sunday, c-span's series january 6. views from the house continues. three more members share stories of what they saw and heard. including hakeem jeffries. >> we did not have the highest degree of information. simply being in the house floor, we did not get to see the images and the real-time footage of the ongoing assault in the capital. however, once we arrived in the secure location, we were able to get some understanding of that and could only have imagined how our loved ones were feeling watching it unfold in real time to read it was a great comfort to myself and every other member to be able to communicate with our family members back at home. one of the two medications i

received that was disturbing was my brother reached out to me to indicate, to check to see if we were ok. then sort of that as an aside, let me know by the way, he and his family had received a threatening message. from someone indicating they knew where my brother and his wife and his three girls lived. and they had people in the neighborhood and if me, winning his brother the congressman did not stop telling lies about the election, something bad was going to happen. >> this week, you will also hear from two texas representatives. january 6, views from the house. c-span, c-span.org, or listen on

the c-span radio app. >> now, a hearing to consider a joint resolution that would repeal the 1991 and 2002 authorizations for use of military force against iraq, testimony from biden administration officials, including wendi sherman. from the senate foreign relations committee, this is 2.5 hours.

>> let me start by thanking our witnesses for being here today. to help the committee consider the challenge of a balance between the congress and executive branch concerning military host -- forced. i am holding this hearing on behalf of other members who requested it prior to a vote on the 2002 repeal, as well as to jumpstart the broader discussion on the 2001 aumf and other issues surrounding the use of force, and this subject, whether to send our sons and daughters into conflict, is one of the most solemn votes any member can take. most solemn votes any membn take. let me start with the 1991 and 2002 repeal of the

authorizations here to let me be clear what we are talking about. the 19 91 authorization resolution authorizes united states armed forces to take action to ensure iraq's compliance with un security council resolutions related to saddam hussein's invasion of kuwait. the 2002 au mf authorizes armed forces to take action against the continuing threat posed by iraq, which was still under the rule of saddam hussein at the time, and then the claim was developing weapons of mass destruction. we know now that that was simply not true. regardless, these authorization simply do not reflect reality, which is in the u.s. troops currently and iraq are there the end patient of the iraqi government. indeed, the president just

welcome the prime minister to the white house for a strategic dialogue. it makes no sense to keep an authorization against iraq. the biden administration has made clear throughout formal statement of policy that it is not relying on the 2002 aumf for ongoing operations or detention authority. as the terms of the aumf apply only to threats emanating from saddam hussein's iraq. in my view, it is irresponsible to keep this updated authority on the books to address future hypothetical threats for which it was never intended. now some have made the argument that repealing this authorization would somehow show weakness or lack of resolve, particularly against iran as it attacks our forces in iraq, however, i see little logic in this argument.

iranian backed militias derive their support from the false narrative that the united states is still an occupying power of iraq. repealing the 2002 aumf would clearly show that we are there in support of the sovereign iraqi government. let's be very clear, repealed or not, the 2002 aumf does not authorize any military activity against iran. that is not to save the u.s. will not show resolve against iran as it continues to threaten our people or our national security interests, but the 2002 aumf provides no authority for that. i would also like to use this hearing to start a discussion on repealing and replacing the 2001 aumf, another 20 --year-old authorization. i believe we must provide this and end executive with the

appropriate authority -- any executive with the appropriate authority for conducting counterterrorism operations, but such an operation must adequately reflect the true nature of today's threats and challenges. as one who did vote in support of the 2000 aumf 20 years ago, i can say that we never could have imagined it being used as a justification for airstrikes in somalia or against groups that did not even exist at the time. now i appreciate that the biden administration in the national security advisor sullivan have been engaging with the chair and interested members on the question what a 2001 aumf repeal and replacement would be, and we look forward to having those continuing discussions on how to achieve that. of course the president has

authority under article two of the constitution to repel attacks against the united states, but we must have an honest conversation about the scope of this authority in the power of congress to declare war. the office of legal counsel at the doj has advanced a theory that congressional approval is required only for actions that rise to the level of war based on the "anticipated scope, nature, and duration." in the action serves "important national interests." this interpretation is self-serving and one-way, and has enabled the executive ranch to justify large-scale uses of military forces without any congressional involvement, stretching the constitution in ways that would be unrecognizable to the framers. a rebalancing is in order.

finally, over the past decade, the u.s. government has advanced a more aggressive strategy in cyberspace. we are all aware of attacks launched by state and nonstate entities in russia, china, north korea, and iran. president biden has made it clear that the u.s. will use offensive cyber capabilities was warranted and accelerate u.s. operations to disrupt and to "defend forward" against foreign cyber operations. the increasing use of cyber operations implicate a host of aumf in war power issues. i firmly believe the committee, and i will be pursuing this, it needs to be more assertive in our role as it relates to the use of force in the cyber domain, and the executive branch needs to be more responsive to our requests in this area.

so there is a lot to address, but i do believe that our goal in repealing these two authorizations that were for a time and place and against a country with a leader, that leader no longer exists, and for which there is no authority to deal with challenges with iran, and actually serves as fuel to militias to say we are an occupying power, needs to be repealed, and i intend to move forward to do exactly that. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you to our witnesses. it is interesting to note that probably the objective of everybody on this committee is the same when it comes to aumf 's. i have sat through hours of open and closed committees to deal

with one of the most vexing problems that we face. having said that, and having said we have the same objective, it is significant to talk to reach a conclusion that as to where we go with these things, and i agree with the chairman that messaging is extremely important. as much as anything, messaging is one of the aumf telegraphs to both our friends and our enemies. i guess i come down on a different side of that, but having said that, when you are talking about messaging, which you have to do is look at not as much is your message, but the people receiving the message, and i suspect the arguments on both sides probably prevail with some people. some will read the message one-way, some were, at the other

way. it is important we discuss it and not only message, but interpret the message for the people listening to it. president biden has directed airstrikes twice this february, both actions have failed to deter further iranian aggression. within a few days of strikes in february, u.s. forces were attacked in iraq, israeli ships in the gulf of oman, and drone attacks against saudi arabia from both iraq and yemen. the day following the most recent u.s. strike, iranian militias launched multiple buckets and southeast syria and attacks against troops and diplomats in iraq, resulting in american injuries. beyond the terrorism in the region, we saw a plot to kidnap an american citizen on u.s. soil, an appalling demonstration of iran's disregard for what we

are doing. the administration decided the legal basis for recent strikes in the practical impacts of repealing the 2002 aumf. the 2002 aumf provides the only statutory authority to strike iranian militias in iraq. the 2002 aumf served as part of the legal basis for the strike against general soleimani. a policy of less than robust response is to attack the interest have clearly failed to deter them. it is important to underscore the message we are sending. with trip reductions across the middle east, i am concerned about the repeal of the 2002 aumf, and i think all of us are sending our allies to the region. this emphasizes the message that

iran is ejecting the u.s. from the region, attacks against americans, and decreases u.s. leverage in talks in vienna, if we have any leverage. it is important to understand the conditions we previously relied on this authority for strikes, and we are certain the repeal would not have the negative unintended consequences. finally, i am concerned with the repeal of the 2002 aumf, and a call for the repeal of the 2001 aumf. i have heard some of my colleagues calling for repeal of the 2001 aumf, and i believe such an action without a suitable replacement, which is the real problem, would make americans less safe. again, i think we have a lot to agree on. i think the messaging is incredibly important. again, it is important we hold this hearing. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. we turn to our witnesses. we have a great panel.

the honorable wendi sherman from the department of state. we appreciate your insights today. the acting legal advisor for the u.s. department of state. and, the honorable general counsel the u.s. department of defense. i would ask that you summarize your statements as much as possible within five minutes. your full statements will be included in the record without objection. with that, secretary sherman, you will recognize. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and thank you ranking member, distinguished members of the committee. thank you for inviting me and my colleagues to testify today. ensuring the safety of american personnel overseas is the highest priority of the state department, and of course that the u.s. government and united states congress and the senate. as diplomats, it is our honor to represent america's values and interests at home and abroad,

requiring personnel to travel and live all over the world, including in various challenging environments. we are here to discuss authorization for the use of military force. i believe the hearing is also about our democracy and the values we model around the world. our foreign policy works best when we work together. president biden is committed to engaging with congress on questions of war and peace and being transparent about when, where, why, and how, the u.s. uses military force. i want to state clearly that the biden/harris administration believes the 2002 aumf against iraq has outlived its usefulness and should be repealed. for the state department, repealing the 2002 aumf would

not affect our diplomatic initiatives. the administration has made clear that we have no ongoing military activities that relies solely on the 2002 aumf. the fact is, the 2002 aumf is no longer necessary to protect the american people from terrorism, to respond to attacks on personnel or facilities, or ensure the safety and security of our people. the president has other tools to achieve these objectives. in fact, for the last six years, the executive branch has relied on other authorities to underpin counterterrorism actions and has only cited the 2002 aumf as an additional authority. this was true for both the trump and now the biden administration. the 2002 aumf is also woefully outdated, in terms of our

diplomatic relationship with iraq, the preamble of the 2002 aumf states that iraq "poses a continuing threat to the national security of the united states and international peace and security." as the chairman has said, this is not the case today. we work closely with the government iraq on economic development, combating terrorism . far from a threat, iraq is an enduring strategic partner of the united states. there should be no doubt that president biden would take necessary, proportionate action to respond to attacks against u.s. personnel or facilities, including in iraq. indeed, he has demonstrated his resolve. a month ago on june 27, the president relied on his article to authority to direct strikes in syria and iraq at sites used by iran-backed militia groups

