tv Sen. Chris Murphy on U.S.- Saudi Arabia Relations CSPAN October 20, 2022 1:30pm-2:38pm EDT
absolutely awe inspiring for all of us and leads all of us to hold tight to our beliefs in justice and humanity. so thank you so much. i want to thank our speakers. you are all terrific. i appreciate the diversity. it is something i personally also find very important and often lacking these days. that we have people with a variety of views on these issues. i encourage you to come to future events and also to read our blog, iran source, with many interesting articles on iran, in all its aspects. i want to thank the staff of the atlantic council also for putting this together. and say hello to our viewers on c-span. i hope you have enjoyed this program. until next time. ♪
announcer: lift now to connecticut senator chris murphy, discussing how saudi arabia and opec plus counterparts will talk about the cutting of oil production and how it's affected u.s. study relations. live coverage here on c-span in just a moment. >> it is my pleasure to welcome you to this virtual discussion on u.s. saudi relations, what next? the saudi move earlier this month to cut production in conjunction with russia has thrust the u.s. saudi relationship into a new phase of crisis. the biden administration, along with bipartisan voices in congress, via the move as a flagrant snub in collusion with putin. the saudi's for their part maintain the move was entirely
due to economic self-interest at home. the question that arises, what next? does this latest crisis signal a significant rupture in a relationship many have argued has outlived the strategic logic of america and become more of a liability? or is it yet another bump in a frequently rocky but still vital partnership, always based more on mutual interests rather than shared values? to tackle these questions, i'm very pleased to welcome our distinguished panelists. senator chris murphy of connecticut, as a member of the senate foreign relations committee. he's been a long-term advocate for revising the saudi-u.s. partnership. we have a leading saudi scholar and activist, who focuses on human rights, health, and gender relations. and ambassador martin i., a distinguished fellow at the
council on foreign relations who has held a variety of senior u.s. government posts related to the middle. -- related to the middle east. senator murphy, we will start with you. thank you so much for joining us. you've publicly called for a reevaluation of the saudi-u.s. partnership. walk us through the specifics of what that reevaluation should look like. what would you like to see moving forward, from the biden administration? >> think it a carnegie for hosting the three of us. thank you for your leadership. i am very much the amateur on this panel compared to the amount of times we have spent exploring the saudi relationship both past, present, and future. it's no secret i've been a proponent for serious re-think
of the foundations of the u.s.-saudi partnership. it sprang forth from my early opposition to the iraq war. i was elected to congress in 2006 as an opponent of the iraq war. i was deeply dissatisfied with the positioning being simply opposition to a war. at that time the administration was selling is necessary to combat global extremism. i dug deeper into the roots of sunni extremism and found many of those roots ran straight to our golf partners who were sometimes quietly and sometimes not so quietly providing significant funding to the very radicals organizing against the u.s.. so my first sort of remarks on this topic of reorienting the
u.s.-saudi relationship human 2016 -- relationship came in 2016. to mbs' credit, he has made progress on that front and there is less movie than before moving out of saudi arabia to some of the forces that we are fighting. but unfortunately, he has replaced that significant error attend in our relationship -- irritant in our relationship with several other irritants. the systematic repression of political dissent inside and outside of saudi arabia, sometimes very often and incredibly public ways that make it difficult for the u.s. to continue to be a strategic partner. this is a regime that is much more militarily engaged in the region. when we sold weapons to the
saudi's they would largely collect dust in warehouses. and airfields. now they are used to fight proxy wars. iran, yemen, once again, making it difficult for the u.s. to continue its relationship with this regime -- there's just no question the u.s. through our funding of one side of the proxy war has stimulated an arms race between shiite and sunni in the region. none to the security benefit of the u.s. we need a broader rethink of our alliance with the gulf states in general. i certainly was not surprised by the saudi's most recent
decision to decrease oil output. not just because of watching them act against our security interest, but since the outset of the ukrainian war, it's been pretty clear that the saudis were intent on choosing the russian side, rather than the u.s. side. had the opportunity early on, they essentially forced the president of the united states to show up and shake hands with bin salman in order to even consider acting in a way that would ultimately bring down prices for the u.s. had the opportunity to divorce themselves from russia inside too close. they did not do that -- inside opec plus. they did not do that. they had the opportunity to hold oil consumption flat over the
