january 6, views from the house, sunday at 10:00 p.m. eastern on c-span, c-span.org, or listen on the c-span radio app. announcer: general john haydn, the vice chairman of the joint chiefs of staff spoke today about defense technology at the newly founded emerging technologies institute. he also answered questions about the covid-19 pandemic, relations with china and russia, and adapting to new technology. >> good morning, everybody. it's great to see so many friendly faces this morning. actually, it is great to see any face. when i became the vice chairman in late 2019 i never expected that i would spend almost all my

time for literally six months but focus on covid to try and get us somewhere out of that. working with the deputies trying to get the department to move, get the country to move, and we started to move. and the work that was done with the vaccine, if you want to see what this country can do if you have to go fast, just look at the vaccine. and i tell you, they do not get enough credit for what they did to move this country forward in developing a vaccine. a lot of people do not realize that we wrote checks, taxpayer checks for almost $4 billion in midsummer last year. to buy 100 million doses of moderna and pfizer. and we did that before they even

started phase three clinical trials. can you imagine what the hearings would have been like? holy cow. i always take an opportunity just to -- it's voluntary, i love living in a free country where people get to make their own decisions. i made my decision to take the vaccine and i'd encourage you to do the same thing and makes life a whole lot better. so, as i sat down this morning at the table in front of me was this book that the eti just published. and it just struck me as i, you know, i prepared my remarks this weekend, the line, two things are on this, number one, modernization quandary and number two the emerging technologies institute that published that and it got me thinking, how the heck did we get to point where

modernization is a quandary. how do we get to the point where we need emergency technologies institute? that was, when i joined the air force, yes, it was a long, long time ago, and people our age talk, always have a number of numbers one is that it was always better back in the day. but holy cow, when i joined the air force, the air force was about modernization, it was about technology, that's what we lived at, that's what we did and we took technology and we turned it into operational capabilities fast. when they didn't work we threw it away and went another direction and we did that quickly without repercussions or anything because we knew that the goal was to defeat the soviet union. that was the goal and everybody was on board with that and we knew we had to go fast in order to do that. well for the last 20 years we've had our eyes and bodies focused on the middle east. our eyes have started to move. our eyes have moved again to the great powers of china and

russia, our body is slowly moving, shoal slowly moving. but our eyes are focused on the-- our sons and daughters are in harm's way and nonetheless the great concerns are the great powers of china and russia, china in particular, so we have to move again and we have to move again quickly. and when i came in 2019 to be the vice-chairman i sat down with general milley the chairman and if you look at our backgrounds, you can't have any more different background than two hours that serve now as the chairman and vice-chairman. general milley was ranger, and i'm air, cyber, as our great

hero is george marshall, general milley and i. and we would try to unup marshall stories, if he was here i would have to tell the stories. my wife went down to the milley's office and they break out the everyday china and it's our everyday china pattern in the 1980's, and look at the book sales, and we sat down, what are the priorities? they align. the chairman has focus on the middle east and i have cyber and came up with a good plan and three months in just leak all plans they failed when in contact with the enemy and the three priorities that i came up with with the chairman have been my priorities since the beginning. priority number one is to make

sure i provide that the best best military advice i can to the secretary and president whenever asked. make sure i provide that to the congress whenever asked, but to make the chairman and secretary of defense successful in everything they do, that's my number one job, to make sure that that happens. my number two and number three priorities were my priorities and they were to institute speed once again in everything that we do in this department. everything that i touch and one of the interesting things about being vice-chairman of the joint chiefs of staff the deputy secretary and i we sit on every panel, we're at the head of the table in every department. a good thing you get to know the deputy pretty well and she gets to know me, and we can move things, but holy cow we've become bureaucratic in

