Skip to main content

tv   The Atlantic Council Hosts Discussion on U.S.- China Relations  CSPAN  December 19, 2020 3:08am-3:57am EST

3:08 am
the go at, or listen using the free c-span radio app. >> with coronavirus cases increasing across the country, use our website, navirus to follow the trends, track the spread, and watch updates on demand, anytime, at >> now, an atlantic council forum on u.s. china relations. panelists discussed china's google influence and explore how the u.s. can work with allies to confront and partner with china on various foreign policy challenges. >> good morning. i'm the senior vice-president of the atlantic council and director of the center for
3:09 am
strategy and security. over the past 75 years, led by the united states, like-minded allies and partners constructed a rules-based international system that has helped generated unprecedented peace and prosperity throughout the world. the system has been coming under significant strain recently from a number of sources, including the united states recently, but also the reemergence of great power competitions with china. the chinese leadership poses a significant challenge to u.s. and democratic allies everywhere. the question of how to most effectively address china's dramatic rise in a way that protects america's and allies way of life and security and prosperity is really the most important issue of our time and will remain so for quite a while. we're really in a new era of history. like-minded allies and partners came together many times in the last century to defeat
3:10 am
autocratic revisionist challenges. hic revisionist challenges. working together, once again, they can send off a different, but still significant 21st century challenge from really the chinese commune case party leadership, and while there has been a lot of activity and discussion about the set of challenges from china, in the center for strategy and security, we think it's critical to focus and channel that activity in pursuit of an actual strategy, which by definition should outline what should be regarding china and also how we recommend the united states work with its eye lies and partners to achieve those goals together. and it's really only by working together that the approach to children on the major issue can have any ultimate success. i'll turn to my colleague in a second to discuss the atlantic county strategy on china that we will release today. but before i do, i want to
3:11 am
first of all, thank steve hadley for their tireless guidance. and to support the efforts, this particular strategy paper on china and also for over five years throughout the years, on the atlantic council's paper theory. and secondly, regarding those watching, police submit any questions you have for our panel on twitter and the hash tag posted #renewing us leadership. jeff. >> thank you, barry. to anyone joining us today, before we go to the panel, let's highlight some of the work the atlantic center has done to develop u.s. strategies for china. global strategy 2021, an ally
3:12 am
strategy for china. en unique, it benefitted from input and contributions from experts who attend to democracy and make up the tag. and furthermore, strengthened through the strategies that have participated in the atlantic council strategy consortium, to discuss security issues facing the u.s. and allies. we're fortunate and grateful that dr. nye participated in this report. the opportunities presented by china were clearly delineated long and short-term goals. the long-term paper arguments and allies, and may seek a relationship with china that permits confrontation and permits cooperation and issues of mutual issues and concern. given the confrontational path taken by china, argues that u.s. and allies should take steps to prevent china from
3:13 am
undermine a rules base in the system. and put forth three elements for achieving these goals, including efforts to strengthen the u.s., its allies and partners for a new era of power competition, defending against destabilizing chinese behavior and beijing violations for the rules-based system and finally engaging china from a position of strength to cooperate on shared interest. and the other work, and more of the pipeline last year, position, for the managed competition, which put forth a strategic approach for the full spectrum of challenges. and transatlantic, the atlantic council worked broadly and continue to be working with states. with that i would like to turn to our panel which includes an impress self slate of speakers.