involved in attacks against u.s. personnel and facilities in iraq. president binder did not need the 2002 aumf to protect american interests in june, and our current assessment is that we will not need the 2002 aumf to protect american interests in the foreseeable future. if we do need additional authority to defend our people, we will not hesitate to come back to congress to seek those authorities. i want to thank members of the senate, including members of this committee, who have worked tirelessly on this issue. i want to acknowledge several senators for your leadership and to think former senator udall for his efforts. i know that members of his committee and others in congress are also actively considering options to repeal and replace the 2001 aumf. as these efforts continue, the

biden/harris administration stands ready to provide our guidance and expertise and other materials to assist congress in its deliberations as the chairman noted, those conversations are already ongoing. repealing outdated, broad, or unnecessary authorizations for the use of military force, and replacing them as needed with narrow, clear, and specific frameworks that allow us to continue protecting our people and interests around the world. finally, i want to take a moment, chairman and ranking member, to thank you for your help in confirming, trying to confirm, state department nominees. i think the chairman, ranking member for moving many nominees forward with broad bipartisan support, and i hope they will be swiftly confirmed by the senate. we are currently hamstrung in our ability to advance america's interests around the world without confirmed investors and

senior leaders. i recently returned from a trip to china where it would have been very helpful to have the expertise of our nominee to serve as assistant secretary for east asian and pacific affairs, who has been passed through this committee and is awaiting for approval. and given the critical need to strengthen our economy and improve the lives of working people in our country, i hope is the committee has done that joée fernandez will soon be confirmed as our undersecretary for economic growth, energy, and environment as soon as possible. i think this committee and senate for confirming our undersecretary for arms control and international security for the dialogue we held with russia last week. other nominees have already been reported with voice vote with strong bipartisan support, and this committee has an additional hearing this week, which we greatly appreciate.

we appreciate this committee's continuing work to move our nominees forward so they can get to work on behalf of the american people. thank you again for inviting me to testify today. i look forward to taking your questions. thank you, mr. chairman, ranking member. >> thank you, madam secretary. we share your concerns about having a state department that is fully staffed at some of the highest levels to promote u.s. foreign policy and perceived u.s. national security and national interests. it is my hope that we will have a process on the floor that would allow these nominees to have for the most part overwhelmingly passed through the committee in a bipartisan way. in the case of mr. fernandez, the objections of one of our colleagues has been lifted, but it seems that the republican leader is still not putting his

name forward. we are waiting eagerly to get him in place. it is incredibly important for any administration to have their nominees and be able to conduct foreign policy on behalf of the united states. >> thank you for allowing us to testify on this. this is about the repeal of the 2002 aumf.

today, the circumstances and iraq have changed dramatically. the iraqi government seeks friendship, partnership, in cooperation with the u.s. and international community. the threats posed by ice is and iranian activities are serious and real. those threats are not with the 2002 aumf was designed to address 20 years ago. as a result, and as just explained, the administration supports the repeal of the 2002 aumf. repeal is aligned with the president's commitments to continuing a strong relationship with our iraqi partners and to working with congress to ensure authorizations for the use of military force are replaced with a narrow and specific framework that ensures we can continue to protect americans from terrorist threats. the president has stated that in any effort to reform existing

aumf's, it will be critical to address threats to the u.s. with appropriately decisive and effective military action. to be clear, we do not believe the repeal of the 2002 aumf will impede our ability to do so. u.s. forces remain in iraq at the invitation of the iraqi government, training, advising, and in an intelligence-sharing role in support of our iraqi partners in their fight against isis. this mission remains essential, but the 2002 aumf is not necessary to execute that vision or protect and defend our forces while doing so. the 2001 aumf authorizes the u.s. counterterrorism mission against isis and al qaeda in iraq and syria. in addition, article two of the constitution empowers the president to direct certain

military action was necessary to protect and defend our personnel and facilities. some members of this committee have pointed out that iran's destabilizing activities in iraq undermine u.s. objectives and pose a threat to u.s. forces in iraq. we agree. iran's militia groups have engaged in attacks against u.s. forces and facilities in iran. although we seek to de-escalate and avoid conflict with iran and iranian-back militia groups, as the deputy secretary noted, we would take action to respond to attacks against u.s. personnel and facilities in iraq. to that end, the president directed strikes in february and june this year in order to defend and protect u.s. personnel from ongoing attacks to deter further attacks. the president did not rely on the 2002 aumf and directing any of these recent actions.

we believe we have sufficient authority to continue the vital counter-isis mission in iraq and syria and address any threats to the u.s. personnel or u.s. that might arise in iraq without the 2002 aumf. if circumstances change and it becomes clear other legal authorities are insufficient to address those threats, the administration would work with the congress to develop an appropriate new domestic authority tailored to addressing that scenario. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. >> thank you. i am honored to be here today to help address your questions about the 2002 authorization for the use of military force against iraq and any legal implications of its repeal. my colleagues in the state

department had provided a thorough summary of the key issues that the heart of any discussion about the 2002 aumf repeal. i will keep my remarks brief. i want to be clear, the department of defense agrees with this administration's view as expressed in the statement of administration policy, that repealing the law would have minimal impact on current dod activities and operations. we can say that confidently, because no ongoing military activities rely solely on the 2002 aumf has a domestic legal basis. repealing the 2002 aumf would not impede u.s. forces ability to protect and defend themselves. the department of defense would have raised concerns in a post repeal if we thought it would put any of our men and women in uniform at greater risk. repealing the 2002 aumf also would not affect the legal authority to continue the important work of insuring the lasting defeat of isis.the

u.s. along with the global coalition to defeat isis and global partners, including the iraq security forces, have made tremendous gains in that fight over the years. for the last, for at least the past six years, the 2002 aumf has been cited only as an additional authority, underlying the defeat isis campaign. it was not a necessary authority at the outset of the campaign and is not necessary now. the president will have sufficient before authority to address the threat from ice is sis and other terrorist groups even if the 2002 aumf is repealed. finally, repealing the 2002 aumf would not constrain u.s. ability to address other foreseeable threats in iraq. in particular, the department is clear eyed about the risk to u.s. forces and to partners and allies posed by iran-back

militia groups. we take those extremely seriously. the department considers the full scope of how any repeal might affect our ability to continue addressing threats in the region quickly and effectively. in the end, we believe sufficient domestic legal authority will be available to do so, even in the absence of the 2002 aumf. as my department of state colleagues have noted, if in the future we are faced with the currently unanticipated need to use military force, the department, together with our interagency colleagues, would work with congress to develop any appropriate new authorization tailored to addressing those threats. thank you again for the opportunity to speak with you today and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you very much. to all our witnesses, let me start around of questions. the administration has issued a

statement of administration policy supporting the repeal of the 2002 aumf. madam secretary, i assume the state department was part of that process? the state supports repeal? >> yes, we do. >> was the defense department part of the process for the policy and does the defense department support repeal? >> yes, we were part of the process. >> does the department support repeal? >> there are no objections. >> it is my understanding there are no ongoing military operations for which it is necessary as a domestic legal authority, is that the case? >> yes, it is. >> i understand the 1991 in 2002 aumf's are not necessary as the domestic legal basis for any detention activities at guantanamo bay? >> that is correct. >> neither 1991 over the 2002

aumf is necessary for the detention of isis members abroad? >> correct. >> the administration has not cited the 2002 aumf for actions against iranian-backed militias in february and july. is it accurate the administration believes it has sufficient authority under article two to defend u.s. interests and personnel against iranian-backed militias and does not need the 2002 aumf to do so? >> correct. >> if there was a need for the administration to take sustained actions against iran for that matter, any matter that goes beyond article to authority, would the administration come back to congress for a new aumf? >> yes. >> based on those responses i don't think congress would be living up to its constitutional responsibility if we do not move

forward with repealing the 1991 in 2002 aumf's. it was an authorization to use force against saddam hussein and saddam hussein's iraq. the need for that authorization ended over a decade ago. as witnesses testified, neither aumf's is needed for operations or detention activities. moving forward with this repeal, this authorization is not just what is important for us to do to uphold our congressional oversight responsibilities, it is also in response to the american people to curtail endless wars in the middle east. i suspect there will be a lot of hypotheticals, what if's, from our witnesses today, but our duty is not to dream up scenarios in an effort to keep a dead letter law on the books, especially when it comes to something so serious is sending our troops in harm's way. the 2002 aumf 2002 -- is not thr to any threat that we are facing

today. and if other existing authorities are insufficient to address those, that side would expect the administration to seek a new a umf. madam secretary, i have heard the arguments against appeal that would weaken our position vis-a-vis iraq, iran, and in the middle east more generally, in fact the senator and i had a productive meeting with the iraqi prime minister on numerous facets of the u.s./iraq lateral relationship and the challenges it faces with iranian aligned militias. our discussion is that we are in a radically different paradigm in our partnership with baghdad than we were in 2002. so, some have argued that repeal requires the united states to appear weak. i don't personally agree to that, but i would like to hear from you from the administration's point of view.

