tv Capitol Police Inspector General Testifies on Jan. 6 Attack CSPAN December 8, 2021 5:29am-6:59am EST
. good morning. i called to order this hearing, which is the rules committee's oversight hearing of the united states capitol police following the january 6 attack on the capitol. as you know senator blunt and i have led a series of hearings over improvements that must be made, changes that must be made.
>> and joint forces of members on the homeland security committee so we have a more comprehensive committee of the security failures on january 6 which of course included mistakes at the top of the capitol police, mistakes of leadership within this building, and then mistakes on the side of the defense department and other agencies. and so we are greatly appreciative of what mr. michael bolton, the inspector general for the capitol police has done. i want to thank you for being here inspect bothen. and i think you know the --.
this committee has responsibility of oversight of the police. we will hear more about the measures already taken to improve the capital police department preppedness and operationsaredness and operations i remember senator blunt and i reviewing the list as we prepared our own recommendations. comprehensive list of over a hundred recommendations. we consolidated some of those, came up with some of our own that as i noted were outside of the police department as well. and i think january 6 is a pretty good date to get the vast number of these things done, which we reason telling the sergeant in arms both bodies as well as the capitol police chief. but we know progress has been made. and in this new year we will
continue this discussion as our first hearing will be with the new capitol police chief. and then we can get much more focused on the details of our own recommendations. so in june, the week before you testified, mr. bolton before this committee we issued our support where the the homeland security committee as i noted focussed on the security, planning and response failures of that day, that unprecedented, horrific day. our report laid out key findings and recommendations and importantly as i noted progress has been made in putting many of those recommendations in place. we recommended that the capitol police produce a department-wide operational plan for all large scale events at the capitol. and now those plans are standard procedure and have been used several times since then. the department has also worked to improve its handling of
intelligence, including by making sure that information is shared with rank and file officers, another of our recommendations. we said that congress should provide sufficient funding to support capitol police training and equipment requirements, as well as needed staffing levels. and in july, president biden signed our emergency funding legislation into law which packed both house of this congress to deliver resources to do just that. significant resources in the supplemental budget that many of us on this committee worked with senator leahy who is a member of this committee, as well as senator shelby to major sure that these resources were included. didn't want to wait till year end. we wanted to get it done immediately that. legislation also provided funding for mental health support for officers. something i've strongly supported. another recommendation was for the capitol police board to appoint a new police chief which
it did in july with the selection of chief major. for the past several months chief major has worked to make needed changes and implement recommendations both from our report as well as from our inspector general report mr. bolton. at or last hearing with you, you u..ed us on the review of capitol police policies and practices since the insurrection including on the four reports you have issued at that time. . since then three more reports detailing issues that impacted the department's response to the events in january 6th. and you are finishing a final report outlining your findings and progress to address them. significantly you have issued a of the o 104 registrations of which 30 have now been implemented in an effort to ensure the department is equipped to fulfill its mission. and it is not as though work is not being done on the other recommendations as you know. they are in progress. and as i noted, we will have an
ideal moment at the beginning of january to go back through with the chief himself, the work that needs to be done, the work that is done. and so this kind of alert to those working on these recommendations not just with the capitol police but the other agencies as well. that they get their work done. this work is crucial to improving the security of the capitol. and also to supporting the brave officers who served heroically and in unimaginable circumstances. it was an honor to stand with some of those officers with senator blunt and their families as our president signed our bipartisan legislation to honor the hero who is defends our democracy with the congressional gold medal. we owe it to these courageous officers to make sure they have the resources and support and the rules in place to do their
jobs. since january 6th, anyone that walks around this capitol talked to officers as i do, asks officers questions, see how they are doing, you find out, one, that there has been some improvement in morale, which i think is really important. they lost so many of their fellow officers, including those who sadly died by suicide. but we also know from them their continues to be staff shortages. we have now put the money forward for that. but this police department, like many across the country is facing staff shortages and we must fill those jobs. euros country moves forward we know there are many issues that merit serious consideration. a major investigation, which i support, is going on, bipartisan investigation, in the house of representatives. looking back at the root causes of what happened with recommendations. our job today is to look at the security at the capitol.
and i look forward to discussing your findings inspector general bolton, the progress that's been meat at the capitol police department in the past several months and certainly the work that lies ahead. not only with the capitol police department but getting answers to the other issues we raised in our report along with senators peter and senator portman with regard to other ages and how they work the capitol police. thank you very much mr. bolton and we look forward to hearing from you. i'll turn it over the my friend and colleague, senator blunt. >> thank you, snorbg. and thank youenator klobuchar. and thank you also for your focus on these issues. as we look at the ig recommendations and i know new recommendations we're going to hear about today. this is the fourth hearing this committee's had regarding the
january 6 attack on the capitol and second time we've had a chance to have the u.s. capitol police inspector general come and be here with us today. appreciate the opportunity to talk to him as he concludes what is his 11-month investigation. it began also immediately. there were recommendations made immediately and others to be made today. glad to have mr. bolton's wife bridget here with us today. and i'll share senator klobuchar's view that we will not ask her any questions that you aren't able to answer. but i know she's proud of your work. and i know the amount of work you have had to put in to cover this territory to come up with all the recommendations you have over the last 11 months, has meant that your family's had to be an important and patient part
of that. and we're grateful to bridget for what he's done so forth this work as well. the impact on the department has been clear. though i think we're still trying to be sure we fully understand the impact today. the detailed 104 recommendations from your office, made with the help of the department's operational readiness committee has made a difference already. as i've said before, what you do and what we've talked about and what your report makes clear and what senator klobuchar just mentioned, you know, the frontline officers were the true heroes that day. securing that door at the
capitol for a significant period of time, never even getting the information that there were already people who breached the building in other ways. my colleagues and i remain incredibly grateful for the dedication of the capitol police and what they do to not just protect the congress, but protect everyone who works here and everyone who visits here. and it is incredibly important. i'd like to highlight two divisions that were subjects of your most recent flash are report. they, according to your report and something i think we all had no surprise in, you described their performance as exceptional and excellent. the dignitary protection division and the incident response division. first the dig tory dig anyway response division --.