3:14 am
it will be # moderated-- before joining axios bethany was a reporter fot international consortium of journalists. and doing the inner workings in camps in shinshon. >> thank you for the kind introduction, jeff. thank you to the atlantic council for hosting this event. i'm very pleased today to be able to introduce the prestigious panel who is going to discuss this report and i recommend that anyone watching today, please check out the report, it helps present some new answers to the big questions that many of us have been asking for the past several years, how can the u.s. and its allies address china in
3:15 am
a constructive and yet, also firm way. so with that, i will attribute the panelists, first, we have dr. sara kinsberger, strategy and security at the institute for security policy. we also have dr. crannic of the global initiatives and at the atlantic council. and we have the director of the center on united states and europe and senior fellow at the brookings institution. i'm going to start out by asking one question of each panelist and that panelist will take two or three minutes and i will go onto the next panelist and i'll ask a few questions to get the discussion started with the panelists and among the panelists, with about 15 minutes remaining on the panel
3:16 am
i will open up to questions from the audience. if you have not already submitted a question, please feel free to do that. we'll see #renewingusleadership on twitter. so sara, i would like to start with you. the question i would like you to answer is how severe is the challenge that china poses to a rules-based international system? >> thank you, bethany and thank you to the center and the colleagues present who wrote this tremendous report, for hosting this session and for having me. i'm thrilled to have been able to contribute a little bit of input to the report that jeffrey and matthew wrote and i think this report is really able to well outline what the challenge is like. and what the nature of this challenge is. and this is one part of answer
3:17 am
to bethany's question. and part of the problem is that it has been hard to agree among allies what the nature of that challenge is and how severe it is because china has a way of showing very different faces to different parts of the world. so, some parts of the world perceive china primarily as actually a partner in a lot of infrastructure development and contact. whereas other parts of the world feel the heat of military challenges from china such as india right now, taiwan or the nations in the vicinity of the south china sea that has conflicting territory claims with china. so among the democracies that are like part of this-- well, alliance of like-minded nations that try to grapple
3:18 am
with china. there are some stark differences how they perceive the challenge and i think from my point of view, speaking as a european, as a german, the systemic nature of this challenge is really worrisome. china is just such a big country, so influential in a political sense and so weighty in an economic sense and so attractive as a market and as a source of funding in some areas of europe. and that is really difficult to enqvistage how to rein china in. we've been seeing so many instances and difficult behaviors from china starting this year and much earlier. that it has become difficult to face this challenge.
3:19 am
and that's my long answer to to your question, it's a new type of china in the international system that we haven't seen in this form before, that forces us to find new ways of confronting that challenge. it has substantial elements to it and putting out the narrative to diplomacy and things we haven't been dealing with in that form before. and even a challenge in terms of what are the rules that we are trying to do defend here? so this is in my view the problem like how do conceptualize this challenge. how do really define what we need to defend and how to go about defending it in this report and makes a very, very substantial contribution to getting to this better position of defending against things we do not want to see.
3:20 am
>> thank you so much. sarah. i really like how you highlighted the new aspects of the problems that china poses and i think that explains why the debate is divisive. it forces us to question many of our assumptions and even many of our values. how can we uphold our values while also trying to make space for a power that we don't even fully understand. i'd like to move on now to matthew. and i would like to ask you, as a national institution, one of the future of the u.s. alliances is they are supported by and played out through international institutions and organizations. how are those organizations supporting us in time. are they weak? are they failing? are they strong? do we need new ones to address
3:21 am
the china challenge? >> thanks, bethany. before turning to your question i'd like to say a couple of words about the strategy paper we released today and why i think it's unique. the first reason, i think it does present an international approach. it's not just another report from an analyst in washington about what washington should do about this challenge, as was mentioned it was developed in collaboration with experts from the d-10 countries and their lead author for the report and there are collaborating authors from all 10 of the d-10 countries including sarah. so, maybe provides the beginning of something that could become a internationn int free world approach to the problem. secondly i think the strategy is unique. it does clearly layout the goals to proceed. and i thought with the trump administration, what is the
3:22 am
goal of competition, competition is not a strategy, it's a diagnosis of the world we're in. i didn't get many clear answers. this report has clear answers, it says we do want china to be a responsible member of a rules-based international system in the long-term, so that idea could be a responsible stakeholder, it was criticized. i think it's a possible goal and it calls for shorter term goals and i defend the system from the challenges that china poses, compete now with the hope of cooperating later. and essentially to try to change the mind of chinese leaders. the current path doesn't advance their interests, it's too difficult, too costly and they'd be better off trying to work a cooperative approach. and i think it's a clear answer for what we're aiming for, a vaccine and other reports. among the institutions of the
3:23 am
first pillar of the strategy is to strengthen the united states, and the new era of competition and with the institution. and you know, often in competition, it's not about tearing down the other guy, it's about strengthening yourself, and i think that's true for the china challenge, and we have calls to the united states and their allies, to insert within the multilateral systems. we've built it and it worked for us and we've ceded too much ground to china and put forward for the leadership position, but we also call for the creation of new institutions. it's not 1945, it's not 1991 anymore, the new era so we can design for the current moment and we call for the democracies locally to set up new institutions, to bring together democracies from north america, europe, and asia, so we call for the creation of the d-10 and actually just yesterday,
