lewis to go through with the merrill acquisition, or did mr. lewis threaten to back out in order to squeeze more money out of the federal government? did the federal government tell mr. lewis to keep quiet about the escalating merrill lynch losses? and the government's commitment to provide billions in federal funding? i'm sure there will be other questions as well. to get to the bot bottom of these issues, we also intend to invite mr. paulson and to invite mr. bernanke to testify at a future date. the committee's willingness to issue subpoenas should clarify our expectations of full cooperation by perspective witnesses. i want to thank, mr. lewis, for being here today. and i look forward to his testimony. at this time, i yield to the ranking member of the committee, mr. darrell icea of california. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank you for holding this important bipartisan hearing today. it is important that those of us who see this hearing today recognize that we are not here to evaluate the value of bank of america or merrill lynch or the

. >> is mr. lewis lobbying? >> with respect to what? >> i said is mr. lewis lobbying when he tells the committee you put pressure on him along with mr. paulson? >> all i know is i never said i would replace the board of management if he invoked mac. >> what did you say? sometimes there's an implication without a direct order. >> i expressed concerns about the effect of invoking the mac both on the financial system and on the bank of america itself. i expressed those concerns which is appropriate but always it was his decision whether to know the take the decision. >> did mr. paul sing lawyer when he told mr. cuomo that he was acting under your suggestions or orders to tell them that the board would be fired if they didn't comply? >> i believe he's modified that statement. i did not tell him -- i did not tell mr. paulson -- >> what did you tell him? >> i didn't tell him anything like that. >> using you didn't tell him anything like that. what did you tell him? >> mr. paulson and i had conversations given our common concerns about the financial system. al

mr. lewis: will the gentleman yield? mr. obey: sure. mr. lewis: we could probably bypass all this discussion and as you said expedite the schedule. i do want to recognize mr. lungren, but if you want to -- mr. obey: i think it would be a very good idea. it would make us have more time to do the real work. mr. lewis: you have the floor, mr. chairman. mr. obey: i thank the gentleman for his wise comments. let me simply say i don't have any objection to several provisions in this motion. i do have to say one thing, however. the effect of this motion would be to substantially increase the likely amount of money approved by the conference for the defense department and to substantially reduce the amount of money provided for the state department. i have always had difficulty undering why people are willing to spend hundreds of billions of dollars to wage war but are resistant to spending a tiny amount in comparison in order to prevent war or to extraindicate ourselves from war. -- extracate ourselves from war. the conference report will probably

was mr. lewis pleaded to going forward with his own bad deal? or did mr. lewis recklessly agreed to pay too much for merrill lynch so that the federal government felt backed into a corner when faced with the prospect of louis backing out of the merrill deal and of course we experienced the inevitable bankruptcy of merrill lynch. could you respond to this? >> yes, sir. today i think has been productive in terms of transparency and more information about what happened. clearly there was a very difficult period and many complex problems of the that were being addressed but as i indicated i believe that we solve this problem without an any way taking steps that were either beyond oh-la-la or on ethical. and i believe we did the right thing in order to stabilize both companies or the financial system. >> thank you very much and thank you, mr. chairman. >> the gentleman's time is expired. congresswoman norton for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman and we do appreciate the transparency your try e and to bring to this transaction. i am not inclined to second

mr. lewis: mr. speaker, i believe that the chairman plans to close and will be the last speaker on that side. then i yield back the balance of my time. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from california yields back the balance of his time. the gentleman from wisconsin. mr. obey: mr. speaker, i yield myself the balance of the time. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman is recognized. mr. obey: mr. speaker, as i noted at the beginning of the debate, this item represents last year's leftover business. it is the last item of last year's leftover business. we have been mired in a war for over seven years. the president previous to this one has continually minimized the cost of that war by financing it on the installment plan. he instead of providing a full estimate of a yearly cost to the war he would ask to fund that war in six-month increments. and when he left office there was still one six-month increment left to go that was not yet paid for left over from his watch. and so this bill today in th