second the hazardous incident response division disposed of multiple hazardous devices found on or near the capitol campus. later that day those teams conducts sweeps of capitol grounds and buildings, which really loud us to get back to the point work of the joint session. . others were back in the capitol by 8:00 or so and when we left the capitol hill at 3:30 that morning. senator klobuchar, we were able to do that knowing that that building had been secured by the capitol police who also
understood i think the importance of the work we do here. it would have been easy moment to say well let's come back tomorrow or we need another 48 hours. but the capitol police and particularly the unit that had to do the sweep of the capitol also shared and understood the performance of the work we do here. any comments or questions i have today regarding any deficiencies of the capitol police are certainly not meant to disparage or deflect on the rank and file or diminish of their actions on the sixth. frankly our questions i think, and certainly mine, are likely to continue to be about the leadership failures that day. i think the committee should hear and i'm glad that the chairwoman has decided we will hear in january from chief manger. there is no better time to find out what the capitol police have
done in the what would then have been the past 12 months to ensure this kind of thing can't happen again, and if it does happen again we would be much better prepared for it in ways that would ensure frankly that the kind of events that happened that day would not be successfully repeated or even attempted. it is important that we understand limitations that have prevented the capitol police from fully implementing the recommendations that you made and our committee has made. but there'd better be limits that makes sense whenever we have a chance to talk to the chief about those limits in this committee in january. chairman and i drafted legislation that would provide the police chief with unilateral authority to request emergency assistance from the national guard. even this week senator klobuchar, we're reading stories
about some of the testimony that we took in eight months ago in finding out that that testimony still is highly dubious as it appeared to be the day we took that testimony. we've worked with our colleagues with the supplemental bill to provide the department with additional necessary funding for salaries. many officers were reaching their salary cap. and obviously with the officers leaving, the officers that remained were a asked to do more and more. we've also looked at overtime pay, at trauma support, riot control equipment for all officers, and specialized training for those officers that need to be part of specialized units. i think we're going to work together to see that the officers are better trained, better equipped and better prepared. we owe that to the frontline
officers and their families. they do everything they can every day to protect the members of congress that congressional officers, employees and visitors to the capitol on a daily basis, and we are grateful for that. and glad you are here today. >> well thank you very much senator blunt. and when i think of that day i think of the two of us, as you noted. at 3:30 in the morning walking across those hallways. those corridors with broken glass on every side, with those two young women with the mahogany box with the last of the electoral ballots. and i think that is forever sered in our memories and so much of this is not just getting to the root causes, which is critical what's happening in the house, but it is making sure it never happens again. and that is going to be about
and making sure there is better coordination and intelligence sharing and the like. i also want to know, we've been joined by senator warner on the committee and also chair of the intelligence committee. so this will be helpful to have him here as well as senator king and senator padilla and senator capita. mr. bolton has served in the capitol police office of the inspector general 15 years. he was pointed at inspector general in january 2019. early in his career he served as special agent in charge of the treasury department's office of investigation for four years. he also served for 21 years with the u.s. secret service. mr. bolton holds a degree in criminal justice from the university of maryland. i will now swear in our witness.
mr. bolton will you please stand, raise your right hand. do you swear the testimony you will give before the committee will be the truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth so help you god? thank you. we are now recognized for your testimony. >> good morning madam chair globe, ranking member blunt and distinguished members of the committee. thank you for this opportunity to appear before you. i'd like to extend my appreciation to the committee for holding this hearing and the important work that this committee continues to do to make the capitol complex safe and secure. i'd also like to take the time and extend and recognize the outstanding efforts and work done by my staff and the oifs of inspector general. through their collective efforts and skills we have produced
eight flash reports outlining areas of improvement for the department resulting in 104 recommendations. our last and final flash report is a summary of the status of the recommendations we have made and security improouflts the department's made since january 6th. although the department has addressed some of o our recommendations is have made security improvements throughout the capitol complex, much work still needs to be addressed in relation to training, intelligence, cultural change and operational planning. we are currently finalizing our final flash report which we anticipate issuing within the next few days. since my last hearing, before this committee, we have issued three additional flash reports. these reports include areas in the department such as communication, coordination, bureau, the hazardous incidents response division, canine and dignitary protection division
and human capital. additionally to gain the perspective on departmentwide command and control challenges on january 6, we contacted 86 officers and completed interviews with 36 of them who agreed to be interviewed. we also reviewed 49 after action reports. capitol police officers and employees completed. based on our interviews, with the capitol police officers and review of afteraction reports we identified departmentwide command and control deficiencies related to information sharing, chain of command, direction, communication, preparedness, training, leadership development, emergency response procedures and law enforcement coordination. our sixth flash report was designed to communicate deficiency the department's hazardous incidence response division and canine unit. deficiency who is included lack of adequate department guidance for both units.