what is the administration's position on that point and what steps is the administration taking, and will the administration take if they ensure the united states maintains its overall leverage in the region? >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. we believe are of p -- repealing the a umf is a signal to the bipartisan work over the last more than two decades to establish an iraq that is very different than the one that existed at the time than the 1991 2002 a umf was decided. we now have a strategic partnership with iraq. it is a sign of strength that together, both republicans and democrats have created a relationship with iraq that is built on strength, out -- on a strategic partnership, that indeed you pointed out we are currently in a place as was

decided by the iraqis themselves where troops are focusing on training, enabling and advising our iraqi partners. that the u.s., iraq strategic dialogue in july resulted in a communique that was last focused on military cooperation as the defining feature than having the iraq government itself commit to defend any american personnel or troops in iraq. i think it really speaks to how strong we are in the region, then in fact we have developed the strategic relationship with iraq. there has been increased capability to lead counterterrorism efforts in iraq sovereignty. i think it speaks to the strength and success of bipartisan efforts in building the strategic partnership. i think as well as you have heard from me and my colleagues at the president will not

hesitate to take action if we believe that any backed militia, iranian or otherwise, are a threat to the united states, that efficient authority under his article to abilities and relying on a revised 2001 and other appropriate circumstances, to take targeted strikes as he did in february and on june 27. i think quite frankly, senator, rather than speak to weakness, this speaks to strength that the united states has established a strategic partnership that iraq is a different country and that the united states is poised to have a different relationship with iraq and the middle east. >> i will pick up where the chairman left off. in the meeting we were heads of the iraqi government and it was

interesting. one thing that went through my head was what you referred to, and that is how different things are today in iraq than they were in 2002 when it was passed. i want to underline here that i think we all want to reach the same objective, and that is the message that we are going to continue to have out of strength and not weakness. i think it's whether it should stay in the books or should be repealed. i am concerned if it is repealed that those who receive the message will say, no matter what they say, they still repealed the 2002 map, which is a sign of weakness. what's to be gained by they umf left in the books. we have all kinds of laws,

resolutions and executive orders that put into place and they put on the shows and nobody repeals them. i see a gain and not revealing it so that those who are enemies can say, we are backing down and weak. i just don't see the advantage to leaving it on the shelf. convince me of what i'm wrong with. >> i understand the concern and messaging is important, but in my view, i think that repeal says we have succeeded. the time most sodom hussein -- the time of saddam hussein is over. in my view, and in the view of the ministration, repealing the 2002 aumf is a sign of strength,

success, of moving forward in history. i agree it should be put on the shelf. i think the only difference we have is the world repeal because i think everyone has noted we are at a different time as you experienced in your own discussion with the iraqi government. i think repeal is really a message to the international community that the relationship between our democracy is one where we acknowledge the progress we have made, we establish the strength of iraqi sovereignty that we have. our partnership with them going forward. that this is a different iraq and a different time. and in a bipartisan fashion, that the united states government has moved forward to a more peaceful, sovereign, and moving towards a more democratic

iraq. >> i like the message. i am troubled by the fact that the message might be a little too sophisticated for some of the people that are receiving the message and have been passing it on. but, be that as it may, the best messaging we have done is taken out general soleimani. in the 2002 aumf was used as part of the reason of that. i think they'd have done that with or without the 2002 aumf, but that is the best messaging that we have seen in a long time. in any event, again, we are all headed for the same objective, i like your message, i hope it's heard loud and clear throughout the middle east and i'm all in, but i don't think we need to repealed the 2002 aumf to get there. but, again, i think there is a whole lot more agreement than there is disagreement on that. >> mr. chairman, first i want to

thank you for hearing -- holding this hearing. this is what we should be doing, oversight on the aumf. i want to thank all three of our witnesses for their service to the country. senator, i think oh -- i will answer your question. it's possible if we leave an authorization on the books in a ministration will misuse the authorization. and i give you the 2001 authorization, which has clearly been interpreted well beyond any of our interpretations when we voted for it. i speak personally because like the chairman i was a member of the congress in 2001, so was senator markey and others that voted for that. and we never, ever in our wildest dreams that it would be used in seven countries the way it has been used. one of the lessons that has been learned through this process is that we need -- considering a

ums to have some process for administrations to be able to update that authority with congressional approval that would allow that authorization to expire. i think that's going to be critically important that we have a use of force. in the lessons we learned from that is the 2001 authorization. 2002 repeal should not be controversial. i understand the point and i asked -- i respect it greatly. 2001 should also be repealed and replaced. i would just like to talk about the urgency here in ask the question. we are now in august of this congress. time is evaporating. this is not an easy subject to replace operations through use of force. and, in all due respect, i think it's absolutely essential for the administration to come forward as to the authorizations

that they need. because, you see, we all have different views about the threats that are out there, the geographical scope of any authorization, the requirements that come back to congress as circumstances change and what type of an approval process is necessary. the length of time for the authorization. all those are questions that each of us have different views. but the starting point should be those that have the responsibility to exercise the power to keep us safe, the executive branch, the president, to come to us and tell us what you need, and then let us debate it with you and hopefully come up with a replacement. senator, i very much respect your view, i thought your best statement about repealing outdated brought unnecessary authorization for military force like 2002 aumf, and for replacing them with clear and narrow frameworks will allow us

to continue protecting our people. i would add 2001 rather than 2002. we have got to replace that. so, i'm seriously considering whether there will be an opportunity for us, mr. chairman, to put a sunset on 2001, giving ample time for a replacement to be voted on by congress, because otherwise i'm not sure we will ever do it. it's just too easy for administrations to misinterpret the 30 -- misinterpret the authority of 2001. and we are not at risk because our witnesses have testified. there is adequate authority under article two to protect us. so article two is there to protect us against any imminent threat. we are not going to be bear as far as rejecting our country. the president will protect us, but congress should give the administration the authority they need and not just this

broad use of an outdated authority. so madam secretary, what is wrong with us setting a date that we need to replace this by recognizing that you always have article two authority? i would hope the legacy of the biden administration will be that future administrations will not be relying on the 2001 authorization in order to protect us from a threat that did not exist in 2001. >> thank you very much, senator. the president of the united states served in this body for 36 years and he has great regard for the article one responsibilities of the congress and senate, in the article to authorities of the president of the united states. and he has committed, and we have all committed to work with congress to ensure that outdated authorizations for the use of

military force are replaced with narrow and specific frameworks to ensure we can continue to protect americans from terrorist threats. there are a lot of complex questions involved in doing this scope duration more, but we welcome enhanced congressional involvement in interbranch dialogue over the use of military force, including protecting the united states and u.s. interests from the abolishing terrorist threats we face. we know that these are changing. the chairman mentioned some, including in cyber, that have changed the nature of thinking about terrorist threats. so, the administration is open and has begun already discussions with congress to replace or revise the 2001 aumf that might consider some of the following things, establishing a mechanism to add groups beyond those that may have been identified by name in the text

of the aumf. as you point out, it has been relied upon and circumstances perhaps that you did not imagine through an appropriate from engagement between congress and the executive branch and congress. to establish a mechanism to add countries in which the use of force is authorized against particular groups, and to have a periodic review of groups and countries. i think there is a lot of work to be done. it may be that those kinds of ideas aren't the right ones, but those are things we are willing to discuss, as well as other things that the senate and i put on the table. but we are in support, senator, of continuing those discussions in a timely manner to reach a revised 2001 aumf, at the same time that we continue to root -- to support the repeal of the 1991 and the 2002 aumf, which we believe are not useful anymore

and are not relied upon in any circumstance. >> senator romney. >> i very much appreciate the opportunity you have given to our committee to hear from these witnesses and to discuss this very important matter. i'm going to continue with some of the comments and questions that were raised. secretary sherman, well the biden administration misuse this aumf? >> no, sir. >> senator cardin indicated that this should be repealed and replaced and i'm focused on the word replaced. there have been efforts to try to narrow and replace these aumf in the past. when this this -- when the senator was chairman in 2018, brought forward a revision that did not make it out of committee. going back to 2013, president obama sought and aumf with regards to syria, that of course

was not successful on the floor. i'm concerned that the prospect of this body ever approving aumf to deal with the ongoing threat represented by isis, the taliban, al qaeda and other like groups would never pass this body. and that, in addition to the comments and concerns that were raised by the ranking member with which i concur, that the idea that somehow we will come up with new ones is just not realistic. and i think about a scenario. yes, certainly, the president has article to defend our troops and to defend against imminent attacks on the united states. let's say he continues to withdraw troops from afghanistan and we have no troops in afghanistan and iraq. in isis goes on a rampage and starts expanding territory and

wiping out individuals there. for that matter, in afghanistan that the taliban who routes the democratically elected -- starts killing women and children. would we under article to have legal authority to go and if we had no troops there if we were threatened in the homeland? >> i would defer to my legal colleagues to answer the legal point there. your broader point, senator, about whether we need a new aumf , we do believe revising the 2001 aumf is appropriate, and we hope that working together with the united states senate, that indeed a 2001 aumf revision can take place. so we fully support your view. that would be a good thing to do. >> quoting a great american, i hope is not a strategy. are there other aumf's that have

not been revealed? >> no, 2001, 19 91, 2002, and as you point out, the article two authority of the president, which has most often been used not only by this president, but by the previous president as a basis for taking action. >> given the fact that you are convinced the biden administration will not misuse this aumf, and the fact that we face ongoing threats from various terror organizations, and my conviction that it would be very difficult for this body to ever agree to another aumf absent a threat to the homeland, why do you believe it's necessary for us to remove this aumf, which has been used by president obama, president trump to defend our interest? i think there's a sense that if the homeland is going to be threatened, that we have every right to step in.

we all agree with that. but our interest in the world go beyond protecting the homeland. they also keep bad things from happening and becoming so severe that they draws in and to represent a threat to the homeland. so why take the chance that, as the ranking member indicated, that this is misinterpreted in the middle east? i can imagine anybody thinking we are at war with iraq. it is very clear we are there at iraq's request and we are helping the government protect itself from isis and protect itself from iran. that's a message loud and clear. no one thinks saddam hussein is still in charge of iraq and we are fighting him. this as extraordinary potential to be misinterpreted. why do it now? they are about to have elections in iraq. this could be misconstrued as america pulling away. it seems like the risk is greater than the benefit of the

nature you are describing. >> i think i'm going to defer to my legal colleague on the use of the 2002, though i do not believe that even president trump used 2002 as the basis for any action he took, killing soleimani was done primarily under article two. but to your broader point, the iraqi government now sees itself as a sovereign country in partnership with the united states, and does not wish to have an appearance on the iraq that is cited in 1991 or 2002. let me let my legal advisor at some legal perspective to the value here. >> thank you, senator. i think there is some confusion that is creeping in, and i think that is because we are talking about to aumf's.