it says, you've apparently -- mr. lewis reported a series of calls. and you talk about a number of things. this is one thing i found interesting. the second point. this says -- this is what you told your boys, it says the treasury and fed stated strongly that were the corporation to invoke the material adverse change mac clause in the merger agreement with merrill lynch and fail to close the transaction, the treasury and the fed would remove the board and management of the corporation. if that isn't a threat, i don't know what is. if i say i'm going to fire you, if you don't do what i tell you to do, not only am i going to fire you, but i'm going to fire your board, what you said -- and i know you were caught in a difficult situation. i know that after this merger was done your folks benefited tremendously and i know that bank of america is doing fine now. i'm here to tell you, no matter how great bank of america is doing today, the end does not -- the means does not justify the end. in other words, throughout these transactions we must have honesty a

now, mr. lewis, i'm going to ask you a series of simple questions. if you're not forthcoming i'm not going to have any choice but to interrupt you. i'm asking for your cooperation. isn't it true that bank of america examined merrill lynch's book of business before signing the merger agreement and then received detailed financial reports every week from merrill lynch after signing the merger agreement on september 15th? >> that is true. >> isn't it true that the merrill losses of mid-december that you claimed motivated you to go to the government were not the largest week-to-week losses at merrill you observed since agreeing to purchase the company. in fact, wasn't the week-to-week loss experienced in mid-november larger than the one in mid-december. >> the losses that were. >> the losses were partly based on losses in november. i'm not saying the losses in that time frame were what caused the increase, it was the increased projections of the losses based on some of those losses in november. >> mr. chairman, i move to put up a bar graph representing t

now, i'm going to ask you, mr. lewis, our investigation finds that mr. bernanke believed that your thought to invoke a mac was not credible. take a look at the following e-mail from chairman bernanke dated december 21st 2008, i think the threat to use mac as a bargaining chip -- we don't see it as a likely scenario at all. you did get a specific amount of assistance when you dropped the threat to back out of your deal, isn't it true? >> yes, we did. >> tell the committee houp. >> $20 billion. >> you got the promise of 118 billion in asset protection for a combination of merrill and bank of america toxic assets. >> we hadn't settled on an amount until sometime -- the wrap wraz being considered. >> that was in addition to the 15 billion of t.a.r.p. moneys you received in october, 10 billion in t.a.r.p. you received upon acquiring merrill, is that right? >> we didn't sign the agreement on the wrap. >> contrary to your representations to the fed, you were concerned primarily about the losses at merrill lynch. merrill's losses were less than half of the probl

. >> let's me go back to this so-called threat concern here mr. lewis. i want to be clear of the on december 17th, when you called mr. paulson, mr. bernanke, did you -- i want to know the nature of the call, did you say we were going to exercise the mac clause or thinking about exercising the mac clause? >> again, it seems like a long time ago. to the best of my recommendation i said we're strongly considering a mac. >> in other words, what the response you then got changed your decision? you were going to exercise the clause, you felt that was the best interest of your bank and your shareholders, you were going to do it. and then what the government told you -- based on what the government told you, you took a different course? >> no sir, it was a factser because they felt stronger but it wasn't the only factor. we also thought after a lot of consideration that there was a downside risk in not winning the mac. >> let me change directions we've been talking about this a lot. i want to get to a bill big concern i have with the unprecedented level the gove

mr. lewis: mr. speaker, i yield two minutes to the gentleman from new jersey, mr. frelinghuysen, a member of the defense subcommittee. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from new jersey is recognized for two minutes. mr. frelinghuysen: i thank the gentleman for yielding and i ask unanimous consent to revise and extend. the speaker pro tempore: without objection. mr. frelinghuysen: if the defense portion of this supplemental was considered as a standalone legislation it would receive my support and the majority of those on this side of the aisle. we recognize that we need to provide our deployed men and women all volunteers with the funding and resources they need to commit to their ongoing missions in iraq and afghanistan. but, unfortunately, the majority has added items to this measure totally unrelated to these wars. first, the much-debated i.m.f. provision which interestingly enough allows our country drawing rights for the first time in the history of the i.m.f. secondly, the majority stripp