course of the remainder of this year. my sense is that is with the administration respected based on the studies. they made a very different decision. i thought the whole purpose of suspending billions of dollars in u.s. taxpayer money on the defensive side -- the whole purpose of deploying thousands of our troops, putting our troops' lives on the line, as jamaal khashoggi was chopped up into little pieces and the studies continued to lock up american citizens inside saudi arabia, the whole purpose of all of that was, if there was a global crisis, right, and we needed the saudis to choose between us and the russians, or the chinese, they would choose us. and they have not. and i think this begs the
question of whether we can stand to be part of an alliance structure with the saudis, if when the chips are down, we don't get the benefit of the doubt. we will talk about the ways in which we can shape the future of our partnership with saudi arabia. i don't argue for a wholesale cooperation. i just think we should be stingy or about the ways in which we engage with saudi arabia, the fights we are willing to support them in. we have far too much personnel on the ground. i think we can think about how we engage with them commercially. do we want to continue to encourage so many american companies to do business with saudi arabia, in the face of this fraying alliance? i think we do need to step back and really ask the fundamental
question of whether the u.s. needs to be so directly involved in this growing contest for regional hegemony and whether we need to be so directly involved more broadly in the fight between the future of islam, between shiite and sunni forces. it is and our interest to play a role in that site. when we look at the way iran is literally repressing -- brutally repressing these legitimate protesters, it makes us feel more confident that we should be on the side of the saudis, against iran. let's also be honest, if there was a similar protest movement simmering on the streets of riyadh, do we think the saudis would treated much differently than the iranians have? are we sure the saudis value it?
of course not. to me this is a moment not just to recalibrate the tactical nature of our relationship with saudi arabia, but really think about our positioning in the gulf, in the region, and to consider whether we are better or worse off over the course of the next decade, continuing to be so firmly planted on one side of that regional contest or power. thank you for having me be part of this. >> great. thanks so much, senator. a lot of food for thought. we are going to be circling back to some of those points. as a longtime advocate for human rights, doctor, you noted in an interview this summer that president biden's trip to riyadh was an "betrayal -- was a
"betrayal." what tools and leverage does washington have? >> thank you for having me, for having a saudi voice in this kind of discussion. i am here to discuss how we can think of a relationship with the people rather than a relationship with the saudi political system. one that exists inside saudi arabia. correctly so, that it is a very difficult place.
saudi arabia, when it comes to freedom, do we expect something different to happen? and what is the united states doing in order to envision a saudi arabia that is reliable and responsible? the only economy that has erupted, the saudi decision-making was erratic. saudi arabia could have mitigated the situation with a some sort of balance or check on the public decision-making. in the interest of the allies and the international community. it is a betrayal, because what we saw after the biden visit,
it emboldened autocratic leaders of this nature. we are seeing more citizens being impacted inside of saudi arabia. as well as draconian sentences, of decades long. actually, i may not be able to highlight a lot, but i can point to the damaging elements that undermine u.s. abilities. including the war in yemen.
without accountability or investigation, therefore undermining the study and the american people -- the saudi and american people. the way ahead should be in theory simple and for what -- anf forward. creating this kind of responsibility or shared values that we have seen in iran and different places. people are really aching for a
democratic transition, respect for human rights, more representation from their own government. on both the shiite and the sunny sides of the conflict. -- sunni sides of the conflict. in the body situation, this is not happening. we are facing a regime that is increasingly supported by the rise of authoritarian powers in the region. in the world in general. as a member of the saudi civil society, much can be improved. we can empower the society, influence our own regime. if we have the solidarity of the u.s. government, businesses and other entities. sadly that is happening inconsistently sometimes without any lasting results.
