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tv   Unser Deutschland  Deutsche Welle  October 3, 2020 2:15pm-3:00pm CEST

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this is news from berlin don't forget you can get all the latest news and information around the clock on our website it's t w dot com i'm michael okun more news as always at the top of the hour. imagine hoe many courses all sluggish us thrown out in the morning climb a tree keep it off a story this is my place it went from just one week. before it can really just. wish to have time to our time during. this. process.
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the cold war ended in moscow in 1990 bringing a new era of peace to europe a divided germany was free to re-unite the treaty that paved the way for german unity was signed here in moscow 30 years ago it was a historic victory for democracy and the deep rifts in europe were on the road to recovery. the lotus we are still aware of was that this was the most important signature of my life book. it wasn't an illusion it was a political project to keep. it we did a lot of things a lot different then when we won the cold war against. soviet
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ambassador vaslav terra coffin was here in moscow 30 years ago when the victorious powers of the 2nd world war determined the fate of germany moscow looks back on this treaty with far more criticism than the west. you know the most by me and this i think listen see is speeches and champagne lift or rather try to send annoying off to taste in new when you think about all of the problems that arose during the many negotiations about what's to finally do with germany. when you consider that a treaty was supposed to solve all problems once and for all that people had been fighting over for many decades to. come global political decisions made back then still affect the world today the great power struggles of the time could have thwarted german reunification or people forget today that this was something that
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there were a lots of things that could have gone wrong and so you wanted to try to move it forward as rapidly but as securely as possible and the key driver for that was the people on the ground in germany. 1989 was a time of euphoria in germany as the berlin wall crumbled the iron curtain in europe lifted. but how would moscow react most people thought soviet leader mikhail gorbachev would never release east germany the soviet union had sacrificed so many people during the 2nd world war and east germany was compensation the day after the wall fell the people of berlin were celebrating the end of a divided germany with. chancellor helmut kohl an envoy from the kremlin would soon
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arrive in the west german capital bonn on a secret mission he was greeted at the chancellor rhee by horst chik helmut kohl's foreign policy advisor. he was acting very secretively. rich to your street had important talks of the highest level and they discussed a lot of issues fear foreign to scoot all the issues that some kind of connection to the topic of german unity to them to move those. yellowish notable i think that was a mistake on our part unclear what it actually come to talk about what could be done after the fall of the wall to put the brakes on the reunification process but if you had to calm the situation down this isn't an issue but he expressed that in a very unclear man a little of. my belief that my report to the chancellor said that and they are starting to talk about german unity that it's high time that we did too this was
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old. kohls poll ratings were dire at the time 10 trips saw an opportunity to boost the chancellor's popularity. out there i told him this was a chance to announce his intentions for german reunification it for. that same night tel chick started drafting a 10 point plan to reunite germany but kohl kept it secret until november 28th when he presented his plan for reunification in the bundestag it came as a surprise even to their coalition partner the f.d.p. and foreign minister hans dietrich. using their wealth but i had no phone and tried to shoot but we're also prepared to go on a major step further concert to develop skill federal structure is between the 2 german nations is going to do with the aim of creating a federation. it's
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a federal state order in germany. to show off. your radio speech was momentous. we thought it would be another 5 to 10 years before germany was actually reunited that. guenter travel to moscow the chancellor's arbitrary 10 point plan had angered the victorious powers of the 2nd world war and sure had to apologize to gorbachev and ask for his understanding about west germany's desire to reunite. the sharable openly and i included his interest i have never taken part in a political discussion where one of the parties let their anger rage so out of control aims to. get us out. of the gorbachev accuse the chancellor of interfering in the internal affairs of east germany's mission now these english base. after that conversation i just couldn't imagine in the soviet union agreeing to
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a process that would allow the reunification of our country any time in the foreseeable future of society for. the western allies were also concerned about the way things were developing in germany and specially the british leader margaret thatcher. the british with the british prime minister was strictly against a reunification of germany. temperamental who was germany was a hostile from the start she was very hostile to the salaciously to the germans because she never had any confidence in the germans as she said they'll betray you and they will keep the trains. she had a conversation with overtures through the summer of 90 days you know and when she called through when they both started to discuss they have misgivings she had a couple of conversations with girls who are reachable who share her misgivings initially indeed. would say express them even more forcefully than she ever did
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because later gender equality is going to change his position will record the shooter but at the beginning his views were were he was very very word to the board even though i thought if i was always the hope that our initial french were both worried that germany would display a hedge a modicum visions they had in mind after all germany's g.d.p. was the same as france and britain but together. with them that there was a potential threat that arose. president francois mitterrand said straight away i mcmullen a cold she really wants you to unite germany that's your business you can do that of of everything this is you like i wouldn't interfere. if you want france's approval even you need to the slick 3 conditions. the order nice in order to heal and to see him over the denuclearization of germany and 3 in the early europe.