mr. lewis: madam speaker. the speaker pro tempore: in the opinion of the chair -- the gentleman from california. mr. lewis: i object to the vote on the grounds a quorum is not present and make a point of order a quorum is not present. the speaker pro tempore: pursuant to clause 8 of rule 20, further proceedings on this question will be postponed. mursuent to clause 12-a of rule 1, the house will stand in recess subject to the call of the chair. >> every weekend's filled with books and authors on "book tv." look for our entire schedule job at booktv.org. >> here is our present policy. we are anxious, willing, eager to stop the bombing just as we're eager to stop the war. >> telephone conversations from the final months of lyndon johnson's final months of presidency. his pick for supreme court justice. listen saturday morning at 10:00 eastern on c-span radio, in the washington baltimore area at 90.1 f.m. online at c-spanradio.org. and on x.m. satellite radio channel 132. >> how is c-span funded? >> private donat

chairman and mr. lewis, i'm confused. just picking up on some of the things that the chairman and mr. kucinich were asking about. i can kind of understand your reaction to discovering there was a $12 billion loss suffered by merrill lynch especially coming after shareholders vote to purchase merrill lynch. i can understand you telling the fed and secretary paulson you were thinking of backing out of of the deal. i can understand that. that was based upon your expertise and your experience. i cannot understand the agreement you reported that you made with treasury and the fed which they both denied to disclose the $12 billion loss. if the loss made this horrible business deal to acquire merrill lynch, why did you still do it? and i know you've told us over and over again. but let's be frank. i mean, and i'm wondering, how do you determine what is -- you must disclose. we have shareholders here who are concerned. you're about to go into a deal with a company that is worse off than is made to believe. and it just seems to me

in discussions with mr. boehner and mr. cantor and mr. lewis, mr. obey and i have tried to come to an agreement. on time constraints. there was a discussion on the floor during the course of the rule between mr. obey and mr. lewis with respect to the time constraints and at that point in time, that was not possible. subsequent to that, there were further discussions between mr. obey and mr. lewis in which there seemed to be some progress, perhaps that was possible. as a result we proceeded with the preprinting requirement i know some people felt was an unnecessary constraint, but it is, after all, the opportunity to give notice to members what amendments can be anticipated. but i know i've discussed it on your side of the aisle you felt that was an imposition. we felt it was an open rule because the amendments were not specified. notwithstanding that disagreement, there were 127 total amendments. one amendment just now that mr. schock, my good friend, he and i have a good relationship, we've traveled together, i think he's a good member, he offered

two questions, one about mr. lewis and then a following up on what mr. fortenberry was asking about. mr. lewis was here with a number of different stories on a single transaction. he told the shareholders that this meryl deal was a great deal for them and persisted in that story even in december after he found out about a $9 billion additional deterioration. frankly my amazement and shock he never bothered to tell the shareholders the news that led him to the next assertion he made, that that was so dire that he might invoking the nuclear option of the m.a.c. clause. then he told us basically that using his words he didn't use the words threat but he said that there was heavy pressure from the fed and treasury to go through with this deal with the assurance that the american taxpayer through the fed and treasury would back up any of the toxic assets from merrill lynch. i'll just ask one specific question about that. one of his assertions to the board was that the treasury and fed have confirmed they will provide assistance to the corporation to restore c

mr. lewis, if you look at the minutes of the bank of america did -- dated september 2008, this was a special meeting. starting at the top of page three, mr. lewis reported that management has obtained detailed oral assurances from the federal regulators with regard to their commitment and has documented those assurances with detailed notes of management's conversation with the federal regulators. you discussed in detail, the commitment of the federal regulators to deliver assistance in the form of capital and asset protection to the corporation. . . asset protection to the corporation. in the word commitment is used at least nine times, but just before the committee recessed for this vote in response to my question, you said there was no agreement in december. in fact, you said that it was for lack of agreement in december that you decided to make the announcement in j january. and that all three parties, treasury, federal reserve and bank of america agreed to that. bank of america agreed