there is no way that we as saudi citizens can impose any balances or checks without those voices pushing towards meaningful reform. one example was the successful saudi campaign [indiscernible] things we are now witnessing. where the critics have notgotten to. they have worked through these issues. but now we are in a state where the saudi government is actively silent as a voice. i would cautiously advise
against that. we are not in a position where the days either or. i think we need a better strategy. they have actually published a good study on the conditionality of aid and support to foreign governments from the u.s. saudi arabia has an extensive relation with the u.s. government and businesses. the u.s. is in a good place as well to rethink policies. this is a good time to act on policies and start thinking of ways to ensure two things, undermining saudi public interests and the support of the democratic condition for
nations is the cornerstone to combating autocratic regimes. much of the debate within saudi arabia now is centered [indiscernible] for saudi arabia. having very much of this kind of diversified, or inconsistent position from the foreign policy of the u.s. toward saudi arabia really undermines any kind of action . and is seen by the study -- by the saudi regime as a winning point. as with other nations, saudi arabia continues to be led by and undeterred leader -- an
undeterred leader. that could have an effect on the saudi peoples' rights and freedoms and this is a good time to act on it. >> terrific. thank you so much for those compelling remarks. you raise a lot of important details and issues, especially unconditionality. we will certainly return to that. i want to turn to you know. you co-authored a cfr report and a foreign affairs article this summer, arguing that washington should offer a strategic commitment to saudi arabia against iran, in return for saudi reciprocity on a number of issues, keeping oil prices low, ending the war in yemen, making peace with israel, improving its human rights record. i think it is obvious rihanna has not made progress on those issues -- riyahd has not made progress on those issues.
what would you recommend moving forward? >> thanks very much to carnegie for hosting this important discussion. i have the greatest respect for senator murphy. i really admire his legislative record and his seriousness, that he brings all the things he does, but particularly his approach to foreign policy, to this subject. he has a long record. i also deeply respected emphasis she put on the issue of human rights in saudi arabia. we did not have to conjure up the history the way the saudi regime under bin salman has
dealt with these issues, particularly of course the murder and chopping up of normal khashoggi -- of jamaal khashoggi, the journalist. there are many other instances, which are highly problematic. and i think that it is also very important that we have both of their approaches, they are different and complementary. answering the question, what kind of future do we want ahead with saudi arabia? the president has called for a reevaluation of the relationship. so i think this is a very important moment to have this kind of discussion. and i think the president needs to order up some internal studies, within the
administration, some consultation with the congress, to take advantage of this pause in the relationship, and the reevaluation. senator murphy's objective could be described as a something between a divorce and a transactional relationship. she was very clear about conditioning our relation on the saudi regime's treatment of its own people. but i approach it from a different perspective, and i think that actually we are in a situation where we cannot live with mbs, and we cannot live without them. -- cannot live without him. that is the kind of reality. what are we supposed to do, then, in that situation?
that is where my colleague came up with this idea of a grand bargain. a strategic compact in which saudi arabia needs a reliable u.s. partner, let's face it, in the last years, we have not been a reliable partner in the middle east, particularly in the trump administration but also in the obama administration before hand. we need, and return, -- in return, a responsible saudi leader, who will work with us rather than against us. and the way in which they can work against us, we have just seen it. the heart of this matter is the fact that the saudis are and
will be for the foreseeable future the flynn producer in the oil market. even though we don't need their oil ourselves, their ability to affect the price of oil by pumping more or pumping less is something that has a profound impact, on our economy and on the global economy. and unless we can find a way to replace saudi arabia in that, and we can discuss that, but it's not simply done, we need to reach an understanding. that we do not have at the moment. i think it is important to look at this alternative. but in return, we reach understandings about their
behavior, on all of the issues that are important in our relationship. starting with the role of maintaining a reasonable price of oil in the oil market. reasonable today would be defined as somewhere between 80 and 90 dollars rather than 100 and 120 dollars they seem to want for themselves and the russians. we need an understanding with them about the treatment of their own people. we need an understanding about yemen, the yemen war. we need an understanding with them about the overall approach to dealing with iran. and the role between saudi arabia and israel should play in that effort, in terms of normalizing the relationship with israel as well. and that kind of broad strategic compact seems to me, if we could achieve it, and i admit it is a big if, it would be a much