the department did not always comply with guidance related to k nine operations or training and did not always ensure k-9 policies and procedures were up to date. a lack of training and experience required for officials and inadequate hazardous response guidance could have hampered the finishes of the k-9 unit on january 6th. our seventh flash report was designed to communicate deficiencies with the department's dignitary protection division human capital. the division greatly contributed towards the department's mission through proper training and successfully evacuating individuals under its protection during january 6th. however the dignitary protection division incurred authorization issues with staging evacuation vehicles on january 6th, in addition to the training program, lacked a dedicated training staff, facilities irks and weapon system training
integration. uscp could not provide documentation supporting that it implemented those recommendations. our eighth and final flash report is a summary of the status of our 104 recommendations and any security recommendations made by the department since january 6th. additional training for cdu, civil disservice units, and hiring of subject matter expert in planning and coordination of larnt e venus or high profile demonstration, department still has more bork to achieve the goal of making the capitol complex safe and secure. out of the 200 enhancements the department has provided only 61 have supporting documentation to support the enhancements to have occurred. some others instituted have been additional intelligence briefings, provided to the rank and file as well as to the
department leadership. department still lacks overall training infrastructure to need the needs of the department. level of intelligence gathering and expertise needed is overall cultural change to move the department into a protective agency as opposed to a traditional police department. in conclusion, department is comprised of extraordinary men and women who are dedicated to protecting democracy, putting their own lives in harm's way in order for congress to exercise their constitutional duties in a safe and open manner. it is our duty to honor those officers who have given their lives but also ensuring the safety all those working and visiting the capitol complex by making hard changes within the department. finally, i would like to thank not only this committee but also the committee on house administration and select committee to investigate the january 6 attack for their continuing support of my office and the work they have done in protecting democracy so that events such as january 6 never
happen again. thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today. i'll be very happy to answer any questions the committee may have? >> thank you very much mr. bolton. we'll never forget the words of one officer on january 6 picked up on the radio. "does anybody have a plan?" in the middle of the insurrection. in your report on command and control issues, you found that there was no plan. the department did not have adequate procedures for coordinated emergency responses. officer were not briefed in intelligence and there was lack of direction about what to do about the attack. you recommended officers be griffin briefings at roll calls on potential hazards. can you elaborate on what was lacking in this area on january 6, how that's changed. >> thank you. that has changed in couple of different ways. first, they have hired from the
outside subject matter expert for operational plans. as evident as you probably saw the difference in september 18th demonstrations that we had up here just recently. the second they have started tending -- intelligence division analysts are tending role calls, providing briefings to the officers and as well as to the command staff whether be the sergeants and above, lieutenants and inspectors, so they are now receiving daily briefings. and receiving the appropriate threat assessments. in addition every officer has been provided a government cell phone to provided for any alert on campus or -- and/or recall messages that may be needed. >> you recommended. you mentioned in your testimony the department established comprehensive lockdown procedures for the capitol complex to account for various potential hazards. how would these planned improved safety and emergency situations? and have you received any
response from the department as to how they are going to implement them? >> they are in the process of updating their policies and procedures, in addition that they have started conducting training, making sure not only the officers on post but also as well as the officials around have knowledge of the lockdown procedures. you need to have that coordinated effort if we indeed need to have another lockdown. everybody knows how to do the procedures in a quick and timely manner so that we can lock this building down quickly. the emergency supplemental funding legislation signed into law in july included significant new funding for the officers access to equipment. we noted the need for funding for equipment in our joint report after finding that 75% of the officers, 900 of 1200 on duty that day were forced to defend the capitol if their regular uniforms. do you agree that this funding should help the department
improve officers access to protective equipment? what steps have been taken to address this issue? >> the department has just recently purchased new equipment to include either replacement of those shields that we had talked about in previous flash reports where they were more properly stored. they are now storing them properly. they have the additional munitions now up to date so now they have improved knowing that they have also conducted joint training for the cdu unit, the civil disservice units, so they are conducting the joint training and getting the training and equipment needed. >> in our last hearing, you noted in response to questions that the department was suffering from low morale. do you still see that as a major challenge facing the department? and do you have any comments on the department's effort to recruit new officers? obviously all the overtime, the repeated day after day of working would take a toll on anyone. and this is of course coming
after having been through that insurrection, not properly trained, not properly equipped, not properly led. and that is what we're dealing with here and we know what a problem its been. >> when you talk about morale, that's a difficult thing to pinpoint as far as getting a definitive feel for morale. that is -- you may get from time to time, but i would say that their morale has generally increaseed or gotten better. they are starting to see things turn around a little bit. department is actively recruiting those. filling the classes. just had one just recently before thanksgiving they sent down to the federal law enforcement training center. so they are starting to see some approved. but i think the officers are in that wait and see mode.
they want to see what else are we going to do. they do recognize it does take time, but also they are watching leadership and watching the community at large how we're going to move forward. >> well as you know there have been massive change in leadership, both at sergeant in arms levels for both house and senate, as well as a new police chief. do you think that the selection of a permanent chief has impacted the department's ability to make needed changes? what issues when this committee has the chief before us at the beginning of next year, what things should we be pushing for in your opinion and what maybe keeps you up at night that hasn't gotten done yet? >> besides having two kids. lot of things keep me at night. certainly having a permanent chief that is one step moved forward. very difficult when you start to try to make changes when you are having an acting capacity, someone in an acting capacity,
those are important to fulfill. the areas i have some concern still is two major issues. training. training infrastructure, proper one and intelligence. one, intelligence is still considered division as opposed to be a bureau level. they have yet to fire a permanent director to head up intelligence. i'd like to see that position filled with individual who has necessary skills and abilities to elevate that intelligence into the bureau level. training, which we we are already conducted. we've actually started your next job. not a flash report. our normal type job we have our annual plan. and training services bureau from top to bottom and anticipate that report will be issued some time in february, that we want to see training become the flag ship of this department. much like when we view quanticos
and the secret service rally training center you look at their org chart compared to ours. we're nowhere near close and we need a training services bureau infrastructure that is going to handle all the training. >> okay. thanks. i'll let senator blunt, warner talk about intelligence sharing. my last question, defense department. relationships with the defense department. obviously much help here at the capitol. that's been drawn down. as we look forward to how we have better coordinated efforts if ever necessary in the future. any recommendations on that? that was a major problem as well. >> i think a lot of that is going to be continuously have the training, integrated training, whether the national guard, metropolitan police department and that kind of goes right back to the training services bureaus the one should be handling that and making
those relationships stronger within the realm of training. needs to be continued. and that's what also worries me. yes we're getting, civil disservice unit is getting trained now. is it going to be continues. >> and part of this was, you know, having the defense department on the ready and soldiers on the ready to help us out. we ended up of course senator warner's national guard there in virginia and others stepped in but there was in our opinion some delays that were very costly. senator blunt. >> thank you senator klobuchar. mr. bolton we had our last hearing with you i think it was pointed out that most of the recommendations you had made up until that time would be done, the majority could be done without the police board being involved or without any even additional funds. how many of your, i think now around 104 recommendations have
been implemented? >> out of 104 we have 30. >> 30. >> yes, sir. >> and are you getting significant pushback on the remaining 74? >> not at this time. we haven't gotten any pushback. there may be some of the recommendations that we'll have to sit down with the chief and with the board to hash out the very nature of what ear looking for to make the changes and what they feel also what's comfortable for them. >> and your first set, your first recommendations were available to them when? >> our first flash report i believe some time in mar. >> that's what i was thinking. >> march. and that was the series, intelligence and operational planning. flash report. which they have as far as the operational plan, they do have that department wide operational plan now being produced in
singular document. >> do you have regularly scheduled meetings with the department leadership to talk about those recommendations and the implementation of them? >> recently we have not. i haven't head a meeting with the chief but i'm sure he's busy with trying to assimilate through with the department all the other issues we have. i do attend the monthly board meeting and i do brief the board on a quarterly basis. >> so you haven't had a meeting with the chief yet, the two of you. >> we had one meeting, i believe that was back in august when we had our initial meeting. >> are there any recommendations that you have made that you can clearly see resistance in the department? >> i believe there probably may be a couple, at least as indicated to me, there may be
resistance. one with the cert teams. the containment emergency response teams. and the issues potential with security clearances. one of our recommendations was that every sworn in civilian would either have a top secret or at worst a secret clearance. there seems to be some hesitation moving towards that. >> why do you think that is? >> i -- hasn't been expressed to me directly. i think some of it is potentially having to change your hiring standards. what to do with those who are already on the job that came on the job without that particular hiring standard. so and also one of the issues that the union may raise, i don't know of any specific ones, but may be some concern what the union may feel about their folks having to get clearances and maintain those clearances.
