Skip to main content

tv   The Two plus Four Talks  Deutsche Welle  October 5, 2020 11:15am-12:01pm CEST

11:15 am
outside in a move that's appeared at odds with protocols for a patient with go to bed earlier his medical team said trump was improving and suggested he could be discharged as early as monday. you're up to date up next our documentary on the 2 plus 4 talks that sealed the german reunification by brian thomas for the entire news team actually. when you hear me now oh yes we're going to need you and how the last 2 years german chancellor when we bring you angle our magic wall as you've never heard have surprise yourself with what is possible to this miracle really what and moves back and want. to talk to people who follow along the way maurice and critics alike join
11:16 am
us from eccles life stops. the cold war ended in moscow in 1990 bringing a new era of peace to europe a divide in germany was free to re-unite the treaty that paved the way for german unity was signed here in moscow 30 years ago it was a historic victory for democracy and the deep rifts in europe were on the road to recovery. the lord is real i'm still aware that this was the most important signature of my life the book. it wasn't an illusion it was a political project to keep. we did
11:17 am
a lot of things a lot different then when we won the cold war against. soviet ambassador about a softer a cough bush here in moscow 30 years ago when the victorious powers of the 2nd world war determined the fate of germany moscow looks back on this treaty with far more criticism than the west does. know the most of. those years i think listen see is speeches and champagne lift or rather try to send annoying off to taste in new when you think about all of the problems that arose during the many negotiations about what to finally do with germany made by p.s. the when you consider that a treaty was supposed to solve all problems once and for all that people had been fighting over for many decades to. the global political decisions made back then
11:18 am
still affect the world today the great power struggles of the time could have thwarted german reunification or people forget today that this was something that there are a lots of things that could have gone wrong and so you wanted to try to move it forward as rapidly but is securely as possible and the key driver for that was the people on the ground in germany. 1989 was a time of euphoria in germany as the berlin wall crumbled the iron curtain in europe lifted. but how would moscow react most people thought soviet leader mikhail gorbachev would never release east germany the soviet union had sacrificed. so many people
11:19 am
during the 2nd world war and east germany was compensation the day after the wall fell the people of berlin were celebrating the end of a divided germany with their chancellor helmut kohl an envoy from the kremlin would soon arrive in the west german capital bonn on a secret mission he was greeted at the chancellor rhee by horst chik helmut kohl's foreign policy advisor. he was acting very secretively. rich to fish but it had important talks of the highest level and they discussed a lot of issues fear foreign to scrutiny all the issues that some kind of connection to the topic of german unity to them too much. the other shuttle will shift i think that was a mistake oh now bottom to the ethical field actually come to talk about what could be done after the fall of the wall to put the brakes on the reunification frozen vignettes to calm the situation down this isn't the ceiling but he expressed that
11:20 am
in a very unclear manner where you know in. my belief to my report to the chancellor said you haven't they are starting to talk about german unity that it's high time that we did too this was as old. calls poll ratings were dire at the time tented saw an opportunity to boost the chancellor's popularity. that's what i told him this was a chance to announce his intentions for german reunification so it's out. that same night tel chick started drafting a 10 point plan to reunite germany but cole kept it secret until november 28th when he presented his plan for reunification in the bundestag it came as a surprise even to their coalition partner the f.d.p. and foreign minister hans dietrich. you see there well for i know vernon cha. shoot
11:21 am
but we're also prepared to go on a major step further conflicts develop confederal structures between the 2 german nations if we can begin with the aim of creating a federation a federal state order in germany. to show off. the latest speech was momentous. we thought it would be another 5 to 10 years before germany was actually reunited the. cantar travel to moscow the chancellor's arbitrary 10 point plan had angered the victorious powers of the 2nd world war and sure had to apologize to gorbachev and ask for his understanding about west germany's desire to re-unite. included isn't this i've never taken part in a political discussion where one of the parties left their anger rage so out of control to. lessen. the gorbachev accuse the chancellor of interfering in the internal affairs of east