better way of proceeding than essentially deciding that this relationship should go its own ways. relinquishing whatever leverage we might have to deal with the human rights issues, the treatment of saudi arabians by the regime, and we would find ourselves in, i believe, a world of hurt, when i come so the issue of the free flow of oil from the gulf, the prices. i want to finish by saying that there is a word for where we are today on how we should proceed that i have in mind. and that analog is what henry kissinger ordered in 1975, when the israelis under then prime
minister -- under other then prime minister refused to do that he negotiated with the egyptian leader. and he was furious, he came home humiliated, president ford was mad as hell, and what did they do? i just wanted to review what they did, because i think it is a good template for what we should do now. they ordered the following steps. a national security study of u.s. interests, policy, and strategy in the middle east. a review of israel's request for $1.8 million in assistance. $700 million in economic assistance. canceled all upcoming visits by the israeli defense minister and
the israeli ministry delegation. we will talk about the timeline for the delivery. they delayed the delivery of missiles and bombs. they instructed each government department to curtail the privilege access is really officials had enjoyed. -- israeli officials had enjoyed. kessinger removed the hotline in the white house with the israeli ambassador's office. and president ford issued instructions that the approach to the israelis should be one of what he called "dignified aloofness," in which high-level meetings and visits were put on hold, points of contact between the israeli and u.s. government officials were to be channelized and strictly limited, and for
"businesslike, arm's-length, and aloof." -- and for activity to be "businesslike, arm's-length, and aloof." bush and administer ration to take harsher measures against the saudis -- pushing thenevertheless, they sr ground and within three months, the israelis get to the pressure. i think that provides a good model for the way we should deal with the saudi's now, dignified aloofness. when think need something from us, we should take our time responding and meanwhile engaged in a serious reevaluation in which we look at our government interagency process and can
congress look at the options that senator murphy has put on the table? and do a serious study of where our interests best ally and create a degree of nervousness on the saudi site -- side as to what exactly we are going to do. that will soften them up in a way that regardless of which approach we take will find them more responses and we come back -- responsive when we come back. >> thank you. some great historical points and important to raise the performative aspect of signaling the aloofness of it. we will circle back to that. i want to turn to our panelists for some reactions and i want to inform our audience that you can ask questions in 15 minutes
using the live chat function on youtube or you can wait -- can tweet at carnegie endow circling back. what the ambassador said about mbs, we cannot live with him, cannot live without him and aside from oil, the usual counter arguments are his cooperation and extremism and on social media, you acknowledge the saudi's have been helpful in that. there is also the domestic jobs argument and finally china. so reactions from you to with the ambassador said when it comes to these issues? sen. murphy: i do not know that i argue for a divorce, but it is something more akin to not sleeping in the same bed. to me, you point out that there
are incredibly important elements to this relationship. we are going to continue to rely for the foreseeable future on the products that saudi arabia produces. e.r.a. decade, maybe shorter away -- we are a decade, maybe shorter, away from being energy independent. security cooperation is important. i give credit to mohammed bin salman for the progress he has made on shutting down pathways to funding extremist groups. there are some freedoms enjoyed inside the kingdom, access to entertainment for instance, that were not there years ago to me, this is about an understanding in which our cooperation is going to be more targeted and more intermittent rather than
systematic. i guess martin is right far more often than i am on any of these topics. i would take the deal that martin is laying down if i thought it existed. that does sound like a good deal. if we could get the saudi's to show accountability for shoji -- khassogi and keep the price of oil below a certain number, that is probably a deal worth taking. i come at it from a different place not because i do not think that is a potentially good outcome for the u.s., but i do not think it is possible. i think mbs has shown that his campaign of domestic oppression and the need to be a regional