and there is always the fear that once you expend that additional funds, which it is going to be additional funding to get the clearances that you will have to pay for those, that your individuals may end up leaving to another federal agency with that clearance because that is a soft after tool with the federal government that if you already have a clearance it makes it much easier to move to another federal agency. >> how many officers have left the department since january 6th? >> i don't have the exact numbers of those but i believe around 200 or so. >> how many -- are there jobs where we're having sworn officers that have the sworn level of training do jobs that somebody else could do? have we got the right match of training and jobs that are being done in the capitol complex by officers? >> if you are talking about the,
what's being proposed right now where you may have some contract -- think of it as the court security officers that you see at the u.s. marshals. those gals and guys in the blue blazers and pants doing basically mag checkpoints there. and providing. >> yes. >> something similar. i know that right now is in discussion with the board and department bringing over potentially contracted focus to augment the officers, one, to allow them to be able to get days off, cut down a little on the overtime. and also to provide the officers would be able to get their much-needed training. so i know those things are in discussion right now between the board and department. and i imagine some of it with the committees as well. >> so with 200 officers or so retiring or leaving the force this year, what percentage of vacant jobs are there in the capitol police? >> i would say it would probably
be that number. i think that's what they other down. i think that's what they're authorized 1800 or so and in the area right now either 16 or 1500. i'm sure the numbers but they are down officers and need to bring the folks on that can augment. because even if you hire somebody today, you are talking over a year before you get them on post. by the time they get done with federal officer training center and cheltenham, by time you get all that training done, get them through their on the job training, with another officer learning the actual post and everything. you are talking almost a year before they are operational. so what they are thinking and proposing now is to be able to get immediate help. to augment those officers and identify posts that may not require strictly still provide some training but it is not the
same extent of training that you are giving somebody coming on the job for law enforcement. >> so my last question for this round would be one of the things we did in the supplemental funding was waive the maximum limits that officers could be paid during a year. are we going face that again this year with that big a shortage of -- from the full force? are we going face that same situation again where we, one have more overtime than the officers or their families want them to have, and two get officers at a point before september the 30th, the end of the fiscal year, that they have already reached their maximum income potential? >> i would anticipate that you would probably find yourselves in the same position through the remainder of this fiscal year and potentially into fiscal year 2023. it will take a while to get
folks on board. not only that, but there are certainly things that you can't dictate or anticipate, whether it be additional protests for something that comes up that nobody knew was coming, that you would, you know, require officers to have overtime, or late-night sessions with members in voting or whatever. so some things you can't anticipate. >> well if you never get more than 90% of the jobs filled in this organization, either we have expect that we have more jobs there than we need, which we know that is not the case, or you are going to have people working harder and longer hours han you want them to work. and we need to think about. that may be the things that argues the most for whatever jobs there are there that don't take the same training skills or arms that you need in other locations. so thank you for that. thank you, chairman.
>> thank you very much senator blunt. next up. senator warner. >> thank you madam chair. let me say at the outset of someone who isn't always been a attendee. this committee's investigation may not have attracted the same level of attention that our friends in the house have. but i think the fact that you have been professional, bipartisan and looking for the facts and looking for how we move forward is a tribute to both of you and the members of the committee. you indicated where i want to go mr. bolton is the -- my role from the intelligence standpoint. and i'm lucky enough to have senator blunt and senator king on the intelligence committee. you raise the issue about security clearances. i know back in your june report. and one of the things i hope that capitol police note is that
this is an area we have focused on for some time. few years back there was 750,000 person backlog on security clearances. actually gave one of the few areas gave the trump administration credit. they worked with us to reform that. we brought that down to about 250,000. we are down to about a 30 day wait in terms of a secret clearance. so i hope that the movement we've made on security clearance reform and you got a stay on this all the time and reciprocity so once you get clearance you can take it with you or move from entity to entity, we maybe ought o give you a briefing so you can get that to the capitol police. but i am concerned on this intelligence sharing between the ic writ large and dhs and fbi. you brought up the point that you were concerned about that ability to have that share. how do you think?
do you think progress has been made since june? or any more formal procedures in place how the capitol police shares information with the dhs, fbi and ic intelligence? >> i would say there's been some progress, but we do have some folks embedded in some of the task force and intelligence. i can see we need to do more. one, i think by -- and as i said earlier, making it into intelligence, bureau, having somebody from the intelligence communities that's lived all their lives. those folks are -- i look at -- anybody comes from the intelligence community, they are folk cut from different cloth. unique skills and sets. you can't learn that and something that takes time to actually know that kind of field. and that is where i, the department needs to recognize they really need to put a lot of resources into the intelligence bauer bureau. i know they have hired additional intelligence
analysts. there is a group right now in school learning. but there is more that we need to hire. make it almost similar to the secret service has, the fbi, that just this area here is we need to have that kind of abilities, especially around the capitol complex. >> e would agree with that. all though i don't -- i'm not sure that would mean that every capitol police officer needs a secret or top secret clearance. but having a large number -- and one of the things again, senator king and i have looked at just communications between different components of the ic, you have to have a classified communications system in place. and my fear is that if we don't have that kind of classified information sharing so that you can have realtime information t capitol police are always going to be at a disadvantage if you have to wait for the fbi or dhs or some other part of the ic to
come and brief on a periodic basis. that's always going to be a hurdle. so do you know whether the capitol police has in place or putting in place any kind of classified communications, so you can go literally online real time and get updates from the ic? >> yeah, they do have that capable, so they can go online and have real live communication with the entity. whether be in their skips they have. throughout the -- they have their own skip as well. so they can do that in realtime. i just want real quick, if whole reason for whether or not the officers have top secret or secret clearance, there is a couple components to the reasoning for that. one is the insider threat, having an individual that has to have a clearance, whether it be on or off duty, making sure their lives comport to what their jobs entail.