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washington was also following this political earthquake in germany west germany had hoped that the powerful united states would support reunification. as the u.s. was seen as a necessary indispensable a that would help to overcome resistance from the french and british sides which is that foreign minister genscher travel to washington to discuss proceedings with u.s. secretary of state james baker baker's colleagues already had press sites ideas about how the international negotiations on german unity should play out we focused on the idea that the key players of the 2 germany's and the 4 powers that had the rights robert zelnick set out america's goals in a confidential strategy document the us wanted to solidify its leadership role in europe through what became known as the 2 plus for talks and to keep a united germany within the western military alliance. nato zealots paper raids we
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want them in our tent not in one of their own working with the germans right now gorbachev needs to show he has some control over the process to plus for gives him that cover with little real control one would know this would be hard for the soviets and when the soviets would push back you needed to respond with a united front. the u.s. government was very firm about it stipulation. of this the board came with a demand that the united germany must be a member of nato that was a stumbling block that we weren't expecting and we do nish feelers and. the question was how when the soviet union react how could anyone convince gorbachev to agree to the stipulation of the united states. had an idea. we have agreed that there would be no intention to expand the need to jurisdiction
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eastwards that doesn't just apply to east germany it applies in general. but so this good. while standing next to the u.s. secretary of state genscher announced that the west would respect the strategic interests of the soviet union. since the end of the 2nd world war large group units of the red army had been stationed on east german territory they crushed the uprising in east germany by force in 1953 just as they did later in 1968 with the prague spring. susan type we had 380000 soviet troops in the country at that time we had a whole family full of wives and children too. we had soviet security forces i think the total number of people was around 650000 towards unmentionables shevardnadze soviet foreign minister not so once told me that in january 1090
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soviet leaders were still thinking about deploying troops in east germany and closing the borders again to their chalets easily could have on the east german army would have marched along to. the edge of the queue. just such decisive actions and harsh decisions weren't exactly gorbachev style mature in the. severe measures weren't in his. it wasn't how he operates it said they were he still criticized for it today in our country and others what those who gives the . u.s. secretary of state james baker visited moscow on a mission to win corporate chiefs approval for the 2 plus 4 negotiations on german unity baker felt optimistic we saw gorbachev and shevardnadze as reformers. we believed them to be that they turned out to be the head.
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but baker knew the kremlin would strongly oppose a united germany becoming a member of nato. or bore every top soviet politician or every soviet with person even some need to as an enemy alliance it needs who was perceived as an enemy of the soviet union with the brits and in fact neither was actually finds under that premise it's that he says that once a book. getting gorbachev's approval would be a tall order baker iterated gantries message that if gorbachev agreed to the nato membership the u.s. would not take military advantage. i remember baker's words it was you don't have to answer immediately but think about this. assuming there is no expansion of nato or jurisdiction to the east not more niche wouldn't it be better and then he
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described to have a germany in scotched in nato wis an american military presence in europe for the future stability of the drug. gorbachev answered. that well obviously an expansion of nato to the east who is unacceptable but i understand what you're saying and i will give it serious thought. what baker said here would be assured time and time again by western politicians to the soviet you . there would be no eastward expansion of nato there was no intention to change the current military power balance in europe a claim that would come back to haunt baker. within 2 days the united states' position changed on that we told the soviet our position that's not our position they never said anything it's still a bone of contention today did baker and other western politicians make promises
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about nato that their successors didn't keep music so what's it like if it was a mistake not to treat these assurances the need to would not expand east in writings the use of the bill if that was a very thin stick never left to face the music and live with the consequences of that mistake basically if they're secure stable then effect i think that it was clear that without those assurances it would have been much harder for gorbachev to . head to to agree. to the us for grew much. the day after baker's meeting chancellor kohl one german foreign minister genscher arrive in moscow the soviets were clearly happy with america's assurances about nato cole also promised financial aid gorbachev gave the green light for the 2 plus 4 agreement on german unity. could see