3:24 am
boris johnson announced that the g7 summit this year will become a d-10 with leaders from the d-10 countries and we called for alliance of free nations, a broader alliance of free nations and this has been reported that biden will have a summit of democracies this summer. and so that could be possibly a first step towards this. we are start of seeing the americas of two different governance systems globally and two different types of order, not in the same way as the cold war, not quite as bifurcated as that, but basically two, two sort of eco systems in which china is increasingly doing its own thing and we and europe are doing sort of our own thing with democracies and asia. and the question that each side has, in a way from their
3:25 am
respect, it's hard to inoculate themselves from the negative externals from the other models. and we're seeing, i think, definitely fears, our model. i think they came to the conclusion some time ago that the success of liberalism globally will be very bad for their regime as putin did. and i think one of the systems, in the interest of the china people. i also think that for the china regime's point of view they may not necessarily be wrong about that. right, as the ccp that calls the shots and the same is true in russia with putin. and i guess in 50 years who does how things will evolve, but i think the question that we have now that are also intermeshed and interconnected, based on an assumption of geopolitical comity, right? and now we're rivals and so
3:26 am
we're sort of distancing from each other. we have all of these problems of coercion and you know, espionage and concerns about strategic vulnerabilities. so i think the answer to your question, we need a strategic and targeted sort of disentanglement which is not widespread. it's as focused as possible. i think there's actually a possibility. a narrow pathway, but that could be cooperative. or it could be elements of coordination in it. and then, i think to your point of course, it's really important, i would hope, you know, that the incoming administration, you know, would embrace what is in the report, right, which is a connected response. so i think what's happening in australia right now deserves a lot more attention, i can think of the support in terms of the pressure they have from china.
3:27 am
and i guess the one area that might differ a little bit, i think institutionalizing them or an article five equivalent is too high bar at the moment. let's just do it. the first service happens, the u.s. should respond in solidarity and call on other countries to respond, and it's not just china. it's also about saudi arabia in terms of what they did to canada and germany in the weeks past and russia. and i think it's an important piece to the puzzle, but it's pretty easy if somewhat challenges to start out at a practical level. >> i love your response. i thought it drew together the conversations and debates we've been having the following years. and a follow-up question, what is the unexpected role or the
3:28 am
consequences of the trade war, the u.s. trade war, was that it brought into our vocabulary, economic decoupling, it's an interesting idea, it's something that needs a lot more fleshing out and what i hear you saying is a-- you know, a much more targeted kind of idea that involves some degree of the decoupling. could you talk more about what you mean? i forget the phrase you used, selective disentangling. can you talk about what that would look like? >> yeah, i think we're in an early stage. i think decoupling, it was a fringe idea and now, the debate has shifted where our people say i view it as technology, you know, but i don't view it
3:29 am
as other stuff. so, it's already shifted from one of principle to one of where you draw the line and very knew people, i think, would want to reverse what the trump administration did on huawei and some of those restrictions that were put into place. so, i think it's already moot. you know, my version of it is, on both sides, actually, both sides would be better off if they were a little more autonomous and independent of never falling from the other side, with are ever, you know, if they want to sort of exert pain, right? so, i think in the u.s. we would benefit not being depen department on china technology, and certainly, maybe in some other areas in terms of small countries, small allies and reliant on china and supply chains issues, that came as a result of the pandemic. and from china's point of view, in the long-term.
3:30 am
it's sort of intolerable for them to be dependent on the u.s. payment system and to other areas, i think they're naturally going to want to become more independent on that. and for pretty obvious reasons. so, that's the sort of-- i think whether or not people agree with it, i think it's just a fact that both sides are going to unilaterally move to that. the question is whether or not we can add a different added layer to figure out how to do it in a way that causes as little damage as possible and still preserve the entanglements where they're beneficial of any areas, like this past year, you know, in china, very, very high, a lot of the market side that's happening. but i think we really need to look at this empirically and i think that people are only beginning to do that to really see what those are, are they actually real or theoretical
3:31 am
and this entanglement, does it ultimately benefit china or the u.s. and some people would argue that the entanglement is a strategic benefit to the u.s. over time. i'm not sure, but i think it's worth looking into. >> and i'm going to open it up now to discussion between and among the panelists and i just would like to remind the audience that you can still submit questions on twitter, with the hashtag and we'll come to those questions in a few minutes. the question i'd like to start out with, we're talking about u.s. working with allies and identifying shared areas of concern, but certainly, the u.s. and, you know, its numerous allies do not share the same priorities or view the problem in the same way. what are some of the areas in which some of these different
3:32 am
countries may prioritize the challenges differently or see the problem differently and i can imagine, position, the u.s. may be working with china's growing sense capabilities and some other countries and i sarah, i would like to start with you and after sarah answers, please feel free to jump in with your own thoughts from there. >> yes, you're exactly right. and from the military aspect of the challenge, you have to be aware it's the greatest divergence of opinion, perhaps, among the d-10 countries especially when it comes to europe. america of course, has these extensive security guarantees extended to allies and such as japan, taiwan, the philippines and so on, and those security guarantees, they weigh of course, heavily on the minds of military planners in washington, whereas europeans, in some cases, even today,