11:22 am
germany submission nasties and the space that was for me after that conversation i just couldn't imagine the soviet union agreeing to a process that would allow the reunification of our country any time in the foreseeable future aside from. the western allies were also concerned about the way things were developing in germany and specially the british leader margaret thatcher. the british with the british prime minister was strictly against a reunification of germany intelligence. that she was temperamental was that germany was a hostile from the start she was very hostile towards the germans shoko she never had any confidence in the german. she said they'll betray you and they will be trailing. she had a conversation with overtures through in the summer of 90 days you know and when she posts through all school when they. started to discuss that is giving this she
11:23 am
had a couple of conversations with crossfire mitchell who share her misgivings initially indeed would say express them even more forcefully than she ever did of course later gender equality going to change his position will record the she did but at the beginning his views were were he was very very word to the board even though i thought if i was always in the heart of our initial french were both worried that germany would just play hedge a modicum visions again. after all germany's g.d.p. was the same as france and britain but together related to them that there was a potential threat that arose. when i'm president francois mitterrand said straight away i would call nicole she will if you want to unite germany that's your business you can do that under above everything this is you like me i wouldn't interfere yes if you want france's approval even you need to respect what 3 conditions one you know the order like it or the healing to your mode of the denuclearization of
11:24 am
germany and 3 in the real europe. washington was also following this political earthquake in germany west germany had hoped that the powerful united states would support reunification. as the u.s. was seen as a necessary indispensable a that would help to overcome resistance from the french and british sides which side foreign minister genscher traveled to washington to discuss proceedings with u.s. secretary of state james baker baker's colleagues own ready had press sites ideas about how the international negotiations on german unity should play out we focused on the idea that the key players of the 2 germany's and the 4 powers that had the rights robert zoellick set out america's goals in a confidential strategy document the u.s. one. to solidify its leadership role in europe through what became known as the 2
11:25 am
plus 4 talks and to keep a united germany within the western military alliance nato zelotes paper reads we want them in our tent not in one of their own working with the germans right now gorbachev needs to show he has some control over the process 2 plus 4 gives him that cover with little real control. one would know this would be hard for the soviets and when the soviets would push back you needed to respond with the united front. the u.s. government was very firm about its stipulation. to food a vis the board came with a demand that the united germany must be a member of nato and that was a stumbling block that we weren't expecting and we didn't initiate a few times. the question was how when the soviet union react how could anyone convince poor but you have to agree to the stipulation of the united states
11:26 am
genscher had an idea. we have agreed that there would be no intention to expand the need to jurisdiction eastwards that doesn't just apply to east germany it applies in general. but so that's good. while standing next to the u.s. secretary of state announced that the west would respect the strategic interests of the soviet union. since the end of the 2nd world war large group units of the red army had been stationed on east german territory they crushed the uprising in east germany by force in 1953 just as they did later in 1968 with the prague spring. susan type we had over a $180000.00 soviet troops in the country at that time we had a whole family full of wives and children too. we had soviet security forces i
11:27 am
think the total number of people was around 650000 towards unmentionables shared with the soviet foreign minister shevardnadze i once told me that in january 1090 soviet leaders were still thinking about deploying troops in east germany and closing the borders against some additional easily could have on the east german army would have marched along to. the edge of the queue. just such decide. see if actions and harsh decisions weren't exactly go but dial mature in the. severe measures weren't in his nature it wasn't how he operates he said they were still criticised for it today in our country and others want somebody who gives the. u.s. secretary of state james baker visited moscow on a mission to win gorbachev's approval for the 2 plus for negotiations on german unity baker felt optimistic we saw gorbachev and shevardnadze as
