9/11 changed the world as we knew it. Part of this change was to redirect the military of the United States away from focusing primarily on conventional conflict to a primary focus on unconventional or irregular conflict. This change required a tremendous learning effort by the military and their supporting research and development community. This learning effort included relearning of old but largely forgotten lessons as well as acquiring newly discovered knowledge. During the process of our immediate 9/11 response, we identified that we were engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan in an insurgency. Subsequently, our focus converged upon the description of insurgencies and the requirements for counterinsurgency. This paper argues that emerging conditions now allow the re-evaluation of the type of conflict occurring today and into the foreseeable future: that we, including the modeling and simulation world, emerge from a singular focus on orthodox insurgencies and start to consider the consequences and opportunities of the complexity of current conflicts. As an example of complexity, this paper will use the relatively common phenomenon of the Warlord or Warlordism. The paper will provide a definition of this phenomenon and then describe the implications for modelers. The paper will conclude by demonstrating the impact of incorporating this one rather prosaic complexity into an insurgency model, using agent based modeling (ABM).