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the curvature of. the system in general secretary gorbachev has unequivocal it given me his word that the soviet union will respect the wishes of the german. it's to live as one nation good. but the soviet union also had conditions foreign minister shared stipulated before the international press that a unified germany would have to maintain political and military neutrality upon his return home brushed over this very clear message from the kremlin he didn't want to taint the good news. that the soviet union imagine if unified germany in late had stayed yes of course all this was said yesterday. cole strategy was successful and his popularity grew he'd made further offers of financial aid to gorbachev to discourage the kremlin from doing anything to block the way forward it does with
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others if you none of this would have happened if the soviet union hadn't been in such a dire economic position at the time of your life. so we didn't know it was struggling to keep its head above water and the west knew that this it was a unique opportunity just had to be sealing it because the suits. in the canadian capital ottawa tensions were stirring over german reunification efforts many foreign ministers of the $23.00 nato and warsaw pact countries were angry that they hadn't been included in the 2 plus for talks on german unity with a dramatic struggle ensued behind the scenes together germany and the us managed to fend off demands for a huge peace conference it would have had to involve around $100.00 countries any nation that had charges against nazi germany. then freedoms for truck i'm feeling of peace treaty was out of the question for us. if we would have an
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inevitability but the issue of reparations on the edge of it sure i guess we wanted to keep that out of the unification processed at all costs it's a 700 meter for ideal sports. if there. had been a peace conference all the countries occupied by german troops during world war 2 could have to man did reparations the u.s. wasn't prepared to enter years of negotiations and put its foot down it was complicated everybody felt like they had a stake in the process but we said no it's going to be to push forward. before the negotiations started chancellor kohl flew to the us to spend 2 days at camp david with president george h.w. bush it was here that they set out a game plan for the 2 plus 4 talks. really a good position because we established early on as camp david
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a relationship of confidence and trust between kohl and bush and to ensure baker and we said we will stay together and we will push this through a regardless of the opposition provided. chester co you support the idea of germany in that. it was clear from the confidential minutes that bush and cole saw eye to eye when kohl asked the american president what could be offered to the soviet union in return for germany's nato membership bush said to hell with that we prevailed and they didn't we can't let the soviets clutch victory from the jaws of defeat cole they want something in return bush you've got deep pockets. the 1st ever
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election campaign for a democratically elected government in east germany the vote on march 18th 1900 would decide who represented east germany in the 2 plus 4 talks. helmut kohl promised a fast economic union and a shared currency between the 2 german nations he supported the g.d.r. coalition alliance for germany whose top candidate was low tardy most year the alliance also wanted a fast reunification with west germany it won with 48 percent of the vote for a coup going to the people of east germany didn't vote for the c.d.u. because they wanted to but because they knew that helmut kohl was behind him to this result brings an incredible responsibility and an expectation of our people but this isn't just an expectation of us but also of west germany and we expect clear answers. to those normally when a politician is elected the 1st thing they do is to think about how to get reelected in 4 years we didn't need to do that our task right from the start was to
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abolish ourselves up social studies teacher it's true that i was prime minister but i was also a kind of insolvency administrator has. no time to mess here formed a coalition with eastern s.p.d. marcos meco became foreign minister he didn't trust the members of the previously governing socialist unity party differs all didn't. and it was extremely difficult to create proper decisionmaking structures during this time i walked into the ministry like it was the enemy's house his house. mechelle brought with him confidants from the peace movement people who he aligned with my concert european missile that's the form of. the formula was unity as fast as possible but as good as necessary we had 2 objectives certain conditions were not in the interest of the population we represented for. at the 1st 2 plus 4 talks in bonn the us and the western allies were forming a front against the soviet union that was only diplomatically concealed.