11:28 am
reformers. we believed them to be that they turned out to be the head. but baker knew the kremlin would strongly oppose a united germany becoming a member of nato. for every top soviet politician every so vehicle person even song need to as an enemy alliance it needs to was perceived as an enemy of the soviet union with the brits and in fact need to actually find its under that premise it's at least as well as a book. getting gorbachev's approval would be a tall order baker iterated gantries message that if gorbachev agreed to the nato membership the u.s. would not take military advantage. i remember baker's words it was you don't have to answer immediately but think about this. assuming there is no expansion of nato
11:29 am
or jurisdiction to the east not more niche wouldn't it be better and then he described to have a germany in scotched in nato wis an american military presence in europe for the future stability of the drug. for hansard. that well obviously an expansion of nato to the east who is unacceptable but i understand what you're saying and i will give it serious thought. what baker said here would be assured time and time again by western politicians to the soviet you . there would be no eastward expansion of nato there was no intention to change the current military power balance in europe a claim that would come back to haunt baker. within 2 days the united states' position changed on that we told the soviet our position that's not our position
11:30 am
they never said anything it's still a bone of contention today did baker and other western politicians make promises about nato that their successors didn't keep music so what's it like you it was a mistake not to treat these assurances the need to would not expand east in writings the use of the bill if that was a very big mistake now we're left to face the music and live with the consequences of that mistake this that there secured a stable then effect i think that it was clear that without those assurances it would have been much harder for gorbachev to. have to agree. to the 2 plus 4 group but. the day after baker's meeting chancellor cowen german foreign minister genscher arrived in moscow the soviets were clearly happy with america's assurances about
11:31 am
nato cole also promised financial aid gorbachev gave the green light for the 2 plus 4 agreement on german unity. to see the. research the general secretary gorbachev has unequivocably given me his word that the soviet union will respect the wishes of the german. it's to live as one nation. but the soviet union also had conditions foreign minister shevardnadze stipulated before the international press that a unified germany would have to maintain political and military neutrality upon his return home brushed over this very clear message from the kremlin he didn't want to taint the good news. that the soviet union imagine if unified germany in late had a state that yes of course all this was said yesterday a. cold strategy was successful and his popularity grew he'd made further
11:32 am
offers of financial aid to gorbachev to discourage the kremlin from doing anything to block the way forward because without this as you none of this would have happened if the soviet union hadn't been in such a dire economic position at the time of the year like it. did so we do know it was struggling to keep its head above water and the west knew that this it was a unique opportunity it just had to be seen that the guy just some. in the canadian capital ottawa tensions were stirring over german reunification efforts many foreign ministers of the $23.00 nato and warsaw pact countries were angry that they hadn't been included in the 2 plus for talks on german unity and with a dramatic struggle ensued behind the scenes together germany and the us managed to fend off demands for a huge peace conference it would have had to involve around $100.00 countries any
11:33 am
nation that had charges against nazi germany. mainstreams for truck fuel of peace treaty with us out of the question for us. for the way that inevitably put the issue of reparations on the agenda it's sure. we wanted to keep that out of the unification process at all costs it was unheard method for and you'll spoil says for. if there. had been a peace conference all the countries occupied by german troops during world war 2 could have to man did reparations the u.s. wasn't prepared to enter years of negotiations and put its foot down it was complicated everybody felt like they had a stake in the process but he said no it's going to be to push forward. before the negotiations started chancellor kohl flew to the us to spend 2 days at camp david with president george h.w.