>> that was raised by the chairman and senator cardin. in reality, we are talking about to -- two. i know i have gone over my time. >> but if i may, senator. the 2001 a umf authorizes activities against isis and the taliban. it's the cornerstone and i think it's important to recognize what we are talking about in the context of 2001 is replacing that with a more narrow specific framework to ensure we carry out the duty. the 2002 aumf, we can continue to conduct our operations, and we can address the isis and the taliban threat. >> if we had no troops there?

>> sir, whether or not we have truths -- troops there is besides the question. we would not put troops there or take away, it does not add authority and we don't rely on it for those operations. >> just the remarks for the senators consideration. i was the author of the aumf because assad was using chemical weapons against its people. that aumf passed this committee with the late john and barbara boxer, two extremes of the ideological divide and a robust bipartisan vote. the reason it did not go -- it's not that it failed on the floor, it did not go to the floor because president obama took the authorization of the committee and made it very clear at the g20 meeting in russia that he

would seek to finalize the authorization and use it against assad if he did not give up his chemical weapons. it's not that it failed on the senate floor, it just never got there because it wasn't necessary. i know that i opened up the conversation, and i intended for it to be that way about the 1991, 2000, 2002 and 2001. with the committee will be voting on in the first instance will be the 1991 in 2002 aumf repeals. and i will say on that regard, it would be a perversion of what congress voted for to read and those authorizations, anything, anything, that goes beyond the saddam hussein era of iraq. and we have a legitimate conversation going on, but in the others, i think it's a

little less certain. but i appreciate the senator views and interests. >> thank you to each of our witnesses for your service and testimony today. i'm going to begin with you and try to restate what i think was senator romney's question. and i am directing it at you because you are in the department of defense. with the repeal of the 2002 aumf impact u.s. forces that remain in iraq now? >> no. >> can you provide a scenario in which the president might need to rely on that aumf to use force in iraq? >> no, i cannot think of one. i'm not sure who to direct this, some have thought about attaining enemy combatants.

maybe you would take the first crack at this. what of any effect you anticipate the repeal of the 2002 aumf would have on the detainee issue? >> none whatsoever, senator. certainly deferred to them if they have anything to. my impression is none. >> senator, the 2002 aumf is not a source of security, including those at guantanamo. >> secretary sherman, i think you answered this in your opening statement, i do believe the previous administration cited strikes against iran and its proxies and, as you pointed out, this administration doesn't

believe that the aumf provides authority for force against around backed malicious or against iran, did i understand that correctly? sec. sherman: it doesn't provide any authority to attack iran. indeed, as i mentioned a moment ago, it is my understanding and recollection that when the previous administration took the attack against qasem soleimani, it primarily relied on article two, the a umf -- aumf 2002 was used as an additional authority but not a necessary one. >> can you describe what authorities the administration is relying on in the operations that have been taking -- taken on so far this year in syria and iraq? >> let me let the legal advisor

already answer. though i believe they were article two. >> that would be correct. under the domestic law basis, the president acted on his authority under article two to defend and protect u.s. personnel from attacks. from an international law basis we were using self-defense under article 51 under the charter. we reported article due to the congress consistent with the war power resolution and reported our bases to the un security council. >> just to be clear, if u.s. personnel are affected again, we don't need the aumf in order to defend them? >> that is correct.

>> i wholeheartedly support the public and official ending of the iraq war. many of us that the war was a mistake to begin with. large percentages of the public think the war was a mistake. even if you pull our veterans who fought in the war, a vast majority think it was a mistake. so publicly ending the iraq war, which is been over for a decade, is a great idea and should not be controversial. the people who want to keep in place should realize this vote will be similar to the vote in 2002. the vote in 2002 allowed 100,000 troops or more to be in iraq in 2000 soldiers to die. it allowed 20,000 people to be wounded in over 1000 young men and women to lose their arms and legs. that's what you are voting for. if you leave this in place, any president could do the same thing they did in 2002, that's what you are voting for.

that would be good if we did not vote for another iraq war. if there is another need for a war, come and vote. when we have been attacked we were voted overwhelmingly. when we were attacked on numeral -- on november 11, we voted overwhelmingly. but leaving it on the books, if you vote to leave it on the books, you are voting to allow a president to send as much as hundreds of thousands of troops in. this is debate over what you can do under article two. i think it would be much more narrow than any recent president has interpreted. every president has interpreted to be wide open. only way to stop them is by defunding something they do. i don't think any president believes they can take 100,000 troops into any country without an authorization of force. getting rid of this gets rid of the possibility of a big war by any president. i don't think any president

would attempt to do that without this in place. we get rid of the possibility of a big war. all the military actions that presidents take, they will continue to take without authorization. with regard to 2001, there is a danger, and this is where i disagree with many who want to replace it. we should repeal it. people want to make it more narrow, it's extremely narrow. it authorizes us to go after those who plan. it authorizes those who aided the terrorist attack on one day, september 11. it's been associated with isis, al qaeda, there is no one left alive that has anything to do with 9/11. does not apply to anything we are doing around the world, but it been overly broad and overly broadly interpreted, so we should repeal it. we should not have 1000 troops in somalia. we should not be in 14 different countries.

but if we replace it, all of the replacements of 2001 authorization have been brought enough to be interpreted to include all the places we are involved with. dozens of wars can be fought with the replacement bills. were supposed to be something that's difficult to get involved with. we give up our power by having any aumf on the books. they all should be repealed, and if people want to go to war, which is a terrible thing, come in vote. when we have been attacked, we will vote to go to war. but we have been reluctant to, and good. that should be a good thing. is it likely we vote to go to war in somalia tomorrow, we would probably vote against it and that would be a good thing. that's also why we should not be there now. i cautioned those who want to replace it, most efforts while well intended, it's more broader than the language. the language is very narrow in 2001 but has been overly

interpreted. i think it's important the american people know this is a vote about a war that has long been over. a vote to keep this is a vote to allow something is because the iraq war was at its maximum. if you want that kind of power on the books and don't want to vote again, if a brand-new threat comes up, you know want to have the power to determine for your constituents whether we go to war or not, that is giving up a huge amount of power that our founding fathers thought should always be vested in congress. >> i think the senator. senator coons. >> i would like to thank our witnesses and take a moment to ensure that i have clarity and that those who may be watching have clarity and members of the committee have clarity about

what we are and are not discussing. if you could each group pete briefly, it has been your testimony today that repealing the 91 and the 2002 aumf will have no impact on our security, on our operations, in fact, they will have positive impacts on our relation with iraq, on a demonstration of the constitutional roles of the democratic process can function, and i will speak for myself, one might view that action as the beginning steps and rebalancing the operational roles in the executive and legislative and the constitutional role of the senate, the declaration of war. in my understanding you correctly, the repeal of 1991 and 2002 will have no impact on our security or deterrent and would be a positive for our nation? >> i agree with you, senator.

>> that is correct, senator. >> there are no ongoing military operations that rely solely on the 2002 aumf. >> it is my hope that we will proceed to take this first step in repeal these two outdated and no longer relevant and necessary aumf, but there has been a lot of conflating. those two because there's a dynamic where the 2001 has been stretched beyond recognition in terms of its scope and reach from when it was initially adopted. the chairman referenced many of the process we went through in 20 where we debated and passed in a robust and bipartisan way. let me ask you a few questions. the united states recently carried out strides -- strikes on targets and some ali a -- in somalia.

that raises questions about adding new combatants that is at the heart of our debate and concerns. given the 2001 does not mention somalia, how did we come to be at war with them? has it ever specifically targeted americans prior to the obama administration determining it was in associating force? >> the obama administration determined and notified congress in 2016 that it is covered by the 2001 aumf as an associated force of al qaeda. the determination was made with respect because, among other things, they have pled loyalty to al qaeda in a public statement, made clear that it considered the united states is one of its enemies and had been responsible for numerous attacks, threats and plots against u.s. persons and

interests in east africa. in short, they have entered the fight alongside al qaeda and is a co-belligerent with al qaeda and hostilities against the united states, making it an associated force, therefore within the scope of the 2001 aumf. as i understand it, i am not a lawyer, my understanding is that it was the 2001 aumf that allowed the domestic law basis for it and it's a matter of international law for use of force by the united states and the territory of somalia's consent of the somali government itself. i don't know if my colleagues have anything they want to add.