everything we've done the last 20 years. it was okay to put significant checks in the system to make sure nobody made a mistake, that we never moved forward unless we knew exactly what happened. that we tested, tested, tested again before we feel there was no risk in the system. we did everything possible to remove risk from the system. we took authorities from the field and put it into committees in the pentagon and then the committees in the pentagon report to congress and the congress had committees to overlook the committees overlooking the field to make sure that we never made a mistake. and that's okay when you don't have a threat staring you in the face. so right now, we have significant threats staring us in the face and china in particular, i hope their competitors for the rest of my life and the rest of my children's lives and the rest of my grandchildren's lives, i hope they're competitors and we compete in the world stage and that would be good, but right now, they're building a military, a military capability

that's enormous and they're building new capabilities, new capabilities in nuclear. new capabilities in space, in missiles, hypersonic missiles, many new capabilities in cyber doing all this have to challenge the united states and we have to figure out how to respond to that not just with the what, but with the speed necessary to stay ahead of any competitor we have in the world. if you're competing in any race, i would hope that your goal is to win that race. if you're competing with a nation for the future of the world, the goal has to be to have your western way of liberal democracy continue to be the way that we work in the future. that's what we have to do. and in order to do that we have to put speed back in the program. my third priority is to make sure-- the third priority is to make sure i never forget the most important thing about our military and that is that the

people that serve. and so i hired a special assistant to look at all of the challenge that we have on people issues from family issues to suicide to sexual assault and prevention, she's been a spectacular partner, a spectacular element in the department as we look at all of those issues. but for the rest of my remarks today, i'm going to talk about speed, my second priority because that's why the emergency technology rah created to take the technology and transition quickly into our force and again, somehow we forgot how to do that. so there's two things i'll talk about today. number one is the concept we're use to go drive that change and number two, i'll talk to you about the j-roc.

to enable the services to go faster. because that's what the jroc is supposed to be do. the and the war concept. people think that you develop a war fighting concept, something pops ut the other end. it's visionary, it's aspirational, it's what could be, not what is. and it's supposed to drive technology and it's supposed to drive doctrine, and drive new capability. most importantly, it's supposed to drive what could be in the future and that's why we pick 2030, how do we experiment to actually look at those things, then you find out what works and doesn't work and then you choose the future and the capabilities and that's where you change doctrine. and it doesn't result overnight in new doctrine and we actually don't know what works.

there are so many things in that joint war fighting concept and most is classified, but there are so many things that are aspirational, i'm not sure they're achievable, but that's the point. to drive that kind of aspirational goals to figure out if you could do this, you could create a military that nobody in this world could touch, and what that does, it creates the most powerful deterrent message in the world and coming from strategic command, focused on deterrents for the three years i was there, deterrents is the most important job of the united states military is to make sure that we never go to war. we don't want to go to war. nobody that has seen war never wants to go back and see war again. the only way to deter war is george washington, it's julius caesar, everybody back through history is be prepared for war. and to have that capability that nobody will want to challenge and right now, we

still have that, but it's a shrinking advantage and it's shrinking fast and china is running the race very quickly, and we have to figure out how to stay ahead. so the joint war fighting concept has morphed. the first one actually looked like what we've been doing the last 20 years and everybody that war a uniform the last 20 years understands pan if we just do that better we'll actually be able to deal with the threat to the future. and we wrote that down and we played it in a war game in october of last year, and without overstating the issue, it failed miserably. an aggressive red team that had been studying the united states for the last 20 years just ran rings around us. and they knew exactly what we're going to do before we did it and they took advantage of it, and that was the red team on our side, but imagine what our actual competitors have

been doing for the last 20 years. probably even more focus, with larger number of people. and so we had to take a step back and we had to take a step back and look broadly, okay, what did we miss? where are we now? and we took not a quite a clean sheet of paper. and you didn't take a clean sheet if you want to get between here and 2030, but as you build it out the concept we came up with now is referred to expanded maneuver. it's expanded maneuver in space and time. and every area that an an adversary could move you have to figure out how to fill that space in time before they can move. ap and you talk about that in all domains, in all commands, in all elements of warfare and you figure out the adversary is going to try to do that for me. so, how do i aggravate my capabilities in order to