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genscher promised east german foreign minister michael there would be such close cooperation that not even a sheet of paper would fit between. the 2 shouted ahmed's at the time i didn't understand what game she had really meant by that you thought i should follow him so closely i only realized later that he was saying i should follow him like a loyal dog but at the time i was still under the illusion that we were part of the negotiations and discussions that i have a problem even remembering the name of the trap who represented the g.d.r. and i feel sorry actually for them because you know the people who are representing them for the purpose of to pass for a living in the hope they didn't have a lot of leverage over any of this i don't feel any body around the table sort that the outcome of these negotiations was going to depend on
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whether sitting behind the g.d.r. this agreed or not if we're going to try and we just didn't want to fall like a rotten apple into west germany where they would just decide what they do with us and try it it was a bit on. the 1st round of the 2 plus 4 talks proved difficult while for. britain and west germany were aligned with the american strategy the soviet delegation wanted to subject a unified germany to strict conditions. not to demanded political and military neutrality from germany. wins a position. that the opponents crippled our position in west germany was not made any easier by east germany as the lack of cooperation does he did it and he a bit loose leash to the d.d.r. was not thrilled about the united country of being a nato member of because i'm tortured sleeze because in fact it rejected the idea
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she had done connecticut also i just wasn't talking about our agenda to be the 1st to stand up and shout yes we have to be in need to vietnam vets so we took a very cautious stance. we didn't want to do anything that was in any way further destabilize gorbachev's the message was all that it is to believe is good for the handwritten notes from the 1st round of talks made by. highlighted the main problem and the position of the g.d.r. it reads the key issue is the power balance in europe it cannot be destroyed during the talks the us and the u.s.s.r. in gauged in a power struggle over their influence in europe there wasn't one for once least as either for us the russians were the enemy per se so we had a relatively relaxed relationship with the soviet union as an attorney i mean knew the all the up evils that happened and also the fall of the wall on the peaceful demonstration the us does and they were only possible because of the moses of
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support from us is more scored on its merits from. in the chancellor's bungalow in bonn a day before the negotiations it became clear that the soviets could not keep up this harsh front foreign minister shevardnadze it was asking for financial aid. received the same request. to be on the show or not so i said i will be inside. by next month and if that happens gorbachev will be a reelected of the party congress at the start of july 4th out here we will be able to see this treaty through. chancellor kohl sent his advisor horst tell czech and representatives from germany's major banks to moscow on may 14th to fulfill the needs of the kremlin wrote so i'm driving i was in moscow for a secret meeting in may 1919 with 2 german bankers to negotiate a loan of $5000000000.00 marks for its goal is to follow the soviet union this world power would have been insolvent 5 summer $990.00 so that and we had the
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mandate to negotiate that goes so that was an aha moment for me. in this. the u.s. had also promised financial aid to the soviet union gorbachev came on a state visit to washington where president bush offered him a trade agreement but in return he would have to make political compromises and i remember the discussion in the cabinet room in the white house and we as a child the question. do you not think that in a country should be able to affiliate with whatever shoot your idiot alliance it wants to and he says well yes of course. the minutes from the meeting between bush and gorbachev on may 31st recorded this pivotal conversation bush i'm glad you and i seem to agree that nations can choose their own alliances gorbachev so we will put it this way the u.s. and the u.s.s.r.
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are in favor of germany deciding herself in which alliance she would like to participate after a 2 plus 4 settlement bush the united states is unequivocally advocating germany's membership in nato however should germany prefer to make a different choice we will respect it gorbachev i agree. this is that voice or that was the breakthrough of egypt air and also this i. because of the resistance that way but this was actually the decisive break through all. the us president knew that gorbachev needed to win the election because there were people in the moscow pullet bureau who opposed his planned course of action this phone makes instance if you think this underpins the existence of the entire process whether or not go but survived. that's one of the americans didn't celebrate to publicize this breakthrough at the end of may they still had to wait and see if he would win or most up for. us to give him. the cia report the
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soviet system in crisis had already warned of a possible coup against gorbachev in november 989. it said the economic crisis and the independence efforts in various soviet provinces were a great danger there were forces in the kremlin that wanted to stop gorbachev it states the threat of eminent social revolution could prompt a coup that would not only lead to retrenchment but also to political repression more severe than during the pression of years. the 2nd round of 2 plus 4 talks took place in east berlin on the 49th anniversary of germany's invasion of the soviet union during world war 2. during these talks in east berlin sure hausen palace the detente between the former enemies of the cold war was plain to see as the foreign ministers were warmly greeted by host marcus machall. the public knew nothing of the simmering hostility between the 2 german delegations