bully is definitional for him. to me, we have to deal with the leader we have. is mutual. why did mbs make this decision? what logic is there to do x and then y? you cannot ever explain why mbs makes decisions. it is based on how he feels that day. when you are thinking about a broad, lasting partnership on which you or do something for me and i am doing something for you committing have to have a reliable partner had the studies used to be that reliable partner. you are not dealing with one liter. you were dealing with multiple power centers. it was easier for the u.s. to manage the relationship when the leadership was more, but today, it is not complex. it is one man. that makes that grand bargain
harder. on congressional china, we generally have to be careful about the strawman argument of week do not -- if we do not support this regime, china will come in. that is an answer to do business with every dirty dictator. there are two reasons to be a little careful about the question of who willfully vacuum. it is true that we used to be worried about russia and china filling the vacuum in saudi arabia. today, russia is not a reliable security partner so we are talking mainly about the chinese the chinese systems are getting better every day that they are still not as good as the u.s. system the q twelves are impressive. it would be a big decision for
the saudi's to turn their backs on u.s.. corporation. that u.s. security cooperation. i also think there is a limit to how much of this u.s. security environment china wants to own in a region they've got a great deal. the u.s. perfectly oil and china gets the benefit there is a point where china will say i am willing to step in if the u.s. pulls out. the saudi's know that. there is a reason when it comes to the threat of being replaced to maybe feed into harder about calling bus. >> turning to review -- to you, if he is in power for a long time, from a u.s. perspective, washington is given a chance to reciprocate. we have not seen that for so
what tools do we have? have there been instances in the past were pressure has been applied in conditionality used to make an impact inside saudi arabia? going back to my original question, what more can the u.s. do? >> would agree with the ambassador on the need for a study. you do not want to be faced with such political upheaval as we hear because of someone who cannot meet start. i would say it is good to recognize that the current situation today is that we have someone with absolute control of every resource in saudi arabia and uses those resources in an
underlying way to affect both nations. i would highlight also that there are -- that happen, like ending the season of qatar. that was more a reasonable player. pumping this kind of unnecessary stipulation -- also, there is a u.s. envoy to yemen. sometimes, there are cease-fires. not successful so far, but it tends to also have that kind of presents. one thing that is irreplaceable is what kind of saudi arabia the world and the u.s. and the people want to see. it is not -- it is unpredictable.
it plays well in the world. the good aspect of that is how much the u.s. has invested in supporting and protecting civil society. it cannot really force their view on the people of the region. it cannot say that we need some kind of relationship with israel and saudi arabia is assisting problems that exist in ignoring these treaties or normalization. we need more entity to -- and the two husk of relationship. thinking about the people, -- it shows the biden administration
-- the presidency. unfortunately, despite how popular she was, she has been ended. i want to quote also a story who said that when saudi arabia and other nations tried to -- the kuwaitis from iraq, they decided to have a condition that for the kuwaiti government to be reinstated, they needed to have a formal recognition setting. this is not just one royal family that decides for millions of people. this is what happened. now we are seeing the impact of that.
they are giving iraq -- or any well-functioning democracy, but at least it is a form of government that benefits political decision-making. it makes people represented and it makes it better for the good governments. -- governance. it is one of the only monarchies that has this form of representation. this is something that has to be present in an effort to deal with existing realities. what can we do to have more of a representation and a democratic transition in saudi arabia? >> thank you and thanks for
bringing the example of kuwait into this. i want to turn it over to you for reaction. specifically, how do we operationalize this notion of aloofness? we have seen this before where there have been positives, senior officials have not gone to meetings. legal states awaited it out -- the gulf states have waited it out before. >> i think the template is the one that tends to be established. we take meeting, we keep them at arms length, we hold up supplies. i think congress is already essentially doing that. but there is the general approach. they feel the cold shoulder. sooner rather than later, they are going to face reality.
that is that saudi arabia is sitting on this huge amount of oil and cannot defend it. they cannot defend themselves. they have brought -- bought all these arms but they do not have the ability to do that. at a certain point, sooner rather than later, they will refuse to extend their troops. then they will start firing rockets again or drones. what are the saudi's going to do? they've got their own patriots, but they depend on us to defend them. part of their problem is they are not sure they can rely on us to defend them. that is why i think it is important that we make it clear that we are willing to do so if they are willing to do so.