>> did the biden administration review the trump administration's -- that it is a force, and if so on what basis and if it differs from what the deputy just articulated? >> i should say that deputy secretary sherman answered it perfectly and proved that she does not need lawyers. and it's conducted by the administration across the entire spectrum of counterterrorism issues, including direct action, and we hope to -- when that review is done, we hope to be as transparent as possible, and it is taking a deep dive look at the entire ct program and it is

underway. but at this point i don't have anything final to report. >> let me just ask, whether in the interest of transparency, something i welcome and will celebrate about the biden/harris administration, could you provide a list to this committee of of all countries where force has been used since it was enacted 20 years ago, and a list of groups against whom you believe force may be authorized pursuant to the 2001 aumf. is that a list you could provide to this committee? >> senator, i know that we report on our activities on regular or reporting and the ndaa on military, including the

locations as well as groups that are targeted, whether we have the ability to go back 20 years. i don't want to necessarily commit that that -- to that, if we have that i don't know why we would provide that. >> madam deputy secretary, i wonder if you can make any commitment to us that you would have an open debate about the current groups and nations in which authorization is to lead to rest on this. >> as i said, we are open to open conversation with you about how the 2001 aumf might be revised, including the groups that should be covered, and met -- and how we might have an ongoing process to ensure an ongoing process and the executive branch.

>> am just going to say how much i appreciate your commitment to finding a way to craft it that is a clear process to adding territory and an end date. that is a direct challenge to the committee and senate to engage in a constitutional and necessary dialogue about our role in your role in securing the people of the united states and demonstrating our ability to exercise our responsibility. >> i understand that the 2001 aumf is of great interest to many of my colleagues because there is much to be debated there in the future as it pertains to the scope of the authorities, how it might be amended, how it might be replaced. but i'm not focused on the thrust of today's hearing, which

is the legislation that is before this committee and will soon i suspect be before the senate. the repeal of the 1991 and 2002 aumf. each of those aumf's was focused on the threat posed by saddam hussein. saddam hussein and his regime in iraq. let's take the 2002 aumf as our focal point. after lengthy findings on the threats posed by the regime of saddam hussein, congress authorized the president in 2002 to use armed forces in the united states as he determines to be necessary, to defend the national security of the united states against the continuing threats posed by iraq, that saddam hussein's iraq.

and enforce all relevant united nations regarding iraq. secretary sherman, is the united states still at war with the government of iraq since the 2002 aumf? >>, no we are not. our armed forces deployed to iraq today at the invitation of a new iraqi government. >> iraq is a sovereign government and we have a strategic partnership with them. >> let's put a pin on it. that's what we are talking about. it has nothing to do with 2001. we are just focused on 91, which incidentally i was right out of high school, just enlisted in the united states navy, and in

2002. as you know, the regime of saddam hussein was removed in 2003. pursuant to the terms of the aumf. the 2002 aumf that i have just referenced. in saddam hussein was brought to justice by brave american servicemen and women, and by some of the iraqi people. the government of iraq is now a partner. they are not an enemy of the united states and u.s. troops are there as deputy secretary sherman just indicated. with that, if our forces in iraq were to be attacked by iranian backed militias, the islamic state or other terrorist groups, is there anything that would stop the president of the united states from allowing u.s. forces to defend themselves against such an attack.

-- attack? >> there is nothing that would keep the president from taking action as he has done is more than one occasion since he has become president. quakes do you agree with that assessment? >> yes. >> do you agree with that? >> would repeal of the 1991 or 2002 aumf, the only thing we are focused on here today, negatively impact or endanger our service members and diplomats serving in iraq? deputy secretary sherman? sec. sherman: no it would not. quakes do you agree with that? >> yes i do. >> if this repeal of the 1991 and two thousand two aumf and no other aumf's moves forward, as i

expect it will, would any of you on the panel have any concern about the safety and security of u.s. personnel stationed in iraq on account of said repeal, yes or no? >> no, not as a result of the repeal. >> not as a result of the repeal, no. >> i agree. >> i have no further questions. thank you. >> thank you, senator. >> mr. chairman, i have had only a few of what i call supermarket moments in my time in public service, these are times in which the people i represent are exercised by a conversation we are having a washington in which we don't wait to walk across the supermarkets to register their opinions, they yell at you. and there have been a handful of them.

another was labor day weekend, 2013 when president obama requested the authorization to use military force in syria and we were about to have that debate. my constituents back home had grave concerns about a commitment of u.s. forces into syria, and so did all of yours. while this committee did do good work and moving that resolution forward, it did receive a bipartisan vote before the committee. it was not likely going to pass the united states senate or the house of representatives. it likely did not have enough support to move through the entire body. the american public is much more skeptical about the commitment of u.s. forces abroad than this body is, or than the foreign policy consensus is an washington, d.c. they have seen time and time again mistakes being made. senator romney is right, passing

future aumf's will be difficult, but for good reason, because the american public are very, very hesitant to commit u.s. forces abroad. and sometimes, despite the fact that bank tanks in washington think it's a good idea for us to make war overseas, the american public downs. as our founding fathers believed, we have an obligation to listen to them. i think it's important to lay that down for the record that the difficulty of passing authorizations of military force is not an excuse to grant wholesale new powers to the administration. there's a reason for the difficulty. my set of question is trying to find limiting principles around the powers that have been granted to the executive branch, particularly in the post-2001

era. i agree with senator young, repealing 2002 in 1991 likely has no impact on our ability to protect forces in the region. i think we should go forward quickly in this matter. i think it makes us stronger in the region. when we more accurately define our enemies. when we train our objectives with a finer point in the middle east, a very complicated place, we are stronger. so, i don't buy the argument that this makes us weaker. let me ask about limiting principles. does the administration recognize the concept of imminent threat as a limiting principle? in other words, if a strike is simply retaliatory against in any -- enemy who has struck the united states, or is designed to prevent future attacks, is that

allowed without and aumf, or does the administration always have to prove that there is -- that they are trying to prevent an imminent future attack against the united states? >> senator, on that question i will defer to my legal advisor. >> senator, i will start, and i suspect it will be helpful if i turn over to my colleague, who understands the dod operational guidance better than i. when we are attacked we have a right to defend ourselves. i think the idea of immanence is really more and what we would call -- from a lingo standpoint as opposed to policy, the idea that you can certainly defend

yourself against an imminent attack. -- >> can you prove if necessary there is an imminent attack taking the two strikes that we did share. the february in the june strikes. i don't think there was a requirement that there be a -- >> let me ask you this, time is running out. do we have the ability to take military action to protect partner forces? let's say there is no attack imminent against the united states, can we take action to protect partner forces? >> this one i will certainly defer to my colleague. >> our u.s. armed forces are operating under existing domestic legal authority, and there is a threat of imminent attack against our forces who are working alongside us to see

the terrorist group. >> even if there is no threat of force being used against the united states? if there is a threat of force against a partner force in a country subject to a battle against an associated force of al qaeda under the 2001 aumf, we have the ability to use military force against them without prior authorizations? >> yes, because it would have already been authorized by congress. >> lastly, i think you can see how it's a little difficult for the american public to figure out where these authorizations and when it is construed so broadly. and i will address this to whoever wants to take it, how do you take a look at the question of when the frequency of article two strikes requires you to come to congress for a new authorization? we have seen an increased

frequency of attacks against iranian alliance militias. how do you enter into this question of when the frequency of article two attacks requires you then to come to congress for new permission. -- permission? you can see a circumstance in which you are striking twice a year, maybe you can consider that article to authority, but if you are striking once a week, that does not sound like article to authority. what's the limiting principle? >> as the voice in my head is going, i'm now having to engage in hypotheticals. that's my one point where facts and circumstances are always important. so we would obviously have to assess it in light of that. but to try to attach it to concrete situation we are dealing with now, the attack from the iran backed militias, for example, we don't see any

continuing ongoing attacks by a particular entity. they tend to be more the industry individual, episodic, if you will. so the article to power is more than adequate. at the beginning of this hearing, senator menendez referenced the opinions and i realized there are differing views. as executive branch lawyers we do take guidance from the office of legal counsel in that regard. and there are limiting principles in terms of, at what point do we think -- and i believe senator menendez referred to this, the scope duration and nature, the reasonably anticipated scope, duration and nature would rise to basically a level of war that would require us to come to the congress. that would be focusing on, not only our operation, but the

likely responses that would follow from that. and in a chance of limiting principles, because i'm here on behalf of the department of state, i would say there are plenty of limiting principles internationally, which we would respect and a strike would need to be necessary and proportionate. and once we are engaged in strikes, we obviously follow the rules of international humanitarian law, which focuses on the principles of distinction, necessity, proportionality so as to minimize harm to civilians, and make sure we are acting proportionately. >> this is a fascinating conversation but i appreciate the indulgence, mr. chairman. >> happy birthday. >> thank you mr. chairman. let me begin by saying thank you to all of you and participating in this.