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this mausoleums would thus immunity to communicate by june a communication with the with german foreign office was very bad it just got worse and worse we were completely isolated from these negotiations and just went along for the ride it. full it could fall into would you take. good to be honest i was often astonished at how certain members of the west german delegation not all of whom don't know that because they hate which words are east german call eagles to a treated them lately in defeated just like losers who should remain silent leave with nothing worth hearing because they no longer had any color you know they are unity if you know the proof. at this time east german delegation leader hans you're going to miss all events didn't know about the breakthrough in washington about gorbachev's agreement that a united germany would be a nato member. starfield the whole trial was only informed that this 3 or 4
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weeks later by bob selleck i regularly offered my resignation to marcus macca it was clear where we stood. by him. the public also had little awareness that the negotiations between the different countries were stalling. does slide the 2nd meeting in the east lynne was a downright disaster and the league you've just lost is off you have to do all the time for the soviet union resent it a draft treaty that listed all of its perm positions you want by want to under and over this. but the chief of staff in the soviet foreign ministry tara sankoh had given elba a heads up who was guns into the sun to those me it was quite interesting sara cinco had whispered to me in private don't worry about the next meeting and don't take everything that happens there seriously lose unst bust up
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a city that had come from shevardnadze and. it was a tactic to build confidence and tolerance build new must not. nato decided to take a major step westerners announced that the soviet union and the warsaw pact military alliance would no longer be enemies of the west but friends a promise made by nato secretary general manfredi ground up. the cold war a long story a story. our alliance is moving from confrontation to corporations we have extended the hand of friendship to the warsaw pact and gorbachev said just that he had seen this as a very important as an important message if you bought. gorbachev needed this message from the west to appease his opponents within the party the 28th congress of the soviet union's communist party took place in what was then known as the palace of congress's inside the kremlin gorbachev defended his policies. i was
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worried that he would survive the party congress. gorbachev was hounded by both sides during the 10 day congress conservative delegates warned him that his actions would lead to the collapse of the u.s.s.r. and socialism on the other side radical reformers like boris yeltsin were calling for a multi-party system and new democratic structures gorbachev spoke openly about the difficult situation to american ambassador jack matlock. gorbachev looked at me and he said look try to get your press to understand this country is on the brink of civil war. not go in the garage it's going. i've got to prevent. you driving a tiger with great effort gorbachev won the power battle within the party he was reelected with almost 2 thirds of the votes the 2 plus 4 talks could continue in school much of it on when gorbachev wonder if he had complete freedom to repeat the
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whole most cold said back in may it's cold use these to present himself as a hero of international relations and that's. the date after gorbachev victory chancellor kohl and foreign minister visited the kremlin since germany's nato membership had already been agreed upon with the us. the main item on the agenda was financing the withdrawal of soviet troops the us refused to fund the soviet union. a chance for west germany to step up in the public eye and the delegation flew out to visit the soviet leader at home in the caucasus call had asked gorbachev for the visit the chancellor could now announce here that nothing else stood in the way of nato membership. the soviet union received $13000000000.00 marks
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for withdrawing their troops from east germany we can't lose sight of the fact that germany was given showing a baby and more. richardson the incentive in and of itself that so there are plenty of reasons. and then the servers were in dire economic straits they needed help. after this meeting in the caucasus the road was now clear for reunification as helmut kohl and others repeatedly announced. but the question of nato membership had already been agreed in secret with president bush who had been waiting to see whether or not gorbachev held on to power kohl was simply the one to break the news . to them so as we fly back from moscow i think this is a day that commemorates us all it's a good day for me and i hope for you as well to germany.
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germany everyone was acting like it was cold to go to go but you have to do that it's complete nonsense globe itself had actually made that decision sometime before but we didn't know if i didn't even know that when i was foreign minister was still apparently east germany wasn't needed at that meeting i found that quite arrogant for. the 3rd round of 2 plus 4 talks took place in paris the day after the. caucasus meeting soviet foreign minister shevardnadze confirmed the agreement made between call and gorbachev the era of hostile blocs in europe was finally over during this round of negotiations there was another fundamental problem to solve the order nice a border between poland and germany was to finally be recognized under international law. the 6 foreign ministers ensured that this demand from poland was met and that germany's ex journal borders would not extend beyond the federal republic and the g.d.r.