3:33 am
they'll fail to see china as an actual military competitive, a military challenge simply because of lack of proximity to the theater. so, europeans are concerned with russia and russian actions on european soil more, much more than any potential military risk coming from china. so, i think this has begun to change a little bit because of the taiwan strike that has been reported in europe. european are beginning to see and which of course draw in american, well, some sort of entanglement, i'm not sure of what nature exactly, but this would definitely have implications on nato and other european defense. so, this is something that has begun to change perceptions in europe. but if you look at the areas where there's more convergence among use of allies, i think
3:34 am
human rights, human rights concerns, such as the treatment of hong kong and other such issues and also of course, diplomacy is an area where allies can pretty much agree that this is a difficult challenge that we need to deal with. and in the economic field again, and off the technology field we have a divergence of opinion, depending where individual countries with regard to chinese investments, infrastructure, projects or economic concerns. germany is well-known to have heavy interest in maintaining the industrial base, in terms of the industries that haven't been dependent on the chinese market, whereas other countries have, for instance, interest in keeping the option of perhaps using huawei technology even though it's not in the interest
3:35 am
of most allies. there's an interest in opinion there, and the highest degree of diversity on valuable-based issues such as human rights. >> you invited us to jump in, bethany. should i go ahead? >> absolutely. >> let me begin by saying i think there's increasing divergence on a number of issues. when i would go to europe a couple of years ago and want to talk about china, it wasn't what was on minds of european officials and now it's often the first thing that they want to talk about so i think it's a growing recognition, when it comes to unfair trade practices, the eu, japan, the united states have complained among technology we see countries in europe, asia and the united states, and on huawei, on technology. human rights, as sarah mentioned, is an area of convergence. china's attempt to undermine democratic practices, detaining canadians, to undermine
3:36 am
canadian rule of law, what they're doing against the australians, currently. so, i think there's a growing recognition of the challenge and i think the military in a sense is an area where there is a divergence. now, in the indo-pacific, of course, there's a recognition of the challenge and you see the democratic challenges in the indo-pacific, and working with japan, australia and the united states working together in the quad arrangement to deal with the military challenge. so, i think the real divergence there is with europe. so one of the things that we call for in this report is pushing the boundary of what would be possible, is for the free world to come together and make a statement on commitment ability in the taiwan streets, to-- taiwan straits. and it's not just a challenge between taiwan or the united states, but that they would risk a rupture with the rest of
3:37 am
the free world. and i don't think that the germans are going to provide military troops in that contingency, but they could make it clear to china there could be costs to taking that kind of action. i don't think it would be in europe's interest or anyone's interests to see a major war in the taiwan straits. >> one question that we haven't addressed very much. the transfers and how to respond, are there still areas that the allies could work with china and engagement and given the increasingly complex environment, how can that be done in a safe and effective way?
3:38 am
>>. >> tom? >> it's a quick question, and i think that everybody agrees would be a mix of-- and i think that's sort of for everyone, you know, the official strategy i think th they-- interesting that pompeo in his speech, but generally speaking that's regarded as important. the problem is where the rubber meets the road, what does that look like as you pointed out and for some people, sort of, i guess, one which is the more camp would say, look, we need to work together on the transnational issues. and so let's engage and there might be an easing of geopolitical tensions that's acquired, but it's worth it in
3:39 am
terms of the payoff that we'll get in terms of cooperation. my question to that is that we've just had a test case of this with local public health. right, so as of 2003, the start of pandemic. we had a lot of diplomatic exchange with china, the u.s. and europe helping to build capacity in chinese lands. you know, china recommitting or committing to greater transparency and cooperative response, when the next pandemic hits, that forms their response to h1n1, as late as the summer, they were having exercises that were premised on greater transparency and cooperation and then when ask asked, and covid hit none of that mattered. that melted away and back to what they were doing in 2003. and people say it's local, and
3:40 am
whether it's xi jinping or a combination of both, but i think what it tells us, this is complicated, right? and just because we engage doesn't mean we're going to get the cooperation that we need. and so my point would be, let's cooperate, let's engage. but let's be realistic about those limits of the cooperation that that's going to yield. there is a pretty much no scenario under which xi jinping is going to agree to access for who or officials if there's a future pandemic in the very early stages. let's go on that assumption and then with the who, but also build parallel structures, you know, that will assume we won't get the level of cooperation we need. right? so, i think that's-- we need to be sort of empirical and fact based about this and look at the sort of 15, 20 years of engagement and see what works and what didn't and
3:41 am
how to improve it and not going back to what we were doing before. before. >> okay. did either of you want to jump in on that or shall i move on to the next question? >> i would maybe like to add to what tom just said. i agree with him. we need to be realistic for the limits that are placed simply for the reason that the ttp has a stark realist world view and the cooperation is difficult, trusting and cooperation is difficult to envisage for any threats for western forces, basically all of the time and this really places some constraints on what is possible in terms of good cooperation.