paulson about his conversation with mr. lewis? >> he reported back to me that mr. lewis as i recall, had decided not to invoke the mac and that laid upon the basis for developing the transaction but again i never told anyone to threaten mr. lewis. >> i thank the gentleman. the chair recognizes mr., of maryland. you may proceed. >> thank you very much mr. chairman. as i listen to you very carefully i think i get it. you were so intertwined in this thing and following up on mr. mchenry's questions, that it is hard to see for your participation and did and where paulson's began and i tiki to your own statement. one of the first things to say in your background is, bankamerica announced an agreement. i did not play role in arranging this transaction in the federal reserve assistance was promised are provided in connection with that agreement. is that accurate, yes or no? >> yes. >> albright. then you go want to talk about all the things it did do. i am confused. let's talk about this whole situation with one of the things you did. this is your statement. it says, respo

mr. lewis: yes, i do. the chair: will the gentleman specify the number of the amendment he wishes -- mr. lewis: amendment number 118. the chair: the clerk will designate that amendment. the clerk: amendment number 118, printed in the congressional record offered by mr. lewis of california. the chair: pursuant to house resolution 55 , the gentleman from california and a member opposed will each control five minutes. the chair recognizes the gentleman from california for five minutes. mr. lewis: i would like to scr this executive order put in the record at this point. the chair: the gentleman's request will be covered under general leave. mr. lewis: thank you. as we all know, mr. speaker, the president signed executive order 13492 to close guantanamo bay detention facility in january. more than four months later, there is still no evidence of a plan to carry out the order and no consultation with the congress. yet the administration is racing to move detainees all the while withholding information from the c

thank you as well, mr. lewis, for coming before the committee. let me go back to a point that mr. cummings and also mr. kucinich raised earlier. mr. kucinich seemed to be hung up on the fact of when there was a significant indicator that merrill lynch was in rapid decline. rather than focus on november of '08. we can go all the way back to fall of '07 when they mounsed an almost $8 billion loss and mr. o neil was forced into retirement. there's a long history of decline here, all be it it accelerated to some degree around the time of there was significant evidence that they had overloaded with collateral debt obligatio

mr. lewis about recently uncovered e-mail's suggesting that bank of america may have been unduly pressured into the merger by the federal government. this hearing of the house oversight and government reform committee is just under three hours. >> thank you all for being here today. on september 15, 2008, when the financial crisis was at its height, bankamerica announced that it was purchasing merrill lynch, -- bank of america announced that it was purchasing merrill lynch, creating one of the nation's largest financial institutions. at the time, mr. lewis called the merger a great opportunity for bankamerica's shareholders. -- bank of america's shareholders. it was negotiated between to willing parties. it was designed for this clause a benefit of private shareholders, and it was to be paid for exclusively with private money. four months later, on january 16, 2009 after the merger was consummated in the quarterly earnings were announced, the world woke up to a different kind of marriage.

. >> thank you, mr. chairman and mr. lewis for being here. a couple of questions. my understanding is that the original transaction started out as a private deal between bank of america and merrill lynch, correct. >> yes, sir. >> and you did the due diligence, financial review, to make you come to the conclusion that it was in the best interest of the shareholders of bank of america to proceed, correct. >> that's correct. >> and then some time after you made this decision, you became aware of the $12 billion additional hole in the balance she sheet, is that correct? >> yes, sir. >> and that was on december 14, 2008? >> that's when we saw the accelerating losses. >> well, that's when -- accelerating as in $12 billion additional? >> correct. yes, sir. >> now your shareholders had already voted to approve the merger based on information you had provided up to that point, is that correct? >> yes. >> but the $12 billion figure that you became aware of on december 14th was of such magnitude that it made you believe that in your capacity as the ceo you would have to consi

. >> thank you, mr. lewis. i appreciate you being here. looking at some notes here, dated december 31, and these are your notes, also looking at some notes taken by joe price, the cfo at bank of america, that were taken on december 21, two dozen 8, about the attempt to use the mac costs. in those notes id says fire board of directors -- directors, is responsible for country. timg would agree. >> this are mr. price's notes? >> yes sir. >> i would have to assume with you because they are his notes. >> based on your recollection of what was going on and based on the notes we see from the cfo that was there, fire board of directors if you do it, was that your understanding? >> the -- that was is probably a reference to the conversation i mentioned that i had with secretary paulson. but, again, those are his notes. >> based on your personal recollection, is that your understanding that the board of directors would be let go if directors would be let go if this mac claus invoked? >> i mentioned that i need a license with whether he said could or