i think senator murphy has started a conversation that many of us wanted to have here today with regard to, number one, the responsibility of the united states congress, the role and responsibility of the executive branch, and how the aumf's that are currently in effect impact that relationship. i think there is a pretty broad agreement that the 1991 is outdated. i think it appears that the 2002, the challenges here -- a number members believe it is outdated. it is believed that it has been relied on by two different administrations, in conjunction with article two capabilities. and just looking back, it would appear that the attack on general soleimani by the trump administration, it would appear

that both the obama administration and the trump administration had used the 2002 aumf to justify military action against iranian backed militias and proxies, the iranian government, and the islamic state, unless i'm mistaken, i believe there referred to both the article two, and the 2002 aumf in their justifications. i'm simply going to ask our two attorneys, and my correct in that assumption? >> my understanding is with the trump administration, it was cited as an additional authority, but the primary authority was article two. >> would you agree, sir? >> i would agree. i would note that my predecessor in my former colleague, when he came up to testify, he, with

respect, he said i would emphasize that independent of the 2002 aumf, the president's authority under article two provided -- provide a sufficient basis in domestic law for the strike. in other words, the 2002 was not necessary. article two would have been sufficient. the 2002 has been, the last six years referred to an additional reinforcing authority. >> thank you. i think the question for many of us here is, the aumf, in a way, was an acknowledgment of congress role in the declaration of war, or the actions that would be considered warlike, and if we walk away or decide that one of these aumf's is no longer necessary, then we are also recognizing that the sole authority that the executive branch uses under article two

is, in some cases, not restricted by that same aumf. so i look at the aumf as a restriction or a direction by congress. and i guess what i'm looking for is, in this particular case, congress had deemed that it was necessary to lay out where those actions were to be authorized. i would suspect that the branch of government would not recognize it as a limitation, but as a further authorization. i don't want to acknowledge, or to suggest that the authorizations, or the use of force by the united states government is solely reliant on article two responsibilities. and what i have asked very

briefly is, would it be fair to say that if we eliminated the 2001 and the 2002, would there be -- and i think you have all indicated somewhat this -- but is there a need to look at the 2001 and perhaps make modifications and update that as part of the overall review of these aumf's? >> we have stated quite clearly that we believe that it makes sense to revise the 2001 aumf's and look forward to those ongoing conversations with congress because the president does respect and appreciate the article one -- of the united states congress. along with his article to authority, which hasn't been the basis. what i would say, senator, because i understand the point you are making, that the 2002

and 1991 aumf are repealed, that it does not give a green light to the president, any president, to do whatever he wants, whenever he wants without regard to the article one authority of the united states congress. i think that is why, to follow why, indeed, to follow-up on senator murphy's question, working on a revised 2001 a umf would indeed assert further congress posh role in defining the uses of military force. i think every congress has one to make sure that any president of the united states is able to act in the defense of our country. >> my time is expired, thank you, mr. chairman. >> thanks to the witnesses for a

great hearing. i'm going to confine my comments , i think the 2001 aumf is a more complex decision. i believe the repeal is straightforward because the war is over. the 91 authorization was to -- 92 was to topple the hostile government of saddam hussein and we succeeded. in the years he was -- since he was executed, a new government has been constituted, so the war is over. after world war ii we didn't keep a military authorization live in japan just in case, or against germany, just in case. we ended the war and made allies

out of japan and germany. after the vietnam war, we did not keep a military authorization for war against vietnam around just in case, we have worked to increase -- build an increasingly cooperative partnership with vietnam. there still challenges in that relationship that we don't keep military authorizations around when the war is over just in case. we try to make allies and partners out of those with whom we have been at war. what a unique thing about our country that we can be at war with japan and then japan becomes an amazing ally of the united states. we could be at war with germany and then germany becomes an amazing ally with the united states. we can have an amazing relationship with vietnam. it speaks to the magnanimity of the united states and these other nations that we turn enemies into allies and we beat

swords into plowshares. so when a war is over, we should not continue to label a nation as an enemy, we should try to make them an ally. i believe you have done this with a rack to a significant degree. we have made them a partner, and to continue to label them as at least enemy enough to warrant a war authorization to get some strikes me as something that we haven't done in the past and we should not do now. let me dig into this. you are a diplomat and you have done a lot of work in the middle east. what does iran fear more, with a rather have an erratic that was hostile -- an iraq that was hostile to the united states or one that was a close economic, diplomatic, military, strategic

humanitarian and security partner with the united states. what is more trouble for iran? >> thank you like. >> so our men would much rather have us be on kind of a war footing with the right because that would give them the ability to go to a rack and say united states will never be a partner. they may say some nice words now and then but they are not really a partner. they've got a war authorization against you and they are unwilling to repeal it. what kind of partner maintains an ongoing war authorization against you tenures after the war is over? i clearly sees the u.s. relationship with iraq is problematic for itself. in your judgment about the prime minister's recent meetings with president biden and others, iraq

really wants a strong relationship with the united states right now, for many reasons including the threat they perceive, isn't that correct? i think it is very important, given the two primary wars we have in the middle east are iran and non-terror states. i think it is important to send a message to iran that we are partners and will work together. that is the message we would sin by repealing this, and my estimation. when they attacked u.s. troops, and i just want to make this clear, when they attacked u.s. troops in iran or syria, well must have the built-in ability to go back in. have the article to power to defend u.s. troops from attack but also the u.s. troops that are there or there pursuant to the 2001 authorization, and

isn't it the case to our lawyers, if our troops are deployed in the nt isis mission and somebody attacks those troops, the 2001 authorization also gives us the ability to repel attacks against those u.s. forces that are deployed with respect to the anti-isis. so repelling nonstate terrorist attacks in iraq and syria, the president has article to power those troops deployed in the anti-isis mission during looted in the 2001 aumf. we have a belt and suspenders military ability to protect the united states already in article two in 2001.

we should recognize the reality as we have with past wars. >> the chairman has returned, senator kaine. i want to say thanks to the chairman and ranking member for having this important public meeting and the classified meeting we had, this is an important meeting and i appreciate our ability to have this. right now is continuing to negotiate with the iranian regime over how to revive the iran nuclear deal. this is deal -- a deal i believe is fundamentally flawed. the united states and our allies in the middle east are also in a longer struggle with the iranian regime over whether this whole region will be nominated by the forces of moderation or by the forces of tyranny and terrorism. on that score, iran is

leveraging, escalating its posture against confusing terrorists, choosing rockets and drones to attack american personnel in syria and iraq and has done so since 2021 it's in this context that the biden administration is supporting the repeal of saddam era u.s. military authorizations interact, but they are not asking for congressional authorization. as a lifelong businessman and former diplomat, i'm loath to everett unilaterally take leverage off the table unless we are getting something for it. as we simultaneously put another card back on the table. i think chairman menendez made this point during the question we had in her classified briefing. deputy secretary sherman, i was glad to see you saying you're

prepared testimony today that the administration supports not only repealing the iraq authorization but also replacing them as needed with clear, narrow, and specific -- to continue protecting her people and her interest. i believe updated congressional authorities are needed because state sponsors of terrorism are continuing to escalate attacks on americans in the middle east. the executive branch will only be in a stronger position if congress authorizes it to defend americans in harm's way. that's why i've authored legislative leg was that would do three things. first it would reveal the 1991 and 2002 authorizations for use of military force. second it would authorize the president to defend our national security interest against continuing threats that are posed by terrorist and state sponsors of terrorist operating

in a rack. third, it would authorize a president to prevent and respond to attacks against americans by terrorists and state sponsors of terrorism who are operating in iraq. i appreciate your acknowledgment of the respect the biden administration holes for congress's article one authority. given the escalation of events around think it is critical that congress exercise its authority. so i have a very simple question. will you commit to ensuring that the administration will provide written feedback on the language that i've proposed in advance of this committee's business meeting on the aumf repeal that will occur tomorrow and wednesday? >> senator, we will certainly do the best that we can to do that in a timely manner in advance of tomorrow's vote. though i will say that we may not be able to do a thorough review you would want of your legislation because we have an interagency process when we do

these reviews, but we will certainly do the best we can to be responsive. >> i am loath to remove an authority and not be prepared to put another in its place. it's not good negotiating strategy. that's the way i would encourage us to look at this and my colleagues and i would import your team to put the time and effort into provide us with feedback on this. i think it would be absolutely critical. i think it is important to put something on the table to signal to our allies in the middle east and to our adversaries where we stand and that we have the resolve to defend not only our nations's interest in her partner's interest, but also the american people. >> senator, i will add that we do still have the 2001 aumf, which is focused on those counterterrorism threats, and so we very much look forward to reviewing the legislation you've put forth, but i don't want to leave you are anyone listening to this and your colleagues to think that we are without tools.

we have the article to authority that we've been discussing this morning and we have the 2001 aumf, which we have used both in terms of al qaeda and the forces in isis. >> back to the earlier comments about communication and messaging, we are using the tool right now and again, i'm loath to remove any tool that gives us leverage and a time that the iranian regime is escalating its posture against us without at least replacing it with something more focused, more current, and more responsible. thank you very much. >> i was in congress in 1991 and we had a robust debate around the need to give president bush the authority to remove saddam hussein from kuwait. he received that authority and

we removed saddam from kuwait. that was 30 years ago. this is ancient political history. so that 1991 authorization just has to go. i was in congress in 2002 when we debated the authorization for use of military force in iraq. of course we know that president bush and dick cheney, his entire administration made this up. there were no nuclear weapons in iraq. they knew there were not. we know they lied and the whole premise was a big lie that we were going into remove nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction from that country. so it is time for that authorization to go, senator kaine has said and others, there

is now completely different posture with the iraq government. we are no longer at war with them. and again, that war was based on a complete and total fabrication, a complete and total lie that was towed to the american public with incredibly negative consequences for so many tens of thousands of people across our country and families in the country of iraq as well. so we have to move on, i think, to the conversation about where we are today. one of the questions i would like to ask is, i welcome the biden administration's announced decision to end its support for offensive operations by the saudi led military coalition in yemen and for its commitment to a political solution that ends a secure civil war that has the tragic distinction of being the largest humanitarian emergency on the planet.