11:34 am
bush it was here that they set out a game plan for the 2 plus 4 talks. really good position because we established early on as camp david a relationship of contravention trust between kohl and bush and to ensure baker and we said we will stay together and we will push this through a regardless of the opposition provided. chester co you support the idea of germany in there. it was clear from the confidential minutes that bush and cole saw eye to eye when cole asked the american president what could be offered to the soviet union in return for germany's nato membership bush said to hell with that we prevailed and they didn't we can't let the soviets clutch victory from the jaws of defeat cole they want something in
11:35 am
return bush you've got deep pockets. the 1st ever election campaign for a democratically elected government in east germany the vote on march 18th 1990 would decide who represented east germany in the 2 plus 4 talks. helmut kohl promised a fast economic union and a shared currency between the 2 german nations he supported the g.d.r. coalition alliance for germany whose top candidate was low tardy most year the alliance also wanted a fast reunification with west germany it won with 48 percent of the vote for cool going to the people of east germany didn't vote for the c.d.u. because they wanted to but because they knew that helmut kohl was behind him to this result brings an incredible responsibility and an expectation of our people but this isn't just an expectation of us but also of west germany and we expect
11:36 am
clear answers. normally when a politician is elected the 1st thing they do is to think about how to get reelected in 4 years we didn't need to do that our task right from the start was to abolish ourselves up social studies to show that it's true that i was prime minister but i was also a kind of insolvency administrator has. no time to mess here formed a coalition with eastern s.p.d. marcos meco became foreign minister he didn't trust the members of the previously governing socialist unity party differs all. and it was extremely difficult to create proper decisionmaking structures during this time i walked into the ministry like it was the enemy's house his house. meco brought with him confidants from the peace movement people who he aligned with my concert you're going missile bits to follow god i lied to the formula was unity as fast as possible but as good as necessary we had 2 objectives certain conditions were not in the interest of the
11:37 am
population we represented for cleanup. at the 1st 2 plus 4 talks in bonn the us and the western allies were forming a front against the soviet union that was only diplomatically concealed. genscher promised east german foreign minister mechelle there would be such close cooperation that not even a sheet of paper would fit between them. just to show to dominance at the time i didn't understand what game she had really meant by that it was that i should follow him so closely i only realized later that he was saying i should follow him like a loyal dog but at the time i was still under the illusion that we will part of the negotiations and discussions would i have a problem even remembering the name of the trap who represented the g.d.r. and i feel sorrier actually for them because you know the people who are representing them for the purpose of the 2 thoughts for living in hope they didn't have a lot of leverage over any of this i don't feel any body around the table
11:38 am
thought that the outcome of these negotiations was going to depend on whether sitting in the g.d.r. this agreed or not if we're going to try and we just didn't want to fall like a rotten apple into west germany where they would just decide what they do with us and try to mostly because one. the 1st round of the 2 plus 4 talks proved difficult while for. once britain and west germany were aligned with the american strategy the soviet delegation wanted to subject a unified germany to strict conditions edvard shevardnadze demanded political and military neutrality from germany. wins a good position. our position in west germany was not made any easier by east
11:39 am
germany as the lack of cooperation does d.d.d. a bit loose mr d.d.r. was not thrilled about the united country of being a nato member of it because i'm torchwood's least because in fact it rejected the idea so you had stephen to darken up till it just wasn't told what our agenda to be the 1st to stand up and show yes we have to be in need to the atmosphere so we took a very cautious stance just we didn't want to do anything there was in any way further destabilize gorbachev domestic stubborn easier to work the handwritten notes from the 1st round of talks made by. highlighted the main problem and the position of the g.d.r. it reads the key issue is the power balance in europe it cannot be destroyed during the talks the us and the u.s.s.r. engaged in a power struggle over their influence in europe there wasn't an influence least because the there for us the russians were the enemy per se so we had
11:40 am
a relatively relaxed relationship with the soviet union as well that during the menus of all the of he evils that happened in the fall of the wall on the peaceful demonstrations against us and they were only possible because of the moses of support from more scorecards murders from. in the chancellor's bungalow in bonn a day before the negotiations it became clear that the soviets could not keep up this harsh front foreign minister shevardnadze it was asking for financial aid. received the same request. feel it got to be on the show or not so i said i will be inside. by next year and if that happens gorbachev will be reelected at the party congress at the start of july 4th out here we will be able to see this treaty through. chancellor kohl sent his advisor horst tell chick and representatives from germany's major banks to moscow on may 14th to fulfill the needs of the kremlin road so i'm driving to i was in moscow for a secret meeting in may 1919 with 2 german bankers to negotiate