provide significant threat, and in any threat environment. we actually have not done that and really for a long time, maybe ever. we always aggravate to fight and aggravate to survive. but in today's world, with hypersonic missiles, with significant long range fires coming at us from all doe mains, if you're aggravated and everybody knows where you are, you're vulnerable, but you have to aggregate to mass fires. it doesn't have to be a physical aggravation, it can be from multiple domains acting at the same time under a single command structure that allows the fires to come in on anybody and disaggregate to survive. that's a simple, simple thing to say, but that is aspirational and unbelievably difficult to do. so we came up with four, we call them supporting concepts ap the first things we called them was orphans, because nobody cared for them.

and then supporting concepts and now called the functional battles. the four functional battles are pretty simple and straightforward. they're contested logistics, when is the last time logistics of the united states into any part of the world was contested? world war ii probably the last time, really. contested logistics is difficult, really difficult to do and magically you think the fuel, munitions and everything you need shows up in an island in the pandemic and someone is actually trying to deny you the island in the pacific and deny the entire supply chain back to the united states. that's a problem so contested logistics has been a rich conversation and we're changing our entire approach because of it. the second piece is joint fires. and the reason that's an

aspirational requirement,en it's a-- i've been criticized for saying this, is because, you know, in the joint war fighting concept, fires come from all doe mains, all services, no restrictions and that's where it comes from. why? because the fires come from all domains and all services with no restrictions and the adversary can't figure out where they're coming from, that's aspirational and i hope that everybody could see if they do that, they could change on any future battlefield and now you have to figure out what is affordable. what is practical. what can do you? where can you bring it from? who can have it, al of those kind of things that you have to work out and you should never limit yourself as you begin a concept with what you don't think you can do. so fires need to come from everywhere, all domains, all

services, kinetic, non-kinetic, and the third element. joint command and control that links everything together and allows a commander or commanders, more specifically, exactly what's going on and in that joint all domain command and control structure there's a number of different critical enablers. data is probably the most critical enabler of all. the data has to flow everywhere and data has a very interesting dynamic in that discussion as well in terms of aggregation and disaggregation. because as you stand outside the threat raid why us -- radius, the goal is to be fully connected to a combat cloud that has the information you can access anytime and anyplace and with all domain command and control to have the best data and act on that. as you enter the threat vierpt,

the access the data is denied. you have to figure out two things, how i operate once again with commission command, things that we learned as young lieutenants, how to operate with real centralized control, but decentralized execution. when you're disconnected from home and the structure, you have the mission type orders that tell you exactly what you're supposed to do and do that based on the best information that you have and you fight disconnected, but then you have to figure out in the new world how to pop up again and quickly connect to the network, have the information quickly aggregate itself and dive back in the environment and the same thing i was talking about, aggregating to fire, disaggregating to survive. that's the way it's going to be in data and across the board and then the fourth functional battle is the summation of those three elements, really, all in one and it's called

information advantage. because if we can do the things i just described, the united states and our allies will have an information advantage over anybody that we possibly face. and that's where some very significant requirements come in for what you have to do in order to maintain information advantage because if you think about it and congressman thornberry, chairman thornberry for years, the words beat me up come to mind, but that's probably too strong. [laughter] >> tried to educate me on the proper role of the joint requirement council and the proper role what we needed to do in order to effectively build capabilities and so as i looked at this structure and realized what we really need is we need to develop joint

interoperability not at the end which is how we've been doing it, the services come to the jroc and build a weapons system because of congress you have to have n interoperatable kbb. you have to operate with everybody. and it's already built and now integrate with the joint force. how about we try to make it interoperable from the beginning not the end because that's how you end up with fighters that don't talk to each other. how you end up with different capabilities because you're trying to slap it on at the end and not at the beginning. i sat down with the jroc, and we knew this was coming, we have to figure out how to do this, and figure it out how to do it in the jroc and make it do that. everywhere i went i got