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. the final round of the 2 plus 4 talks took place in moscow where the treaty was to be signed. the foreign ministers travelled to moscow the evening before the signing demise yeah would sign on behalf of east germany but that evening british foreign minister douglas heard made a startling demand that jeopardized the entire 2 plus for treating falsetto is at your was against it to be had thought of those douglas heard started causing trouble the evening before september 12th going to the joyous heads misgivings about the road of united germany the united germany would have. to look for ways to the european your good no british suddenly demand that the troops be placed on east german territory would push russia was absolutely against the stores or to the toy instructions or it was important to get that nailed gol in writing and i insisted
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that it should it's this wasn't just an attempt to slow down the process it was an attempt to control the soviet union was not we didn't agree with the stationing or a true must on the just a few hours before a treaty aside and it was is blamed for its failure to be that good was a trick this has happened before in the history of diplomacy was 42 deployments in the good bill. soviet minister shevardnadze told latimer pollin office that he would not sign the treaty under those conditions just moments before the signing in moscow germany's reunification looks set to fail because britain did not want to forego a special right as a victorious power in world war 2. by this point then the soviets are feeling their backs against the wall the germans are feeling you know look you know the british are trying to screw this up. dieter kastrup started searching for his foreign minister around midnight genscher met him in the hotel corridor where kastrup
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delivered the bad news so the news if you could see straight away from his facial expression that it wasn't good he said hen minister of the negotiations have failed in this to the front lines and short of the russians have just cancelled tomorrow signings or even due to its items communicants for more can she ensure turns pale and said he needed to see jim baker right away. a call was made to the american delegation. because it had taken a sleeping tablet and drank some whisky he was lying down and couldn't be woken couldn't lift which came straight to ensure decided to go there himself. bozo's introductions me so we drove through moscow at night to go in to wake up the u.s. secretary of state they can listen cantor came down on my door so they walked we have an hour early quite groggy and they said the brits want. their belly to put
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troops in and until they are and us at home are in this because we were right up to the point of signing the treaty and not pick up the phone as they can call douglas shirtless adulteresses says this is a show stopper you you can't do this we've come this far. diplomats were scrambling for a solution into the early hours eventually the ministers agreed to sign a separate agenda that as long as they were still soviet troops on the ground in east germany no known german nato troops would be stationed there but the puter was this was the 1st time in history that germany gained its fool sovereignty not through military victories or feet. but in agreement with all its neighbors aggression you. use of serious we must see. the treaty could seal german unity and gave germany back its full state sovereignty contained just 10 items and
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a separate end of. the signing of this treaty brought epochal changes it ended the cold war and laid the foundation for a new era of peace freedom and cooperation in europe. though i don't believe in the time of that's i think it was clear to everyone who signs this treaty how important it was to be shuffled on his own inside i was doing somersaults i was close to tears it was so i knew about it today and know. it's by the book not as now i know what mercy wants to show and undeserved if it is real and i'm still aware that this was the most important signature of my life. but the nato question is still a sore point today were the soviet negotiators negligent or not putting moral promises in writing. did the west really agree not to expand nato eastward to
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this day russian president vladimir putin still accuses the west of breaking their promise putin is now making the argument that the united states orally promised to serve the union that we would never extend nato that is both ok absolutely. never were such a promise may get there we knew it was a meeting these were declarations of ins handbook but they were never recorded in writing so as easily as the west made those promises of your so to did it's abandon the consumption and that's why we're in the situation we're in today as they were the it was a good thing lord gullibility could have been. in 1991 the u.s.s.r. fragmented into 15 states russia formed a new military alliance with 5 post soviet countries hungry poland and the czech republic joined nato in 1990 later followed by 11 more countries friendly relations
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between russia and the west deteriorated the old rivalry for influence and power led to renewed mistrust and confrontation between the successors of gorbachev and bush. a new cold front has descended. and i hope that future would be that we could turn the clock back to 19000000 woman we ought to start with the idea that we're going to exercise some smart diplomacy we are start some confidence building measures on both sides. and try to understand the positions from which the child. it's coming. through trust and mutual understanding the cold war ended. the determined diplomatic efforts of the 2 plus 4 nations should serve as
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inspiration that today's europe can once again find peace. how to have true sides of berlin home together in the years following germany unification. in pop culture. music. and last but not least in the last. 30 years of german acacia from the perspective of the people. you're over. 30 minutes on d w. happiness
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the back. this is the the view news live from berlin germany celebrates 30 years of reunification president frank loesser steinmeyer speaks of the official ceremony calling the past 30 years a triumph of democracy over oppression and he issues a warning against populism and extremist. also coming up donald trump sends a message of fly.


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