11:41 am
a loan of $5000000000.00 marks for its goal is to for the soviet union of this world power would have been insolvent 5 summer 998 months of it and we have the mandate to negotiate that goes so that was an aha moment for me. in this. the u.s. had also promised financial aid to the soviet union gorbachev came on a state visit to washington where president bush offered him a trade agreement but in return he would have to make political compromises i remember a discussion in the cabinet room in the white house and we asked gervase childs the question. do you not think that in a country should be able to affiliate with whatever security alliance it wants to and he says yes of course. the minutes from the meeting between bush and gorbachev on may 31st recorded this pivotal conversation bush i'm glad you and i seem to
11:42 am
agree that nations can choose their own alliances gorbachev so we will put it this way the u.s. and the u.s.s.r. are in favor of germany deciding herself in which alliance she would like to participate after and to close for settlement bush the united states is unequivocally advocating germany's membership in nato however should germany prefer to make a different choice we will respected gorbachev i agree with. this is that voice or that was the breakthrough of the day or else this i. yes because of the resistance but this was actually the decisive breakthrough will. the u.s. president knew that gorbachev needed to win the election because there were people in the moscow pullet bureau who opposed his planned course of action this one makes instance if you think this underpins the existence of the entire process whether or not go but survived. that's one of the americans didn't celebrate to publicize this
11:43 am
breakthrough at the end of may they still had to wait and see if he would win or most of. us to give him. the cia report the soviet system in crisis had already warned of a possible coup against gorbachev in november 989. it said the economic crisis and the independence efforts in various soviet provinces were a great danger there were forces in the kremlin that wanted to stop gorbachev it states the threat of imminent social revolution could prompt a coup that would not only lead to retrenchment but also to political repression more severe than during the depression of years. the 2nd round of 2 plus 4 talks took place in east berlin on the 49th anniversary of germany's invasion of the soviet union during world war 2. during these talks in east berlin sure hausen palace the detente between the former enemies of the cold war was plain to see as
11:44 am
the foreign ministers were warmly greeted by host marcus mechelle. the public knew nothing of the simmering hostility between the 2 german delegations discussions would this immunity committee could see by june communication with the with german foreign office was very bad it just got worse and worse we were completely isolated from these negotiations and just went along for the ride it. falls or would you take. to try to be honest i was often astonished at certain members of the west german delegation and not all of them going to because they hate words or east german call equals to a treated them likely been defeated just like losers like you should remain silent the very who had nothing worth hearing because they no longer at any hour you know they are unity if you know the proof. at this time east german delegation meter
11:45 am
hans your good missile bit didn't know about the breakthrough in washington about gorbachev's agreement that a united germany would be a nato member. even though the worst a few buttons i was only informed that this 3 or 4 weeks later by bob zoellick i regularly offered my resignation to marcus mecca it was clear where we stood but. the public also had little awareness that the negotiations between the different countries were stalling. thus sligh the 2nd meeting of the east lynne was a downright disaster and the regular just asked if you had to do all the time for the soviet union presented a draft treaty that listed all of its positions you want by want to under the office. but the chief of staff in the soviet foreign ministry to our sango had given elba a heads up who was comes into the son to disney it was quite interesting sara sinko
11:46 am
had whispered to me in private don't worry about the next meeting and don't take everything that happens there seriously as unstressed up a see that had come from shevardnadze and gorbachev truth it was a tactic to build confidence that collins in the must not. nato decided to take a major step westerners announced that the soviet union and the warsaw pact military alliance would no longer be enemies of the west but friends a promise made by nato secretary general manfredi ground up. the cold war. our alliance is moving from confrontation to corporations reiterations we extended the hand of friendship to the warsaw pact and gorbachev said that he had seen this as a very important as an important message if you bought. gorbachev needed this message from the west to appease his opponents within the party the 28th congress of the
11:47 am
soviet union's communist party took place in what was then known as the palace of congress's inside the kremlin gorbachev defended his policies. of the shots i was worried that he would survive the party congress it gorbachev was hounded by both sides during the 10 day congress conservative delegates warned him that his actions would lead to the collapse of the u.s.s.r. and socialism on the other side radical reformers like boris yeltsin were calling for a multi-party system and new democratic structures gorbachev spoke openly about the difficult situation to american ambassador jack matlock. gorbachev looked at me and he said look try to get your purse to understand this country is on the brink of civil war. not go in the garage. i've got to convince. you to be driving a tiger with great effort gorbachev won the power battle within the party he was