but it also elevates your standards and expectations of people you are bringing on. and it is a good recruiting tool as well that this is what we require. we require a high-standard individual. and that is going to -- i believe that is going to attract additional folks to look upon the capitol police as job you would wish to use as a career. >> and one of the things we're working through is this issue of reciprocity. so if you have -- if someone is going move from one part of the ic over to the capitol police, they could take their clearance with them. that's still remaining a problem. i know i've got eight seconds left. i'm going to the other end of the spectrum, an issue i've been strangely interested in for some time. is the performance of the k-9 units. and you pointed out that was also a challenge. in one of your earlier reports. is there any progress on the capitol police use of the dogs? >> yes they are, they are starting to get they are training they need and making sure they document whenever they do the -- some of their sweeps. so that they do, they are making
progress to updating their policy and procedures and getting the training. but again it goes back to i really like to see their training is being conducted by cheltenham and not by the units themselves here. and again, that poses a problem to me. you need that separation of duties to make sure it is separated from the day to day operation to training. and they need to continue to move forward in that area. >> thank you madam chair and thank you for giving me the flexibility to go from security clearances to k-9 units. >> okay. very good. senator caputo, member of the appropriations committee as well we thank you for your help getting the funding that was needed. >> thank you madam chair, and ranking member bluntd and inspector general bolton, thank youing if ber here. i think it bears repeating how appalling the january 6 attack was for us and remains a stain on our democracy so i appreciate everything you have done but also want to express my sincere
thanks and appreciation to our all capitol police officers and law enforcement personnel that were protecting our capitol that day. it is always great when you are on the dice and the person in front of you asked the question. you were going to ask. last time you were here i was asking about can k-9s. . there was a whole lot of talk about expanding the use of k-9s into different types of areas. more perimeter, purchase of these dog, we know the training and purchase is very expensive. i don't need for you to repeat. sounds like the training aspect as to how they can use the k-9 units better. and do you anticipate as training improves for k-9s that they would expand the different parameters what they can be used for? i know some are sniffing toxic
material, some used for others, obviously inspecting vehicles, those kind of things. is that the type of o thing you are that the type of thing you'e talking about? >> absolutely. yes, ma'am. whether it be the vapor weight dogs or your traditional k-9 sweep vehicles, having that training is so important. and they continuously train because you got to make sure the dogs are performing the way they should be performing. >> right. the other thing i would say and i think all of us, certainly i do on my phone as early as this morning as i was deciding how to navigate the way into the capitol, since january 6th, we are getting repeated messages on our phones that raise our awareness as to what streets are closed for what purpose, what's going on on capitol hill, and i think that was one, from a member's perspective, one of the big fallacies of that day, because didn't know really what was going on, where there were safe areas, and -- >> how is that any different than every day? >> well, this is true.
this is true. yes, like today we don't know what's going on, but we do know what roads are closed. i'll say that. i want to express appreciation to the sergeant of arms but also to the capitol police because they have upped their communications with at least me personally, and i assume everybody, and i'm appreciative of that because we do need to know, we do use it. the alerts are very useful. one of the, you know, one of the aspects that you -- i picked up in one of your reports is that there was no continuous radio contact between the officers. they were having trouble coordinating, communicating with one another. has that been improved. seems to me that would be something that would be, i don't want to say anything is easy but easier to improve than neighbor some of the long-term training aspects of this. >> that's a hard one in a sense as far as the communication, because we haven't had something similar to that, but i think certainly what i would say
improvement is by issuing all of the officers with department cell phones. so they can receive those alerts you mentioned with street closures to give them that situational awareness in realtime. it is difficult when you have an incident, people end up over using the radio, and your communication ends up breaking down. i think the long-term answer to that is through additional training and being able to once things get a little bit more settled down to have either table top exercises, having areas to instructing officers how to do radio discipline. >> it seems to be training, training, training, is the aspect that's come forward, and all of your recommendations, and i'm wondering if there has been or there plans to be like a full-out drill of these trainings. drill of a like incident, so that you can, you know, deploy these training, you know, in real life.
you're not just sitting in a classroom or something on a computer. to your knowledge, has there been a full out drill or evacuation drill, i question the evacuation standards that were used to remove us from the chamber. those are questions i'm wondering, have we actually drilled this training? >> what i've seen is they have to continue to do at least the evacuation training but not the overall. i think what you're thinking about. they'll do it in bits and pieces, the child care center, evacuating that, or fairfield building or some of the individual buildings. we'll do as opposed to a whole encompassing, like, situation where you have to evacuate the entire capitol complex. which is very difficult to do. let's make no mistake about that because especially if congress is -- it's not going to happen. we're not going to do a training exercise if anyone is in session. it would have to be something during a break. >> well, in my view, the fact that it's very difficult to do speaks to the need to do it.