pushback, but one of the things i do when i start a new job, i actually go read my orders. i would always recommend that somebody taking a new job would read their orders and the orders for me come in policy, come in chairman's instructions and come in the law. and the interesting thing for me in this area, the law. so congressman thornberry, read that card right there i carry them with me wherever i go. because i got tired of explaining why we're doing this. we try to do this because the law tells me to do. this is u.s. code. title 10, section 181 bravo, i think you helped write and i'll have to put my glasses on to read it. a couple of things that the jroc is supposed to do. i'll just read one. jroc should identify new military capabilities based on

concepts of operations. when is the last time you saw the jroc do that. identify new joint military capabilities. >> we haven't. that's been in the law at noon today, i'll tell them you said hello, and he's probably going to beat me up on this again, all we're trying to do is what the law -- guess what we joined the requirements defined what the services have to do and i published them this month, early july and there are now four joint strategic directives, and they're entitled strategic directive 4,

contested logistics, joint fires, all domain command and control and maintain advantage. and to be honest, general swartz, the services the first six months were fighting the process. i know you're shocked to hear that. [laughter] >> but it was interesting the day the light bulb went off and everybody said, and when the light bulb went off it was easy to see because all of a sudden the services realized, holy cow, if i do that, i don't have to come back to the j-roc to ask mother may i: and then you sit down with ellen lord to write the 5,000 series trying to do the same thing with different software acquisition rules and software has to change and the information advantage, strategic directives how you do

software, and now you align with the 5,000 series and the cool part of that joint directive, that will feed the dap, feed the tank and the dmag, the budget process. and it feeds operations, and it feeds budget and feeds acquisition and guess what i happen to sit on the table of those. i'm to the side of the deputy chairman, i'm to the side of-- and we have to incorporate the speed back in. the goal is to get speed. if you can write the requirements down and do it from the beginning and don't come back and ask mother may i again. just go as fast as you want, that's what you want and what congress intended and what we're trying to do and that's how we have to get there. but we have a challenge because we've created a bureaucracy that doesn't like to move that

fast. and it really doesn't. and the only way to defeat that is to knock it down. so we need help from industry, we need help from industry to say, you're getting in our way. we need help from something like the emerging technologies institute, mark, that actually gets us focused on where we have to go. we need help from congress because congress is going to have to -- and the interesting thing about my congressional engagement the last couple of years, is congress has been one of the most willing partners to actually free up the services to move fast. and we're going to have to do that again. because i tell you, when i was a young captain, the person i wanted to grow up to be was the colonel program director. that's what i wanted to be. the last person in the world i wanted to be was a general because their job sucked. [laughter] >> and that's proven right. [laughter] >> but holy cow, the colonel -- why did i want to be a

colonel program director? because they had all the money and all the authority and that's how you go fast, but you have to give them just like you do any soldier in command and control, any soldier on the battlefield, you have to give them rules of engagement. this is what you can and can't do and you have to give them clear requirements, do this and move fast, if you do that we can enable speed again because the jroc just took a trip, we go to the co-comes. we talk every day, through covid and we talk to the co-coms. in many cases that's not the traditional defense companies, we saw boeing, saw northrup, the big companies, but we also saw little companies and companies in silicon valley that deliver software every day. when i fight to get a software delivery every four years.