thank you very much. >> mr. lewis. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. we have been talking a little bit about this bill because there are some questions that i have. i may very well express some of those questions by way of my statement if you'll be a bit patient with me. but in the meantime i'm very pleased that we have at least temporarily returned to regular order removing this supplemental that is before us. i must confess to being disappointed at the final product that has taken place as compared to where we began with when the house passed its bill. it appears that the majority has chosen over here, has chosen to go the higher dollar level for every account in this conference report except as it relates to the primary purpose of the legislation, a critical troop funding in the department of defense and military construction sections. my understanding of the final agreement is that it cuts the house level for d.o.d. and by $4.6 billion. more or somewhat disconcerting is that the final package includes $5 billion for i.m.f. funding that was not a pa

. >> mr. lewis. >> aye. >> mr. lewis a. mr. youngful >> aye. >> ms. granger, aye. >> on this motion, there are three ayes and five nays. the motion is not agreed to. are there further amendments? >> there is, mr. chairman, you have my amendment. >> why don't you explain it and the clerk will suspend reading. >> as we try to move the house side back to regular order, we have made some progress. but as you can see from the amendments we have not. i move that in lieu of the language proposed in section 14103 of the conference agreement, the house rescind language in the senate section in their entirety they prohibit the transfer, release or iven cars ration of any guantanamo detainees who are within the united states and require the administration's to submit a comprehensive plan of threat assessment for guantanamo detainees. as we all know, the montana signed the executive order to close guantanamo in january. more than four months later, there is still no evidence of a plan to carry out this order and no consultation with the congress. the senate bill

mr. lewis, thank you for appearing this morning. as you can tell, there are serious questions being raised about how much you actually knew about merrill lynch's condition and indeed of condition of bank of america that you then did or didn't share with your shareholders. and i would like to cast a wider lens on a pattern of behavior of bank of america that and perhaps other institutions in our country that have led our nation to the precipice that it now faces. on august 20th of 2007, they reresponded to a question that limited an amount that federally insured banks can lend to related brokerage companies to 10% of bank capital. until that point, banking regulation was that banks with federally insured deposits should not be put at risk by brokerage activity. four months after that waiver was provided to bank of america, bank of america bought countrywide. which has proven to be the worst subprime lender in our nation and i would like to place in the record a report that documents that. and the question that i have is, who headed b

mr. lewis: thank you, madam chairman. as i proceed with this amendment, i want to one more time associate myself first with the remarks of think ranking member regarding the manager's amendment but in turn express my deep respect and appreciation for the two gentlemen handling this bill, chairman price, my colleague from kentucky have worked professionally together and the way i think this house would be served well if we extended to all our subcommittees. the amendment which i have at the desk offers a relatively simple amendment. i rise to restore -- restore some balance to what orse is a thoughtful and very constructive bill. my amendment takes a small fraction of funding, increases recommended for administrative expenses and adds 200 now border patrol agents out of that transfer of funding. agents that will serve on the front lines of the bloody drug war raging in mexico and produce -- and produce increased security across our borders from entry by way of smugglers and people who are coming here for other sorts of con

lewis was genuinely uncertain how to proceed. >> mr. chairman, my time is up i want to say on the record while some one this narrative to be some one this narrative to be this poor >> my time is up. i thank the chair and chairman. >> you have now five minutes to the gentleman from tennessee, congressman duncan. >> thank you. thank you very much mr. chairman. many articles and columns have described the actions taken by the fed in regard to the bank of america, merrill lynch dealing and other dealings of that time period as being -- following too big to fail policies. would you describe your activities in that time period as -- in that way and do you think there needs to be more control or more -- little closer oversight by the fed and other federal regulators of the biggest banks and financial firms? >> yes, i do to the last part. too big to fail is not a policy, it's a major problem, we were faced on numerous occasions in the last year with large firms whose failure likely man would significantly disrupt the world financial system and