yes, i would agree when we're in session, that would cause additional problems, but i do think that -- and the reason i've got this top of mind is the horrifying shooting in the school that occurred in michigan last week. if you read some of the reports from the students and the teachers as to what they did, they had drilled as to what to do if there was an active shooter in their school, and they barricaded themselves into the classrooms. they had practiced this, and i think honestly it saved lives, so it kind of reinforced to me how important actually physically drilling really difficult situations in the whole would save lives in the end. thank you very much for all of your work. thank you. >> thank you very much, senator capito, senator king, member of the intelligence committee as well. >> i have to observe how profoundly sad it is that we're here even talking about this. and january 6th was one of the saddest days in our country, that our magnificent capitol is
not open to the public and we had an attack on the heart of our democracy. it just casts a pal over this whole discussion. second point, as i recall the 9/11 commission, one of their conclusions is there was a failure of imagination. we had not -- security people had not thought about what could happen, the use of an airplane as a bomb. in this case, the u.s. capitol would be attacked. so i think part of the recommendation is not a specific one, but there should be red teams. there should be people in the capitol police who think the unthinkable, who think about what could happen in the mind of a malfactor, and it might be a domestic terrorist or
international terrorist or some combination. so i hope that that's something that you can recommend. again, it's not as specific as saying, okay, let's fix the k-9 core or those things, but there should be a conscious and deliberate policy of trying to think the unthinkable. and therefore be ready for it. a specific question, and i admit, i haven't read all of your reports in detail. i commend you for the work that you have done. i have been surprised there hasn't been more discussion of physical security. it's pretty easy to secure a building these days. why do we have windows that can be broken on the first floor of the capitol. why don't we have an automatted system that when a button is pushed, metal doors shut on all the entrances. is that part of your analysis? >> not specifically because those type of issues really
almost fall under the architect of the capitol, any physical structure. >> here's another silo, madame chair, i mean, come on. >> yeah, that would be outside of my authority to look at those kind of issues. now, i know general henry, and his task force did make several recommendations on the physical security or structural security, but those really fall in the realm of the architect, and that does not quite fit into my jurisdiction. >> i hope madame chair that is something we can look into. if all the doors and windows had been sealed, we wouldn't have had a lot of the problem we have. and there are ways, there's lex sand that you can put in the windows, that is bullet proof, unbreakable. i think that should be part of our analysis. finally, with regard to intelligence, i leaned over to senator warner and said is the
total intelligence budget of the united states government classified, and neither of us are sure, so i'm not going to cite the number, but we spend tens of billions of dollars every year on intelligence. it bothers me that we're creating another intelligence bureau. i think there should be someone in the capitol police whose job it is to look out for the intelligence but we don't need to start another intelligence examination. we've got the fbi, we've got department of homeland security. we've got enormous intelligence assets throughout the federal government, so i would hope that what we can talk about is the receipt of intelligence information but not necessarily the creation of a new intelligence division. i mean, that's the problem in this case, for example, apparently there were indications that in the fbi's system that there was danger that day. but it didn't get to the right
level in the fbi, and never got over to the capitol police. to me, it's a coordination issue rather than a collection of intelligence issues. do you see what i mean? >> yes, sir, i do. and this is not something that we are proponents that we would be actually going out and gathering the intelligence. we'd still be users of the intelligence. we're just elevating the ability to receive that intelligence, and then be able to process and get it to the rank and file and to the committee or committees or members of congress. so we're not advocating that we're out there actually gathering the intelligence. no, we're still users of it. but we have more ability, we have folks there, real quick, in our counter surveillance units are out there, and they receive information just overhear or see, that we need to have a basically an intelligence desk for them to report to our folks who can immediately then push
out to the rank and file, they get that information that our folks are there. it's just what they see in here. there's no active where they're searching or -- >> again, this is pressing beyond your jurisdiction. but there should be very vigorous discussions with the overall intelligence community, the director of national intelligence, to be sure the capitol police are part of their disbursal, their distribution of information. again, the tragedy is to have intelligence, but it doesn't get to the people that need it. that may not be a failure of the capitol police. it may be a failure of some other agency, intelligence agency within the federal government. it's a question of coordination, and that we need our intelligence gathering agencies which are very good, to be sure that that information is being shared in with the appropriate entities, one of which is the capitol police. the best intelligence of the
world is no good if the people that need it don't have it. so i appreciate your reporting. thank you very much for your really diligent, and excellent work on this. thank you, madame chair. >> thank you very much, senator king and on with us remotely is senator ossoff. >> thank you, madame chair, and thank you mr. bolton for your testimony today. when we spoke in june about your prior appearance on this committee, i asked you a simple but important question which is which individual is ultimately responsible for the security of the united states capitol complex. who's in charge, who has ultimate accountability, and that was not a question that you at that hearing nor your colleagues who testified before the committee in february were able to answer with specificity and you acknowledged mr. bolton during that discussion at your last appearance that that was a
problem, that the lack of a single individual who's accountable for and has responsibility for the security of the u.s. capitol is a major management problem and a security risk. that's my assessment. is that your assessment, and let me ask you the question again now, now that there's been time to regroup, consider reforms, consider recommendations from this committee, who is ultimately responsible for the security of the united states capitol? >> once again, you ask a difficult question. that is -- if you look at it strictly from an operational, let's say an operational side, that would be the chief. the chief of police, but because the chief also has to coordinate and you have the house and the senate and the architect of the capitol, the capitol police board, that kind of muddies the water in a sense of ultimate
responsibility, but if you had to pick the ultimate responsibility, it would fall under the chief of police for security. but that still, again, poses an issue because you still have the board and it's not -- i'm not trying to say that the board doesn't have its roles and responsibilities. certainly they do. that's not the question here. the question is who do you look for to having that responsibility for capitol security. obviously if you have an issue or you have a question or a member of your staff does, they're going to go pick up the phone, and probably call one or two people, either the chief or on this side for the senate side, you're going to be calling the senate sergeant of arms. so again, that does pose a potential problem that exists. >> mr. bolton, we've engaged extensively with you this year, and with your colleagues because
there was an egregious security failure which threatened the peaceful transfer of power as required by the constitution between presidential administrations. i don't need to remind you, but i remind all who are tuned in that that failure resulted in the sacking of the united states senate. the invasion of the senate floor, a suspension of constitutionally vital processes, here we are now, nearly a year later, and the answer to the question who's in charge, which we've identified repeatedly as being a crucial driver of both the failure to respond promptly to the contingency on january 6th, and also the effective management and sharing of intelligence in the weeks beforehand. no one is in charge. does that need to change, and how would you change it if you
could simply impose a different set of policies and a different org chart? >> it kind of pushes me outside of my realm as the inspector general for the capitol police, but i think there's certainly -- there would be an ability, and this would be something that the committees would have to look long and hard at where you have maybe something similar to, let's say, the fbi where you have a director in charge. and it would answer your question, who's ultimately in charge of the fbi, it's the director. who's ultimately in charge of the secret service, the director of the secret service, that's who you're going to go to to hold accountable for any questions that you may have. so that would be something that would have to be thought long and hard because of the uniqueness of the capitol police and the various elements, whether it be the house sergeant
of arms or the senate sergeant of arms or the architect of the capitol who make up the capitol police board and a lot of different moving parts there. it's not as clear cut and as easy as over in the executive branch. >> thank you, mr. bolton. it's a matter that i think this committee needs to continue to focus on and any management contacts and any security context, and any command context as you know, the lack of a single point of authority and accountability is a major vulnerability, and we have seen the consequences of that in part earlier this year. with my remaining time, and begging the chair's indulgence, one further question for you, i want to express my gratitude and respect and appreciation for the men and women of the united states capitol police. i want to express my gratitude and appreciation and understanding of the extraordinary burden that they have had to bear, the tremendous amount of overtime that u.s. capitol police personnel have worked and 2020 officers worked
according to my notes here. over 700,000 hours of mandatory overtime, and as u.s. cp, union representatives have noted, this is driven by chronic under staffing. there was of course a wave of retirements and resignations after the january 6th attack. congress has an unpredictable schedule. at present, none of this overtime, again, mandatory overtime, 700,000 hours of it in 2020 counts toward the officers base pay for retirement purposes. my question for you mr. bolton is what more can congress do to relieve the extraordinary burden on the u.s. capitol police requiring so much mandatory overtime and to ensure that their compensation and their retirement benefits reflect the true measure of their commitment and sacrifice to the security of the congress.