and the jroc saw that this country still innovates, still has the technology advantage in the world and we're not taking advantage of it in the department of the defense. we took the trip in april and signed the jroc and new strategic directives in july. we're trying to move and enable the department to move fast. i'm running out of time as our food friend-- good friend frank goran said, four stars have one thing in common we're all circling the drain which means we're about done, and number two, we wish we could go back and start all over again, because, man, it is a great ride. it's a great country, and this country can go fast. it absolutely can go fast, and we've seen it. you see it in the country every

day, we have to enable it again in the department of defense and i know that we will. so, thank you very much for the opportunity. i won't thank you for doing this mark, good luck at eti, and good luck with this whole concept. sadly it's desperately needed and i look forward to your success. now i'll be glad to take some questions. [applause] >> thank you, i know he's graciously agreed to answers some questions. >> there are a couple of microphones in the back. all right. >> i know you and i have talked about this, have we changed our

war gaming? have we made it more realistic in your opinion? >> so, the answer is no, but w-of the documents requirements that the jroc is model and simulation capabilities in all domains. why would the jroc publish a requirement like that? because it's a war fighting requirement. we have a pretty good capability to model air, land and sea, but we can't model air, land, sea, space, cyber. and we can't model the air, land, sea, space, cyber and when we fight and look at a whole campaign, you have to make so many assumptions what's happening in the other domain and that's why you see our

competitors spending an enormous amount in cyber and nukes, because we've had advantage in those areas for a long time and if they can make their their advantage then we're in a significant world of hurt. so the-- so i signed a requirements document to the department. we're working closely with not just the folks in a and s and r and e, and guess who else needs a real campaign model that can actually look at all domains cost. the evaluations and programs. their programs are execution tools. they need that as well. it's interesting. the jroc and cape have the same need for actually different reasons, but in summation, those needs are the same thing. how do we look at the entire force and make sure we understand how things play together and turn it quickly and do hundreds and hundreds,

maybe millions of runs in the same it takes us to do one war game with 200 people, all smart setup that we learned lessons. you want to learn faster. >> [inaudible] >> you have to be able to look at force versus force, but kinetic versus non-kinetics. >> and your allies and partners. >> one interesting thing about al list and partners, if you think about the data structure i just defined, we have to address a classification problems. we're way overclassified in most. and i'm working with the secretary of defense and working with the congress as well to normalize that process about you even if we do that, we still have a problem because we'd like to label things, and

then even our closest allies can't get onto our basic secret system because of the no foreign stuff that's on the system. about if you actually build a cloud and tag your data correctly, all it turns into for you, as a young soldier, with your credentials and your biometrics, you can hook in and everything you're allowed to access, you can access in the cloud. you'll be-- that will be done by who you are. so that applies to allies and partners, too, and that kind of construct which we've written t capabilities because they can bring whatever they need into the fight without having a difficult time, large, small, it doesn't matter. whatever you bring we can figure out how to put that in the fight. friends are our biggest advantage, but not being able

to take full advantage of friends is just criminal and that was an overstatement. wrong is a better statement. >> how general hyten. this morning across the river we'll also be hearing from the white house on the end of combat operations in iraq and a shift to the advisory role. in your view is it necessary to kind of end these long-term, large-scale ground military operations that we've been doing the last 20 years in iraq to be able to fully move forward into the necessary innovations that you see? and then secondly if you could talk a little more about the october exercises and what you've learned and how you saw what the adversary was doing to show that the joint war fighting concept as written was a failure? thank you. >> so no concept is exercise is a failure, first of all. i hate the fact that failure has become a bad word.

it's a learning process and we have to make sure that we fail and we fail quickly and we learn from our failures and move fast. i don't look at that as a bad thing, i look at that as a good thing. the only bad thing is like dick mccann said it sakes so long to build up a war game, we ought to be able to learn like that. to go back to the first question, the job. united states military is to defend this nation against all threats. we support and defend the constitution against all enemies, all enemies, foreign and domestic. that's what we swore an oath to, every time we swear that oath. when we look at the threats, we have to be able to be ready to deal with the threats and we've been dealing with a significant threat in the middle east for a long time. that has required significant blood and treasure for us to defend ourselves against that threat and the fact that there's been no large scale attack since 9-11 is a