lewis. >> you never said this to mr. lacker? >> again, those are his words summarizing a longer discussion said a single thing than what you're saying. but he said was that if they took this decision and if they required to be rescued, that if this decision led the markets to attack and america and create a destabilization of the company and the government had to come in on sunday night to save them we would take into account thinking about management that is a different thing and i did not say that to mr. lewis. >> what about your attorney who said you were going to put pressure? i brought that up in my previous five minute. >> again, i did save three strongly -- but i said to mr. lewis we strongly believe that invoking the mac was bad not only for the financial system but the bank of america but i didn't tie it directly to replacing him or the board. >> i yield five minutes to the gentleman from ohio. mr. kucinich. >> i thank the gentleman. chairman bernanke, your staff believed bank of america knew about milledge's accelerati

lewis was genuinely uncertain how to proceed. >> mr. chairman, my time is up i want to say on the record while some one this narrative to be this poor ceo of a moderately sized bank with the boot of government on his neck forcing him to do things he didn't want to do i believe the narrative lends itself to a corporation gaining the system because he could recognize an opportunity when he saw and it was 15 to 20 million-dollar opportunity. my time is up. i thank the chair. >> i now yield five minutes to the gentleman from tennessee, congressman duncan. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. any articles have described the actions taken by the fed and regard to the bank of america and merrill lynch dealing and other dealings of that time as being falling too big to fail policies. would you describe your activities in that time period it that way and do you think their needs to be more control or clothes or oversight by the fed and other federal regulators of the biggest banks and financial firms? >> yes i do to the last part. too big to fa

lewis. >> you never said this to mr. lacher is wrong. >> he's an internal purpose person at the fed, those are his words, he said a more subtle thing than what you're saying, what he said was if they took this decision and if they required to be rescued, that if they -- if this led the markets to attack bank of america and create a destabilization and the government had to come in and save them on sunday night we could take that into account, that's a very different thing and also i did not stay that to mr. lewis. >> what about your attorney who said that you were going to put pressure on them? i brought that up in my previous five minutes. >> well, again, i did say very strongly -- >> he works for you. >> i said to mr. lewis that we strongly believed invoking the m.a.c. was bad for the financial system and bank of america but i didn't tie it directly to replacing him or the board. >> you have five minutes, the gentleman from ohio, mr. kucinich. >> chairman bernanke, your staff believed that bank of america knew about me

obey asked mr. lewis was whether or not they could get a -- mr. dreier: reclaiming my time. having participated in this process in the past, dwrements are worked out, as mr. king said, between the two leaderships -- agreements are worked out, as mr. king said, between the two leaderships. and as we begin work on an appropriations bill and members are in fact offering dilltory amendments, there's an effort made at the leadership level to bring about an agreement at that time. the notion of trying to impose that constraint before the process has even begun is wrong and it is unprecedented and it has been part of what has killed deliberative democracy under the leadership of this majority. the speaker pro tempore: the time of the gentleman has expired. the gentlewoman from north carolina. ms. foxx: thank you, mr. speaker. i want to point out that i have been told that when he was ranking member mr. obey would never agree to a time agreement before a consideration of a bill. now, mr. speaker, we're nearing the end of the time for debate on this rule. i think we've had some very

the chair: is the gentleman the designee of mr. lewis of california? mr. hensarling: yes, i am. the chair: the clerk will designate the amendment. the clerk: amendment number 79 printed in the congressional record offered by mr. hensarling of texas. the chair: the gentleman from texas and a member opposed will each control five minutes. the chair recognizes the gentleman from texas. mr. hensarling: thank you, mr. chairman. this is an amendment that would strike an earmark in the bill for the art center of the grand prarie in stutgardt, arkansas. i'm not a big fan of earmarks. it's not to say all earmarks are bad. the gentleman from texas to my left here has proposed several very worth while earmarks. but, mr. speaker, we aren't living in normal times. we are in severe economic stress in our nation today. and as i look at what has happened in the united states congress, what have i observed, is that in the history of congress, never have so few voted so fast to indebt so many. already on top of a staggering, staggering national debt, we have seen a $700 billion bailout program th