i can't hear you, mr. bolton. >> can you hear me now, sir? >> yes, i can. >> okay. i have been here since 2006 with the capitol police inspector general's office. i have yet to see where any committees or congress as a whole or even the board be an impediment to the capitol police in getting the necessary resources and funding required to complete their job. some of this is a result of circumstances beyond either the committee's control or the capitol police's control. whether it be the events of january 6th or just natural retirements or folks wishing to get out of law enforcement. there are many different factors and certainly, i don't want to leave any kind of -- i would not leave any kind of impression that at any time, the committees and/or the board were an impediment to the capitol
police, receiving, like i said, funding and/or resources. basically for my position, it is incumbent upon the capitol police to present to the committee and the board their needs, and to be looking forward, forward looking into potentially what they will need, whether it be retirements coming up, need additional classes, or utilizing different aspects in order to bring folk on quicker, whether it may be retired annuitants, capitol police officers coming up on retirement, as opposed to them going to, let's say over to the marshal service to conduct their court security officers. we keep them here. we just may end up changing it to instead of a uniform, they're wearing a blue blazer. so those kind of ideas where you can have a force multiplier, and
those are the type of things incumbent upon the department to look into those types of things. certainly, like i said, since i have been here, i have never seen any committees and/or board, that had inhibited the department from getting those resources. >> okay. next up, senator cruz. thank you. thank you, senator ossoff. >> thank you, madame chair. mr. bolton, welcome, thank you for your testimony. thank you for your service. on january 6th all of us in the entire nation was horrified at the terrorist attack that occurred here in washington, d.c. the violent assault on the capitol was horrific, and the men and women of the capitol police and d.c. metro police and law enforcement demonstrated extraordinary bravery and heroism and courage. at the same time, what happened on january 6th must never be allowed to happen again. a riot that succeeds in breaching the capitol, that
endangers the lives of lawmakers and law enforcement is an unacceptable security situation, and you've done a serious job examining what caused what law enforcement failures precipitated what occurred that day. when you previously testified to this committee, you stated the primary problems were on the front end, a lack of adequate intelligence gathering, and on the day of execution, a lack of operational planning in place to handle an incident like the january 6th attack. and i'd like to follow up on what specific steps capitol police have taken since then to ensure that never happens again. what specific steps has the capitol police taken since june of 2021 to improve its intelligence gathering? >> thank you, sir. one of the things they have done is they went out and hired, actually it was a retired secret
service agent, who had extensive training and expertise in large event planning. operational planning, so they went out and hired from the outside, and you could certainly see the difference in september 18th, the latest large demonstration that we had here on the hill. by bringing that expertise in there and coordinating, they have gathered to have an operational plan has greatly enhanced the department's ability to respond and react to potentially large demonstrations, the department has increased a number of intelligence analysts, they have a ways to go, i would say, but they have increased the intelligence analysts, and testified earlier, that they have additionally four, five analysts in training as we speak. they have made some improvements in providing the intelligence briefings to the rank and file officers to the other, beyond the executive team as i would call them, but your inspectors, and your captain, and your line folks that are going to have to
react to a situation. so those folks are getting debriefings now. they're getting the intelligence materials and assessments in a timely manner so that it's realtime, with the department also issuing government cell phones, they can get the alerts in realtime, in case there's a problem with the radio. they have a back up to get that information, not solely relying on a radio that could get overwhelmed immediately but you have the ability with the cell phones. >> what additional steps do capitol police need to take to improve their intelligence gathering capabilities. >> i think they still need to, one, first order of business is they need to hire a full-time director, right now, they're in the capacity of the an acting director. they need to fill that position. fill it quickly, and then look to have that individual who has that speed to look across his folks that he or she has, and
one is it to elevate to a bureau level. i still believe they need to elevate from a division to a bureau, a stand alone, full, robust intelligence bureau. hire additional analysts, and look and keep up with the ways and intelligence gathering is done, and also to be able to disseminate the information that you receive from the field quickly and timely to the officers. >> the other major source of problems on january 6th that you identified was a failure to implement effective operational plans during the attack. what specific steps have the capitol police taken to develop and design workable operational plans to deal with a situation like that in the future? >> one of the things we noted when they came up with that operational plan initially for january 6th. it was so stone piked, is the term that there were different elements within the capitol police who either would either do their own plan or didn't have one.