11:48 am
reelected with almost 2 thirds of the votes the 2 plus 4 talks could continue its quatro forgiven when gorbachev one of the key had complete freedom to repeat the hold with a cold or he'd said back in may cold use this to present himself as a hero of international relations and soon got switched. the day after gorbachev victory chancellor kohl and foreign minister genscher visited the kremlin since germany's nato membership had already been agreed upon with the us. yes the main item on the agenda was financing the withdrawal of soviet troops the us refused to fund the soviet union. a chance for west germany to step up in the public eye the delegation flew out to visit the soviet leader at home in the caucasus cole had asked gorbachev for the visit the chancellor could now announce here that nothing else stood in the way of
11:49 am
nato membership. the soviet union received $13000000000.00 marks for withdrawing their troops from east germany we can't lose sight of the fact that germany was given showing a $1000000000.00 more. bridger's in the incentives in and of itself so there are plenty of reasons. and in the series were in dire economic straits they needed out . after this meeting in the caucasus the road was now clear for reunification as helmut kohl and others repeatedly announced. but the question of nato membership had already been agreed in secret with president bush who had been waiting to see whether or not gorbachev held on to power cole was simply the one to break the news . to say as we fly back from moscow i think this is a day that commemorates us all it's
11:50 am
a good day for me and i hope for you as well to germany. tomorrow in germany everyone was acting like it was cold who got to go but you have to do that it's complete nonsense gorbachev had actually made that decision sometimes for but we didn't know if i didn't even know that and i was foreign minister was still apparently east germany wasn't needed at that meeting i found that quite arrogant for. the 3rd round of 2 plus 4 talks took place in paris the day after the. caucasus meeting soviet foreign minister shevardnadze confirmed the agreement made between kohl and gorbachev the era of hostile blocks in europe was finally over during this round of negotiations there was another fundamental problem to solve the order nice a border between poland and germany was to finally be recognized under international law. the 6 foreign
11:51 am
ministers ensured that this demand from poland was met and that germany's ex journal borders would not extend beyond the federal republic and the g.d.r. . the final round of the 2 plus 4 talks took place in moscow where the treaty was to be signed. the foreign ministers travelled to moscow the evening before the signing the most year would sign on behalf of east germany but that evening british foreign minister douglas heard made a startling demand that jeopardized the entire 2 plus 4 treaty. falsetto is that there was against it at the end of those dot douglas heard started causing trouble the evening before september 12th going to the actual as heads this giving about the road of united germany the united germany would have. to look for ways to the european rebid nerds if suddenly demanded the troops be placed on cease german
11:52 am
territory which russia was absolutely against forced or subdue the toy instructions or it was important to get that nailed doll in writing and i insisted that it should it's this wasn't just an attempt to slow down the process it was an attempt to control the soviet union was not we didn't agree with the stationing us or a true list on the just a few hours before a treaty aside and these are the us is blamed for its failure because it was a trick this has happened before in the history of diplomacy was through diplomacy for the good bill. soviet minister shevardnadze told latimer pollen off that he would not sign the treaty under those conditions just moments before the signing in moscow germany's reunification not set to fail because britain did not want to forego a special right as a victorious power in world war 2. by this point then the soviets are feeling their backs against the wall the germans are feeling you know look you know the british
11:53 am
are trying to screw this up. dieter kastrup it started searching for his foreign minister around midnight genscher met him in the hotel corridor where kastrup delivered the bad news saying is if you could see straight away from his facial expression that it wasn't good he said get him minister to ensure the negotiations have failed mr different rooms and shut the russians have just cancelled tomorrow signings if you can do that so items communicants for more attention and your turn pale and said he needed to see jim baker right away to space a call was made to the american delegation all. because it's baker had taken a sleeping tablet and drank some whisky he was lying down and couldn't be woken couldn't lift with cancer a cancer decided to go there himself. bozo's inflated to dismiss so we drove through moscow at night to go in to wake up the u.s. secretary of state they can listen cantor came pounding on my door so they were
11:54 am
pre-op and i was really quite groggy and they said the brits want. the ability to put troops in and g.d.r. and russia at home or in this case we were right up to the point of signing the treaty and not pick up the phone i think and call douglas shirt i said doris this is this is a show stopper you've you can't do this route from this far. diplomats were scrambling for a solution into the early hours eventually the ministers agreed to sign a separate agenda that as long as they were still soviet troops on the ground in east germany no non german nato troops would be stationed there but the puter was this was the 1st time in history that germany gained its fool sovereignty not through military victories or 2 feet. but in agreement with all its neighbors aggression you. use of seriously mr c.