mr. lewis, thank you look at the minutes of bank of america dated december 30, 2008. mr. lewis reported. those assurances of detailed notes with the federal regulators. it goes on to say that you discussed in detail, quote, the commitment of the federal regulators to deliver assistance in the form of capital and asset protection to the corporation. in the word commitment is used at least nine times, but just before the committee recessed for this vote in response to my question, you said there was no agreement in december. in fact, you said that it was for lack of agreement in december that you decided to make the announcement in j january. and that all three parties, treasury, federal reserve and bank of america agreed to that. how do you reckoncile your testimony today with what you told the board on december 30th? >> we were working -- we had an agreement that we would work towards a solution. but during even from december 30th until the time that we signed the agreement, there was back and forth in terms of amounts in terms of structure and in terms of securities to b

lewis. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from california is recognized. mr. lewis: thank you, madam chairman. i appreciate very much my colleague yielding. i rise to say just a few things about the way these two people are working together, debbie wasserman schultz, and my friend, robert aderholt, on this bill. not the most expensive bill around but probably one of the most important bills. decides whether the legislative branch works effectively or does not work effectively. i want the members and our public to know that these two people have done a fabulous job at putting us on a course that i think makes sense. i especially want to express my appreciation for concern about the buildings that are the places where we must work and operate the legislative branch. those are institutions in the place that are in serious difficulty because of lack of repair,est. they are on a course that will make -- lack of repair, etc. they are on a course that will make sure they extend their life and are effective to people in the proper way. the visitor center has been said

lewis, to offer amendment number 105. the chair: the gentleman is the designee of mr. lewis of california. and the clerk will designate the amendment. the clerk: amendment number 105 plinted in the congressional record offered by mr. campbell of california. the chair: pursuant to house resolution 552, the gentleman from california and a member opposed will each have five minutes. the chair recognizes the gentleman from california. mr. campbell: thank you, mr. chairman. mr. chairman, as the gentleman from texas before me pointed out, this nation right now is awash in debt. the federal deficit is around $11 trillion. i think at last count, but it's going up so fast, about $2 trillion a year. that it's probably larger than that now, and i don't know exactly what it is. but 46 cents of every dollar spent by the federal government, spent by this congress on the budget this year will be borrowed. 46 cents of every dollar spent is going to be borrowed. the deficit will double in five years and triple in 10 years. interest payments on the debt, interest payments alone are proj

they show mr. bernanke, mr. paulson, ken lewis and his board of directors in order to force the bank of america to acquire merrill lynch for going recognize the actions took place and significant economic challenges and uncertainty but there must be limits to government action even in the time of crisis and those limits must be respected. we must keep in mind is pressure was exerted after many of the nation's banks were forced to accept taxpayer money to the tar program. winnowed in october 2008 mr. paulson, mr. janke, mr. geithner and ms. bair brought the ceos of the largest banks to the treasury department and demanded they except the partial nationalization of their banks. i look forward to learning more about the role in this process as well. thank you again and i would ask for unanimous consent to include in the record majority and minority reports and all documents referenced in those reports. >> without objection, so ordered. mr. bernanke is a longstanding policy that we swear all of our witnesses in. ple

mr. lewis said he told then treasury secretary hank paulson that he was strongly considering backing out of the deal. according to lewis, paulson ultimately told him that if he didn't go through with the acquisition, he and the board would be fired. internal e-mails we have obtained from the federal reserve indicate officials there were very skeptical about mr. lewis' motive in threatening to back out of the merrill deal. fed chairman ben bernanke thought lewis was using the merrill losses as a bargaining chip to obtain federal funds. fdic chairwoman sheila bair was opposed to providing assistance, saying it might ford does not want to do this. in essence, ken lewis claimed that the government made-- made me do it. but was bank of america forced to go through with the deal or was this just an old-fashioned shiekh down? these questions are particularly important with the administration's new proposal to give broad new powers to the federal reserve. i believe that before congress acts on th

thank you mr. chairman. >> mr. lewis? >> mr. treen, thank you. i have no formal statement. i will wait for the secretary's statement and hope to have the chance to ask some questions. >> [inaudible] >> thank you, mr. chairman. it is good to be with the committee today and i appreciate the greetings from my fellow kansan and ranking member of the subcommittee representative tiahrt and it's good to have mr. lewis today. i appreciate the opportunity to come and discuss the president's 2010 budget for the department of health and human services and this does mark my first appearance before the committee is secretary and i want to thank members of the committee for your hard work and leadership. i know we face tremendous challenges in the nation today and i hope we can work together to tackle those challenges. one task we need to complete to get there is health reform. and as you consider the budget before you you and your colleagues are working on a historic effort to reform health care system. like you i know america cannot simply afford the status quo when it comes to health