3:42 am
however, we need to find ways to have the signals in china like what kind of behavior, would actually appreciate to see. there are maybe some issues not so high stakes for either side, but that everybody's interest to tackle. it could be reining in illegal fishing on the high seas or reduce the amount of coal plants currently being financed in many cases in other parts of the world by china and so on to issues that are not a direct threat to the survival of the party, but are in everybody's shared long-term interests. and we might think of ways to signaling to the china leadership how we would appreciate constructive behavior from china, pushing out positively as well as negative incentives. the negative incentives would be showing like our red line. like this is the maximum that
3:43 am
we are willing to suffer. this is what we're going too now. on the other hand you need to offer some sort of potential for a future cooperation because we should not forget that china is know the a military actor and not even the ccp is a military actor, it's many many factions even within the ruling party and some of those are actually pretty much on the same page in terms of the kind of society that they would like to see, the type of future that they would like to have. and we need to reach out to these different, yeah, constituencies to china for ngo's, working for a better future, better society and not let the current tangent with very, very stark and the future generation of chinese years. >> let me add on a word of
3:44 am
engagement. there are three pillars of our strategy and the third is engagement and we think that's important. i don't think that we're naive and we don't think it will be easy, but i think engagement for a few reasons, one, you want to have dialog, even as the competition intensifies, it's tough to hear directly from china what they're thinking and communicate to china. second, i think there are some areas where there can be cooperation. nonproliferation programs in iran and north korea. china has played a constructive role in the past, haven't gone as far as the united states would have liked, but they did play a role. i think that nonproliferation, climate change, food security. and those are our areas where there can be cooperation, i think, even in the short-term. finally, if the long-term goal of the strategy is to incorporate future china into
3:45 am
an adapted rules based system then you need to engage for that reason as well. so, we argue that one point where that might be easier, set rules, areas like new technology, so we think that it's important for like-minded allies and partners and china to begin discussions on new technology, norms and standards for artificial intelligence and other things, and again, no really optimism that will have breakthroughs to see eye to eye on the issues in the short-term, but i think still useful to have discussions what should the rules and standards be, that we might all agree to in the future. >> i'm going to jump to a question from the audience. and it dove tails really well with what was said, how ccp is a modelist and there are several factions in it.