in the meantime we need to be keeping them at arms length and keep them wondering what we are going to do. to respond to senator murphy, he makes a good point. they track record of mohammed bin salman is one of strategic blunder after strategic blunder. he just made another. taking saudi arabia and the war in yemen was a disastrous blunder. ordering the dismemberment of jamaal khashoggi was another blunder. he is prone to this because of his headstrong and ruthless approach to the challenges that
we face. that is the reality that we are dealing with. the problem i have -- i do not know what senator murphy would say, but the separation rather than a divorce, it ends up in a divorce. the problems in the relationship , failing to address those problems head-on and coming to some understanding will mean that those problems will plague relationships to the point where the divorce becomes inevitable. we are headed in that direction now. congress is going to accelerate that. the saudi's seem to be help but
-- hell-bent on following these interests in a cynical way. before we go down that road, we need to try the alternative, trying to come to an understanding, a comprehensive understanding, that maybe it cannot be achieved, but then we have got to think about how we protect ourselves from the consequences of saudi arabia aligning itself with russia and opec plus and engaging in oil price biases -- policies that can be damaging. that means we need to do a study about as well, but in my youth, we at least need to give it a good college try and see if we can come to an understanding. if not, there will be plenty of
opportunities to have them go their own way. >> thank you. i want to open it up for questions for our audience to ask a question. you can use the live chat feature on youtube or treat to #askcarnegie. week still waiting questions. senator murphy, let me turn it over to you for some more reactions. specifically, you mentioned we should not just make this a tactical readjustment. how do we avoid that and really send a signal this time? we have seen these parcels before. drilling down to certain systems we have on the ground there, how can those be used to to send the appropriate signal? sen. murphy: the ambassadors the
saudis do not trust that should there be a need for a very robust defense of the kingdom that the united states will be there. there are reasons for that, but -- they look to 2019. her best friend in the world was donald trump. -- their best friend in the world was donald trump. he offered no response to the massive attack by iran. donald trump put his hands on the org and if he is not coming to our defense, how can we expect anyone in the white house to do so? i understand the nature of these -- of the saudi skepticism towards us. i put this in this broader context, which is why i think i worry about the potential
fallout of an agreement. because i think we have seen evidence that this particular leader is willing to use u.s. security systems in a way that previous leaders were not. we do not need any more conflicts, any more destabilizing activity on our hands region we already have, whether it is a kidnapping of a lebanese prime minister for this nonsensical war in yemen. that was disastrous for all of us. i worry that we are in for more of that kind that more security aid to riyadh, which would be in the name of defending riyadh, is going to find his way into another yemen. we are also in a moment where we are in a fight for the future of democracy.
i have been more critical of this administration in its middle east policy. i think saudi arabia is not alone in meriting more attention from the u.s.. when it comes to its human rights record, i do not understand why we continue with such business with the egyptians when they have political prisoners locked up. i care about this because i think more than ever before it matters today whether the u.s. is both walking the walk and talking the talk on democracy and human rights. back in the cold war, the choice was so bipolar, the soviets were such an unappetizing partner that it was not a fair fight, but today, liberal democracy is an attractive model. the more than america's support for democracy and human rights
becomes corrupted by our close alliance with countries like egypt and saudi arabia that are getting worse when it comes to human rights, it becomes harder to rally the world around the set of values. i also think this is a moment where we have got to be more cold-blooded about the way in which we marry our rhetoric on human rights and democracy with our action. if there is a chance that that agreement could be reached, i think it would have to involve real political reform domestically for it to be worthwhile. i am open to that. maybe what you are hearing is maybe disagreement on the belief we have and ultimately
succeeding -- in ultimately succeeding. >> thank you. one question from the audience. i think this has been well covered in the media. saudi officials argue that the opec plus decision was merely economic and to prevent it intentional collapse in a while. is that completely wrong? we are seeing this line being trotted out. the saudis appear to be pointing to the aid that they are giving to ukraine, the prisoner swap. the narrative you hear is they are not a national state anymore. there is a certain nationalism in their discourse that comes out, along with the economic angle to this. >> i will jump in. i think that this is the saudi
justification. it misses a lot of facts. the first being that president biden went to saudi arabia to effect a reconciliation with the crown prince despite criticism from his own party. he reached an understanding with mohammed bin salman in which the crown prince committed to increasing production of oil. over the next few months to the end of the year, to 702,000 barrels a day. that was a commitment that the crown prince made when the president was there, but there was an agreement to announce it -- the details. that was the commitment. the president said the saudis kevin crede to increase production.