the clerk: motion to instruct conferees offered by mr. lewis of california. the speaker pro tempore: the question is on the motion to instruct. so many as are in favor say aye. those opposed, no. in the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it. the motion is agreed to. the gentleman from illinois. the chair recognizes the gentleman from florida. >> on that qui the yeas and nays. the speaker pro tempore: the yeas and nays are requested. those in favor of the vote by the yeas and nays will rise. a sufficient number having arisen, the yeas and nays are ordered. members will record their votes by electronic device. 15-minute vote. @'s$s#h's s's$s#h$s)uáus

mr. lewis: i call for a roll call. the chair: pursuant to clause 6 of rule 18, further proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from california will be postponed. the clerk will read. for what purpose does the gentleman from kansas rise? >> mr. speaker, i have an amendment at the desk. the chair: the clerk will designate the amendment. the clerk: amendment number 69 printed in the congressional record offered by mr. tiahrt of kansas. the chair: pursuant to house resolution 552, the gentleman from kansas and a member opposed will each control five minutes. the chair recognizes the gentleman from kansas. mr. tiahrt: i thank the speaker. mr. speaker, earlier this year the obama administration told us the stimulus bill was going to be the salvation of our economic woes. they predicted unemployment would top out at 8% and they claimed that jobs would be created or saved immediately. well, we've been significant amount of time since it was passed and our economic woes haven't changed. in fact, the numbers are in

mr. arcuri: i yield an additional two minutes. mr. lewis: we can continue in this exchange. as a result of the change in the rules and the way we can provide amendments, there had been as many as 127 amendments preprint odd this bill. 104 of them by the minority who feel they have been cut out of the process. because of that and because of the importance of the issues in this bill, i can't agree to a time limitation. the time you were discussing was like eight hours. my conference might have a new revolution on its hands and might have a new ranking member. mr. obey: i thank the gentleman for his frankness. and i regret the content of his response, but i do appreciate the fact that he is forthright and honest in laying out what the prospects would be. and mr. speaker, i think that presents a dilemma to the house, because we want to finish our business. and i would point out that the schedule that we have set out can be adhered to only if we can work out reasonable time limits with each of these bills. and i would point out that what we are trying to do with that schedule is

lewis. the chair: the gentleman is recognized. mr. lewis: i rise for a couple of reasons to speak generally about this bill. first to say that the two people providing the leadership for this bill are as fine members of the appropriations committee as there are. chairman price is one of those people who digs into issues, does his homework, he treats people in a fair and balanced way. and beyond that, he's a fabulous person to be associated with in the appropriations committee. hal rogers, on the other hand, let's see, what can i say about hal rogers? a wonderful member from kentucky who also in this arena knows as much about the subject as anybody that i know. one of the things that's disconcerting to me about this bill, for it is one that perhaps addresses the most important area of responsibility we have that is, protecting our homeland, combined this bill with our national security measure and that is our national defense and america's ability to protect freedom in the world. but indeed, it's interesting to note that at a subcommit

lewis, the republican members, mr. culberson, mr. ader holt and mr. bonner. i want to thank staffs on both sides of the aisle who spent long hours putting the bill together. dickson butler, adrian simpson, diana simpson, derek knewberry, and the minority staff, mike ringler and john marten d it is -- martens. overall, the bill as i said includes important increases to priority programs including the needs to address violent crime, particularly crime related to drug trafficking and gangs and the need to boost our nation's competitiveness through more investments in scientific research and improving science and math and education. however, i believe we could have met the most pressing needs by prioritizing within the lower allocation. this allocation given to the subcommittee is $64 billion, $6.8 billion or 11% of 2009 this allocation allows virtually every agency, account, and program to grow and i believe there was more than sufficient amount to address the highest priority needs. the rate of increased spending in the bill corresponds with the majority's over