3:46 am
here is the question. the panelists talked a lot about working with allies, is it possible to work with sympathetic allies in china? how can we support them? >> sarah, i think you're the closest ccp watcher among thaus and maybe you want to. >> yes, the problem with it, how can one engage with actors within china that are not in line with what xi jinping's faction wants without endangering them. that's a very practical question. in the current climate that's so paranoid about western subversion being a threat to the cc p's hold on power, it is actually dangerous for people to be-- well, to be closely aligned with western counterparts where
3:47 am
we've been seeing a lot of ngo's in china coming under pressure, for instance, and a lot of academic exchanges have incurred or curtailed because of this perceived problem with too much western innunes in china. so this is one of the practical problems to solve. how one can identify and then engage constituencies within china that are constructed in our sense, without actually putting them into some sort of difficulty, which is obviously not what we want. so, that's a bit of a problem there. in some cases, it's probably easier to maybe indirectly work with some of these forces in terms of advising them, advising them into some sort of dialog without this being too intense. right now, it's really, really
3:48 am
hard to say how this could unfold. and i'm hoping that the climate in china, when the pandemic is over, will become a little bit more relaxed again, but right now, from my point of view, it should, of course, always be paramount, know the to endanger potential partners in china and in some cases that could mean that one has to sort of refrain from engaging too heavily and sort of support these people in indirect way by giving them ideas and giving them access to information and so on, rather than getting into very, very intense exchange. >> what's the word on that, really. the lodgic of the strategy is to try to work on the cost
3:49 am
benefit calculation of the ccp or people within it. and china did have this more moderate strategy under jinping and biding their time and that was thrown out the window with president xi. it's to try to convince the chinese leadership that xi approach is not working for china, it's too costly, counter balancing coalition and it's going to hurt china economically, diplomatically and they're better off with a cooperative approach. and that may not be possible with president xi and the current chinese leadership, but we're hoping that by following this strategy, perhaps we can convince the next generation of chinese leadership that this approach didn't work, and they're better off following a more cooperative approach. >> another question i'd like to get to, we have about five more
3:50 am
minutes for the question is, tom, i think has these matters as well. the u.s. allies and partners in a strong position to outlast china in a long-term competition? an interesting question. >> yeah, it's a great question, and you know, i would sort of go back to what matt said earlier, the key part of it tend to your own strengths, right? and most of this, i think, is going to be, you know, ifs the there's a military dimension to it, but most of it it's socie societal and technical and from the free society and free world to address these challenges both internal and external. so i think if we do that, i think we will be in a good
3:51 am
position and for the long-term competition. i think it's also important while everyone says, and i would pretty much say, too, that this is not a new cold war for many different reasons. i think it's also important to learn the lessons, including some of the mistakes from previous periods of competition, including the cold war. so, i think we need to be careful, you know, not to feel the need to compete everywhere, to have been china on everything, to be reciprocal. if they don't have the proper conditions, that we should do that too, because we don't want a country to temporarily fall into their orbit. i think we need to focus on the centers of gravity of this competition and to be really concentrated on that and not distracted and you know, that also would be implications for the middle east and for other reasons, which i don't think they're in the asia pacific and
3:52 am
europe. so i think there are lots and lots of lessons, but if we can be disciplined, which is a big if policy, that we are pretty well positioned to engage in this and to be very stable actually and not crisis prone, hopefully. >> would anyone else like to jump in on that? if not, i'll go to the final question. >> maybe just to add to what tom just said, i think our system, part of what makes it resilient and probably durable, is the inherent attractiveness of it. and we have the strength that we really have and i think taiwan is an excellent example of that. it shows that a very traditionalist society embraced all of the values that people hold deer, democracy, human
3:53 am
rights and all of these pluralistic values and taiwan has become the most open society in asia, basically. and that is really something to show the cultural differences are key to determining-- china or anything of that sort and also human beings tend to choose more freedoms. and we have a pretty good china when it becomes richer, more diversified than it is now that increasing numbers of chinese will demand more freedoms. i still do believe in that. even though we're seeing this retrenchment and one could argue that this current trend with authoritarianism in china is out of fear. xi jinping's concerns with domestic civility because of
3:54 am
increasing attendants by certain types of society to argue for more freedom. we've been seeing a lot of people jailed recently for speaking out again, and interrogating measures and i think it's partly a weakness and fear that this government had become so heavy-handed and indirectly in reverse because it's a testament to strength of the ultra liberal model that we all wanted to-- ultimately i do think that this model will prevail. >> i'll just say i agree very much with what tom and sarah said. and as tom said, where we're strong and weak. and the strategy comes about thinking about the opposite, where are we strong and where are we vulnerable and how can we leverage our strength. that's what we try to do in
3:55 am
this report and including the u.s. alliance system. this is one of our greatest strengths is the u.s. against china, 23% of global gdp against 15% of global gdp. if it's u.s. formal treaty allies against china, that's something like 59% of global gdp against china's 15%. working together we're in a much stronger position and that's a major advantage that china doesn't have. it doesn't have friends and trusting partners the way the free world does. >> i think that is a wonderful place to end. tom, did you have-- did you want to add any final comments on that topic? >> no, i think-- >> okay, well, thank you so much tom, sarah, matt, for the conversation today and i'd like to thank to atlantic koicouncil
3:56 am
center for hosting this discussion and for the work and this report and go check it outten a peruse its findings and thank you again to all of >> has minority leader kevin mccarthy spoke replete to reporters following a closed-door fbi weaving on his probe -- briefing on his probe of a suspected chinese spy targeting u.s. politicians, including representative eric swalwell. [inaudible] i was tested: yesterday. i don't talk about what goes on inside there,


info Stream Only

Uploaded by TV Archive on