope you found this interesting. thank you for joining us, our panel and senator duckworth for taking time out of your busy day
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to speak about this important issue. take you all. good afternoon and evening. >> it is 1:30 a.m. there for me. >> thank you so muc >> tonight on book tv on c-span2, 9:00 p.m. eastern on afterwards, a correspondent and his book on the politics and everyday lives of white, working-class americans in appalachia. unproductive national attitude about work. i think we really sneer at people who have jobs that require college degrees, we sneer at people who work at jobs we all need -- working counters and gas stations for i worked the overnight shift at a 7-eleven myself once. we tend to think of people in
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those jobs as "losers" and we treat them bad socially. in a better functioning society, this would be seen as a first step toward self-sufficiency. >> he is interviewed by a washington examiner columnist and c-span contributor. ♪ journal,'s washington every day we are taking her calls live on the air on the news of the day and we will discuss policy issues that impact you. coming up this morning, a discussion about president trump's legacy and the incoming biden administration. we will speak with a president and ceo about civil rights groups and the incoming biden administration. watch c-span's washington journal, live at 7:00 this morning. join the discussion with your
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phone calls, text messages and tweets. senatoria republican kelly loeffler and democratic challenger will debate today. this race is one of two georgia runoff elections that will be held on january 5. we will have live debate coverage at 7:00 eastern, and you can listen with the free c-span radio app. in his first campaign appearance since the election, president -- they face runoffs on january 5. at least one of them needs to win in order for republicans to retain control of the senate. ♪ there ain't no doubt i love this land usa ♪ess the


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