they did not live up to that commitment. that is point number one. point number two is circumstances change. -- by his oil minister. he has spent someone who told him as they were considering that the price of oil was likely to drop. they would not be able to pay for mbs's vision 2030 dreams for saudi arabia. so mbs said, we are going to cut oil. we are focused percolate on their economic self-interest without considering the impact that that would have not only on a commitment to the president of
the u.s., but the impact on the effort to sanction russia and reduce its oil revenues at a critical moment is europe is going into winter and being screwed by putin as he bombs and in ukraine. that unwillingness to take into account the bigger picture or the relationship with the u.s. is highly problematic. strategically, i think it is a big mistake for saudi arabia, but in terms of the relationship with the u.s., it is an indication of lack of regard. having said all of that, it is important for people to understand that the administration responded by saying let's hold off and see. maybe the price is going to drop. we will come in and support the
price by buying up oil for the strategic petroleum reserve to maintain the price if you are right that it is about to drop. we do not believe it is going to drop, but we will give you somewhat of a guaranty in that regard. this was broken by the variety president who wanted to increase production. he went to the saudis and tried to persuade them to go along with this. not something that could help the democrats a month before the elections, but there was so much more writing -- riding on this when it came for the war in ukraine and squeezing the russians. mbs said no. i do not buy this argument that it is just about looking out for
their economic interests. they had broader strategic interests, they had an alternative, they had a commitment to the united states. >> this is also a critical moment in the fight in ukraine. you have dangerous rattling from vladimir putin that you also have diplomatic walls closing on him. you have more public rapprochement from partners like china and india. terrible result in the general assembly showing the lack of patience in many parts of the world. this is a month in which there was an ability to send a consistent message to putin that your friends are vanishing and now is the time to figure out a path out of this. that is the other piece of this, that the timing of -- i just
want to overstate the impact on russia. russia is a sign in light oil around world partners, but this lifeline to russia came at a particularly bad time. >> finally, what we are seeing from the saturday aid is -- saudi aid is not falling within this economic justification. it saudi arabia is worried about its own economic situation, they could've held in a different way. not that i'm against aid, but there are economic limitations. there is money being paid for consultancy for all of that. these are not actions that would support a good economy.
>> good point. last question. i will direct it to senator murphy. how would a sustained pulling of u.s.-saudi relations affected gcc and u.s. security corporations? sen. murphy: if you heard martin explained, there has been noticeably different behavior by the immoralities -- emiraties and saturdays. the emiraties are good at public relations and get more credit than they might deserve. they made a big public show of pulling out of lemon -- yemen. unclear how far out they are, but there is no doubt -- you've seen what the qataris have
done. there are all sorts of signs that if there was a little a transactional relationship with the saudis, other nations in the region may be willing to step up and fight for a greater level of cooperation. i do not think it is an all or nothing proposition in which if you decide to pull troops out of saudi arabia, and again, i hear martin's counsel that this is heading in that direction even if you do not intended. i will think about it, because i want to be careful not to send a motion that we do not intend, but at the same time, there potential that there would be other partners from some of the political vacuum.
other partners do not have the resources when it comes to the contribution of opec oil. >> thank you. we have not enough time. i want to thank all three of you for the rich and illuminating discussion. this is not the end of the debate. we look forward to hearing from you in the future. thank you to our audience for joining us and for your questions. back from washington. -- goodbye from washington. ♪ >> c-span is your unfiltered view of government funded by these television companies and more. >> the world has changed. today, fast, reliable internet is something no one can love without, so wow is there for our customers with speed, reliability, value and choice.
>> we set out a vision for a low tax, high-growth economy it would take advantage of the freedoms of brexit. i recognize that given the situation, i cannot delivery the end date on which i was elected by the conservative party. i therefore notified the king that i am resigning as leader of the conservative party. this morning, i met the chairman of the 1922 committee. there will be a leadership election to be completed within the next week. this will ensure that we remain on a path to deliver our fiscal plans and maintain our economic stability and national security.