11:55 am
. the treaty could seal german unity and gave germany back its full state sovereignty contain just 10 items and a separate identity. the signing of this treaty brought epochal changes it ended the cold war and laid the foundation for a new era of peace freedom and cooperation in europe. though i don't believe in the time of that's i think it was clear to everyone who signed this treaty how important it was the shelf life is on the side i was doing somersaults i was close to tears with sorrow about it. it's by the book not as now i know what mercy was a skiff and undeserved if it is real and i'm still aware that this was the most important signature of my life. but the nato question is still a sore point today were the soviet negotiators negligent or not putting oral
11:56 am
promises in writing. did the west really agree not to expand nato eastward to this day russian president vladimir putin still accuses the west of breaking their promise putin is now making the argument that the united states orally promised to serve the union that we would never extend nato that is both ok absolutely. never were such a promise made if the when you're leading these were declarations of ins handbook but they were never recorded in writing so as easily as the west made those promises of your so to did it's abandon the consumption and that's why we're in the situation we're in today so what the me it was a good citizen of the booth hey look lord it's all gullibility good opinion. in 1991 the u.s.s.r. fragmented into 15 states russia formed a new military alliance with 5 post soviet countries hungry poland and the czech
11:57 am
republic joined nato in 1990 later followed by 11 more countries friendly relations between russia and the west deteriorated the old rivalry for influence and power led to renewed mistrust and confrontation between the successors of gorbachev and bush. a new cold front has descended. ryoko future would be that we could turn the clock back to $9091.00 we ought to start with the idea they were going to exercise some smart diplomacy we are start some confidence building measures on both sides. and try to understand the positions from which each side. coming. through trust and mutual understanding the cold war ended.
11:58 am
the determined diplomatic efforts of the 2 process for nations should serve as inspiration that today's europe can once again find peace. beirut 2 months after the devastating explosion at the port. it affected come close people including many artists studios and galleries have been destroyed and created work in battle water mains is am i the lebanese government.
11:59 am
global 3000. and 90 minutes on d w. media and information literacy the 7th online session of the global media for a covert 19 has changed the way we communicate. this brings new opportunities but also. one solution media and information literacy. is this enough to approach the challenges in our media landscape and join our discussion starts 1230 u.t.c. . this or do so no story a stubborn rice farmer from thailand. his problem past. his credo no come across. it was. the students. don't stand
12:00 pm
a chance. train him successfully. the to me starts oct 15th. place. claim. play. this is d w news live from broadway in the 2020 winner of the nobel prize for medicine is announced the stockholm panel awards 2 americans and a briton for their discovery of the hepatitis c. virus saying that it has helped save millions of lives. also coming up mixed messages as u.s. president donald trump posted.


info Stream Only

Uploaded by TV Archive on