remarkable achievement from the whole of government and on the backs. soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines that have done that work over the years. now, the political decision about when you end that conflict and the people across the river get to make shahthat-- that decision and the primary risk of the nation, the long-term risk is china. maybe the nearer term risk is russia and we have to make sure that we focus our attention on those. so that means, and you've seen it in afghanistan and seeing it play out in iraq and i'm not going to make any announcements today because that's the job of the folks across the river to make those announcements, but what you can see is an understanding that we have to not ignore the threats in the middle east, but deal with the threats in the middle east in a different way with a smaller footprint so we can divert more

of our body on the threats in china and russia. so that's where we're moving there. now, as for the joint war fighting concept and how it failed, it failed in many different ways. but we provide -- we have basically attempted an information dominant structure where information was ubiquitous to our forces just like it was in the first gulf war, just like it has been for the last 20 years, and just like everybody in the world, including china and russia have watched us do for the last 30 years. that's exactly -- and we see just decided, we'll have to keep fighting with all of that information being fully available. well, what happens if right from the beginning that information is not available? you have a big problem. and that's the big problem that we've faced and it goes back to

what mr. mccann just said, you have to be able to understand space and cyber. space and cyber are interesting. they're different, space command and cyber command in the military, but they fundamentally have the same mission, just work through two different domains. and the mission is to provide information, path ways for information and deny information to adversaries. if you think about what we do in space, it's those three things, what we do in cyber is those three things. we just do them in very different domains and that's why we have two different commands. to do those three things, you have to be able to control those domains and when you can't, you have a significant challenge, so to figure out how to expand the space, how to aggregate your capabilities in order to be lethal, disaggregate in order to survive. those kind of structures were not in the first iteration of the war fighting concept and

that's why it failed. so there were a lot of questions in your question, so hopefully i addressed them all. thanks. >> john, we can't thank you enough, we appreciate your time and it was great to hear your comments and-- [inaudible] . [applause] >> c-span is your unfiltered view of government. >> you think this is just a community center, it's way more. >> comcast is partnering with a thousand community centers to create wi-fi so students can get the tools they need to be ready for everything. comcast support c-span is a public service. along with these other television providers. giving you a front row seat to

democracy. >> here some of our live coverage tomorrow the c-span comes -- the house comes in to start work on 2020 two federal spending legislation. on c-span two at 8:00 a.m., a conference with kevin mccarthy in the house members he originally named to be on the special committee created to investigate the january 6 attack on the u.s. capitol. later in the morning on c-span two, the senate starts work at 10:30, with a vote later in the day to confirm todd kim as assistant for the environment and natural resources. and on c-span3 at 9:00 -- 930 -- 9:30 am, the house holds its first hearing with the witnesses from the u.s. capitol police and dcp -- dcp. >> sunday, c-span series views from the house continues. three more members of congress

share stories of what they saw, heard and experienced that day. including california democrat who served as a teller for the electoral vote count on that day. >> the capital author said it was necessary to evacuate. and that we should take the hoods, there are hoods under the seat of each seat in the chamber , take them out and be prepared to put them on. so, everybody did. and, i think when you pulled the little red tag, it activates it, so people that weren't wearing one, there head had been teargas tin the rotunda, which is why we were advised we might need to wear them. but there was this tremendous hissing noise from all these hoods, that was the background of the moment.

and of course the pounding and the noise from the mob had become much louder. at some point someone up in the chambers, and the gallery, a member, was yelling at the republican to call trump and have trump call off his mob. and there was some little yelling back and forth amongst members in the gallery. >> tell the president to call them off. call your friends, tell them to do something. >> this week you will also hear from republican rodney davis of illinois and pennsylvania democrat matt eileen dean. january 6, views from the house sunday at 10:00 p.m. eastern on c-span, c-span.org, or listen on the c-span radio app.

>> housing and urban development secretary marcia fudge testified for congress about affordable housing, homelessness, and the pandemic eviction moratorium, which is slated to expire on july 30 first. california congresswoman maxine waters chaired this hearing. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]