however, the united states government is continuing to support the saudi forces responsible for the immense human suffering in yemen. the united states maintains contracts with the saudi royal air force to maintain its fighter aircraft. how does the administration make the distinction between supporting offensive and defensive operations when we know the saudi air force is carrying out strikes in yemen using you has maintained fighter aircraft? >> center, as you say, our armed forces are providing advice and limited information for defensive and training purposes only in connection with that conflict and we are always very mindful of legislative restrictions to make sure that as we provide assistance to our partners and we make sure the

laws around conflict are appropriately complied with. >> in oman, i know that the biden administration attempted to get the houthis and the government of yemen to return to the negotiating table. >> senator, as you know, the president took a step to end the support to saudi led coalition forces offensive action to basically say it is time to bring this war to an end, given the devastating humanitarian impacts that you noted. we do continue to believe a political solution is the only way to resolve this lesson humanitarian crisis, we have

urged countries like oman that has relations with the houthis to put pressure on them to come to the table. i was just in oman on my around the world travels and encourage them to do just that. we have an envoy who is just nonstop in his going to those countries who can effect all the parties here to try to reach a political resolution which is the only way out of this nightmare. >> what success are we having in getting saudi arabia and the united arab emirates to pay their pair -- a their fair share to take care of this humanitarian crisis in yemen? >> quite frankly, the real answer to this is the one that you are implying, and that is to have a political resolution and bring any conflict to an end. >> thank you to the witnesses

who are here today. ambassador sherman, as you and i have discussed at length, i have very deep concerns with the biden administration's approach to iran. i believe the biden administration has consistently demonstrated weakness and appeasement toward iran. and i believe that weakness and appeasement only invites further conflict and further risk of loss of human life. in the last six months, the ayatollah has declared open season on the united states and our interests. the iranians have attacked american forces repeatedly and killed a u.s. military contractor. they have tried to conduct terrorism on u.s. soil, even going so far as attempting kidnapping of an american journalist on american soil, sending an iranian kidnapped team to our country.

they have launched attack after attack after attack on our arab allies. they have launched multiple attacks on civilian vessels, including an attack on israeli ship, and kill citizens from two u.s. allies, great britain and romania. in the last few hours there are reports of yet warships being hit by iranian mines. and while the biden administration has again and again declined to respond to the tax. and worse, the biden administration has revoked terrorism sanctions against iran's terrorism proxy in yemen. it has removed iranian officials from sanctions. you have dialed back enforcement of oil sanctions including violations by the chinese communist party. you have unlocked iranian accounts worth billions of dollars to allow iran to pay down debt and you have repeatedly declined to respond

to iranian attacks against our troops and haven't imposed a single new sanction. why is it that the biden administration has not responded and responded forcefully to these repeated iranian attacks? >> sinner, come as you note, have an ongoing discussion about how best to ensure that iran is not obtain a nuclear weapon, that it stops its state sponsorship of terrorism, that it stops its malign behavior in the region, that it stops putting our allies and partners at risk. both have the same objective, and that is to ensure that our people and those of our partners and allies are protected and to assure that iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon and stops its line behavior. so we are in agreement on the objective. we have a disagreement about the means. i do not agree with some of what

you have put on the table. i believe the biden administration has had maximum sanctions. >> name one sanction you have imposed on iran. >> we have added additional entities on an ongoing basis. as we have evidentiary information about those entities. >> are they stopping the attacks, or are they scaling them up? >> nothing has stopped the attacks on iran. >> is the reason you haven't responded, do you like the authorization to respond? >> we do not like the authorization to respond and the president has taken strides both in february and june against iranian back militia. senator, think we probably will not come to an agreement on this on how best to approach our brand, but i do appreciate that we have the same objective. >> so the debate congress is

having over the 2002 aumf, i very much support congress reasserting its authority over the warmaking authority of our government. i think that is an important constitutional authority, but i worry that this debate is occurring in the context of the biden administration's embrace of iran and the ayatollah and that the repeal of the aumf will be used as justification for continuing to go soft on iran. the white house has stated in a june 14 statement of administration policy that the united states has no ongoing military activity that relies solely on the 2002 aumf is a domestic legal basis and repeal of the 2002 aumf would likely have minimal impact on current military operations. that statement uses the word current very precisely. given the position -- is it the

position of the biden administration that the 2000 -- the 2002 aumf was necessary? >> i can have the lawyer speak to the last 10 years. what i can say is the strikes that were taken in february and june against iran back militia -- >> let me ask you specifically about the one you reference a minute ago which was the attack on general suit imani. do you believe that was legally authorized and did require the 2002 aumf? >> my understanding is it was used as a primary authority for taking that strike. >> was at strike authorized by article two or not? i'm asking the biden state department. >> i would refer it to the state department's lawyer. >> the strike on suit imani --

soleimani under the last administration, as my former colleague who had been the advisor said to this committee, i would emphasize that independent of the 2002 aumf, the president's authority provided a sufficient basis in law for the strike. plainly at the time and thought that the article two was sufficient, the 2002 aumf was cited as an additional authority , which is consistent with the way it has been articulated at least for the last six years. there was a period of time where it was not a lot of military operations in the rx base. with the return of isis it seems ramped up again and with respect to isis we have the 2001 aumf

that provides us with authority. >> is some point i will determine whether we recess or whether we can power through. >> deputy secretary sherman, back in 1790 seven, john adams was in a situation of observing that the french were seizing u.s. commercial ships, so he requested authorization to respond and congress did not respond. in may of 1798 congress did give him authorization and then he deployed u.s. ships to protect our commercial navy ships. in 18 oh one, thomas jefferson was president and the ruler of tripoli was seizing u.s. commercial ships in the mediterranean. thompson asked -- thomas jefferson asked congress for authorization to respond. a few weeks later, congress did,

in 1802. he made the request in december of 18 or one in february 18 02 congress gave authorization. in 1815, president madison had the situation where the regency of algeria was seizing u.s. ships in the mediterranean. so he sent a message to congress and ask for a declaration of war . in march, the following month, congress rejected the request but passed legislation authorizing responding. why did these three presidents not simply assert article two powers and proceed to deploy u.s. ships, naval ships to protect our commercial ships? >> sinner, my guess is you know the answer to that better than i do. i don't know the history here that you are siding so i'm not sure why they did not assert article two. >> i'm happy to help with this

little history lesson because the answer is that when our founders wrote our constitution, they were very concerned about the use of the power of war, so they delegated that not to the president but to congress. our early presidents took that extremely seriously. if we fast-forward to the vietnam era, we have the conduct of hostilities under president kennedy, president johnson, president nixon, without an authorization, which led to the 1973 war powers for congress said stop, this is a complete violation and we need to re-seize the division of our constitution in which congress has to provide authorization as envisioned in our constitution and acted on by our early presidents. however, it has proved extremely difficult to maintain that

vision. the argument our founders made was that the impact of essentially conducting more or actions of war is so significant that it should be trusted to know one person. but article two has now interpreted the opposite, that one person can make these decisions, and we would think that the supreme court would play a role here in deciding where that balance between the constitutional vision and the current actions? but the court has bailed on these questions, leaving us to wrestle with this as we are at this hearing. so here we are debating this question of when will the president ask for authorization, or how will the president reinterpret this authorization, and how does that fit with our constitutional division of powers?

i've been extremely struck that the 2001 aumf did not contain the words, and associated forces, and yet time after time after time, justification for using the 2001 authorization in various parts of the world has been because the various administrations assert we're going to add the words and associated forces, which means there is no limit in time, no limit in geography, and no limit in terms of the direct involvement that was written in the 2001 authorization, where it said it was specifically on a specific date of september 11, 2001. now we have the situation where

new areas around the world, new involvement of groups we don't like, we employ forces against and we justify it under the 2001 aumf and article two. but the list of groups and individuals the executive branch considers covered by the 2001 aumf is secret. so ask you this, did congress intend for the 2001 aumf to authorize secret wars? >> certainly, senator, aumf and my understanding is for us to have a transparent relationship about the threats that we are trying to address. and the biden-harris administration, as we have said today, is very open and already in discussions with this

committee and with the senate to revise the 2001 aumf to be narrow, specific framework that would resolve some of the terms that you are raising. >> if we were to raise that specific framework in a legislative process, we would have to essentially list the places in the world at we are authorizing. those places are currently secret in terms of the additional information or authorizations that have been interpreted and added. is there reason not to make those locations, those situations public here in the united states of america? >> i will defer to my legal counsel but my understanding is that we are obligated to report to congress what we are doing and that there are no secrets. >> center, we report regularly

under the war powers resolution. >> my question was about public disclosure, not reporting to congress. >> i think -- i'm sorry, i can't hear you. >> my understanding is that certain groups may have been classified for national security reasons, but other information is publicly available. >> is not may have been, they have been. my point is, if congress is going to have a discussion over tailoring such a new aumf, it becomes a public discussion. i guess i'm asking this. will the administration consider making public all the locations where they now have granted themselves are the relation to conduct military strikes? >> we are having that discussion

with you, senator, but to back up what my legal advisor has said, there are situations where it may be in the interest of our national security for those reports to come to congress in a classified setting. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. i agree with a lot of my colleagues on their concerns about the authorizations for military force that have been out there for too long and need to reform them and revoke them. i guess i would like to dig a little deeper into current strategy with iraq. last week president biden announced the united states was ending the combat mission in iraq. can you describe the strategic

objectives we now have in iraq now that we are ending our combat mission? >> certainly, senator. at the request of the iraqi government, we have agreed that u.s. military forces will remain in iraq to focus on training, enabling, and advising our iraqi partners. this is not the end of our military mission interact. there are consultations that have highlighted, the grove of their capabilities will allow for the full transition later of u.s. coalition forces to omission that is focused on training, enabling, a and advise re-task. would defer to my dod colleagues for any additional details. >> i agree very much with that summary, thank you. >> you would agree that there has been some backlash about

having combat troops stationed there and the more limited role of training then advising, but in terms of just our diplomatic relations with iraq, they also agree they cannot want us to have a combat mission in iraq, is that correct? >> this came out of discussions with the iraqi government. one of the points we been making here today is that the iraq government is a sovereign government that is fully formed, that a relationship has shifted over these decades from adversary to partners. >> is the 2002 aumf really needed to obtain any of these objectives? is it necessary for what we are trying to achieve in iraq? >> is not necessary at all, senator.