so you didn't have a department wide plan. now what they have done is they have incorporated whether be c.e.r.t., k-9, hazards, incident response teams, dpd, all under one umbrella. so you have an overall -- so everybody else knows what everybody else is doing, what their plan of action is going to be, whether it be the bike unit or just the patrol division units so everybody at least understands what the other units, what other assets they may have to call upon under one operational plan. so it's department wide as opposed to the way it was on january 6th, cdu and that was it. >> what more do capitol police need to do to improve their operational capability in the event of a riot or other violent attack. >> i think they need, one, to continue with their training. don't make the training they have had, they have conducted with their cdu units but also they need to train together. in other words, whether that be c.e.r.t., and dpd, they need to
be trained doing training exercise together in case of an emergency so it becomes a little bit easier or even k-9, how is k-9 going to make in a way assist, set up scenarios where k-9 is going to have to assist the inventory protection division. come up with scenarios, train together so these units need to start training together as opposed to separate. >> thank you. >> thank you, senator cruz, i know something you and i have discussed and you cared about very much, senator cruz, is the number of threats we have seen over members of congress over the past several years. the capitol police reported over 4,100 threats against members of congress in just the first three months of this year. that's on track to more than double the number of threats against members in all of 2020. the chief has said that he expects that the department and law enforcement partners will
have to respond to 9,000 threats to members this year. has the capitol police, mr. bolton, taken action since june to keep up with these serious threats and are additional resources and personnel needed? >> the department is doing a good job in keeping up with the threats. i think by having them open up a field office down in florida it's going to assist once that gets up and fully running. but they are taking steps. they have hired additional analysts. like i said before, they have several in school, but there still needs to be additional folks hired and brought on board and the intelligence. we still have a ways to go. we are making improvements. we're taking our steps now. >> and understandably, you focused on the -- because of january 6th, the intelligence piece of this, there's more than that as well, of course, and that's the follow up when there is an active threat, and the police protection and the like that we're very concerned about.
i had, let's see, one smaller question, your report raised broader concerns about the accuracy of department staffing records, and we have talked about the problem with lack of staff, but the records, do you agree that the department should maintain accurate records of anyone on duty, and where they are stationed. >> yes, as we noted, in one of our last flash reports with the manpower issue we dealt with, the department couldn't provide us records, whether it be recalls or the amount of folks they actually had at that time, so the concept was an all hands is dubious at best, in a sense. they couldn't provide us with that kind of documentation, and it's also important to note when it came time for deputizing some outside law enforcement, the department didn't have the proper records to document who was deputizing by whom, which
could present an issue, if that individual made an arrest, it was a local officer, then the question of their legal authority for making that arrest could come into question if we can't prove that they were actually deputized. >> okay. something to follow up on. in your report on command communications, you recommended that the department implement a policy requiring senior officials to rotate through various posts of the capitol police. i just am recalling when i was the d.a., i did this a day at a time, but we would see line people at work and basically on the front lines and it gave me a much bigger sense of challenges and the like, so could you elaborate on that, and then i have one last question. >> the department needs to develop a rotational policy. you can't have certain individuals who will spend their
entire career in one unit, c.e.r.t. or dpd. >> you're talking about senior managers rotating to be in charge of different units. >> whether it be the senior manager but also rank and file officers. what you want to do is you want to develop your officers, your individuals who are specially trained in c.e.r.t. or k-9 or have these other skills, you want them back in the field with those skills so get them promoted through the ranks until leadership is issued because they also have that background and knowledge and skills, and also allow your younger officers to come into the specialty skills without having to wait numerous years in order to become a c.e.r.t. officer or k-9 or dpd agent, that you start, what you want is a well-rounded police department. and if you don't have a rotational policy you're not going to get there. >> yes-or-no question, we know there's so much more work to do but do you believe that the department is better prepared than they were on january 6th?
>> keeping it simple, yes. >> i want to thank you so much inspector general, senator blunt do you want to say any closing remarks? >> i have one or two questions. you responded to the event planning question that senator cruz asked and talked about bringing somebody in who was more prepared for that. what about the event on -- the planning for the event on september the 18th. you know, there was installed temporary fencing, announced publicly all of the information that had been shared with the officers as well as partner agencies, and had those partner agencies on standby. what did we learn from that? >> we learned that's how we should be doing business. this is the way, the detail, the
effort, and not only effort, but the impact that you have if you are planning correctly how you have good outcomes. and certainly s.t.e.m. rankings was a good outcome. they were proper prepared. they were ready for any contingency, and that's where we need to continue to be each and every day, whether it be a large event or just regular day-to-day operations. we need to be prepared for any contingency. >> of course there was not much of a contingency to be prepared for there. do you think that's because of the widely discussed preparations or was there an intelligence lack of understanding of how many people were going to come to that event? >> i really don't have any direct hand knowledge about the reasons why it was so -- or wasn't so well attended. there could be various reasons. i think we need to take from
that as an example of how we, you know, the capitol police, what we can control how we should be prepared. >> and the cost of that event, preparing for that event, and paying for that event was -- >> we haven't conducted any kind of work on that to provide that information. >> i think i've read somewhere it was right around a million dollars. well, i think there's maybe more to learn from that, that we should do that every time we think something might be, and probably that's more on the intelligence side. i've actually been supportive of the chief's determination of that if for no other reason than to have a trial run of what happens in terms of how quickly the fence can come up and down, and it was quickly up and quickly down. and how our partner agencies could be prepared to respond, though i'm not of the view that there was ever the level of
threat, but there could be that the preparations made a big difference in who was going to come. i do think the combination of event planning and solid intelligence would make a difference on how we plan for those events and i'm sure i'll have some questions for the chief about that. i think that's all i have. i may have some questions for the record, chairwoman, but i think i'm done for this morning. >> thank you very much. and i want to thank you. we both thank you as all of the members of this committee, regardless of political party, are very very thankful for what you've done mr. bolton. you've laid out detailed recs. we know there has been progress as a result of those recommendations, but we know there's a lot more work to be done, and that is why we're going to be calling the chief before the committee, following up on the progress, and so everyone involved in this who
we've been watching today, who have a few week's notice here, there's always time to get more things done, and we'll go over your recommendations, as well as ours. they came out of the report. i want to thank you mr. bolton, and we look forward to whatever you are providing for us next because it's always done in a professional matter, and you're not afraid to tell the truth, which we need more of every day in these hallways, so the record will remain open for one week, and with that, senator blunt, you want to add anything? >> no, chairman, i don't think there's much to adhere. we both expressed our thanks to general bolton, the recommendations he's made, and follow up to make sure those are done, and he's looked at the recommendations we made in our joint committee report have been significant in moving -- helping
the department move in the right direction, and like you, i look forward to his continued good work in this area. >> thank you. and the hearing is adjourned. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2021] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy, visit ncicap.org] [indistinct conversations]
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