>> i think senator kaine was making the point it could be problematic in terms of iraqi perception of the united states and having them label us in this matter with these past aumfs. >> i would agree with you, senator, yes. >> i would like to just take it a little bit to the idea that two different administrations now have pointed to or than just the aumfs as an authorization to use their military force. the trump administration used an expanded interpretation and claim that the 2002 -- authorize the assassination of soleimani. many colleagues said the 2002 aumf was not that broad. they did say that other authorities, but i just want to go back to this 2002 aumf, which

i agree doesn't serve a purpose to any of our strategic objectives. it clearly states the concern of saddam hussein assembling weapons of mass destruction. i would like to know from the panel, do you believe it is a viable argument that the 2002 aumf authorizes at this point any use of force at all in terms of where things stand today? do we have the cover of an aumf to do military strikes within iraq? >> the 2002 aumf in our view is not necessary at all for operations in iraq. >> what circumstances would enable or motivate the administration to use that aumf aumf 2002 for strikes in either

iraq or iran? would it be stretched or banter are made to imply -- apply to any of our perceived need for conflicts in either of those countries? >> i'm going to let the lawyers answer that, given the way you ask the question, but i will say that we do not have a desire for conflict with either the iraqi government that is a partner, or iran, which is certainly not a partner. >> i think my time is up, but i would prefer if you do have a comment, i would like to hear it and i will yield to senator shots. >> we have the 2001 and for

defense purposes we also have article two. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> secretary sherman, the ending of war usually requires diplomacy. i want to just flag the fact that we have not passed the state department reauthorization act since 2002. to meet our diplomatic objectives to work with the defense department on our strategic military objectives. can you talk about what it would be like if congress passed an annual state department reauthorization act as we do the national defense authorization act and how that impacts this

overall debate? >> thank you very much, senator, and thank you for your support to diplomacy which we always believe should be the first resort and that any use of our military should be the last resort and solving problems. i actually have been in government at a time when there has been a state authorization to increase the contours and deepen the authorities that we have to engage in diplomacy around the world. so we would always welcome congress fonts role in that regard. >> senator sullivan was a leader in getting the coast guard authorization to hitch a ride on the defense authorization. think that something we have to consider for the next defense authorization. i also want to follow up and ask why we shouldn't just submit every aumf and every defense authorization?

i understand military leaders feel concern about geographic and time constraints so that our enemies don't work around them but it's a matter of course that congress -- that we reconsider and reauthorize every year. that would change the way we do oversight and we assert our constitutional authority. so why not just force congress to do its job on an annual basis? >> i think i will leave that to the discretion of the united states senate. >> i think there could be some challenging operational impact of establishing a rhythm like that. >> i've heard that, and i guess i want to press back a little

bit, because the challenging operational impacts with the rhythm like that is really the reason that we haven't even seriously considered a mandate or appealing either -- repealing either of these aumfs. how can we address those legitimate concerns that you are referring to without just abandoning our responsibility? >> we support the conversations that deputy secretary sherman has been discussing in terms of executive branch and congressional conversations about how to replace for example the 2001 aumf with something more narrow and specific and we look forward to continuing those conversations with you and your colleagues. >> as you know, the nature of war is changing. with a keystroke, a foreign

adversary can have a greater negative or even violent impact on the united states then had they mobilized tanks and troops and airplanes. and i'm wondering how we address this new reality in the context of a statute that did not really contemplate anything other than traditional kinetic engagement. how do we define war under the or interpret the definition of war under the war powers resolution in an era of cyber attacks and in an era when we know many of our adversaries are operating here? >> some of your other colleagues have raise cyberspace and its impact on terror threats as well as the nature of -- i think we are all contemplating these new issues and these new domains and arenas.

indeed, we now have a new domain in the defense department with space force. so we are always thinking about how we have to update how we proceed in the world, given these new threats. in terms of what that means regarding law and more, i would defer to my legal counsel here about how they would view that going forward. >> senator, this is an extraordinarily complex mission, without a doubt it is a cyber and what has been loosely defined as cyber war and how it relates to the ongoing conflict as a matter of intense

discussion and examination and the interagency, obviously if a foreign state uses cyber in a way that amounts to use, that would be an object of concern under international law, but it is such a complicated area that i for one would want to sit down and talk to the colleagues to address your concerns which i think are a hearing unto itself. >> what constitutes the use of force is basically the crux of the question. if that really congress role to define the use of force, given that there are new ways to use force that weren't contemplated under the old statute. think you.

i want to associate myself with the comments i heard senator kaine make an your response, that getting rid of the 2002 aumf is important to send a message to the iraqi people and the iraqi government that we are partners and not adversaries, as we were with the government that was there under saddam hussein at the time that authorization was passed. some questions so i understand this administration's thinking. would you agree that other than the president's powers under article two, the president does not have authority to launch military strikes against iran? >> i take that as a legal question, so i'm going to defer to them.

>> our position is the 2002 aumf does not authorize strikes against iran. i would note however that i think senator kaine talked about ancillary defenses where if we came under attack by force that was not the subject of a 2001 mission, we would obviously be able to defend ourselves in the context of operating. >> you are saying you are invoking other than article to power their under the 2001 aumf? >> it's a concept of ancillary self-defense.

if they came under attack from whatever source -- >> is a pretty direct question. i understand that legal responses can be technical as an attorney, but the 2001 au mf relates to isis and its successors. iran is not isis or one of its successors, is it? >> no, it is not. >> so other than article two, does the president have any authority to launch military strikes against the state of iran? pretty simple question. >> senator, the 2000 one does not authorize strikes against iran. i would agree with that. nor does the 2002 authorize strikes against iran. >> correct. are there any authorities left other than article two?

>> with the caveat of what i admit is a sort of nuanced ancillary defense argument, i take your point, neither the 2001, the 2002, nor the 1991 aumf call for the use of force against iran. >> with your indulgence i will keep asking some additional questions. i want to export with the president believes is his scope of authority under article two. and of course presidents do have the authority to take preemptive strikes in the case of an imminent attack, agreed? >> yes. >> and you are familiar with the caroline doctrine that was reaffirmed by the nuremberg trials after world war ii, correct? and does this administration, the biden administration,

subscribe to the standard regarding preemptive attacks that is laid out in the caroline doctrine? >> senator, i would want to consult with my colleagues here from dod. i would have to talk to others. it is not a question i'm necessarily equipped to answer, and i would desperately like to get it right. >> i join the administration just this week, so i would want to have those conversations as well. >> if you could get back to me in writing, because as you know with past administrations, we had the theory of preventative war, which doesn't contain the important ingredients of eminence that is in the caroline doctrine. so i'm very interested in

understanding what the biden administrations decision is with respect to the caroline doctrine. >> we do have the authority to respond to an imminent threat, but i take your point. >> i'm asking whether definition of that standard is the caroline doctrine. if i can just ask a couple of questions regarding the attack on the japanese owned ship under israeli management, and to innocent people were killed, and i saw the secretary, secretary blinken's response saying that we were going to hold around responsible and accountable. my question is, not what you will do, not what you may do, but what you believe you have

the scope of authority to do. does article to give the president any authority to take military action against iran in response to the attack on the mercer? >> i would have to defer to mr. busy gorman is crass as a legal matter. what i want to say is that -- v to mr.isek or his colleague. we would have to take the lead on this since it is in fact their ship, even though it was originally japanese and because a u.k. and a romanian citizen were killed. so we are letting the british take the lead, both at the u.n. in terms of what the response would be, as well as any further response. i do think it was quite critical that we had a ordinate

attribution that this was indeed iran. >> let me just refine that question if i could, with respect to -- here we have a partner, nato partner, the ritz. but it doesn't seem to fall under article two, response authority, other than maybe invoking some other multilateral agreement like nato charter or some un security council resolution. i'm trying to get a sense of what the administration believes its authorities are in terms of military response in a strike like this, a close u.s. friend. >> subject to my colleagues views, this would be a situation

where we would talk about the facts and circumstances, such factors of attribution before i would even want to venture an opinion as to whether or not there was the article two basis and obviously we would look to the department of justice and also legal counsel. nobody has asked me whether this is covered by article two as of yet, if that is helpful. >> mr. chairman, do you want to make any closing remarks? >> there is obviously a robust interest, as is evidenced by the fact that an overwhelming majority of the members on both sides of the aisle have attended this hearing at one point or another, so it speaks to the importance of the issue. we appreciate the insights of

this panel, madam secretary, and your distinguished colleagues in trying to shed light on the issues that we are in the midst of deciding on. the committee will hold a markup tomorrow on the 91 and 2002 and we will see how the votes are cast there and then we will continue to engage the administration, which i want to acknowledge again has been engaged to the national security advisor and others into what such a replacement might look like if congress were to go ahead with a repeal. these hearings record will remain open until the close of business today and with the thanks of the committee, this hearing is closed. >> thank you, mr. chairman. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2021] [captioning performed by the

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